



# Australian Army Journal

FOR THE PROFESSION OF ARMS

E

AUSTRALIAN

ARMY

VOLUME IX, NUMBER 1

AUTUMN

2012

**The *Australian Army Journal* is published by authority of the Chief of Army**  
Lieutenant General David Morrison, AO

**The *Australian Army Journal* is sponsored by:**  
Director, Land Warfare Studies Centre

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ISSN 1448-2843

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## EDITORIAL

# ENGAGING IN DEBATE

This is the first edition of the *Australian Army Journal (AAJ)* under a new managerial team, and it is only appropriate that the efforts of Lieutenant Colonel Mal McGregor and his team are given due recognition. Without his efforts (and those of his editorial team) it is questionable whether the journal would have survived, and the fact that it continues today is testimony to his hard work, perseverance and guidance. The new team has been given the responsibility to ensure that the *AAJ* continues to remain relevant and read by as wide an audience as possible, and it will endeavour to remain true to these ideals.

In a more straitened fiscal environment, and where the Army ponders its future direction as the end of Australia's combat commitment to Afghanistan comes into view, it is increasingly important from both a resourcing and operational perspective for military officers to contribute to the intellectual debate regarding the utility of land forces. The *AAJ* represents a significant forum in which such writing can occur, and everyone should feel free to contribute to the debate through this publication. The importance of the debate regarding the size, structure and role of the Army post-Afghanistan has been highlighted by the inclusion of an edited version of the Chief of Army's speech to the Sea Power Conference earlier this year in which he raised this issue as one of fundamental importance to the future of the Army. As the Chief of Army observed in his speech, the key element of his vision for the post-Afghanistan Army is Plan BEERSHEBA. While multi-role combat brigades will solve the Army's force generation and rotation dilemma, how to employ these forces within our primary operating environment will require the development of an expeditionary mindset, a requirement which offers fertile ground for debate by the organisation's forward thinkers.

But while the Chief of Army has set an example with his willingness to engage in this debate publicly, and to give an intellectual edge to that debate, there is much that

## EDITORIAL

can be done by the rest of the Army to engage in discourse that seeks to advance the interests of Army as a whole, or component parts of it. There is, after all, no shortage of issues to write about and it is often just encouragement that is needed to turn concepts or ideas into articles that may influence decision-makers in the future. A good example of this willingness to debate can be found in the selection of essays penned by junior officers from 1st Armoured Regiment that have been included in the journal. Since 1997 officers from the unit have written on a range of topics as a way of getting regimental officers to articulate arguments and hence hone their skills in preparation for appointments in the wider Defence community. This edition includes some of those essays as a way of promoting the long-standing initiative and to encourage other junior officers to follow suit.

There are already a significant number of contributors, and this edition shows the variety of subjects that can be covered in the Army's professional journal. These include articles on the practical challenges of implementing adaptive campaigning by Daniel Bilusich et al; Lieutenant Colonel Charles Faint's analysis of whether exploitation intelligence should be considered an entirely separate discipline; a refreshingly original way of looking at the voluntary sector for lessons on how to maximise the effectiveness of reserve service by Lieutenant Alex Douglas; three proposed ways of increasing the yield of precious training time by Major Grant Chambers; an historical examination by Jean Bou of the Army's nascent force development in the early years of the twentieth century; and finally, Lieutenant Zach Lambert's look at the short-lived existence of the Australian 1st Armoured Division during the Second World War.

Land Warfare Studies Centre is committed to encouraging research into, and debate about issues of relevance to Army and the wider Defence and security community. Ways of encouraging people to contribute to that debate through writing are being developed, including by increasing the number of people within Army who seek to contribute to the journal. Any suggestions on ways of improving the journal, or of attracting contributors are always welcome. I look forward to working with our new team to produce a journal that builds on the work of previous editorial teams, to develop a publication that is relevant to its readers and contributes to the debate both within and outside the profession of arms.

In closing, the *AAJ* wishes to recognise the passing of a fine soldier, role model and elder statesman. On 19 April the inaugural Regimental Sergeant Major—Army Warrant Officer Class 1 Wally Thompson, OAM, died. His legacy though will live on in the memory of those with whom he served.

# MARITIME STRATEGY

## DEVELOPING JOINT AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY

### CHIEF OF ARMY'S ADDRESS AT THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY SEA POWER CONFERENCE

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL DAVID MORRISON, AO

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#### ABSTRACT

The following is the text of an address given by the Chief of Army, Lieutenant General David Morrison, to the Royal Australian Navy's Sea Power Conference in Sydney on 31 January 2012. Lieutenant General Morrison stated that the introduction into the Australian Defence Force of new amphibious capability is anything but routine. The Landing Helicopter Docks cannot be thought of as merely a transport capability. Rather they are an integral part of a combat system with unique, and unprecedented, command and control and sustainment challenges. The acquisition of the Landing Helicopter Docks represents not only far greater technical complexity in the operating systems than the Australian Defence Force has previously experienced, but will introduce a far greater complexity into the joint training, scheduling and integration across and between services. All parts of Defence activity are going to be affected and will need to adjust. The Army is up for this challenge. The future generations of Army officers will be trained and exposed to amphibious operations from the outset of their careers, as a central pillar to how we fight. This will require an agile and joint mindset that we cannot claim to possess across the entire force at present.

Minister for Defence, Deputy Premier of New South Wales, Chief of Navy, Chief of Air Force, senior international and ADF officers, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, Firstly, Ray thank you for the opportunity to participate in the keynote session of this prestigious and influential conference on Maritime affairs. It is wonderful to be invited to address this gathering and to share the platform with you and Geoff Brown. I think it sends a powerful message about the importance that all three services place on this event—and by implication, on joint operations in the context of maritime strategy. What is clear is that no part of my job is too small for the opportunities, such as this, to be as clear as possible about Army’s focus and how it contributes to national defence and security. So let me make two definitive statements as a prelude to my main theme in today’s address.

Firstly, Australia needs its ADF more than it needs its Navy, its Army or its Air Force if it is to possess robust military options now and in the future. It is about being a joint force and Army knows that. Secondly, the foundation to Australia’s national security is a maritime strategy. That has been articulated and re-articulated in a series of white papers. But a maritime strategy is not a naval strategy, it’s a joint, indeed an inter-agency, and perhaps coalition strategy and Army has an essential role to play if that strategy is to continue to have relevance in the coming decades.

My purpose today is to describe what I see as Army’s role in that maritime strategy and to provide an insight into how we are marrying our doctrinal and force development planning, to Government’s direction and guidance, in order to be capable of executing the strategic tasks allocated to us. At its heart, Army needs to be able to deploy force elements, by air and by sea, with the requisite joint military capabilities to meet the operational challenges it will encounter, sustain that commitment until acceptable conditions are achieved, rotate forces if required if the operation proves to be protracted and then to redeploy to home locations. While that has been our history, such a capacity has not always been resident in the Army of the day, nor achieved with real effectiveness and efficiency. Nonetheless, the many significant operational lessons learned by this generation of soldiers over the last twelve years particularly, allied to the introduction into service of a range of joint capabilities that will occur in the next two decades, will ensure that Army has the potential to be a key contributor to achieving national security through the application of a maritime strategy. For the remainder of my address, I want to focus on how that potential will be realised.

The Australian Army’s reputation and identity was forged at Gallipoli—one of the most famous amphibious operations of the twentieth century—which, while bold in conception, lacked much in execution. It is uncontroversial that Australia’s grand

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... it is somewhat surprising that we are having to relearn amphibious operations again.

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strategic practice since Federation has involved contributing joint military forces to coalition operations to support a favourable global order maintained by the dominant maritime power of the day—in turn Britain, followed by the United States. The relatively small size of the Army at times encourages an almost tactical level thinking about its employment when, in reality, Australian statecraft has made frequent and diverse use of land forces over the past century. For a middle power like Australia, the use of strategic land power is not so much related to size and mass, but rather to effect and objective. When judged against these criteria, it is clear that Australian policy has, since 1942, used elements of land power for strategic purposes more frequently than any other military instrument, particularly in our primary operating environment.

In the light of that history it is somewhat surprising that we are having to relearn amphibious operations again—pretty much from first principles. The explanation for this I believe is that for much of history the three services developed much closer ties with the equivalent services of our allies than they did with the other elements of the ADF. This has not been entirely our fault. Governments of all persuasions have—quite appropriately—provided niche force contributions all over the globe in support of our alliance arrangements. More often than not this has involved penny packeting of niche forces with the result that we have developed both operational and joint expertise—but not with one another. However, the strategic shock of East Timor in 1999 threw us back together and since that time I believe we have made great strides in developing joint concepts, joint doctrine and—most difficult of all—a truly joint mindset and culture.

But we all recognise that we face enormous challenges in developing the forces provided by our strategic guidance, and the doctrine and command and control arrangements to effectively employ them across the spectrum of operations. In that respect Ray, I am indebted to you for a valuable insight from your speech to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute last month. You cautioned Navy against complacency and warned that the introduction of the new amphibious capability is anything but routine, especially in light of the evolution of a frigate culture within your service over the past three decades.

For my part I am concerned that Army has become mired in a belief that the RAN and RAAF only provide strategic lift. This incorrect attitude limits our ability to conceive of Entry by Air and Sea Operations in anything but the most permissive environment. I have echoed your warning to my own service Ray—we cannot afford to think of the LHDs as merely a transport capability. Rather they are an integral part of a combat system with unique, and unprecedented, command and control and sustainment challenges.

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provide strategic lift.

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Indeed the acquisition of the LHD represents not only far greater technical complexity in the operating systems than we as a Defence Force have previously experienced, but it will introduce a far greater complexity into the joint training, scheduling and integration across and between services than we have ever needed to achieve in the past. It means that all parts of Defence activity are going to be affected and will need to adjust. But we, Army, are up for the challenge. I want to own the solutions and have indicated on this slide the price of my “buy-in”.

Lord Edward Grey once eloquently argued that the British Army needed to be ‘a projectile fired by the Navy’—a quote, while popularised by Jackie Fisher, is often mistakenly ascribed to him. I am very fond of that quote as it provides an aiming mark for me and my force developers as we seek to create the land component of the joint amphibious capability. The weapon system of the new LHD is in fact the embarked force, and the true capability is the joint effect delivered through Army, Navy and Air force within the Amphibious Task Group.

In the remainder of my time I would like to outline where Army is at in the development of amphibious capability and some of the hurdles that we need to negotiate in my time as Chief of Army. The key internal factor that will determine Army force generation are the changes to our brigade structures under Plan BEERSHEBA. It is no coincidence that the Minister for Defence publicly endorsed this plan at the same time as he commissioned HMAS CHOULES, in December last year. The two are inextricably linked. Under Plan BEERSHEBA the Army is developing multi-role combat brigades. This is an overdue development. For too long we maintained single capabilities within brigades with deleterious effects on our force generation and career planning cycles. This was inefficient and probably harmed retention as well. The development of the standard multi-role brigade will enable Army to reach the objective set in the 2000 *White Paper* for us to be capable of providing a brigade for sustained operations within our primary operating environment. It also allows us to develop forces of a combat weight commensurate with the level of threat in the modern battlespace. The force generation implications of this are profound and will ensure that we meet our obligation to the Government, and the remainder of the ADF, to be able to undertake sustained joint operations both in the littoral approaches to Australia and throughout the immediate neighbourhood.

Much of the responsibility for raising, training and certifying land forces capable of amphibious operations falls squarely within my remit. But I well understand that it is vital that I collaborate closely with the Vice Chief of Defence Force Group as the

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The training required to prepare Army to conduct combat operations as an integral part of a joint amphibious team is substantial.

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ultimate joint capability authority as there are some enabling functions that are not apparent in this process or fall between single service functions. I have announced that I will commit an Army Battle Group, based on our Second Battalion and including a cross section of combat and enabling capabilities from across Army, to the development of a truly amphibious capability. The training required to prepare Army to conduct combat operations as an integral part of a joint amphibious team is substantial, and is not to be underestimated. New skills and training techniques will need to be developed and sustained, and importantly a new culture and outlook for our role in the region grown and matured.

In any event, the development path of the Army and ADF since the East Timor intervention in 1999 has assumed the existence of a rapidly deployable Battle Group reinforced by a follow-on Multi-Role Combat Brigade. The recent changes that I announced with regard to the transfer of the parachute capability from the conventional force to the Special Operations Command and the allocation of a dedicated amphibious Battle Group conform perfectly to this strategic guidance. Army will have a robust force generation cycle for contingency and sustained operations built around a rapidly deployable Battle Group trained and enabled for Entry Operations across our region, intimately supported by Special Force operations.

We are well on the way to getting the fundamentals right. However, I do acknowledge, that like Navy we are entering uncharted waters—no pun intended. From the outset we (all three services) will need to carefully develop and formalise an unambiguous, robust and permanent C2 structure, supported by doctrine, to plan and command amphibious operations in all likely operational contingencies.

Previously, we have been able to adapt rapidly and get it ‘right on the night’ in East Timor and Solomon Islands. Our excellent people and culture facilitated this, though it was triumph of improvisation rather than professional mastery. My predecessor Ken Gillespie noted at this conference in 2010 that the Australian Army had no standing Commander Landing Forces, nor was there a designated organisation to command and control amphibious training and operations. That deficiency has been rectified with the nesting of a dedicated C2 element with the Deployable Joint Force Headquarters and it is an important development. Army, and the ADF’s, doctrine and training centres need to now adapt to meet the needs of the capabilities and roles upon us.

Our culture needs to be expeditionary in nature, taking account of the new and significant force projection capability, with a permanently embarked land combat force. The future generations of Army officers will be trained and exposed to amphibious operations from the outset of their careers, as a central pillar to how we fight. This will require an agile and joint mindset that we cannot claim to possess across the entire force at present. Likewise we will be required to operate every one of our armoured and aviation platforms from the LHDs simultaneously and across a spectrum of threats. Our array of complex communications and surveillance systems must now be

considered primarily within the amphibious environment. The logistic challenges of operations afloat are unique and substantial. Army must urgently come to grips with maintaining and sustaining a whole range of land equipment in a maritime setting.

The Navy and our allies, in particular the United States Marines, have considerable expertise upon which to draw. Australian Army officers are conducting training with our Allies in the USA and the UK. We have not yet come to grips with the logistic demands of sea basing. This is unsurprising as we have never been called upon to do it. But it will be essential to our ability to conduct operations from the sea and it will entail a large amount of Army's inventory spending time afloat. Our transition from the current training, posture and culture will be difficult but it has begun. It is absolutely necessary because an Australian maritime strategy demands it. A cohesive, joint approach, focused on the geographic and demographic realities of our region, is clearly articulated in the 2009 *White Paper*. To be credible, such a strategy must include an integral role for elements of Australian land power if it is to be flexible and balanced, capable of dealing with diverse and unpredictable global and regional security requirements. The Australian Army is on board, fully embarked and ready to play its part.

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We will be required to operate every one of our armoured and aviation platforms from LHDs simultaneously and across a spectrum of threats.

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### THE AUTHOR

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Lieutenant General David Morrison, AO took up his appointment as Chief of Army in June 2011. He joined the Army in 1979 and graduated from the Officer Cadet School, Portsea to the Royal Australian Infantry Corps. Between 1980 and 1991 he held a variety of regimental positions including Australian Instructor at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in the UK in 1987–1988. He was deployed to Bougainville as part of Operation LAGOON in 1994, and in 1999 took up the position of Colonel Operations, Headquarters International Force East Timor (INTERFET). He commanded the 3rd Brigade from 2002–2004, was appointed Director-General Preparedness and Plans in 2005, Commander of the Australian Defence Colleges in 2006 and Deputy Chief of Army in 2008. During 2008 he led a review into the Army's command and control structure which resulted in the Adaptive Army initiative. He was appointed as an Officer in the Order of Australia in 2010 for his service to the Australian Army in the fields of training and education, military strategic commitments and force structure and capability. A more complete biography is available at <[army.gov.au/Who-we-are/Leaders](http://army.gov.au/Who-we-are/Leaders)>.

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## PEOPLE MANAGEMENT

# RECLAIMING VOLUNTEERISM

## HOW A RECONCEPTION CAN BUILD A MORE PROFESSIONAL ARMY RESERVE

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LIEUTENANT ALEX DOUGLAS

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### ABSTRACT

The focus of the Army Reserve has shifted from supplying deployable units for large-scale conventional warfare to providing individuals and small groups to support the Army's current operations. The requirement for soldiers to be easily integrated into Regular units has caused us to increasingly train, treat and manage reservists identically to their full-time counterparts. This is ineffective because it fails to accept the real and important differences between Regular and Reserve service. Reservists should actually be seen as sharing more characteristics with volunteers than part-time employees. The strategies used and many of the lessons learnt in the voluntary sector could be applied to increase the Reserve's capability and performance.

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### INTRODUCTION

It was once commonplace to refer to the Australian Militia and Army Reservists as volunteers. The United Kingdom Territorial Army still routinely refers to members as volunteers and retains the term 'volunteer' in some unit names.<sup>1</sup> Believing that the term 'volunteer' somehow diminished the standing of reservists, the Australian Army slowly discarded the term from its collective vocabulary.

Replacing ‘volunteer’, the Australian Army now describes Australian Regular Army (ARA) members as ‘full-time’ and Australian Army Reserve (ARes) members as ‘part-time’. This perpetuates the popular mythology that reservist and regular soldiers are distinguishable only by the number of hours they work. This conception denies the extensive differences in motivators, experiences and capabilities of reservists. This article argues that a more accurate picture is gained of reservists if we conceive of them not as employees but as volunteers. This reconception provides a more realistic picture of the potential and limitations of our Army Reserve while prompting us to abandon the unhelpful belief that we can treat reservists in the same way as members of the Regular Army. If we adopt this reconception of reservists as volunteers we can begin drawing on the burgeoning research and literature about volunteer management. It should also prompt us to reassess whether our methods of training, rewarding, leading and recruiting are appropriate for a volunteer environment. Accepting reservists as volunteers, and adjusting our practices accordingly, will counterintuitively provide a more professional Reserve.

### A CHANGING ROLE FOR THE ARMY RESERVE

The *Defence White Paper 2000* announced that:

The strategic role for the Reserves has changed from mobilisation to meet remote threats to that of supporting and sustaining the types of contemporary military operations in which the ADF may be engaged.<sup>2</sup>

A decade on from this strategic overhaul and after the release of another white paper<sup>3</sup> it is useful to evaluate how we conceive reservists.

The birth of the modern Reserve began in 1947 when Australian military forces were divided into the Australian Regular Army and the Australian Citizen Military Force. Australian defence planners had previously relied primarily on part-time militia forces. It was the decision to establish a permanent standing army in addition to a citizen force that created the modern distinction between part-time and full-time soldiers. It is this current dichotomy that this article seeks to understand and address.

The *Defence Act 1903* illustrates the expanding role of the Reserves in Australia’s national security infrastructure. In 1964 call-out of reserve forces was extended to circumstances other than war and the geographical limits were removed from the legislation. Further amendments in 1988

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The capacity to integrate into Regular Army teams about to deploy on operations is the benchmark against which reservists are now measured.

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and 2001 expanded the Reserve's ability to be called out for situations ranging from war to community activities of significance to humanitarian aid.<sup>4</sup>

The likelihood of Australia confronting an existential threat from a nation-state is so small as to be insufficient as the sole *raison d'être* for a reserve army.<sup>5</sup> While threats from invasion have continued to diminish since the end of the Cold War, Australia's participation in overseas operations has rapidly increased. This has stretched parts of the Regular Army and it is now the role of the Reserve to provide individuals and small groups to supplement Regular Army contingents on operations. The Army Reserve has also been tasked with providing larger groups for Operation ANODE, Operation RESOLUTE and Defence Assistance to the Civil Community operations.

### **'INTEGRABLE' SOLDIERS AND THE PROFESSIONALISM MYTH**

Under its former role, the Reserve Army would only be mobilised in times of national crisis. If reservists were required they would be deployed as part of their existing units and they would not need to integrate into ARA forces. However, with the Reserve's current task of providing individuals and small groups to support the Australian Defence Force's (ADF) current operations, commanders are shifting their focus from maintaining a unit that is able to deploy *en masse* to building a reservoir of trained individuals with the capacity to integrate into Regular Army forces. The capacity to integrate into ARA teams about to deploy on operations is the benchmark against which reservists are now measured. Changing the role of the Reserve is a sensible response to an evolving strategic and military landscape, but the desire to have 'integratable' soldiers has resulted in the damaging trend to move the management, training and readiness requirements of reservists ever closer to the ARA standard.

The requirements to make a reserve soldier 'integratable' into a Regular Army unit are increasing inexorably. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the number of days required to train a Private-equivalent soldier in the Reserve has almost trebled over the past twenty years. Since 1997 Army reservists have been required to maintain their Army Individual Readiness Notice level at the same standard as the Regular Army. Reserve soldiers are managed in a very similar way to their ARA counterparts and reservists receive the same annual performance reviews and follow a similar promotion procedure. Some argue for even more assimilation by unifying the Reserve pay and conditions of reservists and regulars.<sup>6</sup>

The alignment of ARes standards with their ARA counterparts is a result of the professionalism myth. The professionalism myth maintains that if a reservist is to maintain the same professional level as the ARA, and therefore be easily integrated, then training, recognition, management and leading must be the same as a regular member. The myth borrows from the private-sector concept where full-time and

part-time employees are treated almost identically. The professionalism myth is ultimately false because it does not appreciate the unique motivators and characteristics of reserve service.

### RESERVES' WORK IS DIFFERENT TO PART-TIME WORK

A consideration of the nature of Army Reserve service shows a number of superficial similarities with civilian part-time work. Reservists attend on a regular basis and are paid for the hours they work, at a rate determined by their skills and qualifications. High-Readiness Reserves and members of the Reserve Response Force are paid bonuses for undertaking particular training and readiness requirements. Reservists receive additional compensation such as health bonuses, access to the Defence home ownership scheme and other employee benefits.

These superficial similarities are deceptive. In reality, the motivation of a reserve soldier is dramatically different from a part-time employee. There are some younger reservists who join the Army while they are undertaking education and training, but these are a minority. The majority of reserve members undertake their service in addition to full-time employment; this is unusual because only 6 per cent of Australians work in two occupations and an even smaller percentage of these have a second occupation in addition to full-time employment.<sup>7</sup> This tells us what we already know: if Reserve service suddenly ended, the majority of former reservists would not take up another occupation in its place. The reason why members work in the Reserve when they would not undertake any other type of part-time work is simple—reservists do not consider their service as work.<sup>8</sup>

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... if Reserve service suddenly ended, the majority of former reservists would not take up another occupation in its place.

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### VOLUNTARINESS RATHER THAN COMPULSION

The problem with the 'professionalism myth' is that it denies some of the fundamental differences between ARA and ARes service. Those who join the modern Australian Army are volunteers; they are not conscripted or compelled into compulsory national service. However, after enlistment the ARA member's career will be dominated by compulsion. Initially the member will be subject to a Return of Service Obligation legally proscribing the individual from leaving the Army. During their service the organisation will be able to tell them where to live, which job they will be performing and they may be legally obliged to deploy

on operations. If the member does not attend work they will be charged with a military offence. Moreover, for most ARA members the Army is their sole source of income so they are compelled to work for economic reasons. In other words, an ARA soldier is compelled to attend the Army by a number of strong economic and legal ‘push’ factors.

In stark contrast to the compulsion of Regular Army service, a reservist’s life in the Army will be characterised by voluntariness. The average Army reservist experience consists of attending parade nights and training weekends. Occasionally the reservist may complete a course or attend an annual exercise. While commanders and leaders may deem certain events compulsory, no member is ever compelled to attend. Commanders have the legal capacity to charge a member for being absent without leave but this authority is seldom used because commanders do not want to further deter members from returning to their roles. Reservists have almost total control over whether they attend trade or promotion courses and can leave the service at any time by either discharging or by not attending training or parade activities. The vast majority of reserves also have other occupations providing them with another source of income and therefore are not compelled to attend training for economic reasons. Reservists are routinely sent overseas on operations, but modern Reserve deployments are optional with the individual electing whether to deploy.

The voluntary nature of Reserve service, combined with the perception of members that Reserve service is not work, should prompt us to see them not as employees but as volunteers. The term ‘volunteer’ should not be seen as pejorative, but as recognition that while the reserve members may perform a very different role to a children’s soccer coach or soup kitchen attendant they have similar motivators and experiences. Reservists, in many ways, share more with a local State Emergency Service volunteer than their ARA counterparts. Failure to accept the voluntary nature of Reserve service ultimately results in less effective training, leadership, recognition and recruitment processes.

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The vast majority of reserves also have other occupations providing them with another source of income ...

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## WHAT DOES A RECONCEPTION OF RESERVISTS MEAN?

### THE MODERN VOLUNTEER

Treating Army reservists as volunteers would seem irreconcilable with the increasing complexity of their role. First we must disabuse ourselves of the falsehood that volunteers cannot perform at a professional standard. With demands on

volunteer organisations continually growing, volunteers are required to fill a number of demanding and complex roles. The requirement that community organisations comply with a duty of care to their volunteers, staff, customers and the general public has dramatically increased their training requirements. Many volunteers require occupational health and safety lessons, child abuse mandatory reporting training and police background checks just to begin learning their new role. Volunteers in a rural fire service are required to understand firefighting theory, the operation of a number of vehicle variants, communication equipment, and firefighting theory, personal protective equipment, and use these under situations of extreme physical danger. Much of Australia's emergency response infrastructure is built around these volunteers, with communities trusting them with their lives. The success of these organisations' recruiting methods is demonstrated by the fact that there are approximately ten times the number of volunteer firefighters as there are ADF Reservists.<sup>9</sup> This should prompt us to question what lessons we can learn from these successful organisations and how we can use their strategies to build a stronger Reserve Army.

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... we have made the classic mistake of having 'simply transferred established employment practices from permanent staff into the volunteer area.'

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#### VOLUNTEERS HAVE DIFFERENT NEEDS

Volunteering Australia, the nation's peak volunteer body, argues that:

While the knowledge and skill required of a volunteer is the same as would be required of a paid worker performing the same task, volunteers will have different needs, will find different things rewarding, will have varying expectations of their volunteering experience and will value training differently.<sup>10</sup>

The remainder of this article attempts to identify what these differences are and how we can tailor the way we treat reservists to meet their unique needs and expectations as volunteers in order to build a stronger Army.

Unfortunately in our drive for the 'integratable soldier' we have made the classic mistake of having 'simply transferred established employment practices from permanent staff into the volunteer area.'<sup>11</sup> If we are to enhance our Reserve force then we must make a considered decision about which employment practices are equally applicable across the entire Army and when these volunteer reservists need distinct and customised solutions.

The most important of the differences in managing employees and volunteers is that motivation is indispensable in a volunteer environment because of the voluntary nature

of the experience. One of the major challenges facing the Reserve is the tendency for Reservists to join, receive expensive training and then leave the service.<sup>12</sup> This is indicative of a system where training activities are not successfully building members' motivation to attend. The sacrifices of an ARA member are extensive; members elect to continue to serve with the ADF instead of seeking external employment, accepting the hardships that accompany the life of a soldier. Reservists make sacrifices as well, but face a different choice. They are not required to forgo civilian employment to serve in the ADF. When attending an activity a reservist does so rather than spending more time with friends and family, pursuing a hobby or joining the local sporting team. The fundamental difference between the way reservists are trained, recruited, recognised and managed must support their choices to participate in the Army over other activities. The tasks necessary to make the Reserve a 'volunteer-friendly' experience can be grouped into training, leadership, recognition and recruitment. Lessons learnt from managing emergency services volunteers are most applicable as the role and volunteer model they present are most similar to the Reserves.<sup>13</sup> By incorporating strategies to make the Army Reserve volunteer-friendly while still maintaining rigorous, or even heightened, standards of professionalism we can build an Army Reserve with members who are both citizen volunteers and proficient professionals.

#### ACTIVITIES AND TRAINING

For the Army Reserve experience to become more volunteer-friendly, the most fundamental changes will be in activities and training. The increasing amount of training that reserves require to undertake their role should not itself be considered antithetical to a volunteer environment. If conducted successfully training can be one of the most effective tools to recruit<sup>14</sup> and motivate<sup>15</sup> volunteers; what we train and how we train will, however, need to be reassessed. Training must be relevant to a member's service occupation because volunteers have been shown to have a limited interest in their non-core roles.<sup>16</sup> Volunteering Australia observes that training in volunteer organisations has two goals; the capability of the organisation is enhanced by improving its human capital, while simultaneously 'motivating volunteers by helping them achieve and maintain satisfaction in their role.'<sup>17</sup> Therefore, the most effective training for both the organisation and the individual is one that fulfils both of these goals and that is the field of common interest (see Figure 1).

A prime example of an area of training that is important to the organisation but outside the area of volunteer interest, is the new requirement that all Reserve members holding the rank of corporal and above hold a competency in military risk management. The plan has the worthy goal of improving decision-making, but is also likely to lessen the motivation of volunteers. This type of training may marginally and temporarily improve the organisation as a skills gap is plugged, but in the long term it will have a detrimental effect on motivation and therefore the organisation's capability.




Figure 1. Effective training for volunteers demands that it operates in the ‘field of common interest’<sup>18</sup>

The top two motivators of volunteering are ‘knowing that my contribution would make a difference’ (80 per cent) and ‘personal belief for a particular cause’ (67 per cent).<sup>19</sup> A volunteer at a soup kitchen can see the homeless customer receiving and immediately consuming the food—the positive effect of the volunteering is obvious and immediate. In an Army context, although reservists make a very important contribution to Australian security, a direct and tangible effect is much more difficult to demonstrate to individual volunteers. Having such an intangible effect remains a fundamental challenge to motivating reservists. We need to ensure that we constantly reiterate that reservists have a positive and important role in Australian security. Moreover, reservists need to be given opportunities to complete tasks that have immediate and tangible results such as disaster relief and Defence Assistance to the Civil Community.

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#### LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT

The leadership and management of volunteers should differ substantially from employees. In studies of volunteer firefighters one of the most common exclamations of respondents is, ‘Remember we’re only volunteers’—a statement that is interpreted to reflect a number of different volunteer emotions.<sup>20</sup> The unspoken implications behind this statement of volunteer status are the feelings that ‘If we don’t like what you do we’ll stop being involved’; ‘You’re not my boss and I therefore have the right to question you if I don’t like what you say or do’; and ‘I don’t have to do anything I don’t want to’. It is neither possible nor desirable for all of these volunteer responses to be accommodated in a military context. However, these findings should prompt commanders to reconsider the type of leadership that is appropriate in the volunteer

environment. Officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers are taught the Regular Army's leadership style but are not given any training on leading volunteers. Insofar as it is consistent with the military environment, leaders should adopt a more egalitarian model when leading reservists.<sup>21</sup>

Volunteering Australia's 2009 survey also indicated that volunteers are suspicious of bureaucracy, particularly if imposed from a distant headquarters.<sup>22</sup> Reserve and ARA members alike would have noticed the increased paperwork required of both individuals and units. Much of the corporate bureaucracy burden applies equally to ARA and reservists. Reservists, however, do not have the same time to complete these requirements and therefore spend a much larger proportion of their precious training time completing corporate governance tasks than their ARA counterparts. These tasks are placed on Reserve units in order to ensure accountability. Similarly, the administrative requirements placed on individuals aim to ensure that members can be integrated with the ARA. Although admirable in intent, the unintended consequences are that reservists, and the ARA members posted to Reserve units, spend a large proportion of their time completing administration tasks. Administrative and corporate governance activities do not fall in the field of common interest and so the long-term effect will be increased absenteeism and lower retention rates as members become dissatisfied and leave the service. A more careful and sophisticated application of administrative requirements on Reserve units and individuals would reduce the high levels of absenteeism and member turnover.

Performance appraisal procedures are an example of both leadership and administrative processes that have been unthinkingly applied to reserves and are ill-suited to a volunteer environment. Junior non-commissioned officers and above receive an annual Performance Appraisal Report (PAR) designed to provide feedback on their performance and information for promotion decisions. In the ARA the supervisor is required to observe the subject for three months to be eligible to write a PAR. In contrast, a Reserve supervisor is required to report on the subject after seeing the reservist for as little as twenty days; during this time the subject of the PAR may have been on a course or exercise which the supervisor did not attend. The piecemeal nature of Reserve service also prevents supervisors from assigning significant tasks to the subject that would normally comprise the basis of the report. Not only is this an inappropriately applied administrative process, it is often also the closest many members get to a recognition of their individual efforts. Recognition is now considered of profound importance to motivating volunteers.<sup>23</sup> The Army periodically recognises members who make an outstanding contribution through awards such as the soldier's medallion, corps prizes, or unit honours. Those soldiers who attend regularly and perform satisfactorily do not receive particular recognition because 'they were just doing their job'. This mentality is inadequate for managing volunteers, because it fails to recognise that participating is largely voluntary and an inherently 'good' act.

## RECRUITMENT

The recruitment of volunteers is fundamentally different to that of employees and the Army Reserve recruitment strategy needs to reflect this. The Army Reserve recruits through the same organisation and generally the same methods as the ARA. Advertising for the Army Reserve in the employment section of newspapers fails to acknowledge that by far the most common method of recruitment to volunteer work is ‘through a friend or relative’. All the advertising combined (including newspapers, community notice boards, newsletters and websites) barely results in half the number of new volunteers as personal contacts.<sup>24</sup> This should lead us to conclude that current and former reservists are being under-utilised in the recruitment process. Reservists can be the Army’s avenue for capitalising on professional and social networks. A recruitment strategy that aims to attract volunteers through a friend and relative would better use existing members and would aim to attract groups of friends rather than individuals.

## CONCLUSION: RESERVES AS VOLUNTEERS

An emergency services respondent to Volunteering Australia’s 2009 national survey asserted that:

‘Many valuable vollies leave because the powers that be are trying to turn them into unpaid professionals’<sup>25</sup>

This could equally apply to many Australian Army reservists. The *Defence White Paper 2009* states that there will be further integration of Reserve and Regular components of the ADF.<sup>26</sup> During this process we need to be vigilant that we recognise the unique characteristics of Reserve service. Recognising that Reserve service is voluntary will prevent the unthinking transfer of Regular Army strategies onto reservists. The reconception of reservists as volunteers illuminates both dangers and opportunities. If we avoid the dangers and exploit the opportunities we will build a Reserve Army that is made up of members who are simultaneously citizen volunteers and proficient professionals.

## ENDNOTES

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- 1 For example, 103 (Lancastrian Artillery Volunteers) Regiment, Royal Artillery; 3 (Volunteer) Military Intelligence Battalion and 3 (Volunteer) Military Intelligence Battalion.
- 2 *Defence White Paper 2000 – Our Future Defence Force*, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2000, p. xii.

- 3 The *Defence White Paper 2009* largely reiterates role of the Reserves and commits the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to 'better integration between part-time and full-time service in the ADF'. *Defence White Paper 2009 – Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030*, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2009, p. 90.
- 4 *Defence Act 1903* (Cwth), s.50D(2). For a more complete and chronological analysis of the see Andrew Davies and Hugh Smith 'Stepping Up: Part-time Forces and ADF Capability', *Strategic Insights*, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Vol.44, November 2008, p. 4.
- 5 For a former Chief of Army's appraisal of Australia's strategic context in relation to the Army Reserve see Peter Leahy, 'The Australian Army Reserve: Relevant and Ready', *Australian Army Journal*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2004, p. 11.
- 6 Davies and Smith, 'Stepping Up', p. 14.
- 7 The figure is even smaller when males are isolated within the data; only 4 per cent of Australian men have more than one job. Productivity Commission, Joanna Abhayaratna, Les Andrews, Hudan Nuch and Troy Podbury, *Part Time Employment: The Australian Experience*, Productivity Commission Staff Working Paper, Melbourne, June 2008, p. 195, available <<http://www.pc.gov.au/research/staff-working/part-time-employment>>.
- 8 It is useful to consider that in many ways the Australian Government does not consider Reserve service work. Reserve salary is not considered work by the Australian Tax Office and is therefore not subject to income tax. Defence does not pay superannuation to reservists unlike all its other workers. Reserve salaries for officer cadets and recruits also often fall below the minimum wage given the number of hours these personnel work.
- 9 In 2005 there were approximately 220,000 volunteer fire fighters while around in 2008 there were only 19,915 Reservists from all services. R Beatson and J McLennan 'Australia's Women Volunteer Fire Fighters: A Literature Review and Research Agenda', *Australian Journal on Volunteering*, Vol.10, 2005, p. 18; Department of Defence 'Key Questions for Defence in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: A Defence Policy Discussion Paper, 2008, p.41.
- 10 *Volunteering Australia, A Guide for Training Volunteers*, Volunteering Australia, Melbourne, 2006, p. 10.
- 11 A Aitkin 'Identifying the Key Issues Affecting the Retention of Emergency Services Volunteers', *Australian Journal of Emergency Management*, Winter 2000, p. 16–23.
- 12 *Defence White Paper 2009* refers to the 'the significant annual wastage rate among part-time personnel' as one of the five challenges to the use of Reserves. *Defence White Paper 2009*, p.90.
- 13 Emergency services are Australia's second largest volunteer sector behind the 'community/welfare' sector. *Volunteering Australia, National Survey of Volunteering Issues*, Volunteering Australia, Melbourne, 2009, p. 6.
- 14 C Fahey, J Walker and A Sleight, 'Training can be a Recruitment and Retention tool for Emergency Service Volunteers', *Australian Journal of Emergency Management*, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2002, p. 3–7.

- 15 G Lennox, C Fahey and J Walker, 'Flexible, Focused Training: Keeps Volunteer Ambulance Officers', *Journal of Emergency Primary Care*, Vol, 1, Iss. 1–2, 2002.
- 16 An example of this was detailed in one study that found rural firefighters 'only want to get on the red trucks and go fight fires with sirens on and lights flashing!: they are not really interested in other activities'. Aitkin, 'Identifying the Key Issues Affecting the Retention of Emergency Services Volunteers', p. 17.
- 17 Volunteering Australia, *A Guide for Training Volunteers*, p. 2.
- 18 Ibid., p.13.
- 19 Volunteering Australia, *The National Survey of Volunteering Issues 2011*, Melbourne, p. 31, available <<http://www.volunteeringaustralia.org/Policy/-National-Survey-of-Volunteering-Issues/The-National-Survey-on-Volunteering-Issues-2011-Full-Report-Released.asp>>.
- 20 Aitkin 'Identifying the Key Issues Affecting the Retention of Emergency Services Volunteers', p. 17.
- 21 Volunteering Australia, 'National Survey of Volunteering Issues', pp. 26–27.
- 22 Aitkin, 'Identifying the Key Issues Affecting the Retention of Emergency Services Volunteers', p. 18.
- 23 Volunteer firefighting literature identifies recognition as one of the four criteria for a successful volunteer organisation. J Snook, J Johnson, D Olsen and J Buckman, *Recruiting, Training, and Maintaining Volunteer Fire Fighters*, 3rd edition, Missisauga, 2006, p.91. For more general explanation of why recognition is so important in volunteer organisations see J Esmond, 'Count On Me! 501 Ideas on Retaining, Recognizing and Rewarding Volunteers' Newseason Publications, Western Australia, 2005.
- 24 Volunteering Australia, 'National Survey of Volunteering Issues', p. 22.
- 25 Ibid, p. 12.
- 26 *Defence White Paper 2009*, p.90.

## THE AUTHOR

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## PEOPLE MANAGEMENT

# IMPROVING TRAINING YIELD

## IN-UNIT COLLECTIVE TRAINING TO WIN THE LAND BATTLE

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MAJOR GRANT CHAMBERS, CSM

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### ABSTRACT

Field training time in the Australian Army is a precious commodity. It is also unlikely to increase in the near future. Fighting echelon units must examine ways of improving their training yield if they are to improve their combat effectiveness. This paper examines three ways that fighting echelon units can improve their training yield. First, by using regimental training to turn their junior leaders into better collective trainers. Second, by using early evaluation of whole-task training to improve training efficiency. Third, by increasing the objectivity of training evaluation. Cognisant of the resource constraints facing units today, the paper aims to offer pragmatic options that do not simply demand doing more with less. Where options requiring greater effort are detailed, the costs are made clear, but so are the benefits.

## INTRODUCTION—IDENTIFYING THE NEED FOR CHANGE

Regardless of the particular fighting echelon, branch or corps one works in, troop leading is a complex cognitive function.<sup>1</sup> In the Australian Army the regimental system relies on each commander training the echelon immediately subordinate to him or her to shape, adapt and win the land battle.<sup>2</sup> It is generally useful for that commander to do so in the most familiar setting; for example, tank troop leaders generally train tank crews within a troop setting. The requirement to train this subordinate echelon is also partly why the professional organisations in armies have evolved the commissioned and non-commissioned structural relationships that they have.

Most of the Army's fighting echelon units train in similar ways. They establish a training continuum, including a mix of part-task and whole-task training<sup>3</sup> that more or less follows a 'crawl-walk-run' methodology, and apply that methodology to both the echelon that the training focuses on and the difficulty of the training being conducted. Unfortunately, for a number of concrete reasons (mostly to do with resource consumption and available time) the balance between part- and whole-task training is unquestionably in favour of the completion of part-task training.<sup>4</sup> This will most likely remain the case, so improving combat effectiveness by training more cannot be the answer. Fighting echelon units must examine ways of achieving higher quality training in order to ensure levels of professional mastery that will weight combat outcomes in blue favour rather than in red.

This paper examines three ways that units can improve their training yield. First, units should focus on making better trainers by providing their junior leaders with collective training skills that are not delivered by current individual training continuums. Second, units can use their training time more efficiently by using evaluation to identify where training effort is required and where it is not. Finally, units can improve the effectiveness of their training by increasing the objectiveness of proficiency reviews.

**Terminology:** 'Whole-task training' and 'whole-of-task practice' are training situations that are as close to operations as possible—orders are issued, a detailed background situation is developed and a live enemy opposes blue force actions. Whole-task training must occur in the field. In peacetime training, the fear and danger associated with executing operations against an enemy cannot be replicated; the decrease in effectiveness of force exposed to these elements over time is also not replicated. Whole-task training is useful in increasing the practical

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If the conduct of collective training is fundamental to fighting effectiveness, why are the skills not given to Army's junior leaders?

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experience of those undertaking it. It improves the intuitive decision-making cycles of commanders through iterative learning, aids in developing an understanding of where friction is likely to hinder the successful execution of missions, and is a very effective means of identifying weak proficiency in constituent skills. Constituent or part-task training and practice incorporate the myriad subordinate skills that are used during tank troop operations. This includes weapons handling and preventative maintenance checks and services through to higher order practices like Advanced Gunnery Training System (AGTS) and Steel Beasts simulation.

There are significant benefits in increasing the ratio of whole-task training to part-task training. Unfortunately it is unlikely that there will be an increase in the available field training time for tank troops and so the ratio is unlikely to change in the near future.<sup>5</sup> As a result, regiments must improve their conduct of training and examine the priorities allocated to training the myriad constituent tasks at the troop level to create an improved yield.

### MAKING BETTER TRAINERS

There is no more important influence on the training of a unit than its commander.<sup>6</sup> Training is the single most important factor affecting morale<sup>7</sup>, and in turn morale is the most important single factor in determining fighting effectiveness<sup>8</sup>. If the conduct of collective training is fundamental to fighting effectiveness, why are the skills not given to Army's junior leaders?

Units should focus initial internal regimental training (distinct from collective training continuums) on turning their junior leaders into collective trainers. They should do this by improving the experience of their junior leaders through the conduct of historical battle studies. They must provide their junior leaders with coaching and mentoring skills. Junior leaders must be trained in collective training design and execution. Finally, units should use a regimental training program to develop a habit of critical self-review amongst its junior leaders.

Improving the quality of training in units by making better trainers will have an initial cost. Early in the training cycle junior leaders should undertake a regimental training program focused on common development training. This training is as important as the ADF mandatory training that occurs at the start of any given calendar year, and will certainly have a far greater effect on improving warfighting capability.

**Training rather than instructing:** There is an important difference between individual training instructors and collective training trainers. Army has a tradition where non-commissioned officers (NCOs) are trained to become extremely good individual training instructors. It also has a strong system for developing their instructional experience by posting them away from their fighting echelon units after their junior NCO (JNCO) command appointments to complete corps-specific

or all-corps instructional appointments. As a result they have significant strength in some of the part-task training necessary to generate exceptional fighting sections and crews. This system does not necessarily make them good collective trainers.

The All Corps Officer Training Continuum (ACOTC) includes periods of instruction on collective training design in every course leading to sub-unit command. It does not include instruction on the execution of that training, but relies instead on commanders mimicking the commanders they have been trained by—this can create a destructive feedback loop. It is understandable that completing the ACOTC does not make great trainers as the focus in the process should remain on tactical proficiency and fundamental operations staff officer skills so that every soldier can be an expert in close combat. Moreover it is impossible to identify the elements of training in the various training management practices of the ACOTC that could be removed to increase the number of periods of instruction focused on development of these officers as trainers.

Accepting that training institutions do not have the resources—time, training aids, correctly experienced instructors—to develop the collective training skills needed by junior commissioned and non-commissioned officers, the training burden falls elsewhere. This is where fighting echelon units come in. Fighting echelon units have the greatest vested interest in making better collective training trainers. Fighting echelon units should focus regimental training on providing junior leaders with collective training skills.

**Studying historical battles:** The most important result of studying history is that students learn what they need to think about.<sup>9</sup> One part of regimental training that should be employed to improve collective training trainer-skills is the use of historical studies that emphasize the successful use of defeat mechanisms (disruption and dislocation) and the control of friction. By improving the base knowledge of their junior leaders, units can ensure that when they design and execute training it is more likely to successfully develop the collective skills necessary to make use of defeat mechanisms as well as control the effects of friction. It is clear that units could employ the study of campaigns and battle of which they have been a significant part in order to improve their own esprit de corps but it is not necessary. The key is that the focus of the battle studies must be to improve training design skills of the junior leaders of the unit. Ideally those design skills should enable junior leaders to design training that will focus on using disruption and dislocation to defeat an enemy as well as identifying the points in any mission where friction is likely to be high and to employ control measures to mitigate that friction.

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Fighting echelon units have the greatest vested interest in making better collective training trainers.

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**Understanding how the combat team is likely to fight:** Most arms corps lieutenants graduate their respective Regimental Officers Basic Courses with a working knowledge of the tactical actions (formations, methods of movement and some of the battle drills) their first command may undertake to achieve any given mission. Unfortunately the corps schools are simply unable, given resource restrictions, to provide training in a combat-team setting fighting an enemy that is capable of forcing decision upon them. Given the schools are not equipped to do so, fighting echelon units must establish a common base of understanding of how combat teams are likely to fight. Ideally the formation should coordinate how units do this so as to better enable rapid regrouping within the formation during combat. There are a number of ways of doing this within a regimental training system—the most efficient is to demonstrate the tasks a combat team may be employed in by using simulation. A unit's simulation officer could reasonably easily construct instructive simulation videos that detail how a combat team is likely to achieve key tactical actions. For example using Virtual Battlespace 2 (VBS2) a simulation video

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... fighting echelon units must establish a common base of understanding of how combat teams are likely to fight.

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could be constructed that demonstrates how a combat team achieves break-in to a defended urban environment. The video could clearly demonstrate how each of the Battlespace Operating Systems are employed to achieve the requisite combat functions and how it sets the conditions for follow-on actions once break-in is achieved. A series of these videos could form the basis for a regimental or formation training program that establishes a common understanding amongst its junior leaders of how the formation's combat teams are likely to fight. The 1st Brigade Concept of Operations<sup>10</sup> and the Multi-role brigade—close combat narrative<sup>11</sup> are two resources that may enlighten the discussion.

**Coaching and mentoring skills:** As previously discussed, the Army already produces good instructors. What is needed in developing the capacity to lead training for complex cognitive functions like combat command are coaches and mentors.<sup>12</sup> The Army is not as accomplished in producing coaches and mentors as it is instructors. Fortunately there are other organisations that can help fighting units in developing these skills. Importantly our junior leaders must be given some techniques for identifying when training is ineffective and selecting a different approach to train the same skill. The Combat Training Centre (CTC) has been training observer/trainers (OTs) for more than ten years and has a very useful package for developing the necessary skills to improve collective training. Units could approach the CTC to gain use of its training package to deliver elements of it to aid in junior leaders'

development as trainers. Fighting echelon units could also qualify key trainers as high-order coaches within the National Coaching Accreditation Scheme. While the athletic sports-specific skills are not applicable to training for troop operations, the generic skills modules are definitely transferrable<sup>13</sup>.

**Developing design skills:** Before the junior officers and NCOs are sent to train their troops they must have an understanding of training design. Unfortunately there is a dearth of useful Army doctrine on designing, developing and executing training for developing capability at the troop level. The current collective training doctrine is useful in helping unit and sub-unit commanders use their experience to develop and execute training programs; it is less useful in aiding the development of training programs for troop training. The US Army provides a more useful aid to training for junior leaders with its *Battle Focused Training Field Manual 7-1* and the frequently-used guide to that manual—*The Leader's Smart Book*.<sup>14</sup> This guide is the most useful reference for training design, development, execution and review available for unit, sub-unit and troop-level training available. It should be a compulsory document for all junior leaders within fighting echelon units. The strength of the guide over Australian or US doctrine is its succinct aide-memoire style. Most importantly it is the best tool for understanding training theory and the transition of that theory to praxis.

Developing the training program for troops or platoons must be nested through sub-unit to unit level. The best method of doing this is by conducting a workshop (reminiscent of previously conducted quarterly training briefs) with unit key leaders down to troop level. During the workshop the commanding officer (CO) should articulate the training goals of the unit based on his own analysis. The operations officer (S3) should articulate the training time available and which echelon the training time is allocated to. Once this is done the CO should also articulate when each echelon is required to achieve each directed Army Training Level (ATL) and to what standard and under what conditions these levels will be achieved. The command group should then develop a (or ideally refine an already-developed) list of the assessments or tasks, conditions and standards associated with each Army Training Level/Standard (ATL/S). Once this is done, sub-unit commanders should then detail the tasks and skills they will train and those that will be trained by subordinate commanders. Armed with this list the unit's junior leaders should then develop the training programs for their echelon. Their programs should be checked by their OC, but back briefed by the troop/platoon leader to the CO. This action should be undertaken quarterly in order to review previous performance

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*The Leader's Smart Book ...*  
should be a compulsory  
document for all junior  
leaders within fighting  
echelon units.

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(more on this later) and to account for any changes in the higher echelon. By doing this task in person the CO and OCs can be certain that their subordinate commanders understand their role in the training regime. There is also a degree of certainty of unity of effort, making this a more powerful method than relying on the commander's written training guidance. It is absolutely understood that the time demands on the CO are already extreme. This essay contends that because the CO is the most important individual in the training culture of a unit, time spent personally ensuring that junior leaders understand his training intent is vitally important in improving combat effectiveness. For the cost of four days in any given calendar year unit training is likely to be far better nested and far more effective.

**Critical self-review:** Army's second principle of leadership behaviour is to 'know yourself and seek self-improvement'.<sup>15</sup> One of the most challenging parts of training an organisation is conducting objective reviews. It is very difficult for those closely responsible for designing and executing the training to see fault in the work they have been involved in. By using objective measurement tools that use techniques where predetermined conditions and standards are set for constituent skills or for the execution of whole tasks it is less likely that faults will be overlooked during review. After action reviews (AARs) remain the most effective means of identifying flaws in an organisation's performance and thereby identifying means to rectify them. Therefore, early in the training cycle leaders should be trained in how to complete AARs. To ensure that subordinates have established a habit of completing AARs their commanders can require them to raise post-activity reports or the commander can attend the subordinate echelon review in person. A mix of these two tools is appropriate. Finally, if units establish a habit of critical organisational review it is reasonable to assume that the same habit will result in leaders habitually reviewing their own performance without the need for a formal setting.

By making better trainers fighting echelon units will be prepared to commence training to adapt, shape and win the land battle with more effective trainers who have an intimate understanding of their commander's training intent, knowledge of how their echelon will fight as part of the larger organisation, an increased understanding of the likely points of friction within their future missions and how they may target an enemy's weakness. However, more effective trainers are not the only means of improving training yield—units must also improve training efficiency by being selective about how much time they allocate to training specific constituent skills.

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After action reviews (AARs)  
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means of identifying  
flaws in an organisation's  
performance.

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## FOCUSING THE EFFORTS OF NEW TRAINERS

**Being Selective:** As suggested earlier, most fighting echelon units train in similar ways. Furthermore most fighting echelon units train in ways reminiscent of how they themselves have been previously trained. Although this creates a strong organisational culture it is important that fighting echelon units look critically at the training they conduct to achieve war-fighting capability. Most fighting echelon units adopt a time-honoured tradition of troop/platoon internally-directed training followed by company/squadron-directed training before entering into actions like Paratus Cup<sup>16</sup> and Predator's Gallop<sup>17</sup>. Although this collective training cycle has proven effective at developing very good troops and combat teams, it may not necessarily be the most efficient means of doing so. A more efficient means would be to establish a way of identifying where most training effort is needed at the start of a training cycle rather than trying to allocate time to train all combat skills. Fighting echelon units must become more selective in determining how they use their precious whole-task training time. In order to do so formations must also be prepared to provide them a little leeway in allocating training resources early in the collective training continuum. Units should be selective about the tasks, standards and conditions that they train at each ATL. The basis of making these selections will be a mix of intuition and evaluation. This evaluation is the key part of being selective; at the moment evaluation of whole task proficiency occurs too late in the training cycle to drive efficient collective training.

**Evaluate proficiency early and often:** Fighting echelon units should change their collective training methodology from 'crawl-walk-run' to 'run (with close evaluation)-crawl-walk-run'. The first whole-task training event (either in barracks or the field) that a troop/platoon conducts during a collective training cycle should be used to evaluate its proficiency in specified skills and tasks. Their proficiency should be evaluated by dedicated, unit-provided, experienced leaders (officer commanding, regimental sergeant major, squadron sergeant major, 2IC and/or adjutant) acting as an Observer Trainers (OT). This evaluation should occur before the troop is given time to conduct its own internal field training. The training should be intense, it should test the troop to failure and it should be of a duration that will test their operational viability period (OVP)—approximately 72 to 96 hours for a troop. The troop leader must conduct a combination of internal reviews and AAR while still undertaking the mission against an unconstrained enemy (that

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Fighting echelon units must become more selective in determining how they use their precious whole-task training time.

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is without any exercise pauses for the conduct of such reviews). The troop must enact fixes to rectify faults while still completing its actions with an active and unrestrained enemy. Throughout the conduct of the mission the OT must collect data and record observations to enable review at the end of the mission. At the end of the mission the OC, the troop leader and subordinate commanders must complete a thorough review of their performance. The review must be based on the requirements established during the Regimental training mission analysis that has been previously discussed. It must identify the strengths and weaknesses of the organisation and its subordinate elements. The weaknesses then become the focus for troop/platoon-directed internal training. The OC must articulate how and when the troop's proficiency will be evaluated in those weak areas. While this will be a very demanding training action for a unit it will improve the training yield by ensuring troops are not overtraining actions that they are already proficient in.

**Best reward for effort:** This type of early whole-task evaluation will not only identify which tactical actions the troop must train to improve, it will also identify the constituent tasks that are weak. For example if the duration of the training exercise is sufficiently long it will certainly identify if the operator maintenance skills of an organisation are adequate. It will determine if the organisation has reasonable crew rest procedures in place. If properly instrumented it will confirm whether or not the crew's equipment maintenance was adequate. In the event that whole task evaluation is not feasible due to lack of training space or other resources, the OC must rely on simulation to determine proficiency and identify weakness in constituent skills. As with the whole-task training the evaluation of proficiency of constituent skills must occur first in the training cycle. This initial evaluation then allows targeted training to improve weaknesses and avoids wasting training time on making strengths stronger. Once the tasks requiring training are known, the effectiveness of the training can be improved. By evaluating the performance of the unit's subordinate fighting elements during whole-task and constituent training, the areas of weakness can be understood. Once the responsibilities for training to improve those faults have been allocated, subsequent training design can begin. To ensure that the training undertaken is effective the Regiment must manipulate the training environment and increase the objectivity of training goals and assessments.

## MANIPULATING THE ENVIRONMENT

**Varying intensity and duration of whole-task training:** Frequency, duration and intensity are three of the fundamental elements of training that can be altered to affect the organisational outcomes of training. While these three elements have been used to promote stress adaptation in physical training for many years<sup>18</sup> an understanding of their effect on training complex cognitive function is less mature.

It is reasonable to suggest that they can be used to promote similar adaptation in collective training. As previously stated, frequency of training is unlikely to be increased, so the paper will only examine how duration and intensity of training may be used to prompt adaptation within a unit's subordinate elements. Importantly though, these mechanisms will result in failure of different constituent parts of the system during the conduct of whole-task training. Increased intensity will stress cognitive capacity, while increased duration will stress cognitive endurance. How each can be employed in unit collective training will be examined.

To increase training intensity fighting echelon units should increase the strength of the adversary in training exercises. An enemy capable of using the combined arms effect to force dilemma on the blue force commander, while at the same time operating in depth to have a disruptive effect on the combat team's supporting elements, is likely to stretch the junior leader's cognitive capacity to failing point. Once cognitive capacity has failed, and the exercise has reached a point where review is feasible, the OT should coach commanders through a review of their decision-making processes and identify unnecessary elements of the problems that commanders considered or appreciated. Training for this intensity will result in two improvements. First, the stress adaptation of doing this type of training may result in increased cognitive capacity, and second it will identify any external factors a troop/platoon leader can ignore during future decision making thereby lessening the demand on the commander's cognitive capacities in future similar situations.

By increasing the endurance of the adversary in exercises, training duration is lengthened but with a valuable outcome. A persistent and pervasive enemy that is capable of making and maintaining contact with a force, but is not capable of decisively engaging a troop or platoon will stretch the troop/platoon commander's cognitive endurance. For example, where an enemy has adopted an operational plan reliant on exhausting the moral authority of an opponent, the tactical enemy is likely to use techniques not dissimilar to the Vietcong in South Vietnam or the Taliban in Afghanistan to wear down the blue force. The enemy must still be capable of lethal combat, but is only likely to employ it in its own defence when its support elements are threatened. An exercise design that sees the unit employed in stabilisation operations and in constant contact with an enemy that uses sniping, ambushing and mine attacks to disrupt the blue force while avoiding decisive engagement is likely to result in decision fatigue in the blue force commander. When the exercise design allows,

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the OT should guide commanders through a review that identifies where errors in judgement were made as a result of fatigue. The OT can adjudicate discussion, identifying points when the commander made unnecessary decisions that resulted in stressing cognitive endurance. Establishing standard operating procedures will enable commanders to focus on the task at hand without having to make decisions about routine operations and increase the troop/platoon's endurance.<sup>19</sup>

**Varying intensity and duration of part-task training:** The same techniques can be used to good effect during part-task training. The aim of a part-task training event should be to train to failure, identify the cause of the failure and then re-train to rectify the fault. Weapon handling drills are a classic example of this. Junior NCOs (JNCO) should direct weapon drill training so that the crew carries out drills until they fail. The JNCO can induce increased intensity by asking the individual members of the crew questions about preventative maintenance checks and service tasks related to their station or tabulated data relevant to their trade while they are undergoing the task. When the individual fails, the JNCO stops the practice, identifies the fault, and ensures that the drill can be correctly carried out under decreased intensity and then resumes. Carrying out the training at night will also aid in increased intensity. JNCOs directing the training can increase duration by repeating the task for a long time at low intensity until the crew fails and by then carrying out the corrective action detailed above. By training to failure induced by intensity or duration, identifying the fault and then training to rectify it stress adaptation will occur, improving the proficiency of the individual members of the crew.

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## INCREASING OBJECTIVITY

**Audio and video recording:** Whenever training design allows, the execution of tasks should be recorded. The use of video in the review of performance has long been a successful element of training in the elite sports and is directly applicable to some of the skills employed within the tank troop. For example, when a tank troop is conducting whole-task training in an intense scenario it is likely, particularly if the training is early in the cycle, that the troop leader's communication will be ambiguous at times. It is also likely that this ambiguity will lead to a subordinate crew carrying out a task that the troop leader did not order, or at the very least in a way that the troop leader had not visualised. If the OT has recorded the radio transmissions and can play them back during review the troop leader and

subordinate commanders will accept the transmission objectively and seek a means of rectifying the fault rather than arguing the toss on what was said during the transmissions. While outside the scope of troop training, the same tool would be useful during a unit's battle staff training. During both the planning and execution phase, an OT could use the recordings to objectively establish the events, identify fault and then lead the staff in a discussion to rectify fault. Training effectiveness is likely to improve through the recording of certain elements of training to increase objectivity. Noting that units resource allocations are always stretched (particularly cash) they may have to rely on personal recording devices to achieve these aims. While this may create extra work for the Unit Security Officer it is likely to yield better training outcomes.

**Establishing tactical checklists:** The US Army uses the Army Training Evaluation Program (ARTEP) to evaluate a unit's tactical proficiency. This method has also been used in certain sections of the Australian Army. The ARTEP produces a checklist of the subordinate tasks that are required for the successful completion of a tactical task. It can be argued though that this system reduces the opportunity for initiative, and ties proficiency to procedure rather than to mission success. Instead of using the checklists for determining proficiency, they should be used for increasing the objectivity of review of performance. This type of checklist should be used during proficiency evaluation exercises as a means of identifying those constituent skills that are performed well and those that need more attention paid to them. Importantly, the checklists should only be used by OTs, not by troop leaders, as a map to successful execution. Their use as a troop planning tool could very easily lead to formulaic mission preparation and execution resulting in less room for initiative and imagination.

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... an OT could use the recordings to objectively establish the events, identify fault and then lead the staff in a discussion to rectify fault.

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## COSTS

**Varying the environment:** When the intensity or duration of a training event is increased to promote stress adaptation, troops must be allocated sufficient rest following a training action to recover. Without this rest the troops will not make the desired adaptation. In a system that has finite field training time available, this means that more of that time may be required for rest. While this may seem counterintuitive, if the intensity or duration of single training actions is increased the reward is definitely worth the effort.

**Increased objectivity:** Increased effectiveness does not come without a cost. In the case of establishing tactical check lists for OTs, upfront work required by experienced commanders like OCs and SSMs will undoubtedly increase. It will also result in another burden on the time of the CO to ensure that the checklists nest with the visualisation of how tank troops will fight. OTs will simply not be available for every training action, nor should they be used in this way. Troops and platoons must develop the capacity to execute tasks in isolation and rely on their own ability for critical review and fault rectification. OTs should be used early in the training cycle to identify proficiency and weakness to aid in improving training efficiency through selectivity. They should also be used late in the training cycle to evaluate proficiency prior to reorganisation for operations or progression to higher order training. Establishing OTs is not easy for a unit. The best people to fulfil OT duties for troop training are OCs, 2ICs, adjutants, some staff captains depending on their experience, and SSMs. Removing them from their other tasks to provide the OT function will result in reduced capacity elsewhere in the system—a reduced capacity that may result in increased risk to mission or force elsewhere. The decision must be made whether the risk is worth the reward. The decision on when to use OTs should be considered during the quarterly training design workshops discussed earlier. The decision must include the assessment of the associated risks and the subsequent exercise design must reduce or mitigate the risk through some additional control measures. By identifying the OT requirement early, the sub-units executing the training will be better able to prepare for their provision as well as anticipating how to overcome the risks associated with drawing them from elsewhere in the organisation.

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Troops and platoons must develop the capacity to execute tasks in isolation and rely on their own ability for critical review and fault rectification.

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## CONCLUSION

Available field training time in the Australian Army is generally outside of the control of the unit commander and, to a large degree, of the formation commander. As a result, if units want to improve proficiency they cannot do so by increasing the amount of field training conducted. Units must find ways to improve their training yield. There are three ways they can do this. The first is through creating better trainers by giving them a number of skills that will improve their ability to plan and execute training. The second is to improve the efficiency of training by being

selective about the skills that they dedicate their finite training time to. The third involves increasing the effectiveness of training by varying the training environment to promote stress adaptation and increasing the objectivity of training reviews.

Making better trainers requires fighting echelon units to find additional training time early in the training cycle; this is the only technique discussed in this paper that requires units to increase their in-barracks training time. Fighting echelon units should complete a development package for the officers, warrant officers and SNCOs who will undertake training design and execution. The package should include battle studies that inform the trainer's understanding of defeat mechanisms, how friction affects the execution of tasks and how to insert control measures that will overcome that friction. It should inform the trainer's understanding of how combat teams are likely to fight as part of battle groups. It should also develop the trainer's capacity for critical self-review. Finally it should provide them with training design skills informed by the conduct of a quarterly training mission analysis and design workshop. The presence of the CO will result in a far greater understanding of his intent for training than if it is left to the dissemination of written guidance. If only one element of the development package can be achieved then it must be the COs directed training analysis and design workshop.

Increasing training efficiency relies on increasing the rate of evaluation of troops/platoons undertaking training. This evaluation should occur as early in a collective training cycle as possible and during the conduct of both whole- and part-task training. The outcomes of the evaluation should then inform the constituent task training that must be completed to improve warfighting proficiency at the lowest level. Instead of occurring as a culmination of ATL/S 3B training it should occur at the start of ATL 3 training and be used to inform the subsequent training of troops/platoons.

Increasing training effectiveness is achieved in two ways. Firstly, by manipulating the training environment using intensity and duration to promote stress adaptation, and secondly by increasing training objectivity. Objectivity can be increased through instrumentation, recording and reviewing performance and through the use of tactical checklists. The abovementioned methods of increasing training effectiveness rely heavily on the use of OTs. Generating OTs creates a significant burden on organisations executing training as they will generally need to be sourced internally. The removal of OTs from their regular offices also results in increased risk to the force that must be accepted or mitigated. Importantly OTs should not be used for every training action. They are

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evaluation should occur as early in a collective training cycle as possible and during the conduct of both whole- and part-task training.

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suited to identifying the training need and for evaluating ATL/S proficiency. The most useful tool for improving training effectiveness is recording training actions to objectify review.

During the current Strategic Reform Program the allocation of resources throughout the ADF will remain modest into the foreseeable future. If fighting echelon units must select only some of the techniques set out above to improve their training yield then they must focus on making better trainers and using OTs to identify the constituent tasks that need training and to increase the objectivity of training feedback. If units can carry out these tasks effectively then it is likely that the quality of training will improve. This will increase the morale of fighting echelon units and in turn their fighting power.

## ENDNOTES

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- 1 Jeroen van Merrienboer, *Training Complex Cognitive Skills*, Educational Technology Publications Incorporated, 1997, New Jersey, p. 169–72.
- 2 Land Warfare Development Centre 2010, *The Army Objective Force 2030*, Puckapunyal, p.25.
- 3 van Merrienboer, op cit, p. 169–172.
- 4 For example, during the training conducted during 2011 at 1st Armoured Regiment, the cancellation of training at Cultana, the conduct of gunnery training at Mount Bundy Training Area, the deployment to Shoalwater Bay Training Area and the completion of Paratus Cup 2011 resulted in less than four months useful field training time. Considering the directed elements of Exercise HAMEL and time for rest, maintenance and sustainment it is reasonable to suggest that no more than ten weeks were available for whole-task training in the field. The other eight months of the year were spent in barracks. Removing the weekends and mandated tasks that could not incorporate constituent task training still leaves at least fifteen weeks available for the conduct of part-task training. 2011 was not unusual in its available training time.
- 5 This assumption is based upon the current requirement for field training for a medical evacuation plan that enables any casualty to be removed from the point of injury to a resuscitation facility within one hour and to a surgical facility within the subsequent two hours. The cost of establishing this system, given that Army does not use its own aviation assets to do so, means that a functional-level command is responsible for funding and a formation-level command is responsible for coordinating the support. The current method for resource allocation is that no increase in a resource of greater than 10 per cent is likely to be granted. When this policy is coupled with a very close watch on the time soldiers with critical skills (most of whom reside in the combat service support arms) spend in the field, it is clear that field training time will not increase.

- 6 Land Warfare Doctrine 1, *The Fundamentals of Land Warfare*, Department of Defence, Puckapunyal, 2004 paragraph 2.23.
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- 14 Field Manual 7–1 (FM 25–101), *Battle Focused Training*, Headquarters Department of the Army, 2003.
- 15 Land Warfare Doctrine 2, *Leadership*, Department of Defence, Puckapunyal, 2004 Annex B to Chapter one.
- 16 Paratus Cup is the 1st Armoured Regiment's annual competition to determine its champion troop.
- 17 Predator's Gallop has long been a 1st Brigade exercise controlled by the formation with the aim of testing combat teams in a battle group setting.
- 18 Roy J Shephard, 'Intensity, Duration and Frequency of Exercise as Determinants of the Response to a Training Regime', *European Journal of Applied Physiology*, Vol. 26 No. 3, June 1968.
- 19 John Tierny, 'Do you suffer from decision fatigue?', *New York Times Magazine*, 17 August 2011, <[http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/21/magazine/do-you-suffer-from-decision-fatigue.html?\\_r=1&pagewanted=all](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/21/magazine/do-you-suffer-from-decision-fatigue.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all)>.

## THE AUTHOR

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## CONCEPTS

# VISUALISING ADAPTIVE CAMPAIGNING

## INFLUENCE DIAGRAMS IN SUPPORT OF CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT

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DANIEL BILUSICH, FRED D J BOWDEN, SVETOSLAV GAIDOW AND  
CHRISTOPHER MANNING

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### ABSTRACT

*Adaptive Campaigning— Future Land Operating Concept* describes the Australian land force's response to the challenges of future warfare. It discusses the need for Army to perform successfully over various lines of operation and to maintain an adaptive approach in order to achieve its objectives. However, the novel nature of this approach poses some challenges in its practical implementation. A visualisation technique known as influence diagrams is employed to examine adaptive campaigning and help support its further development as a concept.

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Although conflicts have always incorporated both conventional and unconventional aspects, the focus of doctrine development and materiel acquisition appears to have been more on the side of conventional warfare. More recently however, military doctrine has started to explicitly incorporate the unconventional aspects. This is essential as complex asymmetric conflicts cannot be won by conventional approaches alone.

*Adaptive Campaigning—Future Land Operating Concept (Adaptive Campaigning)* outlines the Australian land force’s response to the conflict environment as part of the military contribution to a whole-of-government (WoG) approach to resolving conflicts, whether they are conventional or unconventional. It was first published in 2007<sup>1</sup> with a revised version in 2009<sup>2</sup>. There have been a number of iterations of the main document as well as sub-concepts, some formally endorsed and some remaining only in draft format. *Adaptive Campaigning* is dynamic and the last endorsed version is a living document. It will change over time as a result of changes in the environment, experience on the ground and lessons learnt.

In this paper we employ a visualisation technique called influence diagrams (IDs) to extract the key components of the concept in order to assist the concept developers to improve the concept by filling in some holes in its next iteration. However, the ID is not limited solely to this utility; it can also assist people who will implement the concept. Our focus has been the use of IDs of adaptive campaigning (AC IDs) as a concept tool, an implementation tool and a teaching tool.

This article first provides a short summary of *Adaptive Campaigning*, highlighting the novel nature of the concept and the involvement of many actors. This is followed by a section on visualisation techniques, particularly IDs, which can simplify the understanding of the concepts described in *Adaptive Campaigning* and make it more user-friendly. Examples of how AC IDs have been developed in order to support implementation and training are summarised. The paper also reveals how IDs are well suited to examine the adaptive campaigning concept. This then leads into the development of another set of AC IDs to support concept developers as they work on keeping the concept current and complete.

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... how best the land force can influence and shape perceptions, allegiances and actions of a target population to allow peaceful political discourse and a return to normality.

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## ADAPTIVE CAMPAIGNING

*Adaptive Campaigning* outlines the Australian land force’s response to the conflict environment as part of the military contribution to a whole-of-government (WoG) approach to resolving conflicts.<sup>3</sup> Adaptive campaigning is not a counterinsurgency concept but a concept which incorporates both conventional and non-traditional military aspects in a complex environment. It describes the reasons for the Army to adopt an adaptive approach to future military operations dependent on

continuously evolving complexity and operational uncertainty.<sup>4</sup> The purpose of adaptive campaigning as a warfighting concept is to set out how best the land force can influence and shape perceptions, allegiances and actions of a target population to allow peaceful political discourse and a return to normality. Given the complexities of the environment the key to the land force's success is expected to be its ability to effectively orchestrate effort across the five lines of operation (LOOs). These, with their Australian Army (2009)<sup>5</sup> descriptions, are:

- Joint Land Combat (JLC)—actions to secure the environment and remove organised resistance, and set conditions for the other LOOs;
- Population Protection (PP)—actions to provide protection and security to threatened populations in order to set the conditions for the re-establishment of law and order;
- Information Actions (IA)—actions that inform and shape the perceptions, attitudes, behaviour and understanding of target population groups;
- Population Support (PS)—actions to establish/restore or temporarily replace the necessary essential services in affected communities; and
- Indigenous Capacity Building (ICB)—actions to nurture the establishment of civilian governance, which may include local and central government, security, police, legal, financial and administrative systems.

*Adaptive Campaigning* emphasises the interdependence of the LOOs and their ability to reinforce each other. Hence, the ability of the land force to effectively orchestrate effort across all five lines is considered as a key to successfully achieving its mission. Moreover, operational uncertainty early in a campaign may most likely require the land force to take also the leading role in non-warfighting activities (Figure 1).

For the Australian Army to operate over the five LOOs with greatest effectiveness in order to achieve mission success in an ever-changing asymmetric complex environment, it needs to be able to adapt to emerging changes during the campaign. This requires the ability to quickly shift the main efforts and focus within individual LOOs as well as across LOOs. The capabilities required to operate effectively over the five LOOs include operational flexibility, responsiveness, agility and resilience.<sup>6</sup>

Operational flexibility is the ability of Army to remain effective across a various range of tasks, situations and conditions and the ability to have the means to change the main areas of focus when needed. Operational responsiveness is the ability to rapidly change effort. This is essential for responding to emerging threats in an ever-changing environment but is also the key to exploiting emerging opportunities that present themselves as a campaign unfolds. Operational agility involves knowing when to, and being able to, shift strategy, by dynamically managing the balance and weight of effort across the LOOs. Operational resilience can be defined as the ability to be resistant to shock. It is the capacity to sustain loss, damage and setbacks yet still




Figure 1. Adaptive campaigning within the army conceptual framework.<sup>7</sup>

maintain a level of capability above a given threshold.<sup>8</sup> These four capabilities along with robustness, the insensitivity to enemy actions, are essential for having the capability to operate over the five LOOs and to succeed in complex environment campaigns both conventional and asymmetric.

Since the introduction of *Adaptive Campaigning* in 2007, with a revised version in 2009, there have been journal publications addressing various aspects of this concept, ranging from specific fundamental components which make up the concept to how various aspects of the Army may implement the concept in operations. This suggests that the concept is becoming familiar to more officers and soldiers and that its implementation across the board is progressing. Some examples of discussions relating to adaptive campaigning include:

- describing the differences (or similarities according to some) between the observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) loop and the act-sense-decide-adapt (ASDA) adaption cycle, also known as the adaptation cycle<sup>9</sup>;
- why ASDA needs to be conducted at the minor tactical level and not just the strategic level (this requires empowering junior leaders to be able to apply the adaption cycle)<sup>10</sup>;

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- highlighting the importance of adaptive campaigning to Army doctrine and developing officers<sup>11</sup>;
- the leading role chaplains could play in welfare warfighting across the five LOOs and how they would operate to support each LOO<sup>12</sup>; and
- the need for health personnel to take additional responsibilities in order to achieve the five LOOs and how health support could fit into each of the LOOs<sup>13</sup>.

## INFLUENCE DIAGRAMS

Many techniques can be used to unravel complex systems. These often involve using diagrams and pictures to help the human mind grasp and better understand relationships, connections and effects. They are judgement-based and represent one potential interpretation of the problem. Depending on the nature of the problem, some techniques will be more beneficial than others. Some commonly-used techniques include mind maps, impact wheels, 'why' diagrams and influence diagrams.<sup>14</sup> These techniques help illustrate, visualise and analyse problems and reveal key gaps in knowledge about the problem.<sup>15</sup>

The novel nature of adaptive campaigning makes it suitable for the application of visualisation techniques. IDs help identify influences one action or event has over other actions and events and can also identify feedback loops. They are particularly useful when analysing complex situations because they allow a clearer understanding of the connections between the components. Some IDs may include time delays. When constructing an ID, all influences between actions and events must include a positive or negative sign to highlight the nature of the influence. Once a feedback loop is formed, the presence of the influence signs allows loops to be identified as either reinforcing loops or balancing loops. An additional property of IDs is that the same situation can be examined at different levels, allowing greater understanding of the situation and also so the most suitable diagram can be used to communicate the findings to a desired audience. This means that an ID can be developed specifically for a particular audience while a different ID of the same situation can be used for a different audience. Finally, IDs can also be used as the basis upon which system dynamics models are developed.<sup>16</sup>

The application of IDs to military problems is not new. A few select examples of previous work include:

- the development of a generalised counterinsurgency ID to understand the feedback loops and how changes in approaches might create reinforcing effects<sup>17</sup>;
- how IDs can be used to support the development of military experiments<sup>18</sup>;
- their application relating to the Colombian civil war to understand the impact of greed and past grievances on the warring factions<sup>19</sup>; and
- the use of IDs to model counterinsurgency in Iraq (Fallujah) and Afghanistan<sup>20</sup> which have been described as 'hairball' diagrams and discussed extensively in the media.

Other examples of previous military-related applications of IDs are also available in the literature.<sup>21</sup>

An ID of the adaptive campaigning concept also was developed.<sup>22</sup> The diagram was based on *Adaptive Campaigning*<sup>23</sup> and its sub-concepts<sup>24</sup> with the addition of tasks and activities supporting them. Figure 2 reproduces this diagram.

The diagram clearly reveals the influences between the LOOs, highlighting the need to consider all five lines and not focus solely on JLC and expect this to be sufficient. This philosophy is already being implemented by the ADF, with one example being the Australian Reconstruction Task Force in the Uruzgan Province of Afghanistan. They have for several years been engaged in supporting local population groups by rebuilding facilities such as mosques and local gathering halls while also teaching locals trade skills through trade training schools.

This AC ID was the first step in revealing the potential applicability of this visualisation technique to support the understanding and implementation of this concept.

The first benefit of developing an ID of the concept is that the graphic nature of the diagram clearly supports the philosophy which underpins the concept to anybody who is exposed to it for the first time. The ID clearly identifies the interdependencies of the LOOs and therefore the need to conduct operations involving all five LOOs. The cross-LOO influences along with the pathways of influence (connections of several actions and events) and loops, support the assertion that the lines cannot be considered independently in sequence but should be considered holistically with emphasis on particular LOOs changing as the environmental conditions of the campaign evolve. Adaptive campaigning has been further explored by mapping various operational tactics employed by US forces in Baghdad<sup>25</sup> on top of the essential tasks and activities AC ID.<sup>26</sup> It revealed that when actions were spread across the LOOs the outcome was better than when actions were focused on a particular LOO such as population protection. In this example, there was a strong correlation between the actions and outcomes in the real world and what would have been expected by interpreting this AC ID and developing a campaign plan. This supports that the AC ID can be used to assist in the development of future campaign plans to ensure actions are spread across the spectrum of LOOs.

Utilising essential tasks and activities AC ID during an operation can also be of great benefit. One of the main areas of application is in measuring the success of a campaign. With conventional warfare, measures can be based around kill ratios and ground taken, but in a complex environment these measures may not be so

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... when actions were spread across the LOOs the outcome was better than when actions were focused on a particular LOO such as population protection.

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


Figure 2. Essential tasks and activities AC ID.<sup>27</sup> Here and in all other diagrams a full arrow stands for physical movement of people, a dashed arrow describes information flow or influence exerted and the different colours correspond to the sub-concepts of adaptive campaigning.

informative. However the sub-concepts and enablers present in such an AC ID may in fact be better nodes to probe and measure success and campaign progress. Gauging effectiveness in one area may also be used to prepare for actions in other areas due to the further-reaching and time-delayed influences.

Explicitly identifying the network of influence also means this ID could be used to support the adaptability of the land force. The identification of many pathways increases potential flexibility as there are several different action pathways which can be taken to achieve the desired outcomes. It increases responsiveness by allowing rapid changes to be made when effectiveness with one approach is on the decline. Utilising more than one pathway to achieve the same desired outcome means the approach has greater resilience and robustness as the influence will continue through one pathway if an attack and consequent loss of influence occurs in another pathway. Highlighting all the influences (even though at certain times not all regions will be covered by the land force and coalition partners) supports identifying potential areas where the enemy may try to operate. This at least allows sensors to be put in place to monitor activity in these areas.

In addition to operations planning and analysis, IDs can also be used for pre-deployment training; either for a specific operation or for the general training of officers and soldiers. IDs can also be used during experimentation; experimental planning, computer wargaming, seminar wargaming and for adjudication purposes during these activities.

More recently, the AC ID in Figure 2 has been used to demonstrate how this visualisation technique could help in communicating and sharing understanding with coalition partners, other government agencies, and indigenous and international non-government agencies.<sup>28</sup> Cross examination of IDs can support understanding of other coalition approaches for the same environment. It can also support the synchronising of approaches, or at least combining them into the same diagram to understand where the differences are.

In large operations with coalition partners, it may be more effective to divide and focus on particular roles rather than each partner trying to cover the entire spectrum of operational activities. A shared ID could support this distribution of tasks between the coalition and also civil-military cooperation partners. The influences between activities being undertaken by different groups can help coalition partners understand how their actions in one area can have an influence on others working on different activities. Identifying these interfaces between group activities can improve communication between partners.

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... there are several different action pathways which can be taken to achieve the desired outcomes.

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One of the main benefits of using influence diagrams as a communications tool is that the technique is user-friendly and can be used at multiple levels depending on the intended audience.<sup>29</sup>

### APPLICATION TO CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT

The remainder of this paper will explore whether IDs can be used first to understand the written concept as a whole, and second to work towards more comprehensive concepts in the future.

To consider this first aspect, an ID needs to be developed which considers only the concepts mentioned in the *Adaptive Campaigning* documents and the influences detailed in those documents. An ID was developed by the authors for each of the sub-concepts (JLC, PP, IA, PS and ICB) independently and then fused to form one ID which represents adaptive campaigning as a whole.

The JLC sub-concept paper<sup>30</sup> describes the following concepts: dynamic sensor-shooter coupling; distributed manoeuvre; dominant response; isolation of the battlespace; mission-oriented force protection, and focused understanding. The influences between these concepts as described in the document are represented in visual form in the ID for JLC in Figure 3. It is worth noting that distributed manoeuvre has a negative influence on mission-oriented force protection and this reflects the idea that as opposing force operates in a more and more distributed manner, force protection will become increasingly difficult. Obviously force protection can and will still be achieved, and this is recognised by the one-way influence as mission-oriented force protection does not negatively influence distributed manoeuvre.

The PP sub-concept<sup>31</sup> consists of security actions, population control actions, weapons and hazardous material control actions, and constabulary actions, with the central aim to achieve disarmament, disbanding and reintegration. The ID (Figure 4) reveals a set of several positively reinforcing feedback loops which features links between any two sub-concepts. That means any successful action undertaken will positively influence the other actions or sub-concepts which will eventually return with a positive influence on the original sub-concept.

For the information actions (IA) LOO, in addition to the sub-concepts described in the documentation<sup>32</sup>, three additional sub-concepts have been included in the

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... any successful action undertaken will positively influence the other actions or sub-concepts which will eventually return with a positive influence on the original sub-concept.

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diagram as hexagons (Figure 5). These three sub-concepts are mentioned throughout *Adaptive Campaigning* but are not explicitly stated as sub-concepts for this LOO. Information dominance is seen as the key outcome that information actions is aimed towards maintaining/achieving through its actions. The other two, ‘enemy’s will to fight’ and ‘population’s hearts and minds’, although not explicitly discussed in the sub-concept have been included due to their key role. Their importance is further supported in *Adaptive Campaigning*, overseas doctrine and by other authors.<sup>33</sup>

The diagram (Figure 6) for PS is technically not an ID. It is a chronological diagrammatic representation of where the initial action/sub-concept of emergency relief gives way to emergency rehabilitation and reconstruction over time as




Figure 3. Influence diagram of joint land combat sub-concepts.




Figure 4. Influence diagram of population protection sub-concepts.

described in the sub-concept document for PS.<sup>34</sup> This diagram is the only one that explicitly shows time delay.

The influences documented within the ICB LOO<sup>35</sup> are shown in Figure 7. The term ‘stable’ in stable economic environment refers to a level of economic activity which is satisfactory to the Australian Government and the context of the host nation and region. It is worth noting that in this diagram there are no actions which influence security sector reform according to the sub-concept document. However, security sector reform sets the conditions for effective indigenous government and civil society development.

*Adaptive Campaigning* strongly advocates the essential need to conduct operations over all five LOOs as each line has the potential to influence the ability to conduct actions over other LOOs. Therefore, it is of interest to combine the IDs of the individual LOOs into one diagram to clearly identify the cross-LOOs influences. This was conducted by placing the five LOO IDs onto a single page and then linking components together where either direct influences were mentioned in the concept documents or were sufficiently well described enabling a possible influence




Figure 5. Influence diagram of information actions sub-concepts.




Figure 6. Influence diagram of population support sub-concepts.

to be identified. Only such explicitly considered cross-LOO influences are shown in the overall ID in Figure 8.

**INTERPRETATION OF THE SUB-CONCEPTS ID**

From Figure 8 it can be seen that all of the influences identified are positive except for those relating to the enemy’s will to fight and between distributed manoeuvre and mission-oriented force protection. What this suggests is that during a campaign, if things are ‘going well’ they will continue to improve. For example (from the ID in Figure 8), if there is an improvement in security sector reform, this will lead to better results in shaping the population’s hearts and minds, which has a positive influence and therefore leads to greater information dominance and this in turn will improve security sector reform. Once this reinforcing loop is established, it will continue to cycle leading to ever increasing levels of security sector reform, information dominance and winning the population’s hearts and minds. However, what happens if the situation is not improving but declining? If information dominance is declining, according to this ID, this will lead to a reduction in security sector reform which has a negative impact on population’s hearts and minds (for a positive influence, more leads to more and less leads to less). This in turn reduces the information dominance and this damaging reinforcing cycle continues. The ramifications of having insufficient negative influences are that if things are not going so well, the situation will continue to spiral downward (negative influences are not ‘bad’, they are influences where more leads to less, and less leads to more. A theoretical example of a negative influence is where increasing security along a route reduces the likelihood of an improvised explosive device being emplaced on that route).

To break this downward spiral, a major change needs to be made. One option is to increase other actions (such as command and information protection actions)




Figure 7. Influence diagram of indigenous capacity building sub-concepts.




Figure 8. Sub-concepts AC ID.

which have a positive influence on components of the reinforcing loop. If this positive influence on information dominance is significant and outweighs the reduction in information dominance from sliding, this may allow the loop to return to an improving reinforcement. An alternate solution is to activate entirely new reinforcing loops which also have an influence on the population's hearts and minds. Having multiple actions influencing this component of the system may be sufficient to sway the situation back in favour of the land force and coalition partners. A third approach which could be taken is to initiate one or several balancing loops in order to break the downward feedback loop and bring the situation back to favour.

Balancing loops (which have an odd number of negative influences) tend to a particular level of equilibrium for a given environment. Over time, continuing actions (or even increasing actions) in a balancing loop will not improve (nor degrade) the situation. There may be some fluctuations but the nature of the balancing loop is to maintain a relatively constant cycle. Where balancing loops are of greatest importance is when a reinforcing loop is spiralling out of control. Activating a balancing loop which overlaps with the reinforcing loop can bring the level up to a neutral point of equilibrium. Once this level is reached, continuing actions in the balancing loop will have limited improvement, but it is at this stage that the balancing loop can be de-activated (re-enabling the reinforcing loop) to allow the upward reinforcement of the cycle. Such considerations may support the idea for a surge in operations and when it is required.

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Where balancing loops are of greatest importance is when a reinforcing loop is spiralling out of control.

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However, for this to be possible, the concept (and therefore the ID) should have sufficient negative influences to allow the decision maker a choice of potential tasks which could either be initiated or enhanced to activate the balancing loops. The ID in Figure 8 of the current concept clearly reveals that there are an insufficient number of negative influences to enable this. However, this may not necessarily be the case; these negative influences may in fact be implicitly present in the concept but because the ID was developed by joining sub-concepts where influences were explicitly mentioned in the documents, they were left out. As *Adaptive Campaigning* is the foundation document for the future operating environment, all these implicit influences should be brought to the surface and made explicit. It is essential to have all these influences explicit to enable future development and planning. Examination of the ID in Figure 2 which includes additional essential tasks and activities to those described in *Adaptive Campaigning* may be of some assistance in this process. If these influences were to be made explicit in the development of the next iterations of the concept, this would

allow a more concise ID to be developed which could then be used to better support the implementation of the concept.

One of the core messages of *Adaptive Campaigning* is the need for the land force to orchestrate their efforts across the five LOOs<sup>36</sup>. Rather than consider each LOO in sequence during an operation, they should be considered as a group since *Adaptive Campaigning* also emphasises the interdependence of the LOOs and that they mutually reinforce each other. Conducting actions on one LOO will influence the ability to conduct actions on the other LOOs. Therefore, it is to be expected that there are many cross-LOO influences which describe how particular actions within one LOO influence various actions within the other LOOs. Examination of the ID in Figure 8 does not provide enough evidence of this as there is a rather low number of cross-LOO influences which were drawn out from the concept documents.

Is this a result of considering each LOO independently in close detail in the five sub-concept documents of *Adaptive Campaigning* and spending insufficient time linking the LOOs together? Possibly, but once again it may be that these cross-LOO influences are present implicitly within the concept documents but are simply not explicit. It may also be an artefact of the relatively new nature of this type of thinking resulting in some actual influences not yet being fully understood and articulated.

Whether the cross-LOO influences are implicitly present in the concept, or not articulated at all, the ID in Figure 8 may help in allowing the concept developers to explicitly state in future versions of the concept where (what and why) these cross-LOO influences are. Having the cross-LOO influences explicitly stated will support improved planning and implementation of the concept to current and future operations.

In this document we have utilised IDs to visualise diagrammatically the current version of *Adaptive Campaigning* and identify potential aspects which should be considered for future versions. However, the use of IDs is not limited to a post-analysis tool; it could also be used to support concept development in real time. This would involve the concept developers drawing the influences onto the ID as they develop the concept. Conducting these activities in parallel will improve the developers' mental models of the system they are describing and should result in greater coverage and a more thorough concept. The IDs may also be included in the concept document itself to allow readers instant access to the visual mode of the concept and help achieve a common understanding. This will assist readers to develop their own consistent mental models of the concept and develop further IDs specific for the application they require.

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... the use of IDs is not limited to a post-analysis tool; it could also be used to support concept development in real time.

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## CONCLUSIONS

Adaptive campaigning is a means for fighting human-centric warfare in the 21st century. Its foundation is the need for an adaptable Army to consider all five inter-dependent LOOs in order to achieve the desired end state. To identify potential gaps in the influences between LOOs, the sub-concepts of adaptive campaigning have been displayed individually in the form of IDs and aggregated to a common ID. These diagrams can then be used:

- as a tool to assist in better understanding the concept;
- to support the implementation of the concept; and
- to help develop or improve the next iteration of *Adaptive Campaigning*.

Previous papers applying AC IDs to a real world military operation provide a strong correlation between conducting operations over multiple LOOs and the end-state conditions. This suggests that the philosophy underpinning adaptive campaigning is well suited to the current operational environment.

The IDs show that the current iteration of adaptive campaigning contains a relatively low number of cross-LOO influences and also a low number of negative influences, both within and across LOOs. Many of these influences may not have been included in the documentation due to their implicit nature. The utilisation of IDs in the process of further concept development could assist in exploring more thoroughly the intra- and inter-LOO influences. An extension of this would be to develop related IDs for Royal Australian Navy, Royal Australian Air Force and Joint/coalition.

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## DOCTRINE

# EXPLOITATION INTELLIGENCE

## A NEW INTELLIGENCE DISCIPLINE?

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LIEUTENANT COLONEL CHARLES FAINT

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### ABSTRACT

Lessons learned by the United States in the global war on terror and in overseas contingency operations underscore the value of intelligence information gleaned from the exploitation of captured enemy personnel, equipment, and materiel. A key element of successful exploitation is accurately categorising information by intelligence discipline in order to apply the correct resources towards the exploitation effort and maximize exploitation potential. In light of these revelations, it is time to review the existing intelligence disciplines to determine whether a new intelligence discipline– exploitation intelligence or ‘EXINT’– should be added to the disciplines currently in existence.

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### FRAMING THE PROBLEM

At the 2009 Document and Media Exploitation (DOMEX) Conference hosted by the National Ground Intelligence Center, Colonel Joseph Cox argued for the establishment of DOMEX as a separate intelligence discipline, which he named ‘document and media intelligence’ (DOMINT). At that conference and in a subsequent article published in the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin<sup>1</sup>, Colonel Cox laid out his reasoning for placing DOMEX on par with the seven existing

intelligence disciplines.<sup>2</sup> As I considered Colonel Cox's ideas and related them to my own observations in Iraq and Afghanistan and my experiences as a career Army intelligence officer, I was convinced of the utility of DOMINT. As I thought more about it, however, I began to wonder if DOMINT could in fact stand alone as an intelligence discipline, or if DOMINT would better serve the intelligence community as a component or sub-discipline of an entirely separate intelligence discipline, one centred on the exploitation of captured enemy personnel and materiel. I named this potential new discipline 'exploitation intelligence' or EXINT.

The process of exploiting captured enemy personnel and materiel for intelligence purposes dates back thousands of years. One of the earliest examples comes from the Egyptians, who exploited the captured iron weapons of their Hittite opponents in order to improve their own weapons, made of inferior bronze.<sup>3</sup> More recently, the fledgling US Army made use of captured enemy personnel, equipment, and documents during the American Revolution, and the practice expanded and continues to the present day. In the modern era, information derived from the interrogation of captured enemy personnel and the exploitation of their possessions contributed to the capture of Saddam Hussein<sup>4</sup>, the death of Abu Musab al Zarqawi<sup>5</sup>, and the killing of Osama bin Laden<sup>6</sup>. These examples underscore the utility and value of the exploitation process and intelligence derived from exploitation methods.

### FINDING COMMON GROUND

It is important to accurately define, describe, and categorise intelligence information in order to apply the correct resources against it and to utilise it to its fullest extent. This is because inconsistent, imprecise, or inaccurate terms, procedures, and policies within the intelligence community cause redundancies of effort and inefficiencies in supporting the intelligence mission. In researching this subject it became apparent that the intelligence community is not always in agreement on descriptions, doctrine or definitions related to intelligence. For example, the US Army states that there are nine intelligence disciplines, while its joint military publication on intelligence states there are seven<sup>7</sup> and the Federal Bureau of Intelligence promulgates five 'intelligence collection disciplines.'<sup>8</sup> Furthermore, the Department of Homeland Security is pushing for the creation of 'Homeland Security Intelligence (HSINT) and also makes mention of 'security intelligence', 'domestic intelligence', and 'domestic national security intelligence.'<sup>9</sup>

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... inconsistent, imprecise, or inaccurate terms, procedures, and policies within the intelligence community cause redundancies of effort ...

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Given the inconsistency of common terms within the intelligence community, I had to decide on a common reference in order to deconflict terms for this article. Because elements of the US Department of Defense comprise more than half the seventeen organisations of the intelligence community (sixteen members plus the Office of the Director of National Intelligence)<sup>10</sup>, I felt it was logical to use Department of Defense references in situations where I encountered conflicting information. As a result, this article relies on joint military publications, specifically Joint Publication 2-0 (JP 2-0), *Joint Intelligence*, published in June 2007, as the most authoritative source of doctrinal intelligence-related information. In cases where a useful contrast to JP 2-0 is provided by other sources, or where existing doctrine falls short, this article provides those sources as well as alternative definitions and descriptions based on compilations of sources.

### THE PURPOSE OF INTELLIGENCE

To adequately assess the potential value of EXINT as a separate intelligence discipline, an important starting point involves an understanding of the purpose of intelligence. Unfortunately, there does not appear to be a consistent description of the purpose of intelligence across the intelligence community. Some definitions of the purpose of intelligence are very detailed and complex, while others can explain the purpose of intelligence in a handful of words. Most military definitions of the purpose of intelligence revolve around derivatives of ‘informing the commander’ or ‘driving operations’. This line of thinking is typified by the US Army’s description of the purpose of intelligence:

The purpose of intelligence is to provide commanders and staffs with timely, relevant, accurate, predictive, and tailored intelligence about the enemy and other aspects of the AO [area of operations]. Intelligence supports the planning, preparing, execution, and assessment of operations. The most important role of intelligence is to drive operations by supporting the commander’s decision-making.

Additionally, the purpose of intelligence as specified by JP 2-0 is to:

...inform the commander; identify, define, and nominate objectives; support the planning and execution of operations; counter adversary deception and surprise; support friendly deception efforts; and assess the effects of operations on the adversary.<sup>11</sup>

JP 2-0 lacks a holistic definition of the purpose of intelligence because it is military-centric and can not be easily applied across the civilian components of the intelligence community. The JP 2-0 definition also rather conspicuously omits the mission of counterintelligence. Moreover, while the above definitions are sufficient in military applications, they do not accurately represent the expectation most




Figure 1. Purposes of joint intelligence.<sup>12</sup>

US citizens have of the intelligence enterprise, which in most cases might simply be to prevent surprise. A concept of intelligence that is better suited for the entire intelligence community can be found in Mark Lowenthal's often-cited textbook, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*:

Intelligence is the process by which specific types of information important to national security are requested, collected, analyzed, and provided to policy makers; the products of that process; the safeguarding of these processes and this information by counterintelligence activities; and the carrying out of operations as requested by lawful authorities.<sup>13</sup>

Lowenthal's definition is much better than JP 2-0, but is still somewhat lacking. Combining all the available definitions of the purpose of intelligence, I compiled the following:

The purpose of intelligence is to enable 'decision advantage'<sup>14</sup> by disseminating timely, accurate, predictive and contextualized assessments of the operational environment in order to provide early warning and prevent surprise, and to prevent the compromise of intelligence products and the sources and methods of collection.<sup>15</sup>

The above definition encompasses all the existing intelligence disciplines, including counterintelligence which, as previously noted, seems to have been omitted in the military definitions of the purpose of intelligence. It also makes the definition more encompassing by removing the stipulation that intelligence is for 'commanders' or 'policy makers', thereby recognising the fact that anyone can be a legitimate consumer of intelligence, including other intelligence professionals.

Some terms in the above definition of the purpose of intelligence warrant further explanation. The best definition I found for 'decision advantage' was the '...ability of the United States to bring instruments of national power to bear in ways that resolve

challenges, defuse crises, or deflect emerging threats'.<sup>16</sup> This is significant because intelligence exists not for its own sake, but in order to provide decision-makers with the best information possible so that they may make the best decision possible. Additionally, in the definition above, 'early warning' provides intelligence related to specific anticipated events, such as fixing the enemy in time and space in order to make this enemy targetable, while 'preventing surprise' refers to the efforts to determine and mitigate enemy plans and intentions. In short, 'early warning' is focused on the enemy, while 'preventing surprise' is friendly forces-centric.

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... there does not appear to be a consistent description of the purpose of intelligence across the intelligence community.

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### THE INTELLIGENCE DISCIPLINES

With the purpose of intelligence established, we can move on to a description of what makes an intelligence discipline, and explore the seven joint intelligence disciplines currently in existence. An intelligence discipline is a 'well defined area of intelligence planning, collection, processing, exploitation, analysis, and reporting using a specific category of technical or human resources'.<sup>17</sup> According to JP 2-0, the extant joint intelligence disciplines are counterintelligence (CI), human intelligence (HUMINT), geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), open-source intelligence (OSINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), and technical intelligence (TECHINT).<sup>18</sup> There are several sub-disciplines within these, as shown in Figure 2.

The way the intelligence community distinguishes intelligence disciplines from one another is based on how the information is collected, instead of what is collected. By doing this, it is easy to see how a strong case can be made that the same collection effort might fall into different intelligence disciplines, or '-INTs'. A useful example may be to consider a telephone conversation between two people. If one of those individuals uses the phone to pass along information to a witting recipient on the other end of the line, this is easily recognised as HUMINT. But if that same conversation took place between two unwitting participants and was intercepted by a third party, the information garnered would

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


Figure 2. Intelligence disciplines and sub-disciplines.<sup>19</sup>

be SIGINT. Using a similar example, if a photograph of a military installation is taken by a classified overhead collection platform, it would be imagery intelligence (IMINT). But if a photo of the exact same installation were downloaded from the Internet, it would be considered OSINT and if it was delivered by a paid source, it would be HUMINT. A radar return showing an enemy armored convoy is considered IMINT, but a case can be made that, since radar measures the return of radio waves, the information is collected as a result of MASINT.

The above examples are far from semantic; accurate descriptions of intelligence disciplines are tied to proper collection and classification of information, as well as training, equipping, and fielding the right kinds of intelligence platforms and personnel. Moreover, for an intelligence discipline to reach its maximum level of effectiveness, it must be defined precisely and supported, resourced, and utilised properly. It is with that in mind that I will now turn my attention towards explaining EXINT.

## DESCRIPTION OF EXPLOITATION INTELLIGENCE

Joint Publication 1-02, 'Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Related Terms', explains 'exploitation' in part as 'taking full advantage of success in military

operations, following up initial gains, and making permanent the temporary effects already achieved' and 'taking full advantage of any information that has come to hand for tactical, operational, or strategic purposes'.<sup>20</sup> This is a very useful definition to use when exploring the potential utility of EXINT. By exploiting captured enemy personnel and materiel, EXINT would make permanent the temporary gains achieved in the seizure of those personnel and equipment by extracting the maximum value from those items. This in turn would allow US forces to take 'full advantage' of what has 'come to hand' by providing more thorough intelligence information to support decision-makers at all levels. Combining the definition of exploitation with the definition of the purpose of intelligence provided earlier in this article and putting it into the context of 'exploitation intelligence', the definition of EXINT is as follows:

Exploitation Intelligence (EXINT): the process by which captured enemy personnel and materiel are exploited for intelligence purposes as part of the all-source effort to provide 'decision advantage' to decision-makers at all levels. EXINT consists of four parts: biometrics (BIOINT), detainee interrogations (DETINT), document and media exploitation (DOMINT), and technical intelligence (TECHINT).

If EXINT were to become a separate -INT, what would comprise the new discipline? To begin with, TECHINT, already established as a separate intelligence discipline, would become a sub-discipline and be subsumed under EXINT. EXINT would also encompass interrogations, which would become a separate sub-discipline: detainee exploitation, or DETINT. Document and media exploitation intelligence, or DOMINT, would move from HUMINT, as would biometrics intelligence or BIOINT. TECHINT, DETINT, DOMINT, and BIOINT would comprise the four elements of EXINT.

EXINT is differentiated from other -INTs by the way in which it is gained from personnel or enemy equipment that is in friendly hands; information collected 'in the wild' belongs to another discipline. For example, when the exploitation of a captured enemy communication device yields a specific contact number, then that is EXINT. When collection is applied against that number, the resulting information is SIGINT. Information from an enemy detainee is EXINT, while information elicited from an enemy politician or soldier by a collector is still HUMINT. Intelligence information gained from the technical evaluation of a missile fired by the enemy would be MASINT, whereas the technical information derived from that same missile would be EXINT if it were to occur while the missile was in friendly hands.

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If EXINT were to become its own discipline, little in doctrine would have to change.

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If EXINT were to become its own discipline, little in doctrine would have to change. CI, GEOINT, OSINT, and MASINT would likely be completely unaffected by EXINT. HUMINT would lose three components: biometrics, interrogations, and DOMEX. Doctrine would need to further change to reflect the establishment of BIOINT, DOMINT, and DETINT as official sub-disciplines under EXINT. The -INT most affected by EXINT would be TECHINT, because it would lose its status as an independent discipline and would fall under EXINT. HUMINT would also be affected because interrogations are currently a HUMINT function. Change would be required in order to implement EXINT, but most if not all of these changes should be transparent to the majority of the intelligence community and the intelligence consumers that it supports. If JP 2-0 were revised to take the above changes into account, it might look something like Figure 3.

**CONCLUSION**

If the purpose of intelligence is to enable ‘decision advantage’ at all levels, and if an intelligence discipline is defined as collection in a ‘specific category of technical or human




Figure 3. Revised JP 2-0 intelligence disciplines

resources, then EXINT (comprised of BIOINT, DETINT, DOMINT, and TECHINT) would appear to be able to stand on its own as a new intelligence discipline.

Although the potential value of EXINT is clear through myriad historical examples, more research is required in order to determine if the cost/benefit analysis of establishing a new intelligence discipline weighs in favour of EXINT, or whether the tasks that this article ascribes to EXINT are better accomplished by the intelligence disciplines already in existence. At this point however, when considered against the doctrinal definition of what comprises an intelligence discipline, the validated contribution of intelligence gained from exploitation methods, and the intuitive utility of grouping 'like functions' together, it appears likely that EXINT is warranted.

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- 18 JP 2-0.
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- 20 JP 1-02, p. 132

### THE AUTHOR

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# MILITARY HISTORY

## AMBITION AND ADVERSITY

### DEVELOPING AN AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCE, 1901–1914

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JEAN BOU

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#### ABSTRACT

Between its inception in 1901 and the beginning of the First World War in 1914, the Australian Army (or the Commonwealth Military Forces as they were then known) underwent two periods of extensive reform aimed at creating a modern effective force out of what had been inherited from the colonial governments. In both instances the reforms were ambitious and bold, but they were also severely troubled by the limitations imposed by government, insufficient resources and a fundamental problem of creating an army from an almost entirely part-time soldiery. This article was originally presented as a paper at the Chief of Army Military History Conference in September 2011. It was first published in the proceedings of that conference and is reproduced courtesy of the Australian Army History Unit.

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In September 1909 a group of Australian army officers filled a room at the United Service Institution of New South Wales to hear Major W F Everett, a permanent officer then appointed the brigade-major of the 2nd Light Horse Brigade, deliver a lecture entitled, 'The future use of cavalry, and our light horse'. Having recently attended the 1909 autumn manoeuvres of both the British and French armies, as well

as visiting the battlefields of the Russo–Japanese War, Everett had returned to argue in his lecture that the regiments and brigades of the Australian Light Horse, being neither proper full cavalry nor the more limited mounted infantry, needed to be organised and trained ‘on definite lines.’<sup>1</sup> There was nothing extraordinary about Everett’s lecture, nor the discussion that resulted from it. They were but a contemporary example of the professional discussions about military developments that then occurred at officer gatherings and in service journals, much as they still do today. At this lecture, however, the officers, in discussing what form Australia’s mounted troops should take, were not simply debating matters of organisation or armament, but trying to grapple with some fundamental matters about the military system of which they were part. These matters stemmed in large part from an ambitious desire to create a modern, efficient and effective military force from an organisation where almost all officers and soldiers were part-time and the resources of all kinds were far from plentiful. One of the officers present at Everett’s lecture, Colonel George Lee, by then a senior permanent officer and respected veteran of the Boer War, noted:

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... the state governments  
passed the control of the  
various colonial forces they  
had maintained to the new  
Federal Government ...

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It is absolutely impossible to train our mounted troops up to the standard of Imperial cavalry ... We can put into the field first-class irregular light horse ... I have no hesitation in saying that with the material we have in Australia an exceedingly useful force can be made available.<sup>2</sup>

In broad terms this is what Australia had supplied to fight in the Boer War of 1899–1902, which, if often imperfect, had been adequate—but what about the next war? As Major Everett pointed out in his lecture, ‘we will not have the Boers to fight again, and much higher training will be required against European troops.’<sup>3</sup> And so it would prove to be.

The Commonwealth Military Forces, as Australia’s army was then known, was created in the immediate aftermath of the Boer War. Then, just a few years before the Great War, almost completely recreated. In both cases the schemes implemented reflected the fundamental ambition to create something effective and efficient, but each time the efforts would be severely troubled by the problems that beset them.

The Commonwealth Military Forces came into being just a few months after Federation when, on 1 March 1901, the now state governments passed the control of the various colonial forces they had maintained to the new Federal Government and the Department of Defence, established in Melbourne. In most of the colonies, efforts to maintain some form of local defence force had begun with a degree of seriousness

in the 1850s, but generally speaking it had only been since the mid-1880s that the larger colonies had become prosperous and developed enough to maintain them on an ongoing basis; a resolve that had been severely tested during the economic depression of the 1890s. The forces that the Commonwealth inherited were all recognisable as examples of British-pattern nineteenth century citizen-based part-time forces, but were widely varying in their administrative and organisational forms, level of training, size and, it was soon discovered, quality. As part-time paid troops or part-time unpaid volunteers, their members also tended to be proud of their status as citizen soldiers and the units they belonged to had also often developed their own distinctive cultures and ethos.<sup>4</sup> The result was that they could be vocal in their own defence. The fact that many officers were also pillars of their local, and sometimes colonial, societies meant that they could also create political waves if they were so inclined.

To meld this disparate conglomeration into a federal force the Commonwealth Government, after several refusals, secured the services of the British Army officer, Major-General Sir Edward Hutton. An experienced officer with a record of active service in various colonial campaigns in Africa, Hutton was a vocal proponent of mounted infantry and perhaps an even more vocal advocate of imperial defence cooperation. He was no stranger to Australia and had been the commandant of the New South Wales military forces between 1893 and 1895. In that appointment Hutton had undertaken a great deal of useful reform and revealed a vigorous energy when trying to improve the colonial forces under his control. He had, however, also clashed with his civilian masters and shown himself to be undiplomatically outspoken, often tactless, and dismissive and scornful of those with differing views. These were traits that came to the fore again in 1899–1900 when he got into serious trouble with the Canadian government while commanding their militia and was quickly removed to a face-saving field command in South Africa where he led a mounted infantry brigade made up mostly of Canadians, Australians and New Zealanders.<sup>5</sup>

Hutton arrived for his second stint in Australia in early 1902 and quickly outlined his plans for Australia's new army. In broad strategic terms he reiterated the long held view that though the Royal Navy was the ultimate guarantor of Australian safety, there was the possibility that this might be temporarily unavailable and a unified defence force needed to be available as a backup.<sup>6</sup> In this regard Hutton's basic ideas were not revolutionary and this strategic assessment had been a staple of colonial defence thinking for some decades. Similarly the idea of creating a unified mobile military force to meet such an eventuality, in addition to the maintenance

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... the units they belonged to had also often developed their own distinctive cultures and ethos.

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of coastal fortresses, had been part of local military thinking since another British officer, Major-General J Bevan Edwards, had proposed it to the colonial governments in 1889.<sup>7</sup> It was an idea that the various colonial commandants of the 1890s, including Hutton in New South Wales, had pursued, but that had never gained the political and popular support necessary for it to be realised.<sup>8</sup>

With the opportunity to finally effect something like what Edwards had proposed, Hutton quickly outlined his plan to the government. There was no desire from anyone to up-end the pre-Federation reliance on part-time military service, and under Hutton's scheme the number of permanent soldiers would be limited to that required to man the more technically demanding corps associated with the forts, mainly the coastal garrison artillery and the associated submarine miners. There would also be a small permanent administrative and instructional cadre that would tend to the requirements of keeping the forces running smoothly and teach the other members of the forces their duty. More numerous were to be the two kinds of part-time troops. First the unpaid volunteer, predominantly infantry, units that Hutton had inherited would be accommodated by attaching them to the coastal fortresses for local protection, and together with the gunners and other troops in the forts they would constitute the Garrison Force. More numerous and significant in developmental terms was to be the Field Force, which was to be predominantly made up of part-time paid troops with a stiffening from the permanent cadre in time of war. With a wartime establishment of 26,000 men this element was intended to be the highly mobile, well trained and prepared to move to threatened areas as required. Showing his imperial thinking Hutton also intended that troops of the Field Force could be embarked and sent to defend Australia's 'interests', however that may have been defined, should it be necessary.<sup>9</sup> This last idea was not in line with the Government's thinking, however, and after making it clear to the British Government at the Imperial Conference of 1902 that no Australian troops would be earmarked for imperial use, it oversaw the passage of a defence act that ensured that its troops could serve outside Australia only if they specifically volunteered.<sup>10</sup>

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(The Government) oversaw the passage of a defence act that ensured that its troops could serve outside Australia only if they specifically volunteered.

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Because of the requirement for mobility, the Field Force was to have a very high proportion of mounted troops with six of the nine brigades arranged to be made up of light horse, which under Hutton's scheme were a type of abbreviated cavalry known at the time as mounted rifles. The other three brigades were to be infantry, but in keeping with Hutton's thinking they were to be organised and prepared to

take up the role of mounted infantry if required. These brigades were to be balanced, self-sufficient formations that included artillery, engineers and service branches, and the intention was that a component of virtually any size could be drawn from them for independent operations.<sup>11</sup> The emphasis on mobile forces and the establishment of formations that were in many ways readymade ‘columns’, not dissimilar to those that had recently been ranging across the *veld* of South Africa, was no accident. Hutton believed that if a war had to be fought against an invader on Australian soil then it was likely that the campaign would closely resemble that which the British had just fought against the Boers.<sup>12</sup> It was not the only precedent, however; the idea that fast moving, firearm-equipped mounted troops supported by artillery could have a dramatic effect on the course of a campaign was an idea that had excited theorists of mounted warfare, including Hutton, since Union troops had marched deep into the Confederacy in the final years of the American Civil War.<sup>13</sup>

Hutton’s Field Force was an ambitious goal that would require a good deal of reform and improvement from the disparate forces inherited from the colonies. In the first instance it would require a dramatic expansion and reorganisation. Only in New South Wales had there been an attempt to create a military organisation above that of the regimental level before Federation (under Hutton’s direction in the 1890s), and aside from the larger eastern colonies such a step would have been futile given the number of troops at their disposal. With nine brigades to be created, including some that included units drawn from across state boundaries, existing units would have to be split and expanded, and some country infantry units would be required to convert to light horse. Men who could command these new entities at all levels would also have to be found, a problem that was made all the more critical because of two factors. The first was that Hutton’s vision of the Field Force required the pushing of responsibilities downwards through the ranks and a great deal was expected from regimental level officers who might have been required to act independently on campaign.<sup>14</sup> The second was that in order for defence costs to be kept down the Field Force was to be established on a cadre basis; that is, that though each unit was to have close to its full complement of officers and non-commissioned officers, peacetime soldier numbers were to be kept to a minimum, meaning that upon mobilisation much would be expected of regimental leadership and the more experienced rankers to bring the new recruits up to the required standard.<sup>15</sup>

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Not surprisingly training was a significant matter and the men of the infantry and light horse would be expected to attend sixteen days training per year; artillery and engineers would do more.<sup>16</sup> Essential to the program was the annual completion of the assigned musketry course and an inspection by the state commandant. For city infantrymen this meant an annual camp, usually of four days, plus a series of night and weekend activities. For men in the country, particularly the horse owners of the light horse, the training was concentrated into a regimental or brigade level continuous camp of eight days, supplemented with a smaller program of local unit-run parades.<sup>17</sup> Officers had not only to make this basic commitment, but be prepared to study in their own time, attend the new 'Schools of Instruction' that Hutton instituted, pass examinations for promotion or confirmation in rank, be prepared to conduct administration on their own time, and if possible they were to take part in staff rides (tactical exercises without troops) run by state commandants.<sup>18</sup> Given that before Federation soldier training had been usually limited to the traditional four-day Easter camp and a mixture of local evening or weekend parades, and that officer training programs do not seem to have even existed in any meaningful way, this training requirement was a substantial new commitment that caused considerable disquiet.<sup>19</sup>

Hutton's ambitious plans ran into trouble almost from the start, and the problems he faced quickly seemed to outweigh the opportunities presented. The most pressing matter, not surprisingly, was one of money. The new Federal Government had limited taxation powers and there were strong parliamentary calls for military expenditure to be kept down. Hutton's first funding requests, based on an assumption that his budget would equal the combined colonial defence budgets, had totalled more than £480,000 over four years, estimating that if this were kept up the Field and Garrison Forces would be fully equipped by 1908.<sup>20</sup> This proved overly optimistic, however, and upon submitting these and other spending proposals to the department Hutton was informed that his budget for the first year was not to exceed £50,000, which quickly stymied many of the changes afoot.<sup>21</sup> The effects were obvious at the unit level and the light horse would have to continue using their completely unsuitable civilian pattern saddles, the field artillery would not get replacements for their obsolete guns, machine-guns could not be bought, the infantry would have to continue with the old pattern equipment they brought from the colonial stores, and there was no hope of creating the logistical train required to support the Field Force if had to be mobilised.<sup>22</sup> Moreover it meant that attempting

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to expand the establishments to meet Hutton's targets could not be contemplated.<sup>23</sup> Dismayed and, typically for him, enraged that civilian politicians could be so difficult and obstructionist, he could do little but amend his budgets and point out that no guarantees of military efficiency could be offered to the government any time soon.<sup>24</sup>

The problems extended well beyond those associated with money, however. The requirement to convert rural volunteer infantry into part-time paid light horse, for example, ran into difficulties when the affected men pointed out that buying horses was beyond their means. In one instance the men of the Kerang Company of the Victorian Rangers found this such an impost that they enlisted the local newspaper and Member of Parliament to their cause and then, having gained the ear of the Minister for Defence, managed to fend off Hutton's changes to their unit. Other units complained about reorganisations, the trampling of what they saw as their identities and traditions, and their being broken up to facilitate expansions.<sup>25</sup> Senior regimental officers could be prickly too. Lieutenant-Colonel William Braithwaite, the senior officer of the Victorian Mounted Rifles, expected to command one of the new Light Horse brigades but was judged incompetent by Hutton and replaced. Braithwaite responded by venting his grievances in the newspaper, which led to more difficulties for Hutton and the government.<sup>26</sup>

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More fundamentally it was obvious that the quality of many units allotted to the Field Force was far from high. With the experiences in South Africa still fresh, training activities during the Hutton years often sought to draw on them. In Victoria, for example, both the 1903 and 1904 annual camps were conducted in areas chosen because of their physical similarity to the *veld* and which could be used to demonstrate characteristics of the fighting there.<sup>27</sup> But these and other camps quickly demonstrated that despite the smattering of Boer War veterans present, the overall quality of the troops and their training was low and that they possessed only, as Hutton put it, an 'elementary knowledge' of their duties.<sup>28</sup> Hutton had a poor opinion of the Victorian forces he had inherited and believed that only New South Wales and Queensland, which had maintained the highest proportions of part-time paid troops, had maintained reasonably effective organisational and instructional standards before Federation.<sup>29</sup> In the other states he felt the limitations of pre-Federation budgets and poor instruction had severely limited the development of their forces.<sup>30</sup> Upon his first visit to South Australia, for example, he had been so alarmed at the lack of instructors available that he immediately arranged for the dispatch of more from other states that could better afford the loss.<sup>31</sup>

Despite the effort to inject rigour, learning and professionalism into the militia and volunteer forces, the likelihood of success was always going to be diminished by the inherent problems of the defence scheme's structure and resources. Sixteen training days per year including, at most, an eight-day annual camp was a good deal better than the more relaxed pre-Federation arrangements, but was still not a period of time sufficient to create competent soldiers, let alone effective units or brigades. There was some hope that the leavening of South Africa veterans would help, but this was a small and diminishing pool whose talents were often open to question given the patchy performance of many of the Australian contingents in that war.<sup>32</sup> Moreover, it was becoming increasingly clear that finding enough men to fill even the limited peacetime establishments was a challenge. The strength of forces that Hutton had inherited from the colonies had been artificially high thanks to a spurt of martial enthusiasm that had accompanied the Boer War, in much the same way that war scares and Britain's imperial conflicts had spurred colonists into military uniforms for brief periods throughout the nineteenth century.<sup>33</sup> As the memory of the war started to fade, however, so did the taste for soldiering. When this combined with the ordinary difficulties of part-time service such as giving up precious time, facing the burdens of buying kit, repetitive or dull training, maintaining a horse, putting up with officers of dubious quality, or having to continually travel to parade, it soon meant that units' strengths were often well below even the restricted establishments.<sup>34</sup> In many places it proved impossible to raise new detachments and sub-units in compensation when the hoped-for wave of local volunteers failed to materialise.<sup>35</sup> On top of this was a continuing need to keep defence spending tightly in rein, and for some years after Federation many units were not authorised to recruit up to even their limited peace establishments.<sup>36</sup>

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Hutton may have been able to correct these problems, but his time as General Officer Commanding came to an end in late 1904, not surprisingly in acrimony with the Government over plans, among other things, to replace him with a committee rather than another opinionated and perhaps difficult senior officer.<sup>37</sup> Hutton had not been successful in his effort to create an efficient and capable field force, but this did not mean he was a failure either. He had carried out the essential and difficult process of amalgamating the various colonial forces (the difficulty of which should not be underestimated) and, for all its failings, created a military force that aimed to address the country's defence needs with the limited resources at its disposal. With Hutton's departure the Government and his replacement, the Military Board of

Administration, undid more than a few of his less popular reforms and undertook many of their own. In broad terms though, his Field and Garrison Forces continued on as they then existed until new, even more ambitious schemes were developed towards the end of the decade.

In 1905 Australia's defence outlook changed considerably with the Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War. The possibility of a competent Asian military and naval power was one that had exercised Australian minds for a generation and the development caused much vexation. This, combined with a growing realisation that the military forces created after Federation were unlikely to overcome the problems that beset them to become effective, led to increased thought being given to some form of universal military service obligation. In 1906 a committee formed at the behest of the second Deakin ministry, headed by the Inspector-General, Major-General J Hoad, reported that despite the assurances about Japan and the power of the Royal Navy coming from London, Australia had to have a more capable military force. Several political and military threads were woven together over the next few years and the result was a shift towards the creation of a broadly-based citizen force founded upon the idea of compulsory military service for all able-bodied males, inspired in part by the Swiss model. Though the push began as early as 1906, it was 1910 before the Government of Andrew Fisher passed the final legislation that would bring the Hutton era army to an end and replace it with what was virtually a completely different force.<sup>38</sup>

Drawing on work done by Australian officers, notably Colonel JG Legge, Field Marshal Lord Kitchener visited Australia in 1910 at the Government's request and in his report on the military forces offered a template for the army of what is generally known as the Universal Training era. The scheme adopted called for all males to commence their military service at age twelve in the junior cadets and, after passing through the senior cadets later in their teens, continue until they were twenty-six years old when they would complete their service in what became known as the Citizen Force.<sup>39</sup> Unpaid volunteer troops, which had always been the most problematic and under-trained element of the colonial and federal forces, were to be done away with, and all men of the force were to be paid (though for privates at half the rate than under the old system).

The expansion that the scheme was to bring about would make what had been attempted under Hutton seem puny, and the goal for the Universal Training era was a peacetime strength of about 80,000 personnel, expanding to 135,000 upon war

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breaking out. Kitchener proposed that there be twenty-one brigades of infantry, which made for eighty-four battalions, twenty-eight regiments of light horse and fifty-six field or howitzer batteries—objectives that were all increased very shortly.<sup>40</sup> To facilitate the plan, the country was divided up into unit and brigade areas from where the men that would fill the ranks would be drawn. The expansion was not to be immediate and it was planned that the scheme would take eight years to reach its intended peacetime establishments. Moreover there were notable exceptions to the idea of universal service. No man who lived more than five miles from a training centre would be obligated to endure the difficulties of travel to serve, and because of the need to provide a horse, the light horse regiments would continue to rely predominantly on volunteer service.<sup>41</sup> Still, this was an extremely ambitious plan that called for a massive change and expansion of the forces.

At a tactical and operational level the army was changing too, and had been gradually since Hutton's departure. In 1906 the Australian military had started a process of more closely following the example and model of the British Army. This was reflected in several ways, not the least of which was the gradual acceptance at the 1907, 1909 and 1911 Imperial conferences of the idea that the British and Dominion armies be aligned as closely as possible in their organisation, training and doctrine. It was a process that had led in part to the creation of the Imperial General Staff to help such coordination. There were other changes too, and the primacy of the mounted soldier that Hutton had established in his Field Force, and which had been encapsulated in his own locally produced mounted service manual, had not survived much beyond his tenure. The infantry, apparently dismayed with the idea of mounted drill, seem to have devolved themselves of the mounted infantry role the moment Hutton sailed for Britain.<sup>42</sup> A reorganisation of the Field Force brigades in 1906 had also changed the proportions of infantry and light horse available in each state, effectively calling into doubt the idea of a 'move anywhere' mobile federal force and suggested that the defence of each state would depend on units raised there.<sup>43</sup> The introduction of the Kitchener scheme completely removed the last vestiges of the Hutton horse-mounted columns and relegated the mounted branch to a more conventional supporting role,<sup>44</sup> leaving the model of the Boer War and nineteenth century cavalry theorising behind.

The new scheme commenced for the senior cadets in 1911 and for the Citizen Force in 1912. Not surprisingly, however, the demands of establishing the Universal Training plan were manifold and difficult to overcome. There were too few

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permanent officers and non-commissioned officers to administer and train the men being brought into the ranks; a situation made worse by the requirements of controlling a massive increase in the cadets. The long-standing problems of militia officer quality were perhaps exacerbated by the scheme as the good ones were diluted into a larger force where they were called on to do more.<sup>45</sup> The light horse faced a fundamental manning crisis brought on by the pay cut of the new scheme that did not come close to compensating for the costs of horse ownership. Moreover, as the new Inspector-General, the imperial officer Major-General GM Kirkpatrick, toured the country in 1912 and 1913 he found that the forces were, by and large, as poorly trained and inefficient as they had been since Federation.<sup>46</sup>

When in 1914 General Sir Ian Hamilton visited to inspect the Australian forces his report did not necessarily make happy reading. Though it is often cherry-picked for the encouraging and supportive comments he made, less is usually made of the grave deficiencies he highlighted in manning, logistical underpinnings, training, unit cohesion and tactical competence. Referring to the mounted branch he worried that any attempt at manoeuvre by anything larger than a squadron-sized body would quickly degenerate into ‘disarray and confusion.’<sup>47</sup> In 1917 the Military Board, made wise by the realities of fighting a terrible war, looked back at the militia of 1914 and realistically concluded that ‘at the outbreak of war it would not have been possible to take a Militia Regiment as it stood and put it in the field at once against an efficient enemy, without disaster.’<sup>48</sup> Clearly if the force was going to be required, a substantial period of mobilisation and training would be necessary to get it ready.

Regardless, the ambition had not disappeared. The Universal Training scheme had made no specific proposals for the establishment of divisions, but there was provision for divisional mounted troops and a close correlation between the number of battalions and brigades required, and what would be required if divisions were to be formed.<sup>49</sup> Establishments prepared in 1912 had hinted at such a step for the infantry, but nothing was then done about it.<sup>50</sup> The idea clearly stayed around though and on 1 July 1914, just a few weeks before the outbreak of war, the Military Board met and recommended that a divisional organisation be adopted. At that meeting a memorandum prepared by the Director of Military Operations, Major CBB White, and submitted by the Chief of the General Staff, Brigadier JM Gordon, stated that as the division was the ‘approved military organization for the Empire ... its adoption is therefore recommended.’<sup>51</sup> Though it recognised the problems

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that would come with creating higher formations in a part-time citizen army in which even brigades were perhaps still more theoretical than real, the scheme went on to propose the establishment of a 'Field Army' of three light horse brigades and two infantry divisions to be drawn from the 2nd and 3rd Military Districts (essentially New South Wales and Victoria). District Field Forces, which in the 1st and 4th Military Districts (Queensland and South Australia) included under-strength infantry divisions were also to be established in the smaller states. It was recommended that the commanders and their divisional staffs be appointed from the ranks of the Australian permanent forces by reorganising the existing military district headquarters (which had replaced the older state-based commands of the immediate post-Federation era). In conclusion the submission recommended that this structure be adopted as the basis for planning until 1920.<sup>51</sup> The plan was apparently cut off by the events of August 1914, but did not disappear entirely and throughout the war the military authorities issued revised national establishments that set out the organisation of a force made up of two light horse divisions and six infantry divisions.<sup>52</sup>

Whether this scheme for a divisional army could have been attained, and the problems that Hamilton identified overcome, is impossible to know, as the outbreak of war dramatically altered the situation and the chance to correct the deficiencies of what still a very new system was taken away by the demands of the moment. The Defence Act's ban on sending troops outside Australia without their specifically volunteering precluded a war role for the militia and a specially-created expeditionary force, the Australian Imperial Force, would instead serve in Europe and around the Mediterranean. In a sense the pre-war Citizen Force gave this new force everything it had to give, from its best and most able officers, and much of its manpower, to its materiel, and eventually its financial lifeline. In other ways it also gave it very little. Though many officers of the Great War started their military careers in the citizen forces, and though the militia experience gave the military an administrative and organisational framework to work with in 1914 and 1915, it is difficult to conclude that what eventually became the very effective Australian Imperial Force that existed by 1917 and 1918 in both France and Palestine owed much of its competence to the pre-war militia.

The militia did not disappear with the war. Although the goal was to continue with what had been started, gutted of its best soldiers and officers, and increasingly lacking resources as the war went on, the militia in 1918 was nothing like what had been hoped for.

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... the chance to correct the deficiencies of what still a very new system was taken away by the demands of the moment.

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Before Federation the Australian colonial forces were enthusiastic and often popular, but small in an age of mass armies, largely parochial in their outlook, established with minimal official support, and, with some possible exceptions, not very competent. In the dozen or so years that passed after Federation (a not very long period of time for a peacetime army) successive governments, ministers of defence and senior British and Australian officers sought to dramatically reform this inauspicious material into first a national army, a difficult task in itself, and then into an efficient and effective force capable of defending the nation. The obstacles were manifold and many are familiar to all armies throughout history—a lack of money, waxing and waning interest from governments, and insufficient or obsolete equipment. More fundamentally, however, the great weakness was a continuing reliance on the model of part-time military service. For men and units that practised their martial pastime eight, ten, sixteen or twenty days a year, efficiency and competency were always going to remain elusive objectives. The Universal Training scheme attempted to overcome this problem by extending training to a decade-long process where it was hoped that at each stage improvements could be based on what had already been learnt. It was worth a try and a feasible idea, but it seems unlikely that it would ultimately have worked.

## ENDNOTES

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- 1 Major W F Everett, 'The Future Use of Cavalry, and our Light Horse', *Journal and Proceedings of the United Service Institution of New South Wales*, XXI, Lecture LXXXVIII, 1909, 91-103, at p.91. The light horse were organised as an abbreviated form of cavalry known at the time as mounted rifles. Mounted infantry, as understood at the time, was merely infantry made more or less permanently mobile by the addition of horses or some other riding animal. For more see Jean Bou, *Light Horse, A History of Australia's Mounted Arm*, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2010, pp. 69–71.
- 2 Comments made Colonel G Lee; Everett, 'The Future Use of Cavalry, and our Light Horse', p. 102.
- 3 Everett, 'The Future Use of Cavalry, and our Light Horse', p. 99.
- 4 The best overall treatment of pre-Federation forces remains that of Craig Wilcox. See his *For Hearths and Homes: Citizen Soldiering in Australia 1854–1945*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1998 and his PhD thesis, 'Australia's Citizen Army, 1889–1914', Australian National University, 1993. See also, D H Johnson, *Volunteers at Heart: the Queensland Defence Forces 1960–1901*, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia 1975.
- 5 Craig Wilcox, 'Hutton, Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Thomas Henry' and Stephen Clarke, 'Colonial Commandants' in Peter Dennis et al., *The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History*, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2008,

- pp. 139–43, 271; A J Hill, ‘Hutton, Sir Edward Thomas Henry (1848–1923)’, *Australian Dictionary of Biography*, <<http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/hutton-sir-edward-thomas-henry-6779/text11725>>, accessed 16 September 2011; Carmen Miller, ‘Hutton, Sir Edward Thomas Henry’, *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, <[http://www.biographi.ca/009004-119.01-e.php?&id\\_nbr=8205](http://www.biographi.ca/009004-119.01-e.php?&id_nbr=8205)>, accessed 16 September 2011.
- 6 Hutton, ‘Minute Upon the Defence of Australia’, B168, 1902/2688, National Archives of Australia (NAA).
  - 7 Major-General J Bevan Edwards, ‘Correspondence Relating to the Inspection of the Military Forces of the Australasian Colonies’, Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty, August 1890, British Parliamentary Papers, 1890, C. 6188.
  - 8 Wilcox, ‘Australia’s Citizen Army’, p. 157.
  - 9 Hutton, ‘Minute Upon the Defence of Australia’, B168, 1902/2688, NAA. The war establishment of the Field Force was 26,019 men, with 15,334 of these in the three infantry brigades and 10,485 in the six light horse brigades.
  - 10 Albert Palazzo, *The Australian Army: A History of its Organisation 1901–2001*, Oxford University Press, 2001, Melbourne, pp. 22, 32.
  - 11 Hutton, ‘Minute Upon the Defence of Australia’, B168, 1902/2688, NAA; Defence Scheme for the Commonwealth of Australia, July 1914, B168, 1904/185, NAA.
  - 12 Hutton, ‘Minute Upon the Defence of Australia’, B168, 1902/2688, NAA.
  - 13 Major-General Edward Hutton, *The Defence and Defensive Power of Australia*, Angus & Roberston, Melbourne, 1902, pp. 15–19; Bou, *Light Horse*, pp. 30–1, 61–2. For more on mounted troop theory during this period see Gervase Phillips, ‘“Who Shall Say That The Days of Cavalry are Over”: The Revival of the Mounted Arm in Europe, 1853–1914’, *War in History*, Vol. 18, No. 5, 2011, pp. 5–32, at 29–30; and Stephen Badsey, *Doctrine and Reform in the British Cavalry 1880–1918*, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2008. The contemporary literature is large, but for an example that seems to have been influential with Hutton see George T Denison, *Modern Cavalry: Its Organisation, Armament and Employment in War*, Thomas Bosworth, London, 1868. The American experience was not the only inspiration, but it was a prominent one.
  - 14 Australian Regulations and Orders of the Military Forces of the Commonwealth, provisional edition, 1904, part 8, section 11, A2657, vol. 1, NAA.
  - 15 Militia and Volunteer Peace and War Establishments, B168, 1902/2688, NAA; Australian Regulations and Orders of the Military Forces of the Commonwealth, provisional edition, 1904, part 8, sections 8 & 10, A2657, vol. 1, NAA.
  - 16 Hutton, ‘Minute Upon the Defence of Australia’, B168, 1902/2688, NAA.
  - 17 Australian Regulations and Orders of the Military Forces of the Commonwealth, provisional edition, 1904, part 8, section 37, NAA, A2657, vol 1, NAA; Hutton, ‘Minute Upon the Defence of Australia’, B168, 1902/2688, NAA.
  - 18 Hutton, ‘Minute Upon the Defence of Australia’, NAA, B168, 1902/2688.

- 19 Before Federation officer training, such as it existed, seems to have occurred only within the regimental environment, perhaps with supplementation through personal study and attending lectures at colonial service forums such as the United Service Institutes where they were established.
- 20 Jeffrey Grey, *A Military History of Australia*, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2000, p. 67–8; Hutton's estimates for the first four years totalled £486,283: Palazzo, *The Australian Army*, p. 33.
- 21 Secretary of Defence to Hutton, 1 June 1903, and Hutton to Secretary of Defence, 8 July 1903, AWM3, 03/624, Australian War Memorial.
- 22 Hutton wanted to spend over £10,000 on saddlery for the light horse and other branches, but had to settle for spending £90 to produce a small number of sample saddles. Secretary of Defence to Hutton, 1 June 1903, and Hutton to Secretary of Defence, 8 July 1903, AWM3, 03/624; 'Narrative of Instructional Operations by a Cavalry Division ... and remarks Thereon by Major-General Sir Edward Hutton', B168,1902/618, NAA; Palazzo, *The Australian Army*, p. 33.
- 23 Grey, *A Military History of Australia*, p. 68.
- 24 Hutton to Secretary of Defence, 2 June 1903, AWM3, 03/624.
- 25 The infantrymen of the Victorian Rangers were most vocal in their opposition to becoming light horse, but they were not the only unit to do so. The Melbourne Cavalry and New South Wales Lancers both also made complaints about the changes being forced on them regarding organisation and armament. Bou, *Light Horse*, p. 74–80; see also Craig Stockings, *The Making and Breaking of the Post-Federation Australian Army*, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra, 2007, p. 19.
- 26 Lieutenant-Colonel William Braithwaite was commander of one VMR battalion and the senior regimental officer. Hutton, with the concurrence of the state commandant, brought in a NSW permanent officer to command an ad hoc brigade created from the two VMR battalions for a camp in 1903. See Bou, *Light Horse*, pp. 79–80 and Wilcox, 'Australia's Citizen Army', pp. 189–92.
- 27 'Narrative of Instructional Operations by a Cavalry Division', B168,1902/618, NAA; Wilcox, 'Australia's Citizen Army', 163.
- 28 Ibid.
- 29 Hutton to Secretary of Defence, 22 November 1902, MP84/1, 1930/1/12, NAA.
- 30 'Second Annual Report upon the Military Forces of the Commonwealth of Australia by Major-General Sir Edward Hutton, 'Commonwealth of Australia, *Parliamentary Papers*, 1904, vol. 2.
- 31 Hutton to Secretary of Defence, 22 November 1902, MP84/1, 1930/1/12, NAA.
- 32 Bou, *Light Horse*, p. 81–3.
- 33 All the colonies and states had expanded their forces during the Boer War, in particular their mounted branches given the example of what was happening in South Africa. Bou, *Light Horse*, p. 63–6.

- 34 For more on the travails of citizen unit service during the late colonial and early Federation period, see Bou, *Light Horse*, pp. 87–98, 115–30; Wilcox, *For Hearths and Homes*.
- 35 See for example the troubles the 17th Light Horse Regiment had in South Australia. Inspector-General's report on his visit to 1 Squadron, 17th Light Horse Regiment on 17 March 1906, B168, 1906/5262, NAA.
- 36 Lieutenant-Colonel W T Bridges, AQMG, to Queensland Commandant, 3 July 1903, AWM3, 03/677, pt 1; Bridges, AQMG, to Secretary of Defence, 14 September 1904, AWM3, 03/600.
- 37 A J Hill, 'Hutton, Sir Edward Thomas Henry (1848–1923)', *Australian Dictionary of Biography*, <<http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/hutton-sir-edward-thomas-henry-6779/text11725>>, accessed 16 September 2011.
- 38 For more detail on the threat from Japan and its effects on the development of Australian defence policy in this period, see Wilcox, *For Hearths and Homes*, pp. 55–61; Palazzo, *The Australian Army*, pp. 39–56; Grey, *A Military History of Australia*, pp. 71–6.
- 39 'Memorandum on the Defence of Australia by Field Marshal Viscount Kitchener of Khartoum', J Kemp, Government Printer, Melbourne, 1910; Palazzo, *The Australian Army*, pp. 37–45.
- 40 'Memorandum on the Defence of Australia by Field Marshal Viscount Kitchener of Khartoum', Commonwealth of Australia, *Parliamentary Papers*, vol. 2, 1910; 'Extracts of the Annual Report of Major-General G.M. Kirkpatrick', 1913, A1194, NAA.
- 41 Wilcox, *For Hearths and Homes*, p. 59; Palazzo, *The Australian Army*, p. 51.
- 42 *Mounted Service Manual for Mounted Troops of the Australian Commonwealth*, F. Cunningham & Co, Government Printer, Sydney, 1902; Bou, *Light Horse*, pp. 72–3, 90–1.
- 43 Stockings, *The Making and Breaking*, pp. 24–5.
- 44 Bou, *Light Horse*, p. 99.
- 45 *Ibid.*, p. 103.
- 46 Bou, *Light Horse*, p. 103–7.
- 47 *Report on an Inspection of the Military Forces of the Commonwealth by General Sir Ian Hamilton*, Albert J. Mullet, Government Printer, Melbourne, 1914.
- 48 Meeting of the Military Board, 24 August 1917, cited in Palazzo, *The Australian Army*, p. 76.
- 49 The following information regarding the plans for the establishment of divisions was first outlined, Jean Bou, 'An Aspirational Army', *Sabretache* Vol. 49, No. 1, 2008, pp. 25–30; see also Bou, *Light Horse*, pp. 110–11.
- 50 War Establishments of the Australian Military Forces, 1912, A1194, 22.14/6970, NAA.
- 51 'Ultimate organisation of the Commonwealth Military Forces', Minutes of Military Board Meeting, 1 July 1914, Military Board Proceedings, A2653, 1914, NAA.

- 52 Tables of Peace Organisation and Establishments 1915–16, issued with Military Order 245, 1915, A1194, 21.20/6895, NAA. The cover of the tables is in fact in error and they were actually issued with Military Order 244, 27 April 1915; Tables of Peace Organisation and Establishments, 1916–17, issued with Military Order 176, 1916, A1194, 21.20/6896; Tables of Peace Organisation and Establishments, issued with Military Order 575, 1918, A1194, 21.20/6897; Tables of Peace Organisation and Establishments, 1919–20, issued with Military Order 463, 1919, A1194, 21.20/6898, NAA.

### THE AUTHOR

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## MILITARY HISTORY

# THE BIRTH, LIFE AND DEATH OF THE 1ST AUSTRALIAN ARMOURED DIVISION

LIEUTENANT ZACH LAMBERT

### ABSTRACT

This article examines the history of the formation of the Australian 1st Armoured Division for use in both the Middle East and the defence of the Australian mainland during the Second World War, from the intellectual and policy developments leading to approval by the War Cabinet to the equipment, manning and training issues experienced in trying to raise a formation in a short period. It also addresses the purpose of the formation given the circumstance of the time, and the creation and continuation of the armoured tradition in the Australian Army. It finally looks at the way the unit was disbanded and the follow-on effects to Australian armour, briefly addressing the impact of the armoured vehicle in Australia's primary operating environment.

The 1st Australian Armoured Division, formed in 1941, was a 2nd Australian Imperial Force (AIF) formation and the first substantial armoured formation in the Australia military. Although Australia had previously possessed two small tank companies, at the onset the Second World War there were only eleven mobile tanks in the country. Under these circumstances, the fact that Australia raised an armoured division and prepared it for deployment only

eight months after receiving its first tanks is a remarkable achievement. The 1st Armoured was designed to be used primarily in the Middle East, although this role changed with the entrance of the Japanese into the war, when the division became a key element to the defence of continental Australia against Japanese aggression. It was eventually disbanded without seeing combat.

There are three aspects to consider when discussing the 1st Armoured. First, why such a powerful formation was thought necessary for Australian success in war, and the influences that acted to encourage its formation; second, the specific issues encountered while raising the 1st Armoured Division and their effects; and finally, why the division was disbanded without seeing action, even though at its height in November 1942, it was the most powerful fighting formation in terms of firepower and manoeuvrability that Australia had ever possessed.

The value of the Armoured Fighting Vehicle (AFV) was demonstrated amply during the First World War, and the effectiveness of armoured support to infantry forces had been proven successful time and time again. However, at the outset of the Second World War, Australia was woefully unprepared for the realities of armoured combat. There had been an undercurrent dragging the Australian land forces towards mechanisation over the decade preceding the Second World War, but the voices calling for the creation of armoured forces, although present, were greatly stifled in the Australian military. After June 1940, with the firepower and manoeuvrability of the armoured division demonstrated by the Germans in the fall of France, possession of an armoured capability in the Australian military seemed highly desirable.

At the onset of the Second World War, the *Defence Act 1903* still restricted the small full-time Permanent Military Force from forming field units, primarily relegating them to training or staff roles. It also restricted the much larger

part-time militia forces from serving outside Australia at all.<sup>1</sup> As a result, the 2nd AIF—the direct successor of the 1st AIF of the First World War—was raised in September 1939, with one infantry division raised and sent to Palestine to complete training before heading to France. However, following the fall of Britain's major ally, France, and the entry of Italy into the war, the AIF was tasked instead to fight in the Middle East, and would later serve in the Far East. As a result of the events in Europe, enlistment in the AIF surged in Australia. At the same time, in July 1940, the War Cabinet directed that a supply of AFVs necessary for the equipment of an entire AIF Armoured Division be acquired.<sup>2</sup> Provisions were also made for establishing

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a training school for AFVs as well as the development of a permanent Australian armoured corps. After the ruthless efficiency of German armour in France, it was believed that armoured divisional formations would be essential to victory in the war, and that Australian AIF soldiers in the Middle East would require an armoured division to support them. Recommendations were made that a division be created, and plans for its formation discussed. On 10 July 1940 final approval was given for the ‘initial portion of the 1st Armoured Division A.I.F. to be raised in the period July–September 1941’.<sup>3</sup> This event was only possible due to the substantial development of Australian defence policy over the previous ten years, and several factors contributed to the final decision to create an Armoured Division for the AIF.

The first factor contributing to the creation of the 1st Armoured Division was the intellectual contributions of Lieutenant-Colonel Lavarack in 1930 and Lieutenant-General Squires in 1938. In 1930, as Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, Lavarack argued that Japan was a serious threat to Australia, and that relying on the Royal Navy for defence was not sufficient to defend the country.<sup>4</sup> He argued that a policy of mechanisation would give Australian land forces the ability to protect the country from invasion. These views were later supported by Squires in the role of Inspector General of the Australian Military Forces, when he advocated light cruiser tanks to defend the Australian coastline against invasion, believing that only light enemy AFVs such as the Japanese Type 95 light tank could be landed without port facilities.<sup>5</sup> The importance of defending the Australian mainland with armoured forces was recognised by the Minister for Defence as early as 1938, when Harold Thorby supported the concept of a mechanised force to protect the coast of Australia.<sup>6</sup>

The growing concern that the Australian mainland could be under threat was one that had been developing in strategic planning circles for the majority of the inter-war years<sup>7</sup>, leading to a cautious policy directive from the Military Board in 1938 that Australia’s land forces should focus on the possibility of defending against an invasion. Following the 1938 crisis in Czechoslovakia and the subsequent Munich Agreement, the Board stated that ‘it is evident that the threat of a more serious scale of attack or even invasion of some important area [of Australia] is a possibility which can no longer be disregarded’.<sup>8</sup> These recommendations would eventually be translated into practice with the provision of both light and medium American M3 tanks to the 1st Armoured Division to allow it to function in a dual role—first, as a home defence division, utilising light cruisers as a first response force to possible invasion, and second, as a deployable AIF formation for potential use in the Middle East.

Another factor that strongly contributed to the creation of the 1st Armoured Division was the success of mass armour tactics by the Germans in Belgium and France, as well as British successes in the Middle East, and the resulting effect on

doctrine within Australia. By July 1940 a belief had developed in senior Australian military and political leadership that ‘ever since the formation of the 6th Australian Division A.I.F. it has been considered vital that the A.I.F. in the Middle East should possess its own tank units.’<sup>9</sup> This belief was soon apparently validated by British successes in North Africa utilising divisional level armoured action in Operation Compass, from December 1940 to February 1941. It was seen as increasingly vital that tanks were not only utilised in large formations, but the types of tanks to be used were to be of the cruiser variety as opposed to infantry tanks, in order for them to operate independently of infantry formations. As a result, it was believed an AIF armoured division would be best suited to Australia’s needs in the Middle East.

It is important to outline here the difference between infantry and cruiser tanks, and the significance of the formations in which they operate. In a study ‘The Provision of Tank Equipment and Personnel’, released to the War Cabinet on the 10 July 1940, the key differences between infantry and cruiser tanks are defined as follows:

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It was seen as increasingly vital that ... the types of tanks to be used were to be of the cruiser variety

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Infantry tanks are heavily armoured and comparatively slow moving. They are organized in army tank battalions and brigades mainly for the close support of infantry. Cruiser tanks are less heavily armoured than infantry tanks and possess a greater speed. They are organized in Armoured Regiments and Brigades within the Armoured Division.<sup>10</sup>

This is a fundamentally important detail with regards to the formation of the 1st Armoured, and several points must be noted. Firstly, the 1st Armoured was formed as a division rather than a series of brigades. This was based on the British model of an armoured division, with two brigades of three regiments each, as well as headquarters and supporting elements including three motor regiments, an armoured car regiment, a field artillery regiment and an anti-tank regiment. This formation demonstrates that the division was purposefully designed to operate distinctly separate from infantry formations, a departure from Australian formations until that point.<sup>11</sup> Secondly, the 1st Armoured Division was originally intended to be equipped with American M3 Stuart light and Grant medium tanks obtained through the British Purchasing Commission from the United States even though they were considered to be ‘not suitable for use against modern German and Italian tanks owing to their light armour.’<sup>12</sup> They were to be used as training aids and more specifically for home defence, and although it was believed that cruiser tanks were essential to the success of the Australian war effort both in a defensive role and abroad in the Middle East, the War Cabinet stated that ‘it is considered that M3 light

tanks should not be employed outside Australia.<sup>13</sup> Due to the relative weaknesses in both armour and armament when compared to similar tanks in use by other nations, the M3 variants were 'recommended by the [British] War Office as reasonably suitable for local defence [in Australia] and is expected to be equal to any tanks which could be landed on our coast in the early stages of an attack.'<sup>14</sup> This recommendation was consistent with the advice given by Lieutenant-General Squires in 1938.

However, this proposal was made on the basis that the 1st Armoured would be re-equipped with British tanks upon deployment to the Middle East. Sadly, this policy never came to fruition; although enquiries were made with the British War Office on several occasions, the British did not believe they could provide enough tanks to equip any more than one armoured brigade, and this only with Valentine Mark III infantry tanks. A cable from SM Bruce, the Australian High Commissioner in London, received on 19 May 1941 explained that:

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... the division was purposefully designed to operate distinctly separate from infantry formations, a departure from Australian formations until that point.

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Enquiries have been made with the War Office on several occasions to [ascertain] the possibility of obtaining British infantry tank equipment that would be manned by A.I.F. Armoured Corps personnel. In January and February 1941 the prospects became brighter and recently the High Commissioner, London, has confirmed War Office ability to provide infantry tank equipment for one Army Tank Brigade A.I.F. in the Middle East in the first quarter of 1942... High Commissioner, London (cable No. 2510) states that although delivery of sufficient cruiser tanks is not assured the War Office may be able to provide sufficient infantry tanks Mark III for use as cruiser tanks by one Armoured Brigade A.I.F.<sup>15</sup>

The fact that insufficient cruiser tanks of adequate specifications could be obtained, combined with the entrance of the Japanese into the Second World War on 8 December 1941, meant that the chances of the 1st Armoured Division going overseas were all but finished. It was no longer able to fulfil its function of contributing to the Australian war effort in the Middle East, but it now had a new role as the most capable defensive unit in Australia to deal with an invasion of the mainland. As a result, it became all the more essential to prepare the division for a possible invasion by the Japanese even though on 6 December 1941 only ten M3 light cruisers were available to the division in Australia.<sup>16</sup> Up to 400 other American light and medium tanks had been ordered, but they would not arrive in Australia before April. The story of how the 1st Armoured Division—a force

that would become, with its firepower and manoeuvrability, the most powerful formation Australia had ever created—went from an organisation on paper to an effective fighting force begins here.

When the initial components of the 1st Armoured Division were raised from July to September 1941, Major General John Northcott was placed in charge of the formation with the expectation he would supervise the raising and training of the unit, and then lead it overseas in the Middle East.<sup>17</sup>

He spent the first two months of his posting attached to the British 7th Armoured Division in the Middle East before returning. Northcott faced several serious issues in attempting to prepare the division for battle, most notably in manning and equipment. In a letter to the Headquarters of Home Forces Office on the 27 January 1942, Northcott wrote that one of the major factors retarding progress in training and organisation was the fact that:

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... a force that would become, with its firepower and manoeuvrability, the most powerful formation Australia had ever created.

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...the two most recently formed Regiments in each Brigade were required to select the best-trained officers, N.C.O.s and other ranks to make up the two Independent Squadrons for immediate service overseas.<sup>18</sup>

The devastating impact of this transfer was felt in two ways. First, according to a report completed just prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War on the operational value of the 1st Australian Armoured Division, only officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) had completed AFV courses, and were therefore the only men capable of effectively training the soldiers in what was essentially a highly technical skill.<sup>19</sup> Secondly, Northcott wrote that:

The Psychological effect upon A.I.F. Troops who were expecting to embark for overseas service early in the new year, of the loss of many of their most experienced officers, the shortage of training equipment, absence of tanks, and having to accept a lower priority than militia formations, has made it very difficult to maintain the interest and progress in training which is essential.<sup>20</sup>

Also, to add insult to injury, the officers and NCOs chosen for the Independent Squadrons were informed on the eve of their departure to Malaya that they would not be deploying.<sup>21</sup> They were then returned to the 1st Armoured to take up positions that had been temporarily filled by other men. This had a long-term negative effect on the morale of the division that would continue to get worse over the life of the formation. This psychological effect was extremely important during wartime as members of the division were AIF and therefore entirely voluntary unlike the conscripts of the

militia. At the time, there were severe shortages of trained personnel and, as noted, the division was given a lower priority in this regard to even the militia units in Australia, Papua and New Guinea. For example, the Brigades did not have any armoured vehicles of note before April of 1942. In December 1941, it was reported that:

8 Light and 10 Light Cruiser Tanks only available. The Light Tanks are obsolescent and spare parts are short. The U.S. Light Cruisers are new but NO SPARES are available.<sup>22</sup>

Instead of tanks, the division was equipped with less than thirty machine gun carriers per regiment for the purpose of training. Due to these factors, it became extremely difficult to maintain training standards.

On 5 April 1942, Major General Horace Robertson arrived at the 1st Armoured to take command of the formation and prepare it for war. However, due to Japanese action in December 1941, the purpose of the division had crucially changed, and this was reflected in its commander. Robertson was a permanent officer, and for the majority of the year previous to his appointment at the 1st Armoured he had been in command of the AIF Reinforcement Depot (Middle East).<sup>23</sup> This left him supremely qualified in bringing the division to standard in the quickest time possible. However, although Robertson had advocated for an armoured division throughout his career, he was not held in highest regard by his superiors due to his independent nature, and was not initially considered for the position.<sup>24</sup> However, with the outbreak of war with Japan, he along with several other younger officers were returned to Australia to take command of forming units for use in the defence against the Japanese.

Robertson arrived at the 1st Armoured Division just in time for the first tanks to arrive and be issued to the division. From the start though there were issues with the equipment. The 2/9th Armoured Regiment received the first batch in mid-April 1942, but it was discovered they had radial aircraft engines that ran on petrol, and required specialised and unavailable equipment to get started.<sup>25</sup> This presented an extremely large logistical problem due to the high maintenance requirement of petrol engines. On 31 August the Armoured Division Headquarters and the 1st Armoured Brigade were finally fully equipped with 170 petrol tanks. However, there was a large maintenance liability at that point as twenty-six tanks were in need of an essential 100 operating hour service while a further 105 tanks would require their service within the next fortnight. As the combined brigade workshops could only carry out ten overhauls per week, it would take almost three months to bring the brigade back to full effectiveness.<sup>26</sup>

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... it was discovered they had radial aircraft engines that ran on petrol, and required specialised and unavailable equipment to get started.

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As well as the issue of maintenance, Robertson expressed his concern with the severe lack of trained personnel available to the Brigade. In fact, he noted that ‘there is no trained personnel available to replace even normal wastage under training conditions.’<sup>27</sup> This was an issue that went further than simply the mechanics who kept the vehicles in working condition; there were severe shortages of trained NCOs and officers due to the fighting against the Japanese in Papua, especially during the crucial months following the Battle of Milne Bay in August 1942. This meant that the 1st Armoured had suffered even further as a result of priority given to militia units in the Australian territories. In order to counteract the obvious lack of preparedness for war created by this situation, the 2nd Armoured Brigade was re-equipped with more easily maintained M3 diesel tanks, and had approximately ninety functioning tanks by the beginning of September.<sup>28</sup> Although the greatly reduced maintenance requirement allowed 2nd Armoured Brigade to function effectively and continue training as required, it forced the Brigades to train and operate separately and as a result, the division could not be considered a single functional unit. This greatly hampered Robertson’s ability to prepare the 1st Armoured to present a coherent defence against possible invasion, and as a result he drew up plans for a series of intensive divisional level exercises in the Narrabri training area in New South Wales.<sup>29</sup>

These exercises were to be conducted over the course of several weeks from the end of September to the end of October with the purpose of ‘reaching operational readiness by 1 November.’<sup>30</sup> Although the exercises were not perfect, they did achieve the purpose of preparing the 1st Armoured to operate at a divisional level—by 1 November 1942, for the first time since its formation, the 1st Armoured Division was prepared to go to war. It was noted that the training had been extremely valuable and would ‘result in a considerable reduction in the number of valuable trained lives likely to be lost in the first and subsequent actions.’<sup>31</sup> However, Brigadier Macarthur-Onslow, Commanding Officer 1st Armoured Brigade, drew several severe criticisms of the conduct of the brigades as umpire. He highlighted a lack of tactical understanding of armoured warfare and a lack of professionalism when it came to maintaining equipment, both of which would cause major issues should the division go to war.<sup>32</sup> However, it cannot be ignored that the division was as fully trained and prepared as it could have been without facing action. Sadly, this was not to last. On 18 October, near the end of the exercises, Robertson informed his commanders down to regimental level that ‘the division as they knew it was to be broken up.’<sup>33</sup> The reorganised 1st Armoured Division was to be sent to Western Australia as part of

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Lieutenant-General Bennett's III Corps, and within the next month it was reorganised and deployed to a location near Geraldton, Western Australia.

By the time the decision was made to send the 1st Armoured Division to Western Australia substantial thought had gone into the reorganisation of land forces in Australia. The guiding concept was that instead of one single armoured division that could defend only one location, it was in the best interests of Australia to redesignate the 1st and 2nd Motor Divisions as armoured divisions and equip one brigade per division with M3 tanks. This was due to the Australian Government's failure to develop strategic transport infrastructure in the form of roads or railway networks, meaning that units could not be moved to the site of an invasion if in fact it did take place.<sup>34</sup> In order to address this fault, the 1st Armoured would lose 2nd Armoured Brigade, and gain a motorised brigade in return.<sup>35</sup> The creation of the three new divisions would allow an effective defence of both the eastern and western coasts with armoured units, and allow for one division to be kept in reserve in the vital south-eastern areas of Australia. The reorganisation did occur, with the 3rd Armoured Division created in November 1942 after absorbing 2nd Armoured Brigade, and the 2nd Armoured Division created in Queensland in February 1943. The reorganised 1st Armoured Division was to take responsibility for defending the west coast under

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The new strategic focus on the South-West Pacific Area ... was the beginning of the end for the 1st Armoured

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Lieutenant-General Bennett and III Corps. At the beginning of 1943, due to the rapid Japanese advance and the increasing threat in Papua, it became increasingly apparent that the 1st Armoured Division would not have the opportunity to fight as a formation. The new strategic focus on the South-West Pacific Area and the limitations of terrain there meant that the 1st Armoured was quickly losing relevance as a massed armour formation.<sup>36</sup> This was the beginning of the end for the 1st Armoured, as well as for the other Armoured Divisions created by the reorganisation.

Major-General Robertson had been aware of the doctrinal thought behind the reorganisation and had several times attempted to point out the problems with modifying or disbanding the division—problems such as the £20,000,000 cost of equipping it, or the fact that it would be practically impossible to supply the number of trained personnel required to fully man all three divisions.<sup>37</sup> However, his relationship to his superiors meant that his opinion went unheeded and he was dispatched to Western Australia. As the war against the Japanese progressed, it became increasingly apparent that an invasion would not occur; Robertson attempted to occupy his troops although recognising that his division was becoming less relevant. In early 1943 he was reported to have told the Minister for the Army

that ‘they have sent me to the end of Australia to get me out of the road’.<sup>38</sup> However, the division still participated in exercises aimed at preparing for defending the coast until as late as July 1943.<sup>39</sup>

Eventually the soldiers of the 1st Armoured Division realised that they would not be defending Australia against an invasion by the Japanese. It became almost a running joke to the soldiers, with one recalling a conversation held in the mess late in 1943, where it was remarked that:

There is a strong possibility that we will be awarded a campaign medal...I heard the CO and Colonel discussing it and both agreed that we won our battle without fighting. The Japs were too scared of us to make a landing and decided to bugger off.<sup>40</sup>

Finally, in September 1943, the 1st Armoured Division was disbanded. This was in line with similar action to the 2nd and 3rd Armoured Divisions, which were disbanded in February and October respectively. The 1st Armoured Brigade of the 1st Armoured Division was retained as an independent brigade, and other new units such as the 4th Armoured Brigade were formed with the purpose of providing units to attach to infantry formations in jungle warfare. This represented a reversion to the tactics of providing infantry support tanks in squadrons and battalions to individual units. The new brigades were deployed in elements into the South–West Pacific theatre, and almost all were re-equipped with Matilda infantry support tanks before deployment due to the greater effectiveness of the Matilda in the jungle. For the remainder of the war the concept of an armoured division was abandoned as irrelevant for the war Australia was fighting.

A divisional formation for armour has not been attempted in the Australian Army since the disbandment of the 1st Armoured Division in September 1943.

The Australian Government’s decision in 1940 to approve the formation of the 1st Australian Armoured Division was extremely ambitious, but given the evidence they had at their disposal, the decision seems to have been justified.

The shock caused by German victory in France caused ripples that spread across the world, and the risks associated with the decision to create a large armoured formation in Australia were mitigated by the way in which it was implemented. Instead of simply creating a formation for overseas service, the Government considered advice from several sources and created a formation that would also be able to effectively fulfil the role of home defence. The raising of the division, although fraught with technical and manning issues, was still accomplished in less than

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The raising of the division ...  
was still accomplished in less  
than eighteen months, a minor  
miracle given Australia’s almost  
total lack of expertise ...

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eighteen months, a minor miracle given Australia's almost total lack of expertise and tank construction capabilities. Also, as Australia's military modified itself for war in the jungle, the disbandment of the division in 1943 is understandable, as it was a huge resource drain on the war effort, and the perceived threat of Japanese invasion was reduced for every soldier deployed to the Australian territories in Papua. Combined with Japanese naval losses at Midway and Guadalcanal, the threat of invasion was greatly reduced. Overall, there are several important points to make with regard to the 1st Armoured Division and its influence on the Australian Army tank forces that followed it.

The 1st Armoured Division was created in response to a very real need to possess a powerful, deployable armoured force. Although it never functioned in its intended role, it fulfilled two key purposes. First, it trained men in the tactics and skills required of armoured units. This allowed them to function at a much higher and more capable level when they were deployed in smaller formations. The value of the experience gained during the formation of the 1st Armoured should not be ignored; the men of the formation did not simply forget their skills when it disbanded. Also, it provided Australia the ability to react to any possible Japanese invasion with a precise, powerful force that could decisively engage and defeat any possible landing force. Although it was not used, at the time it was seen to be Australia's best hope against a determined landing.

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Although the 1st Armoured was formed to exploit a demonstrated development in armoured tactics at the time, its use as a defensive formation was justified. The doctrinal thought behind using a fast, heavily armoured and manoeuvrable formation to defend mainland Australia in the event of an armed landing is not without merit—the terrain generally suits a mobile armoured defensive strategy. It is also significant to note that although Australia has never utilised an armoured formation in this role, it is one that has been maintained in the Army from the time of the 1st Armoured Division until today, with the M1A1 Abrams main battle tank fulfilling the same role as the light and medium M3 cruisers of 1942. It is also curious to note that in the only two theatres in which the Army has deployed tanks, the South–West Pacific Area during the Second World War and Vietnam, they have been used in an infantry support capability, and yet no AFV-equipped unit has been dedicated to functioning in this role since the Second World War.

In the present, this shortfall has been addressed partially by the provision of the cavalry regiments and the Light Armoured Vehicle (LAV), but their primary role has always been medium reconnaissance and independent operations separate

to the infantry battalions. Although they have recently gone beyond their core functions and been attached at the combat team level to infantry sub-units, a capability gap still exists between a dedicated infantry support AFV, and the current in service LAV and the Protected Mobility Vehicle (PMV). The M113A4 Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC) partially fills this role, but lacks in both the survivability and firepower required for close combat high-end warfighting in support of infantry in complex terrain. The M1A1 Abrams main battle tank also provides some infantry support capability, but has not been utilised in the Australian context, and there is no indication that this will change. Overall, there is an identified capability gap between in service equipment and an infantry support AFV.

The primary operating environment for armoured vehicles in the Australian Army today remains similar to that of the Second World War—operations within Australia, the South Pacific islands and littoral operations in South–East Asia. This environment calls for the provision of an AFV with the ability to support infantry operations, and whilst the M1A1 Abrams main battle tank may be suited to the original role of the AFV in defence of northern Australia, its 62-tonne weight is largely unsuited to littoral operations throughout Asia.

The primary initiative towards providing the infantry support AFV capability to the Australian Army is the Land 400 project, and there are several lessons that can be drawn from the experience of raising the 1st Armoured and applied to the acquisition of a Land Combat Vehicle System (LCVS) in the infantry support AFV role.<sup>41</sup> The Land 400 concept of operations requires the LCVS to provide close combat reconnaissance, intimate/direct fire support and high survivability for both the vehicle and its occupants<sup>42</sup> This will require the substantial developments in force structure that are currently underway, as effective training can only be conducted in formations where the units are able to operate and train collectively. One lesson from the development of the 1st Armoured Division is that when units are equipped differently and trained separately, they cannot operate effectively together, even in controlled exercise situations. As such, frequent intimate collective training between the LCVS and infantry battalions or embedding of the vehicles will be essential to the effective use of the system. This will result in a higher required manning and maintenance liability due to the diffused force structure, but is essential to force effectiveness on operations.

There is also a lesson for the Land 400 project in the logistical problems presented to the 1st Armoured Division on the initial acquisition of its petrol radial M3 tanks.

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... when units are equipped differently and trained separately, they cannot operate effectively together, even in controlled exercise situations.

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Both tooling and maintenance were a major issue—it is not good enough to simply provide the new vehicle without correct support at the field workshop level, as having to send a vehicle to the manufacturer to repair each time it is damaged causes unacceptable delays. In a wartime situation this can be a critical failure and lead to massive equipment shortages. Supply was also a major issue, with the majority of the facilities set up for the division catering to diesel vehicles, causing extreme difficulty when resupplying the petrol vehicle, both in barracks and in the field. Interoperability then becomes paramount, as the rest of the vehicle fleet should be able to be maintained and supplied with the same supply chain and with the same petrols, oils and lubricants.

Until the introduction of the Land 400 LCVS, it appears that for the foreseeable future, the 1st Armoured Regiment will continue the tradition of the 1st Armoured Division in ensuring both the defence of northern Australia and the provision of high-end combat power in direct support of infantry, and will continue to train for these eventualities. It remains to be seen if this capability will be utilised, given that it has never been used for this purpose. The Land 400 project should provide a capacity to fill the infantry support AFV capability gap that has existed since the deployment of Matilda tanks in the Second World War. The Land 400 vehicle must keep in mind the primary operating environment, and the requirement to operate in this terrain and conditions in close proximity with infantry, as well as the requirement to operate in both littoral and jungle environments. If these considerations are achieved, it will continue the Australian tradition of utilising AFV to ensure infantry forces are more effective in close combat and receive fewer casualties.

The Australian 1st Armoured Division was the opening chapter to the use of armour in Australia. Although it never served overseas, it achieved a great deal in the defence of the nation and as such should not be relegated to the vaults of history. The men who served in the 1st Armoured went on to serve throughout the South–West Pacific Area, and their performance was in part due to the training and preparations they received during their time with the division. The 1st Armoured should not be known as the division that never saw battle, but instead as the division that built Australia's current armoured tradition from nothing. The continuation of this tradition will show in the increased capabilities provided by Australian armour into the future.

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## THE AUTHOR

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## PARATUS PAPERS

# UP FRONT THINKING

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LIEUTENANT COLONEL SCOTT WINTER

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**P***aratus Papers* started in 1997, an initiative of the Commanding Officer of the 1st Armoured Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel (now Major General) Craig Orme. The Regiment has a long and proud history of excellence in officer training, and *Paratus Papers* sought to build on this tradition. Named after the unit's motto, the Latin term for 'prepared', the *Papers* aim to inspire officers to 'think up-front', that is, ensure that the intellectual preparation for innovation and adaptation is done so that officers are better placed to fight and win on the modern battlefield. Since 1997, *Paratus Papers* have been produced annually and disseminated throughout the wider Army to encourage professional discussion and debate.

In 2011 I challenged the officers of the Regiment to get their heads 'out of the turret' and engage with the wider issues that make up our profession. As a result, *Paratus Papers 2011* covers a broad range of contemporary topics. The results of these endeavours are contained in the pages of *Paratus Papers 2011*, of which a small selection are provided in the following pages.



# AMPHIBIAN DEPLOYMENT AND SUSTAINMENT

## FURTHER INVESTMENTS ESSENTIAL TO REALISE THE DREAM

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CAPTAIN ANTHONY BAMFORD

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### ABSTRACT

Successive Defence White Papers have emphasised the need for an effective amphibian deployment and sustainment system involving Army, Navy and Air Force assets to project force across Australia's primary operating environment. Australia is purchasing two ships capable of carrying significant amounts of equipment, but further investments of both money and professional resources will be essential to develop an effective force package capable of the full suite of amphibious tasks. Lessons can be learned from the US Marine Corps and the UK Royal Marines. A layer of complexity is added by Australia's geographically diverse primary operating environment. This article aims to encourage further professional discussion and makes a number of recommendations toward turning the 'dream' of a full range of amphibious capabilities into a reality.

*Government has recognised that the ADF must have both situational awareness and the ability to operate with decisive effect across the POE. This has therefore led Government to determine that the ADF must be expeditionary in orientation at the operational level, and must have the requisite force projection capabilities to enable the achievement of this orientation.*

Australia's Amphibious Concept<sup>1</sup>

## INTRODUCTION

Joint and combined arms is how we do business—it has to be. The Defence capability plan, Joint Project 2048 (JP 2048), reflects this. The *Defence White Paper 2009* articulates Government's intent for the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to build, maintain and sustain an Amphibious Task Force (ATF)<sup>2</sup>. The need for this has been recognised by consecutive governments since *Defence White Paper 2000*.

The ATF is to consist of an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) of Battlegroup strength and an Amphibious Ready Element (ARE) of Combat Team strength capable of force projection within our primary operating environment (POE)<sup>3</sup> to either defend against an incursion on Australian territory or lead coalition operations against hostile actors within our immediate vicinity. Acknowledging there are significant issues that remain outstanding with respect to this capability, this paper will focus on the following three key points: it will provide context to the combined arms team as a critical capability of JP 2048, evaluate a number of requirements to make this concept a reality and recommend key future actions.

## COMBINED ARMS TEAM

The Australian Army's capstone land warfare doctrine, LWD-1, *Land Warfare Doctrine*, defines combined arms as a 'case-by-case mix of combat, combat support, combat service support and command support elements selected on the basis of a specific combination of task, terrain and threat'.<sup>4</sup> This remains important to the Joint Team, the purpose is to present an adversary with a dilemma and enable the Joint Force Commander to fight more than one way. This philosophy must be central to the development of our own ATF and drives the C2, interoperability and doctrine based recommendations of this paper.

## CONTEXT

In discussion of the amphibious deployment and sustainment system (ADAS), heavy weighting is given to the Landing Service Dock (LSD) and the Landing Helicopter

Dock (LHD) as the key acquisitions under JP 2048. However it is now widely recognised that ADAS, in its current proposed form, would be incapable of operational manoeuvre from the sea (OMFTS) in the littoral environment. It would be unable to dominate the environment that lines the coast of both Australia and our neighbours (the POE).<sup>5</sup> Even when in receipt of appropriate air support, the proposed landing craft would offer limited flexibility to a commander tasked with anything other than limited ship-to-shore manoeuvre.<sup>6</sup>

In its current proposed form, it is hoped that ADAS will deliver a combined arms team (up to battlegroup in strength) from ship-to-shore to an uncontested beachhead in a non-permissive environment attempting ship-to-objective manoeuvre (STOM) within the POE. Realising this there is *opportunity* for other defence projects to make significant purchases within the bounds of JP2048, an example of this is the acquisition of an armoured breaching capability and increased interoperability with the United States Marine Corps (USMC).

Over the past ten years Government direction for ADAS has become increasingly narrow, so narrow that we risk not building an effective force element that will achieve operational and strategic objectives, but find ourselves focused solely on constraints driven by the budget. It appears the ADF is deviating from its goal of developing a force package capable of achieving the requirements laid out in consecutive white papers that would be comparable to that employed by both the USMC and British Royal Marines (UK RM). It would appear that this is in order to meet Government's reduced spending objectives.

If Government wants a true amphibious capability that reflects that of Australia's peers, it will have to commit and invest appropriate funds.

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Government direction (...) has become (...) so narrow that we risk not building an effective force element that will achieve operational and strategic objectives

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## AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP

For the purpose of this paper I will broadly discuss the landing force currently proposed by *Defence White Paper 2009* and the JP 2048 concept document within the bounds established under the *Adaptive Campaigning — Future Land Operating Concept (AC-FLOC)*.<sup>7</sup>

*Australia's Amphibious Concept* has determined that the ARG is to be capable of the full suite of amphibious tasks. The ARG is based on both of the LHDs and the LSD currently in the acquisition phase. The manoeuvre component is

a medium-weight battlegroup of approximately 2200 personnel with associated stores and equipment. The battlegroup is likely to be comprised of infantry, armour (including tanks), artillery, engineers, armed reconnaissance helicopters, lift and mobility helicopters, and other combat support enablers.<sup>8</sup> The ARG naval platforms will, at the time of writing, need to be augmented by civilian contractors for combat services support—another example of under investment. The force package built on these naval assets, battlegroup and air force assets would form our own Amphibious Task Force<sup>9</sup>.

The ATF will be expected to operate throughout the POE, facing threats of varying intensities and sophistication in circumstances ranging from permissive to hostile. Threats to ADF expeditionary forces include anti-ship missiles, long-range artillery, fighter-ground attack aircraft, man-portable air defence, fast attack craft, submarines and mines. As a result, investment in and access to over-the-horizon intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance, becomes even more important and is a vital component to ensure the success of the ATF.<sup>10</sup>

Furthermore, the archipelagic nature of our region adds a layer of complexity to sea-based manoeuvre. While an amphibious capability that is configured to operate from afloat offers increased flexibility in its ability to concurrently influence affairs ashore across multiple islands without necessarily a commitment to land operations, the use of coastal, riverine and reef enclosed waters for resupply and tactical manoeuvre by an adversary must be countered by an equally agile maritime force. The ADF's POE is geographically diverse and complex. It is dominated by ocean with numerous land-masses separated by narrow maritime passages. Its littoral nature is characterised by the archipelagic, riverine and estuarine terrain, subject to large tidal variations and severe weather.<sup>11</sup>

This means that the naval component of our ATF must be more diverse than just a floating staging base if we are to set up the ARG for success—it should have the capacity to take advantage of the terrain within the POE and landing craft must have the flexibility to manoeuvre and deliver the ARG over an increased range and in a wider variety of sea-based environments as described above.<sup>12</sup> To achieve this we must invest in this capability. Currently there is a significant gap between expectation and reality. If we were to invest, the potential to conduct operations across the spectrum of conflict within the POE certainly exists, but to achieve this we must learn from our peers, as such this paper will recommend increased interoperability and exchanges with the USMC.

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... the naval component of  
our Amphibious Task Force  
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## COMPARISON

If we are to follow the tried and tested USMC model, our battlegroup afloat would look something like a Marine battalion landing team. The battlegroup would be comprised of infantry (mechanised with the ability to deploy with or without their vehicles), armour (based on a tank troop group), artillery, engineers (with mechanical breaching), armed reconnaissance helicopters, lift and mobility helicopters, and other vehicles.

This battlegroup will have many constraints placed upon it. It will still be expected to conduct STOM, possibly on multiple and concurrent lines of operation. Growing and training such an organisation will be best based on the experience of our peers and will be best achieved by investment in a 'plug and play' component of the USMC model.

Sustaining the mechanised force that must constitute the ARG if it is to be capable of operating in a hostile environment is a massive burden that must not be under-appreciated. From a manoeuvre battle operating system perspective alone the ATF would require us to learn from lessons of the past fifteen years in the maintenance of Army's armoured fighting vehicle (AFV) fleet. It would require investment in operational pools of repair parts scale, investment in the recruitment, training and retaining of maintainers for our AFV fleet that would allow our equipment to be sustained appropriately in respect to our goals.

At a glance, logistics to the ARG is relatively straightforward, with 'sea basing' being the default response. This method would be unlikely survive first contact in anything other than a permissive environment. Future planning for ADAS will need to address the massive investment required in second and third line logistics in both combat support and combat service support elements to allow the ARG to have a chance at operating past its operational viability period.

It is also an essential requirement for our ADAS system to have a 'plug and play' function or to be able to achieve complete interoperability with our USMC and UK RM brethren. While both these organisations are recognised as leaders in amphibious warfare, it is important we base our expectations, and those of our senior leadership and government, on the realities of what we are prepared to invest.

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... the development phase of the amphibious deployment and sustainment system should be exchange-heavy, with a focus on brick-size exchanges, not just individual exchanges ...

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## RECOMMENDATIONS

### COMMAND AND CONTROL

The development, training and sustainment of the ATF requires a large investment, both professionally and financially. As a result, the ARG responsibility should reside with a specialist battlegroup headquarters and not be rotated between units—the specialist nature of these operations would be seriously degraded by the generalist approach of rotating control. The specialist battlegroup headquarters will require a habitual relationship with the key elements of the combined arms team discussed within this paper.

### INTEROPERABILITY

Should Government invest in a true near peer capability for ADAS, this would need to be reflected in the equipment purchased. Further appreciation must be conducted of the sea-based terrain within the POE, and the type of landing craft purchased must reflect this. Cross training between a broad range of ADF specialists and generalists should continue with increased emphasis.

### DOCTRINE

*Australia's Amphibious Concept* correctly identifies that we should not reinvent the wheel as we have done in the past. In order to instil experience and learn from past experience the development phase of ADAS should be exchange-heavy, with a focus on brick-size exchanges, not just individual exchanges; for example a tank troop.

### OPPORTUNITY

The emphasis on an increasing working relationship with the USMC should provide leverage for other acquisitions within Army; for example the acquisition of an armoured breaching capability and the purchase of additional M1A1 and M88 in support of Plan BEERSHEBA.

### EXCHANGES

Continue the Expeditionary Warfare School Development Program with increased panel size (all ARA brigades should contribute in order to develop understanding); exchange with 31 Marine Expeditionary Unit for staff training and familiarisation of combat team and troop size force element; the Combat Training Centre should develop an amphibious training cell in preparation to shape our training in parallel to that of the USMC elements we would operate with; and augment marine expeditionary unit with ready battlegroup and LHD assets in years to come.

## CONCLUSION

While the two LHDs procured through JP 2048 will represent a significant increase to the ADF's current amphibious warfare capability, they do not have the capacity to deploy a medium-weight combined arms battlegroup and, more specifically, they do not have the capacity to hold the required numbers of vehicles and quantities of explosive ordnance. They will only be capable of limited manoeuvre.

The ADF and Government need to understand that while a professional force will learn how to conduct the full range of amphibious operations, STOM and OMFTS is beyond us, given the current personnel and equipment constraints. To man the amphibious task group and make this dream a reality, significant further financial investment from Government and professional investment from the ADF will be needed.

There are some good immediate observations that reinforce why the combined arms team needs to be fundamental to JP 2048 rather than an optional extra or afterthought. Not surprisingly, embarking tanks (or Land 400) requires a significant investment (logistics, vehicle preparation, equipment and simulation), and sustaining them and the people takes experience. The resulting capability is, however, very much worth it.

## ENDNOTES

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- 3 *Australia's Amphibious Concept*, p. 14.
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- 6 *Ibid.*, p. 5.
- 7 Australian Army, *Adaptive Campaigning — Future Land Operating Concept*, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2009.
- 8 *Australia's Amphibious Concept*, p. 14.
- 9 *Ibid.*, p. 13.
- 10 *Ibid.*, p. 5.
- 11 *Ibid.*, p. 12.
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## THE AUTHOR

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Captain Anthony Bamford, Royal Australian Armoured Corps, commissioned from the Royal Military College, Duntroon in December 2006. He has served with the 1st Armoured Regiment as a Troop Leader, Squadron Second in Command and most recently as Adjutant. Captain Bamford has represented the Australian Defence Force on exchange with the 2nd Royal Tank Regiment (UK, 2008) and has deployed on Operation SLIPPER as a PMV Troop Leader (2009). He is currently a Staff Officer in the Operations Cell within Headquarters 6th Brigade.

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## THE AGILE COMMANDER

### IN THE ADAPTIVE ARMY

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CAPTAIN MATTHEW JEFFERIES

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#### ABSTRACT

Change within our society and primary operating environment has reached exponential levels. The requirement to create an adaptive Army was recognised early this century and Army has been working to create a cultural shift that will make it more effective in its current endeavours. The key catalyst to enable an adaptive Army is agile commanders who have the freedom of action to adapt and overcome. This article examines the methods that software engineers and project managers use to solve non linear complex endeavours that are surprisingly relevant for today's junior commander.

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*In times of change the learners will inherit the earth, while the learned will find themselves beautifully equipped to deal with a world that no longer exists.*

Eric Hoffer<sup>1</sup>

## INTRODUCTION

Each year the Australian Defence Force (ADF) spends billions of dollars on capability and infrastructure. Despite this significant expenditure the single most important investment is and always will be its people. The Army is characterised by a clearly defined hierarchy and chain of command. The senior ranks are held accountable for the direction of the Army and for its actions but they are not the ranks with the power to influence cultural change. The implementers of change are the junior commanders—the corporals and lieutenants. Junior commanders can compensate for shortfalls in resources, equipment and systems. Junior commanders can provide the inspiration and innovation necessary to achieve the mission in difficult and hostile terrain, the dynamic, non-linear complex endeavour that forms Australia's primary operating environment (POE).

In mid-2008 the Army began a detailed self-examination to study the force structure and command arrangements required to succeed in the contemporary and future operating environments. The resultant Adaptive Army is a series of inter-linked initiatives to ensure that the Australian Army remains relevant, effective and reputable.<sup>2</sup> Adaptive Army came from a study of many other defence and civilian best practice systems. The correlation between the software developers' project management methodology of Agile Management and the resultant Adaptive Army Initiatives are clear, and as such merits a closer look at the Agile Management systems.

### AIM

The underpinning tenets of Agile Management are applicable to developing the agile junior commanders that the Australian Army needs. In the foreword of the May 2009 *Update on the Implementation of the Adaptive Army Initiative*, Chief of Army Lieutenant General Ken Gillespie expressed why he believed Adaptive Army was important. He stated:

The success of Army in the conduct of contemporary (and future) operations, force generation and preparation will be largely determined by our capacity to learn lessons, and then adapt based on those lessons. The Army must continually review and adapt to ensure that it remains fit for the changing environment.<sup>3</sup>

Commanders at the regiment and battalion level have been entrusted with continually reviewing and adapting to ensure their units remain fit for the changing environment. They must foster a culture of innovation and adaptation, supportive of mission command within the Army. They must invest in their junior commanders to allow them the freedom to be the implementers of the Adaptive Army.

## AGILE METHODOLOGY

Agile methodology was developed as a tool for software developers and project managers to enable them to be more responsive to their clients' end user requirements<sup>2</sup>—in Army terminology 'to be more responsive to the commander's intent'. In a conventional construction project, objectives are completed in a linear sequential format. Groundwork is completed followed by construction of the foundation, followed by construction of the walls, construction of the roof, and so on. Software development is a non-linear complex endeavour. There are multiple inputs and outputs that create activities that occur simultaneously and that are all interlinked with an input into one activity, thereby changing the output of another. In functionality this is very similar to the POE that the ADF operates within.

A single operational unit is required to train for and carry out multiple activities on all levels of the force spectrum; in other words, multiple inputs and outputs. A single troop commander may have subordinates who are required to undertake activities ranging from supporting of local community events such as a school fête, preparing for emergency and disaster response, providing a peacekeeping force in Timor-Leste, supporting Special Operations Command in Afghanistan and training within Australia for conventional mid-level intensity warfare. It is important for a junior commander who is facing this non-linear complex endeavour to study other methodologies that operate in similar complex environments. This is true of the junior commander who plans the activities (lieutenant) and the junior commander who will carry out the activity (corporal).

From the original Agile Manifesto<sup>4</sup>, three core values that are highly relevant to the junior commanders are:

- **Individuals and interactions** over processes and tools. Not rigid constrictive systems to force members into compliance, but the development of mutual trust and respect through communicating with individuals and interaction up and down the chain of command.
- **Functional standard operating procedures** (SOPs) over comprehensive documentation. Moving away from forty-page operations orders designed to protect the chain of command from litigation, towards functional SOPs and understanding and implementation of common doctrine.

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- **Responding to change** over following a plan. With valued individuals and functional SOPs, a junior commander can utilise their freedom of action to achieve their commander’s intent and the mission despite a hostile, friction-laden environment subject to constant change.

Agility is defined as that ability of an organisation to effectively adapt to change. It is an enabler to command and control (C2) that fits squarely into the Chief of Army’s intent for an adaptive Army. Agile C2 recognises the requirement for current junior commanders to have a more collaborative interaction with their subordinates in the complex endeavours they are required to undertake.

Passive agility is a prescribed conditioning that prepossesses a set of characteristics that allow a unit to continue to operate effectively, despite changes in circumstances or conditions. In Australia’s POE passive agility is expressed as pragmatic doctrine and up-to-date functional SOPs. More practically it is the common base level of training that enables a unit to flow from one task to the next with minimal disruption to the unit’s operational effectiveness. A recent example would be the reolling of engineer elements involved in training for conventional mid-level intensity warfare to Defence Aid to the Civil Community (DACC) tasking providing flood relief. The passive agility that allowed the flow from one task to another was already present in the unit due to the level of its training and its SOPs.

Active agility is the ability of a unit to effectively respond or adapt when required. This may involve taking an action, stopping an action, changing a process, changing an approach to management, governance, or C2. It may also involve changing perceptions or even the way success is defined.

Active agility provides more of a practical challenge because it relies on the impetus of the unit rather than the unit’s innate ability. Active agility also requires the questioning of the assumptions behind the activity in order to allow the most appropriate response.<sup>5</sup>

Taking into account the size of the ADF, its accountability to the Australian Government and the bureaucracy required to maintain highly complex endeavours under intense scrutiny, the Australian Army excels in the provision and execution of passive agility. However, increasing scrutiny has led to a group think ‘safety in numbers’ mentality that stymies the creative problem-solving required for active agility in favour of a conservative ‘cover your arse’ approach to management. By instilling active agility within junior commanders and providing them freedom of action, Army can realise the Adaptive Army vision and remain fit for the changing environment.

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... increasing scrutiny has led to a group think ‘safety in numbers’ mentality that stymies the creative problem-solving required for active agility ...

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It is one thing to espouse a desire to be more responsive, more flexible or innovative, it is quite another to create the conditions that are necessary to enable the prerequisites for active agility. Improving agility requires that enablers be present and impediments are removed. It is therefore key for senior leadership to develop the following tenets from *The Agility Imperative*<sup>6</sup> with their junior commanders:

- **Responsiveness:** to be responsive a commander must be able to recognise potentially significant changes in the operating environment, an adversary, or the unit in a timely manner and recognise then what would be an appropriate response. Being agile therefore involves the ability to create an adequate awareness and understanding of the environment and the ability to anticipate and where relevant, detect and recognise a relevant change in circumstances. Active agility also requires the ability and freedom of the commander to respond appropriately.
- **Robustness:** the sufficient training and equipping level of units that permits the junior commander to achieve a level of performance or effectiveness in accomplishing a new or significantly altered task or mission. A lack of robustness and multi-skilling limits a commander's ability to succeed when the nature of the task or mission differs from what is expected or when it changes in unanticipated ways.
- **Resilience:** the ability of the unit to maintain its task and complete the mission despite significant loss of capability. Resilience permits the junior commander to recover the lost performance or effectiveness caused by loss, damage, misfortune or a destabilisation in the environment. This is especially relevant to the junior commander who has been detached from his sub-unit and its associated integral support. Resilience is enhanced by encouraging subordinates to be creative, innovative and flexible.<sup>6</sup>

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Senior commanders must be more willing to allow failure by their subordinates, particularly in a contained environment ...

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## IMPEDIMENTS TO AGILITY

### ENVIRONMENT

Junior commanders and their subordinates must be given the freedom to fail. Junior commanders provide the most effective means to compensate for shortcomings in organisation, processes and resources. They are also the most agile level of command and have the greatest understanding of how the unit will respond to change. Yet the current environment, where only success is encouraged, does not

allow the junior commander the freedom to fail. Failure is an important teaching tool. Senior commanders must be more willing to allow failure by their subordinates, particularly in a contained environment, in order for them to learn the lessons that can only be learnt by experiencing failure. The current operating continuum gives soldiers and officers a very short time in command roles. Therefore commanders feel a great deal of pressure to succeed as this will directly reflect on their performance review and future employability.

#### INFLEXIBILITY

The Army through its strong emphasis on discipline and clear hierarchical structure can become a breeding ground for inflexibility and stubbornness. While discipline is a core tenet of carrying out a complex activity in extremely hostile environments, the chain of command must recognise that its soldiers and junior commanders are increasingly better networked and more communications savvy than their senior commanders. Soldiers and junior commanders (most of whom are Generation Y) have grown up in a rapidly changing world, and as a result they are far better at assimilating these changes and adapting their actions to capitalise on opportunities.

#### MINDSET

A closed and complacent mindset is an impediment to agility. Although the lower levels of an organisation often contain the most agile members, they cannot flourish if senior commanders are set in their ways. Within Army the commanding officer and officers commanding must have an agile mindset. They must always be looking for and encouraging their junior commanders to look for opportunities to do things better and smarter and to question the status quo. Providing junior commanders with the authority to act, therefore allowing them to rapidly respond to changing circumstances and respond appropriately gives them the opportunity to practice agile thought processes and actions. This freedom must be delegated down the chain of command.

In contrast to the inflexible success-oriented closed mindset that may be found in some training environments, the focus of real-time operations is much more closely aligned with the adaptive Army. On operations the junior commander is more likely to be allowed increased freedom of action to achieve the commander's intent. The junior commander who is confronted by an issue at their level is encouraged to step

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[T]he unit's members ... are far more satisfied with their performance than those subjected to only training environments and a higher level of 'micro-management'.

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forward with a solution at their level and as a result the deployed unit is far more responsive, robust and resilient. Anecdotally, the unit's members report a much higher ownership of the mission and are far more satisfied with their performance than those subjected to only training environments and a higher level of 'micro-management'.

## CONCLUSION

The desire to be more adaptive requires all members of the organisation to have a vested interest. Responsive, robust and resilient junior commanders require an environment that expects them to perform to best practice and to make changes for the benefit of the unit. Outlined in this paper are some of the salient points of agile management that are being encouraged in the Adaptive Army initiatives. Senior commanders within Army have shown that they are willing to provide an environment conducive to agility. The next step for creating an agile unit is to provide junior commanders the education, training, information and resources to further develop their skills. With these resources, in an environment that encourages trying new things in a controlled training scenario set by senior commanders, units can obtain true agility and meet the aspiration for an adaptive Army.

## ENDNOTES

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- 1 E Hoffer, *The Ordeal of Change*, Hopewell Publications, 1967.
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## THE AUTHOR

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Captain Matthew Jefferies joined the Army as a Combat Engineer in 2001. He was posted to the 3rd Combat Engineer Regiment where he completed the Army Year 12 Equivalency Course and was accepted at Duntroon. After graduation he transferred to the Royal Australian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers and has been posted to the Army Logistics Training Centre, 1st Command Support Regiment, Special Air Service Regiment, 1st Armoured Regiment and is currently serving at the Australian Headquarters Joint Operations Command. He deployed to Afghanistan in 2011 with Mentoring Task Force – Two.

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## PARATUS PAPERS

# THE DISTRIBUTED MANOEUVRE BATTLE

## PREPARING COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT ELEMENTS

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CAPTAIN GEOFFREY ORTON

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### ABSTRACT

Distributed manoeuvre—multiple small combined arms groups operating independently of each other—will be further explored and developed by the Australian Army over the next two decades. Small groups in the first echelon need to be supported by a second echelon of combat, combat support and combat service support, with a main body ready to rapidly mass and strike as required. This creates a number of challenges for maintenance, supply and health elements tasked with supporting the battlegroup. Logisticians will also have to adapt to a changing Army structure. With the uncertainty of future funding, rollout of future technologies and platforms, the Army should immediately focus on those aspects that will remain constant in 2030. All logistic personnel need to be ‘soldiers first’ so that they may survive long enough to perform their job on the battlefields of tomorrow.

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*Generally, management of many is the same as management of few. It is a matter of organisation.*

Sun Tzu

## INTRODUCTION

In 2010, Lieutenant General Ken Gillespie as Chief of Army endorsed the Army Objective Force 2030 as the aiming mark for Army's modernisation and development. The *Army Objective Force (AOF) 2030 Handbook* describes, among other things, how the future Army needs to be able to fight and one of the four manoeuvre concepts that the AOF 2030 must perform—distributed manoeuvre.

By 2030 it is expected that many of the skills conventional forces currently lack to conduct distributed manoeuvre will be overcome by technological solutions. It is anticipated that technology will be able to enhance the situational awareness of all friendly elements, automate or simplify a number of functions and provide situational awareness across a joint force at the lowest levels.

This paper will firstly explain the concept of distributed manoeuvre and discuss the logistical challenges it imposes. It will also look at the ability of Army's proposed new force structure to sustain distributed manoeuvre operations and what steps are needed in the near future to ensure the Australian Regular Army is postured to meet the AOF 2030 sustainment requirements. It will focus on the combat supply, maintenance and health aspects of combat service support (CSS).

## DISTRIBUTED MANOEUVRE

The basic concept of distributed manoeuvre is to employ large numbers of small, combined arms teams in complex environments to destroy the enemy without presenting a targetable mass. This and similar concepts are currently being explored and developed by Western armies but all are essentially twenty-first century modernisations of the skirmishers used in the eighteenth century and the German 'Storm Troop' tactics of the First World War. For distributed manoeuvre to be effectively realised, the Australian Army must develop greater precision in both its use of technology and its human resources. The management of joint fires and very specific elements of manoeuvre, as well as the coordination of small well-trained and cohesive teams that this entails will create ongoing challenges.

Justin Kelly and Mike Brennan explain that distributed manoeuvre relies on multiple, small, combined arms groups operating independently of each other across the battlespace ahead of more traditional groupings of conventional forces. These independent groups continually and simultaneously probe the enemy defensive system with the intent of triggering an enemy response. This response is observed or measured and through the collection of multiple responses, friendly force commanders can determine the enemy's overall defensive posture.<sup>1</sup>

With multiple, continual probes the offensive force hopes to overwhelm the enemy and remove their ability to react. Through these actions the attacker can

now know how the enemy operates and shape their responses, therefore allowing the attacker to employ the full spectrum of assets at their disposal to defeat the enemy.

For this to occur, the small groups in the first echelon need to be highly capable and have the ability to act decisively within their allocated tasks. They need to rapidly employ many supporting elements, in particular precision fires from naval assets, conventional artillery or aircraft. The strength of these groups in the first echelon lies in their ability to operate below the enemy's detection threshold, work with and make the best of the micro-terrain and pass through gaps in the enemy's defence. They are also vulnerable because they lack traditional mutual support mechanisms and because of their inability to sustain combat with enemy forces for any lengthy duration.

These small groups therefore need to be supported by a second echelon of combat, combat support (CS) and some CSS elements that facilitate the rapid reinforcement, replacement, resupply or relocation of the small groups. Behind the first and second echelons a main body of conventional forces is waiting in formations that prevent effective engagement by enemy indirect fires. The main body is postured to rapidly mass and strike as required.

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These independent groups continually and simultaneously probe the enemy defensive system with the intent of triggering an enemy response.

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### LOGISTIC CHALLENGES IN DISTRIBUTED MANOEUVRE

Distributed manoeuvre creates a number of challenges for typical first and second line maintenance, supply and health elements that are tasked with supporting the battlegroup or task force. Key challenges include:

- **The distribution of forces.** The obvious challenge in distributed manoeuvre for CSS is the dispersal of friendly forces. The distance and therefore travel time between the forward elements and likely CSS locations are increased, which creates potential issues for time-dependent tasks such as casualty evacuations. Therefore a force conducting distributed manoeuvre is likely to require more CSS assets at first line or greater support from aviation assets than a similar force grouped as conventional combat teams.
- **Insecure lines of communication.** As the small groups advance it is possible that they either do not detect or completely eliminate enemy forces. Enemy elements may even attempt to remain hidden or counterattack through gaps so that they can strike at valuable CS and CSS assets. As a result all CSS assets in this environment need to be protected and capable of at least fighting defensively. Logistic planners

need to ensure there is a redundancy of CSS assets and that they are also dispersed. Aviation assets can again be of benefit in sustaining distributed manoeuvre as they are less susceptible to insecure routes or enemy interdiction behind friendly lines.

- **Maintaining a continuous battle.** Distributed manoeuvre also requires the attacker to maintain continuous pressure on the enemy so as to overwhelm the defender's ability to respond. This tempo also has the potential to overwhelm the attacker's own logistic system. Traditional rest and refit or operational pauses will probably not be available to make good supply shortages or conduct maintenance in a distributed manoeuvre battle. Maintaining an appropriate and flexible logistic reserve will help mitigate against this risk.

## AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE

In addition to preparing for distributed manoeuvre operations, logisticians will shortly have to adapt to a changing Army. The AOF 2030 handbook states that by 2030 the Army will have moved to three alike brigades.

Each brigade or task force will be made up of three battlegroups, two are dismounted and consist of three infantry companies and the third is an armoured cavalry regiment consisting of one tank squadron and three intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance squadrons that are each capable of lifting a dismounted combat team. Additionally, all battlegroups will have integral support elements and an attached engineer squadron. The task force will also include a combat service support battalion, artillery regiment and aviation battlegroup.

For the dismounted battlegroups the integral CSS elements will potentially become smaller as most infantry battalions will lose the majority of their tracked or wheeled mobility assets to the new armoured cavalry regiments. However, to sustain four armoured vehicle squadrons this regiment will require significant maintenance, supply and transport assets.

Also unknown is how the introduction of new equipment fleets under projects Land 121 and Land 400 will affect the ability of logisticians to conduct their core business. Land 121 was commenced well before the AOF 2030 concept so there is a possibility that the products of Land 121 will not align with requirements of AOF 2030.

As previously mentioned, the provision of logistic support in distributed manoeuvre can be greatly assisted through the use of aviation assets. Unfortunately Australia's future aviation capability is entrusted to the armed reconnaissance helicopter and multi-role helicopter. Both are behind schedule and have had numerous difficulties during their

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... all combat service support assets in this environment need to be protected and capable of at least fighting defensively.

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introduction into service. Furthermore, both assets do not share commonality with our likely future coalition partners, an underlying requirement of AOF 2030.<sup>2</sup>

Further doubt is created by the current global financial situation that has seen numerous defence programs cut or scaled back. It is highly likely that the numbers of protected logistic delivered through either Land 121 or Land 400 could be reduced in order to generate a saving.

On a positive note we can expect the future to bring technological aids that will greatly assist the logistician. A networked Army will have the ability not only to share battlefield intelligence but also logistic data. This allows the demand for stores to be more accurately predicted therefore reducing waste. New types of sensors will give maintainers and health services remote diagnostic tools. New equipment should also be more modular, allowing it to be tailored to specific roles or threats, and built-in test equipment will allow it to be repaired or replaced more efficiently.

## CONSIDERATIONS AND PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE

What is known is that the manner in which logistics is provided at first and second line on operations has changed significantly in the last ten years and will continue to change in the next twenty years. Our doctrine and training needs to acknowledge these changes and teach techniques and procedures that will enable logistic elements to survive on the future battlefield.

The contemporary battlefield has already proven that logistic elements will be expected to provide their own protection and must be able to employ the full range of support effects that combat forces do. They also need to operate with the same situational awareness that combat arms have in

order to improve their own safety and reduce the risk of fratricide. This capability and situational awareness is not present in Army with our current equipment and skill levels.

These shortfalls in CSS have already been acknowledged and partially addressed through the development of combat logistic patrols (CLP) on operations. The concept of CLP has developed from Coalition experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, but has not yet been fully integrated into Australian logistic training. CLP rely on the logistic personnel having the skills and equipment to provide sufficient protection and situational awareness to logistic forces.

Furthermore, the current B Vehicle fleet has only limited access to communications equipment, even in armoured corps units. Most vehicles operate without a

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The concept of combat logistic patrols has developed from Coalition experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan.

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radio and the operators themselves have only limited knowledge or understanding of communication equipment. Communication equipment and battlefield management systems need to be installed in greater numbers in logistic vehicles. Training in these systems should also be included in all basic logistic training.

In distributed manoeuvre operations, multiple, small CLP will be the norm and not the exception. These patrols, like the small combined arms teams will rely heavily on the skills and professionalism of their junior leaders. This is why training in tactics, the employment of offensive support and battlefield communications are so important for logistic personnel, especially those employed in first and second line CSS elements.

Another concern is the current adaptability and structure of A1 echelon assets. These assets will be primarily responsible for the provision of integral CSS to the dispersed, forward elements in a distributed manoeuvre operation. Supporting dispersed elements could potentially be achieved by designing A1 echelon elements for troop- and platoon-sized organisations rather than traditional company- or squadron-sized organisations. Alternatively the company or squadron A1s must be made modular so that they can be detached in 'capability bricks' that provide a platoon or troop with the essential integral support they need when dispersed from their company or squadron headquarters. At present there are insufficient personnel or assets within armoured or mechanised units to form these modular A1s. Therefore any current distribution of forces below company or squadron strength relies heavily on A2 echelon and second line assets pushing forward.

In the future, the traditional practice of a task force or battlegroup's CSS elements massing for mutual support and efficiency will also need to be considered against the enemy's detection and offensive support capabilities. Any CSS organisation that establishes itself forward to support small groups needs to similarly remain small, highly mobile and employ stealth to avoid detection.

The dispersion of CSS assets will become a critical component of future operational planning. In distributed manoeuvre, logistics is unlikely to 'just happen'. Detailed consideration must be given to what health assets can deploy forward in order to meet the 'golden hour' for casualties and what resupply procedures will be allowed so that constant pressure on the enemy is maintained. With multiple small groups engaging the enemy and potentially insecure lines of communication the evacuation, resupply and recovery teams will need to be closely monitored and controllable at a battlegroup level if required.

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... company or squadron  
A1s must be made modular  
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in 'capability bricks' ...

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## CONCLUSIONS

The Army's logistic corps are already in the process of adjusting to meet the AOF 2030 guidance. With the uncertainty of future funding, rollout of future technologies and platforms the Army should immediately focus on those aspects that will remain constant in 2030. Specifically the Army should focus on:

- the ability of logistic elements to communicate, understand and interact with the deployed forces; and
- the training and knowledge provided to the individual logistic soldiers and junior leaders.

Developing knowledge and skills across a wide range of areas will enable individuals to make the most of whatever equipment is provided between now and 2030. Better education for our soldiers also means they will require less emphasis on technological enhancements to complete their assigned duties and remain competitive against future opponents. We need to ensure that all logistic personnel are in fact 'soldiers first' so that they may survive long enough to perform their job on the battlefields of tomorrow.

What size force can be sustained during future distributed manoeuvre operations will depend on our future CSS structures and organisations under AOF 2030, and how successful our future acquisitions and logistic training reforms are.

## ENDNOTES

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- 1 Justin Kelly and Mike Brennan, *Distributed Manoeuvre: 21st Century Offensive Tactics*, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra, 2009, p. 32.
- 2 N Pittaway, 'Beyond Black Hawk – Air Mobility Operations with MRH90', *Defence Today*, September 2011.

## THE AUTHOR

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Captain Geoff Orton is a Royal Australian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers officer currently posted to the 1st Armoured Regiment as the OC Technical Support Troop. His previous postings include 7th Combat Service Support Battalion, 8/12th Medium Regiment and Headquarters 16th Aviation Brigade. Prior to his posting to the 1st Armoured Regiment he deployed as a member of Joint Task Force 633-A where he served in Kabul and Tarin Kowt. He holds a Bachelor of Engineering (Electrical) and Bachelor of Business (Logistics and Operations Management).

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## BOOK REVIEW

Ernest Chamberlain, *The Viet Cong D445 Battalion: Their Story*, Ernest Chamberlain, Point Lonsdale, 2011, ISBN 9780980562347, 252 pp, available: <http://www.scribd.com/doc/62621973/The-Viet-Cong-D445-Battalion-Their-Story>.

Reviewed by Dr Bob Hall, Visiting Fellow, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of New South Wales, Canberra

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Usually, the victors get to write the histories of wars. But in the case of the Vietnam War the historiographical output of the United States—and to a lesser extent, Australia—dwarfs that of Vietnam. To make matters worse, those histories that are published in Vietnam are sometimes difficult to find and, not surprisingly, are written in Vietnamese. Both factors tend to limit their Western readership. But, with his publication of *The Viet Cong D445 Battalion*, Ernest Chamberlain, a former senior intelligence officer, Vietnamese linguist and Vietnam veteran, has enabled us to see the war in Phuoc Tuy province—the Australian area of operations—from our former enemy’s point of view.

The foundation of Chamberlain’s book is a history of the Vietcong (VC) D445 Battalion published in Vietnam in 1991 under the title *The Heroic 445 Battalion: Its History and Tradition*. This comprises Part I of Chamberlain’s book. Though fascinating in itself, to this translation of the Vietnamese text Chamberlain has added a wealth of detail and analysis contained in ‘translator’s notes.’ Many of these notes link statements in the Vietnamese text to primary source documents held in the Australian War Memorial or various US archives, enabling scholars of the war to pursue further the many insights they will find in this book.

In Part II, Chamberlain adds a series of annexes containing translated and other material relating to the history of D445. These include translated extracts from the 5th VC Infantry Division history, descriptions of the organisation and personalities in leadership positions in D445, translated extracts from the history of the Minh Dam secret zone—a D445 base area—and much other data. Included in this part (at annex G) are translations of D445 command and political reports that give insights

into the functioning of the battalion at about the time of the battle of Long Tan. Chamberlain's book makes these reports and other Vietnamese sources available to Western readers for the first time.

In 1971 the 1st Australian Task Force (1 ATF) noted that 'one of the most formidable forces with which the Task Force has had regularly to contend is D445 VC Local Force Battalion.'<sup>1</sup> In terms of its military capability the Task Force rated D445 as akin to a main force Viet Cong or People's Army of Vietnam (North Vietnamese) unit. From its arrival in Phuoc Tuy province in 1966 to the departure of the Task Force nearly six years later, D445 remained a constant irritant no matter what the Task Force threw at the task of destroying it. Its battlefield skill, determination and capacity to take punishment yet remain a potent and active force earned for D445 the respect of many in the Task Force. No one took D445 lightly.

In *The Viet Cong D445 Battalion*, Chamberlain describes how the force that would one day become D445 emerged from the Binh Xuyen—a private army of nationalist leanings—that was attacked by the Diem regime in 1955 in its attempt to consolidate its own power. Infiltrated by revolutionary cadre, this small force gradually acquired recruits, arms and a military doctrine. A decade later it had fallen completely under the control of revolutionary cadre, grown to 'company' strength and played a pivotal part in attacking the Diem regime's 'strategic hamlet' program in Phuoc Tuy province. Following the arrival of the 1 ATF it had grown to 'battalion' status with a strength of over 350 men. It took part in the battle of Long Tan (18 August 1966) and numerous other battles and was the target of numerous 1 ATF operations. The accounts of these battles have to be read with caution. The D445 account of the battle of Long Tan, for example, seems to claim that 'tanks' (probably armoured personnel carriers) accompanied the leading elements of D company, 6 RAR into the battle, that one tank was hit and burned, that an entire Australian company was 'wiped out' and that heavy casualties were inflicted on an Australian battalion. Chamberlain's detailed 'translator's notes' provide a broader context, citing both Australian and other Vietnamese estimates of casualties leaving readers to draw their own conclusions.

*The Viet Cong D445 Battalion* provides valuable insights into the effects of 1 ATF operations on D445 battalion. Although 1 ATF conducted numerous 'reconnaissance-in-force' operations against the enemy in Phuoc Tuy province, these seem to have made little impact on D445. They are barely mentioned in the Vietnamese history. Instead, the 1 ATF 'strategies' that feature strongly are those that attempted to, or partially succeeded in, cutting off D445 from its supporting population base. At a 1952 conference on guerrilla war, Ho Chi Minh had emphasised the importance of the connection between the guerrilla forces and the people. 'What matters the most', he said, 'is that our armed forces ... must hold fast to the people; divorce from the latter will surely lead to defeat'. In a phrase that contained echoes of our

own ‘hearts and minds’ strategy, Ho continued, ‘to cling to the people means to win their hearts, gain their confidence and affection. This will allow us to overcome any difficulty and achieve sure success.’<sup>2</sup> The bond between D445 and the people of Phuoc Tuy was essential to the battalion’s survival. From its supporters among the people, the battalion derived supplies, intelligence, recruits and political support. But, most important of all, from these bonds the battalion derived food. Without a sure supply of food D445 would have to shed strength and turn much of its effort to food production. Threats to the continuing connection between the battalion and the people posed a significant challenge.

The D445 history describes three ‘strategies’ adopted by 1 ATF in its efforts to cut this connection. These were the barrier minefield built by 1 ATF between the village of Dat Do and the sea (the story of which is described in Greg Lockhart’s, *The Minefield*<sup>3</sup>), the construction of bunkers and barbed wire fences around the villages and lastly, what the D445 history calls the ‘barrier-shield’ strategy. This last strategy was the saturation ambushing around the villages. These tactics, particularly the latter two, are described in the D445 history as ‘extremely dangerous.’ The history describes how D445 examined the problem posed by the 1 ATF tactics and, mostly successfully, formulated responses to them.

The D445 response to the 1 ATF saturation ambushing around the villages is particularly noteworthy. It is evident from their history that these ambushes posed the greatest challenge of any of the 1 ATF tactics. The history notes that because of the ambushes ‘445 Battalion was almost never able to slip into the hamlets by night.’<sup>4</sup> Their solution to this 1 ATF tactic was to form ‘suicide squads’—small teams of men who would sacrifice themselves on the Australian ambushes to reveal the ambush positions to larger, well-armed groups which would then assault the ambush positions. The D445 history claims that this technique caused numerous casualties for the 1 ATF ambushers and allowed them to penetrate the ambush screen around the villages, but this is not supported by Australian records. Instead, 1 ATF appears to have found the Holy Grail of counterinsurgency—a tactic which forced the insurgents to fight on 1ATF’s terms.

An interesting silence in the D445 history deserves comment. Both 1 ATF and the Viet Cong recognised that the war in Vietnam was primarily about the building and maintenance of political legitimacy. The military struggle was essentially for the creation of relative security in which the contending political forces could compete for the political allegiance of the people. Australian military historiography of the Vietnam War tends to overlook or downplay this political element of the struggle. On the strength of the D445 history, we can now say that Viet Cong historiography of the war also avoids or slights this political dimension. The D445 history follows the relentlessly positive practice of using terms such as ‘the masses’, or ‘the people of Phuoc Tuy’, as if to imply that the vast majority, if not all, of the citizens supported

the revolutionary cause. We know that this was not the case. 1 ATF's tenure in Phuoc Tuy province was marked by numerous elections conducted by the Saigon regime. Perhaps chief among these were the National Constituent Assembly election of September 1966 a few months after 1 ATF's arrival in the province, and the October 1971 South Vietnamese Presidential election held shortly after 1 ATF's departure. Both elections were marked by a strong voter turnout against the demands of the National Liberation Front/Provisional Revolutionary Government to boycott the elections. None of these elections—key markers in the political struggle—are discussed in the D445 history.

Chamberlain has done a great service in translating and contextualising the D445 history. He has produced a book containing golden insights into the war in Phuoc Tuy province. Read in combination with other sources Chamberlain's work also reveals insights into counterinsurgency in general. For those with an interest in developing a deeper understanding of Australian combat operations in Vietnam, *The Viet Cong D445 Battalion: Their Story*, is an invaluable resource. Hard copies (which include all the annexes) are available through select libraries and collections. The book is also available on the internet at <<http://www.scribd.com/doc/62621973/The-Viet-Cong-D445-Battalion-Their-Story>>, but the internet version does not include the annexes.

## ENDNOTES

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- 1 HQ 1 ATF 'D445 Local Force Battalion (Ba Long Province)', 6 May 1971.
- 2 Ho Chi Minh, *Selected writings 1920–1969*, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Hanoi, 1973, p. 150.
- 3 Greg Lockhart, *The Minefield: An Australian Tragedy in Vietnam*, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 2007.
- 4 Ernest Chamberlain, *The Viet Cong D445 Battalion: their story*, Ernest Chamberlain, Point Lonsdale, 2011, p. 75.

## BOOK REVIEW

Jeremy Black (ed), *Elite Fighting Forces: From the Ancient World to the SAS*, Thames and Hudson, London, 2011, ISBN 9780500251768, 208 pp, AU\$39.95.

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Ben Pronk, Directorate of Army Research and Analysis, Australian Army

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In his seminal *A Little History of the World*, Ernst Gombrich condenses the entire story of human existence into a couple of hundred pages of beautifully composed text, written to be easily understood by children. In many ways, this appears to be what Jeremy Black and his contributing authors have attempted to do in *Elite Fighting Forces*. Largely, they have succeeded, however the very nature of this format will likely prove unsatisfying for the reader seeking serious military history.

Large, glossy and full of colour pictures, *Elite Fighting Forces* looks like a coffee table book and is perhaps best approached as such. Outlined in chronological order, each of its fifty-two chapters contains a brief, yet detailed synopsis of the history of an elite unit. The contributing authors boast impressive academic credentials and, while the nature of this compilation demands brevity, the depth of knowledge is obvious—the short paragraph on the reorganisation of Alexander’s armies, for example, would have been impossible to write without an academic’s understanding. As such, *Elite Fighting Forces* invites the reader to pick it up, read one or two chapters, and walk away with a good overview of the forces in question, and perhaps even a piqued interest to research further.

The analyses also provide some interesting parallels with the contemporary environment. Then, as now, when employed in role, elite forces can produce disproportionate results. Oda Nobunaga’s samurai victory against seemingly overwhelming odds during the Battle of Okehazama in 1560 serves as an excellent example of this, and conforms almost perfectly to the theory of relative superiority proposed by current commander of US Special Operations Command William McRaven in his 1995 work *Spec Ops*. Conversely, episodes such as the defeat of the Teutonic knights at the Battle of Tannenberg by the numerically superior Polish and Lithuanian armies,

and the ineffectiveness of the First World War German Stormtroopers when employed in conventional roles, should reinforce the dangers of using elite forces outside their areas of expertise. Similarly, attempts to rapidly increase the size of elite forces without due regard to the high standards required of such troops are cited as contributing to the downfall of the Praetorian Guard, the Ottoman Janissaries and Napoleon's Imperial Guard, and doubtless serve as the basis for the modern American 'SOF Truth' that special operations forces cannot be mass produced. Finally, the preponderance of mercenary forces amongst elites throughout history is also worthy of note. As globalisation threatens the pre-eminence of the Westphalian nation-state, and private security companies come to play an ever-increasing role on the modern battlefield, it is interesting to speculate whether organisations like Academi (formerly Xe Services/Blackwater) might evolve into contemporary versions of the fourteenth century *Almogàvers*—soldiers for hire in a dollar-driven environment of fluid loyalties.

I harbour two main criticisms of *Elite Fighting Forces*. Firstly, the nature of its compilation means that, read cover to cover, the volume is somewhat unsatisfying. It is not that the book is entirely without continuity—Black has gone to great lengths to ensure that style and tone are consistent between chapters, and there is some cross-referencing between units. What *Elite Fighting Forces* lacks however, is a strong unifying theme. While I know full well from my limited forays into doctrine-writing that gaining consensus on the definition of 'elite', 'unconventional', or 'special' forces is nigh on impossible, I found Black's definition of elite forces ('those elements of a power's armed forces singled out in some way as special fighting groups for a particular task') to be particularly vague. By this rationale, could not almost any fighting unit be considered elite? And indeed, in many cases, I found myself questioning whether the subject units were in fact elite by design or whether they were simply existing units that performed particularly well under difficult circumstances (the Vikings, the fighter pilots of the Battle of Britain and the Soviet Shock Armies of the Second World War serving as examples). This disparity of represented forces, combined with the lack of continuity that a unifying theme might have provided, renders *Elite Fighting Forces* a collection of interesting vignettes rather than a comprehensive analysis of the continuous development of elite forces from ancient times to the modern day.

Secondly, the informed military reader is likely to find the chapters on contemporary special operations forces lacking. Like the rest of the volume, these pieces are written by academics rather than practitioners; this results in a well researched, but rather 'hearsay' account of these forces. This is perhaps best exemplified by the complete lack of reference to modern US Tier One special operations units, surely the most advanced, and arguably most effective, elite force ever fielded.

Despite these flaws, *Elite Fighting Forces* is an informative and enjoyable compilation that would make an appropriate, if not necessarily essential, addition to your military history library—or, indeed, coffee table.

## BOOK REVIEW

Richard Holmes, *Soldiers: Army Lives and Loyalties from Redcoats to Dusty Warriors*, HarperPress, London, 2011, ISBN 9780007225699, 506 pp, RRP AU\$59.99.

Reviewed by Major Tim Inglis, Royal Australian Army Medical Corps

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The Chief of Army has stressed the importance of all serving personnel knowing their military history. Our Army Museums, barracks and messes are filled with reminders of the proud history we have carved out of the events of the last century. Clearly our history reaches back much further through our links with the British Army, and it is this history that comes to life in *Soldiers*. Written around a series of themes, *Soldiers* explores the British Army over its 400-or-so year history. It is not a conventional military history.

The last acts of a dying man tell you a lot about his character. Richard Holmes—military historian, Territorial Army officer, academic, author and broadcaster—chose to finish this pen portrait of the British soldier as his parting shot. Drawing on an encyclopaedic range of sources, Holmes provides a platform for the soldiers he cared so much for, both as academic historian and as serving officer. His analysis is characteristically deep and the book rich in verbatim evidence. His pithy comments on turning points in military history provide a series of snapshots that form a backdrop to the central theme of this work on the life of the ordinary soldier. Fine words, carefully crafted by a master wordsmith at the peak of his game should not strain the reader's patience. The narrative travels swiftly from witness to witness, seasoned with a soldier's raw honesty and plain language.

In his first major theme, Holmes explores the relationship between the State and the Army. His chapter on the evolution of the rank system (Brass and Tapes) opens with 'Armies are hierarchies, their structure given daily prominence by costume jewellery and codes of behaviour'. In this valuable essay on the steps that mark a soldier's progress from private or trooper to field marshal, he cites the unusual case of 'Wully' Robertson, the only British soldier to climb the rank ladder from end to end.

The second main theme is leadership. In ‘Temporary Gentlemen; 1914–45’, he documents the emergency measures Britain took to raise a land army for two successive wars of national survival, taking a well-aimed shot at the widely held but inaccurate view that rank was rigidly class-based during the First World War. Reflecting on the evidence for class bias, Holmes shows how the abolition of commission purchase had the opposite effect to the purpose of well-intentioned army reforms.

Holmes’s third major theme is the recruitment of a national army. In his chapter entitled ‘Foreign Friends’, Australian readers will be happy with his assessment of the Australian Imperial Force contingent on the Western Front along with the Canadians that ‘contained, by common consent, some of the very best troops in the Allied armies’. He goes on to deal with the thorny issue of conflicting chains of command, citing the disagreement between General Auchinleck and Lieutenant General Morshead over splitting Morshead’s division.

In the author’s fourth major theme, the life of the regiment (‘Tribes and Totems’), we see his passions come close to the surface. ‘Tribal markings’ is an instructive account of the rise and fall of regimental colours, under which so much blood was bravely spilled. A poignant single sentence stands out, in light of recent experience: ‘Both colours of the 66th Foot were lost at Maiwand in Afghanistan in 1880, and neither has ever been recovered’.

In his last major theme, Holmes writes on the army as a social environment. Writing in the tone of a regimental Colonel, he pulls no punches. For example, ‘Bullies and Beast-masters’ deals with the thorny issue of impromptu discipline: ‘... beasting in its many forms is so deeply embedded in the gnarled load-bearing timbers where officers’ mess, sergeants’ mess and barrack room meet that it is part of the tribe’s fundamental structure. It is neither always good nor always bad’.

Page notes, endnotes and a thorough index will make *Soldiers* a useful source for future scholars. My only disappointment with *Soldiers* is that there cannot, will not, be a sequel. It seems appropriate that, having left hospital several times in order to finish one last book, Richard Holmes should have the final word. Here in Holmes’s words is his author’s intent: ‘This is not a chronological history of the army and its achievements. Its organisation is thematic rather than chronological, and its preoccupation not with big battles or frontier scimmages, but with the myriad routine observances of military life. It is the story of a man as ancient as a redcoat in Charles II’s Tangier garrison and as modern as the gate guard on Camp Bastion’.

## BOOK REVIEW

John Cotton and John Ravenhill (eds), *Middle Power Dreaming: Australia in World Affairs, 2006-2010*, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 2012, ISBN 9780195567274, 360 pp, RRP AU\$79.95.

Reviewed by Andrew Carr, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University

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Of what do middle powers dream? This is the intriguing question at the heart of this excellent addition to the *Australia in World Affairs* series. Like its predecessors (this is the fourth edited by James Cotton and John Ravenhill), *Middle Power Dreaming* is a must have reference for any serious student of Australian foreign policy. It provides an authoritative account of Australian foreign policy during the last years of the Howard government, the full Rudd government, and some early thoughts on the Gillard government, and is written by many of the most respected observers of the Australian political landscape.

One advantage of a whole book on a short period of time is its ability to delve into the machinery of Australia's foreign policy. For instance Michael Wesley carefully charts one of the most significant changes of the last five years, the move by the Australian Government from what Alan Dupont and William J Reckmeyer have termed a 'narrowly construed, siloed approach to national security planning towards a genuinely whole-of-government stance'.<sup>1</sup> Likewise James Cotton's discussion of the United States–Australia relationship details the specific events and institutions that keep the relationship humming, while Tanya Lyons gives much needed attention to the growing Australia–Africa relationship. Garry Rodan also has an artful chapter on Australia's relationship with South-East Asia, especially when discussing asylum seekers, an issue which has generated so much heat, but so little light in Australian scholarship over the last decade.

As always with multi-author books about recent events, the tension between recording and reflecting does raise some issues. One notable tension is that the term 'middle power' is used in a variety of different and somewhat contradictory fashions. The editors begin, stating that 'the close identification of the country's

foreign policy with that of the United States during the Howard governments, and their contempt for many of the activities of the United Nations (UN), rendered any middle power ambitions that [Foreign Minister Alexander] Downer might have harboured unlikely to be realised' only to write a few lines later that 'The "middle power" concept refers principally to aspects other than size, but most definitions refer, in one way or another, to capability or "capacity"'.<sup>2</sup>

Neither contempt for multilateral institutions, nor close relations with a great power affect the size, capability and capacity of a state. While the later definition is likely drawn from Ravenhill's excellent 1998 article on middle power activism,<sup>3</sup> the book *Middle Power Dreaming* seems guided by the literature's traditional definition of middle powers as states which 'pursue multilateral solutions to international problems ... embrace compromise positions in international disputes and ... embrace notions of "good international citizenship" to guide their diplomacy'.<sup>4</sup> This focus on multilateralism helps explain why the editors suggest Australia under the Howard Government wasn't a middle power, but was under the Rudd Government. Not because Australia had suddenly changed, but because the Government was now more open to multilateral institutions.

Yet surely the co-editors of this volume were deliberate in their title choice of *Middle Power Dreaming* instead of 'Multilateralism Dreaming'. Rudd wanted a larger role for Australia, but so did John Howard and Alexander Downer. The Howard Government's record of activism and global influence might have been less than their political opponents, but their build-up of Australia's defence capability, deployment of these forces in East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq, and their regional leadership of the Proliferation Security Initiative all suggest a middle power in action. Can we really dismiss all this simply because of their ideological dislike of multilateral forums? The confusion over what defines a middle power demonstrates Cooper's claim that the literature has reached an 'impasse'.<sup>5</sup>

Fortunately, the title of this volume may identify a way out of this conflict. Of what do policy makers in middle power countries dream? The best answer is influence in matters that affect their nation's interest. While multilateralism might be the forum in which these policy makers tend to operate (as do most states on most issues), we need another definition of middle powers that gets at the *systemic* role these states play in international affairs that is free from the normative judgements found within behavioural definitions.<sup>6</sup> After all, the real value of terms such as middle powers is not their classification of power, but their explanation of it. Such as, what is the impact of middle power states on the international and regional system? Can they overcome the wishes of a great power on an issue of utmost significance? A systemic definition might help answer these questions, and provides a greater predictive power than other approaches. Some initial work in this vein was undertaken by scholars such as Robert Keohane,<sup>7</sup> but it needs updating for the modern era.

Another difficulty faced by the editors and authors of this volume is the disruptions for Australian foreign policy from the three changes of government between 2006 and 2010. Discussions of Howard and Gillard sit slightly uncomfortably in the book—one tired but well established, the other yet to begin. The real question is what to make of Kevin Rudd's Government—a government that started so many projects, but completed few of them. Andrew O'Neil in the final chapter is right to argue that first term governments always struggle, but inexperience doesn't quite explain the Rudd Government's tendency to drive in circles.

Prime Minister Rudd not only had major problems of process and decision making, it wasn't always clear which way Rudd wanted to go. He was both a 'true friend' and a 'brutal realist' on China. He launched an anti-nuclear commission and then embraced the US nuclear umbrella. He worked himself to exhaustion in support of a climate change agreement at Copenhagen, yet quietly dropped his own emissions trading scheme at home. Even important and worthwhile initiatives such as the Asia-Pacific community were derailed over Rudd's initial confusion over whether the European Union was, or was not, a model.

While Kevin Rudd is a careful student of Australia's place in the world, his constant, crippling demands for more information and delayed decisions suggests a man who didn't yet have a course in mind when he took over the country. Of what did Kevin Rudd dream on behalf of Australia in the Asian century? *Middle Power Dreaming* suggests even he didn't quite know. Rudd wanted activism and change for the better certainly, but struggled to limit his ambitions to either the few really big issues or select from the niche opportunities where Australia could have the most influence. So, he tried to do everything, but ended up giving proper attention to nothing. The complexities of this fascinating Prime Minister and period in Australian foreign policy are nowhere better covered than this latest edition of the *Australia in World Affairs* series.

## ENDNOTES

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- 6 Cooper, 'Challenging Contemporary Notions', p. 321.
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## BOOK REVIEW

David Shambaugh (ed), *Charting China's Future: Domestic and International Challenges*, Routledge, London and New York, 2011. ISBN 9780415619554, 187 pp, RRP AU\$51.95.

Reviewed by Dr Jingdong Yuan, Acting Director and Associate Professor, Centre for International Security Studies, University of Sydney

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This edited volume could not have come at a more opportune time. With China overtaking Japan as the world's second largest economy and with its growing political influence and military power, there are increasing interests in and analyses of what China's future holds. Will this rising power challenge the existing international system, or will it become a responsible stakeholder and contribute to global and regional peace and prosperity? Given its upcoming leadership transition and its more assertive external behavior in recent years, the stakes are high.

*Charting China's Future* provides the reader with concise, intelligent, and forward-looking essays written by some of the world's top China scholars. The essays cover China's domestic developments, its foreign relations, and its growing interactions with Taiwan, and offer insightful analyses of both recent developments and likely future.

Without question, China's future begins at home. Here the six essays that look at China's political, economic, and social futures present a mixed picture. While the Chinese Communist Party, by its sheer size (almost 76 million members and growing) and its ubiquitous presence in all walks of life in China guarantees its tight control over the government and key institutions, the challenges it faces are more from within—how to handle corruption and minority discontent. At the same time, the Party needs to maintain a sustained rate of economic growth and increasingly must use its power to ensure more equitable distribution of wealth to minimise, if not completely prevent, rising social unrest. Both are tall orders given the worldwide recession and China's still underdeveloped domestic market and consumption. Clearly, the tasks ahead will be daunting for the fifth-generation leadership poised to take the reins in late 2012.

However, reform and opening up during the three decades have deepened China's integration into the global economy so much so that its future is just as affected by, as it can influence, its external environments. The next five essays in this book examine some of China's key bilateral relationships and its growing role in the international arena. Clearly, managing major power relations remains the top priority for Beijing. Sino-US relations will dominate global politics in the coming decade as the two powers find themselves at once wrestling in intense competition and engaged in cooperation, due largely to different expectations of benefits and responsibilities, and lack of strategic trust between the two. Overall, China's presence and role in international affairs are expanding. In the former, the need for resources has Beijing rediscovering the importance of the developing world; at the same time, its growing participating in international peacekeeping and anti-piracy operations is indicative of China's changing perspective of its own responsibilities, albeit still performed selectively.

The two essays on cross-Strait relations present different futures for mainland-Taiwan ties. While both acknowledge the stabilising impact of Beijing's more patient and economically oriented policy toward Taiwan and Ma Ying-jeou's emphasis on status quo and non-provocation, they also point out that the period of stability and growing economic interdependence could be disrupted either because of domestic politics in Taiwan or due to Beijing's push for political negotiation. However, the January 2012 Taiwan elections and Ma's return to office for another four-year term suggest that for the time being at least, the forces for stability and status quo on both sides of the Strait have prevailed.

In sum, this timely volume is a welcome addition to the growing literature on the rise of China and its global and regional implications. While most debates are informed by and focus on how China's rise will affect the existing international system, *Charting China's Future* looks at the domestic and international challenges Beijing is facing and will likely confront in the near term and carefully analyses both the impetuses of, and options for, Chinese policies in the coming years.

## BOOK REVIEW

James Kraska, *Maritime Power and the Law of the Sea: Expeditionary Operations in World Politics*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2011, ISBN 9780199773381, 472 pp, RRP AU\$113.95.

Reviewed by Allison Casey, Directorate of Army Research and Analysis,  
Department of Defence

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*Maritime Power and the Law of the Sea* explores how mounting constraints to freedom of navigation in exclusive economic zones (EEZ)—the maritime area that stretches seaward from a coastal state's baseline up to 200 nautical miles, as provided in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)—could affect the role of expeditionary activities. While the sea is usually considered to be navies' primary area of operation, as is the focus of this publication, this discussion comes at a time when Australia's land power, namely Army, is expected to develop a more substantive role within a maritime strategy.

In this book, James Kraska makes the case that the tendencies of coastal states to put forward excessive maritime claims, which are often based on creative interpretations of UNCLOS, present adverse consequences for international security. As an underrepresented potential locus of conflict, Kraska argues, EEZs deserve far greater attention in the US oceans policy agenda than is currently allocated. This raises questions about how naval forces might be affected. In eight chapters, and with particular emphasis on sovereignty, security and environmental issues, Kraska develops an answer.

The quality of Kraska's contribution is evident at a glance by the fact that it was awarded the US Navy League's Alfred Thayer Mahan Prize in 2010. As a US Navy commander and the Howard S. Levie Chair of Operational Law at the US Naval War College, he is clearly positioned at the centre of current debates about the role of defence forces at sea. Indeed, Kraska has written widely on maritime strategy. In 2011 he published two full-length monographs (*Maritime Power and the Law of the Sea* and *Contemporary Maritime Piracy*) as well as editing and contributing to a third (*Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change*). Kraska's expertise in international law

and naval experience combine seamlessly in this book, enabling him to present his wealth of knowledge about contemporary maritime strategy in a way that is both accessible and engaging. The chapter devoted to Law of the Sea regimes is especially noteworthy for its breakdown of UNCLOS provisions. By adopting a holistic view of these issues that incorporates geopolitical and military considerations, Kraska avoids a dry narrative that can sometimes be found in evaluations of international law.

Although the discussion progresses from a US standpoint—Australia’s Antarctic EEZ is used to illustrate an excessive yet relatively innocuous maritime claim that is inconsistent with UNCLOS—many of the conclusions in the final chapter resonate for Australian interests at sea. The need to establish greater cohesion among government agencies involved in oceans policy and the continued management of coastal state and naval power relations has long been prominent in discussions about Australian maritime strategy. Neither recommendation can be easily addressed. Yet as an island continent, Australia’s geography provides a long-term impetus to adopt a more active approach to regional maritime affairs and articulate a whole of government oceans policy.

*Maritime Power and Law of the Sea* is valuable for anyone interested in the core tenets of the Law of the Sea, the role of sea power and how the two interrelate. Given that the future shape of naval power in the Asia Pacific is not clear, regional economies’ continued ties to the maritime domain for their access to international commerce and Australia’s location adjacent to an archipelagic Southeast Asia, it is little wonder that Army’s need for a stronger maritime doctrine is so often pointed out. Kraska provides a compelling background to some of the major legal and operational issues that face seaborne expeditionary forces, many of which are relevant to Army’s maritime activity.

## BOOK REVIEW

Joseph S Nye Jr, *The Future of Power*, PublicAffairs, New York, 2011, ISBN 9781586488918, 320 pp, RRP US\$27.95.

Reviewed by David Goyne, Strategic Policy Division, Department of Defence

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Joseph Nye has given eminent service to the US Government as a deputy undersecretary in the State Department, an assistant secretary in the Defense Department, and as chairman of the US National Intelligence Council. As an academic, he has been the dean of Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, probably the premier global institute for studying and teaching how government works. He has written extensively on power in international relations and government and how to use that power. *Foreign Policy* placed him on their 2011 list of global thinkers (a respectable 64 out of 100), noting: 'When Foreign Policy asked 10 prominent American political scholars what prospective 2012 presidential candidates should read, four picked books by Joseph Nye, the longtime Harvard University professor and former deputy undersecretary of state best known for coining the now-ubiquitous term "soft power"'.<sup>1</sup> This track record makes a new book by Joseph Nye on what 'power' is and how it functions in the modern world particularly interesting.

In *The Future of Power* Nye extends his concept of 'soft power'<sup>2</sup> (that part of national power based on attraction rather than compulsion) to the totality of what constitutes power, and how to apply it successfully. His perspective, naturally enough, is how the United States should use its power wisely to achieve its global ends. This US focus does not limit this book's utility for others, who, as well as being able to use their own national power successfully, will need to understand the capacity and approach of what is still the dominant global superpower.

The first part of the book examines the question of how to define power, and then the elements that make up national power with a chapter each on military power, economic power and soft power. Here Nye shows the gap between power's capability in any of its forms to affect someone for either good or ill, and the limited ability of power to persuade someone to do as you wish. This, however, is the necessary conversion you must make if you are to succeed in your purpose.

The second part of the book examines what Nye calls ‘power shifts’; that is, the changes in the way power is applied today and in the relative power of major global actors. He covers both ‘cyberpower’ and the question of ‘American decline’ in two separate chapters; both are worth reading as standalone discussions of these issues. He is cognizant of the growing reach and importance of cyberpower which he sees as diffusing power to a range of actors beyond the traditional states, while not ignoring the concentration of resources and, hence capacity, that a state represents.

His coverage of the question of American ‘decline’ is particularly thoughtful. Without any jingoism, he notes all the elements that continue to make the United States the singularly most powerful nation, and then goes on to examine potential competitors, noting their respective strengths, but equally importantly, their limitations and weaknesses. He examines Europe, Japan, and the so-called BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) as potential competitors or replacements for the United States as the pre-eminent global power. He ends up with the view that US pre-eminence is likely to endure, especially, but not only, if its current problems of debt, political gridlock and declining education standards are addressed. Only China represents a potential peer competitor to the United States, and even then only in the uncertain case it maintains its current growth trajectory into the future. That said, Nye sees there is a rebalancing of the relativities of power caused by ‘the rise of the rest’ rather than any US decline. He views this as leading to ‘... an increasing number of issues in which solutions will require power *with* others as much as power *over* others’ (italics in original).<sup>3</sup>

In the final part of the book, Joseph Nye lays out his policy prescriptions for applying power. He advocates an American ‘smart power’ strategy; smart power being his term for the judicious combination of hard power, both military and economic, and soft power to achieve desired outcomes. In this sense, his vision of ‘smart power’ is an evolution of his earlier thinking on soft power. This was the section of Nye’s book of which I had the most expectation, and where in the end I was a little disappointed. I accept that soft power is real, not just a polite fiction, and a necessary complement to the unabashed use of hard power. I also recognise the need for a cohesive strategy that uses the different forms of power in the right combination to achieve the desired ends, rather than just accepting some incomplete and inadequate surrogate short of that final objective. Examples of this focus on using power effectively to achieve the desired end might include: not just attaining the military objective in a war, but really winning the war by building the right peace which all sides will accept into the future; or not just enforcing sanctions to punish a rogue state for its development of nuclear weapons, but actually persuading that state to change its objectives and eschew the acquisition of nuclear weapons. There has always been a problem converting means to ends in strategy, and I didn’t expect a simple formula for this. However, if it is hard to convert the blunt instruments of

military and economic power into the right outcomes, it is much harder to convert the diffuse influence of soft power. Here I hoped Nye might have some concrete guidance that practitioners of strategy could follow, but I was left disappointed with only vague suggestions.

If you are interested in power, international relations or national strategy, don't let this reservation stop you from reading Nye's book. His concepts and ideas influence decision-makers particularly in the United States (perhaps he is a living example of soft power in action). If you want to understand the language these decision-makers will use, then you will need to understand the concepts of 'soft' and 'smart' power, and there is no better guide than the person who coined these terms—Joseph Nye.

### ENDNOTES

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- 1 See [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/11/28/the\\_fp\\_top\\_100\\_global\\_thinkers](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/11/28/the_fp_top_100_global_thinkers), accessed on 14 December 2011
- 2 Joseph S. Nye Jr, *Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics*, PublicAffairs, New York, 2005.
- 3 Joseph S. Nye, Jr, *The Future of Power*, PublicAffairs, New York, 2011, p. 204.

## BOOK REVIEW

Paolo Tripodi and Jessica Wolfendale (eds), *New Wars and New Soldiers: Military Ethics in the Contemporary World*, Ashgate, Farnham Surrey, UK and Burlington, VT, 2011, ISBN 9781409401056, 296 pp, RRP AU\$60.00.

Reviewed by Dr Lacy Pejcinovic, Australian National University

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There is a tendency in current academic literature dealing with war, conflict and violence to assume that there have been fundamental shifts in the political, military, economic and social fabric of the international system since the turn of the millennium. Books and articles that seek to tell us what exactly has changed and how are increasing exponentially. However, what is lacking is scholarship that questions the impact of these changes on the moral and ethical foundations of the modern world. That is, how do modern conflicts pose challenges to our understandings about the ethics of war, to the traditional legal and theoretical foundations that have governed the recourse to war for centuries? Moreover, while a few well-renowned authors tackle such questions, very few have in mind a military audience and hence do not consider the role and needs of modern military personnel. *New Wars and New Soldiers* goes a long way to redressing this balance and presenting important insights into military ethics in the contemporary era.

This is a far-reaching book, a product of a workshop held in Australia and funded by the Australian Research Council and GovNet. The academics, military officers and members of the general public who participated in this workshop sought to ask questions about the ethical issues in modern combat. This is clear from the way in which the individual chapters are connected by an overarching interest in how military forces should employ force. According to the editors, ‘in environments that were significantly different from traditional battlefields—environments no longer characterized by a simple friend–enemy dichotomy but complicated by large numbers of civilians whose status as friend or foe, innocent or non-innocent, could be very unclear’. Within this framework, military ethics now embraces not only the ethics of traditional war, but the ethics of the ‘nature, conduct and moral dilemmas’

faced by individual soldiers in negotiating the new terrain of global conflict, the threat of international terrorism, autonomous weapons systems, and the reinvigorated use of private military or security agents. *New Wars and New Soldiers* embraces the multi-disciplinary approach necessary to address the ethical concerns found in issues as broad as these themes, which means we see, throughout the chapters, a combination of philosophical, historical, theoretical, scientific, and legal reasoning used to interrogate the ethical questions at hand.

The book has five sections. Section I deals with the relevance of Just War Theory to modern combat. Is the normative framework of Just War suitable for assessing modern conflict including the threat of international terrorism? Or, do modern wars render the moral constraints of the Just War obsolete or even dangerous? Following from these questions, each of the chapters, consciously or subconsciously, addresses the question of whether new or different aspects of war constitute a reason to revise or loosen the constraints of Just War Theory.

Section II deals with the ethical questions of humanitarian intervention. Since the 1990s military forces have increasingly been used in 'operations that did not resemble conventional battlefields'. Given the acknowledged shifting role of military forces in many Western countries, including Australia, to combine both traditional warfighting functions with humanitarian, development, and reconstruction roles, the questions and issues raised in this section are of particular interest to an Australian audience and should be carefully read and debated at all levels. These include an evaluation of the appropriate level of risk an intervener should carry out to save a civilian, and the moral obligation or duty of a state to intervene in crisis situations. This last point engages the relationship between 'assistance' and 'duty' in the common parlance of states and individuals in a morally ambiguous situation.

Section III interrogates the ethical implications of modern weapons systems. From long-distance weaponry, to robotics and unmanned weapons systems, this section asks some of the toughest ethical questions in the book. The ethics of killing-at-distance is not a new issue for the study of war. Medieval warriors fought an ethical battle over the use of the bow and arrow within the framework of the Chivalric Code that governed conflict between principalities and kingdoms up until the early seventeenth century. They sought to ban the use of the bow and arrow in warfare because it removed not only the skill involved in killing a man in combat, but it allowed anonymity in killing which was antithetical to the honour, glory and courage associated with medieval knights. Are we facing a similar ethical issue with modern unmanned or autonomous technology? Robert Sparrow comments in chapter seven when he writes about robotic weapons in war, particularly unmanned weapons systems (UMS), that 'it is hard not to think that by distancing warfighters from the consequences of their actions, both geographically and emotionally, UMS will make it more likely that the operators of Robotic Weapons will make the decision to kill too lightly.'

Section IV is concerned with new actors in the battlefield—mercenaries, corporate private military companies, state military forces, anthropologists, researchers, and journalists. In a particularly interesting chapter Uwe Steinhoff asks whether being or acting as a mercenary per se is immoral. His conclusion is that mercenaries are no worse than regular soldiers in modern warfare. They are all employed to fight wars and understand the risks involved with such a profession. Their sources of income might differ as may their inherent motivations, but as individual actors mercenaries are no different from regular soldiers. However, the widespread use and deployment of mercenaries and the private military companies which employ them may have more negative consequences. Similarly, George R Lucas has studied the programs of embedding non-military personnel in combat situations, with a specific focus on civilian ‘social scientists’ employed through the US Army’s ‘Human Terrain System’. Envisaged as a project to assist ground forces with navigating the cultural, linguistic, and human dimensions of a battlefield, ethical questions arise when you combine the complex problem of professional ethics interwoven with a ‘wider moral debate over the justification of America’s “irregular” wars in Iraq and Afghanistan’. How should the legitimacy of a given conflict influence the behaviour of professionals involved in the conflict?

Finally Section V analyses the ethical challenges of individual soldiers on the battlefield, in particular those involved in counterinsurgency operations. The chapters engage with moral reasoning, behaviour and decision-making at the individual level, and in particular how the ‘military culture’ and ‘mindset’ can impact on this. Because of the association of ethical and moral reasoning with individuals, it is these chapters where the more nuanced philosophical and theoretical questions are raised. For example, under what circumstances may an individual who is not predisposed to evil commit an act of evil? According to Paolo Tripodi in chapter eleven, ‘atrocities by situation’ can not only be explained by the inherent predisposition of an individual, but must take into account the nature of the ‘evil zone’ in which they are placed. This is a zone where multiple forces are in play—sights, smells, noises, fear, living conditions, and the more abstract sociological, psychological and emotional. The combination of these factors may lead an individual to choose a course of action they know is wrong.

An obvious omission in what is otherwise a very interesting and thought provoking collection of papers is a conclusion which finishes the project as a book rather than a slightly longer special edition of an academic journal. As mentioned, Paolo Tripodi and Jessica Wolfendale set out to show how military ethics was challenged by a range of developments in modern warfare and some final concluding remarks would have been useful to summarise the critical advancements made by the chapters in the book. Nonetheless, this is an essential book for those in the military profession or for research and teaching academics interested in the vast array of ethical questions being asked about modern conflict.

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Listed below are a select group of books recently or soon to be published that either contribute to the discussions initiated in the articles in the *Australian Army Journal* or on subjects that may be of interest in the near future. Some of these books may be reviewed in forthcoming editions of the *Journal*.

- Nathan Mullins, *Keep Your Head Down*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2011, 347 pp, ISBN 9781742377940, AU\$24.99.

The war in Afghanistan has been the subject of many first-person narratives offering insights into the soldier's experience of the difficulty of engaging a population that is so diametrically opposed to theirs. In some ways this book is one more among the many. In other ways though, Nathan Mullins's account of the four months he spent in Uruzgan as part of the Second Commando Company Group is radically different. Mullins and his group are reservists. In his civilian life he is the International Program Manager for an international humanitarian organisation, and was a police officer and private security consultant before this. He has worked on aid projects in difficult and frequently dangerous environments throughout Timor-Leste, Pakistan, Thailand and Burma. He was also a member of the Australian Army Reserve for fifteen years prior to this deployment. Deploying to Afghanistan was, for him, both a decision to be made, and an opportunity that had to be earned. It required him to question his reasons for going and his purpose once there. Mullins readily admits that the deployment of Second Commando Company Group did little to immediately improve the overall life of the Afghani villagers—unlikely in the short space of four months—but his account offers well-reasoned observations of the changes that he saw among individuals, both Afghani and Australian and adds a different perspective to the growing literature in the area.

- James Hurst, *Game to the Last: The 11th Australian Infantry Battalion at Gallipoli*, Big Sky Publishing, Newport NSW, 2012, 267 pp, RRP AU\$34.99.

As part of the first wave of the Australian and New Zealand landings at Gallipoli on 25 April 1915, the 11th Australian Infantry Battalion has been part of many historical accounts of Australia's involvement in the Great War. In this book

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James Hurst builds a portrait of this battalion from their enlistment in Western Australia, embarkation for overseas service, time in Egypt and eventual landing on the beaches at Gallipoli. Released in time for Anzac Day, this book adds to the extensive history of these events by focusing on the effect of this far-away war not just upon the men who served, but also on their immediate families and the greater community. Richly visualised through the words of soldiers involved, Hurst's book presents a detailed and multi-layered narrative that avoids both sentimentalism and emotionalism, leaving the reader with a strong image of the practicality and pragmatism of those involved.

- Bruce Picken, *Fire Support Bases Vietnam: Australian and Allied Fire Support Base Locations and Main Support Units*, Big Sky Publishing, Newport NSW, 2012, ISBN 9781921941542, 759 pp, RRP AU\$34.99.

In structure and content Bruce Picken's book may appear to be simply a reference to the construction and use of fire support bases by Allied forces during the Vietnam War. It is far more than this though. Using a combination of official sources, Australian Unit War Diaries and military maps, Picken reconstructs not just the construction and use of these bases, he also provides an insight into the changes that this war brought upon the Australian Army's operational procedures. Beginning with 1st Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment (1 RAR) at Fire Support Base (FSB) Bien Hoa in 1965 and ending with the final battle in Nui Le in 1971, this is a detailed account of how engineering, artillery and infantry combined to create more flexible approaches to enemy actions necessary in jungle environments. Although this is the book's primary purpose, Picken also provides a window into a past landscape that is rapidly disappearing. For the increasing number of serving soldiers and veterans visiting Vietnam, this book provides an entry into the 'thriving digger community [that] has now merged into the landscape.'

- Tom Lewis, *Lethality in Combat: A Study of the True Nature of Battle*, Big Sky Publishing, Newport NSW, 2012, ISBN 9781921941511, 368 pp, RRP AU\$34.99.

The demands made upon soldiers today have created intensive ethical debate with implications that go beyond the battlefield. Counterinsurgency, humanitarian and peacekeeping operations all require individual soldiers to evaluate legal and ethical issues on-the-fly, often under the scrutiny of a watchful media. In this environment, violence is frequently presented as an unnecessary and 'evil' consequence of political power. In this book though, Tom Lewis, a former officer in the Royal Australian Navy, focuses on the very real consequence of going to war—as unpleasant and uncomfortable as it may make us he argues, 'warfare is

about exterminating the enemy'. Using analyses of wars from the Boer War in the late nineteenth century through to Iraq in the twenty-first century, Lewis argues that although soldiers bear the ethical fallout that accompanies contemporary war, those that send soldiers to war should face the grim reality that 'rules of war' may be inadequate to the task they set.

- Elinor C Sloan, *Modern Military Strategy: An Introduction*, Routledge, Oxon and New York, 2012, ISBN 9780415777711, 151 pp, RRP AU\$55.00.

As the title of this book makes clear, this is an introductory perspective on military strategy. Focusing on post-Cold War strategic thought, Elinor Sloan offers some interesting perspectives on how both civilian and military strategists have applied past theory to better understand the direction of future war. Organised functionally with sections on the traditional domains of warfare—land power, sea power and air power—Sloan also covers newer battlespaces, particularly space and cyberspace. But she does more than just cover the major strategic theories in each of these spaces; she develops a considered view of how changes in relations between countries pre- and post-Cold War have created overlaps in how these domains are viewed by the different Services. For example, whereas once the oceans were considered the primary domain of Navy, the current focus on amphibious warfare, with emphasis on the littoral environment and sea lines of communication is increasingly of interest to strategic theorists and planners across Army, Navy and Air Force. It is important to remember though that this is an introduction to major principles and themes in modern military strategy; Sloan does not claim to present the ultimate text in this area. The strength of this book is its clarification of the links between current military strategists and their predecessors. Its weakness is in its format. As a textbook its structure is designed for clarity rather than the promotion of debate—and modern military strategy, obviously still a work-in-progress, needs debate.

- Steve A Yetiv, *The Petroleum Triangle*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 2011, ISBN 9780801450020, 241 pp, RRP AU\$47.95.

Al Qaeda and its affiliates throughout the oil-rich region of the Middle East have become the face of international terrorism. In this book Steve Yetiv presents a compelling argument that this most recent terrorist threat is not just linked to oil and globalisation—it is intertwined with them. Today, oil not only funds terrorist infrastructure, but economic agreements devised in international forums also fuel political resentments and increasing anti-Western sentiments throughout the Middle East. On its own, oil could not have created such a pervasive terrorist network as al Qaeda has become. Globalisation has allowed terrorists to travel extensively, make use of sophisticated technologies to communicate with current

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networks, engage new members, and even fundraise. The convergence of the effects of globalisation with oil in the 1990s allowed terrorist organisations to become both real and perceived threats—real because of their actual capability to do harm, and perceived due to the fear that they sow well above this capability. Although not a unique argument, the strength of this book lies in Yetiv's clearly explained links between the economic domain and the development of contemporary warfare. Economic interconnectedness is often seen as a guarantee of peaceful relations between states, even those with differing values and ideologies. Yetiv argues that this interconnectedness has actually led to an increase of terrorism and the rise of non-state actors as a threat throughout the region, implying that hybrid and irregular warfare are here to stay for the foreseeable future.

- Toby Dodge and Nicholas Redman (eds), *Afghanistan to 2015 and Beyond*, Routledge, Oxon, 2011, ISBN 9780415696425, 300 pp, RRP AU\$48.95.

An Adelphi publication, this edited book is the culmination of a research program instigated by the International Institute for Strategic Studies after President Obama announced the United States change in policy toward Afghanistan in 2009. It takes into account not just US political policy, but also the anticipated future of NATO and reductions in budget allocation for defence. Although the outcome of the research is cautiously optimistic, the researchers recognise the difficult road that both the Afghan Government and its international supporters will face in the future. Through an analysis of the local historical and cultural context, and considering regional political tensions and economic competition, the authors predict that Afghanistan will remain poor, weak and unstable. The obstacles and challenges seem insurmountable on the surface, but the overall findings of this research project indicate that the fledgling Afghan Government and its security forces have a good chance of maintaining general control of the country against insurgents—but only with continued Western military assistance and financial aid.

- Dilip Hiro, *Apocalyptic Realm: Jihadists in South Asia*, Yale University Press, 2012, ISBN 9780300173789, 352 pp, RRP AU\$36.95.

Dilip Hiro is not as convinced as the Adelphi authors above. He believes that the terrorist groups using Pakistan as a base will continue to destabilise the region. Since its foundation as a nation in 1947, Pakistan has had a complex cultural and political relationship with its neighbours—India and Afghanistan. In this book, Hiro analyses the development of the jihadist movement throughout these three countries, focusing on Pakistan's liminal position as both proving ground and haven. In this attempt at an historical analysis of the development of Islamism

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in the region, Hiro uses sources that have previously been unavailable to argue that the jihadist movement that originated in Afghanistan could easily escalate tensions between Hindus and Muslim and extend the aims of al Qaeda and associated organisations throughout the region. This book is a timely analysis of not just the development of terrorism in the region, but offers some interesting insights into potential flashpoints that will challenge fledgling Afghan security forces and their Western mentors.



# Australian Army Journal

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Each manuscript should be submitted through the Australian Army Journal email inbox, [army.journal@defence.gov.au](mailto:army.journal@defence.gov.au). For more information see <http://www.army.gov.au/Our-future/Directorate-of-Army-Research-and-Analysis/Our-publications/Australian-Army-Journal/Information-for-authors>.

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- Microsoft Word (.doc) or Rich Text Format (.rtf)
- 1.5 line spacing
- 12-point Times New Roman
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- No 'opcit' footnote referencing
- Australian spelling (e.g., -ise not -ize)

## GENERAL STYLE

All sources cited as evidence should be fully and accurately referenced in endnotes (not footnotes). Books cited should contain the author's name, the title, the publisher, the place of publication, the year and the page reference. This issue of the journal contains examples of the appropriate style for referencing.

When using quotations, the punctuation, capitalisation and spelling of the source document should be followed. Single quotation marks should be used, with double quotation marks only for quotations within quotations. Quotations of thirty words or more should be indented as a separate block of text without quotation marks. Quotations should be cited in support of an argument, not as authoritative statements.

Numbers should be spelt out up to ninety-nine, except in the case of percentages, where arabic numerals should be used (and *per cent* should always be spelt out). All manuscripts should be paginated, and the use of abbreviations, acronyms and jargon kept to a minimum.

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Authors submitting articles for inclusion in the journal should also attach a current biography. This should be a brief, concise paragraph, whose length should not exceed eight lines. The biography is to include the contributor's full name and title, a brief summary of current or previous service history (if applicable) and details of educational qualifications. Contributors outside the services should identify the institution they represent. Any other information considered relevant—for example, source documentation for those articles reprinted from another publication—should also be included.