


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COVER: 'Zero Hour' by sculptor W. Leslie Bowles.
At the Australian War Memorial.

ARMY JOURNAL

A periodical review of military literature

No. 239, APRIL 1969

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(Australian War Memorial)

Billets in the loft at the Brewery Farm, Querrieu, France in May 1918. One of the war correspondents noted: 'The opening has the appearance of a stage and the group there playing cards is a stage scene or a picture of Rembrandt's—strong faces, loose brown khaki clothes, dashing old hats, strong sun-browned faces intent on the game; easy, strong virile attitudes of half a dozen players and onlookers.'

The Silent Peninsula

Anzac 1968

Lieutenant-Colonel A. Argent
Royal Australian Infantry

THE chance to travel to somewhere within reasonable distance of Turkey doesn't often arise. I took the opportunity when it came and in a surprisingly short time I was in a Landrover driving across the Gallipoli Peninsula from the small coastal village which my ungridded 1:50,000 1915 map called Maidos but which is now called Eceabat—a change due to Turkish nationalism and anti-Greek sentiment.

Despite the change in names of places, nothing else it seems has changed. The dirt road still followed that shown on my old map, faithfully to every bend as it went across the brown, sun dried country to Gaba Tepe. The rough stone houses would not have changed this century and shepherds drive their flocks on these unfenced lands as had generations before them. The dry fields producing wheat, cotton and sesame border the dusty road that runs west on flat ground between the high hill mass of Sari Bair on one side and the Kilid Bahr Plateau on the other. To the north, as one starts across the Peninsula, there is the distinctive shape of Mal Tepe, 534 feet elevation, from where Xerxes in 480 B.C., is supposed to have reviewed his fleet in the Hellespont (the old name for the Dardanelles) 4,000 yards away to his south-east.

However, Mal Tepe has a more important claim on history than that of an ancient saluting dais—it was the final objective of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps when the operation orders for the assault on the Gallipoli Peninsula were run off in April 1915.

The assault plan of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force on the Gallipoli Peninsula is shown at Figure 1 and was the direct result of the failure of the Allied fleet's attempt to shoot its way up the Dardanelles to Constantinople. The Turks still recall the attempt. A large sign that

Lieutenant-Colonel Argent enlisted in the A.I.F. in 1945. In 1948 he graduated from the Royal Military College and was allotted to Infantry. After service in Japan and Korea with 3 RAR he completed a Flying Instructors Course in the U.K. This was followed by service with BAOR Germany. From 1958 to 1962 he held flying appointments in Australia and qualified at the Australian Staff College. Service with 2 RAR and 3 RAR in Australia, Malaya and Borneo followed, then a staff appointment in AHQ Canberra. At present he is attached to AAS Washington as Exchange officer (Flying).

simply reads '18-3-1915' has been erected on a hillside just north of Canakkale. Certainly the local people know the significance of the date but it is doubtful if the crews and passengers of the many ships of all flags that pass by understand what it means. On the other side of the Narrows, set in the hills above Kilid Bahr, is a large white figure of a Turkish soldier with rifle and bayonet—the grossly under-estimated man (by our side) who ensured that Mal Tepe and all the other objectives were never gained by the British, Indian, Gurkha, French Colonial, New Zealand and Australian troops.

Figure 1 The Gallipoli Peninsula




Figure 1

It takes only minutes to cross the waist of the Peninsula, which was to be the Anzac right flank, and then one is at Gaba Tepe on the coast.

Here, on the camping spot, one can usually meet Australians of all ages who are bussing overland from Europe to India. Gaba Tepe and its guns was to have been captured on 25 April by two companies of 9 Battalion but these were landed 3,000 yards too far north. On 4 May 100 men led by a West Australian, Captain R. L. Leane (who was later to be, with his brothers, famous in the AIF) made an unsuccessful seaborne assault on Gaba Tepe. Gaba Tepe ('Rough Hill') was never to be in Australian hands and although Royal Navy fire kept the Turks off the feature, it was to remain the enemy's main OP for the Anzac area.




Figure 2

Anzac Cove

It is at Gaba Tepe that one begins to realize just how small the Anzac area was, because from there such places as Lone Pine and Chunuk Bair can be easily identified. The old Anzac area was considerably less than, say, the present size of Canberra airport. Perhaps a more relevant comparison is shown in Figure 2. The battles of August mainly resulted in extending the area northwards to Suvla Bay—'500 acres of bad grazing ground'—as one general described it. Just before the August offensive the Anzac area held 1 Aust. Division, NZ and A Division, three Light Horse brigades, 13 Division, 29 Indian Brigade and 40 Brigade as well as the supporting arms and services, so one can only marvel at the administrative ingenuity that made all this possible. Until late August all men, animals and stores, including water, were brought into Anzac Cove, a small curving beach which takes about three minutes



(Australian War Memorial)

Anzac Cove four days after the Landing. Men in foreground are carrying kerosene tins to collect water.

to walk along. Photographs can barely convey how crowded it must have been. Soldiers of the 1960s still manage to trip over the guy ropes supporting radio aerials, and since there were several of those then very modern military equipments serving the headquarters at the Beach, one can best imagine the feelings of heavily laden fatigue parties and orderlies stumbling into wire and rope at night.



(Radio Times Hulton Picture Library)

Anzac Cove, early summer 1915. This photograph was taken from Hell Spit, looking north, and shows how crowded the Beach was. Bathing was one of the very few recreations open to the soldiers and, although it was a dangerous pastime due to Turkish artillery fire, it never lost its popularity.




Figure 3 The Anzac Lines.

After the August offensive the line extended north along the coast to link up with IX Corps at Suvla Bay

Figure 3

Monash Valley

From the Beach the main supply line was up Shrapnel Gully and the Monash Valley to Pope's¹ Hill and the posts at Quinn's², Courtney's³ and Steele's⁴. (Figure 3). Other valleys lead from Shrapnel Gully and the shore to Lone Pine and the lines to the south.

¹ After CO 16 Battalion, Lt-Col. H. Pope.

² Captain H. Quinn, a company commander of 15 Battalion, who took the first sub-unit there on 29 April after 1st Australian Division re-organized. He was killed in the post one month later. (Before 29 April, this small area was held by various groups of men from 1 and 4 Brigades AIF).

³ Lt-Col. R. E. Courtney was CO 14 Battalion.

⁴ After a company commander of 14 Battalion.

The head of Monash Valley was the scene of fierce fighting because, had the Turks captured Quinn's Post, they would have cut the Anzac position in two and the valley would have been theirs. There, at certain points, the opposing trenches were five to seven yards apart.

A walk up or down the valley is recommended—there are still vestiges of that once dangerous and busy track—although the climb at the head of the valley may be difficult due to steepness and the heavy undergrowth. During this walk one can begin to appreciate the Official Historian's '...they felt themselves penned between two long blank walls reaching perpetually ahead of them, from which there was no turning and no escape, save that of death or of such wounds as would render them useless for further service.'⁵

From the Heights

Once at the head of Monash Valley, it is an easy 2,000 yards walk along a narrow, gravelled road across Baby 700, Battleship Hill (named by a young gunner officer, Lieutenant Hodgson, who was dangerously wounded at Anzac. Those who were in BCOF would remember him as the Australian Ambassador) and thence to Chunuk Bair. Australian troops never reached this point. New Zealanders, British and Gurkhas reached the summits of Chunuk Bair and Hill Q during the August offensive after heroic efforts, but they were soon driven off. The efforts of the soldiers and their regimental officers were once more to be undone by poor leadership (due to lack of communications, in the main) at divisional and brigade level.

Today there is a New Zealand Memorial at Chunuk Bair recording 852 names, including that of Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. Malone, the fifty-six years old CO, Wellington Battalion; probably the most outstanding (and forthright) unit commander at Anzac. Within yards of this memorial the victors have also raised one which marks the spot where Mustafa Kemal issued his orders for the counter-attack which was to seal the doom of the British August offensive, if not the whole campaign.

Fifty-three years have not obliterated the trenches. They can still be traced amongst the tough, low scrub on those narrow heights.

The nearest that Australian troops got to these commanding heights was on the day of the Landing. One group of about sixty men under

⁵ Bean, C. E. W. 'The Story of Anzac'. *Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18*, Vol. II.

an aggressive junior officer⁶ reached Battleship Hill. From here they traded shots with a party of Turks to their front. Amongst the Turks was Mustafa Kemal who, more than anyone else, was to be responsible for British failure and enemy success.

The view from the heights is outstanding. North there is the Suvla Plain and the glistening Salt Lake. (The lake was dry in 1915 which perhaps gives an indication of how hot the weather was; there was water in it in 1968.) Looking west one sees the beach north of Anzac Cove and then continuing south The Nek, Quinn's, Lone Pine and Gaba Tepe appear within a stone's throw, so clear is the air. To the south-east shines the Narrows.



(Australian War Memorial)

Anzac Cove, from south to north, 1100 hours Sunday 25 April 1915. Troops of 1 Infantry Brigade (1, 2, 3 and 4 Battalions) landing. The first troops ashore—men of 3 Infantry Brigade from the battleship tows—landed at Ari Burnu, the promontory at the northern end of the cove.

The Men

The few men who saw the Narrows—perhaps without realizing it—and those who fought in the tangled undergrowth and gullies nearer the beach, were possessed of a fine fervour that the Australian Army has

⁶ Captain E. W. Tulloch, 11 Battalion. After recovering from severe wounds he commanded a battalion in France. Tulloch was a champion oarsman and coached the AIF team to victory at Henley in 1919. He was murdered in East Melbourne in 1926. His assailant was never apprehended.

never been able to recapture. Indeed, it would be impossible to do so because the world and its values have changed so. One can best get the feeling of those times by reading letters and diaries. The impressions of Gallipoli by Major Baker (*AAJ* April, 1966) is a good example.

The unit war diaries at the time provide little direct evidence of this spirit. The diary form used was almost exactly the same as that familiar to COs, Adjutants and IOs of the Second War, Korea and early Malaya, except that it was about half the size. In a number of them the Landing is covered in less than two pencilled lines and, poignantly, there is a different hand-writing every few days.

In passing, the attachments to the diaries such as routine orders show that soldiers don't change very much. It should come as no surprise to those who recall their troopship days that in 1914 and 1915, in one battalion at least (14 Battalion), sitting on the ship's rail was promulgated as a prevalent offence and the punishment was made to fit the crime.

It is very difficult to judge the standard of training of the First AIF in 1915 but by certain accounts it was better than that of the Second AIF in 1940. At any rate the Army was better prepared for war in 1914 than in 1939, perhaps because the political leadership then was firmer and less devious.

The battalions were stronger in bayonets than they are today—four rifle companies each had 228 men. The men in 1915 were slightly older than those who now serve in the RAR. At the Landing the average age of twelve AIF battalion commanders was 48.⁷

The Peninsula Today

The Peninsula is a silent, almost deserted place. There are farmers who make a hard living on the old battlefields at Helles and Suvla Bay but the Turks have made the Anzac area a reservation and local people rarely go there. In addition, the soil at Anzac is poor and the hills are too steep to support shepherds and their flocks. Mercifully the Peninsula is free of large airfields and if there are jet routes they are above sound range. In exposed areas the main noise is the prevailing wind against the leaning trees.

Relics of war abound. At Anzac Cove there are a few remains of the piers; on the hills there are rusty tins, pieces of the round Turkish

⁷ For the same battalions, during the August 1918 battles, the average age was 30. The nine COs of 6 Division AIF, on its raising, had an average age of 44; at Wewak 1945, the average was 34. It was also 34 for Korea but Malaya and Vietnam have seen a steady rise.

hand grenade, trouser buttons with the Sydney manufacturer's name still readable, water bottles with the blue enamel still showing and occasionally one sees rainwashed bones. A private museum at Krithia, on the Helles front, has a number of interesting items including a stamped, metal 'Australia Inf' for wearing on the shoulder strap. The 'Inf' is centrally above 'Australia'.



(Author)

Anzac Cove today. By agreement between the Commonwealth War Graves Commission and the Turkish Government, the local authorities maintain the road that skirts the Cove.

Hints for the Traveller

Visit Gallipoli during the spring or autumn. Winter is too hard, the summer too hot. The nearest accommodation is at Kilid Bahr or Canakkale and living here is relatively cheap compared with Australian standards. The expensive thing in Turkey is taxi fares. Therefore, if the traveller arrives in Istanbul the best way to go to the Gallipoli Peninsula is by bus (1968 figures: 180 miles, nine hours, \$1.35 Aust) or sea (150 miles, 12 hours, \$2.85 Aust). The Commonwealth War Graves Commission representative at Canakkale is extremely helpful and should be contacted. Travel on the Peninsula is unrestricted (1968) and there is little evidence of the Turkish military. In fact, the local Turkish Army authorities will go out of their way to help Australians, particularly if both parties have served in Korea.

But one of the best features about a visit to Gallipoli is that it is wonderfully free of other tourists. □

The Problem

*Major R. J. G. Hall,
Royal Australian Armoured Corps*

In this world, things are complicated and are decided by many factors. We should look at problems from different aspects, not just from one.

Mao Tse-Tung, 1945

LIFE is full of crises. The life of a professional soldier is no exception. It is perhaps the misfortune of our calling that the list of crises in the career of an officer is closely associated with the course of his promotions. In the years between receiving a commission and entry to Staff College an officer will have attempted written examinations in eight to eleven subjects.

I know of no short cut to success in written examinations but I firmly believe that the traumatic experience of completing the 'written requirement' can be reduced.

I suppose there is a vast number of officers who share with me the experience of hearing a slightly more senior colleague talk about the 'haves' and the 'have nots'. These terms are used so succinctly to describe the qualified and non-qualified. Generally this monument to the 'haves' will not hesitate to point out that the difficulties faced in his day were considerably greater than those to be faced by us.

One must admit however that a rather nasty gap does exist between the 'haves' and 'have nots'. All too often the 'have nots' bear an easily recognizable emblem. This emblem is The Problem.

How does one identify The Problem?

The Problem is what besets the officer who is never allowed sufficient time by his commanding officer to undertake private study. He works at his job with great zeal; he has six extra-regimental appointments; Saturday training parades start at midday, and on Sunday he has to play one round of golf.

Major Hall joined ARA in 1952. Graduated from OCS Portsea in 1953 and was allotted to RAAC. He served in regimental appointments with 1st Armoured Regiment, A Squadron, 4/19th Prince of Wales's Light Horse and 10th Light Horse between 1954 and 1964. During 1956-57 he was attached to 15/19 The Kings' Royal Hussars in Malaya. He commanded 1st Forward Delivery Troop for six months before being appointed GSO2 Puckapunyal Area in 1964. He graduated from the Australian Staff College in 1968 and is currently the Instructor in Armour, Staff Duties, Training and Intelligence at the Royal Military College Duntroon.

The Problem is suffered by the officer who is cursed with poor coaching classes. He is bored by the lecturer who offers nothing new. The Problem is then displayed at the bar in the mess. Here the candidate describes the coaching efforts with verbal competence but is quite unable to write in simple, natural and correct English a description of the duties of a Regimental Funds Committee in the Administration paper.

The Problem is AHQ who never publishes the Current Affairs syllabus until it is too late. But do we read past the football pages in the newspaper? Do we read and have reason to agree or disagree with Creighton Burns, Denis Warner or Roy Macartney? Do we even know who they are?

The Problem is that experts such as Colonel E. G. Keogh, instead of providing an instant pass in Military History, urge us to read extensively, to analyse detail and seek the cause and effect.

The Problem is universal. It is most burdensome for the candidate who cannot bring himself to start his study twelve months before the examination — who becomes so bothered by the situation that he cannot read the Promotion Manual or prepare a study time-table. The 'others' have failed him so badly that he can always be in good company when the results come out. Then The Problem can be shared with some satisfaction with the growing band of 'have nots'.

By now we should have recognized our problem. How then do we go about reducing it to manageable proportions? In fact the worst is over: once we have honestly established that this year's major exercise, the new posting, or the new wife, or the new baby, is not a reason for failure in July, we are in a position to make some progress.

Without any claim to originality I offer these five steps to the candidate:

- Motive.
- Organization.
- Location of the study.
- Material.
- Method.

Motive

The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines Motive as '... what induces a person to act.'

If we really have any awareness of our own vocation, an examination in the arts of our profession should be a welcome confirmation of our

ability to communicate our understanding of what is a fairly limited segment of our military knowledge. There is little profit in debating the merits of the written examination, as it happens to be the current requirement. Failure to overcome this obstacle indicates a basic inability in ourselves.

The correctly-motivated candidate therefore treats every day of his service as a day of study. If this sounds pompous at least we should recognize that an attempt at examinations requires study over a far greater period than that covered by a coaching course.

Organization

Candidates for examinations have a tendency to leave much undone that they ought to have done and engage in a great deal of what ought not to be done, at least in regard to preparation for the examination. Even those 'haves' who reach that state by virtue of last minute cramming will hesitate to recommend their programme as a key to success. Similarly, the long hours routine is more often than not the result of a belated or poorly organized programme of study.

The most frequent example of the poorly organized programme is demonstrated in such remarks as: 'Why are you reading Standing Orders for Fire Services?'

'It's in what syllabus...?'

'Oh — can I borrow it when you are finished?'

The essential item for the organization of your study is undoubtedly the syllabus. Sadly, few appear to realize that it is contained in the *Promotion Manual* and *Army Routine Orders*.

The Place to Study

In the era of television, small babies and a strong sense of social obligation, study of the military arts becomes rather demanding. Dozing in front of the TV set with the *Manual of Military Law* on your lap is no substitute for study in some isolated place.

Standard married quarters seem to provide a very limited selection of isolated places. Even the most isolated room must serve the needs of all of the family some of the time. The single officer has better study facilities but perhaps suffers more from a reluctance to leave the attraction of TV, radio, bar party or good company.

Accept the fact that study is an integral part of our life for many years to come, so the sooner it is established, made comfortable and effective the more rewarding will be the results.

Study Material

Every reference necessary for the study of the particular subject should be obtained at the beginning of the study year. Despite many complaints that references are never available there are none that a student cannot obtain through the RAAOC system, Command Library, unit resources or by private purchase.

After placing these books in a book case you will be appalled by the quantity so it is essential that a list is prepared showing the portions that must be studied.

A notice board, on which organizations, syllabus and time-table may be displayed, is helpful.

Method of Study

This is a very personal matter as few officers have the same approach to any problem. Unfortunately a significant number have no approach at all. For the uncommitted, therefore, I offer these suggestions.

Programme your studies, taking into account unavoidable social engagements, field exercises, your wedding anniversary and any other activity which represents an expenditure in time. The whole programme should then be completed two weeks before the examination.

You will make a great many notes during the course of your preparation. But neglect at your peril the style of writing and expression with which you will convince the examiner of your ability to write coherently, concisely and with logic and conviction.

Read Part 5 of the *Promotion Manual* and digest the recommended methods of reading texts.

There should be no need for sad little observations such as 'I know it all, but just couldn't write it in the examination.' Practise writing examination answers to questions in previous papers, or those devised by an obliging colleague. Prepare the answers under examination conditions. This can be done at home if you are gifted with extraordinary honesty but it is far more effective to devote the infamous 'final-coaching-periods' to trial examinations with critical comments from appropriate 'haves'.

Finally, profit by the errors of the 'have nots'. The annual comments of examiners are read objectively by very few prospective candidates. Why else do we continue to Describe when asked to Compare, or Discuss when asked to Describe?

Conclusion

I doubt if anyone will claim that he can make examinations happy events but I do suggest that within each one of us is an ability to produce a knowledgeable articulate candidate. Success is as inevitable to such a candidate as is failure to the bearer of The Problem. □

ANZAC

Open-hearted, ever generous, true as gold, and hard as steel, Australia's first great volunteer army, and its valorous deeds, will live in history while the world lasts.

—Lieut. Phillip F. E. Schuler, *Australia in Arms* (1916)

Czechoslovakia

A Scenario of the Future?

Phillip A. Karber

THERE has been a flood of analyses following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Yet all the analytic verbiage in the Free World will not undo the Soviet *fait accompli*. It is with this regret that we must ask ourselves: Was the Soviet invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia a scenario of the future? Until we can be sure that aggressive Soviet military action will not be repeated, it is necessary to study the possibility, extent, and likely success of a similar Soviet aggression in central Europe.


The occupation of Czechoslovakia was one of the most slyly executed operations in recent history. The Czechoslovak Defence Minister, General Martin Dzur, was said to have commented that the preparations for an invasion of such magnitude had to start some six months before. This suggested, he said, that the Soviet Union had begun contemplating a military invasion shortly after the Czechoslovak party deposed the conservative leadership of Antonin Novotny in January 1968.¹

Preparing for Action

The expertise of this planning was visible not only in the complete military success of the invasion on 20 and 21 August, but also in the stealth of the pre-invasion manoeuvring under the noses of the Western alliance. The appointment of General Sergey M. Shtemenko to replace a weak and aging Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact forces took place the day following the Soviet signing of the Bratislava communique that supposedly endorsed the broad lines of policy adopted by the reformist leadership of Alexander Dubcek, First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party.

Shtemenko, a Stalinist general, was credited with conceiving a winning strategy for the decisive tank battle at Kursk in 1943. Even as

Phillip A. Karber is a Research Fellow with the Centre for Strategic Studies in Washington, D.C., and is working on advanced degrees in international law at Georgetown University. He was a Research Associate with Pepperdine Research Institute in Los Angeles, California, and has served as a Research Consultant on matters of nuclear strategy and proliferation to a congressional member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. This article is reprinted from the February 1969 issue of Military Review.



the Soviets seemed to be signing a truce at Bratislava, the Soviet High Command was preparing for action.

The ultimate co-ordination of planning and deception culminated one hour before the invasion when an unscheduled Soviet *Aeroflot* 'commercial' airliner landed at Ruzyně International Airport in Prague. Camouflaged within the airliner was a mobile air traffic control post which began directing the landings of other unscheduled *Aeroflot* planes loaded with paratroops who then secured the first Soviet airhead just four miles from the centre of Prague.²

The mobilization of troops and the co-ordination of five national armies into a successfully orchestrated invasion under complete secrecy and with minimum suspicion from the West are, indeed, a tribute to Soviet military planning.

Viable Military Force

The capabilities of the satellite armies under the Soviet Union's leadership within the Warsaw Pact are, certainly much greater than the Western pre-invasion estimates. They were thought too politically unreliable to be used against the West, but now they have gone into action without protest against an ally.

The invasion was in the best tradition of mechanized warfare with emphasis on shock and speed. The Soviet faith in and expertise with armoured forces have obviously proliferated to all the pact countries. Over half of the 30 invading divisions were armoured and at full strength.

Since 1927, the Soviet Army has employed and developed the use of airborne assaults. The airlift of the huge invasion vanguard that was flown into Prague was the largest ever conducted by the Soviet Union outside her frontiers—250 aircraft put down a full airborne division complete with armoured vehicles, fuel and supplies.

Within hours of the invasion, the airlifted troops had completely secured Prague, its airport, and all the entrances to the city, including the bridges over the Vltava; surrounded Ministries, the Communist Party Headquarters, the post office, and the newspapers; and controlled the city's water and power sources. The speed and effectiveness were as smooth and effortless as the best operation of which the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces are believed to be capable.

¹ Tad Szulc. 'Soviets to Leave Bloc Divisions on Czech Soil.' *The New York Times*, 29 August 1968, p 1.

² Clyde H. Farnsworth, 'Seven Days of Intervention in Czechoslovakia.' *The New York Times*, 2 September 1968, p 1.

Prague was occupied and surrounded within two days by 100,000 troops and 2,000 tanks, yet the real potential of the Warsaw Pact was demonstrated in the tactical applications of Soviet blitzkrieg throughout Czechoslovakia. The Soviet, East German, Polish, Hungarian, and Bulgarian armoured columns entered Czechoslovakia dispersed along 18 crossing points from the north, north-west, south, and east. All of the ground forces were completely mechanized, with each tank division consisting of approximately 9,000 men and 350 T55 and T62 medium tanks. The motorized rifle divisions, consisting of about 10,500 men were equipped with medium tanks and armoured personnel carriers which enabled the entire division to speed across country.³

The Warsaw Pact accomplished such complete paralyzation of the Dubcek government that it tends to over-shadow a puzzling question: What happened to the Czechoslovak Army?

The Czechoslovak Army of four armoured divisions and 10 motorized rifle divisions⁴ was considered by most military experts prior to the invasion to be at near parity with Poland and overshadowed only by the Soviet Union. While the total number of Warsaw Pact troops of the Soviet Union, Poland, East Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria would certainly have overwhelmed the Czechoslovak Army in a prolonged conflict, the initial Warsaw Pact invasion force barely reached a strategic ratio of two to one during the first week of the invasion. This would not have been enough force had the Czechoslovak Army fought back, and the invasion certainly would not have the same degree of success — if it had succeeded at all.

Advantageous Position

It could be argued that, even if the Czechoslovaks had fought the invaders, the surprise and speed of the action did not give them time for mobilization. Yet the Czechoslovak Defence Ministry issued a communique announcing manoeuvres in division strength would take place on 21 and 22 August in central and western Bohemia. Whether or not these manoeuvres were called because Czechoslovak intelligence got wind of the invasion, or if they were just a training exercise, the fact remains that these manoeuvres put the Czechoslovaks in a most advantageous fighting position should a surprise attack be launched.

So the questions remain. Why did not Dubcek order the Army to resist? Did he feel it futile? Did he hope to prevent needless bloodshed

³ *The Military Balance, 1967-1968*, The Institute for Strategic Studies, London, p 7.

⁴ *Ibid*, p 3.

and destruction of Czechoslovakia? Or did he doubt the loyalty of the Czechoslovak Army and its commanders to choose and fight for nationalism over communism?

The Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia came as a total surprise to the US public and news media. Were the Free World intelligence and decision-making communities totally surprised?

Western intelligence agencies have repeatedly claimed knowledge of the exact location and number of Soviet ballistic missiles through electronic monitoring systems, 'spy in the sky' satellites, and agents. However, the preparations for the invasion of Czechoslovakia, which entailed massive troop movements and stockpiling of the necessary fuel and supplies, seemingly went unnoticed. Unless all of this was known to US intelligence agencies, but classified from the public, the NATO early warning system must be revised and less reliance placed on its accuracy.

War-Limiting Policy

Harlan Cleveland, US representative to NATO, stated shortly after the invasion that a government that can move troops so efficiently behind so 'sloppy a political plan might be capable of misreading Western determination too'.⁵ *Détente* and flexible response, as the recent cornerstones of Western political and military strategy, have greatly decreased the threat of immediate nuclear response to a Soviet conventional thrust. While this war-limiting policy may prevent a general conflagration, it also has increased the ambiguity of the Western deterrent to conventional attack, thus increasing the likelihood of that type attack and resting the security of central Europe on the perceptions and motivations of the Soviet Union.

Before the invasion, there had been much debate within the Western alliance as to whether the Moscow leadership was becoming increasingly moderate. Whatever the ideological climate within the Kremlin, it seems clear that the Soviet actions were dictated by:

- An almost pathological Soviet fear of West Germany and her influence in eastern Europe.
- Fear of a liberalized Czechoslovakia that would seek economic independence and eventual political deviation, as did Yugoslavia.
- Fear that this revisionism would have contagious effects throughout the Eastern bloc, weakening the Soviet empire.⁶

⁵ Anthony Lewis, 'NATO Build-Up Doubted Despite the Prague Crisis,' *The New York Times*, 8 September 1968, p 1.

⁶ Peter Grose, 'U.S. to Ask Moves by NATO in Wake of Prague Crisis,' *The New York Times*, 9 September 1968, p 1.

Like all empires, the Soviet Union has exercised conquest by force, alien domination of political decision-making authority, and economic exploitation of east Europe. In this respect, the invasion of Czechoslovakia was nothing new to the Soviet Union. Conquest by invasion was used in Hungary in 1956; political stooges like Walter Ulbricht are notorious; and the pre-invasion economic exploitation of Czechoslovak uranium alone has been placed at 170 million dollars annually.⁷

The Soviet Union has acted like any paramount power faced with the erosion of its client empire, yet the USSR also has a unique motivation—a pathological fear of a non-Communist Germany. Twice in this century, the Soviet Union has suffered in wars with Germany, and the Kremlin is determined never to do so again. Soviet paranoia is evident in statements which claim that, 'in the Federal Republic, anti-communism is, as it was in Hitler's time, the official state doctrine, part of the psychological preparation for war.'

Leonid I. Brezhnev, Party General Secretary of the USSR, warned European Communists that:

*Bonn is hoping to involve the USA and its other NATO partners more deeply in its revenge-seeking plans and thereby secure a revision of the Second World War in its favour.*⁸

Marshal Vasili D. Sokolovsky declared that:

*The main role in the unleashing of a new war is played by West Germany, where revanchism has been made state policy. For this reason United States, British, and French imperialists have permitted West Germany to have the strongest army in NATO and are planning to give her nuclear weapons, encouraging in every way possible the revanchist aspirations of West German militarism.*⁹

Soviet Commentary

This theme has increased in severity since the Czechoslovak invasion as evidenced by a Soviet broadcast commentary proclaiming:

The arms race and claims of the Bonn militarists to a leading role in NATO are evidence of the growing aggressiveness of the foreign

⁷ 'Czechoslovakia Is a Major Uranium Producer,' *Christian Science Monitor*, 1 August 1968, p 1.

⁸ *Information Bulletin*, Number 70-71, quoted by Stephen H. Johnson, 'An Introduction to the Role of Proxies in Soviet Strategic Planning,' *Phalanx*, Volume 1, Summer 1967, p 60.

⁹ Marshal Vasili D. Sokolovsky, *Military Strategy*, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, 1963, p 275.

*political policy of the German Federal Republic. The interest of peace and security in Europe demand a decisive counter-action by all peace-loving forces to Bonn's most evil plans.*¹⁰

The West was shockingly reminded on 18 September 1968 by *Pravda*, the Soviet Communist Party newspaper, that, under the United Nations Charter, the Soviet Union claims the legal authority to invade West Germany:

The Soviet Union proceeds from the fact that, in accordance with their obligations under the Potsdam and other international agreements, the powers of the anti-Hitler coalition continue to bear the responsibility for preventing the revival of German militarism and Nazism.

*As a participant in the Potsdam agreement, the Soviet Union will continue to stand ready, together with other peace-loving states, to take the necessary effective measures, if the need arises, to stop the dangerous activities of neonazism and militarism.*¹¹

According to article 53 of the UN Charter, the only military action legal without the authorization of the Security Council is action against any state which, during World War II, had been an enemy of any signatory of the charter. Article 107 declares that nothing in the charter shall invalidate or preclude action taken or authorized as a result of World War II by the governments involved. An invasion of West Germany by the Soviet Union would, according to Soviet interpretation, be legal. Western diplomats dispute this claim.¹²

Imperialism and Fear

The reasons why the Soviets want West Germany under their hegemony are the same overriding motivations that were behind the Czechoslovak invasion — imperialism and fear.

¹⁰ 'Daily Report — Soviet Union,' Broadcast by radio from Moscow in English to eastern North America, 19 September 1968. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Volume III.

¹¹ Vladen Kuznetsov, 'Far Reaching Aims,' *Pravda*, 18 September 1968, p 5.

¹² Secretary of State Dean Rusk, in addressing the UN General Assembly on 2 October 1968, stated:

Neither article 107 nor article 53 of the Charter nor the two articles together gives the Soviet Union or other Warsaw Pact members any right to intervene by force unilaterally in the Federal Republic of Germany. Any such action would lead immediately to self-defence measures pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty, a treaty whose validity under the United Nations Charter is unquestionable.

The Department of State Bulletin, Volume LIX, Number 1530, 21 October 1968.—Editor.

If the Soviet Union controlled West Germany, if only up to the Rhine, the shift in the military and economic balance would be devastating to the West. Strategically, the USSR would hold the best defensive position on the Continent, with an unstoppable military capability to coerce any neighbour and thus attain many long-standing Communist ambitions, among them control of the Baltic gate.

Such an action could even be used to unite a factioning Eastern bloc that still remembers the terrors of Adolf Hitler. The reliability of client states is always greater on the offensive, and even the Czechoslovak Army could be effectively re-integrated into the Warsaw Pact through action against a traditional national enemy.

In 1956, in fear of an anti-Communist upsurge, the Soviet Union made a pre-emptive invasion of Hungary. In 1968, in fear of national deviation with possible strategic consequences, the Soviet Union launched a pre-emptive occupation of Czechoslovakia.

Already in mortal fear of a 'revenge-seeking' West Germany, the Soviet Union is showing increased alarm over the relationship of Bonn to nuclear weapons.

NATO's conventional inferiority to the Warsaw Pact traditionally has been augmented by the superiority of the US nuclear deterrent. The replacement of superiority by parity has changed the value of nuclear deterrence. According to military analyst B. H. Liddell Hart:

... the US strategic missile force, has completely ceased to be a deterrent, and protection. It remains a deterrent to, and thereby an indirect protection against, nuclear attack so long as the capacity for retaliation is sufficient to ensure that any surprise blow—any attempt at a nuclear Pearl Harbour strike—is likely to prove mutually suicidal. But it has become doubtful whether this former 'Great Deterrent' remains a sufficient deterrent to lesser forms of aggression or even to a strong invasion and conventional force.¹³

Considering the present state of the NATO forces, a Warsaw Pact conventional surprise attack could meet with initial success, leaving nuclear response the only option left.

If the West is deterred from using nuclear weapons and it refuses to maintain a parity in heavy conventional forces, with what will it deter the Soviet conventional capability? One answer—allow West Germany to develop an independent nuclear deterrent. It is undoubtedly

¹³ B. H. Liddell Hart, *Deterrent or Defence*, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, 1965, p 43.

this answer that prompted the Soviet Union to push so hard for a treaty to ban the spread of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union has indicated that she will stop West Germany from acquiring independent control of the bomb somehow through diplomacy or coercion, and, if these fail, she hints at pre-emptive attack.

Excellent Capabilities

The prospect of reduced nuclear risk has led to Soviet reassessment of military conflicts in Europe. Beginning around 1960, a distinct change took place in Soviet policy. In Marshal Sokolovsky's work, *Military Strategy*, the one example of a future limited war involves a full-scale non-nuclear attack initiated by the West in central Europe. This apparent reappraisal has been noted by the Soviet analyst, Thomas W. Wolfe:

Under the new regime, there have been further indications of a doctrinal reappraisal of the possibility of non-nuclear theatre warfare, the implication being that the theatre forces must be better prepared for a situation in which it might not be expedient to bring Soviet nuclear power to bear.¹⁴

Wolfe has also noted the Soviet discussions of the advantage of surprise and the new emphasis on the need for prompt seizures of the initiative and rapid offensive exploration.

The latest Soviet principles have also called for a continuous offensive developing rapidly throughout the depth of the theatre at an average speed of 60 miles per day. All of the Warsaw Pact divisions that would be assigned German action are mechanized, with half of them armoured, and the pact forces have enough transport aircraft to drop four airborne divisions simultaneously.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons

The Soviets, while hoping for an absence of any nuclear weaponry, have shown preplanning for possible tactical nuclear warfare. Dispersal of fast-moving armoured thrusts starting at many points and following separate transportation lines, massing only when in battle or in capturing an enemy city, means that tactical nuclear weapons cannot be used effectively on the attacking forces without eliminating thousands of civilians, important positions, and friendly forces.

It must be remembered that, in the early stages of a surprise attack, it will be the defender whose static positions will offer the best targets

¹⁴Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Military Power and European Security*, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, 1966, p 4.

to tactical nuclear weapons. The employment of airborne troops in conjunction with major conventional ground units would allow for a quick occupation and give the Soviets major hostages.¹⁵

Over the past 13 years, the Warsaw Pact has changed its emphasis radically from defensive to offensive. Programmes were undertaken to re-equip the east European forces up to Soviet standards, to establish integrated command for conducting joint warfare in the European theatre, and numerous joint exercises were held. The largest of these military manoeuvres was conducted in September 1966 in Czechoslovakia. Operation *Moldau* demonstrated the belief within the Warsaw Pact that a nuclear strike at a war's outset was improbable. The success of these exercises was demonstrated in the perfect co-ordination of the Czechoslovak invasion.

Strong Advantages

Through the stationing of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia, the Warsaw Pact has achieved strong advantages over the NATO alliance in position and forces. Prior to the occupation, the conventional military balance in central Europe appeared stable. Analysts generally concluded that, to achieve a blitzkrieg effect, the Warsaw Pact would need an overall superiority in divisions of three to one, and that, because of a reliability factor, the satellite armies with the greatest Soviet integration would be the most successful.

It was usually considered that the Warsaw Pact could secretly move at least 10 more Soviet divisions and the bulk of the Polish Army into East Germany because there were already Soviet divisions and logistics permanently stationed there. Since no Soviet troops were stationed in Czechoslovakia, the chance of a build-up being noticed was much greater.

Considering these factors, the likely Soviet build-up would occur in East Germany and, consequently, the weight of the attack would be in the northern part of Germany, with a Polish thrust toward Kiel, a march by the East German and Soviet divisions to the Rhine north of Frankfurt, while the Czechoslovaks would establish basically a defensive line through Bavaria. NATO has met this potential threat by placing the bulk of its 24 divisions between Denmark and Frankfurt. This northern strategy has been rendered insufficient since the Czechoslovak invasion because:

¹⁵ Robert Dickson Crane, Editor, *Soviet Nuclear Strategy*, The Centre for Strategic Studies, Washington, D.C., 1965, p 47.

- With Soviet forces permanently stationed along the Bavarian frontier, additional troops can now be added for a surprise attack *without drawing suspicion from the West.*
- With the Soviet occupation, the 14 Czechoslovak divisions can be re-educated on the German threat and integrated within the Warsaw Pact for greater reliability.
- With the post-invasion build-up in Czechoslovakia, the strategic balance along the Iron Curtain has reached a Soviet advantage.

The Warsaw Pact has greatly increased its options and capability. To cover this new and flexible Soviet strategy, the addition of conventional power by repositioning and rebuilding of present NATO forces, along with changes in doctrine, are necessary.

Future Scenario

Considering the current Soviet motivations, the newly apparent Warsaw Pact viability, and the strategic advantages achieved through the occupation of Czechoslovakia, the future of stability in central Europe looks bleak.

The Soviet propaganda campaign that has already started against West Germany can be expected to increase. The rise of the neo-Nazi National Democratic Party, no matter how small, and the West German reluctance to sign the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, no matter how logical, will, undoubtedly, be claimed as proof that the West Germans are secretly manufacturing nuclear weapons and are following Hitler's path by starting world war III. Even the US public is fertile ground for the sowing of skillful propaganda built on long-standing preconceptions. For the Communist propaganda machine, it is, indeed, an easy step to confuse the non-proliferation treaty with nuclear war and patriotic Germans with Nazis.

After an intensive propaganda campaign spread over several months, the 'peace-loving' Soviet Union, with the 'unanimous' support from the Warsaw Pact, would make a limited conventional attack to remove the 'German threat' to world peace.

Only minutes before the midnight attack, Soviet Ambassadors in all Western capitals with nuclear capabilities would notify the heads of state that, since the West had not curbed the 'militarist aims of the Germans,' the Warsaw Pact was, under the UN Charter, removing the threat with conventional arms.

They would stress the limited aims and means of the attack, but would leave no doubt that any use of nuclear weapons whatsoever would trigger a nuclear holocaust. The various Ambassadors might even suggest that NATO bases and airfields were being monitored, and, as long as they remained uninvolved, they would not be attacked. The overriding emphasis to the US President would be on the immediate and fatal results of escalation once the nuclear threshold was crossed.

Meanwhile, over the night skies of West Germany, the Soviets would attain air superiority, with the majority of NATO craft still on the ground. Four airborne divisions would be landed simultaneously so that the Soviets could control the key bridges and roads. Fast-moving Soviet armoured divisions dispersed in the dark countryside would take city after city as hostages and use westward fleeing refugees as shields.

Within hours, the conventional phase of flexible response would be played out, leaving the US President with the decision to employ or not to employ tactical nuclear weapons. As General Hans Speidel has stated:

It is he alone who holds the power and responsibility — the gravest of all decisions: when, where, and with what weapons the counter blow is to be struck.

The only decision left would be to choose between a Soviet Germany and a nuclear world war III. The necessity for this decision will have been the legacy of the 1968 occupation of Czechoslovakia, for, if we do not study, review, and project its re-occurrence into central Europe and then make the necessary political and strategic adjustments, the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia will have, indeed, been a scenario of the future. □

MONTHLY AWARD

The Board of Review has awarded the \$10 prize for the best original article published in the January 1969 issue of the journal to Major W. W. Lennon for his contribution 'Engineer Support in Vietnam'.

The Industrial Mobilization Course

Colonel P. H. G. Oxley,
Royal Australian Infantry

The History of the Course

DURING the Second World War Sir John Storey, who was for many years a most capable Chairman of the Joint War Production Committee (JWPC), had experienced personally the difficulties encountered by Industry in trying to meet the demands of the Services in times of emergency. These demands on occasions were unreasonable and they indicated a serious lack of understanding on the part of Service officers of the complications, limitations and difficulties of manufacture and production. On the other hand, some industrialists were ignorant of the practical requirements of the Services on mobilization.

Sir John and his JWPC were keen to ensure that this highly inefficient and unsatisfactory situation would not arise in the future. They took positive steps and set up a course of lectures in 1953-54 designed to improve the Service officer's knowledge of industry, its

Colonel Oxley graduated from the Royal Military College in December 1942 and was allotted to the infantry. He served in SWPA as a platoon and company commander and adjutant of 15 Battalion until wounded in June 1945 in Bougainville. After the war he was appointed PA to the GOC Eastern Command and in 1950 attended the Staff College at Camberley. Service with AAS UK then followed.

From 1955 to 1957 he was the first Brigade Major of 28 Com Inf Bde Gp in Malaya and was mentioned in despatches for this service. After a period as 2IC 2 RAR he was a member of the Joint Planning Staff at AHQ (1959-61) until he attended the Commonwealth Joint Services Staff College at Latimer, UK. He then served as GSO1 in DMO&P until seconded to the Defence Department as Military and Naval Attache in South Vietnam. On his return to Australia in 1965 he became the first CO of 5 RAR. In September 1967 Colonel Oxley was again seconded to the Defence Department and assumed his current appointment as Director of Studies, Industrial Mobilization Course at Victoria Barracks, Melbourne.

capabilities and its weaknesses. The first course stretched over two years. Except for a few industrialists the students were all officers of the Services and other associated departments in the Defence Group.

In 1953 Sir John had visited the USA and had discussions with Mr Wilson, then Secretary for Defence. These talks resulted in a visit to the United States Industrial College of the Armed Forces, which is a properly constituted staff college type organization with a Vice-Admiral as Director of Studies and some 180 resident students. The United States Industrial College was first established in 1924 as a positive means to improve mobilization procedures. Its purpose is to study the problems of planning and the administration of the mobilization of American economy. Its establishment was the direct result of the painful experience suffered by the US Government, faced with enormous difficulties and problems of mobilization when that country entered the First World War in February 1917.

When Sir John Storey returned to Australia he recommended to the then Secretary of the Department of Defence, Sir Frederick Shedden, and to the Defence Committee that Australia should have an Industrial Mobilization Institution. One of the aspects of American thinking that appealed was its aim 'to bring senior authorities in Defence and the Armed Services into closer and more intimate working relationships with the top men in Industry.' The time had disappeared when the Services could remain detached from civil life until shooting began.

In 1953 there were eight industrialists in a course of 100 students. In 1956 the proportion improved to 16 industrialists in a total of 40. This improvement continued year by year. In 1968 the proportion was 50/50.

Thus over the years the aims of the course changed until they are now defined as:

- To give members an understanding of the economic, industrial and other interrelated factors which affect our national security.
- To bring together the representatives of responsible departments and of industry, to encourage thought and discussion and to create a spirit of understanding and co-operation between students.

The Scope of the Course

These aims led to the scope which now covers six broad areas of study:

- *The Introductory Look* at the basic problems of just how pre-

pared is industry to meet any national emergency and the important inter-relationships of the economic, legal, and financial factors.

- A study of the *Natural Resources* of Australia which is a fascinating investigation into the quantity, type, availability and distribution of the untold wealth of this continent of ours, and the question of the extent of its self-sufficiency in peace or in times of emergency.
- Thirdly, with regards to *Secondary Industries*, an examination is made of the production aspects of industrial output and future potential. The limitations of each industry and the military/industrial relationship are highlighted.
- *Public Utilities* are the fourth item to be investigated as each one is an important factor to the economy and may well require strict control and subsequent development if emergency demands are to be met successfully and practically.
- As a fifth study the all important matter of *Manpower* must be fully analysed in relation to the mobilization of the national economy and the needs of the armed forces.
- Finally, the matter of *Defence Forces Supply*, where the many problems associated with the provision of supplies of all natures for the Services are given consideration.

The Types of Courses

The scope generates three types of courses, the Long Course, the Short Course and the Refresher Course. The Long Courses take place in Victoria and New South Wales. They are based on Melbourne and Sydney. The Short Courses are held at Brisbane, Adelaide and Perth on a triennial basis. The Refresher Courses are conducted in all capital cities, including Canberra, approximately every four years.

Duration

The duration of the three types of courses is:

The Long Course in Melbourne and Sydney is a part time course of approximately 10 months during which members can attend and still carry on with their normal vocation. The two separate courses run concurrently each year from February to October. Students are required to attend lectures at a central location in the capital city on Monday nights between 5.30 p.m. and 9.30 p.m. There are from 40 to 42 such lectures in a long course and from 23 to 25 visits to industrial establishments, which usually take place on a Tuesday between 9.30 a.m. and 4.30 p.m.

A long course requires members to attend a symposium of one week's duration at the beginning and the end of the course when they are required to reside in the officers' mess of a Service establishment. The Navy, Army and Air Force act as hosts in rotation. The two symposia take up a total of 21 lectures. The remainder are delivered on the Monday night sessions.

The Short Course in Brisbane, Adelaide or Perth runs for one week at a Service establishment (the hosts in rotation are Navy, Army and Air). It has a concentrated programme which contains the basic lectures of the long courses. There are 15 lectures.

The Refresher Course is conducted in all capital cities in rotation on a four to five year cycle for the benefit of graduates and ex-staff members who have become out-of-date with regard to changing policies which affect national security as the years pass. They are of two days duration and comprise the very basic six lectures of the long and short courses. On the second evening a general course reunion is held which includes all ex-members and staff from 1953 onwards.

The long course programme in Melbourne and Sydney is probably the most comprehensive course of lectures on Australian Industry and the Services that is available anywhere in Australia today. In addition to the bed-rock lectures dealing with the 'International Situation as a Background to Defence Policy', 'The Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy', 'The Higher Defence Organization', and the various basic lectures on the Services, there are lectures by leading authorities on Petroleum, Petro-Chemicals, Coal, Iron, Steel, Non-Ferrous Metals, Electronics, Machine Tools, Paper Making, Explosives, Transportation, Containerization, Food Processing, Chemicals, Rubber, Plastics, Aircraft, Ship-Building, Textiles, Power, Gas and the Automotive Industry. Most of these lectures are followed the next day by a factory visit. Other visits take the student interstate to the Port Kembla complex to visit the iron, the steel, and the coal industries; to Whyalla to see iron-mining, pelletising iron-ore, the ship-building; the Snowy Mountains Scheme to inspect water conservation techniques and the generation of electric power.

The Cost

The course is free. There are no tuition fees and no payment is required for text books, pamphlets, brochures, lecture notes, briefs or official industrial booklets. During the two weekly residential symposia accommodation, meals and some services are provided free at an officers'

mess. There are charges — quite small — for mess subscription fees, newspapers, supplementary rations and miscellaneous items associated with the entertainment of the members of the course.

Bus transport is provided for visits by the Services, and the Defence Department. Firms and departments are required to meet accommodation charges for the two or three day visits to Port Kembla, Lithgow, Whyalla and the Snowy Mountains Authority visit. Firms and departments are also required to meet the cost of air fares.

The Organization

The current approved number of students and the allocation of vacancies is contained in the following table which is typical:

<i>Department or Firm</i>	<i>Melbourne</i>	<i>Sydney</i>	<i>Perth</i>
Prime Minister's or Premier's			
Western Australia	—	—	1
Defence	—	—	1
Treasury	—	—	1
Navy	2	2	2
Army	2	2	2
Air	2	2	2
Supply	2	2	1
Labour and National Service	1	1	1
Civil Aviation	1	1	1
Trade	1	1	1
P.M.G.'s	1	1	1
C.S.I.R.O.	1	1	1
Universities	2	2	1
State Electricity Commission/Trust	1	1	1
Gas Company/Corporation	1	1	1
Labour and Industry	1	1	1
Railways	1	1	1
Banks	1	1	1
Industry	16	16	14
Exchange Officers from Abroad	—	—	1
<i>Totals</i>	<u>36</u>	<u>36</u>	<u>36</u>

The Management

The Defence (Industrial) Committee, formerly the Joint War Production Committee, is responsible to the Minister for Defence for

policy in relation to the conduct of the course. The course is organised, managed and conducted by a Director of Studies who is responsible to an Executive Committee, a part of the DIC, which is made up of the Fourth Naval Member and Chief of Supply of the Naval Board, the Army Master-General of the Ordnance, the Air Member for Supply and Equipment of the RAAF and the Secretary, Department of Supply.

The Director of Studies is a service officer, of the equivalent rank of colonel, seconded from his own service to the Department of Defence for two to three years. His office is located in the Department of Defence, Victoria Barracks, Melbourne, Victoria. The appointment is a joint-service position which is filled on a rotational basis by the three services. The Director has an Assistant Director of Studies on a part-time basis in Melbourne and Sydney who is a service officer of the equivalent rank of major, and this is also a joint-service rotational appointment. This officer assists in the conduct of lectures and visits.

The Course Chairmen

Each course has a chairman. For the long course the chairman is appointed by the Secretary of the Department of Defence and is usually a distinguished retired serviceman of the equivalent rank of major-general or brigadier. The chairmen of the two long courses receive a retainer for their services and are given a travelling allowance and their out-of-pocket expenses are paid for by the Department of Defence. The chairman for short courses is usually the Secretary of the Department of Supply. The refresher courses are chaired by the chairman of the Executive Committee of the Industrial Mobilization Course. The two symposia conducted at Service establishments at the beginning and end of the long course year have as their chairmen the member of the Executive Committee whose service is acting as host for the course. Thus if the first symposium of the New South Wales Long Course is held at the Royal Australian Naval Air Station HMAS *Albatross* at Nowra then the chairman would usually be the Rear-Admiral, Fourth Naval Member and Chief of Supply of the Naval Board.

Security

Students are required to sign an appropriate security undertaking and are cleared to the required level to listen to certain classified talks. Some of the information given during the various courses has a security grading which is indicated by the lecturer at the time of the talk.

The Conduct of the Course

Most lecturers have background notes which are forwarded to students for reading and study some four weeks before a talk. Before most visits some form of pre-visit material such as brochures, pamphlets or books, as prepared by the firm or department to be visited, are sent to the student.

The course is conducted in the following manner:

- Lecturers are invited to give a talk lasting for approximately 45 to 50 minutes. Some may only talk for 35 minutes.
- Students are divided into four syndicates, each having a separate syndicate room. Each student sits in a nominated seat in the central lecture room. Syndicates are grouped together in the lecture room.
- At the conclusion of each lecture or visit the syndicates, under the chairmanship of their nominated syndicate leaders, retire to syndicate rooms or separate areas to discuss the forthcoming 'Question and Answer Period'. This discussion lasts twenty minutes or such time as the chairman indicates, before the syndicates retire.
- Following the syndicate discussion, the students return to the central lecture room and a 'Question and Answer Period' with the lecturer is carried out for approximately 45 to 50 minutes. The chairman nominates quite clearly in what order syndicates are to ask questions of the lecturer.
- The syndicate leader either asks the question himself or nominates a different member of his syndicate to ask the question each time so that every member has a turn.
- Each student when asking questions stands up in his place, gives his name, firm or department and the number of his syndicate and then asks the question sufficiently loud and clear for all members of all syndicates to hear.
- The syndicate leader has a number of important responsibilities which include his proper handling of the syndicate discussion so that it determines the views of the majority, that all members contribute their views, and that the questions arrived at are in fact the optimum to either cover ground left out by the lecturer or to make clearer points that the lecturer mentioned.
- The syndicate leader is responsible to the Director of Studies for having his syndicate return to the main lecture hall at the time laid down and for specifically advising the Director of Studies of the absence of any member of the syndicate at the lectures or the syndicate discussions.

The Students

When the heads of government departments and the chairmen of industrial firms are invited by the Secretary of the Department of Defence to nominate members to become students of the Industrial Mobilization Courses they are requested to consider the following principles for the selection of personnel:

- As maximum attendance by each student at all lectures, symposia, and industrial visits is important in achieving the aims of the course, selection should be limited to those students who are unlikely to be transferred from their present States and who are most likely to fulfil this requirement.
- Members selected should have reasonable career prospects and may be drawn from supply, executive, administrative, technical, or scientific appointments. Service personnel will be of the rank of not less than commander, wing commander, lieutenant-colonel, and public servants will be of a classification of not less than Clerk, Class 8, (Third Division).
- Nominees aged 35 to 50 years are preferred, but suitable individuals outside this limit will certainly be considered.

There are no examinations or tests. A person is deemed to have graduated from the course when he has attended a minimum of 65% of total number of lectures and visits. There are no diplomas issued.

There is a tie which is worn by graduates of the course. It has a dark green background (the defence colour) on which are superimposed in gold the cogged wheels of industry and the long crossed swords of defence.

Up to 1968 over thirteen hundred students from industry, the services and government departments, instrumentalities and institutions had completed the course. Today a large number of people in positions of authority, trust, and responsibility are now acquainted with the problems of industry and defence and are in a position to co-operate in the event of a national emergency. The contacts, friendships and inherent comradeship experienced, made and cemented during the courses are important and these are maintained by courses and general reunions and social events arranged not only by the Director of Studies but also by the members of the various courses themselves.

The Industrial Mobilization Course represents a valuable exercise in public relations by showing members of industry how the defence vote is spent and highlighting the problems associated with preparations for the defence of this nation.

Conclusion

The course plays an important part in our national training for defence and helps to achieve that close co-operation so necessary for effective harnessing of our productive capacity. It seeks in theory, by its lectures, and in practice—with its visits—to give students a good understanding of the current state of Industry and Service organization and requirements with the object of assisting defence preparedness in the event of a national emergency. □

If you concentrate exclusively on victory, with no thought for the after-effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by the peace, while it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another war. This is a lesson supported by abundant experience. The risks become greater still in any war that is waged by a coalition, for in such a case a too complete victory inevitably complicates the problem of making a just and wise peace settlement. Where there is no longer the counter-balance of an opposing force to control the appetites of the victors, there is no check on the conflict of views and interests between the parties to the alliance. The divergence is then apt to become so acute as to turn the comradeship of common danger into the hostility of mutual dissatisfaction—so that the ally of one war becomes the enemy in the next.

—Liddell Hart, *The Strategy of Indirect Approach*

The Case for Army FACs

Major B. A. Murphy, MC.

Royal New Zealand Artillery

Introduction

CLOSE air support is a powerful form of fire support in the tactical battle, but even today this source of fire power is not being fully tapped. In its role of close support the air force has the same responsibility as the artillery to ensure that fire support is available when and where the infantry require it. In order to discharge this responsibility effectively it is necessary to 'sell the product' to the infantry. The salesman must seek out the prospective customer, demonstrate the effectiveness of his product and gain the customer's confidence in its use.

The US Air Force learnt the necessity for this approach when the present large tactical air force was introduced into Vietnam in support of the ground forces. Such a powerful force was useless without active co-operation with the ground forces, who, after all, are basically responsible for fighting the war. Consequently an extensive air force system for tactical air control was introduced. The system at field formation level provides for forward air controllers (FACs) with infantry battalions and air liaison officers at formation headquarters. During operations an airborne FAC in a light fixed wing aircraft is kept on station over the formation's area of operations. All communications are provided by the air force. There is no provision for army control of close air support under any circumstances.

Ostensibly this system effectively meets the requirement for air force co-ordination with the ground forces and it demonstrates a commendable attempt by the air force to take their 'product' to the 'consumer'. The system has been adopted by both the Royal Australian and Royal New Zealand Air Forces, except that in both countries the army continues to supply tactical air request communications. The British system,

Major Murphy graduated from the Royal Military College, Duntroon in December 1957 and was commissioned in the Royal New Zealand Artillery. After serving as an instructor in the School of Artillery he was seconded to infantry and served with 2NZ Regt in Malaya during 1960-61. He became adjutant of 1 Fd Regt RNZA and then occupied a number of staff appointments. In 1965 he served in Vietnam with 161 Fd Bty RNZA, which was in support of 1 RAR. Service as a Bty Comd in 16 Fd Regt RNZA then followed until he attended the 1968 course at the Australian Staff College, where this article was written. His present appointment is Chief Instructor of the New Zealand Army Tactical School.

whereby the air force acquiesces in the training and employment of army FACs, has been discarded.

The Argument For Air Force FACs

The air force have a number of convincing reasons for restricting control of close air support to air force FACs. They believe that the best man to control ground attack aircraft is an air force pilot trained in the use of that aircraft. He knows the techniques of flying the aircraft, its capabilities and its limitations. He knows the capabilities and limitations of the available weapons systems and the best means of delivering them. He is capable of assessing the terrain and possibly enemy ground fire from the pilot's point of view. He understands the problems of target recognition from a fast moving aircraft and has no trouble in conversing in the staccato language used over air force radio. All this adds up to the best possible understanding between the FAC and the pilot, and the employment of close air support missions to their best effect.

The Need For Army FACs

The reasons given for using air force FACs are not disputed; they are all valid. However, one FAC to each infantry battalion, which is the most that can be expected in normal circumstances, is all too few. If the artillery pursued the same policy it would be most ineffective in South-East Asia. Even with the present scale of forward observers it is seldom possible for a 'gunner' to observe all targets that require engaging. The artillery's problem is usually overcome by practising the infantry, down to section commander level, in shooting with their direct support battery so that they become confident enough to control the fire of the battery themselves when necessary. In this way maximum use is made of artillery fire support.

In typical South-East Asian terrain a company which is one thousand metres away from its battalion headquarters is often out of visual contact and is unlikely to be contacted physically in under an hour. In a counter-revolutionary war, companies are likely to be even more widely dispersed than this. Instances have occurred in Vietnam where companies operating semi-independently have come into close contact with enemy groups ranging from company to regimental size. These are the circumstances where maximum fire support is needed to make up for a deficiency in numbers on the ground. Naturally, artillery fire is called down immediately and adjusted in onto the enemy. But seldom is close air support used.

In such an engagement response must be quick. The battle will probably only last a few hours, during which time the company commander will be fully committed to fighting his three platoons in the limited visibility of dense tropical forest. He certainly will have no time to control an air strike through a remote FAC at battalion headquarters. The airborne FAC is probably in a better position to help but it is likely that he will see only the tops of trees under which the battle is taking place and will not be capable of controlling alone what must be a very accurate air strike. There can be no doubt that in such a situation detailed control must come from the ground.

In this situation the company commander has the maximum FAC support he can expect under the present system. But it is doubtful that even this number would always be available. Because air force FACs must be trained pilots, experienced in the ground attack role, they could never be plentiful in our air force even in peacetime. So there must come the time when because of sickness, injury or some other reason there just is not an air force FAC available. Furthermore, in time of limited war when the air force is faced with carrying out all its roles—including air defence—there may not be sufficient pilots available to provide the present scale of FACs.

Suggested Solution

Properly applied close air support could often mean the difference between success and failure in jungle operations where ground mobility is so restricted. Although the air force FAC is certainly the best man to control an air strike there is a limit to the number that can be provided. Often air support, although available, is not used because there is no FAC on the spot. Surely the best way to overcome this problem is to train selected army officers as FACs, who in the worst case could control a strike by themselves, but who would normally operate in conjunction with a supporting air force FAC.

Training to this standard does not require a long course. The Royal Air Force have been training British Army FACs for some years. A course of two weeks duration is sufficient to familiarize the officer with control procedures, weapons systems and the techniques employed by the various ground attack aircraft. Naturally refresher courses would be necessary to keep these officers up to date.

All Army Air Corps officers and selected officers from artillery, infantry and armoured corps should be trained as FACs. Certainly all artillery forward observers should be trained, for the forward observer

is the best person to co-ordinate all supporting fire for the infantry company commander. In the situation depicted in the previous section, had the forward observer been trained as an FAC he undoubtedly would have called for an air strike. The strike would be controlled through the airborne FAC and would be closely co-ordinated with the artillery fire in progress at the time. Ideally his communications would allow him to talk to the FAC on the same frequency as the FAC talks to the attacking aircraft, thereby ensuring that no errors would be made in the transmission of information.

Clearly the employment of army FACs would lead to an increase in the part played by close air support in the tactical battle. Control of strikes would be better, particularly in close country, and the increased confidence in air support resulting from the training of army officers as FACs would lead to it being used whenever it is available. □

THE SPIRIT OF ANZAC

Beside the ruins of Troy they lie buried, these men so beautiful;
there they have their burial place, hidden in an enemy's land.

— Aeschylus 525-456 BC *The Agamemnon*

The Heavy Hand of Marshal Grechkow

Fictional Address given to the Supreme Soviet: 'Prague and its Consequences.'

by General Baron Leo Geyr von Schweppenburg
German Army, Retired

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Translated by Captain W. Fladun, RAAEC

Comrades,

Now, after Prague, it is my task to summarize once again and put before you the reasons for our action and the consequences arising from our decision. I gave my advice, I participated in making the decision; therefore I carry part of the responsibility.

I will use the frank and straightforward language of the Russian soldier.

Our decision caused a storm in a waterglass; it was a decision that conforms to our 'grand strategy'. As such, apart from purely military considerations, economic questions were involved to a high degree. There were others too. Since 'common ideological grounds' can be taken for granted in states of our design and socialist philosophy, this factor was of only secondary importance.

I will commence my balance sheet with the military considerations in our shrunken world.

The foreseeable future will see great decisions made in the Pacific Area. Red China is able to commit more than 120 divisions, the atomic bomb and about 24 nuclear long range submarines armed with atomic missiles. Theoretically, the latter could threaten the security of the west coast of the USA right now. We do not know with certainty whether Red China has the hydrogen bomb ready as part of her arsenal as yet.

The author, known for his longstanding experience as an expert on Soviet Russia, attempts to read the mind of a Russian general. A contributor of a number of articles to the Army Journal over the years he served in the 1914-18 War, and during the 1939-45 War he commanded a Panzer Corps in the Caucasus and during the attack on Moscow. At the end of the war he was Inspector General of Armoured Forces, West Normandy.

In view of this development in the Far East we must not permit ourselves to remain inactive when strategic, military and political changes take place on our Western flank which are to our military or economic disadvantage.

At the centre of our defence thinking remains the need to avoid a war on two points.

That German, Bismarck, was not empty-headed when it came to matters of foreign policies. He had, what is more, a considerable understanding of Russo-German relations. It was he who said that Bohemia, in terms of military geography, is the key to Germany. It is out of the question for us to refrain from controlling this space. This is still true despite the changes conventional strategy has undergone; perhaps even more so. On the other hand, our country cannot be interested in adventures of foreign politics, fraught with nuclear risks, when we keep in mind our rapid internal organizational, industrial and economic development. But our intervention in Prague did not mean taking such a military risk. Our socialist-communist 'caravan' is moving on, not in the slightest disturbed by all the furious barking.

Neither was our course of action influenced by the possible potential of the Czech army. This did not worry us. The *Good Soldier Schweik* would easily be rendered insignificant by other members of the Warsaw pact, not to mention our own Red Army.

But, the intellect, the ingenuity of a large proportion of the Czechoslovak nation on which the economic and industrial importance of the area rests, and which is equalled only by that of the German Democratic Republic, does not allow us to permit a break-in into the complex economic system of our bloc, unless we want to endanger vital Soviet interests. We cannot stand by while Prague commits adultery with some other partner in economic policies.

It is this reason, in conjunction with the military geography of the area, that dictates to us.

The Germans are a people of diverse talents, but they show none of these in politics. Their policies regarding us are behind the march of time: this is my personal opinion only.

NATO in its present state does not present any danger to our Western flank, although our own efficient propaganda would have you believe otherwise. NATO's lack of cohesion and the widely diverging

points of view NATO represents render it harmless. The European West is undergoing a considerable moral softening process. This we welcome.

Comrades, just compare our primary school reading material, designed to educate the young, with similar products of Western 'Kultura'. Compare furthermore the excellent exposition by the Marshal of the Soviet Union, Comrade Sokolovsky, on the subject of our grand defence strategy, especially the psycho-political indoctrination of our people with similar processes, or rather stagnation in the countries of the West. Seen historically, much reminds one of a development in antiquity; Rome—at that time still spartanic—and capitalistic Carthage.

I will now return to some singular problems connected with our action in Czechoslovakia. World opinion, or at least that of the West, blew furiously. I ask you as a soldier, as Comrade Stalin once did: How many nuclear submarines, nuclear missiles or bombers does world opinion possess? Of what significance is world opinion, let us say in the eyes of South American populations approaching the historic development stage of Revolution? Or what means to us the disapproval mumbled by a number of African negro states south of the equator.

Can, on the other hand, the situation we created in Czechoslovakia influence the thought of our excellent, tough, obedient and disciplined Red Army men, who came from places like Gorki in the far Volga region, or from Tashkent in the south, or from Jakutzk on the Lena River?

Our brother parties in France and Italy were disturbed by our step. Their status in internal politics may suffer temporarily—so what!

The psycho-political loss sustained by us against world opinion is of little, certainly not of decisive, importance. In any case it is of a temporary nature.

Before I conclude, Czechoslovakia is part of the Soviet sphere of interest for the reasons I have already spoken of. But Czechoslovakia is also a nation of Slavic race and therefore part of our area of interest.

Like Faust-Mephisto, one is tempted to ask 'Why all the noise?', when all we want to do is to keep our area of interest intact. I fail to see any risks or dangers worth thinking about.

The barometer of world weather indicates that a 'High' covers our huge empire at present. The same applies to Red China. As to the West and their powerful bloc, I would rather debate this and describe them as stagnating.

The domination of the Seven Seas by the Anglo-Saxons is a thing of the past. The oceans have ceased to shield the strongest of our possible enemies, the USA.

The same is true, or it will soon be, regarding the domination of air space. The lead the USA had in space research and its undefined military value is already diminished.

From our Western flank it is fairly unimportant how many divisions, including US divisions, stand at the Iron Curtain in the European West. To name just one point; the 'big lift' would at best just reach the Azores. The army of the German Federal Republic is of no account in a conflict, in view of the power we can deploy and develop. We have however a useful privilege, earned by historic experience, and that is getting full propaganda value from possible, presumably German, aggression and to act accordingly. The Cold War has swung back to original form with our Prague action. This has placed a recognizable psychological strain on West German nerves. It gives us the opportunity to state again our claim to the right of intervention in accordance with articles 53 and 107 of the UNO Charter and the Potsdam Agreement. It is however not advisable to go beyond propaganda claims. For the time being it will suffice that we have delivered threats three times in one week.

In the affairs of the world today it is wise to hide our possible moves in mysterious secrecy. Let them try to fathom it. Were we not the first who, in the twenties, already incorporated psychological warfare as a necessary weapon into our military manuals?

We Soviet Russian Communists do not wish, nor can we afford, to be politically soft-hearted. We are not a club of Sunday-School teachers. Whatever serves the ideology and the maintenance of socialist life, according to Moscow, is right and just. And on any possibly necessary evolution, the decision will be made here in the Kremlin and not in Prague or Bucharest. Budapest and Prague made that clear!

Furthermore, it is we, and only we, who decide what areas are vital to Soviet interests. To safeguard those areas and interests I quote a famous Anglo-Saxon saying: 'We have the men, the money and now the ships.'

Apart from that, the saying *Oderint dum metuant*¹ is very much valid.

This is my point of view: Decisions must remain the prerogative of the political leadership. □

¹ Fear makes averse.



CONTEMPORARY MILITARY STRATEGY, By Morton H. Halperin
(Faber and Faber, London, 1968, \$4.70).

Reviewed by Lieutenant-Colonel P. C. Gratton

Contemporary Military Strategy is a concise and readable summary of the major strategic issues of the present day, together with some account of the developments in strategic thought since 1945. As a former Research Associate of the Centre for International Affairs at Harvard, and more recently Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, Halperin is well qualified to produce such a study. His work naturally reflects the American viewpoint in places, but is on the whole commendably objective and realistic and well worth the reading. His principal sources are freely acknowledged in lists of selected reading provided with each chapter.

Halperin's approach to his subject is a practical one with little concern for strategic theory. Discussion is limited to actual strategies used in real situations, considering them in terms of three components—'capability', or what forces the country should have, 'communication', or what the country wants the enemy to believe and 'action', or the plans for using the forces. This approach is realistic since strategic decisions, in the West at least, are not taken in furtherance of any theoretical doctrine. As a consequence however it does omit such major contributions to strategic thought as Liddell Hart's *Strategy of the Indirect Approach*.

Much of the book deals with general nuclear war, which while perhaps the least likely situation is certainly the most serious. This subject has had little influence on Australian strategic thought but we should note that it is the prime concern of our major ally. The various philosophies of employment of strategic nuclear forces are traced from the original Massive Retaliation of the mid-fifties to the present doctrine of Controlled Response, in which emphasis is placed not only on deterrence but on limiting damage if deterrence fails. The history of NATO's nuclear difficulties are instructive as a guide to problems with which Australia may be associated in Asia in the 1970s.

For the Australian reader, the sections on limited war are probably the most interesting. Halperin analyses the processes by which limited wars start, involve the major powers, remain limited, and end. He identifies four major policy determinants—the objectives sought, the fear of general nuclear war, national images of the role of force and last but by no means least, domestic politics. For the first of these, he contends that local territorial and political objectives are unimportant, the real issues for the major powers being the international political effects achieved. (Vietnam?).

There is interesting discussion on national images of the role of force. The United States, unlike the Russians and Chinese, still publicly claims to reject force as an instrument for securing political ends. This is of course unrealistic, and the United States has violated this principle several times. This dualism however has been the main cause of the schism in the American people over the Vietnamese war. Halperin notes, in good Machiavellian style, that the most important of the dissenting (reviewer's underlining) American elites holds the belief that '... a clear moral and legal issue is needed to justify the use of violence'.

Deterrence and defence in Asia is discussed primarily in terms of containing China, and is of interest in the light of the current Australian strategic review. Halperin examines China's foreign policy objectives and capabilities, and assesses the West's ability to frustrate them. He concludes that China has neither the capacity nor the slightest intent to undertake overt military adventures far from her borders but will continue with border probes and with support for wars of national liberation, keeping both these activities well below the nuclear threshold. The whole analysis is clearly reasoned, free of prejudice and convincing, but will probably disappoint the more hawkish readers. It is certainly at variance with traditional Australian assessments. Paradoxically, he considers that the development of Chinese nuclear capability will only serve to make nuclear force even more irrelevant in Asia than it is at present.

The treatment of counter revolutionary warfare is sketchy—perhaps indicative of its scant importance in American strategic thought as late as 1966. There can be little exception taken to what is said, but in 1969 one would like to have seen a good deal more. □

Letters to the Editor

REMEMBER WITH ADVANTAGES

Sir, — Some of the observations made by General Graham (*Army Journal*, December 1968) raise points which merit comment. However, what is perhaps more important are those things which General Graham refers to obliquely or hardly mentions at all. Not necessarily in order of importance, these are some of the points.

Use of Light Aircraft

A fundamental but, unfortunately, a common error has been made in comparing fixed and rotary wing aircraft. Here one is not comparing, say, apples but rather an apple and an orange and, to continue the homely illustration, there is not much point in denigrating the orange because it hasn't a rosy skin. In other words, against the whole range of what helicopters and aeroplanes can and can't do, to say that a fixed wing aircraft is 'more economical, easier to repair and can take more battle damage' is not very meaningful or in fact, if present aircraft are considered, accurate.

Presumably, the observations refer to the aging OH-13, the 'Sioux'. Unfortunately, but for good reason, the latest figures for the small turbine helicopter that has replaced the OH-13 in South Vietnam are still classified. However, running costs, maintenance man-hours, 'fly-home' figures after damage and pilot survivability for this aircraft are such to warrant a fresh approach in our thinking about light aircraft.

The Utility and the Medium Helicopter

Throughout the article General Graham mentions utility and medium helicopters and how essential they are e.g., the infantry battalion is an airmobile organization, not a battalion with some helicopters tacked on to it. However, it is difficult to imagine how this highly desirable state of affairs can ever be realized with the present illogical arrangement where the RAAF own and operate utility helicopters. For another Service to operate utility helicopters which are so basic to Army's role, so much part of the everyday life of the regimental officer and his men, makes about as much sense as the Royal Australian Navy owning and operating all our artillery pieces, including the guns of the

'Centurions', on the argument that the Navy shoot from a moving platform and therefore they know more about the Army's business than does the Army. I believe that unless the Services are to amalgamate next year the Army must own and operate its utility (armed and unarmed), medium and heavy helicopters. If we neglect to do this, in the long run, as always, it will be the infantryman who suffers. The issue is as clear-cut and as simple as that.

A further point is this. Even with the best will in the world the man from the RAAF, doing the Army's job, cannot escape his past — that is, his years of previous service and rightly, where his loyalty lies. His progress in his Service depends on his RAAF seniors, not on his temporary employers. Quite correctly, of course, he will regard his posting to a helicopter squadron as just another twenty-four months of different flying before going back to Williamtown or Richmond or some such place that fits in with his overall service career plan.

Surveillance and Radio Research

Somewhat surprisingly no direct mention was made of these aspects of operations, perhaps because of the rather limited horizon of brigade operations. However, if history is any guide it seems unlikely that the Australian Army will be in a position to commit less than a division to the field in the future. It follows then that the Army should be making a close study of aircraft (and other) resources to fill our alarming gap in these areas.

Military Historian

As one who has had more than a nodding acquaintance with war diaries etc., I think the suggestion of a military historian is an excellent one. General Graham envisages 'a competent lieutenant-colonel at least holding this position.' However, I think it is a mistake to have an officer as a military historian for these reasons. Firstly, in our tiny Service inevitably the officer will know many of the commanders very well. Secondly, in all probability he may have commanded the units or sub-units involved. Both these things add up to the difficulty of being impartial or objective when the historian is so closely involved with the commanders, the units and his Service. And history is not history unless it has the historian's opinions and comments.

I would prefer to see a uniformed, unranked civilian with officer status. He would be a journalist of some repute. He would not have had any service with Army public relations, for reasons which should be quite clear. It could be argued that he wouldn't understand what

was going on.¹ However, a little honest reflection will show that it wouldn't take an observant, active journalist long to know most things about a brigade or division in the field. Admittedly, we could never hope to have another historian of the stature of C. E. W. Bean (who began without any military knowledge). The discussion can be summed up by paraphrasing a famous editor, 'Facts are sacred but comment must be free.' It is difficult to envisage free comment on the subject of trees from even a competent lieutenant-colonel after he has lived for more than twenty years in the forest.

Logistics

I would like to have read more about this, particularly General Graham's thoughts on its command organization. I am thinking here of the practicability of the service battalion to a brigade/task force and, although it may not be wholly relevant to the article, the organization of the divisional services into a support command under its own commander.

USAAVNS
Fort Rucker,
Alabama

A. Argent, Lt-Col

Maj-Gen Graham acknowledges the need for considerably more coverage of the logistic problems in Vietnam operations but the subject was too long for his article. He is hoping that another author will undertake some such study—*Editor*.

COST ANALYSES

Sir,—I would like to reassure readers of Major van Gelder's article in the January 1969 issue of the *Army Journal* that his article on benefit-cost analysis does not add yet another item to the bewildering list containing such titles as 'cost-effectiveness,' 'systems analysis,' 'cost analysis,' and 'programme budgeting.' Basically, all these concepts embody the cost approach to decision-making. So while Major van Gelder's efforts to bring these to the notice of decision makers at all levels is to be applauded, there is danger that proliferation of these catch phrases may confuse rather than assist.

It may be unwise to assume that the approach is something new; resources for war have always been a problem, even before the days of *Pax Britannica*. One of the reasons for the prolonged viability of Greek

¹ Here one is reminded of a story about Mark Twain. Twain was asked, 'How can a reviewer criticize a book when he has never written one himself; or criticize a picture when he himself can't paint a stroke.' Twain replied, 'You don't have to be a hen to know if an egg is rotten.'

civilization was that they realized sea power was worth the price of free oarsmen as opposed to galley slaves. Alexander the Great is reputed to have carried a team of philosophers on his military field establishment—a sort of operational research group! Another example is provided by the disturbance of the civilizations of the Tigris and Euphrates by the barbarians who had discovered that iron swords were more cost effective than bronze ones.

There is nothing magic in the cost-benefit ratio; one could equally compare two columns of a table of costs and benefits, discounted to the present using the accepted accounting technique of present worth. The big problem is to formulate the decision problem in the first place, account for the alternatives, optimize any mixes as necessary and, finally, present the results in a form understandable to those who aren't familiar with the jargon, but quite aware of the issues involved.

Of course the McNamara approach to Defence decision making is a tremendous step forward from the seat of the pants method, but it would be naive of us to imagine it will always produce the right answer. Like computers, it is only as good as the formulation and the input data. This brings to mind the saying, "There are lies, damned lies and statistics".

Finally, as an example of the traps into which the unwary may fall, let us consider a simple case of the 'Scale of Project Problem'. Suppose the maximum cost benefit ratio of project 1 is 2.5 at an outlay of one million dollars. Further outlays would increase the absolute returns, but the cost benefit ratio would drop to 2.3, say, for a total outlay of 1.3 million dollars. Now suppose we could spend 0.3 million dollars on a second project having the maximum cost benefit ratio of 1.2. So the total benefits from the total outlay of 1.3 million dollars would be $(2.5 \times 1,000,000 + 1.2 \times 300,000) = 2,860,000$ dollars. On the other hand, we could have invested the whole 1.3 million in project 1, giving a total benefit of $2.3 \times 1,300,000 = 2,990,000$ dollars. This simple sum shows that it could be preferable to operate at a point off the optimum for the one project rather than run two projects exactly on the optimum. Thus, this decision is not quite so simple as Major van Gelder implies. The moral here is that, while analytical techniques have their use, the formulation of the problem is of prime importance.

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J. C. M. Jones