AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

No. 223 December 1967

AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

[redacted] *Editor:* C. F. Coady
Staff Artist: G. M. Capper

The Australian Army Journal is printed and published for the Directorate of Military Training by Renown Press Pty. Ltd., and issued through Base Ordnance Depots on the scale of one per officer, officer of cadets, and cadet under officers.

Contributions which should be addressed to the Editor, Australian Army Journal, Directorate of Military Training, Army Headquarters, Canberra, are invited from all ranks of the Army, Cadet Corps and Reserve of Officers.

$10 will be paid to the author of the best article published in each issue. In addition, annual prizes of $60 and $20 respectively will be awarded to the authors gaining first and second places in the year.

AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

A periodical review of military literature

No. 223, DECEMBER, 1967

Contents

(Australian War Memorial)

SANANANDA, December 1942. Australian infantrymen move forward through a group of Americans to

Aspects of the Military Geography of South-East Asia

H. S. Hodges and G. R. Webb,
Royal Military College, Duntroon

And so the campaign of General Slim and the American-directed Chinese forces which started from the Hukawng Valley had to be conducted in the most difficult of all ways. There were no roads leading from Assam across the huge jungle-clad ridges which barred the way to the valleys of the Chindwin and the Irrawaddy. Everything had to be improvised.

— C. Falls, 'Geography and War Strategy' in *The Geographical Journal*, Jan 1949

The jumbled, rough and steep mountainous terrain of north-western Luzon makes a major military effort a problem even in dry weather.

— R. R. Smith, *Triumph in the Philippines* (1963)

Introduction

THE term 'South-East Asia' is a collective name for the series of peninsulas and islands which lie to the east of India and Pakistan and to the south of China. The area comprises Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, North and South Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Indonesia and the Philippines.

South-East Asia sprawls across the equator, extending from 28 degrees 30 minutes N to 11 degrees S and from 92 degrees 20 minutes E to 134 degrees 50 minutes W. The complex physical character of South-East Asia makes it a very distinctive region. In contrast to the massive continental areas of India and China, South-East Asia is an area of intricate relief and outline — 'an area of geographical fragmentation, an area broken into peninsulas and islands'.[1] The extent to which the sea intrudes can be seen from the fact that within the broad limits of the region as defined above the sea exceeds the land in the ratio of roughly four to one.

This is the first of a series of articles on the military geography of South-East Asia written for the AAJ.

Professor Hodges received the degree of B.Sc. (Econ.) and Diploma of Education of the University of London before serving (1940-46) in the Royal Artillery in Britain and India. He has been in charge of Economics and related subjects at RMC Duntroon since 1948.

Mr Webb received the degrees of M.Com. (1962) and B.A. (1967) of the University of Melbourne, and he has lectured and tutored in Economic Geography at that university. He was a Senior Project Officer Dept. of National Development, before joining the RMC staff as a Senior Lecturer in Economics in 1966.

The land surface of South-East Asia totals 1,571,000 square miles. About half of this is accounted for by the single mass of the peninsula mainland, while the remaining area is divided among the several thousand islands which comprise Indonesia and the Philippines.

Structure

In studying the relief of South-East Asia and its effect upon military operations, it is necessary, first of all, to have some understanding of the geological history of the region, and of its underlying structure.

South-East Asia is mostly an area of fairly recent origins. As Fisher comments 'the physique of South-East Asia differs fundamentally from that of most other tropical lands . . . the proportion of its area which is accounted for by geologically youthful structures is strikingly high in comparison with the inter-tropical zones of both Africa and the Americas, much the greater part of which consists of ancient pre-Cambrian table-lands of considerable altitude and vast extent'.[2] The youthfulness of the region is perhaps nowhere better demonstrated than in the case of Indonesia where at least 70 per cent of the surface rocks are either Tertiary or Quaternary in age.[3]

Before proceeding to describe the structural history of South-East Asia, a brief explanation should be made of the classification of geological time. Geological time is divided into four main eras, namely the Cainozoic, Mesozoic, Palaeozoic and pre-Cambrian eras. In turn, these eras are subdivided into periods and epochs. The Cainozoic, Mesozoic and Palaeozoic eras cover the last 600 million years of the earth's history, whilst the Pre-Cambrian era covers all earlier history. The geological time scale is set out in some detail in Table 1 and should serve as a useful reference point for the following discussion.

The present structure of South-East Asia was evolved in a number of clearly defined stages:

● The pre-Cambrian folding of Cambodia and South Vietnam. The oldest known portion of the region is a piece of pre-Cambrian folding in Cambodia and South Vietnam (see Figure 1). Broadly speaking, it was around this ancient nucleus that the rest of South-East Asia was gradually built up by a successive series of folds on its outer margins in subsequent geological times.

---

[1] C. A. Fisher, 'South-East Asia: The Balkans of the Orient?' *Geography*, Nov 1962, p. 347.
[2] C. A. Fisher, *South-East Asia*, London, 1964, p. 20.
[3] Fisher, p. 12. In Java the figure rises to over 99 per cent.

THE GEOLOGICAL TIME SCALE

Table 1

Era	Period	Age in Years	Major Orogenies
Cainozoic	Quaternary	0—1,000,000	
	Tertiary	1—70,000,000	Western Burma, Indonesia, Philippines
Mesozoic	Cretaceous	70—135,000,000	Eastern Burma, Thailand, Malaya, South-West Borneo, Northern Vietnam
	Jurassic	135—180,000,000	
	Triassic	180—225,000,000	
Palaeozoic	Permian	225—270,000,000	Northern and Eastern Burma, Northern Vietnam, North Western Thailand
	Carboniferous	270—350,000,000	
	Devonian	350—400,000,000	
	Silurian	400—440,000,000	
	Ordovician	440—500,000,000	
	Cambrian	500—600,000,000	
Pre-Cambrian		600,000,000 — 3,000,000,000 +	Cambodia, South Vietnam

● The Palaeozoic folding of northern Burma and northern Vietnam. Considerable palaeozoic folding can be traced through the Kachin hills of northern Burma, the Shan plateau and the mountains of northern Vietnam. During this era, Australia was extended by mountain building out towards Timor and northwards to include what are now the coastlands of southern New Guinea. Much of this extension has by now been levelled and submerged and now constitutes the (Sahul) continental shelf beneath the Timor and Arafura Seas.

● The extensive mountain building of Mesozoic times. Considerable mountain building occurred in Mesozoic times, giving rise to the mountains of northern Vietnam, eastern Laos, central and southern Thailand, lower Burma, Malaya and south-western Borneo. In other words during this time most of the mainland portion of South-East Asia was built, together with its continental shelf. As Fisher points out, following this phase of orogenesis (mountain building) 'the mainland portion of South-East Asia was built outwards approximately to the position of the present-day Shan-Tenasserim highlands in the west, and to the respective eastern and northern margins of Sumatra and Java in the south-east and south. Thus in late Triassic times the great massif of Sundaland . . . much of it now covered by the shallow waters of the Malacca Straits and the South China Seas first took shape as a coherent whole.'[4]

[4] Fisher, *South-East Asia*, p. 12.


STRUCTURE OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA
(After C.A.Fisher)
Exposed Pre-Cambrian folding.
Paleozoic folding.
Mesozoic folding.
Tertiary folding.
Tertiary folding and recent vulcanicity
Limits of shelves.
0 200 400 600 Miles
INDIA
PAKISTAN
INDIA
BURMA
NORTH VIETNAM
LAOS
THAILAND
CAMBODIA
SOUTH VIETNAM
PHILIPPINES
MALAYA
SUNDA SHELF
SABAH
SARAWAK
BORNEO
SUMATRA
A
MENTAWAI ISLANDS
CELEBES
Banda Sea
WEST IRIAN
NEW GUINEA
PAPUA
JAVA
TIMOR
SAHUL SHELF
AUSTRALIA
20°
10°
0°

FIGURE 1

The older areas of South-East Asia, i.e. the pre-Cambrian massif, the Palaeozoic and Mesozoic folds (including the Sunda Shelf), are sometimes referred to collectively as the Indo-Malayan system, and form a marked contrast to the surrounding Tertiary structures.

● The building of the mountain arcs of Tertiary times. The last major phase of folding took place in Tertiary times, when most of the high mountain ranges surrounding the Pacific Ocean and those stretching from Burma across to the Western Mediterranean were created. Here it is useful to distinguish between the formation of the Burma—Java mountain arcs and the Philippine mountains. During the Mesozoic era great thicknesses of sediments had been laid down in the geosynclines or ocean troughs between New Guinea and Borneo, and along the western edge of the South-East Asian mainland. These relatively soft rocks were uplifted in late Cretaceous times, following compressional movements between the Sunda Shelf and the Sahul/Australian massif. The moulding of the Mesozoic material against the Sunda Shelf is illustrated by Figure 2 which shows a cross-section through the Mentawai Islands,

FIGURE 2. Cross-section from A–B on Figure 1 (after R.R.Rawson)– (across central Sumatra).



a Mentawai Islands.
b Volcanic Western range.
c Longitudinal valley
d Folded Eastern range.
e Coastal plain and swamp
f Swampy island.
g Malacca Strait
h Southern Malaya

1 Mesozoic and Tertiary rocks, severely folded.
2 Tertiary, gently folded over Sunda Platform (Mesozoic)
3 Recent Alluvium.

central Sumatra and the Malacca Strait. Finally, in Tertiary times intensive folding led to the formation of the Burma—Java mountain system. This consists of two great mountain arcs. The first and older of the two is known as the outer arc and runs through the western ranges of Burma, the Andaman islands, the Mentawai islands, the Moluccas and possibly the eastern Philippines. The second and more youthful arc is termed the inner arc and runs roughly parallel to the outer arc through central Burma, Sumatra, Java and the lesser Sunda islands, Wetar (north of Timor), and thence round the eastern side of the Banda Sea. With regard to the formation of the mountains of the Philippines, Robequain has shown that the exisiting outlines of the Philippines are due to very

recent phenomena.[5] The greater part of the island group was built up during mid-Tertiary times as a result of the folding of sedimentary rocks. At that stage it is possible that a continuous island may have stretched from Luzon to the Celebes. However, due to violent earth movements, the land mass was broken into islands, giving rise to the present complex outline of the Philippines.[6]

The Indonesian and Philippine archipelagos together form part of one of the world's main unstable belts. Evidence of crustal movement is to be seen firstly in the volcanic activity of the two island groups: for example, there are 17 active volcanoes in Java, 10 in Sumatra and 12 in the Philippines.[7] A second characteristic is the concentration of seismic activity in the two archipelagos. The many major earthquakes experienced in this area are yet another symptom of its instability.

The volcanic and earthquake activity in this zone of young mountains at times causes heavy loss of property and life. For example, the eruption of Mount Agung in north-eastern Bali in March 1963 resulted in the loss of 1,500 lives. In February 1967 an earthquake in eastern Java demolished nearly 6,000 houses in the city of Malang and killed 51 people. In May 1967 an earthquake destroyed more than 2,000 buildings in the town of Lhokseumaive in northern Sumatra and killed 10 people, and again in 1967 violent volcanic activity is feared about 30 miles south of Manila.

Relief

The foregoing comments on the structure of South-East Asia help to explain the present relief of the region which is characteristically mountainous, lowlands being the exception rather than the rule, and slopes of over 45 degrees being not uncommon. Thus in Vietnam, for example, mountains and upland areas occupy about 80 per cent of the total area. Similarly in Malaya, at least 70 per cent of the peninsula is over 1,000 feet and over 4 per cent of the area comprises steep or actually mountainous land.

Throughout the mainland portion of South-East Asia the prevailing pattern of relief is ridge and furrow, especially where the great rivers of the Irrawaddy, Salween, Menam and Mekong occupy roughly parallel depressions.

As might be expected, the island archipelagos of Indonesia and the Philippines take their relief from the mountain arcs which traverse the region. In most cases their relief is dominated by rugged mountain backbones.

---

[5] Charles Robequain, *Malaya, Indonesia, Borneo and the Philippines* (translated by E. D. Laborde), London, 1961, p. 259.

[6] Robequain, p. 260.

[7] It should be noted that there is a striking contrast between the two mountain arcs of the Burma-Java system. Thus whilst the inner arc is dotted with volcanoes, many of which are still active, the outer arc is non-volcanic.

The relief of South-East Asia has been considerably modified over time by erosion. Throughout the region the rate of erosion tends to be very high, as most parts receive over 60 inches of rainfall a year. The abundant rainfall has brought about a network of many major rivers which transport tremendous volumes of alluvium. High temperatures and rainfall combine with abundant rotting vegetation to produce rapid chemical erosion of the rocks, and in limestone areas this gives rise to Karst features including many caves which have had to be cleared of the enemy under hazardous conditions.

The extent to which the relief of the region has been modified can be seen from the fact that the highest mountains in the oldest areas of the mainland and Borneo have been gradually denuded to about 10,000 feet. It is thought that they were originally of huge size, probably of Himalayan proportions. On the other hand, the mountains of the Tertiary zone have been subjected to much less erosion. As a result important contrasts occur in relief as between the older and younger areas. As Fisher has pointed out: 'The contrast between the older Indo-Malayan core and the peripheral Tertiary structures is reflected in the generally more subdued and characteristically erosional relief of the former and the bolder and more markedly tectonic lineaments associated with the latter.'[8]

Influence of Terrain on Military Operations

The rugged relief of South-East Asia restricts ground movement to a considerable extent. Movement within particular countries is generally unhampered in the plains and river deltas. Here the terrain is flat and use can be made of existing roads, railways and waterways. However, even this remark must be qualified in so far as paddy fields affect the cross-country movement of troops and vehicles. Furthermore, during the wet season the plains and deltas may become vast sheets of water. It is significant that in the Allied drive to recapture Rangoon in 1945, General Slim was concerned to reach the city before the commencement of the wet season. Unfortunately, however, the early arrival of the monsoon turned the countryside into a lake and his forces were halted only a short distance from their objective. 'On the afternoon of the 1st May, a great misfortune befell 4 Corps. Pegu was in our hands and the advance resumed, when a torrential storm burst over the whole area, followed throughout the night by continuous heavy rain. The monsoon was on us — a fortnight before its time! By morning much of the country was waterlogged, airstrips going out of action, and the Pegu River rising ominously .... The troops slipped, splashed and skidded forward, but all streams were in spate and all bridges down. On the evening of the 2nd ... the 17th Division was halted in drenching rain forty-one miles by road from its goal. More heavy

[8] Fisher, *South-East Asia*, p. 15.

rain during the night swept away approaches to bridges already built, and a whole brigade found itself marooned on what had suddenly become an island.'[9] As a result, it was a seaborne assault force which first reached Rangoon.

Away from the lowlands the terrain of both the mainland and the islands is mainly rugged and mountainous and poses a serious problem for the movement and use of troops, armour and artillery. In addition, military operations are hampered not only by high steep ranges and deeply dissected plateaux, but also by the climate and the dense vegetation which clothes much of the upland areas.

This is illustrated by the difficulties of map reading to take one small example. Steepness of slope (rather than altitude), combined with high rainfalls have in most parts of South-East Asia inhibited human development of the country[10], so that in the highlands one forested mountainside looks like any other and even the valley bottoms may lack roads and habitations. Thus map reading to within distances of 100 yards becomes extremely difficult — even when the vegetation permits a view of the landscape.

The extent to which the terrain can hamper military operations is strikingly illustrated by the fighting in Burma and the Philippines during World War II. Owing to limitations of space it is not possible to utilize all the available material from these campaigns, but some of the more pertinent illustrations are highlighted below.

The western mountains of Burma (including the Chin Hills and the Arakan Yoma) are very steep and densely forested. Reaching heights of up to 12,000 feet they have long formed a natural barrier to contact between India and South-East Asia. The difficulties which they presented to military operations during the Burma campaign are vividly portrayed by Slim in his history of the conflict. Flying across the Arakan ranges in 1942, Slim describes his first impressions of the terrain in the following terms: 'We flew over the Arakan Yomas, and I had my first sight of the jungle-clad hills of Burma. Flying over them you can realize what an obstacle they are to vision, but you cannot really appreciate what an obstacle they are to movement. To do that you must hack and push your way through the clinging, tight-packed greenery, scramble up the precipitous slopes and slide down the other side, endlessly, as if you were walking along the teeth of a saw . . . as we roared over these endless, razor-edged ridges, covered to their very summits with the densest jungle, they gave the impression of a thick-piled dull green carpet, rucked up into fold after fold.'[11] In the fighting around Imphal and the Allied drive back through the mountains to Tamu and Kalewa, the

[9] Field-Marsall Sir William Slim, *Defeat Into Victory*, London, 1956, p. 505.
[10] There are notable exceptions in parts of Luzon and Bali, to name but two, where terracing of hillsides for food-crop cultivation has been pursued up to considerable altitudes.
[11] Slim, p. 9.

problems of the terrain were always a dominating consideration. The Allied troops had to struggle through continuous rain and mud sometimes knee-deep, whilst whole sections of the roads vanished in landslides. The combined effects of terrain and climate were perhaps most clearly demonstrated on the 'Chocolate Staircase'. This 'was the name given to the Tiddim road where in seven miles it climbed three thousand feet with thirty-eight hairpin bends and an average gradient of one in twelve. The road surface was earth, and marching men, animals and vehicles soon churned it into ankle-deep mud. The hill-side, and with it the road itself, often disappeared in thunderous landslides . . .'[12] Although movement was seriously restricted in the western ranges, once out on the central plains of Burma the Allied forces were able to advance at a much greater speed and had much greater scope for the employment of armour, artillery and aircraft.[13]

In the Philippines campaign the incredibly steep and rugged terrain in northern Luzon presented a serious obstacle to American forces in their efforts to destroy the Japanese. This is readily apparent from an examination of the official American history of the invasion of Luzon.[14] For example the drive to capture Baguio quickly revealed the problems imposed by the terrain in northern Luzon: 'the terrain was such that it was often as difficult for the regiment to knock out one Japanese machine-gun nest as it would have been to destroy an entire Japanese infantry battalion.'[15] Similar problems were also encountered in the fighting along the Villa Verde trail in the Salacsac Pass area.[16] However, the most difficult terrain of all was probably encountered in north-west Luzon.[17]

The rugged relief presents problems to fast aircraft similar to those encountered in Korea. Jet-powered planes in many areas find inadequate turning space in the valleys and must adopt courses which will avoid head-on collision with the steep slopes, while light and slow aircraft can seek protection by keeping to valley bottoms and small re-entrants which enemy jets dare not penetrate. The dangers for aircraft posed by the terrain are of course aggravated by low visibility caused by low cloud bases and by heavy rain during the wet season, and vice versa. Air-field selection is restricted by the topography. Major air-bases must be confined to lowlands (there are no sizeable, undissected plateau areas), on sites not subject to risk of flooding and preferably remote from mountains, but level interfluves and broad coastal plains are not everywhere available. Minor air strips are easier to locate, but in the highlands they will

[12] Slim, p. 362.
[13] Slim, pp. 385-6.
[14] R. R. Smith, *Triumph in the Philippines* (1963), a volume in the official series, United States Army in World War II.
[15] Smith, p. 487.
[16] Smith, pp. 497-8.
[17] Smith, pp. 543-4.

be confined to ridge-tops where landing and take-off hazards are on a par with those of an aircraft carrier lacking all deck facilities, or to small flats in deep valleys, the limitations of which are equally obvious.

Finally, it must be stressed that whilst the relief of South-East Asia undoubtedly presents a serious problem for ground movement, nowadays tactical mobility can be restored by means of air transport, particularly through the use of helicopters.[18] This fact has been clearly demonstrated in the present conflict in South Vietnam. Nevertheless, it is surprising that the military potential of the helicopter has taken so long to be recognized. □

[18] See the excellent article on this subject by Major I. R. Way, 'The Influence of Mobility on Military Operations in South-East Asia' in the *Australian Army Journal*, Mar 1966, pp. 18-32.

PRISONERS OF THE ITALIANS

ONE instance of Calcaterra's [Camp Commandant] wrath is worthy of record if only to exemplify the sense of humour that never deserted the average Australian even in the direst circumstances. Calcaterra, inspecting the morning check parade, came upon an offending beard and ordered that all beards were to be removed.

The murmurs and demeanour of the rest of the men conveyed to the commandant that the order was not popular and likely to be disobeyed. Thereupon Calcaterra ordered that not only beards but also hair on the head should be removed. Remonstrance by the camp leader, Warrant-Officer Cotman, who was vociferously supported by the rest of the parade, further incensed Calcaterra who worked himself into such a state that the prisoners' attitude changed from resentment to open amusement, bringing Calcaterra almost to apoplexy. He rushed out of the camp and returned with all available guards with fixed bayonets; a machine-gun was mounted and small handcarts loaded with handcuffs were wheeled into the compound. Those who refused the ministrations of the barber were handcuffed. As the refusals increased more handcuffs were called for. Half way through the proceedings one humorist, on leaving the barber's chair, bleated like a sheep and scampered away jumping a non-existent hurdle in imitation of a sheep being released. This was taken up by others until the compound resembled a burlesque of a shearing-shed yard. Eventually 'shearing' was completed, the handcuffed ones were led away to the cells and the camp quietened down.

That night after the camp seemed at rest, a plaintive 'baa' came from one of the huts, and was taken up from hut to hut until the camp was in a pandemonium which continued almost throughout the night. The climax arrived the next morning when Calcaterra discovered that those placed in detention for refusal had not been shorn! His wrath then fell on his guards. Some months later the malcontents were removed to another camp — ironically, the best in Italy.

—Barton Maughan, *Tobruk and El Alamein* (1967)
Recounted by J. L. Brill, *Stand-To*, April 1950.

Trends in Japanese Nationalism

E. D. Daw

FOR many years after Japan's defeat in World War II nationalism seemed to many observers to be virtually non-existent, or at the most harmless and inward-looking. Yet there have been grounds in recent years for speculation that Japan's formerly strong nationalism may be re-emerging, in a manner highly reminiscent of (if perceptively different to) the type of nationalism which has been characteristic of Japan in previous eras. This speculation can be seen not only in the works of writers who are not favourably disposed towards Japan, but also in those who believe that 'the likelihood of her not changing course [in foreign policy] seems greater'.[1]

In the light of this it is instructive to examine the type of nationalism which has existed in Japan in modern times, the reasons for it, and the forms which it has taken.

Most of the elements of Japanese nationalism were present before the development of the nationalist movement. Indeed, nationalism could hardly be said to have been discernible in Japan until the mid-19th century. Loyalty was rather decentralised, and was directed to the samurai rather than to the nation.[2]

There is evidence that the Japanese were at least worried by Russian 'pressure' in the 18th and 19th centuries, and by British pressure in the early part of the 19th century. There were some partially successful proposals that Western methods be adopted. However, it was American pressure, culminating in the appearance of Admiral Perry in 1853, which first led to significant anti-foreign feelings in 19th century Japan. The reaction of many to the subsequent treaty was immediate and violent: 'Revere the Emperor, expel the barbarians'.[3] The greatest awareness of the implications of Western power was to be found amongst the ruling classes; national consciousness for them meant defence against infiltration.

---

[1] J. V. d'Cruz, 'Japanese Foreign Policy and the Cold War', *Australian Quarterly*, Vol XXXVII, No. 3, Sept 1965, p. 48.
[2] R. Storry, *The Double Patriots: A Study of Japanese Nationalism* (1959), p. 1.
[3] D. M. Brown, *Nationalism in Japan: An Introductory Historical Survey* (Berkeley, 1955), Ch. 4.

Mr. E. D. Daw is a graduate of the University of Sydney. He taught there in 1966 before taking up an appointment as Lecturer in Government at the Royal Military College early in 1967. He has previously contributed articles on various subjects to other journals.

Thus, modern Japanese nationalism stems directly from the impact of European power. Prior to the Meiji Restoration of 1868, however, the divisive tendencies amongst the ruling classes were too strong to allow the emergence of any really positive nationalism, despite the otherwise favourable background.

Japan is somewhat unique with respect to the combination of factors which made the development of nationalism much easier and much faster than perhaps it would otherwise have been. Among these factors are the following:

- Geographical separateness. Japan had been free from foreign invasion, possessed historical continuity as a geographical entity, and has considerable uniformity of economic activity.
- Belief in a common racial descent.
- Possession of a language which was both distinct and uniform.
- Common and unique religious beliefs.
- A common government, accepted as such.[4]

Other factors of a less objective nature were:

- Belief in a 'divine mission of expansion' and improvement.
- Belief in the possession of superlative inborn qualities.[5]

There was little nationalism evident in the early years of the Restoration leadership — rather, it aimed at self-consolidation. But it is clear that the fact of the Restoration, and stronger anti-foreign feelings around the time of the Restoration, were 'manifestations of a more positive form of national consciousness'.[6]

Anti-foreignism declined after 1868, as the leadership concentrated on internal centralization and consolidation. For example, clans were abolished, and taxes were henceforth to be paid in money rather than in kind; a national conscript army was established; government-sponsored economic reform added to social cohesion; and Shintoism was reformed and established as the official religion. It was given still higher status in 1889. In addition, educational reforms were introduced in 1872 as a means of implementing the reform programme. As a result national consciousness spread rapidly, and by 1887 the purpose of education had been broadened, and it was now deliberately aimed at inculcating loyalty to the nation.

The results of all this were political centralization, economic expansion, and (most importantly) a high degree of ideological unity.[7] All this moved Japan further along the road to modern nationalism.[8]

---

[4] Brown, Ch. 1.
[5] Storry, p. 3 ff.
[6] Brown, Ch. 4.
[7] Brown, Chs. 5, 6; Storry, p. 10.
[8] At this time also, the first 'right-wing' nationalist groups were founded. They were disgruntled at the social and ideological changes in Japan. (See M. B. Jansen, 'Ultra-nationalism in Post-War Japan', *Political Quarterly*, April 1956).

In 1887, Japan attempted to revise the treaty with America (viewed by many as disadvantageous to Japan), and the internal reaction to this is seen by some observers as the beginning of 'modern' Japanese nationalism. There was a psychological reaction to Westernism, and a swing back to traditionalism. A 'national essence' movement was promoted from below (not from above). Its influence was felt, for example, in art, history, and religion. Expansionist sentiments began to overshadow internal reform and consolidation in the minds of many Japanese. 'Agitation for more positive action' had grown considerably by 1894, as had resentment towards Western nations. Christianity was again condemned as un-Japanese.

At the turn of the century, however, anti-Russian feelings made up the dominant theme of Japanese nationalism. By 1904, social solidarity had virtually reached modern proportions, and the Russo-Japanese war of that year was in every sense of the word a 'popular' one. Some of the educated elements had been actively agitating for the war.[9]

The tone of Japanese nationalism was altered radically by the victory over Russia. There was general pride in national accomplishments, and confidence in Japan's ability to become more powerful. The tone was now one of confidence, rather than one of fear, as before. It was now more like the nationalism that had emerged in France, Britain, and America.

This inter-war period (1905-1914) saw some efforts to expand Japanese interests on the Continent by peaceful means. Nationalist societies were active (especially with respect to China and Korea), and this usually preceded activity by the Japanese Government (in China, for example). Until 1918, however, the nationalist societies of any importance were few in number, and consisted of two main types, the reputable and non-political variety, and the conspiratorial variety.

The main interest of early Japanese nationalism lay in geographical expansion; and the coming of World War in 1914 presented Japan with opportunities for expansion on the Continent. These were readily exploited.

The relative decline in prosperity at the end of World War I saw an increasingly restless working class, while tenant farmers also showed discontent. This discontent was basic to subsequent trends in Japanese nationalism.[10] The right-wing in Japan developed along two distinct lines, the first of which was fairly orthodox in tone, emphasizing 'national essence'. The second line of development was almost fascist in character, advocating many sweeping reforms. Fortunately, this was the less successful of the two lines of develop-

[9] Brown, Chs. 6, 7; Storry, p. 17.
[10] See Brown, Chapters 7—9.

ment.[11] Japanese fascism in this period was virtually confined to the civilian population — military fascism did not really develop until after 1931. Right-wing societies proliferated, this being a persistent feature of modern Japanese nationalism. The social sources of support for Japanese fascism were to be found amongst workers and small owners, and those with any significant degree of education — i.e. among the 'pseudo-intellectuals'.[12] Japanese nationalism in this period again became rather fearful in tone, as it had been at the turn of the century, and internal strengthening of the nation was again emphasised. Relations with China were poor throughout the 1920s, and had become particularly bad by 1928. Incidents were deliberately provoked by nationalists amongst the military.[13]

Storry has put the stimulation of nationalist organizations in the 1918-1931 period down to the following basic causes, all of which are 'external' in nature:

- Failure to get a 'racial equality clause' in the Covenant of the League of Nations.
- Termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance by Britain.
- The Nine-Power Treaty, which imposed restraints on action towards China.
- The evacuation of Siberia in 1922, under Allied pressure.
- The 'exclusion' legislation of America in 1924 with respect to immigration.
- Reduction in the standing army.
- The abortive military adventure in Shantung.
- Ratification of the Pact of Paris (1928). The Pact failed to reconcile Japan and China in the Manchurian controversy.
- The London Naval Treaty of 1930.[14]

These, together with the 'internal' factors discussed above, indicate that nationalism in Japan had by 1931 undergone a fundamental change in comparison with 1914. The economic conditions of the early 1930s gave an added impetus to the development of fanatical nationalism.

The year 1931 marks a major turning point in the development of modern Japanese nationalism.

In 1930 a group of army officers began plotting for a 'national reorganization'. Unfortunately, the more conservative forces were too cautious to effectively counter the military moves.

The Manchurian Incident of 1931 was directly planned and created by the army, in opposition to consular and government officials. Disapproval was also forthcoming from the Emperor and

[11] Jansen.
[12] Maruyama, *Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics* (Oxford), Ch. 2, Pt. V.
[13] Brown, Ch. 9.
[14] Storry, Ch. 1 (p. 17 ff).

some members of the Cabinet. Despite widespread respect for 'the Emperor system', there was clearly some absence of respect for the Emperor's personal views. It is both interesting and significant to note that, even at this stage, an all-embracing nationalist movement could not be formed. Most of the many nationalist groups were urban in composition, although some were rural. The latter generally sprung from unfavourable reactions to cities, industrial life, etc.

In 1932, a series of assassinations occurred, largely at the instigation of various right-wing nationalist groups. The immediate cause was dissatisfaction with the speed and direction of overseas expansion. Public sympathy was with the assassins, aided by anti-Japanese sentiment abroad following Japan's successful defiance of the League of Nations over the Manchurian Incident.[15] The significance of the assassinations was that there could be no turning back from overseas expansion; liberalism was now a spent force. The army began preparations for war in 1935-36, despite internal factionalism.

A greater emphasis on symbolism now became apparent as ultra-nationalism took over. Liberalism, capitalism, and democracy were being increasingly rejected, and the establishment of an economy based on the mystical concept of 'Japanism' was favoured. Emphasis was again placed on such things as 'national entity', 'spiritual mobilisation', and so on. The crises of 1936-37, culminating in the invasion of China in 1937, drew the still diverse nationalist movement a little closer together.[16]

The war with China provided further evidence of military domination — indeed, it began without the government's prior consent or knowledge. The irrational nationalist outlook of the military became more evident.[17] The Japanese fascist movement had reached maturity, and was moving rapidly into the stage of consummation, in which the civilian element lost control to the military.

Until 1936, there had been indications that nationalism in Japan could have become a popular movement, but after that date there was no doubt that a ruling clique was in firm control of the movement. The movement had, however, been acceptable to the ruling groups — the appeal of non-nationalist ideologies had been weakened, military men were indicated as the natural leaders of the nation, and deeper feelings of national unity had been aroused. Fascism became increasingly difficult to distinguish from ultra-nationalism, the mass media were closely controlled, there was closer identification with the Axis Powers, and the nation was 'spiritually mobilised.[18]

[15] Storry, Chs. 3—5.
[16] Brown, Ch. 10.
[17] Storry, pp. 216, 221.
[18] Brown, Ch. 6.

It was fascism from above, for the fascist movement from below had faded into the background and was absorbed into 'totalitarian transformation from above'.[19]

Ultra-nationalism in the 1930s thus led irrevocably to its consumation at Pearl Harbour. It is apparent that Japanese nationalism never really faced the attitude of the United States.

Several observations may be made about Japanese nationalism in the 1930s. For the nationalist movement as a whole, it was as much a time of study and preparation as of agitation. Unfortunately, there existed no 'comprehensive documentary outline' of Japanese plans, as there was in *Mein Kampf* in the case of Germany. The political history of Japan in the 1931-1941 period was not the product of a single grand conspiracy, for the nation was governed by 'a narrow but disunited collective leadership' which was indisputably susceptible to pressure. For many observers, the most arresting feature of ultra-nationalism was its pervasiveness. For Storry, the most important reason for this was 'the readiness of the collective leadership to accept as public opinion the general ultra-nationalist thesis of an urgently-expanding Japan'.[20]

At no time was there a mass organization, and there was no zeal for organizing the masses from above (although popular support was widespread). The plans of the fascist nationalists were generally destructive, rather than constructive in nature.[21]

Japanese nationalism suffered a severe setback following Japan's defeat in 1945. It 'began with provincialism and traditional loyalties, was taken and used from above, and in 1945 returned from whence it came.[22] Yet in the very weaknesses of the pre-war nationalist movement lay the best hope for the survival of many nationalist groups. Among these weaknesses was their lack of ideological and organizational unity.

Nationalist groups in post-war Japan, as in the pre-war period, were largely right-wing in character. They continued to strive unsuccessfully for mass support, being handicapped by ineffective leadership. As before, their best hope lay in alliances with the existing ruling groups.[23]

Post-war nationalism was primarily 'for home consumption', and as such was often encouraged by the government. Militarism was abandoned.[24] Non-political symbols were used, but these could become political in character given the right circumstances. In the early post-war years in particular, there was a kind of 'ideological vacuum' in Japan, and the appeal of nationalism was therefore to a

[19] Storry, p. 192; Maruyama, Ch. 2, Part VI.
[20] Storry, pp. 298—300.
[21] Maruyama, Ch. 2, Part IV.
[22] I. I. Morris, *Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan* (1960), Ch. 10.
[23] Morris, Ch. 3.
[24] Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (Boston, 1945), Ch. 13.

latent sense of nostalgia, to an inward kind of nationalism. There was some post-war revival of nationalist elements along traditional lines. The continual stress on crises (whether political, economic, or international) has furthered this development. Geographical expansion is no longer stressed, and anti-foreignism is not nearly as strong as it was before the war.

Many theses have been advanced in attempts to explain the character, purpose, and direction of Japanese nationalism since 1868. Some are more tenable than others. However, we can only survey them briefly in this article. (We have already mentioned some of the factors which made the development of nationalism easier in Japan.) Unfortunately Japanese nationalism has never had a solid, conceptual structure, as was the case in Nazi Germany for example.

Perhaps the basic point which must be noted is that the standard of values in Japan is relative proximity to 'the central entity.'[25] Directly connected to this was the Japanese social or family system, which was rigidly hierarchical. Each member of the family had his proper place, and had to observe it. The concept of equality was quite alien — each had to take his 'proper station.'[26] Family and birthplace were stressed as 'bonds of cohesion'.[27]

Translated onto the national plane, this led to a belief in the 'automatic righteousness of the Emperor', and from this it was but a short step to believe in the automatic righteousness of the nation's conduct abroad, especially as this conduct was legitimized by the symbolic use of the Emperor. By extending this logic to cover the world as a whole, the ultra-nationalists engendered a policy of 'causing all the nations to occupy their respective positions' vis-a-vis Japan, which would rank each country in an order based on social status. Once this order was secured there would be peace throughout the world. In such a scheme there is clearly no room for a concept like international law, which treats all nations alike and is equally binding on them.

The assumed divinity of the Emperor, and the 'fact' of Japan being 'coeval with heaven and earth' guaranteed the indefinite expansion of 'the range in which the ultimate value was valid', and conversely the expansion of the 'martial virtues of the Empire' reinforced the absolute nature of the central value. 'This process spiralled upwards from the time of the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars, through the so-called China Incident through the Pacific War.'

The Japanese education system, from 1872 onwards, was vital in the inculcation of the values of taking one's proper station and of loyalty to the Emperor. Furthermore, ethics and power were

[25] See Maruyama, Ch. 1, for a fuller treatment of this proposition.
[26] Benedict, Ch. 3.
[27] Maruyama, Ch. 2, Part III; Morris, Introduction.

interfused, while morality was something exterior. 'The real locus of Japanese morality was not in the conscience of the individual but in the affairs of the nation', and hence it was estimated in terms of its power.

Yet it must not be forgotten that modern Japanese nationalism stems directly (if not basically) from the impact of European power. The ruling classes in Japan were aware of the implications of Western power. This national consciousness was implanted by a 'systematic mobilization of traditional values'.[28]

Japanese nationalism was clearly 'external' in character. While emphasizing traditional Japanese values, it was constantly directed at the impact of foreign nations, no matter what form the impact took. In this respect, nationalism in Japan was not revolutionary but rather anti-revolutionary — it was what Maruyama calls a 'transfer mechanism' for such popular revolutionary energy as existed.

Alone among Asian nations, Japanese nationalism has completed one full cycle, and there is no strong reason why a second cycle should not commence in the future given the right combination of circumstances. Indeed, Japan today displays many of the features of the 1920s and 1930s[29] — nationalist groups are predominantly right-wing in character, they are splintered, with myriads of groups and sub-groups, each stressing its own particular viewpoint. In addition, they are without a mass base. Democracy has not become an ingrained feature of the Japanese way of life. Power is still exercised by a relatively narrow group.

Nevertheless, the right wing remains closer to Japanese nationalism and traditionalism than the left, and subject to circumstances it has the potential for becoming 'a significant auxiliary force in shaping Japan's future in an anti-democratic direction'.[30]

Nationalist groups in post-war Japan need to unite if they are to achieve concrete results even more than their pre-war counterparts did; for there are no dynamic forces to which they can attach themselves, while their prestige and self-confidence is almost entirely absent as is any vision of a 'future society'[31] Yet, Japan's history shows that given the right circumstances nationalism could well become a significant, even dominant force in the life of the nation once again.

Consequently, the announcement last year by the Prime Minister of Japan that his Government will support parliamentary action to revive the controversial Kigensetsu, or 'National Foundation Day',

---

[28] Maruyama, Chs. 1, 4.
[29] See W. M. Ball, *Nationalism and Communism in East Asia* (Melbourne, 1953), Ch. 2; H. Conroy, 'Japanese Nationalism and Expansionism', *American Historical Review*, July 1955.
[30] Morris, p. 203—5.
[31] Morris, p. 379 ff.

assumes considerable significance.[32] This holiday, first observed in 1872, was banned after 1945 by the Americans. While there was opposition to this from Japanese radicals, there was also a surprising degree of support for the measure.

The movement to revive Kigensetsu was headed by Shinto organizations, ex-servicemen's associations, and nationalist groups striving to raise the status of the Emperor. Many others are concerned with the moral and spiritual confusion of Japan's post-war youth, and see a revived (and possibly revised) form of nationalism as a remedy for this. The Socialists, however, condemned the revival of Kigensetsu, seeing in it the jingoism and conformist ultra-nationalism which so dominated Japan in the pre-war period.

Clearly, a revival of pervasive nationalism in Japan is becoming an increasingly relevant possibility. For the immediate future, little change seems likely. But with the centenary of the Meiji Restoration in 1968, and the opportunity for ending the present treaty with the U.S.A. in 1970, there will undoubtedly be a change in the *status quo* of Japan's internal and external political life. □

[32] *Economist*, 5 March 1966.

LIFE IN THE GUARDS

I was surprised that I felt so differently about the unit now that it was my own, and that I was no longer keeping the chair warm for someone else. It was a satisfactory feeling, as if one had paid the final instalment on a motor-car, and the machine at last really belonged to one. During my long spell as that half-creature, second-in-command, I had not felt at liberty to monkey with the system, but only to try to be a good steward who administered according to the letter of the law on behalf of the absent master. Now, however, there was a second-in-command as steward of the Regulations, and I was free to monkey.

As a first assault on this ancient citadel of bigotry, I formed a Commanding Officer's Committee. There were several members from each company and department, and the committee met fortnightly. The ostensible purpose was to bring up matters of welfare and amenities, but more important was the opportunity to keep a finger on the pulse of the unit. Often some routine order, thoughtlessly worded, creates hardship and discontent out of all proportion to its necessity. At my committee I learned exactly what was the impact on the individual in the barrack-room of promulgations issued from the comfort of the Orderly Room. Similarly, the representatives could learn from me the reasons for such orders.

—Thomas Firbank (Coldstream Guards) in *I Bought a Star*.

A Photo and a Story

Lieutenant-Colonel A. Argent,
Royal Australian Infantry

THE general gloom and drabness of Army Headquarters at Canberra is somewhat relieved on the second floor of Army Building 1 by photographs of past Military Boards. Appropriately enough, these photographs begin at the door of the Military Board room and then run along the corridor in a counter-clockwise direction as viewed, say, from the top of 'Bugs Bunny'. Different people look at them in different ways. Younger officers who are both ambitious and mathematically inclined have been known to calculate that if '. . . it has taken 62 years of Boards to produce 35 yards of photographs I should gaze out at posterity from the second stairway . . .'; young things who have finished Canberra Tech and who are waiting in the corridor for job interviews remark on the cut of the suit of one of our more recent Ministers; and a member of the present Board was heard to remark that while photographic techniques may have improved over the years, faces hadn't. Junior officers greeted this observation with discreet silence.

Every picture has its own story to tell, but the 1905 photograph of the first Military Board could not possibly give any hint that the Minister and the lieutenant-colonel seated on his left would soon be taking part in probably the most dramatic episode in the history of Australian arms — the landing at Anzac and, about 18 hours later, the proposal to re-embark that night. The story of their rendezvous with destiny is this.

First Military Board

Defence became a Commonwealth responsibility in 1901, but it was not until almost four years later that a military board came into being. During these years, Major-General Sir Edward Hutton was 'GOC the Military Forces of the Commonwealth of Australia' and the Service was administered by General orders. The two last General Orders issued were G.Os. No. 3 of 6 January 1903 and No. 4 of 7 January 1903 (a Saturday).

Lieutenant-Colonel Argent enlisted in the A.I.F. in 1945. In 1948 he graduated from the Royal Military College and was allotted to Infantry. After service in Japan and Korea with 3 RAR he completed a Flying Instructors Course in the UK. This was followed by service with BAOR Germany. From 1958 to 1962 he held flying appointments in Australia and qualified at the Australian Staff College. Service with 2 RAR and 3 RAR in Australia, Malaya and Borneo followed and he is presently occupying a staff appointment in AHQ Canberra.

FIRST MILITARY BOARD AND DIRECTORS MELBOURNE 1905

Standing (left to right) Capt P. N. Buckley (D of Wks), Cmdr S. A. Petheridge (Asst Sec D of D), Col (Hon Surg Gen) W. D. C. Williams (DGMS), F. Savage (D of Stores).

Sitting (left to right) Lt Col H. le Mesurier (C of Ord), Col J. C. Hoad (DAG), Lt Col the Hon J. W. M'Cay (Minister of Defence), Lt Col W. T. Bridges (C of Int), J. A. Thompson (F.M.).

Order Number 3 stated that 'A new system of administration and control of the Defence Forces of the Commonwealth will, under the Defence Acts 1903-04, commence on and from 12 January 1905 . . .' It went on to say that the Military Board would consist of:

Minister of State for Defence
Deputy A-G
Chief of Intelligence
Chief of Ordnance
Finance Member

and a schedule listed their responsibilities.

General Order No. 4 gave the names of those appointed to the Military Board.

The Minister of Defence was J. W. M'Cay and Chief of Intelligence was Lieutenant-Colonel W. T. Bridges, RAA. Five days later, on Thursday 12 January 1905, the Military Board met in Melbourne for the first time. At this meeting the Minister gave the general idea of the procedure he proposed should be adopted and said that members should join in discussions 'in a conversational manner without regard to seniority'. Other matters considered were information to the Press (only the Minister should give it), promotion of permanent officers of the RAA and engineers[1] (to be referred to the Chief of Ordnance for his remarks), the adoption of the Patterson or the Imperial Service bandolier (postponed for further consideration); and finally the seniority of the captain of the Ipswich Rifle Club was amicably determined.

At the time of this meeting the Minister, James Whiteside M'Cay, had just turned 41. He was born at Ballynure, Ireland whence his parents migrated to Victoria when he was a child. He was educated at Scotch College, Melbourne and was dux there in 1881. Five years later he was commissioned as a lieutenant in the Victorian Military Forces. He studied law and was called to the Victorian Bar in 1895. M'Cay was keen on politics, became a member of the Legislative Assembly of Victoria and then, in 1901, was elected to the first Federal Parliament. All through this period M'Cay continued his service in State Volunteer Forces and later in the Commonwealth Militia. For example, records show that on 4 February 1890, as a captain in 4th Battalion, Victorian Rifles, he gained a certificate in Army signalling. In 1897, as a major of 4th Battalion, Infantry Brigade, he was field officer at the Easter Camp of Instruction. By 1905, he had been a lieutenant- colonel for two years.

Bridges was three years older than M'Cay. He was born at Greenock, Scotland in 1861 where his father was a captain in the Royal Navy. His mother was from New South Wales. He was educated in the United Kingdom and at RMC Kingston, Canada, and

[1] The engineers became Royal in 1907.

then migrated to N.S.W. where he worked for the Roads and Bridges Department. In 1885 he was commissioned lieutenant into the N.S.W. Permanent Artillery and commanded the fort at Middle Head — a place where there was little to do. Bridges spent most of his time there sailing and reading novels. Following courses in the UK he was Chief Instructor of the School of Gunnery, Sydney, from 1893 until he served in the South African war 1899-1900. There he was a gunner major attached to the Cavalry Division. After his return to Australia he was the AQMG (lieutenant-colonel) at AHQ and, in 1905, became Chief of Intelligence, the genesis of our present General staff system.

1905-1914

M'Cay was not to remain long as Minister of Defence or in politics. He was defeated at the 1906 elections and was an unsuccessful candidate for the Senate in 1910. However, he maintained his interest in the Army and was CO of 8th Australian Infantry Regiment in 1907. Next year the Australian Intelligence Corps was formed and he was promoted Colonel and gazetted as 'Commander Australian Intelligence Corps'. As this was now a Citizen Force posting (a GS Branch having been formed) M'Cay continued practising law. In 1912 he was made Honorary Colonel of 67 Infantry Battalion.

Just as M'Cay's term of office was short, so was Bridges'. Next year — 1906 — he was promoted to colonel and went overseas to Canada and Europe on special duty mainly concerned with the formation of a general staff and imperial defence. In 1909 he became the first CGS and again went overseas where, among other things, he visited military academies. On his return he was appointed the first commandant of RMC Duntroon and for the third time in five years went overseas — this time for another look at military colleges in the UK and on the Continent. Bridges was Commander of RMC until May 1914 when he was made Inspector-General; he was visiting Queensland when the Great War began in August 1914.

The AIF and ANZAC

Natal and New Zealand were the only two countries of the British Empire which, before 1914, had made any provision for sending expeditionary forces overseas should England go to war. Luckily for Australia, however, one Defence Minister (Senator Pearce) had had the initiative to draw up a tentative scheme with New Zealand. This called for a force of 12,000 Australians and 6,000 New Zealanders and the figures were based on the contingents which had gone to the South African War. This time though, they would be grouped together to form a division. However, when this scheme was presented to the Australian Prime Minister, Joseph Cook, he considered that Australia should provide more men than 12,000 — in fact, in order to keep our contribution in line with Canada's offer of 30,000 (as was believed), our force should be 20,000. The force would be ready to leave

Australia in six weeks — a rapid mounting by present-day standards, but possible then because of the compulsory service scheme, the system of area officers and the idea that training would be completed in the United Kingdom. Most of this early planning was borne on the shoulders of a young major[2] because the CGS had only recently retired and his replacement had not yet returned from the UK. On his return to AHQ from Queensland Brigadier-General Bridges, still the Inspector-General — a man of particularly strong views and stern resolve — took over the task of organizing the expeditionary force. With great foresight he decided that the force must be a totally Australian division and that it should not be so constructed or presented to the British Government in such a way that it could be fragmented into brigades and attached to other formations. From this solid foundation Australian leaders in both world wars were able to resist attempts to employ Australian troops away from their parent formations. In a lucid four-page, double-spaced letter to the Minister, Bridges on 8 August 1914 (four days after the declaration of war) gave his 'Proposals and Suggestions for Raising and Organizing one Division and one Light Horse Brigade to Proceed as soon as possible for England'. In this letter, he recommended Colonel the Hon. J. W. M'Cay to be Commander 2nd Infantry Brigade (Victoria). The Minister approved.

At the same time, a smaller, quite different force was being raised to seize German possessions in the Pacific, particularly in New Guinea. This force was known as the AN & MEF — Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force — and so it was necessary to have a name for the much larger force. Eventually Bridges' own suggestion — 'Australian Imperial Force' — was adopted.

As yet no commander of 1st Division AIF had been named. Under the Defence Scheme the Inspector-General was to command the Home Defence forces and Bridges, working on this plan, had suggested General Hutton, the recently retired CGS, as commander AIF. However, the Cabinet would not have it that way and on 25 August in answer to a cable from London — 'Army Council desires know name of officer selected to command Australian Expeditionary (sic) Force' — named Brigadier-General Bridges as its choice.

Although the 30,000 Australian and New Zealand force was ready to sail in six weeks time as cabled, in fact it did not leave Albany, West Australia, for the United Kingdom via Suez until 1 November 1914 due to the menace of the German raiders in the Pacific. During the voyage across the Indian Ocean, war was declared against Turkey and it was rumoured that the force would go to Egypt instead of England.

---

[2] Major C. B. B. White. Later, in 1915, he was Bridges' GSO 1 at Anzac. CGS 1920-23 and 1940. Died in aircraft accident, Canberra, 13 August 1940.

However, the reason that the force was diverted to Egypt was because of unsuitable training areas on Salisbury Plain and the totally inadequate accommodation there against the English winter. The Canadians had been responsible for the military education of the Commander of the AIF; their offer of troops to England had been a determining factor in the initial strength of the AIF and it was their bitter protests about conditions at Salisbury Plains which caused the British Government, after Australian representation, to alter the convoy's destination. As the AIF disembarked at Port Said, fate took another step closer.

The 1st Division trained hard in the desert, near the Pyramids.[3] Colonel M'Cay trained his 2nd Brigade (5, 6, 7 and 8 Battalions)[4] . . . 'with conspicuous ability. He did a great deal of the detail work himself, drawing his own orders, and sometimes training his own platoons — a characteristic which marked him throughout his work at the front. He exacted incessant exertions from his men. The efficiency of the 2nd Brigade towards the end of its training attracted the special notice of General Bridges and to some extent influenced the order in which he eventually threw his brigades into the fighting. But the unceasing work upon which the brigadier insisted affected from the first his popularity with his men . . .'[5] While this was going on, plans were being made to put the theories of training into the practices of war.

The plan was for an assault against Turkey and had been advanced for a number of pressing reasons — the stalemate and mounting casualties on the Western Front; to assist the Russians; to divert Turkish attention away from the Suez Canal. The problem of forcing the Dardanelles was not new — it had been studied by the Admiralty and War Office in 1904, 1906, 1908 and again in 1911. In early 1915 it was decided that the Royal Navy should try to force the Dardanelles without the assistance of troops but a little later it was agreed that the shores of the Dardanelles would have to be held if the Fleet passed through. Therefore a military force, known as the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force[6] was hastily thrown together. General Bridges' 1st Division was part of this force.

---

[3] The difficulties of training were lessened in at least one way — by the experience of officers and some senior NCOs. Only 24 of the 631 officers of 1st Division AIF had never had previous service. Of the 631, 99 were or had been regular officers of the British or Australian Amies; 104 had seen active service. In the battalions the RSM, RQMS, signals sergeant and machine-gun sergeant were regulars.

[4] Initially, AIF battalions had eight companies. On 1st January 1915 they were re-organized to conform to the British battalions — a 4-company organization. Each rifle company had 228 men and was commanded by a major or captain. There were four platoons to a company.

[5] C. E. W. Bean, *Official History of Australia in the War of* 1914-18, Vol I.

[6] The MEF consisted of the 29th British Division (made up of regulars from India and Egypt), the Royal Naval Division, the 1st French Colonial Division, the New Zealand and Australian Division, and the 1st Australian Division.

The attempts by the Royal Navy to force the Dardanelles were not successful due to weather, Turkish and German mines and, as history has shown, lack of tenacity. Surprise was lost, the Turks sent more troops to the Gallipoli Peninsula and the British Government, on the advice of their men on the spot, decided to land troops on the Peninsula. Thus the original plan had now been reversed, but the Army assumed that once they were ashore, the Navy would resume its assault on the Narrows. The plan for the landings on Gallipoli Peninsula is shown below.



The story of the landing at the small beach which later became known as Anzac Cove is too well known to be repeated here. It is sufficient to say that commanders and troops had been told that it was vital to push inland as quickly as possible and, despite all the difficulties met by the assaulting brigade (3rd Brigade — 9, 10, 11, and 12 Battalions), they did just that, mainly in groups smaller than platoons. Indeed during the whole of the campaign no troops ever got as close to their objectives again. If anyone wishes to find examples of junior leadership at its best, he need seek no further than these pages of the Official History. Reading between the lines one can also detect failures in leadership — one battalion commander, for example, remained sheltering on the beach when his troops were far out on the ridges.

As part of the covering force, 3 Brigade were to secure a series of ridges on the right and 2 Brigade were to be on their left. However, because 3 Brigade had been landed too far north, its commander decided that the position could only be retrieved by 2 Brigade, which was now landing, switching to the right flank. This was asking a lot of Colonel M'Cay, the commander of 2 Brigade. In his first action he was being implored to disobey his divisional commander's orders. In addition, the commander of 3 Brigade was his junior. However, M'Cay was assured that the left, where he should have gone, was secure and he agreed to transfer his brigade to the right.

Shortly after this, at 0720 hours, General Bridges landed amid Turkish ranging rounds being fired from batteries behind Gaba Tepe. He could do no more than approve of what had already been changed and at 0900 hours, after a rather dangerous reconnaissance of the beach-head, and communications having been established, he assumed command.

As the day wore on and the Turks brought up fresh units and additional artillery the situation became more and more critical. Urgent requests for reinforcements reached Bridges. Sometimes these messages came by runner, direct from forward companies, only because the troops knew where the Beach was but did not know where battalion and brigade headquarters might be. Bridges remained rock-steady from crisis to crisis, plugging holes in the beach-head with troops as they came ashore. By 1645 hours that day he had deployed eleven Australian infantry battalions, some New Zealand infantry and had only one battalion left in reserve. The fighting was still desperate on the left flank and centre when M'Cay, on the right, pleaded again for reinforcements to fill a gap. One of Bridge's staff officers[7] was at M'Cay's headquarters — only about half a mile from the Beach — and he, over the telephone,

[7] Major T. A. Blamey, GSO2 (Inf) 1 Div.

confirmed that the situation was dangerous and that some of the men were giving way. Bridges himself spoke to M'Cay over the telephone and said, 'I want you to speak to me not as a subordinate to a general but as M'Cay to Bridges. I have only one battalion left. Do you assure me that your need for it is absolute?' M'Cay assured him that it was and the staff officer returned to the Beach to lead forward the last battalion. The right flank at Anzac held, despite a number of unwounded men leaving the line.

But by now the key to the Anzac position had been lost. This key was Baby 700 — a feature one mile in from the Beach at the head of Shrapnel Gulley and Monash Valley — which lead on to Hill 971. As night approached the messages from the firing line became grimmer. It seemed doubtful if the line could be held by tired and thirsty men. Too much was being asked of them — they had been landed at the wrong place, the carefully prepared plans and briefings were now worthless, maps had been inaccurate, most units had lost cohesion,[8] many leaders had fallen, they had very little artillery support. The Anzac leaders were certain that the Turks would launch even stronger counter-attacks during the night and next day. It was put to Bridges by his GSO 1 (White) and General Godley (GOC NZ and A Division) that the best thing to do would be to withdraw and eventually land elsewhere — perhaps reinforce the landings at Cape Helles. These men, of course, were influenced by the reports from M'Cay and the commander of the enlarged 3 Brigade. In addition, being at the Beach, where understandably there was administrative confusion, they were seeing and hearing the most unreliable of all reports — those from wounded men and stragglers who had been under fire for the first time. And, as so often occurs at times of extreme crisis, it started to rain.

Re-embarkation Suggested

The situation was deemed so serious that at 2200 hours Bridges and Godley signalled their Corps Commander (General Birdwood): 'General Godley and I both consider you should come ashore at once.' Birdwood did so and in Bridges' dugout, lit by candles and a torch, his two divisional commanders pointed out to him the gravity of their position. Only one brigadier opposed the evacuation — the commander of the NZ Brigade, a British regular. Birdwood was shocked at the suggestion of evacuation but in the end agreed to lay the facts before General Hamilton, the commander of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force. He was careful to make no recommendations. He dictated his signal and Godley wrote it out on a message form.

---

[8] For example, 1 Brigade was mainly under the orders of 3 Brigade. The Landing was on Sunday and the first chance for re-organization came on the next Wednesday and Thursday. The roll calls were held near the Beach and the casualty figures — 13 officers and 453 men — of 10 Bn (3 Brigade) are typical of other units.

It read:

Both my Divisional Generals and Brigadiers have represented to me that they fear their men are thoroughly demoralized by shrapnel fire to which they have been subjected all day after exhaustion and gallant work in morning. Numbers have dribbled back from firing line and cannot be collected in this difficult country. Even New Zealand Brigade which has been only recently engaged lost heavily and is to some extent demoralized. If troops are subjected to shell fire again to-morrow morning there is likely to be a fiasco as I have no fresh troops with which to replace those in firing line. I know my representation is most serious but if we are to re-embark it must be at once.

BIRDWOOD.

It was only by good luck that the signal reached Hamilton at all, because it was not addressed to anyone. The beachmaster, a Royal Naval Captain, who carried the signal naturally assumed that it was meant for his admiral who commanded the ships used for the landing and which, presumably, would be required for any re-embarkation. He left the Beach about 2230 hours and the message reached the admiral at 2300 hours. The admiral was staggered by its contents because more than anyone else he realized the enormous difficulties of an evacuation under such adverse conditions. He decided to go ashore and talk to Birdwood. However, at that moment the battleship with General Hamilton on board hove-to near Gaba Tepe and the admiral took the message to him.

The rest of the episode is well-known. Hamilton's famous reply to Birdwood with its exhortation to 'dig, dig, dig until you are safe' belongs to history. This message reached Bridges' headquarters on the Beach at about 0230 hours. The Official Historian has recorded, 'of this message, which I heard read out, my diary states: "That clearly settled it. The group about the signal office broke up, and everyone seemed to start digging — they were digging in the moonlight above the Divisional Headquarters Office; the clink of shovels everywhere on the hillside." ' The beach head remained at Anzac simply because it was then impossible to evacuate.

Below brigade headquarters level, officers and men had no idea that such conferences had taken place and it is doubtful, because of lack of communications and the extent to which the force had been jumbled up, if Hamilton's message was ever passed on to battalions. Certainly the men knew that things had gone wrong but they were still supremely optimistic that they would get to their objectives and that the British and French advancing up from Cape Helles would soon join up with them. This, in addition to the shortage of entrenching tools, was one reason why men were reluctant, at first, to dig in.

So during the night of 25-26 April, scarcely noticing the rain, men fought and dug in when and where they could on the hills no more than 1,500 yards from the Beach. Reinforcements continued

to come ashore, stragglers and lightly wounded men on the Beach were gathered up and with sometimes a section here, a platoon there or perhaps 100 men from three or four units, some gaps in the line were filled. The position remained fast that night and for the next eight months.

(Australian War Memorial)

Shrapnel Gully which lead to Monash Valley. General Bridges was fatally wounded further up this valley. Note telephone wires strung on bushes at the left of the photograph.

Epilogue

At 0900 hours Saturday, 15 May, three weeks after the Landing, Bridges, as was his daily habit, left his Divisional headquarters on the Beach, to visit his commanders. He had with him his GS01 (Lieutenant-Colonel White) and an ADC (Lieutenant R. G. Casey). The party walked up the busy track in Shrapnel Gully and then turned into the equally busy Monash Valley. By this time, to lessen the effect of Turkish sniper fire into the Valley, sandbag traverses had been built, alternately left and right, on the sides of the Valley. This sniping was most severe in the morning when the sun was behind the Turks' positions which looked down into the Valley. Before the sandbag traverses had been built, 30 men a day were being hit. On this particular morning Bridges was warned that five men had already been lost at the next corner he would have to pass. As the General stepped out from behind the traverse

he fell to a sniper's shot fired at range of about 600 yards. He died on the hospital ship *Gascon* three days later, before the ship reached the port of Alexandria.

Much has been written of Bridges. Here it is enough to say that he was the founder of the AIF; that it was mainly he who held the force together during one of the most difficult operations of war — an amphibious assault by raw troops over a wrong beach; that he never lost his nerve and that he was brave to the point of being foolhardy, particularly in the way he had continually exposed himself to Turkish bullets. Naturally mistakes were made. He has been criticized for not getting his field artillery into action in sufficient numbers in the first few days and there is the tragic misinterpretation of orders which lead to an unordered advance and consequent grievous casualties on the afternoon of 26 April.

M'Cay continued to command 2 Brigade. Because Bridges thought highly of his brigade, they and the NZ brigade were withdrawn from Anzac on 6 May and transferred to Cape Helles for four days. There they suffered heavy casualties — 1,056 officers and men out of a brigade strength of 2,900 — in the unsuccessful attacks towards Krithia.

Later, back at Anzac, M'Cay was wounded and, on his return to Australia, was briefly Inspector-General. In early 1916 he formed the 5th Division AIF in Egypt and commanded this division in France. From 1917 to 1919 he was GOC AIF Depots in the UK.

He returned to civilian life in 1919 and in addition to being the vice-chairman of the Board of the Victorian Savings Bank, he was a business adviser to the Commonwealth Government. He died in 1930.

M'Cay, as happens to most commanders in their careers, came under criticism which was sometimes severe but mainly unjustified. There were three events which caused hostile comment — the casualties sustained by his brigade at Krithia; the particularly arduous three-day march across the desert from Tel el Kebir to the Canal which was not administratively well managed; and the heavy losses which his division suffered in its first action in France — the one-day battle of Fromelles where 5,533 officers and men were lost. However, the Official War Historian, when passions had cooled and with the cold hard facts before him, exonerated M'Cay of these criticisms. □

Richard B. Haldane: War Minister Extraordinary

Ernest M. Teagarden

TODAY the career and accomplishments of Richard Burdon Haldane as War Minister are limited, on the whole, to academic interest. Three generations of fighting men have passed through the ranks of the British Army since Haldane, in 1912, gave up the seals of office as Secretary of State for War to become Lord Chancellor. The army has undergone so many changes since those Edwardian years that Haldane would probably recognize little but its basic organizational structure. It has been mechanized and nuclearized. Its strategical purpose and tactical operations are different. Yet the organizational structure which he created is the foundation on which many later improvements have been built. Haldane's reorganization and *modernization programme*, perhaps the finest in British military history, deserves to be remembered. The spirit of constructive change which he initiated in developing his programme is also a credit to his memory.

Haldane would have done well in any cabinet post for he had the orderly compartmentalized mind of the administrator in combination with the mental flexibility required of the successful innovator. He took the war office principally because it would be a challenge to his talents as an administrator and not to prove his genius as an army expert. The writer has been unable to locate a single public utterance of Haldane's concerning military matters prior to his accepting the war ministry. There is also no record of him having served in any of the auxiliary forces. He was a barrister by profession and philosopher by avocation, neither of which are usually considered prerequisite for a successful army career. Haldane first entered Parliament as a Liberal for the East Lothian constituency in 1885. He showed considerable interest in public education, especially the Worker's Educational Association and the provincial universities, but little in military affairs. His ultimate goal was the Lord Chancellorship, an intention made known to many. Following the great Liberal victory in 1905 he asked for and received the seals of office as Secretary of State for War only after Sir Robert Reid was appointed to the Woolsack.

The Army needed severe reform — the South African War had clearly demonstrated this — and Haldane took up the challenge. He desired to make the Regular Army mobile and capable of rapid

Ernest M. Teagarden is Chairman of the Division of Social Science and Business Education at the General Beadle State College, Madison, South Dakota. Holder of a Ph.D. degree in history and economics he served with the U.S. Army from 1945 to 1947. He has written a number of articles on military history and book reviews for eminent historical journals.

expansion in wartime, to reorganize the auxiliary units into a coordinated, efficient force, and to institute a functioning General Staff. His task was not easy. The House of Commons was packed with Liberals bent on economizing in governmental expenditures. He had to contend with Lord Roberts and the National Service League who wished to emulate the large continental standing armies. Finally, he faced the traditional opposition to change which saturated most armies in the nineteenth century. Unlike his unfortunate predecessor, H. O. Arnold-Forster, Haldane got the support of the army by taking the officers into his confidence and seeking their advice in the development of his reorganization plans. The economy-minded members of his party were placated when Haldane, in his first Estimates address, was able to ensure a reduction in overall army expenditures. He established the principle that efficiency and economy were not incompatible. Unfortunately, the reduction in expenditures incited the wrath of the many Conservative members of Parliament who desired a large army for diplomatic and imperialistic purposes. Fortunately, these were vastly outnumbered by members of his own party. Haldane, in addition, took Arthur Balfour, the Leader of the Opposition, into his confidence and kept partisan politics to a minimum. Even his opponents admitted that Haldane had great ability in conciliating opposing groups. His technique was the dinner party where he believed that tempers could be cooled and reconciliation brought about over good food and good wine.

Much of Haldane's success was due to the encouragement and support he received from King Edward VII and to the efforts of his friends and subordinates. In Lord Esher, Haldane had a supporter who was not only interested in military affairs but was also in the fortunate position of having the confidence of the King. Brigadier-General Douglas Haig and General Sir William Nicholson efficient administrators; Haig doing important work in connection with the organization of the Expeditionary Force, and Nicholson contributing valuable services during the institution of the Imperial General Staff. The constant encouragement of King Edward was indispensable. The King did what no other man could have done in getting the Territorial Force off to a good start: he called together all of the Lords Lieutenants and commanded their support for the County Associations. This more than made up for the irritation he caused Haldane when the latter deactivated portions of the Guards regiments early in his ministerial career.

Despite encouragement and support from friends and highly placed officials Haldane was never really able to destroy the apathy of the public toward the Regular Army. There was after the South African War, as after most wars, very little public interest in the Regular Army or the regular Army Reserve. Campbell-Bannerman, himself a former War Minister, was said to have once remarked that

if the War Office could show some reductions in expenses, no one would care what happened to the Regular Army. This observation is difficult to dispute. Of course, the Regular Army and Reserve were of interest to the participants but these persons were not, ordinarily, substantial members of English society. When one joined the Regular Army he more or less withdrew from the English public. The auxiliaries were a different proposition. The men of the Militia, Volunteers and Yeomanry organizations were important locally; they had wealth; they read the journals and newspapers; and they did not leave home. The Government had to reckon with public opinion when it made any changes which affected the status of these men.

Haldane's first major achievement was the conversion of the Regular Army into the Expeditionary Force. The Expeditionary Force was small when compared with the large continental standing armies. It also was small when viewed within the perspective of the First World War. Nevertheless, in 1906, it was what England needed. The necessities of Empire defence required an army of well-equipped, highly-trained men organized for rapid movement anywhere in the world. The course of the South African War would have been different had the army in 1899 fulfilled these requirements. No one knows what might have happened to the French left flank had the Expeditionary Force not been able to move rapidly to its assistance in 1914.

The Territorial Force grew out of the 'Blue Water' school of military thinking which relied upon the Navy as the first line of defence. It provided a defence against raiding parties which might slip by the Navy while the Regular Army was abroad. An additional reserve for the Regular Army was also made available. By wisely basing the Territorial Force organization upon the counties like the National Guard in the United States, Haldane showed his appreciation of local connections in securing recruits. It was unfortunate that because of his personal prejudices against locally trained troops, Lord Kitchener, in 1914, chose not to use this framework to train new armies. For this error he has been severely castigated by many persons including Haig and Winston Churchill. The reinstitution of the Territorial Force at the conclusion of the First World War was a tribute to Haldane's organizational ability.

Some contemporary military experts regard the constitution of an Imperial General Staff to coordinate Empire defence as the most important of Haldane's reforms. Like the Territorial Force, the Imperial General Staff suffered at the hands of Kitchener during the First World War. In his desire to concentrate control of the war effort in his own hands, Kitchener reduced the Staff to a shell. It also survived the Kitchener period and went on to be the guiding factor in Empire military policy during the Second World War.

Haldane introduced the concept of a military air service based upon scientific rather than empirical principles. In 1912 the various air units were organized into the Royal Flying Corps, predecessor of the famed Royal Air Force which saved Britain from almost certain disaster in 1940. Time did not permit the newly organized Officers Training Corps to prove its value before the outbreak of the First World War but it introduced for the first time a coordinated programme of reserve officer training in the universities and in many of the large public schools. It was also continued after the war.

Haldane did not have all successes. The military intelligence service, MI-5, never really fulfilled its purpose due to a lack of staff. Its functions were carried out by a director and one clerk until the outbreak of the First World War. The British 'regular' failed to respond to the educational opportunities offered him. He could not provide an adequate supply of horses. The conscriptionists were not won over. Many contemporary writers have accused Haldane of a lack of foresight in not providing England with a large Regular Army which the First World War was to prove a necessity; but it is improbable that anyone could have accurately prophesised in 1907 the trend the next war would take and most certainly any Government that pushed for a large conscription programme at that time would have been turned out of office.

However, these failures were minor when compared with Haldane's successes. When he left the War Office in 1912 for the Lord Chancellorship he had created not only a number of new organizations but had given England something it had lacked since the end of the South African War — a policy. The 'Blue Water' programme of defense was adopted and the Expeditionary Force and the Territorial Force were its implementations. Churchill remarked in 1914 that the War Office came to the emergency war meetings united on a plan of action. It was Kitchener who disrupted the Territorial expansion plans.

After the victory in France the British Expeditionary Force returned home to much rejoicing. A victory parade was held in London and the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Douglas Haig, and King George V rode at the head of their troops along the Mall. That evening Haig called on Haldane at the latter's house in Queen Anne's Gate and left a volume of his dispatches. On the opening page were written these words.

> *To Viscount Haldane of Cloan the greatest Secretary of State for War England has ever had. In grateful remembrance of his successful efforts in organizing the Military Forces for a War on the Continent, notwithstanding much opposition from the Army Council and the half-hearted support of his parliamentary friends.*
>
> *Haig, F. M.* □

Western Australia: The Need for New Defence Thinking

Brigadier R. C. Foot, OBE, MC,
British Army (Retired)

EARLY in August 1966, the Minister for Supply visited Western Australia to convene a meeting of manufacturers there for discussion of the application of the fast growing production potential of that State to the needs of Supply. The rate of manufacturing growth in Western Australia particularly in the mineral field, and in the immediate processing of the State's mineral assets, has been phenomenal. But does not the recent exploitation of minerals there also make Western Australia immediately more attractive to a potential enemy? How, and for how long, could the Minister of Defence undertake to ensure the availability of the State's production for the benefit of the Minister of Supply?

We are too prone to 'island' thinking. The old British concept that 'the frontiers of Britain are the coasts of her enemies' cannot apply to this vast island continent, the more so because the sea is no longer the only approach; air transport has made possible sudden attack on a port, or group of ports, with overwhelming force; and, after a successful attack, is able to keep those ports open for heavy seaborne transportation. So, an entirely new concept for defence of Western Australia seems necessary. It should be directed to making an occupation of any part of the land so troublesome, so difficult of exploitation, that the aggressor would be forced to withdraw.

This could be done by 'guerilla', a much misused word which literally means the 'little war', and derives from the Spanish resistance to the occupation forces of Napoleon in Spain from 1807 to 1812.

Brigadier Foot was commissioned in the British Army in 1912 and served in France and the Middle East in the 1914-18 War as adjutant of a field regiment and for two years as a field battery commander.

In World War II, after successively commanding searchlight, light anti-aircraft and rocket regiments, he was promoted brigadier in 1943 and commanded the 49 AA Bde in London. At the end of 1944 he took command of the 310 Infantry Brigade which joined in the final advance from the Rhine Crossing to the Elbe in 1945. A longer biographical note accompanied an article in the June 1966 issue of the journal.

More recently, the resistance of the Ethiopians to their Italian invaders, between 1936 and 1940, after slow beginnings, resulted in the surrender of numerically superior occupying forces, when organized military support came to their aid. Again, the resistance of the French people, after almost passive acceptance of the German invasion in 1940, rose to a crescendo in 1944. In all three cases, the guerilla was, in the end, assisted by conventional forces to accomplish the final ejection of the invader. But it was also the period of the guerilla which sapped the fighting strength and morale of the occupying enemy, and forced him to withdraw in the face of conventional attack.

But guerilla by untrained civilians, ardent in the patriotic desire to regain their homeland, is wasteful of human life, because it is apt to goad the occupiers into savage and inhuman reprisals. The technique of guerilla is now well known; with proper training, and with modern communications, it can be employed effectively in defence, and with much greater speed than in the campaigns cited above. The motto of guerilla should be 'he who fights and runs away, lives to fight another day'.

Australia has some inherent advantages for its defence by guerilla. There are wide, almost uninhabited, spaces where depots of material could be secretly cached, and kept supplied by air drop. The population is educated, and amenable to training in the techniques required. Away from the cities, both men and women acquire an instinctive sense of the bush life, are self-reliant in emergency, and are intensely loyal to their country. With prepared organization and training, these natural advantages could be put to Defence use.

Organization would have to be on a Commonwealth basis, as a 'fourth arm' of Defence. The present State Civil Defence organizations have quite different aims, and internal State viewpoints, and could not be used for this purpose. It should be represented on the Chiefs of Staffs Committee, with the other three arms. General Eisenhower's letter to 'Special Force Headquarters' on 31 May 1945 may be quoted here:

> In no previous war have resistance forces been so closely harnessed to the main military effort... Organized forces of resistance played a very considerable part in our complete and final victory. — — — I must express my great admiration for the brave and often spectacular exploits of the agents and special groups under control of Special Force Headquarters.

Following that precedent, 'Special Forces' might be a suitable name for a 'fourth arm' of Defence.

Selection of the best available personnel is vital. A trained senior staff officer of one of the three armed Services, selected for his unconventional outlook, inventive capacity, and flair for leadership, would be the best commander. He would need at least one trained

Staff Officer from each armed Service, and one from Supply, to assist him. Beyond the Headquarters personnel of 'Special Force', the organization must pass to progressive veils of secrecy, until, in the case of active agents, false identities have to conceal individuals.

Training could be partly superimposed on existing Service schools, as for parachutage, skin-diving, wireless, small arms. But 'Special Forces' would also have to operate training schools of its own, for basic training in such activities as industrial sabotage, aircraft demolition (see the exploits of Mayne, always a uniformed soldier, in Fitzroy Maclean's *Eastern Approaches*, p.195), small-boat operation, ciphers, and for exercises and rehearsals of its own activities, that could not be matters for instruction in existing schools.

And good training is vitally necessary to produce effective agents by whom the objectives of such a 'Special Force' could be secured. There is a wide bibliography, both factual and fictional, of the work of such agents during World War II. Their successes were the result of good training; their failures were more often due to lack of following their training, than to any enemy precaution or action. More recently, both in Malaysia and Vietnam, Australian armed forces have had to contend constantly with guerilla in all its forms. We should be learning from this experience how to adapt guerilla to our own use.

We have not yet suffered invasion in Australia. East of the Urals and Suez, and west of the Pacific, we have the highest standard of living and the widest living space for our population, and must be the envy of all Asia for that good fortune. Envy can lead to hatred, and hatred to war, and the sea around us no longer makes us secure. □

AAJ MONTHLY AWARDS

The Board of Review has awarded prizes for the best articles published in the March, April and May 1967 issues of the journal to:

March: Squadron Leader D. C. Mazlin ('Living with Nuclear Proliferation') $10.

April: Major L. H. Shaw ('Aerial Minelaying') $10.

May: Major T. A. Tabart ('Air Drop Systems') $10.

AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

INDEX

1967

No. 212 JAN., 1967 — No. 223 DEC., 1967

PART 1

TITLE INDEX

PART 2

SUBJECT INDEX