Australian Army Journal

FOR THE PROFESSION OF ARMS

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EDITORIAL

This edition of the *Australian Army Journal* appears at a time of significant change for the Australian Army. Since the publication of the previous edition, Lieutenant General Ken Gillespie has assumed command as the Chief of Army. The Chief has undertaken a significant reform of the organisation of the Army—the most substantial in nearly four decades.

The Adaptive Army initiative will replace the system of functional commands, which had been designed by the late General Sir Francis Hassett. These functional commands remained largely intact from 1973. While appropriate for that era and the period of relatively low tempo operations that followed the Vietnam War, this organisation has been rendered obsolete by the fundamental changes in the way the Australian Defence Force conducts operations. In particular the higher level command and control systems of the twenty-first century ADF are inextricably joint, and increasingly, multi-agency and whole-of-government. Army's internal structures had not adapted to reflect this change.

Moreover, arbitrary divisions between responsibility for individual and collective training were undermining the effectiveness of Army's force preparation and generation efforts. This also impeded Army's ability to integrate and rapidly disseminate lessons learned from current operations. This had to change. As Lieutenant General Gillespie explained at his recent exercise in Brisbane, 'a small army must focus heavily on organisational, cultural and leadership agility'. The Adaptive Army reforms are aimed squarely at achieving that agility. In this edition we publish an article by the Chief of the Army in which he explains the nature and scope of these essential changes.

We are also pleased to commend to the wider Army the Chief of Army's opening remarks to his annual History Conference that he delivered in October. The Chief raised the issue of the ephemeral nature of modern electronic records, which have largely replaced the written orders, war diaries and even personal correspondence of earlier wars. While the information revolution has brought many beneficial effects to the command and control of operations, it will present a challenge to the historians of the future. This is of more than academic interest. History begins

yesterday, and the process of identifying lessons learned for input into the Army learning loop overlaps with the work of operational historians. This need highlights the importance of the *Australian Army Journal* in providing a forum for our officers, NCOs and soldiers to record their contemporaneous experiences in an enduring and easily available form.

In that regard we are delighted with the contents of the Summer 2008 edition. We continue to receive a steady stream of manuscripts from the members of the Army and the wider Defence Force. In particular, the contributions from members returning from operations are of considerable value. We are pleased to announce that one such article, by Colonel John Frewen, has won the Chauvel Essay Prize for 2008. His essay on his experiences in Afghanistan, which was published in the Autumn 2008 edition of the *AAJ*, earned praise from senior officers of allied armies. The trend of returning soldiers writing on their experiences is continued in this edition with articles by a former Chauvel Essay prize winner, Major Michael Scott, who recounts his experiences with the Multi-National Force in Iraq, and Warrant Officer Michael Craig, who reflects upon his time at the COIN Academy at Taji.

If there is one area in which the *Australian Army Journal* needs to respond to the Chief's challenge, it is in the area of analysis of Army's contribution to joint operations. While the *Australian Defence Force Journal* is also focused on joint issues, contributors to this Journal must adopt a joint perspective in reflecting on their experiences.

This edition appears as a very demanding year draws to a close. Next year will present even greater challenges to the Army in its service to the nation. The new White Paper should appear before our next edition. Nor is there any sign that operational tempo will slacken. And of course the process of structural and cultural change entailed in the Adaptive Army will make demands on the entire Army, both our military and civilian workforce.

Accordingly, we wish all our readers fortunate enough to be able to take leave a safe and happy Christmas. To our mates deployed on operations we wish them also a safe Christmas. We also extend the thoughts and best wishes of the entire Army family to the families of our men and women who are away from their loved ones at this special time. In that regard we note that since the last edition of the *Australian Army Journal* appeared, another Australian soldier was killed on operations in Afghanistan. To the family and loved ones of Signaller Sean McCarthy, we extend our respectful condolences.

INTRODUCTION

AN ADAPTIVE ARMY

LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEN GILLESPIE AO DSC CSM

The past decade has been one of constant change and adaptation for the Australian Army. Since the deployment to East Timor in 1999, the Australian Army has been constantly deployed in a range of different environments on several continents. The resulting tempo has challenged our personnel, training and material resources. While this keeps Army busy, there is an ongoing need to ensure that the Army keeps its eye on the future.

The threats to the forces deployed on operations are not static in nature. New threats cannot always be predicted with certainty; they may often appear with little or no warning. This is particularly the case in places such as Iraq or Afghanistan, where improvised explosive devices are often the insurgents' weapon of choice and have resulted in the killing and maiming of our soldiers. Our adversaries have proved adept at conducting information operations to shape the perceptions of different populations (including our own). Insurgent tactics vary from province to province, but they have demonstrated the capacity to adapt rapidly to changes in the operational environment and to achieve an effective blend of kinetic and non-kinetic operations. We must ensure that our soldiers are appropriately trained and equipped to succeed in such an environment.

Contemporary operations are characterised by the need for deployed land forces to work *among the people* and establish a broad relationship with the supported population, while simultaneously engaging in offensive, protective and information operations to deprive the adversary of this support base. This requires extensive employment of civil-military cooperation, humanitarian assistance and other

non-warlike roles, as well as the synchronisation of physical manoeuvre and fires within a joint—and often inter-agency—construct. Such warfare requires small teams of soldiers to have the flexibility to transition rapidly from a non-aggressive posture to one of controlled aggression with superior firepower in order to defeat the threat when it presents itself and then back again.

As if these demands are not enough, the individual soldier is affected by the increasing importance of political priorities, the law of armed conflict, humanitarian issues, international law, and a reduced tolerance for collateral damage. Combine this with the growing pervasiveness of domestic and international media (both traditional and new media) and it leads us to an environment that demands we prepare our people for levels of contextual awareness, flexibility, expertise, sensitivity, and precision which have rarely been required of the soldier in past conflicts.

But training and equipping for operations is not enough. The Army's adaptability and capacity to out-think an adversary is critical for operational success. We have recognised this through the development of our core philosophy—*Adaptive Campaigning*. Additionally, the development of Army's doctrine for counter-insurgency operations is now at an advanced level. This is the product of much of what our Army has learned in the past decade. It builds upon the hard learned lessons of our forebears, from places such as Vietnam, Korea, New Guinea, North Africa and Europe, to ensure our operations achieve the appropriate balance of land combat, population support, protection and indigenous capacity building, regardless of the scenario. Combined with the training and equipping of our soldiers, the intellectual foundation for contemporary operations that doctrine provides helps to ensure Australian soldiers are among the best prepared troops in the world.

Therefore, initiatives that will generate and prepare soldiers—physically and intellectually—for this environment are key to the ongoing development of the Army. The Army's contemporary, and likely future, operations are about influencing and rebuilding (and often building for the first time) civil societies. Some of our operations are less about killing the enemy than about making the enemy irrelevant to the population. The role of kinetic operations in this context is to keep the enemy at arms-length while others (not always military) undertake the capacity building so essential to restarting societies. That is not to say that the capabilities for high-end warfighting are not essential; they are. However, the Army must maintain an appropriate balance of robust kinetic and non-kinetic options if it is to achieve the aspirations of *Adaptive Campaigning*.

> The Army's adaptability and capacity to out-think an adversary is critical for operational success.

ADAPTING ARMY'S FORCE GENERATION AND PREPARATION

Given the changes in the environment over the past decade, there is a compelling need for the Army to review its procedures for force generation and preparation for operations. The Army's current approach, with multiple levels of command in a strict hierarchical structure, reflects the pre-HQJOC command and control arrangements. It would be fair to state that Army's higher level command and control has not evolved significantly at a time when we have seen huge changes in how ADF command and control is undertaken.

The last time that the Army undertook a wide ranging re-examination of its higher level command and control arrangements was in the early 1970s. Then, General Hassett introduced the Army's extant Functional Command structure. While there have been some changes since that time, the structure—which differentiated the commands based on individual and collective training—has remained essentially intact for the last thirty-five years.

Adaptive organisations continually review themselves. Army needs to reassess periodically the appropriateness of its structures, processes and priorities to ensure an ongoing level of fitness for the changing environment it operates in now, and in the future. This also means the Army must possess a clear view of what it means to be fit for purpose. I believe it is:

- An Army that is ready, and able, to deploy at short notice with our joint and inter-agency partners to undertake a range of missions anywhere in the world our government requires.
- It is an Army that is physically and mentally hardened against the rigours of close combat and the austere physical environments into which it deploys.
- It is an Army that supports the families of our soldiers, in good times and bad.
- It is an Army that first and foremost recruits, trains and retains the finest Australian men and women, and gives them the physical and intellectual wherewithal to complete the missions we assign them.
- It is an Army that never forgets the ideals and aspirations of the nation we serve, and acts in a manner which brings credit upon it.
- Finally, it is an Army that thinks that the status quo is never good enough and is continually seeking to adapt and improve its performance—at all levels—while also retaining important lessons from the past. And that leads us to the situation in which we currently find ourselves.

The rapid improvement in the ability of soldiers, units and headquarters to share information in the last decade has challenged our traditional comprehension of command and control. The hierarchical and stove-piped approaches of the 1970s and 1980s are no longer appropriate in an age where our people are highly proficient operators of BlackBerries and contributors to—if not the authors of—weblogs.

The duplication of functions at different headquarters, and the multiple layers of headquarters, often retards the passage of information within Army. This has affected the Army's capacity to adapt and respond to changes in the security environment, and will continue to do so unless some fundamental issues within Army are addressed.

As the Army has transitioned to one that is constantly deploying force elements, it has forced a greater focus on supporting mechanisms. In particular, Army has learned much in the last decade about the strengths and weakness of our current structures and processes for generating and preparing personnel and organisations for operations. Rapidly evolving operational and contingency requirements for joint operations demands an equally flexible force generation and preparation process. We believe an optimum level of support for operations can be achieved through a more systemic approach to adaptation within the force generation and preparation of Army force elements.

> … the Army must possess a clear view of what it means to be fit for purpose.

AN ADAPTIVE ARMY

At the start of 2008, a team of planners from across the Army assembled to develop and wargame options to ensure that Army's force generation and preparation is conducted more effectively and efficiently, and in better alignment with the new joint command framework. Based on the work of this team, the Adaptive Army initiative was developed and subsequently launched in August 2008.

Under this initiative, the Australian Army will restructure its higher command and control arrangements. The principal aims of this restructuring are to:

- Improve Army's alignment with, and capacity to inform, ADF's strategic and operational joint planning.
- Better execute force generation and preparation, in a manner that balances operational commitments and contingency planning.
- Increase the effectiveness and efficiency of training within Army.
- Improve the linkage between resource inputs and collective training outputs within Army's force generation and preparation continuum.
- Improve the quality and timeliness of information flows throughout Army in order to enhance Army's adaptation mechanisms at all levels.

Adaptive Army contains several key measures that will improve Army's ability to achieve these goals.

The restructuring of Army will be executed concurrently with the force preparation of force elements for operational commitments and contingencies. Headquarters 1st Division will focus on the force preparation of Army force elements for current

operations and contingencies. To support the Commander of the 1st Division in this role, a Land Combat Readiness Centre will be raised, which will incorporate the Army's current Combat Training Centre as well as much of 39 PSB. The establishment of this organisation is a significant evolution in how Army conducts its higher level training, mounting, assessment and certification of different force elements for their operational missions.

In many respects, our formation headquarters have become 'moored' to the barracks in the last few years because of their responsibilities for mounting operations. With the new Land Combat Readiness Centre, much of the mounting, assessment and certification of force elements will be standardised to free up our brigade commanders to focus on training their own headquarters for operational missions.

In July 2009, Army will raise a Forces Command which will have as its primary function the force generation of Army individual and collective organisations. The standard of individual training provided to Australian soldiers has been a key determinant in our successes on operations. However, Army's systems for collective training does require improvement. To improve our training continuum, collective training standards are being developed. These will be linked to individual training and will be implemented across all Functional Commands as the Army Training Continuum. This will ensure a common approach to assessing the capabilities of our various force elements, and will allow us to gain better transparency on the true cost of building and sustaining our land warfare capability.

> Army will raise a Forces Command which will have as its primary function the force generation of Army individual and collective organisations.

Because the transition to the new structures is to be manpower neutral, the existing Land Headquarters will be disestablished. The functions of this headquarters will, in the main, be absorbed into the new Forces Command. Personnel made available because of this measure will be reassigned to the headquarters of Forces Command and other high priority units. This means that Army, from 2009, will have three Functional Commands of equal stature (Forces Command, Headquarters 1st Division and Special Operations Command).

Another important consideration in this restructure has been to ensure that our new structures align with Army's learning loops. As such, Headquarters 1st Division's primary focus will be the short learning loop to ensure those about to deploy receive the benefits of the lessons learnt by preceding force elements on current operations. Forces Command will focus on the medium learning loop,

ensuring Army is well postured, and prepared, for contingencies and able to respond to strategic shock. Of course, each command will also be expected to contribute to Army long learning loop where required.

Underpinning this restructure will be several important elements. First, Army will place a greater emphasis on preparedness management. A key enabler for Adaptive Army is a review of Army's procedures for the management of preparedness. A range of enhanced processes will be implemented to enhance the conduct of preparedness management, including better direction (through a redeveloped Chief of Army's Capability Directive) and more effective and transparent readiness reporting mechanisms. These will support the conduct of preparation for extant operations and contingencies, and will form the basis of the preparedness model for our Army After Next.

Second, Army will be soon commencing a program to examine its fleet management processes more closely. We have a significant fleet of equipment which includes many types of vehicles, trailers, aircraft, weapons and electronic equipment. Flowing from our implementation of better command and control structures and processes must be a review of how our fleets are used and maintained within the new Army organisation. In many respects, our purchase, use, management and eventual replacement of equipment is based on procedures developed in the 'long peace' that followed the Vietnam War. However, as we have found in the last few years, we are using up the life of some of our equipment more quickly in a high operational tempo.

Ironically, at the same time some of our equipment is not being utilised as much, or as effectively, as it could be. So we are going to seek ways to better employ and administer our vast equipment fleet.

> … we need to take a good look at which Army capabilities are a high priority for retention and further development.

Third, we need to take a good look at which Army capabilities are a high priority for retention and further development. As the security environment has changed over the last decade, and the manner in which Army operates transforms, we have come to appreciate that our force structure may not be entirely appropriate—for current operations or for the future. Therefore, Army will be re-examining the capabilities it maintains to ensure we retain a relevant and responsive set of land warfare skills into the future. This may demand that some hard choices be made, but it would be irresponsible not to continually look at ourselves to ensure our structures and capabilities give our soldiers the best possible chance of success on operations. An Adaptive Army cannot allow itself to rest on its laurels or be restrained from innovation by traditions and capabilities that are no longer relevant in a twenty-first century force.

Finally, a set of explicit measures of success and failure for the implementation of Adaptive Army are being developed. To ensure we realise the goals of this restructure, the implementation of Adaptive Army will be guided by measures that determine where we are being successful and where we are failing to meet our goals. For example, one measure of success for the restructure may be that Army Headquarters would have access to very high quality information on the readiness of land force elements in near real-time. While there is some way to go in the development of these measures, they will be vital to ensure that Army gains maximum value from the resources expended in the transition to the new Functional Command structure.

CONCLUSION

The success of the operations that have involved Army in the past decade indicates that the soldiers of the Australian Army are of the very highest quality. Our soldiers perform at exceptional levels of individual and collective performance despite often being placed under significant pressure. But operational excellence requires constant re-evaluation of how we think and how we operate. To ensure the Army's soldiers continue to excel on operations, the challenge is to ask: 'how can we improve?' The Adaptive Army initiative aims to address this challenge.

The measures outlined in this article will ensure Army is better postured to contribute to joint operations in a manner that balances extant commitments with preparations for future contingencies. The Adaptive Army initiative will result in a more effective Army, and one that is well positioned to continue its adaptation to changes in the security environment in the coming decades.

The implementation of Adaptive Army will not always be easy. It will demand the courage to make the hard decisions related to our capability priorities. It will require initiative, by our soldiers and leaders at all levels, to identify further opportunities within our adaptive culture to improve our Army. But most of all it will demand absolute teamwork, in a 'whole of Army' approach, to ensure we realise the worthy aspirations of Adaptive Army.

OPERATIONS

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY

A CULTURAL CRINGE?

COLONEL MICHAEL LEHMANN

ABSTRACT

This article examines the extent to which cross-cultural competence has been absorbed by the Army and incorporated into its institutions and practices. The author concludes that there is a firm understanding of culture's importance within the Army, but that more work is necessary. The author focuses on several areas where improvements may be made, such as increasing the Army's awareness that its own culture will affect operations, and the further institutionalisation of hard-won cultural lessons through more focused training and education.

From Sun Tzu's repetition-worn exhortation to 'know your enemy', through Moses directing the Jews to spy on the people of Canaan,[1] the campaigns of Napoleon in Spain and Lawrence in Arabia,[2] the Second World War considerations of how to run post-surrender Japan,[3] and into the slums of Iraq and poppy fields of Afghanistan today, understanding the local population and their culture has either reinforced success or contributed to failure. The place of culture in military

operations remains a topic of professional discussion, with military journals, 'lessons learned' publications and the news media continuing to debate the importance of cultural factors to the modern battlespace. This interest is mirrored in the Australian Army; in June 2008, the Centre for Army Lessons newsletter had three articles that touched on culture, and in Lieutenant General Peter Leahy's assessment just prior to his retirement he stated that the future will involve 'a battlefield which is much more about the population. Where we protect and support and persuade. Where you need to understand culture and anthropology'.[4]

While there are voices cautioning that the wars of today will not necessarily be tomorrow's,[5] if today's battlefields are about interacting with the population in the face of some adversary or disaster, and the population's culture is critical to this interaction, then it is timely to ask whether the Australian Army is performing adequately in this regard. Are we embracing culture where it is relevant to our mission, or cringing at the idea of 'soft' power infringing on 'hard' decisions?

CULTURE AND MILITARY OPERATIONS

When discussing culture and military operations, the first issue is a definitional one. Culture touches on anthropology, sociology, history, religion, linguistics, economics, politics and psychology, and therefore means different things to different people. To complicate the matter, there is a proliferation of similar terms including human terrain, cultural awareness, cultural intelligence and cultural competence.[6] The Army has dipped its spoon into this definitional soup and defined cultural understanding as 'the capacity for active study and understanding of human and cultural influences affecting all decision-making and actions in the operating environment, *in order to optimise one's own decision superiority* through empathy'.[7] While there is a lot to like in this definition, particularly in the way that it relates culture to military operations, empathy is not a broad enough term to be more than partially useful in under-standing all of the factors that have an impact on culture. It also does not suffi-ciently recognise that using cultural understanding for military gain involves more than identifying with the emotions and mental state of the 'other bloke'. Incorporating cultural factors into military activities requires an awareness of one's own culture and the way that this influences perceptions of what the 'other bloke' is doing. Additionally, the Army's definition also implies a focus on commanders through the use of the term 'decision

> Incorporating cultural factors into military activities requires an awareness of one's own culture …

superiority'.[8] In today's operations, everything that our soldiers and officers do when interacting with the population touches on culture, whether it is patrolling, engaging local leaders on security and development issues, coordinating with non-government organisations, or in wargaming a sequel to an operational plan. Consequently, I prefer Selmeski's definition of 'cross-cultural competence' as it is broader and explicitly recognises the relationship between the observer and the observed.[9] Selmeski's definition is, however, focused on individuals and I have adapted it so that cross-cultural competence can be defined as the ability to quickly and accurately comprehend distinct cultural environments, and then appropriately and effectively act to achieve a desired effect.

With this definition in mind, it is worthwhile returning to the idea that cultural competence is a way through which military forces can influence a population. While a complex topic, the argument as to why culture is important to the success of military operations follows from the truism that the population is important. If future land operations are most likely to occur in complex, urban environments, then these environments will have many state and non-state stakeholders who may move between support, neutrality and opposition to military forces. All military operations, including combat, will have an impact on at least some of these stake-holders, and many will specifically aim to influence them. Ultimately, the perceptions and behaviour of the non-combatant stakeholders are the decisive factor in determining political success. When soldiers and military forces understand and incorporate cultural factors into their activities as a way of influencing perceptions and behaviour, this significantly increases the contribution that military operations make towards achieving political objectives.

The relative importance of culture to each operation, however, will differ. For example, cultural considerations, at least tactically and operationally, are largely peripheral in environments where the population is absent or negligible. Strategically, however, these considerations (for example, the British public's reaction to the Argentinean invasion of the Falkland Islands) can be vital. Cultural considerations are also only relevant when the military outcome requires some degree of cooperation with the population, or a decisive element of the population. But even if it is thought that the population and cultural factors can be ignored, there can be second and third order effects that occur over decades. Examples can be seen in the contributions to future conflict of the Treaty of Versailles and the practice of elevating an ethnic minority to prominence to assist in the running of a colonial government.

Any discussion about cultural understanding should always be premised on the fact that understanding is not synonymous with military success. Understanding *why* there is racial or religious conflict, *why* women are not allowed to be educated, *why* government is unrepresentative, or *why* there is a patronage system that

encourages nepotism and corruption does not ensure security, develop economies or result in good governance. Awareness, and even understanding, of different cultural norms may sometimes do little more than emphasise the intractability of a problem to a military-based solution. It should always be remembered that cultural understanding is no more of a silver bullet than technology.

CULTURE AND SOLDIERING

Everything that our soldiers, staffs and commanders do when considering or interacting with a population reflects the culture of both sides. The importance of even low-level interactions has been recognised in the concept of the 'strategic corporal'. The idea is that even basic military decisions can have profound 'ripple' effects due to the media's ability to broadcast what is happening almost instantly and almost limitlessly. While sometimes hyperbolic, when these interactions are portrayed as damaging to the local population, particularly when they are culturally insensitive or offensive, significant damage can occur—Abu Ghraib is a clear example of this. In many ways the phenomenon of the 'strategic corporal' could also be described as that of a 'cultural corporal', one who understands that every action that affects the local people has potential consequences beyond the here and now, and consequently makes good tactical decisions.

These decisions are embodied in the interactions that occur on a daily basis between soldiers and the locals in their area. It is these interactions, in competition with the adversary's efforts to influence and coerce the population, which will determine where hearts and minds will go. The Army has sought to shape the attitudes and behaviour of our soldiers by providing them with basic language skills and cultural awareness from briefings and handbooks, and in training scenarios that include cultural aspects.[10] This has been described as 'formal and immersion training, incidental and collective experience and intrinsic motivation … [and] regular, albeit secondary parts of many Mission Rehearsal exercises'.[11] Although some military forces are doing more to prepare individuals, particularly in the United States,[12] these efforts are not without their critics; Selmeski, for example, describes US efforts as ranging from 'adequate but superficial to downright poor'.[13] Regardless, some programs, such as the *Tactical Iraqi* interactive language and culture computer game, have achieved considerable success: 'over 20,000 US servicemen and members of the Australian Defence Force have successfully learned and transferred to the

> In many ways the phenomenon of the 'strategic corporal' could also be described as that of a 'cultural corporal' …

real world the skills they acquired with our foreign-language training programs'.[14] Returning to the definition of cross-cultural competence, one weakness of these programs is that they often focus on descriptions of the 'other' culture, rather than on drawing out cross-cultural differences. Without understanding these differences, this knowledge runs the risk of being decorative rather than decision-quality.

It is difficult to judge the effectiveness of the Australian Army's preparation of its soldiers, although success can be inferred from the lack of any significant cultural incident in Iraq or Afghanistan. Regardless, cultural training is critical and should continue to be refined and expanded, although the responsibility for doing so sits largely with a busy chain of command, arguably neither better trained, nor more experienced, nor more aware of specific cultures than the troops they are preparing to deploy.

CULTURE AND DOCTRINE

If the Army institutionally recognises the importance of culture in current operations, then it is reasonable to expect that such understanding be reflected in doctrine. To a limited extent it is, with the multidimensional complexity of the operating environment,[15] the importance of the population,[16] and the need to see from other perspectives[17] all mentioned. *Adaptive Campaigning* is perhaps the Army's most inclusive statement of the place of culture in operations, recognising that 'influencing populations and perceptions … is the central and decisive activity of war'[18] and going on to reinforce this declaration by clearly linking four out of its five lines of operation to the population.[19]

While this is positive, too many of the Army's doctrinal references are fleeting (the *Fundamentals of Land Warfare* refers to the 'perceptional domain' in a footnote[20]), dismissive (*Urban Operations* refers to the non-combatant population as a 'friction of the environment'[21]), or lacking in substance. In terms of substance, population, culture, beliefs, ethnicity and religion are all mentioned, but the references are typically more declarative than substantive. A prime example is in *Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0 Operations*, which devotes six pages to discussing the manoeuvrist approach to warfare, of which only twenty-nine words relate to the population and then strictly in terms of the 'bond between the population and adversary'.[22] This lack of substance appears common, and issues include:

> If the Army institutionally recognises the importance of culture in current operations, then it is reasonable to expect that such understanding be reflected in doctrine.

- The tendency to consider population and culture as only being relevant to psychological operations, public affairs and information, and rules of engagement.
- A weakness in manoeuvre theory in that, while the population is seemingly a perfect opportunity for an indirect approach, manoeuvre theory appears focused on achieving a blitzkrieg, and does not adequately integrate the population or the culture through which it may be influenced.[23] Multidimensional or not, while manoeuvre theory advocates 'the centrality of the human element in warfare'[24] it almost exclusively does so in relation to the threat. In this way, it could be argued that the Army's manoeuvre theory is as flawed as any industrial age focus on attrition.
- The tendency to make statements about the importance of population and culture without integrating these factors into planning and decision-making processes.
- The tendency to present culture as a laundry list, in one case running into hundreds of factors.[25]
- The lack of differentiation between the needs of the soldier, the staff and the commander.

A specific shortcoming exists in the relationship between cultural factors, intelligence doctrine and military decision-making processes. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) is driven by the commander, and provides inputs into the military appreciation process (MAP) about the threat and the environment. It is clearly the process best suited to kick off the comprehension of distinct cultural environments that was mentioned in the definition. Unfortunately, culture and population is notable in current IPB and MAP doctrine mainly by its absence. These considerations are lumped under 'other factors', secondary at best in centre-of-gravity constructs, and not considered in wargaming.[26]

> Our doctrine does tend to focus on operations and our own perspectives—the comfortable and the knowable.

These shortcomings are not restricted to the Australian Army, and they have been discussed in some overseas professional military forums, with probably the best result currently being found in US Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*.[27] Many of the proposed solutions, unfortunately, are limited by presenting culture and population as an additional, separate consideration for the commanders, instead of one that should be interwoven into existing processes.

Although it would be tempting to say that Australian doctrine, in general, pays lip service to culture, it is fairer to see this as a more-or-less traditional focus on the application of military capabilities to win the land battle. Our doctrine does tend to focus on operations and our own perspectives—the comfortable and the knowable.

There are sufficient mentions of the importance of a population and the Army's interactions to indicate that this dimension of conflict is acknowledged, but not sufficient detail and practical incorporation to indicate that this has really sunk in. This is not to say that insightful commanders and clever staff will not appropriately consider culture and population, but they are not encouraged to do so by doctrine.

CULTURE AND LEARNING

If culture deserves a place in the awareness of every individual deployed on an operation, as well as in the Army's planning and decision-making processes, then it follows that there is a requirement for training and education. This broad requirement was discussed in a cultural intelligence seminar held in Canberra in May 2008,[28] achieving a consensus that the combinations of anthropological, psychological and sociological expertise required to support the range of cross-cultural competence was almost certainly unobtainable from within the military. Competent linguists and regional 'experts'—assuming this is not a euphemism for passed over military officers—are not enough. Specialist civilian assistance is needed, but this is not without controversy.

The American Anthropological Association (AAA) has described the involvement of anthropologists in military operations as 'controversial' and involving 'important unresolved issues and continuing concerns'.[29] Some anthropologists have publicly expressed concern over the 'weaponisation' of anthropology: there is a 'Network of Concerned Anthropologists' opposed to 'research and other activities that contribute to counter-insurgency operations',[30] and at least one social scientist has been killed while on operations.[31]

Just as the US anthropological community is divided about involvement in military operations, it is almost certain that there would be similar concerns among Australian academics. These concerns reflect the ethical issue of non-disclosure of the purpose of their activities with the people they interact with, the spectre of indirectly causing harm to civilians due to subsequent military operations, and the potential for damage to the academics' profession and career. If the Army is to consider using psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists or other specialists on operations, it should at least be aware of these ethical issues and preferably actively engage with professional associations beforehand.

The advice and presence of academics does not, however, remove the need for Army to train and educate soldiers and officers in cultural matters relevant to the operations.[32] With the importance of the 'cultural corporal' and his or her interactions with the local people, this training should occur as early as possible in both the All Corps officers and soldiers training continuum. The focus of this training should be on understanding why culture matters, on our own Australian (and Army) culture,

and the ways in which other cultures can be broadly different. It should focus on individual behaviour at first, and then grow in complexity throughout an individual's career. In this way our soldiers and officers will have the skills to be at least partially culturally competent wherever they are, no matter how much notice they are given to deploy, as they will know *how* to think about cultural differences. These basics can then be built upon, either from learning from experience on deployment, or from specific pre-deployment training. Fortunately, such an approach is not revolutionary, and forms the basis of the way that Army plans to develop its cultural capability.[33]

Building cross-cultural competence should be a process of continual renovation, as cultural competence is a two-way, dynamic activity. The stakeholders in a population, particularly adversaries, observe and learn about the culture of the military forces among them. When cultural preconceptions or patterns of behaviour are found, these can be used against those forces. While the result of many factors, there were cultural preconceptions contributing to expectations that there would be no attack from the Viet Cong during Tet or the Arabs during Yom Kippur. Similarly, the adversary's culture can also change. An example can be seen in the Taliban's experimentation and enthusiastic adoption of suicide attacks. Such attacks have been widely described as being against Afghan cultural values, but any cultural squeamishness has been overcome as these attacks have proven to be an effective psychological and propaganda weapon for the Taliban, significantly escalating in number from 2006.[34] When situational factors influence a culture, the cross-cultural competence 'floor' may shift, surprising those who see it as a static absolute. An openness to this dynamism will be an important part of the Army's planned training and education.

> … cultural competence is a two-way, dynamic activity.

CONCLUSION

The operating environments in which the Australian Army is most likely to find itself in the future will be complex and populated by a wide range of different stakeholders, including the local population. If war is a violent extension of political struggle, then using culture as a lever to influence this population (and other groups as required) is one means by which military organisations can improve their chances of success. This understanding of the differences between cultures, and the ability to use such an understanding to achieve better results, should be developed in soldiers, staffs and commanders at all levels.

The Australian Army has a reasonable level of cultural understanding of the areas in which it has recently operated, although the manner in which this

understanding was gained could be described as largely *ad hoc* and won on-the-job. To institutionalise this knowledge, a good approach would be to educate our soldiers and officers in broad cultural competence concepts; combine this with specific, organised and practical training on the culture of areas to which they were to deploy; and supplement this knowledge and skill set with specialist, deployable cultural advice. Importantly, this education should help form explicit Australian cultural perspectives, so that there is an understanding of the baseline against which we often subconsciously consider others' actions. Army's leadership has laid a good platform for this, but there have been some initial delays and moving cultural competence from the page and into the classroom and field will probably require additional command focus.

As doctrinal reviews take place they should explore and, where appropriate, incorporate the relationship between military operations, influencing the population and using culture to do so. This task is probably most pressing for intelligence, planning and decision-making doctrine. Through all of this, the temptation to make culture a separate consideration must be resisted. It will be of most relevance to military operations when it is considered as a way to improve what we do, not change it.

To return to the original question of how the Australian Army is performing in regards to cultural awareness training, the answer appears to be in an *ad hoc* manner, but not badly. There is sufficient evidence to indicate that the Army 'gets' the importance of culture and has a plan to institutionalise and develop what has been done so far. The work required is to flesh out these hooks into robust, considered doctrine supported by tiered education and training. In this way, the hard work of using the soft power of culture will be eased, giving our soldiers and commanders every chance of success.

ENDNOTES

1   Book of Numbers 13: 17-33.

2   The significant part that culture played in the Spanish resistance to Napoleon is discussed in George W Smith, Jr., '*Avoiding a Napoleonic Ulcer: Bridging the Gap of Cultural Intelligence (Or, Have We Focused on the Wrong Transformation?)*', Essay, Marine Corps War College, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/cjcs_essay_smith.pdf> accessed 7 July 2008. Lawrence of Arabia has a considerable amount to say on culture, such as his statement that 'the beginning and ending of the secret of handling Arabs is unremitting study of them,' from T E Lawrence, 'The 27 Articles of T E Lawrence', *The Arab Bulletin*, 20 August 1917, <http://www.usma.edu/dmi/IWmsgs/The27ArticlesofT.E.Lawrence.pdf> accessed 12 August 2008.

3   Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture*, 1st Mariner Books edition, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1946.

4   Max Blenkin, 'Future battlefield will require soldier-anthropologists', *AAP Newswire*, 2 July 2008.

5   Michael J Mazarr, 'The Folly of "Asymmetric War"', *The Washington Quarterly*, Summer 2008, pp. 33–53.

6   Brian R Selmeski, *Military Cross-Cultural Competence: Core Concepts and Individual Development*, Occasional Paper Series No. 1, Royal Military College of Canada, Centre for Security, Armed Forces & Society, 11 October 2006 (revised 16 May 2007), pp. 3–8. See also Erik B Eldridge and Andrew J Neboshynsky, 'Quantifying Human Terrain', Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, June 2008, pp. 19–23. <http://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCS/Docs/Pubs/Eldridge_Nebo_Thesis.pdf> accessed 7 July 2008.

7   Deputy Chief of Army, *Planning Guidance for Development of a Cultural Understanding Capability in the Australian Army*, Department of Defence, Canberra, 19 November 2007.

8   The reference does recognise the importance of cultural understanding in all ranks in the body of the document.

9   Selmeski, *Military Cross-Cultural Competence*, p. 12.

10 Examples include: meetings with tribal or religious elders; use of culture specific hand gestures to convey meaning; and the searching of women at checkpoints.

11 Selmeski, *Military Cross-Cultural Competence*, p. 2.

12 There are least five organisations in the US military whose 'expertise' includes culture. There is a Culture Center at the US Army's intelligence home, Fort Huachuca; the US Air Force has a Culture and Language Center, and the USMC has a Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL). More broadly, Singapore's Nanyang Technological University has a Centre for Leadership and Cultural Intelligence.

13 Selmeski, *Military Cross-Cultural Competence*, p. 24.

14 See <http://www.tacticallanguage.com> accessed 7 July 2008.

15 Department of Defence, *Joint Operations for the 21st Century*, Department of Defence, Canberra, June 2007, pp. 12, 19; Australian Army, *Land Warfare Doctrine 1 – The Fundamentals of Land Warfare*, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2008, pp. 15–16, 41.

16 *Land Warfare Doctrine 1 – The Fundamentals of Land Warfare*, pp. 15–16, 41; Australian Army, *Land Warfare Doctrine 3-9-5 – Urban Operations* (Developing Doctrine), Department of Defence, Canberra, 2005, pp. 1-30–1-31.

17 *Joint Operations for the 21st Century*, p. 19.

18 Australian Army, *Adaptive Campaigning – The Land Force Response to Complex Warfighting*, Department of Defence, Canberra, 1 December 2007, p. 3.

19   *Adaptive Campaigning*'s lines of operation are Joint Land Combat, Population
     Protection, Public Information, Population Support, and Indigenous Capacity
     Building.

20   *Land Warfare Doctrine 1 – The Fundamentals of Land Warfare*, p. 14 (footnote).

21   *Land Warfare Doctrine 3-9-5 – Urban Operations* pp. 2–12.

22   Australian Army, *Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0 – Operations*, Department of Defence,
     Canberra, 2003, pp. 2-9–2-15.

23   *Joint Operations for the 21st Century*, p. 19, discusses 'Multidimensional Manoeuvre'
     but is explicitly focused on the relationship between adversary and friendly
     capabilities. Australian Army, *Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0-1 – Counterinsurgency
     Operations*, Department of Defence, Canberra, 1999, p. 1-10, does discuss attacking
     the 'centre(s) of gravity at every level, that is—diplomatic, economic, psychological
     and military', but its limitations are clear when it goes on to say that a manoeuvrist
     approach is manifested in 'interior' geographical manoeuvre, and 'exterior'
     international manoeuvre, only the latter of which includes a psychological dimension.

24   *Land Warfare Doctrine 1 – The Fundamentals of Land Warfare*, p. 41.

25   Annex G to Chapter 2 of *Land Warfare Doctrine 3-9-5 – Urban Operations* is a
     sixteen-page checklist of factors, many of which would have to be considered multiple
     times for each group relevant to an area of operations.

26   The 'Action, Reaction, Counteraction' wargaming cycle is friendly/threat focused.

27   Department of the Army (US), Field Manual 3-24 / Marine Corps Warfighting
     Publication 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*, December 2006.

28   This two day seminar was sponsored by Intelligence Security and International Policy
     Group with the aim of looking at the role of intelligence staff in assessing culture. It
     was attended by professional intelligence officers and a variety of civilian specialists
     from related fields.

29   The AAA has established an advisory 'Commission on the Engagement of Anthropology
     with the US Security and Intelligence Communities'. Their initial 2007 report is available
     at <http://www.aaanet.org/cmtes/commissions/CEAUSSIC/index.cfm> accessed on
     18 August 2008.

30   See the 'Pledge of Non-participation in Counter-insurgency' at <http://concerned.
     anthropologists.googlepages.com/> accessed on 27 June 2008.

31   Michael Bhatia was killed while working with a US Human Terrain Team in Khost
     Province, Afghanistan in May 2008.

32   This need, and guidance on how to address it, is in the Army's *Planning Guidance for
     Development of a Cultural Understanding Capability in the Australian Army*.

33   Ibid., p. 5.

34 See the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan's report 'Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan (2001-2007)', 1 September 2007, pp. 3–4, 38, <http://www.unama-afg.org/docs/_UN-Docs/UNAMA%20-%20SUICIDE%20ATTACKS%20STUDY%20-%20SEPT%209th%202007.pdf> accessed 17 August 2008. See also Hekmat Karzai, 'Afghanistan and the Logic of Suicide Terrorism', *IDSS Commentaries*, 27 March 2006, <http://www3.ntu.edu.sg/rsis/publications/Perspective/IDSS0202006.pdf> accessed 17 August 2008.

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<div style="background-color: #a8b878;">OPERATIONS</div>

FLYING A PLANE WHILE IN THE PROCESS OF BUILDING IT

REFLECTIONS ON IRAQ

MAJOR MICHAEL SCOTT

ABSTRACT

This article recalls the author's experiences at the Iraqi Joint Headquarters. During his time in Baghdad, the author came to understand that there was cause for guarded optimism about the future of Iraq, and that success for the US-led coalition was indeed possible. However, he also learned that some significant progress is yet to be made along this path, and he details what he believes are the precursors for such progress.

> *We are Sunni, we are Shia, we are Christian, we are Kurd. We come together as Iraqis for the good of our country. Down with terrorism.*[1]

This article provides a post-tour perspective of my impressions of Iraq, the Iraqi people, and the US-led coalition in Iraq. Based on observations made from June to December 2007, this article chronicles experiences that have served to reshape many pre-tour perspectives.

REFLECTIONS ON IRAQ AND THE IRAQI PEOPLE

It is clear that the Iraqi psyche has been shaped and changed by a history of violence and oppression. The conditioning that has resulted from a generation of subjugation under a brutal regime and frequent wars has altered their perception of life, death and loss.

The traumatic loss of parents, siblings, children and friends is common. Indeed, many have lost loved ones in the current insurgency.[2] While this conditioning has developed a very strong survival instinct within most Iraqis, one manifestation of which is that some can mislead without betrayal by any visual tells, there still exists an inner confidence and positive outlook.

Nonetheless there is a significant segment of the population which is comprised of tolerant, secular and progressive people. Many of the educated middle class embrace the separation of religion from public life as a fundamental underpinning of sound governance. They tolerate freedom of religious belief, and the social and vocational emancipation of women. However, many who hold such views do so privately, confining their expression of them to close friends, family members and in-confidence discussions with inquisitive Australian Army officers.

Iraqis are proud and nationalistic residents, children and guardians of the so-called 'land between the rivers'. While the Iraqi community is comprised of disparate groups, some of whom draw close affiliation with Iraq's neighbours, such affiliations may be viewed as 'temporary associations of expedience', rather than a widely supported desire to secede territorial integrity or sovereignty to a neighbour or foreign power.

Iraqis want for a better future. In working towards this, many Iraqis assume great personal risk. It is widely known that Arabic–English translators have a US$10 000 bounty on their heads—an indication of the critical role that interpreters play in the ongoing rehabilitation effort in Iraq.

Iraqi citizens who volunteer their services as soldiers, officers, police and civil servants within the 'new Iraq' are brave souls who are owed a debt of gratitude and recognition, a fact that is rarely acknowledged in Western debates on Iraq. Iraq remains a very dangerous place. Those who opt to serve their country immediately risk their lives, and the lives of their family. This risk, and the everyday bravery demonstrated by Iraqi men, women and children, is not widely appreciated in Australia.

In my time working with the Iraqi Joint Headquarters,[3] I heard many accounts of violence directed towards Iraqi military personnel. In order to better understand the risks and the sacrifices that these men and women make daily, it is valuable to consider some actual accounts.

The first account describes the plight of a senior Iraqi officer who was serving in the Joint Headquarters during my time in Baghdad. I was informed that armed militiamen entered an Iraqi two-star officer's home while he was at work. At gunpoint, the officer's wife was directed to make a choice between her son and daughter. Knowing what fate may befall a female, the mother made the terrible choice for her young son to depart with the assailants. After being informed of the situation over the telephone by his grief-stricken wife, the officer made contact with the gunmen, who directed that his life may be exchanged for that of his son.

As a Sunni officer within the Iraqi Joint Headquarters—a rare and precious asset because of the need to achieve representative heterogeneity at executive levels—he felt that his life was too important for the future integrity of his country. This belief left him faced with the heart-rending decision to deny the gunmen their request. Instead, the officer offered the gunmen his worldly possessions, cash and jewellery, in exchange for the life of his son.

> This risk, and the everyday bravery demonstrated by Iraqi men, women and children, is not widely appreciated in Australia.

Thankfully, the exchange was made and the son was returned unharmed, but no doubt severely traumatised. I met the officer two days later at the Iraqi Joint Headquarters, where he enthusiastically hosted the Commanding General, Joint Headquarters Transition Team, an Australian brigadier, through a newly established strategic logistics capability. No outward emotion, other than enthusiasm at the progress being made, was betrayed by the officer—an act of extreme composure and professionalism.

A second account describes the last hours of a junior officer within the Iraqi Joint Headquarters, who was captured by gunmen on a Baghdad street and put in the boot of a car. As the vehicle drove away, the officer managed to escape. He was about to leave the neighbourhood when the gunmen contacted him on his mobile telephone and explained that they had returned to his house, had custody of his family, and that if he did not return home immediately, his family would be killed in his place. He returned home and was shot dead.

These are but two tales in a long line of horrors that provide some insight into the risks that Iraqis face, and have faced, in rebuilding their country. Despite the risks, Iraqi men, women and children continue in their quest for a better future.

REFLECTIONS ON THE INCIDENCE OF SECTARIANISM WITHIN IRAQ

While there is no doubt that much killing, intimidation and reprisal in the past has been along sectarian lines, sectarianism should not be overstated by Western observers. In times of improved security, it is neither polite nor appropriate to discuss one's sectarian affiliation. Indeed, it is said to be common for urban couples in Iraq to become engaged prior to divining the sectarian persuasion of their betrothed.[4] To moderate Iraqis, there is no cause to delineate a person from the Middle East region beyond their national identity. Moderate citizens see themselves as Iraqi first and foremost.

Throughout the second half of 2007, Baghdad underwent a demographic reorganisation from mixed suburbs to neighbourhoods of greater homogeneity. It would be inaccurate for observers to conclude that this shift was a result of deep and irreconcilable rifts within the Iraqi community along sectarian, religious or ethnic lines. Rather, the shift has arisen through fears for personal safety and the need for enhanced protection. In mixed areas, it proved easier for accelerants to the conflict, defined later, to move between and within a community and commit atrocities such as killings, kidnap and intimidation.

> Throughout the second half of 2007, Baghdad underwent a demographic reorganisation from mixed suburbs to neighbourhoods of greater homogeneity.

Many residents of Baghdad have either relocated or have been forced to flee their homes. Some have become refugees in countries neighbouring Iraq. Others, lacking the means or resolve to relocate, maintain a low profile within their dwellings and disguise their personal circumstances through fear of persecution.

Based on the accounts of translators who reside in the wider Baghdad area, security has improved somewhat. The presence of illegal checkpoints in Baghdad—a routine occurrence in 2006 and early 2007, as militias sought to regulate human movement, extort graft and target supporters of the new Iraq—has greatly reduced.

TRUST, A FUNDAMENTAL UNDERPINNING OF IMPROVED SECURITY

Any lasting security and peace must arise from a paradigm shift within the Iraqi community. A culture of silence and acceptance persists and has an impact on improved security within Baghdad. Although the frequency of attacks is decreasing markedly as territory is cleared and then retained, consolidation will not occur until

Iraqis learn to communicate wrongdoing and expose malevolent elements of their community to the appropriate authorities.

The cornerstone of Iraqi stabilisation and rehabilitation is the level of trust that the average Iraqi has in their security agencies to act ethically, legally and impartially. At present, the average Iraqi's trust in their security agencies is quite limited. Trust may come in time, but would require a series of significant confidence building activities. For now, an important strategic message for the people of Iraq is that the Coalition cannot sustain a presence in Iraq indefinitely. In order for the security situation in Iraq to improve, anti-Iraqi Government people and groups must be identified. If you do not presently have confidence in the Iraqi Police, you must inform Coalition or Iraqi Army personnel. By providing this vital human intelligence, the situation will improve as divisive elements will be dealt with by Iraqis, in accordance with Iraqi law. This, in turn, will serve as a positive demonstration to other members of society, including those holding public office, that anti-social behaviour will not go unpunished. This will also serve to assist in the regulation of security forces, who equally are required to conduct their business in a defined manner. If you do not report such acts, the situation cannot get better, indeed it is doomed to deteriorate further.

REFLECTIONS ON FORCES OPPOSING THE COALITION AND GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ

In order to understand the counterinsurgency fight within Iraq, it is necessary to consider the threat to the Coalition and the Iraqi Government. Threat or opposing forces within Iraq are heterogeneous. It is trite to say that the Coalition and Iraqi Government face 'terrorists', or to label all groups hostile to the government as terrorists. Indeed, from a strategic communications perspective, the word 'terrorist' should be excised from our professional lexicon as it is unhelpful and oversimplifies the problem at best; and is inaccurate and dehumanises a potentially reconcilable demographic at worst.

To my mind, the following groups may be identified as hostile to the Coalition and the Iraqi Government, and are improperly labelled as terrorists: criminal groups or individuals, irreconcilable militias, ideologically driven organisations, opportunistic businessmen,[5] thugs, foreign government operatives, aggrieved citizens, citizens deficient in their ability to generate commerce through lawful endeavour, blackmailed citizens, armed citizens in the wrong place at the wrong time, and hostile international non-government actors and organisations.

This complex threat environment warrants careful planning, management and engagement. Strategies required to 'treat' or 'manage' these disparate groups require careful thought and consideration, not a reductionist approach.

Indeed, the mistreatment of one anti-Iraqi Government organisation can damage the ongoing war effort by providing a 'cause celebre', which other anti-Coalition groups may use to swell their recruiting base. Commanders at all levels, both Iraqi and Coalition, face such realities in their operations in Iraq, where a mistake may have strategic consequences and undo considerable good work.

I have heard al-Qaeda in Iraq described as an accelerant within the contemporary Iraqi construct. This term is most appropriate and one that warrants further consideration.

> … from a strategic communications perspective, the word terrorist should be excised from our professional lexicon …

Horrific attacks cause mass casualties and erode the trust that Iraqis have in their political representatives and in each other. Attacks on areas of national or religious significance, such as the attack on the Great (or Golden) Mosque of Samarra in 2006,[6] can trigger a maelstrom that may not have otherwise occurred. Intimidation, extra-judicial killings and reprisals by militias and death squads reduce trust. Unfortunately, it is far easier to attack and undermine trust than it is to nurture and develop it.

The targeting and removal of accelerants at the fringe of society is a necessary line of operation to defeat any insurgency, particularly in Iraq. One may argue that it is not realistic or possible to eradicate all accelerants, particularly in the Middle East—a region characterised by numerous fault lines, friction points, grievances and porous borders.

While al-Qaeda's freedom of manoeuvre has been reduced in recent times, to the point where some observers are announcing its strategic defeat in Iraq, it could re-emerge. Pressure must be maintained on the leadership, financiers, materiel supporters and soldiers (the network) of these accelerant organisations, criminal elements and irreconcilables.

REFLECTIONS ON THE IRAQI ARMY – AN OPPORTUNITY TO TRAIN AND DEVELOP A NATION

It is generally conceded that Iraq had a burgeoning middle class and highly effective educational institutions in post-colonial times and through the 1980s during the Iran–Iraq War. It was not until the war in Kuwait that education became less accessible. At that time, the country appeared to undergo a profound change as the ruling party felt more threatened, and resources dried up as a result of sanctions. The lack of funding to education, training and development institutions was compounded

by the loss of a large portion of the middle class, who departed Iraq for a more secure future abroad. For Iraq to move forward and rehabilitate, strategies must be developed to encourage the reversal of this lamentable loss of intellectual capital, and to avoid a recurrence.[7]

A generation of Iraqis, from 1990 to the present day, has passed through their adolescence without the same educational opportunities that were enjoyed by their parents. This is a cause for ongoing concern as it provides a ready-made pool of poorly educated men and women from which to recruit and sustain an insurgency or a private army. The Iraqi Government will need to formulate policies to reach out to this demographic and enhance their employment prospects within a stabilised Iraq. One approach to addressing this is to continue to recruit military formations as an expedient to improved security, employment and vocational skilling, and the development and rehabilitation of Iraqi infrastructure.[8] The Iraqi Army is one of the few organisations that presently receive near universal support from the Iraq people. It is seen as an honourable career for young men to enter and is an organisation that may play a positive social role in reshaping the nation.

> A generation of Iraqis … has passed through their adolescence without the same educational opportunities that were enjoyed by their parents.

In mid-2008, fourteen Iraqi Army divisions were being generated to constitute the new Iraqi Army. To place this force into context, Sadaam's Army boasted a strength of fifty divisions in 1990.

Provided that oil export revenue can sustain increasing costs, which it almost certainly can, force generation activities should be continued in Iraq for many years to come. Effort may focus on the creation of mounted infantry or light cavalry manoeuvre formations—suited to counterinsurgency and rear area security operations, but less suited to cross border force projection.[9]

Embedded within these manoeuvre formations are the human resource enablers to capability: logisticians, electrical and mechanical engineers, civil engineers, linguists, pilots, medics, teachers, mentors and leaders. Hence, continued army recruitment would provide the tangible benefits of employment, population empowerment, up-skilling and economic stimulus, and the intangible benefits of increased national and institutional pride, trust and hope.

A policy of continued army recruitment would, however, require a defined end state. An end state could be based on a number of factors, either quantitative (number of divisions, soldier to citizen ratio), time-based or conditions-based.[10]

REFLECTIONS ON THE CHARACTER OF THE NEW IRAQI ARMY

I was fortunate to have observed the training of Iraqi Junood (junior soldiers) and new recruits during my visits to Iraqi bases. These soldiers showed great spirit, a love of their country and a determination to improve the security situation within Iraq. On a visit to Besmaya Training Facility with General Babakir, the Chief of Staff, Iraqi Joint Forces, on 6 November 2007, soldiers from the newly formed 3rd Brigade, 11th Iraqi Army Division, enthusiastically welcomed their chief with much song and dance. With the aid of a translator, I learned that they were chanting:

> we are Sunni, we are Shia, we are Christian, we are Kurd. We come together as Iraqis for the good of our country. Down with terrorism.

The leaders of this welcome were not officers. The chants and songs were led by raw recruits and the act appeared unscripted. This experience left a most positive perception of the spirit and motivations of young Iraqis. It also demonstrates a fundamental and profound shift away from that of a conscript army. It should be remembered that as recently as 2002, an officer was entitled to shoot Junood to assist with enforcing collective discipline. I was informed that an officer had a quota—approximately five per year—where no paperwork of consequence would result. It was only after that quota had been reached that an officer would refer future matters to a superior, with a higher 'quota'.[11]

A challenge the Iraqi Joint Forces faces is the development of a robust and professional non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps. The old Iraqi Army had no relevant NCO corps. Under the old regime, junior officers would perform some of the roles and responsibilities that we in Australia would expect NCOs to perform, while other roles were neglected.

Notwithstanding this fundamental change in paradigm, an NCO corps is emerging and positive signs are apparent. The Coalition invests considerable effort into this cause. Indeed, on 24 November 2007, Lieutenant General Dubik, Commanding General Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq, hosted a dinner in honour of the Iraqi Army

> Incentives, mentoring and positive example is helping to grow a non-commissioned culture within the new Iraqi Army.

Non-Commissioned Officer and Soldier of the Year. Soldiers and NCOs were selected from each division of the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Special Forces, under the Iraqi Army Recognition and Incentive Program as Non-Commissioned Officer and Soldier of the Year, 2007. Incentives, mentoring and positive example is helping to grow a non-commissioned culture within the new Iraqi Army.

Increasingly, it is observed that NCOs are wearing rank in order to distinguish them from junior soldiers. Anecdotally, this had not always been the case—another positive sign that augurs well for the future of the Iraqi Army. A challenge will be to continue to identify and progress the better soldiers from basic training to non-commissioned officer or officer training, and then employment in counter-insurgency operations.

REFLECTIONS ON THE CHALLENGES CONFRONTING THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT

The work being undertaken by the Coalition and the Iraqi Government is profound and advancing simultaneously on all fronts. At times, it has proven difficult to develop and maintain a main effort, when urgent action is required in so many areas. Conceptually, the generation of whole divisions and the establishment and operation of government institutions, concurrent with the prosecution of the counterinsurgency fight, has been likened to *flying a plane while you are in the process of building it*.[12]

The consequences of failure that this metaphor evokes holds true and is as a strategic message to various audiences. Whole divisions and their headquarters are being formed along with brigades, battalions, companies, platoons and sections, and their command elements, concurrently. A similar tempo is evident in the generation of non-military Iraqi Security Forces and departmental civil servants. Such endeavours would be beyond the capacity of many nations in less complicated and trying circumstances.

REFLECTIONS ON THE GROWTH OF DEMOCRACY AND CIVILIAN INSTITUTIONS WITHIN IRAQ

Corruption, the perception of corruption in Iraq, and how this perception inter-relates with elections and the forming of government in a democratic country should be considered further. I have been informed anecdotally by Iraqi citizens that they believe that elements of their government are corrupt. Such a statement requires due attention, whether it be founded in truth or not.

Iraq is a fledgling democracy. Democracy, democratic principles and the concept of free and open voting are all new to Iraqis, let alone the intrigues of party politics, associations, party loyalty and their implications. Democracy in Iraq will take time to bed down as Iraqis grow to appreciate the ways in which representative governments operate, and the notion that a government works for the people and is accountable to the people. In the climate of present day Iraq, an important strategic communications message is that if you do not like, trust or respect your officials,

then vote them out of office at the next opportunity … and incidentally, do not pick up a rocket propelled grenade launcher and take matters into your own hands mid-term.

To the realist, forms of corruption exist in all societies; only some are more refined and better concealed than others. It is possible, indeed highly probable, that corruption does exist in Iraq at this juncture. Corruption is unlawful and cannot be tolerated in Iraq any more than it is tolerated in Australia or the United States. But when dealing with Iraq, its government and the generic causes of corruption, a position of sanctimony is unhelpful and should be dispensed with from the outset.

> To the realist, forms of corruption exist in all societies; only some are more refined and better concealed than others.

I have heard the generic accusation from Iraqi citizens that 'Iraqi police are corrupt'. Let us consider this in greater detail. To serve as a policeman is a public and visible expression of one's desire to work to rehabilitate the country of Iraq. There endures an element of the community, whether they be foreign fighters or irreconcilable Iraqi citizens, that have visited unspeakable acts of horror and cruelty on their fellow human beings for association with the Coalition in rebuilding Iraq. To understand this is to understand a fundamental cause of corruption and militia association. And we may ask ourselves, if faced with such circumstances, would we act differently?

Iraqi police and government officials are public figures who are deprived of a paramount survival mechanism in today's Iraq, one that was closely guarded by my interpreters: anonymity. Presently, to serve as a public figure in Iraq is to mark yourself, your associates and your kin as a target for people who can only be characterised, through their actions, as evil. In such an environment, 'associations of convenience' with militias and other forms of quasi-protection, must be expected until such time as 'security' improves to a point where anonymity is no longer a primary means of survival.

But in making this point, it is possible, indeed probable, that malefactors continue to seek employment with the Iraqi Security Forces, to wield power and influence on behalf of divisive forces, and for ill-gotten gain.

REFLECTIONS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECURITY AND ECONOMIC RECOVERY IN IRAQ

Iraq is a classic chicken-and-egg dilemma. What comes first: security, or employment and economic recovery? To those enlightened, the answer is that they both come together, but slowly and over time. In the interim, policies must be developed to assist with the protection of Iraqi Security Forces and public figures in order that they can commit to their employment in the rehabilitation of Iraq while safe in the knowledge that their families and friends are not at the mercy of the wolves.

REFLECTIONS ON LESSONS LEARNED

Progress is being made, but it remains to be seen whether progress will be achieved before one of any number of deadlines—domestic to Iraq, regional and international—expire. One may applaud the current commanders in Iraq for their vision and leadership. The partnership of General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker has been a remarkable success. General Petraeus' leadership and management will provide academics and military historians with a wealth of material to analyse and investigate, and a new generation of military professionals with a wealth of strategy and policies upon which to build.

It is apparent in today's operational environment that it is no longer enough for the modern military professional to be technically proficient. At all levels, a commander is a soldier, leader, strategist, policy analyst, diplomat and statesman. Such is the reality of military involvement in the information age, where all elements of national power must be brought together to achieve a national effect.

> At all levels, a commander is a soldier, leader, strategist, policy analyst, diplomat and statesman.

The principles of combined arms warfare, where disparate capabilities come together to mitigate individual weaknesses and augment the collective strength, must be taken to the next level and applied to achieve national objectives through true whole-of-government endeavour. Such ideas are not new; indeed, General Zinni, former Commander, United States Central Command, wrote of such a requirement in *The Battle for Peace*.[13]

Until Western nations adapt to coalesce disparate lines of operation, from a cabinet of portfolios into a homogenous arm of national and international policy, the timely resolution of future mid- to high-intensity stabilisation operations and counterinsurgency warfare may remain elusive.

CONCLUSION

There are several overriding realities when considering Australia's continued involvement in Iraq. First, the Middle East will continue to remain of strategic importance to the West for many years to come. Second, strategic goals within Iraq will take time to achieve and consolidate. Third, the United States will continue to be an ally of profound strategic importance to Australia.

At the working level, the mood of the Iraqi people may be described as one of cautious optimism. While tangible improvements are being made, many maintain their anonymity with the knowledge that a greater commitment on their behalf may leave them exposed and persecuted in the event of a hurried withdrawal of Coalition forces.

The opportunity to serve with the US-led Coalition in Iraq was both challenging and rewarding. The deployment was a source of professional development that money cannot buy and academia cannot teach. It has served to change some of my perspectives on Iraq, the Iraqi people, and the strategic importance to Australia of the US-led coalition in Iraq.

ENDNOTES

1   A translation of a welcome chant sung by soldiers from 3rd Brigade, 11th Iraqi Army Division, on the occasion of a visit to the Besmaya Training Facility by General Babakir, Chief of Staff, Iraqi Joint Forces, 6 November 2007.

2   The insurgency commenced in the aftermath of the 2003 US invasion of Iraq.

3   The command element of the Iraqi Armed Forces. An organisation that loosely resembles the structure and functionality of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.

4   One may equate this to a Westerner seeking knowledge about whether their interlocutor was Catholic, Anglican or Agnostic, during an initial exchange of pleasantries.

5   Kidnappers who on-sell their victims to irreconcilables or ideologically driven groups.

6   The bomb attack and destruction of the Golden Mosque of Samarra on 22 February 2006, a site of profound significance to members of the Shia faith, ignited widespread rage and reprisals throughout Iraq.

7   The haemorrhage of translators from Iraq to Western countries on Special Immigrant Visa Programs, while beneficial to people that many soldiers have grown to know well, trust, and become attached, including myself, may have the long-term effect of denying Iraq a critical human resource. Notwithstanding, my dealings with Iraqi interpreters have suggested a high probability that the Iraqi middle class would integrate very well into contemporary Australian society.

8   The current process to recruit, screen, equip, train, employ, remunerate and sustain Iraqis of military service age is working and is essential to reduce the manpower pool from which an insurgency can draw.

9   The development of offensive formations, based on armour, may spark a regional arms race and/or draw the ire of Iraq's neighbours, both unhelpful second order effects given the present internal challenges facing Iraq.

10   Reduction in insurgent activity to a defined level, reduction in unemployment, the achievement of sustainable growth levels in terms of Gross Domestic Product, foreign investment levels and/or confidence in Iraq and its government by the World Bank and international lending institutions.

11   Anecdotal account in September 2007 from an Iraqi interpreter, and ex-officer within the old Iraqi Army.

12   A fabulous description, of unknown origin, it well captures the challenges and risks of stabilising Iraq.

13   General T Zinni and T Koltz, *The Battle for Peace: A Frontline Vision of America's Power and Purpose*, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2006.

THE AUTHOR

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OPERATIONS

WAR OF THE PEOPLE

COUNTERINSURGENCY EDUCATION FOR NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS

WARRANT OFFICER MICHAEL CRAIG

ABSTRACT

This article examines the need for a system to educate the Australian Army NCO corps about counterinsurgency operations. The author argues that, as the 'strategic corporal' becomes ever more important, properly educating them becomes equally important. This education will offer an assurance of capability to commanders that simply relying on Australia's non-existent 'natural predisposition' for COIN cannot. The author warns that with such education must come a commensurate devolution of authority to such junior leaders in order to empower them to succeed on COIN operations.

Welcome to the COIN CFE boys!!! I'm glad you're here because now we finally have some instructors with real counterinsurgency expertise!

Commandant Multi-National Force–Iraq
Counterinsurgency Center for Excellence[1]

INTRODUCTION

The myth that the Australian soldier is a 'natural' counterinsurgency (COIN) expert has been perpetuated both within the Australian Defence Force and the US Armed Forces. The truth is that the 'natural' counterinsurgent does not exist—history shows that armies develop counterinsurgency skills through a process of experience and deliberate education and training. There is a perception that the Australian soldier will just 'adapt' to this style of operations, based on his mastery of 'conventional' or 'high level' warfare. The recent example of the difficulties encountered by the world's premier 'conventional' force, the United States Armed Forces, in Iraq and Afghanistan shows how fraught with peril that assumption is. Within the Australian Army, our officer training continuum is only beginning to incorporate COIN education. The non-commissioned officer (NCO) continuum does not address it at all, despite Australia currently being an active participant in two COIN wars—albeit in a limited form. Australian soldiers can be as good as any other in the world when it comes to this complex, frustrating, and extremely demanding form of war—if given the right training and education. Reading the essays within the recent *Australian Army Journal* special edition about counterinsurgency,[2] it was apparent to this author that there was very little consideration given within a major thematic edition of the Journal to the problem of educating Australian Army NCOs about COIN. An aim of this article is to address this important consideration.

> The understanding required to make 'huge decisions' should be informed by sound education …

This article will describe the need for COIN education for the Australian Army NCO Corps. COIN education is the vehicle whereby our NCO Corps will move from the rote learning and drills of Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) on to developing the philosophical and conceptual understanding required for success in contemporary COIN campaigns. US General David Petraeus has said regarding junior leaders and COIN: '…it is the junior commissioned and non-commissioned officers who often have to make huge decisions, sometimes with life-or-death as well as strategic consequences, in the blink of an eye'.[3] The understanding required to make 'huge decisions' should be informed by sound education, not instinct based on learnt drills. Examination of how our major ally has tackled the problem of closing the COIN education gap during recent operations is useful when developing an Australian COIN education program.

THE UNITED STATES AND COIN WITHIN THE IRAQ THEATRE OF OPERATIONS

Six months after the removal of the Ba'athist regime in Iraq it became clear that there was not going to be an easy end to the violence across the country, with the situation descending into a protracted insurgency confrontation. The problem for the majority of the US forces—with the possible exception of the US Special Forces, who had retained some previously gained skills in counterinsurgency warfare techniques—was that their officers and NCOs had trained for 'conventional war' for decades. This meant that many units had difficulty planning and taking appropriate action for the fight that was developing. Compounding the problem was domestic political pressure within the United States that arose due to the US public being accustomed to short, relatively inexpensive (at least, in terms of friendly casualties) wars with a defined outcome. The need to change the mindset of officers deploying into the Iraq theatre of operations (ITO) became apparent to the commanding general of MNF-I, General George W Casey, Jr. He realised that he could not reach back into the military schools in the continental USA (CONUS) and effect change quick enough to have any impact in his fight on the ground within a reasonable timeframe.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF 'IN-THEATRE' COIN EDUCATION

General Casey decided to attack the problem on two fronts. Firstly, he dictated to the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) commanders in the field his unambiguous commander's intent regarding the need to train Iraqi security forces, include them in the fight and help them to take ownership, while at the same time adapting their own tactics towards a COIN fight. His second 'line of operation' was to establish an in-country academy, the COIN CFE, just north of Baghdad at Taji. General Casey made it mandatory for all combat leaders, US Army and US Marine, company to brigade level, to attend a COIN Leaders Course (CLC) prior to taking over their areas of operations.[4] There were no exemptions to the requirement for attendance at this course—a situation that continues to this day. Attendance at the CLC shaped the mindset of US Commanders deploying to Iraq for the COIN fight that awaited them. It ensured commanders and staff understood the real nature of the problems they faced on every street, market, mosque and highway in Iraq and facilitated the effective takeover of battlespace by incoming units.

COIN EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT IN CONUS

Efforts within CONUS matched those underway within the ITO. In 2006 US Marine Corps General James Mattis and US Army General David Petraeus founded a joint COIN school within the Combined Arms Centre at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center focused on 'integrating

COIN education into training establishments, doctrinal support, (particularly the integration of the new US publication FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5 *Counterinsurgency*), and providing advice to leaders and organisations both military and civilian'.[5]

RESULTS

Evidence of US success began to appear in late 2006 when the 1st BCT of the 1st Armoured Division took responsibility for the city of Ar Ramadi in the Western Iraq Al Anbar Province. They 'combined traditional COIN principles with precise, lethal operations' and enabled what is now referred to as the 'Anbar Awakening'.[6] This province,

> They 'combined traditional COIN principles with precise, lethal operations' …

formerly regarded as lost to the insurgents, became a model for future BCT operations throughout Iraq. This success, while certainly not solely attributable to the COIN CFE, suggests that the COIN education offered did have an impact upon the officers that attended the CLC. Many officers, interviewed during and after their tour in Iraq, remarked how their decisions were influenced by the instruction they had received at the COIN CFE.[7]

EMPOWERING JUNIOR LEADERS THROUGH COIN EDUCATION

During 2006 and 2007, the COIN CFE became an efficient way of delivering 'just-in-time' (JIT) education to officers; however, it was not addressing the NCO training gap. The NCO instructors at the COIN CFE began a survey of troops in the field specifically targeting the quality and depth of pre-deployment training and its validity to the soldiers once deployed.[8] It was evident from their survey that NCOs required training that drilled down deeper into the theories and principles of COIN. The NCOs were frustrated due to their lack of understanding about COIN, particularly during the dangerous first few months of their tour. Presentation of the findings of this survey to the Commandant of the COIN CFE included a suggested solution—educate the platoon commanders and NCOS. The idea was to provide them with some nested training that paralleled what their commanders were learning in Taji, so that they in turn could teach their soldiers. General Casey agreed, and a junior leaders COIN course for US personnel was trialled, validated and became part of the mandatory training for junior leaders prior to deployment into Iraq.

The initial duration of this course was only one day, but it had an immediate impact on the target audience. It consisted of educative lessons and a few current TTP that gave soldiers who had never deployed to Iraq a new focus regarding the pre-deployment training.[9] For veterans, it gave explanations of some aspects of previous deployments and operations. As one Sergeant First Class from the 1st

Cavalry Division remarked to instructors at the conclusion of a day's training: 'the light went on about a few things we did during my last deployment'. Another NCO commented that the subject matter in the lessons had given him a form of 'tactical compass'. This is exactly what the team from the COIN CFE had set about to do: educate the junior leaders so that they could talk on even terms with their officers and, armed with this new knowledge, educate their soldiers so that fundamental mistakes were not repeated on the street. Many of the junior leaders who received instruction from the COIN CFE began asking the obvious question: 'Why didn't this training occur in the US so that we get it earlier?'

> One of the main challenges for training developers is the standardisation of instructional content …

THE STATUS OF US COIN EDUCATION

The US Army's 'Road to War' concept—where the training and education of all elements of a BCT are laid out from warning order through to deployment into theatre and then back to home station—is well established. One of the main challenges for training developers is the standardisation of instructional content into their leader and training processes. COIN is being taught formally and informally, and is integrated into training scenarios and exercises. An emerging issue, familiar to Australian military schools, is resistance to add more 'mandated' training into various curricula that are already under other pressures to be reduced in length.[10] Another problem is that the current level of NCO COIN training within courses in CONUS is *ad hoc*.[11] These problems would be familiar to any Australian officer or NCO who has ever tried to influence the content of a course or block of instruction. Despite these pressures, the COIN school at Fort Leavenworth has worked on 'nesting' COIN into existing training rather than requesting additional hours of instruction. This has had some positive outcomes to date—the school's Operations Officer, Major Niel Smith, has observed that 'the force is hungry for COIN training, and everywhere it is given, it is extremely well received'.[12] This matches the author's experience since returning to Australia, and is an opinion shared by most of the Australian embeds that served at the COIN CFE in Taji.[13]

CONTEMPORARY COIN EDUCATION IN THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY

Unlike the US examples discussed above, this author's research has revealed that there is no systemic institutionalisation of COIN education within the Australian Army. At least two training institutions in the Australian Defence Force are identified as having fully formalised COIN into their curriculum: the Australian Command and Staff

College (ACSC)[14] and the Defence Intelligence Training Centre (DINTC).[15] Other organisations touch on COIN in various fashions, but it is invariably *ad hoc* and often 'hidden' within other subjects.[16] The inclusion of COIN into the course for middle level officers at ACSC marks a significant shift in contemporary officer education for Army.[17] The course incorporates COIN on several levels by superimposing irregular problems over conventional ones, as well as seeking to find practical solutions to the complexities suggested by *Adaptive Campaigning*.[18] Included into the curriculum alongside more 'traditional' case studies topics such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq are studies of the less conventional 'invasion' of Afghanistan after September 11 and the Second Battle of Fallujah. Senior Army staff are adamant that such education must continue at the ACSC and be further refined to reflect current and future operations.[19] While efforts to introduce such training on the staff course are important, such an inclusion is only a small part of the full continuum of officer training within the Australian Army. ACSC is beginning to address the training gap for senior officers, although the elective at ACSC does not extend to company and squadron commanders—arguably the level of command that most need it, as sub-unit command normally occurs prior to attendance at Staff College. But even this level of effort exceeds that currently existing within the formal Australian Army NCO training continuum.

> The inclusion of COIN into the course for middle level officers at ACSC marks a significant shift …

COIN EDUCATION FOR AUSTRALIAN ARMY NCOS

> *We need wisdom as well as expertise at all levels of the conflict, not just the strategic. Training and doctrine is often enough in modern warfare but training is very limited in utility in a highly unpredictable situation, therefore revising training and doctrine is important but preparation through education is irreplaceable.*

> Lieutenant General Sir John Kiszely[20]

General Kiszely's statement clearly echoes the need for formal COIN education as a cornerstone for soldiers to gain a true understanding of the operations they may be conducting. A solid foundation in education (the why) rather than focusing on the traditional methodology of TTP and best practice (the how) is what will lead to understanding rather than rote application of learnt drills in response to a situation. If an NCO is going to be an effective 'default planner' and be able to assume command in the absence of officers, they must necessarily have a sound

understanding of the environment in which they will operate. While Commander of the Combined Arms Center, then Lieutenant General David Petraeus developed fourteen observations that he considered were 'relevant to the broader challenge of conducting counterinsurgency operations in a vastly different culture than our own'.[21] Any COIN operations the Australian Army conducts will inevitably be amongst cultures different to our own. Three of Petraeus' observations underpin the argument for COIN education for Australian Army Junior Leaders. They are summarised below:

- **Observation 12** – Remember the strategic corporals and lieutenants. Commanders have two major obligations to these junior leaders: first to do everything possible to train them before deployment for the various situations they will face, and second, try to shape situations to minimise the cases in which they have to make hugely important decisions quickly.

- **Observation 13** – There is no substitute for adaptive flexible leaders. The key to many of the successes in Iraq has been the junior leaders who have risen to the occasion and taken on tasks for which they had little or no training.

- **Observation 14** – A leader's most important task is to set the right tone. Setting the right tone, and communicating that tone to subordinate leaders and troopers is absolutely critical for every leader at every level.[22]

General Petraeus' observations may seem obvious to some readers—and the term 'adaptive' has been an Australian Army buzzword for some time now, but are we truly comfortable that we are giving our junior leaders the tools to be 'adaptive'? We cannot expect our junior leaders to be adaptive and flexible if we have not given them the knowledge that will assist them in making the right and timely decision. This knowledge can only come from genuine COIN education. No Australian General Officer would want to be placed in a situation where they are expected to make strategically important decisions without a sound understanding of the nature of the problem they face. This is, quite rightly, why the Australian Army invests a considerable amount of effort in *educating* General Officers. Why should a junior leader, who may well be placed in a similar position, not be given the same privilege of understanding? Failure to address this issue makes the repeated reference to the proverbial 'strategic corporal' in Army's publications and various speeches by senior Defence officials purely rhetorical.

> … are we truly comfortable that we are giving our junior leaders the tools to be 'adaptive'?

A recent paper published in the *Marine Corps Gazette* highlights a ground-swell of discontent among US Marine NCOs concerning the lack of professional education within the NCO curriculum.[23] It states that Marine SNCOs are being

educationally cheated and set up for failure. This argument is aimed squarely at the system's inability to prepare platoon sergeants for the complex operations they now face, and such thoughts have some resonance with our own Army's education system. A review of the Australian NCO education continuum reveals a glaring lack of COIN specific education.[24] The key to flexible, adaptive leadership is a sound understanding of the underpinning knowledge that shapes a given situation. This is true whether in peace or war, civilian or military practice. If the true nature of the operation is not immediately apparent, education can help compensate for any training shortfalls by helping junior leaders in knowing *how* to think.

THE WAY AHEAD

A logical place for the Australian Army to begin delivering COIN education to soldiers would be as part of the Subject One courses, which all future NCO leaders have to complete. These courses are all conducted at the Warrant Officer and Non-Commissioned Officer Academy at Canungra in Queensland. Embedding COIN education into these courses would facilitate a gradual escalation of instruction in line with the progression of each course and rank. For example, the corporal's course might only have two to four periods of instruction, with further levels of instruction on the sergeant's course. This training would focus on the imperatives and paradoxes of COIN with an emphasis on understanding how military operations embed into a 'whole-of-government' approach for success. There should also be an equal emphasis on understanding insurgents, their aims and their organisational structure. The aim during this level of instruction should be to make sense of the COIN puzzle for the junior leader. The culmination of this instruction would be on the warrant officer's course, with features such as advanced level instruction by subject matter experts, a scenario based Tactical Exercise Without Troops (TEWT), and incorporation of instruction on use of the Military Appreciation Process.

The close proximity of the DINTC at Canungra could provide the opportunity for both organisations to 'dovetail' training. Some of the intelligence course outcomes (such as

> … the way adopted is less important at this stage than acknowledgment of the need …

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield products) could be incorporated into the scenarios on the warrant officer and sergeant courses.[25] The value of such a scenario is the knowledge that can be taken back to every unit in the Army, adding another dimension to unit training. This would assist in developing an ever-expanding core of critical COIN 'thinkers' at all levels within the Australian Army. Of course, this

is only one example of how Army might introduce COIN education into the NCO education continuum. Ultimately, the way adopted is less important at this stage than acknowledgment of the need and agreement upon a suitable outcome. This would be a positive step towards orientating our education towards both our current and likely future fights—which is vital if we are to be an organisation that 'continually improves' in the complex environment depicted in *Adaptive Campaigning*.

CONCLUSION

The old maxim 'soldiers don't lose wars, officers do' is not applicable in a COIN fight. The soldier's contribution to winning or losing a COIN fight is important because it is their actions that have an immediate impact on the contested population in the 'war amongst the people' that typifies COIN. This article has highlighted the need for COIN education for Australian Army NCOs. Australian soldiers need education on the 'why' of such warfare so that they can prosecute the 'how' and 'when'. An army's backbone is the quality of its junior leadership, and NCOs form the core of that junior leadership within the Australian Army. COIN warfare is complex, unpredictable, protracted and lethal. It is bewildering that our junior leaders spend many hours sitting in a lecture room being 'taught' pre-deployment hyperbole, yet we cannot spare a few periods of instruction on a subject course in order to gain some real professional development and understanding of how to lead soldiers in the current fight. There is a compelling and enduring requirement to address COIN education to ensure that relevant and worthwhile outcomes are being achieved. It is only then that we might begin to make a reality out of the current myth of the Australian soldier as a COIN expert.

ENDNOTES

1   Greeting by the Commandant to the first Australian embedded personnel to arrive at the Multi-National Force – Iraq COIN Center for Excellence (CFE) in Taji, Iraq, June 2006. The colonel was expecting to receive Australian COIN 'experts' to instruct at his academy.

2   *Australian Army Journal*, Special edition: Counterinsurgency, Vol. V, No. 2, Winter 2008.

3   David Petraeus, 'Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Iraq', *Military Review*, January 2006, p. 9.

4   General Casey would relate these reasons behind his decision to found the COIN CFE during his lecture to the students attending the COIN Leaders Course in Taji. He attended every course without fail to deliver his intent to commanders, unless weather prevented him from flying. On at least one occasion during this author's deployment he arrived by road when flying was impossible because he felt so strongly about the importance of the course and the need to talk directly to his officers.

5   Taken from the original charter for the Joint US Army/US Marine COIN Centre, drawn up by Generals Petraeus and Mattis in 2006.

6   N Smith and S McFarlane, 'Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point', *Military Review*, March-April 2008.

7   Conversations with US officers during follow up visits to operational areas by COIN CFE staff (including the author). These usually occurred two to three months after Relief in Place / Transfer of Authority had been conducted by a BCT. The purpose was to gauge the effectiveness and relevance of the COIN CFE curriculum (continuous improvement cycle) through validation in the field.

8   A questionnaire given to NCOs and lieutenants was combined with oral interviews. This occurred during 'survey missions' to the field designed to gather data on pre-deployment training relevance and to identify any training gaps that existed.

9   Validation of the course was conducted in the ITO initially, with newly arrived units. It was then trialled during pre-deployment training. General Casey was enthusiastic for the concept and wanted the training for his men. The positive feedback and enthusiasm for the training by US Junior officers and NCO surprised even those who had championed the concept at the very beginning.

10   Observations made by staff at the USA/USMC COIN School, taken from both discussions with the author during a visit to Fort Leavenworth in May 2008, and subsequent communications for the purpose of this article.

11   Assessment offered by a senior staff member at the USA/USMC COIN School at Fort Leavenworth to the author during an interview, May 2008.

12   Ibid.

13   The author, after speaking to the majority of Australians who served at the COIN CFE, concluded that there was general agreement on this point. It also matches what former Australian staff members from the COIN CFE in Taji and Kabul have found within the Australian Army during the delivery of *ad hoc* COIN training since their RTA.

14   The author made several visits to the Australian Defence College in Canberra during the writing of LWD 3-0-1 *Counterinsurgency*, (2008). During those visits Colonel Roger Noble was interviewed and made himself available for subsequent discussions for the purpose of gathering information to support this article. The author gratefully acknowledges his support and cooperation.

15   Taken directly from the training package delivered to DINTC personnel and also telephone conversations with Captain Nicholas Rose, Land Intelligence Wing at DINTC.

16   The DINTC effort is particularly vital, as intelligence is one of the most vital components of COIN operations. The DINTC package aims to provide trainees with an overview of the asymmetric adversary environment outside of conventional war. It provides an introduction to insurgency and counterinsurgency but centres on providing Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) products for commanders.

It also drills down to typical insurgent and terrorist TTP in order to assist personnel to understand threats and indicators of attacks. This represents a sound *beginning* in COIN education for Intelligence Corps NCOs and soldiers and at the very least, acceptance of the need for this type of education.

17 In 2008, the Australian Command and Staff College introduced COIN as a course elective, but with the dual purpose of writing the second draft of LWD 3-0-1 *Counterinsurgency* as the outcome of the elective. This unusual process was adopted because the original draft of the publication, produced in 2007, was unsatisfactory. The then Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Peter Leahy, was determined to see the publication ready as a matter of priority. The ACSC Course Members received instruction on theory and practice of 'modern' COIN and then, under the tutorship of Dr Michael Evans and Colonel Roger Noble, began the process of piecing the chapters together.

18 *Adaptive Campaigning* is the Australian Army's principal warfighting concept.

19 Author's discussions with Colonel Roger Noble, Director of Studies – Land, ACSC, June 2008.

20 Comment made by Lieutenant General Sir John Kiszely, Director UK Defence Academy, during a speech at the Swedish and UK COIN Symposia, March 2008.

21 David Petraeus, 'Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Iraq', *Military Review*, January 2006, p. 3.

22 Ibid.

23 Richard Choquette, 'Bridging the Gap', *Marine Corps Gazette*, July 2008; p. 22. The purpose of his article was to highlight the perceived deficiencies in current Marine Corps NCO development. Choquette was referring to current course curriculum not keeping pace with operations and the impact on key NCO appointments while in the field on active duty.

24 Information regarding current training conducted on subject courses was gained through conversations between the author and the package master at Canungra.

25 Furthermore, the Intelligence Course Members might gain valuable practice in the briefing and delivery of their products through participation in the Subject One scenario based training. Similarly, the Subject One course members would benefit and learn from engagement with the intelligence staff.

THE AUTHOR

Warrant Officer Michael Craig is an infantryman with service in 2/4 RAR, 2 RAR, 4 RAR and 4 RAR (CDO). He has experienced operational service in Rwanda, East Timor and Iraq during Operation FALCONER. Warrant Officer Craig also deployed on Operation CATALYST where he served at the US Counterinsurgency Centre for Excellence (COIN CFE) at Taji. He is completing a degree in Vocational Education and Training at Charles Sturt University and has written a COIN Junior Leaders Handbook for the Australian Army. Currently, Warrant Officer Craig is posted to the Special Forces Training Centre.

OPERATIONS

POST-OPERATIONAL DEBRIEFING IN THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY

JENNIFER MEDBURY

ABSTRACT

This article reviews the current state of post-operational debriefing in the Australian Army, demonstrating its strengths and weaknesses and comparing it with similar coalition processes. The author concludes by offering two recommendations for enhancing the utility of post-operational debriefing, suggesting that it occur prior to departure from the theatre of operations and that the Chief of Army's Lessons Seminars be expanded.

After the Second World War the United States chief combat historian, S L A Marshall,[1] brought together groups of soldiers to discuss their immediate reactions to their combat experiences. The focus of the debriefing was a cognitive review of the events, and was described as 'beneficial to the soldiers because they were able to share their experiences and group unity was re-established'.[2]

An effective post-operational debriefing process benefits the Australian Army at both the organisational and the individual level. Firstly, the benefits to the organisation include improved knowledge management and organisational learning. The information gained from deployed personnel ideally flows into strategy and

capability decisions, enabling the Army to implement changes that could increase the effectiveness of future deployments.

Secondly—and just as importantly—individual members benefit psychologically from expressing what they experienced and learned while on operation; such a cathartic release would help during the decompression process. Conversely, if personnel perceive that they are being ignored they may become disillusioned or disgruntled and stop expressing recommendations for improvement, or may even leave the Army.

This article outlines the current system of formal psychological screening and operational debriefing within the Australian Army, and proposes two options for expansion: the introduction of operational debriefing occurring prior to personnel returning from deployment; and the expansion of the Chief of Army's Lessons Seminars, an informal forum for sharing combat experiences conducted since 2006.

As many deployments include a Tri-Service component, effective debriefing and information sharing is important to future planning and coordination between the Services; and to ensure that all personnel receive access to the same debriefing opportunities.

While the logistics and benefits of a joint post-operational debriefing program are important topics, they are outside the scope of this article.

CURRENT SITUATION

There are two main components of the Australian Army's post-operational phase: psychological support—which is carried out for a specific mental health purpose—and operational debriefing.

PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT

The aim of operational psychological support in the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is to assist personnel to deploy, perform their operational duties effectively and then return to their work and private lives with minimal disruption.[3] For each operation, a psychological threat matrix is developed, which considers the following factors: additional harm to self; threat of psychological harm from exposure to others being injured; psychological harm relating to organisational factors (such as leadership and communication); operational tempo (such as the ability to work and rest); and isolation (either from family/friends or from Australia).[4]

The results from the psychological threat matrix have an impact on all three stages of psychological support provided to operations: *Pre-Deployment Psychological Preparation*; *In-Country Support*; and *Return to Australia Psychological Support* (RTAPS).

1. Pre-Deployment Psychological Preparation: Prior to deployment, all personnel receive a psychological preparation for deployment briefing. If specific risks are identified in the psychological threat matrix then additional briefings may also be included, for example hostage survival skills, fatigue management and dealing with human remains. At this brief the post-deployment psychological screening process is outlined[5] and personnel receive a deployment guide booklet that contains detailed information on separation, strategies for managing stress, critical incident mental health support and potential issues that may arise during homecoming.[6]

2. In-Country Support: While personnel are deployed, medical officers typically manage any mental health issues. However, for larger deployments or missions that have been identified as having an increased risk of personnel being exposed to large-scale psychological trauma, psychological support teams[7] may also be deployed.[8] In situations where there is no embedded psychological support team, psychological support can be provided by coalition partners or through 'fly-in' capability—although this depends on the operational requirements and the tempo of the units involved.

> Prior to deployment, all personnel receive a psychological preparation for deployment briefing.

3. Return to Australia Psychological Support (RTAPS): The aim of RTAPS is to assess the deployed member's current level of psychological functioning and to promote successful reintegration back into non-operational roles.[9] The first stage of RTAPS commences either prior to personnel leaving the area of operations or immediately upon returning to Australia, and consists of a reintegration brief and a screening questionnaire.[10] This brief targets key issues from the deployment as well as regular topics including reintegration to family/work/social environment and alcohol usage (potential for decreased tolerance). Once these questionnaires have been completed, a screening interview is conducted to clarify and expand on any issues identified.

Within three to six months after returning from operations, personnel are required to complete the post-operational psychological screening (POPS) process. POPS consists of readministering several of the RTAPS tests, the alcohol use disorder identification test and another interview. If personnel are identified as requiring follow up, the psychologist will refer them to appropriate agencies for further assessment and treatment.[11]

On 6 May 2008, the Defence Instruction (General) Personnel 16–28[12] was released, with the aim of ensuring that post-operational psychological screening is universally implemented. The goal is for all returned personnel to receive the opportunity to 'unload' about their experiences while on deployment. While debate

exists on whether psychological debriefing impacts on the onset of post traumatic stress disorder[13]—and that the benefits of debriefing differ amongst personnel—the main benefits include the perception of social support and emotional assistance.[14] However, as psychological screening has an understandable mental health focus, it has limited scope to act as a formal lessons collection mechanism, and therefore operational debriefing is required.

OPERATIONAL DEBRIEFING

Operational debriefing relates to the actual experiences from the deployment and may include reflections on the command process, the equipment used, the tasks undertaken and the team environment—including interoperability with coalition partners. In the past, debriefing has occurred when members return from deployment. However, the Army has not been able to capture all of the unique, 'non-mainstream' experiences which would have flowed into the Army's 'Adaption Cycle'.[15]

A move towards formalising the debriefing program was the Chief of Army's Lessons Seminars Program. Commencing in March 2006 and facilitated by the Centre for Army Lessons (CAL), the seminars aim to capture personal insights from operations (in a non-threatening environment) in order to identify lessons.[16] Through a combination of group discussions and one-on-one interviews, the seminars aim to achieve the three therapeutic components of debriefing: ventilation in a context of group support, the normalisation of responses, and education about post-event reactions.[17]

> Operational debriefing relates to the actual experiences from the deployment …

While the sessions are flexible in regard to the themes of discussion, topics that often arise include leadership (across all levels), Defence policy, mission command, training, coalition partners and interoperability, equipment and planning. In each three-day seminar there are usually 300 to 700 observations collected, which are recorded for further analysis. The results from the seminars are disseminated through the *Smart Soldier* publication, pre-deployment handbooks and to the Army Doctrine Wing, which incorporates appropriate lessons into their publications. Seminar reports have also been distributed on occasion to the Future Land Warfare branch (although again, this is not a formal reporting process) with the aim of eventually influencing Army gap analysis, experimentation and capability development.

While the seminars provide a formal debriefing mechanism within the Australian Army, several challenges exist. First, there is a large percentage of personnel that return from deployment who do not participate in the seminars. In particular,

individual embedded staff, small group deployments and third country deployments are usually not included in the seminars. These members may not be debriefed at all from an operational perspective, which may mean that valuable information could be overlooked.[18] Second, the Centre for Army Lessons is still perfecting techniques for inputting, storing and extracting the information. Finally, once the information has been collected and potential lessons identified, the challenge is then getting this information through to the appropriate committees and/or decision-makers. For example, there needs to be a straightforward way to identify any information relating to specific equipment so that it can be disseminated to the in-service support organisation, who will then decide whether the item is retained in inventory, upgraded or replaced. This concept also relates to information that would have an impact on operational concepts, the intelligence cycle, cultural understanding priorities and even major capability systems.

COMPARISONS WITH COALITION PARTNERS

The United States Army has developed an official website that allows company-grade and non-commissioned officers to post their lessons learnt either while in-country or following a deployment.[19] The United States Army Combat Readiness/Safety Center also conducts a program that is similar to the CA Lessons Seminars—the US Army Readiness Assessment Program (ARAP).[20] While the ARAP focuses on organisational safety, it provides a mechanism for individuals to tell their battalion commanders anonymously about things that are going well (or not well) within the unit. Once this information has been collated, ARAP personnel brief the commander about the overall results and themes. The commander is then expected to back-brief their unit and higher command.[21]

The Canadian Forces run a 'Debrief the Leaders' program, which surveyed more than 800 officers using a combination of focus groups, survey questionnaires and individual interviews, on the key categories of chain of command, mission-own troops, unit cohesion and cultural training.[22] The program—which is currently being expanded—aims to equip leaders by learning from the successes and mistakes of previous operational leaders.

> The thirst for organisational learning from individuals' experiences is clearly one shared …

The thirst for organisational learning from individuals' experiences is clearly one shared, and in the future it may be possible to bring these and similar programs from other coalition countries together, so that lessons learnt can be shared across allied partners.[23]

PROPOSAL ONE – UNIVERSAL DEBRIEFING SHOULD OCCUR PRIOR TO PERSONNEL RETURNING FROM OPERATIONS

As memories are perishable, there is strong argument that universal operational debriefing should occur prior to personnel returning from operations. While memories gained on operations are often strong (there is a recognised relationship between the level of stress experienced and memory intensity), much of this detail and often the specific memories themselves fade with the passage of time and as other experiences accumulate.[24] Therefore, capturing experiences while the memories are fresh will assist the lessons learnt process. A key supporting reason is that by being debriefed while still overseas, personnel are more likely to feel a sense that the deployment has been completed prior to returning to Australia, reinforcing a sense of 'event closure'. This is likely to help facilitate the transition to a non-operational mindset.[25]

This proposed method of operational debriefing could occur in two ways—quite possibly in tandem—either by capturing lessons in theatre through deployed lessons teams and/or through debriefing immediately after the deployment ends or during the decompression phase, possibly at a staging location.

CAPTURING LESSONS IN THEATRE

The ideal time to capture information about the operation is while the deployment is still occurring. However, in-theatre collection is complicated; the lessons collection team are classified as 'visitors' and, as they have to be escorted at all times, personnel are diverted from achieving the goals of the operation.[26] Also, there is resistance to having visitors in-theatre, with negative perceptions about their utility and value—particularly in combined deployment situations.

One way to mitigate this challenge is to establish a team of qualified[27] personnel dedicated to collecting and collating lessons. The CAL could prepare this embedded team, which would undertake ongoing collection and debriefing activities (for medium and long-loop learning[28]) and prepare mid-rotation reports on the status of each deployment.

These reports would be beneficial for short-loop learning, where lessons identified could be implemented for the second half of the rotation—if possible—or prior to the next deployment arriving. An embedded lessons team would also mitigate one of the existing challenges involved in the Chief of Army's Lessons Seminar by being well placed to capture information from deployed personnel who do not return as part of a large group.

Some countries within the ABCA Programme[29] have dedicated lessons staff deployed on operations. If the Australian Army implements capturing lessons in-theatre, it is recommended that this be approached in consultation with these

units, to determine what level of interoperability between the deployed lessons staff would be possible.

DEBRIEFING OCCURRING DURING THE DECOMPRESSION PHASE

An alternative, or complement, to an embedded lessons team is having *all* personnel debriefed while they are in the decompression phase of their rotation. While there is no formal policy within the Australian Army about the length of decompression, the aim of decompression is to provide a perceptibly safe environment—potentially in a third country location—which facilitates personnel transitioning from the operational environment to a home environment.[30] In an ideal setting, decompression should be about releasing issues and achieving a resolution for the deployment, with a focus on resting.

> … decompression should be about releasing issues and achieving a resolution for the deployment …

One nation that has salient experience with decompression in a third-country location is Canada.[31] In 2002, the Canadian Forces with Operation Apollo—Canada's initial military contribution to the international campaign against terrorism—undertook a period of decompression in Guam. During these few days, personnel were involved in exercise, sightseeing, private time, lectures and debriefing. According to a 2004 report commissioned by the National Defence and Canadian Forces Ombudsman, the main benefits from the Guam decompression period included:

- Recognition: Members appreciated the extra effort and expense, which the Canadian Forces invested to ensure that they were properly cared for and followed up. They appreciated this recognition of their value and contribution to the mission
- Comfortable environment
- Ability to unwind
- Access to education and training.

However, the report stated that it is hard to quantify the impact third country decompression has on stress reduction or if there is any long-term effects on reducing operational stress injuries among those deployed. The other challenge associated with debriefing during the decompression phase is that there is no time to implement any changes for the next group, as they have already arrived in-theatre when the preceding group enters decompression.[32] One way to mitigate this challenge is to also capture the lessons in-theatre, as discussed previously.

FORMAL POLICY

Aside from the debriefing process, the Australian Army currently does not have a formal policy for decompression and reintegration.[33] This means that while personnel deployed to the Middle East often spend time in a third country location at the end of their deployment, there is no *formal* decompression program with lectures, relaxation time and focused debriefing. Also, personnel deployed to locations closer to Australia, such as East Timor and the Solomon Islands, do not have access to time in a neutral, transitional locality at all.

Having formal decompression would not only benefit deployed personnel, but also their families. In the Canadian case study, some family members were initially opposed to decompression in Guam, as they felt that this was making the deployments even longer. However, once the benefits were explained, such as their loved one being able to take time to transition out of an operational mindset and receive support, they became supportive of the initiative.[34]

The Army—or preferably the Department of Defence—could consider developing a formal decompression policy that covers the following issues: the objectives of decompression, length of time, suitable location, activities that should occur, and specific policy for embedded personnel who are not deployed as part of a wider unit. However, the costs of a decompression phase, especially in a third country location, will need to be weighed against any potential benefits.[35]

PROPOSAL TWO – CONTINUING THE CHIEF OF ARMY'S LESSONS SEMINARS PROGRAM

According to the CAL, the Chief of Army's Lessons Seminars have produced positive results and are a step forward for achieving a formalised debriefing project,[36] especially in the short-term. Feedback from individuals is also very positive to date, and it is envisaged that greater effect will come from a maturing of its application through linkage to the Army Gap Analysis. Further benefits will also flow from broadening the target audience to capture personnel who were deployed as either individuals or in a small team.

> Effective communication is a major challenge for any debriefing process …

INFORMATION SHARING

Effective communication is a major challenge for any debriefing process, whether it is conducted within the area of operations or in Australia. Communication needs to flow not only from those being debriefed through the collection and storage

process to the relevant decision-makers, but also back to those that provided the initial information. A key component to any effective post-operational debriefing process is an equally effective knowledge management system, where knowledge owners or authorities have agreed responsibilities for lessons and Army knowledge is managed through recognised and delegated authorities.[37]

Communication directly relates to the issue of managing expectations, especially those from the personnel being debriefed. It is not possible to utilise all of the information provided during debriefing, so a balance is needed so that relevant information is identified as being important and then flows onto decision-makers.

CONCLUSION

Formal post-operational debriefing benefits both the individual solider and the Australian Army. However, expanding this process to include items such as third country decompression would be complex, and further consideration is needed regarding areas such as managing expectations and potential interoperability with other ABCA lessons teams.

The timely passage of information and lessons sharing is essential for learning from the experiences of deployed personnel. When teamed with an effective knowledge management system, the information gained from deployed personnel has a direct impact on Army's strategy, capability and tactical/procedural decisions. This process will provide the catalyst for institutional adaptation that Army recognises as indispensable, but just as importantly, it will contribute to maintaining that vital contract of mutual trust and interdependence between the soldier and the organisation.

This paper is the author's own thoughts and does not reflect either the Department of Defence or Australian Red Cross policy.

ENDNOTES

1   Noting the various critical views of S L A Marshall's findings in other fields, this reference should not be taken to infer wholesale support for his other work.
2   Z Kaplan, I Iancu and E Bodner, 'A Review of Psychological Debriefing After Extreme Stress', *Psychiatric Services*, Vol. 52, No. 6, 2001.
3   Director-General Defence Health Service Health Bulletin No. 11/2003 – 'Mental Health Support to Operationally Deployed Forces', Department of Defence, 13 August 2003.
4   Lieutenant Colonel Maree Riley, 'Presentation to 9 FSB Operational Stress', Presentation to 9 FSB (Grade 3 Course), 2005.

5   'Defence Instructions (General) Personnel 16-28 – 'Operational Mental Health Screening', Department of Defence, 30 April 2008.

6   'Director-General Defence Health Service Health Bulletin No. 11/2003 – 'Mental Health Support to Operationally Deployed Forces'.

7   Services provided by the embedded Psychological Support Team include screening, assessment, counselling, critical incident mental health support and continuing psycho-education. Lieutenant Colonel Maree Riley, CO 1 Psych Unit, 'The Provision of Psychological Support to Australian Defence Force Personnel on Operations', Presentation to the 41st International Applied Psychology Symposium, Enduring Psychological Readiness and Resilience for Deployed Forces.

8   Director-General Defence Health Service Health Bulletin No. 11/2003 – 'Mental Health Support to Operationally Deployed Forces'.

9   Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Maree Riley, Defence Force Psychology Organisation; and Lieutenant Colonel Nick Floyd, Deputy Director Strategy – Army, 4 October 2007.

10 The RTAPS screening questionnaire includes a deployment experience questionnaire, the Kessler Psychological Distress Scale (K10), the Post Traumatic Stress Checklist – Civilian (PLC–C) and a Traumatic Stress Event Scale. Once these questionnaires have been completed, a screening interview is conducted to clarify and expand on any issues identified. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Maree Riley, Defence Force Psychology Organisation; and Lieutenant Colonel Nick Floyd, Deputy Director Strategy – Army, 4 October 2007.

11 Director-General Defence Health Service Health Bulletin No. 11/2003 – 'Mental Health Support to Operationally Deployed Forces'.

12 Defence Instruction (General) Personnel 16–28 – 'Operational Mental Health Screening'.

13 J L Bisson, A McFarlane and S Rose, 'Psychological Debriefing', *Journal of Traumatic Stress*, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 555–57.

14 'Individual Differences and Debriefing Effectiveness', *The Australasian Journal of Disaster and Trauma Studies*, Vol. 1, 1998.

15 *Adaptive Campaigning* outlines the four stages of the Adaption Cycle: *Act*, *Sense*, *Decide* and *Adapt*. The results from universal debriefing would have an impact on all four of these stages. Future Land Warfare Branch, *Adaptive Campaigning – The Land Force Response to Complex Warfighting*, Department of Defence, Canberra, December 2007.

16 Interview with Geoff Cooper, Manager CAL, 14 December 2007.

17 Kaplan, Iancu and Bodner, 'A Review of Psychological Debriefing After Extreme Stress'.

18 Importantly, these groups comprise those individuals whose experiences are often unique, and whose insights are often valuable given the access, placement and seniority of those individuals.

19   Correspondence with Lieutenant Colonel Jayson Altieri, Commanding Officer, 2–82nd AVN Regt, US Army, 17 June 2008.

20   Army Readiness Assessment Program website< http://unitready.army.mil/what_is.asp>, accessed 12 November 2007.

21   Chris Frazier, 'New Release: Leader takes new approach to safety', US Army Combat Readiness/Safety Center, Fort Rucker, 10 October 2007.

22   Debrief the Leaders Program (Officers), Canadian Officer of the Special Advisor to the Chief of Defence Staff for Professional Development, 2001.

23   While it may be a logical and appealing idea, the concept of developing an 'allied' debriefing mechanism is beyond the scope of this paper.

24   E Bruce Goldstein, *Cognitive Psychology: Connecting Mind, Research and Everyday Experience*, Wadsworth Publishing Company, Belmont, 2005.

25   Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Maree Riley, Defence Force Psychology Organisation and Lieutenant Colonel Nick Floyd, Deputy Director Strategy – Army, 4 October 2007.

26   Interview with Geoff Cooper, Manager CAL, 14 December 2007.

27   These qualifications would include psychological and operational analysis fields, as well as relevant humanities fields (such as anthropology, etc).

28   The *Defence Instruction (Army) 10–1, Army Lessons* outlines three learning loops: short ('the war'), medium ('a war') and long ('future war'). These loops are influenced by different types of experiences, for example the short learning loop is influenced by experiences from operations. Defence Instruction (Army) 10–1, *Army Lessons*.

29   The ABCA currently comprises of the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. While New Zealand was officially accepted as a full member of ABCA in March 2006, the name remains unchanged.

30   National Defence & Canadian Forces Ombudsman, 'Special Report – From tents to sheets: an analysis of the Canadian Forces experience with third location decompression after deployment', 2004.

31   Ibid.

32   Interview with Geoff Cooper, Manager CAL, 14 December 2007.

33   Director-General Defence Health Service Health Bulletin No. 11/2003 – 'Mental Health Support to Operationally Deployed Forces'.

34   National Defence & Canadian Forces Ombudsman, 'Special Report – From tents to sheets'.

35   As an added return, the policy should also address the potential wider benefits, which include time to complete personnel and unit administration, Honours and Awards actions, Post-Activity Reports and Unit History Reports.

36   Interview with Geoff Cooper, Manager CAL, 14 December 2007.

37   Colonel Shane Amor (Director Doctrine Simulation Experimentation and Lessons (DSEL), Geoff Cooper (Manager CAL), 'Inculcating Army Lessons', 2007.

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<div style="background-color:#a8b072;">OPERATIONS</div>

NO CASUALTIES PLEASE, WE'RE SOLDIERS

ALBERT PALAZZO

ABSTRACT

This article examines the issue of casualty aversion. The author concludes that this is more of a myth than a reality, and exists largely within the minds of the decision-making elite. The article explores the ramifications of this fact, demonstrating that casualty aversion and excessive force protection cedes a valuable asymmetric advantage to the enemy and prevents the full range of strategic options from being exercised in pursuit of political goals.

For a nation at war Australia has been remarkably lucky. Afghanistan and Iraq, the two conflicts in which the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is currently participating, have resulted in just six battle-related fatalities among the approximately 32 000 personnel who have served on Operations SLIPPER, BASTILLE, FALCONER and CATALYST.[1] This is a fortunate if not extraordinary achievement, but one that cannot be explained by luck alone. The reality is that in these wars the Australian Government has followed a policy of deliberate casualty minimisation in order to safeguard its military personnel from harm and husband the support of the electorate.

Force protection is an essential duty of all military commanders. When taken to excess, however—when force protection becomes the measurement by which mission success is judged—casualty minimisation can generate complications that have significant and generally negative consequences. When a nation adopts a policy of casualty avoidance it lessens its ability to use force in the pursuit of national goals, creates a perception that war can be waged without risk to personnel, and sends an ambiguous message to potential adversaries. Furthermore, casualty avoidance prepares neither a nation's warriors for the hazards of combat, nor the public for potential loss, when the enemy no longer allows the attainment of mission goals without cost.

CASUALTY AVERSION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

Casualty aversion is a practice that is associated with the United States. Its beginnings lie in the aftermath of American defeat in the Vietnam War, and it was revalidated by the failed interventions in Beirut and Somalia.[2] Some scholars perceive an even more distant origin and argue that it has 'long pervaded US military culture'.[3] Its core tenet is that the American public will not support a deployment if casualties are anticipated, or will abandon an existing operation if casualties do occur. Such is the perceived effect of casualty avoidance on the US psyche that after the Pearl Harbor-like attacks of September 11 it still seemed necessary for Professor Paul Kennedy to ask the question whether the United States could sustain its will year after year, decade after decade, while absorbing high or even moderate casualties, in a prolonged war against terrorism.[4]

This belief in the need to avoid losses has also been extended to include the infliction of harm on foreign civilians and even on the enemy. In effect, senior US military personnel and policy-makers accept that their ability to utilise force for

> … American planners assume that they must 'sacrifice operational and even strategic effectiveness for the sake of casualty minimisation.'

the advancement of national security goals is proscribed by the public's reluctance to tolerate a loss of life. As a result of what has been termed the 'Vietnam Syndrome', American planners assume that they must 'sacrifice operational and even strategic effectiveness for the sake of casualty minimisation.'[5]

US policy-makers raised the practice of casualty aversion to official status in the determination of national security policy with the pronouncement of first the Weinberger Doctrine and later the Powell Doctrine. In combination, these doctrines raised the threshold for the employment of force in the pursuit of national policy

goals, while also mandating the use of overwhelming military power in order to reduce the possibility of US casualties.[6] The Weinberger-Powell Doctrine assumes that the public's tolerance for casualties is minimal, places force protection above mission success, and compromises operational and strategic effect.[7] Its goal is to prevent the United States from being mired in another Vietnam War and it sets tests designed to avoid US involvement in any protracted, limited, and/or unconventional military operations.[8] By increasing the reliance on technology to distance warriors from the battlefield, the United States was able to reduce further exposure of personal risk to soldiers.

In bringing the First Gulf War against Iraq to its hasty conclusion the White House acknowledged the influence of Weinberger-Powell. The magnanimous cease-fire terms General H Norman Schwarzkopf offered his Iraqi opposites obtained a rapid peace, but his generosity was not without a price.[9] In effect, the United States traded the possibility of further casualties for the continuing rule of a despot who believed he had not been defeated. US lives had indeed been spared, but a further consequence was that the US public was shielded from the reality of war—'a grim, ghastly, and bloody affair'.[10]

In planning the 1990–91 Gulf War, the United States approached its first conflict with Saddam with a high degree of trepidation, despite what should have clearly appeared as overwhelming military force, an unassailable political requirement to liberate Kuwait, an international mandate for action, and the support of a coalition of nations. Pre-war wargaming did not emphasise the advantages the United States possessed but rather focused on the prospect for heavy casualties.[11] After the conflict the US Committee on Armed Services admitted that 'in planning Operation Desert Storm minimizing allied and civilian casualties was the highest priority'.[12]

In the 1991 Iraq War many US military commanders and policy-makers were veterans of the Vietnam War, or had come of age under its influence, and believed that there was

> What the United States had also done, however, was signal to the world that a fear of casualties was its centre of gravity.

little tolerance at home for casualties, US or Iraqi. The public's reaction to the loss of American lives in the destruction of the Dhahran Billet by an Iraqi missile, and the death of several hundred Iraqi civilians in a Baghdad bunker being used as a bomb shelter seemed to confirm these fears. What the United States had also done, however, was signal to the world that a fear of casualties was its centre of gravity.[13] Such was the importance of casualties in US international policy-making that when President Bill Clinton announced the United States' 1995 intervention in Bosnia

he went to great lengths to dissociate the operation from Vietnam. This, however, did not stop one commentator from calling the deployment the greatest gamble of his presidency.[14]

Seven years after DESERT STORM, as the United States and NATO considered intervention in Kosovo to prevent the genocide of its majority ethnic Albanian population by the Serbian military, the focus of policy-makers and military leaders was again on casualty aversion, not mission success. When General Wesley K Clark wrote about the planning for what was known as Operation ALLIED FORCE he stressed the primacy of the need to avoid casualties. In setting the operation's goals Clark identified four measures of merit. Each was important but the paramount one for him was 'avoid losses'.[15] Referring to the need to minimise aircraft casualties he observed that once losses begin 'the countdown starts against you' and he raised doubts as to NATO's steadiness if contributing nations suffered 'a succession of aircraft losses'. He concluded that in order for the mission to survive in the long term it was necessary to take 'extraordinary steps to avoid losses'.[16] Consequently, US pilots sacrificed bombing accuracy by flying above 15 000 feet where they were largely immune from ground fire.[17]

Force protection not operational effectiveness became the mantra of those involved in ALLIED FORCE. US Army Command declared that the mission's primary objective was 'to protect and take care of the force',[18] while the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Henry Shelton, stated that 'the well being of our people [is] our first priority'.[19]

The low-key approach of the United States and NATO to Kosovo attracted particularly strong language from commentators. In an article titled 'Gutless Giant?', Jeffrey Record identified the intervention as 'an excruciat-ingly circumscribed military action … which provoked an acceleration of the very ethnic cleansing of Kosovo it was designed to halt'.[20]

> Ironically, by highlighting its reluctance to take casualties the US military might in fact have raised the risk to its deployed troops.

In even stronger words Record asserted that the Vietnam Syndrome had 'metamor-phosed into a force-protection fetishism that threatens to corrupt American statecraft', and that US behaviour was based on a 'desperate unwillingness to place satisfaction of US armed intervention's political objective ahead of the safety of its military instru-ment'.[21] To the journalist Jonathan Foreman the 'crippling caution displayed by the military in the Kosovo war has no precedent in American history …'.[22]

In making force protection its priority the United States revealed to its adversaries an 'Achilles' heel',[23] and despots around the world noted the phobic response of US policy-makers to the risk of incurring casualties. Osama bin Laden saw the US rout

from Mogadishu in Somalia as evidence that it would be possible to force the United States from its bases in the Persian Gulf. For bin Laden, the United States' reaction to the death of eighteen US Army Rangers in the 'Black Hawk Down' incident was proof that the superpower was nothing more than a 'paper tiger'.[24] The US casualty posture in Iraq, Somalia and Kosovo suggested to every tyrant in the world that 'if you kill a couple of hundred or even 20 American troops, the rest of them will run away'.[25] Ironically, by highlighting its reluctance to take casualties the US military might in fact have raised the risk to its deployed troops. Adversaries like Saddam, bin Laden, and Slobodan Milosevic now had incentive to try to kill US troops in the hope that body bags would paralyse a super power and force a withdrawal.[26]

The desire to avoid casualties amongst one's own personnel can lead to an even greater loss of life, albeit amongst other peoples. The United States blocked an early intervention in Rwanda and, along with France and Britain, was extremely cautious over involvement in Bosnia. The consequence of such prevarication was the slaughter of approximately 800 000 Rwandans and 200 000 Bosnians.[27] Ethnic cleansing occurred in these civil wars because adversaries sensed that intervention either was unlikely or would be delayed. In a similar manner, after his defeat in the 1990–91 Gulf War, Saddam took the chance to viciously—and successfully—put down a revolt by Iraq's Shiite population. He had gambled that the United States would not intercede, whereas the Shiites had made the mistake of assuming that the powerful US forces positioned nearby would not abandon them. Saddam demonstrated the folly of reliance on casualty averse American leaders.

There is also a strong case that by prioritising casualty aversion, governments run the risk of prolonging conflicts, and thereby risking a higher cost. There is evidence that by minimising its ground presence in Afghanistan, the United States allowed bin Laden and many of his al-Qaeda followers to escape across the border into Pakistan.[28] As a result, the hunt for bin Laden continues and al-Qaeda remains an international threat. Even more drastic in its effect was the inability of the Coalition to prevent the outbreak of the insurgency in Iraq. There, the failure to provide enough troops to control Baghdad after the collapse of Saddam's regime was a major factor.

Despite the evidence outlined above, the case that the United States suffers from a casualty phobia is not clear cut, as proponents of the Vietnam Syndrome would have us believe. After all, in the two World Wars of the twentieth century, the United States showed that it would not flinch from the necessity of taking and inflicting

> There is also a strong case that by prioritising casualty aversion, governments run the risk of prolonging conflicts, and thereby risking a higher cost.

heavy losses and widespread destruction in order to achieve its national goals. The Japanese armed forces, which had based its war strategy on the assumption that the United States would recoil from the cost of reconquering the Pacific, learned a hard lesson in American resolve. The ferocity of the fighting in the American Civil War also shows the United States' willingness to bear casualties. As the MIT scholars Harvey M Sapolsky and Jeremy Shapiro have observed, 'The lesson that [General Ulysses] Grant taught America—[is] that war is about death, pure and simple…'.[29] Moreover, despite being deeply unpopular, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are now into their sixth and seventh years, respectively.

In fact, casualty aversion in the United States is more complex than simply being a desire by a nation living in the shadow of Vietnam to avoid the trauma of bloodshed. The phenomenon exists, but is an affliction limited to the nation's military and liberal elites. Research by social scientists has discovered that casualty aversion among the masses is nothing more than a myth.[30]

The political scientists Peter D Feaver and Christopher Gelpi have concluded that there is little evidence of casualty phobia amongst the public and that restrictions on the use of force by the US political and military leadership 'appears to be self-imposed'.[31] Furthermore they believe that only a minority of the public can be classified as casualty averse.[32] The Director of the Centre for Defence Studies, Paul Cornish, came to a similar conclusion, writing that casualty intolerance 'appears to be largely an elite, "top-down" preoccupation',[33] and Jeffrey Record, of the US Air War College, has called it a 'misperceived lesson of the Vietnam War'.[34] Perhaps the US Naval War College's Richard A Lacquement, Jr. has stated the case most clearly: 'There is in fact no evidence that the public is intrinsically casualty averse.'[35]

What is evident is that the American public takes a more nuanced and flexible approach to the employment of force and the risk of casualties in determining the worth of any foreign adventurism. In his groundbreaking Rand Corporation study into this subject, Eric Larson concluded that when assessing an intervention the US public conducts a cost-benefit calculation that balances an operation's ends and means. The American public, it appears from his research, does not hold an inflexible attitude towards casualties, unlike the nation's political leaders and senior military officers. To the public, casualty tolerance is a variable that is derived from the interaction of the perceived benefit of the intervention, the prospect for success and the possible and, once committed, actual cost. The public also requires to be shown visible, even if slow, progress towards a known objective.

> 'There is in fact no evidence that the public is intrinsically casualty averse.'

The last and perhaps most important factor in the public's determination of their support for an operation is the quality of their political and military leadership. The nation's leaders must make a strong case for an operation's necessity and then sustain the public's support through to its conclusion.[36] For example, the public's lessening of support for the Vietnam War after the Tet Offensive had as much to do with a sense of having being misled by the overly rosy reports that emanated from HQ MACV as with the losses resulting from the battle.

CASUALTY AVERSION AND THE RISK TO AUSTRALIA

While casualty aversion is closely associated with the United States, its influence is evident across the range of modern Western democracies. For example, following the terrorist bomb attacks on Madrid's commuter trains the Spanish Government abandoned its commitment to the US-led Coalition in Iraq,[37] and the Philippines Government withdrew its forces to save the life of a single kidnapped Filipino truck driver.[38] In Afghanistan, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF) battle against the Taliban is handicapped by the reluctance of some of its contributing countries to put their soldiers at risk. Even a few casualties have the potential to weaken support in these contingents' homelands, trigger a withdrawal and even bring about the ISAF's collapse and failure.[39] At the time of this writing the US-led coalition in Iraq contained twenty-one countries,[40] but since the onset of the insurgency in mid-2003 only the United States and the United Kingdom have willingly exposed their personnel to the hazards of combat, and recently the British resolve shows signs of weakening.[41] In Iraq, most contributing nations restrict their troops to low-risk roles. Australia is clearly in this latter category.[42]

In 1996 Sapolsky and Shapiro described casualty aversion as 'an American dilemma, though like blue jeans and Coca-Cola it will probably spread to many other countries'.[43] As is the case for much of the West there are indications that this has also happened

> In Iraq, most contributing nations restrict their troops to low-risk roles.

in Australia. The absence of battle fatalities in Iraq—when by comparison those suffered by the United States alone has surpassed 4000—cannot be explained by good fortune or superior prowess alone. Certainly, there have been a few close calls; a number of attacks have resulted in Australians wounded, which would have had a more serious outcome with a different blast trajectory. However, rather than luck or skill the more rational explanation for the absence of Australian battle fatalities is that the ADF has adopted force protection as the priority goal for its troops in Iraq. In mid-2004 when Major General Jim Molan returned to Canberra on leave from his

position in Baghdad, he noted that the main interest of the senior people with whom he met was on 'making sure our troops didn't get hurt'.[44] More recently, in his speech to the National Press Club the Minister for Defence, Joel Fitzgibbon, commented on the deaths of six Australian soldiers in Afghanistan. While he recognised that Australia's loss was minor when compared to that of our allies, Fitzgibbon nonetheless observed that they were 'six lives too many'.[45]

The emergence of a cult of casualty aversion in Australia is a cause for great concern. While the protection of one's troops is a noble objective—it would be a disservice to the nation if its military strength was wantonly wasted—the institutionalisation of an automatic default to casualty aversion in decision-making holds critical pitfalls. It is unsustainable to the point of folly, it risks the nation's ability to use force to obtain critical strategic objectives, and it desensitises public and even military understanding of the unchanging character of war, which is that it remains violent, brutish and bloody.

> … it desensitises public and even military understanding of the unchanging character of war …

The context of Australia's decision to emphasise force protection as a mission goal should be seen within a framework for strategic policy development. Contemporary theorists have divided wars into two categories: wars of choice and wars of necessity. Wars of choice are those in which there is a strategic need for Australia to participate, but not necessarily make a large contribution or expose those deployed to great risk. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are considered wars of choice because Australia is not under direct threat and the goal of our participation is less to defeat the insurgents than to demonstrate support for the lead nation, namely the United States. The United States is Australia's most important defence partner and this relationship is the foundation of the Commonwealth's national security policy. Wars of necessity, by contrast, are those conflicts in which Australia has a vital interest and in which the ADF is likely to be the force leader, not just one of a host of coalition members. Consequently, wars of necessity are conflicts which Australia must win. By this definition Australia's most recent war of necessity was the Second World War, although the 1999 intervention in East Timor is held up as an example of the ADF being the lead nation.

The decision to deploy a military force with the proviso that no one gets hurt is a curious one, and raises two questions. First, since military operations are inherently dangerous, why deploy in the first place? It would be much safer to stay home. Second, if a government is unable to maintain support for an operation in the face of potential or actual casualties then it must be asked whether the mission is of

sufficient national worth to be undertaken in the first place. As the Dean of the Academic Board of the United States Military Academy observed, 'You don't deploy somewhere to protect yourself.'[46]

Since wars of choice are less critical than wars of necessity there is a perception that Australia can avoid the heavy lifting; a direct confrontation with the enemy's forces which might result in casualties. This is a false and baneful distinction. One of the realities of modern war, or, in fact, warfare in any period, is that one's opponent gets to have a say in the conflict's level of intensity. It is from this perspective that Australia has indeed been lucky in Iraq. For reasons that are not entirely clear, the insurgents have chosen not to focus their attention on Australian targets. This happy circumstance, however, is beyond the ability of the Australian Government and ADF to control, and it could change at any moment. For a country to maintain a national security agenda on the premise that its adversary will consider it unworthy of notice is a decidedly high risk strategy indeed.

Insurgency wars are particularly vulnerable to the negative effects of a casualty avoidance policy. When compared to conventional war, insur-

> When compared to conventional war, insurgencies are considered to be of a lower order of magnitude.

gencies are considered to be of a lower order of magnitude. This sense is reinforced by the political nature of an insurgency war, as well as the mode of operations conducted by the counterinsurgent. The application of violence is not the counterinsurgent's primary tactic to secure success; rather it is to win the 'hearts and minds' of the population in which the insurgent lives. By contrast, for the insurgent the target of their operations is not the military personnel they attack in the field but the political leadership and public will in their opponent's homeland.[47]

However, one of the lessons that must be taken from the insurgency now being waged in Iraq is that the threat environment of a counterinsurgency can still be extremely dangerous and lethal. It is the insurgent who determines the intensity of the conflict. In the battles for Fallujah and Najaf in Iraq the insurgents decided not to slip away but to stand and fight. The result was that US soldiers and marines had to fight street by street, building by building to take these from the insurgents. The insurgents were well armed with modern weapons, had stockpiled ammunition, prepared defensive positions, and were willing to fight to the death. Rather than an opponent who avoided confrontation, the US Army and Marine troops fought intensive knock-down fights that required the application of copious quantities of firepower in order to kill or drive out their enemy. The November battle for Fallujah alone cost the United States 54 dead and 425 wounded. Approximately 1000

insurgents also died and much of the city was reduced to rubble.[48] The battles for Fallujah and Najaf, while part of an insurgency, were not low-casualty affairs.

While some theorists argue that conventional war is no longer possible—the residents of Tbilisi might dispute this assertion—conflict with insurgents can be as brutal, violent and deadly as that of traditional war. In fact, the passing of state-on-state war has only increased the prospect of the outbreak of numerous and potentially nasty small wars. Jeffrey Record has observed that weak and failed states have become 'shelters and breeding grounds for such transnational threats as terrorism, drug-trafficking, refugee generation, environmental degradation, and political and religious extremism'.[49] Australia rests on the edge of a region that is prone to destabilisation and in which it has already had need to intervene on numerous occasions. To date, these interventions have been more peacekeeping than warfighting affairs. However, the prospect that a new insurgency may break out in the region or one of the existing ones may turn nasty cannot be discounted, and if this happens Australian troops must be prepared for casualties.

The belief that casualties equate with military error has already been seen in the ADF's deployment to Iraq and elsewhere. Senior officers, who should limit themselves to the strategic level, now intercede in tactical level decisions. Furthermore, casualties are viewed as meaning that something has gone wrong or someone has made a mistake. After every incident involving Australians copious reporting and examination takes place, often including the dispatch of a delegation of investigators from home to ascertain the circumstances surrounding a soldier's death. The soldier and scholar Karl W Eikenberry has concluded that when the dominant culture mandates the detailed investigation of every casualty to ascertain cause and often to assign blame, the result is that the force 'may be ill-prepared for the inevitable tough fight lurking over the horizon. Considered coldly,' he continues, 'soldiers … are ultimately a means, not an end.'[50] Attempts to manage casualties at the zero defect level also fly in the face of the classical understanding and interpretation of the nature of war. War is chaotic. War is violent.

> Australia rests on the edge of a region that is prone to destabilisation …

More worrying than self-delusion on the part of government and the ADF is the effect this development has had on the Australian populace. As Professor Jeffrey Grey has observed, there is now a real risk that as 'citizens in a western liberal democracy of failing to understand fully the implications of what we send others to do in our name and on our behalf'.[51] Wars, as Grey continues, are not casualty free and 'we need to accept and understand that fact'.[52]

Australians can take comfort in the accomplishments of its military personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. Closer to home the ADF has performed well in the

interventions in East Timor, Bougainville and the Solomon Islands, and has demonstrated flexibility and humanity in the response to disasters in Aceh and Papua New Guinea. However, these relatively trouble-free activities may suddenly come to an end. For this eventuality Australian soldiers and citizens must prepare for the need to take greater risks and accept the reality of more casualties in the pursuit of national objectives. War is an unforgiving enterprise. It would be foolish to plan for anything different.

CONCLUSION

Australia and its army emerged from the Vietnam War unscathed by America's 'Vietnam Syndrome'. To now impose upon itself its own version would be a mistake at a national level. Those in the West who equate casualties with mistake or failure, who are repulsed by images of broken bodies played across television screens and who automatically discount the use of force in the attainment of national security objectives may prefer to see the goodness and kindness in the human spirit, but they forget the complexity that is contained within our species. By contrast, the opponents of Western liberal democracies do not suffer from such casualty aversion debility. This is asymmetry at its most dangerous. In becoming casualty phobic the West is exposing a weakness that its adversaries will be sure to exploit to our disadvantage.

Writing nearly fifty years ago the British historian Cyril Falls reflected that it was remarkable:

> how many people exert themselves and go through contortions to prove that battles and wars are won by any means except that by which they are most commonly won, which is fighting.[53]

ENDNOTES

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WHAT MOTIVATES SUICIDE ATTACKERS?

BOMBARDIER ALEXANDER HOWE

ABSTRACT

This article examines the factors that most often make up the motivation behind suicide attacks. The author argues that it is rarely one issue that influences the behaviour of individuals and groups who resort to suicide attacks, and addresses several misconceptions that exist regarding these dangerous enemies.

Do not kill yourselves. God is merciful to you, but he that does that through wickedness and injustice shall be burned in fire. That is easy enough for God.

Koran, Surah 4:29

In recent times the world, particularly the Middle East, has seen a rise in suicide-related terrorist activities. An example of suicide attack is when a terrorist with an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) strapped to their body enters a crowd of people and detonates the device, killing themselves and any bystanders unlucky enough to be near the explosion. In some cases this is spectacularly successful—the

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE or Tamil Tigers) assassinated a world leader by this method.[1]

With the attendant media coverage a significant attack receives, there are still many misconceptions about suicide attackers. The Queensland Police Service undertook a recent survey, which asked: 'What are the characteristics of a typical suicide bomber?'. The answer was, universally: 'They are always male'.[2] Another misguided opinion is that suicide terrorism is purely an Islamic creation. While Muslims may be the most vocal of the proponents of suicide attacks,[3] the greatest number in the last twenty years have been carried out by the Tamil Tigers, a Hindu organisation.

The main difference between a suicide attack and a suicidal attack is that a suicide attacker must die to achieve their objective, whereas a suicidal attacker, while having full knowledge that they are unlikely to survive the attack, does not have to die to meet their aim and may in fact emerge from their mission alive. While this chance of survival may be overwhelmingly theoretical, it marks a crucial difference to the mental state of the attacker.[4]

This article will aim to outline the various factors that may motivate a person to volunteer for a suicide attack. While considered by many to be an overriding factor, religious fanaticism is only one of a broad range of possibilities. From revenge to national survival to an order from a higher authority; rarely are any of these seen as individual motives. A combination of factors will normally come together to create a suicide terrorist. Recruiting, training and the mission are important factors; however, this article will focus primarily on the issue of motivation.

> A combination of factors will normally come together to create a suicide terrorist.

Revenge has been a powerful motivator for attack for almost the entirety of human history, but is it a causal factor in suicide attacks? There is little evidence to suggest any suicide bombings have been due to a single person solely attempting to gain restitution for a previous grievance against them or someone close to them. However, there is evidence that some suicide attackers have approached terrorist groups, motivated by personal revenge.

A famous case in point is the assassination of Rajiv Ghandi, on 21 May 1991 in Madras. The assassin in this case was a female, known only as Dhanu, who had reportedly been gang raped by Indian soldiers as they looted her town and killed her four brothers.[5] The acts committed against her by Indian soldiers may have given her a strong personal motivation for an attack against the Indian Prime Minister. The successful assassination of Ghandi, a major political opponent of the Tamil Tigers, was a vital victory for the organisation. Some grievances can stretch back many years, even centuries. Arab and Asian communities have been known to carry on

blood feuds over long periods of time, and this can influence individuals—driving them to volunteer to be a suicide attacker.[6]

Another interesting subset of the terrorist is the bereaved widow. The death of a spouse may leave her cut off from productive society and/or leave her with a sense of hopelessness, especially in very traditional communities, as seen in Islamic societies.[7] Volunteers for the increasing number of suicide attacks in Iraq are often local Iraqis attempting to avenge the occupation of Iraq by US forces and the Global War on Terror, increasingly seen as a war on Islam.[8] Many of these volunteers have witnessed clashes between civilians and occupying forces that steeled their resolve to fight, or are merely fighting to remove US forces from Iraq.[9] The theme of avenging the occupation is mirrored in the Israeli experience in Gaza, the West Bank and Southern Lebanon. While maintaining a military presence in these areas, Israel saw the highest concentration of suicide attacks launched against its territory. After withdrawing from Southern Lebanon the suicide attacks by Hezbollah stopped,[10] whereas Hoffman maintains suicide attacks from Palestinian factions increased following 2002.[11]

The overpowering and occupation of one country by another larger, militarily superior country will most often be seen as a threat to the very survival of the occupied country. When survival is at stake, more and more desperate measures are brought into play. A society that can see or feel a threat to its way of life, values or even survival may react in such a way as to make the attacking party rethink the value of the conquest in relation to the cost. In this situation the suicide bomber becomes a more attractive proposition—the average suicide attack can be achieved very cheaply, for a cost report-edly as low as $150.[12] This offsets the numerical, technical and training superiority of more developed nations.

In developed nations (primarily Israel and occupying US forces) the effects of suicide terrorism can far exceed the effect of most conventional weapons. First and foremost is the negative psychological effect of an unseen but devastating enemy. When any member of a crowd could be seconds away from detonating a device, the awareness and attentiveness needed by nearby soldiers quickly rises to unsustainable levels, making them prone to fatigue, mistakes and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.[13] Second, the suicide campaign will have flow-on effects to the civilian population of the invading or occupying force. The population 'back home' will quickly tire of seeing its soldiers blown up and killed and will consequently pressure the government to change its policies, achieving the terrorist's main aims.[14] Third, the targeted army's response to the suicide bombers and parent organisation is to divert resources, already in short supply, sometimes too thinly

> … the average suicide attack can be achieved very cheaply, for a cost reportedly as low as $150.

spread to be effective. As this shows, a terrorist organisation with limited funds but a supply of willing volunteers can tackle a much larger force. The image of a smaller, weaker society struggling to survive against a larger, stronger invader is one that is particularly stirring to terrorists. With differences, particularly in religion, it becomes easier to demonise the enemy, to convince the populace that they are here to destroy them and their way of life. For a number of already dispossessed peoples this has become a reality and they are now fighting to regain their homelands. Typical of these is the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), of Kurdish origin and the LTTE in Sri Lanka.[15] These two organisations have committed the great majority of suicide attacks, with both using systematic suicide attacks as a regular tactic rather than an extreme measure, although the PKK no longer uses this level of violence to forward its cause. The occupation of traditional homelands leaves most native to the area with little recourse but to resort to suicide attack for the same reasons outlined previously—psychological, civil and financial effects—and is arguably the only way a smaller, weaker force can hope to overcome a large advanced foe.[16]

Another causal factor in the decision to use suicide attacks can be the motivation of the parent group and its leadership. This is the result of a group's leadership deciding to use suicide attack, either singly or in a sustained campaign, and then systematically selecting and training would-be recruits. There can be several reasons for this. The organisation might merely see it as a natural progression, the next step in a sustained campaign where success has been lacking. This has been a primary motivator for Chechen rebels in the Caucasus.[17] After suffering setbacks at the hands of Russian forces the Chechens took a change of direction, moving the fighting to major Russian centres with suicide attacks primarily perpetrated by women. This tactic goes against the grain of the traditional Chechen role of women as nurturers. This change has been blamed on an influx of fighters from other nations bringing their traditions and ideologies with them, and military losses depleting the number of available men, which has led to a change in the ideology surrounding a Chechen woman's place in society.[18]

Also in this vein was the change of tactics by Hamas. The signing of the Oslo accords did nothing to legitimise or even recognise Hamas, so the decision was taken to continue the offensive against Israel, without the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). But without support from the larger and more capable organisation, Hamas became nothing more than a nuisance to Israel. It was at this point that Hamas moved into the area of suicide bombing, with its first instance

> … it becomes easier to demonise the enemy, to convince the populace that they are here to destroy them and their way of life.

in 1994.[19] While the transition to suicide attacks can be seen as a natural step for some groups, others have had their hand forced. At the time of Hamas' first suicide attack, another group was competing for attention as the pre-eminent Palestinian terrorist organisation. Religiously motivated, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) was in danger of being eclipsed when Hamas began to use suicide attacks. In order to keep up and maintain its relevance PIJ had to resort to similar tactics, launching its first suicide attack in 1995, shortly after Hamas.[20]

The issue of these groups moving to a more violent and deadly course of action such as suicide bombing has become more pressing as the relative success of this tactic has been demonstrated in recent years. Smaller, less influential groups may see the need to resort to these methods as a way of becoming a known quantity and gaining new recruits in a competitive market.[21] Larger organisations that already have a history of terrorism may consider the suicide attack as a way to reaffirm their commitment to the cause and maintain relevance in the face of greater demands by their civilian supporters.

While terrorist organisations may identify the need to resort to suicide attacks, they do not have the opportunity to explore these methods without widespread support from the community they claim to represent. Whether actual approval (sanction by community or religious leaders) or tacit approval (no opposition or resistance from the community) is gained, the empowerment of working for a cause that benefits the entire society can be a powerful motivator for fresh recruits.

In the case of the female LTTE assassin Dhanu, an event such as rape leaves a Tamil woman seen as unfit to marry or bear children. However, employment as a suicide attacker is seen in Tamil society as an acceptable, if not encouraged, option for women who would otherwise have little to contribute.[22] The same can be said of Middle Eastern cultures. Women have been known to accept the role of suicide bomber to escape the social stigma of being unable to bear children.[23] A disturbing trend in recent years, confined primarily to Islamic societies, is the practice of blackmailing young women into becoming suicide attackers against their will. This is achieved in several ways. A young woman may be seduced by a man selected by the terrorist organisation and, when approached with evidence of the illicit affair, is told that the only way to bring honour back to herself and her family is to undertake a 'martyrdom' mission. The male operative from the terrorist group may aim to get the woman pregnant to guarantee her participation. The only option left to her after this is a so-called 'honour' killing by

> A disturbing trend in recent years … is the practice of blackmailing young women into becoming suicide attackers against their will.

the male members of her family. Where women have not been induced to follow these schemes there is evidence that terrorist groups have arranged for their rape. In Islamic society, the social stigmatisation of real or implied promiscuity can mean the end of a woman's desire to remain an effective member of society, and there are few options left to them.[24]

The acceptance of suicide tactics is dependent on the society's view of the legitimacy of suicide. All major religions of the world consider suicide an abomination against God, on the basis that it is against the laws of God to kill or only God should have the power of life and death, even over one's self.[25] All texts are quite clear in this respect but also incorporate passages to justify killing others in religious wars. In Islam, in comparison to any other religion, the interpretations of the Koran by spiritual leaders has massive influence over the view of certain acts by the whole community. Although suicide is specifically banned, legitimacy can be gained for suicide attacks if it can be shown that suicide is acceptable under certain circumstances, such as during a Jihad (holy war) declared by Muslim clerics. During this time it becomes allowable to kill infidels, even other Muslims under particular circumstances,[26] waive daily prayers or even commit suicide attacks.[27] This theological legitimacy extends to the benefits received after death. Much has been made of the 'seventy-two virgins' a martyr will receive in heaven, but less well known is the promise of the ability to intercede with Allah and bring seventy relatives directly to heaven—surely a strong motivation for socially awkward young men with little direction.

While there is a cause to fight for, most communities will endure extraordinary hardships and sanction retaliations that may not ordinarily be within their scope of thinking, but what happens when the battle is over? Robert Pape has stated that suicide attacks are not committed for their own sake but as part of a sustained campaign.[28] When the campaign achieves its objectives, the original motivating factor is removed and public support, upon which terrorists are as dependent as any political party, is in danger of waning. Without public support the organisational, financial and recruiting needs of the group cannot be met. It is at this point that further theological justification may be required to spur a reluctant community into further action.[29]

This article has presented factors which have been previously identified as significant in the motivation of people freely or coercively undertaking suicide terrorism. As such this list is not exhaustive, as an individual's perceptions will colour their motivations. These perceptions are ultimately arbitrary and thus highly individualistic motivations are the most notable catalysts for suicide attack. Revenge and retribution for past acts can lead individuals to make themselves available for suicide attacks. In some communities the opportunity to strike back can appear to be the only option left to citizens. Societal survival as a motivator is closely linked to revenge. Invasion and occupation by another country, or even control by an unpopular or oppressive government, can spur the subjugated community to drastic

measures. Opposition by an organised resistance or insurgent force will most usually take the form of guerrilla warfare as the smaller force attempts to undermine the larger. In this case suicide attack will be a progression of this strategy, as seen in the sheer number of suicide attacks in Iraq. Public support for this type of campaign is vital. If a terrorist organisation loses the endorsement of their community they can quickly find themselves separated from the support they need to carry out their campaign. Under these circumstances a uniting force, such as religion, can be called upon to create a surge in favour of and fervour for the battle.

> In some communities the opportunity to strike back can appear to be the only option left to citizens.

With such a range of motivations, both for the individual and groups, it becomes apparent that stopping suicide attack is difficult. The best method for stopping an attack has always been to remove the reason for the attack; but in the case of suicide attack the range of motivations makes the task nearly impossible. Early successes have almost guaranteed its use into the near future, but an effective technique to nullify its popularity will become apparent and force another change in tactics by terrorist organisations.

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FUTURE WAR – FUTURE WARFARE

JUSTIN KELLY

ABSTRACT

With the Australian Army's *Complex Warfighting* in mind, this article delves into the debate surrounding the nature of future wars and future warfare. Drawing on prominent figures in the current literature, the author concludes that while the fundamentals of war will remain solid, they will manifest themselves in ways that appear, at least initially, unrecognisable. The author argues that Clausewitz's 'Trinitarian' conception of war—properly understood—provides a suitable framework for understanding future war in this confusing situation, as it allows a relatively clear illustration of continuities and differences between today's wars and those of tomorrow. Understanding these similarities and changes will enable professionals at arms to better prepare themselves for future challenges by building on the solid foundations of proven current practice.

The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be; and that which is done is that which shall be done: and there is no new thing under the sun.

Book of Ecclesiastes 1:9

INTRODUCTION

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War marked a point of departure for military analysis. Until then strategic problems, although complex and thorny, were necessarily dealt with within the context of the greater competition between the East and West. From then, each new strategic problem outwardly enjoyed a degree of singularity and, accordingly, required a greater amount of *a priori* examination. Replacing the somewhat arid and mathematical debate that underlies the conduct of the Cold War, the profusion and novelty of these emerging strategic problems stimulated an equally profuse and disparate array of analysis and prescription.

The new wave of military theory began a little earlier, in the late 1980s, when Soviet theorists began to discuss the implications of emerging weapons, sensing and communications technologies—conventional means that replicated the power of, and provided a useable alternative to, tactical nuclear weapons. They anticipated that the impact of these weapons would require a fundamental reordering of the tactical battlespace in the same way as the introduction of smokeless powder in the 1890s and of tactical nuclear weapons in the 1950s. The 1991 Gulf War offered a practical demonstration that hinted at what might be achievable through the thoughtful combination of these technologies and triggered a flood of seemingly new ideas, including the proposition that there was a revolution in military affairs (RMA) underway.

The proposition that an RMA was in progress triggered a veritable flood of books describing the long waves of military innovation and identifying earlier periods of discontinuous or extremely rapid change. Depending on semantic arguments of what constituted a revolution and historical arguments centred around the causality of victory and defeat, this resulted in lists of from none to ten historical RMAs.

The span of arguments fuelling this debate has been broad but has fallen into two principal schools: one focused on the power of technology and the potential it offers, and the other on the response of putative enemies to Western technological dominance. The result of the to and fro between these two schools of thought has seen the debate follow a quite clear trajectory: from examination of the implications of technology on the tactical battlespace, through a period of technological triumphalism culminating in the unsuccessful air campaign against Serbia in 1999, and settling into a Hobbesian view of an anarchic tribal world rife with blood feuds and incessant terrorism.

In 'War and Anti-War'[1] the Tofflers argued for the power of the technologies that comprised the RMA but warned that states would not monopolise that power. Arquilla in numerous writings went further and posited that 'netwar was coming' and that the field of battle would increasingly shift away from geographic space and into cyberspace. In 1989 Lind introduced Fourth Generation War; in 1991 Van Creveld described the processes that he saw underlying what he considered to be 'the transformation of war'[2] and announced the death of Clausewitz—an announcement that drew

vigorous support from John Keegan[3] and relief from staff college students the world over. In 1999, two Chinese colonels created a ripple when they published *Unrestricted Warfare*,[4] in which they argued the futility of confronting US power directly and called for an approach that was both more comprehensive and nuanced.

The US experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has stimulated what has become a debate between a technological view and an anthropological one—between the 'special forces on horseback' exemplar in Afghanistan and the daily bloody grind of Fallujah, Ramadi, Tarin Qowt and Baqubah. In short, a debate on whether modern war was amenable to technological resolution or would continue to rest on brutish and bloody close combat. Although there is a clear consensus that insurgency is the proximate strategic problem, there are larger questions that have not been resolved—in particular whether conventional state-on-state war has passed into history.

Most recently, Frank Hoffman in *The Rise of Hybrid Wars*[5] and Max Boot in *War Made New*[6] have refreshed the debate with Hoffman projecting from the *Unrestricted War* platform

> … the field of battle would increasingly shift away from geographic space and into cyberspace.

and resting heavily on the Australian Army's *Complex Warfighting*[7] and Boot carrying forward the RMA banner. There are superficial similarities between these two works that mask fundamentally different views. Boot decries the Napoleonic aphorism that the 'moral is to the physical as three is to one', whereas Hoffman argues persuasively that where there is a will there is a way. The result is that Boot sees that the answer lies in institutions able to seize technological opportunities, whereas Hoffman expects to be engaged in a broader battle of wills. Part of this is the semantic difference between war and warfare, with Boot focusing on how to win battles and Hoffman describing what roles battles will fill in deciding the outcome of future wars. Hoffman is aligned with Rupert Smith[8] in arguing that, increasingly, wars will be decided in the 'hearts and minds' of the belligerent populations rather than on the battlefield.

This article does not attempt to review each of the works mentioned or to proffer detailed arguments for or against the positions they propose; rather, it will investigate a number of broad themes intertwined through them all in order to draw some equally broad conclusions about the characteristics of future wars.

THE ENDURING NATURE OF WAR

Gray[9] notes that when trying to predict the future of war the ideas of continuity and discontinuity—that is what changes and what does not—are of compelling concern. He argues forcefully that the nature of war is not variable, whereas the character of

warfare has and should be expected to continually evolve. On this basis future war is not an amorphous mass of unknowns but rather has a discernable and constant core. Only aspects of war outside this core are amenable to change—this makes prediction much easier.

Clausewitz described war as a chaotic interaction between rational analysis and aspirations, irrational emotions like love, hate, fear and envy, and random factors like blind luck, friction and the effects of incomplete or incorrect information. He saw these elements interacting in what he referred to as the 'remarkable trinity', which was the source of the term 'Trinitarian war'. Clearly the trinity is at work within each human being and within every group that human beings form—from family to international organisation. It describes how humans interact with the universe. Most importantly it describes the mechanism that we know as politics and is why war is a political act. When Clausewitz said that war is an extension of politics he did not mean to suggest that it was an act of rational policy but rather that it was a product of the action of the remarkable trinity and therefore of politics with all of the chaotic interactions and irrationality that such an association suggests.[10]

Because each of us is subject to our own Trinitarian foibles and each group to its own, war involves the interaction of a myriad of individual, group, national and cross-cultural trinities. The resulting chaos means that each war—whatever the wish or intent at the start—will take a form that is unique to itself and will change, unpredictably and continuously, throughout its course. This then is the immutable nature of war; it is a political act—a social, cultural and political phenomenon that will constantly seek to escape human control in order to establish an independent existence.

> … war is not variable, whereas the character of warfare has and should be expected to continually evolve.

Many contemporary writers on the future of war manifest a wrong-headed tendency to see Trinitarian war as being between states and fought by the regular military forces of those states.[11] They tend to disparage this Clausewitzian model of war in favour of one which sees it as an endeavour founded on social, cultural and informational precepts. On this basis it is possible to look at factors like economic interdependency, the frequency of international travel or the proliferation of international, multinational and transnational organisations, and come to the conclusion that state versus state war has passed, or is passing, into history. In reality, state versus state wars fought by regular militaries and terrorist attacks by radical Islamists are both manifestations of true Trinitarian war in which politics finds its expression at least partially through the application of violence, and which is subsequently shaped by its own logic.

It is this variability that makes warfare a free, creative act in which the contending wills of the protagonists seek to find and exploit advantage over each other. Edward Luttwak[12] described the 'paradoxical logic' of war in which adversaries seek 'to oppose, deflect and reverse each others actions'. The result of this logic is that defensive preparations trigger attacks, for example; that flexible deterrent options provoke rather than deter; and that the creation of strengths directs adversaries against comparative weaknesses. Accordingly, the notion of 'asymmetric' warfare is nonsense; war is by its nature a search for asymmetrical advantage over an enemy. This constant jockeying to seek advantage means that the character of any particular war will inevitably be shaped by the relative social, cultural, physical, technological, informational and economic strengths, weaknesses and perceptions of the protagonists and we should not be surprised if our next war requires a mode of warfare that is completely unlike anything we have done before and which we find hard. It would be unusual if this were not so.

> … war is by its nature a search for asymmetrical advantage over an enemy.

Once war is seen as a political act, in the Trinitarian sense, it can be easily understood that wars are decided politically—not militarily—and that military force is merely one blunt instrument that can be applied to influence the remarkable trinity of an opposing polity to concede rather than resist. This sets clear limits on the utility of military force. Wars can only be decided in the 'hearts and minds' of the populations of the rivals.

WHY WARS ARE FOUGHT AND WHO WILL FIGHT IN THE FUTURE.

Kto Koap? (Who is to rule? Who is to be ruled?)

Lenin

The death of the state has been long anticipated[13] and with the exception of Colin Gray, most of the pundits publishing today are heralding the end of conventional state versus state wars and the rise of irregular wars fought between and against other polities clustered around some political, social or ideological issue.

In *The Clash of Civilizations*, Samuel Huntington posited the view that sources of future conflict would be found along the boundaries between differing cultures. Although his arguments have been widely criticised they have as their foundation the idea that cultural identity and the desire to assert it, or need to defend it, will be the principal source of future wars. That is, that even (or especially) in a globalised world, individuals will continue to ask and answer the questions 'who is the "we",

who makes up the "us"?'. Having decided who are insiders and who are outsiders, the question of who rules whom comes naturally. All wars are ultimately about the distribution of political power.

The proposition that we have seen the end of state versus state wars does not sit well in this context. Despite some optimism late last century, the state is not in decline. People still cluster together based on some sort of territorial identity and they form communities as a result of the manifold advantages it brings. Over time some of those communities arise as states and are admitted, grudgingly or not, into the international system. Although continuous re-ordering of the state system is natural and inevitable, the creation of states is a natural outcome of geography and economics and of an anthropological drive. The existence of states and the arrangement of the international system based on states is not under threat.[14]

It should not be forgotten that successful insurgencies, by definition, become states and that terrorism is simply a tactic of insurgents intended to coerce obedience from those who would resist, or as a propaganda tool to attract recruits or deter external interference. Even al-Qaeda, that most formless of groups, is currently fighting in a number of locations seeking to establish a geographic toehold from which it can grow the Caliphate—itself a state. For the time being political power can only be fully expressed through the medium of the state and so states will continue to be central to our experience of war.

Over time, the relative power of the countries that make up the international system will wax and wane and the status quo will become more or less tolerable depending on individual points of view. In our own time the rise of China, India and Russia will profoundly affect the strategic environment in ways that are only broadly discernable. Gray argues that resistance to US hegemony will be the keynote of the state system in the mid-term and this view has some validity. However, how the rising states will relate to each other and the combinations that will be made between these emerging and existing great powers and between them and other powers—in response to perceptions of status, resource security or direct and indirect threats—is less clear. Almost certainly, simple resistance to US influence is too crude a model. What is clear is that the kinds of competition for status, resources or a sense of security that triggered wars between states in the past seem certain to be present in the future. State versus state wars remain a strategic problem for today.

Since war is an expression of political processes it is timely to recall the aphorism that 'all politics is local'. There is a tendency for strategists to ascribe to protagonists

> For the time being political power can only be fully expressed through the medium of the state …

a degree of rationality, to treat them in fact as unitary rational actors. Such rational behaviour is both foreclosed by Clausewitz's theory and extremely rare in the historical record. This is because the leadership of any polity is beholden to the members of that polity in a way that is much stronger than the web of relationships extending from it to the outside—nationalism remains a very strong driver. Therefore, overwhelmingly, internal pressures—the remarkable trinity at work—drive external actions. This affects both the causes of wars and how they are fought.

The existence of disaffected internal groups, and the sources of their identities, provides opportunities for third parties to become involved. In southern Thailand, for example, unrest among a local Islamic community in the face of claimed neglect by the culturally Buddhist central government—although founded purely on local issues—provides the opportunity for revolutionary Islamists to become involved with a view to connect this local conflict with the global jihad.[15] This process of recruitment of local conflicts to a wider war is not new—it was the principal way that the Cold War expressed itself violently. The result today, as then, is that even seemingly minor local conflicts may be more important, much harder to resolve, and more likely to develop in unexpected directions than first appearances might suggest. However, it seems likely that this is to become the principal way in which military force will be applied in competitions between states in which, in any single geographic area, at least one side will likely fight entirely through proxies—at least initially and as long as reason retains control.

> The existence of disaffected internal groups … provides opportunities for third parties to become involved.

There is no help here in terms of narrowing the field of options for how future war will look. State versus state warfare will not go away. The influence of cultural identity will continue to be felt for many years and will be an important driver in the evolution of the international system as new states emerge, or struggle to emerge, and older states compete for their place in the sun. The recruitment of local conflicts to wider causes and resistance to perceived Westernisation will also continue and probably accelerate. Local conflicts will continue to arise but will seldom remain local and will seldom be able to be ignored. Transnational threats along the lines of, but not limited to, Islamic terrorism will remain a major preoccupation. Although conventional confrontation of the United States may appear futile that does not mean it will not happen—equally, the United States remains a special case and conventional confrontation of nearly any other country remains within the bounds of rationality. None of these sources of conflict will be isolated from the others, and state and non-state actors will exploit them to pursue their own ambitions. Another bloody century indeed.

TECHNOLOGY AND WAR

War is completely permeated by technology. Humans are a tool-using animal, and since the development of opposable thumbs they have used tools to dominate their competitors. As technology has advanced over the centuries the ability to produce more and better weapons has advanced apace, and today weapons are available that can destroy virtually any target with great confidence. On this basis it is possible, and common, to apply a degree of technological determinism to war. It is wrong to do so. Technology can influence the character of a war but it does not affect its nature and, with the possible exception of the special case of nuclear weapons, nor is it ever likely to be a decisive factor in the resolution of a war. There are a number of reasons for this.

The first and most important is that, as has been stated, wars are decided in the 'hearts and minds' of the belligerent populations and technology has only a limited capacity to influence them. Overwhelming technological advantage can deter war up to a point but, given sufficient reason, populations have historically shown a readiness to fight against seemingly insuperable odds. Once military confrontation has started, mere destruction of the armed forces of the enemy may not be sufficient for victory unless the enemy population perceives it to be so. It is possible to win every battle and lose a war.[16]

The notion of a tool rests on a sense of a stable cause and effect relationship. When you hit a nail with a hammer in a certain way it penetrates deeper into the wood. On the basis of this stable cause and effect relationship there is a tendency towards specialisation. This is why there are a number of different types of hammer, for example—each specialised for a relatively narrow range of tasks and each designed specifically to perform that array of tasks with the greatest possible efficiency. The further one moves away from specialisation the less efficient the tool becomes. The result is that the scissors on Swiss army knives are not used by tailors and nor are the saws used by carpenters. Thrown into juxtaposition with the paradoxical logic of war, this tendency towards specialisation places limits on the utility of any technology. The more specialised a weapon is, the easier it is for an enemy to create conditions that make it either unusable or of very low utility. The increasing use of urban terrain by ground forces to limit the utility of stand-off surveillance and engagement technologies is a contemporary example. Excellence in technology necessarily creates opportunities for asymmetry.

In this vein, each technological strength necessarily presents a weakness to an enemy: heavy tanks are hard to destroy but equally hard to support; fast jet fighters are enormously powerful but totally reliant on long, fixed, obvious, concrete runways.

> Excellence in technology necessarily creates opportunities for asymmetry.

As a result, the exploitation of technological strength relies heavily on organisational complexity and robustness. It is not sensible to rely on fighter aircraft unless the air and ground defences of airfields are fully provided for, nor is it sensible to operate tanks unless appropriate combat service support arrangements can be made.

That is not to say that technology can be eschewed. Innovative technology can confer an advantage for the time it takes the enemy to think their way around it. This interplay between innovation and counter-innovation represents an aspect of the constant search for asymmetric advantage. An ability to innovate and to produce practical responses to an enemy's innovations, not exclusively technological innovations, is essential for survival on the battlefield let alone success.[17]

> The more advanced and specialised technologies become, the easier they are to subvert.

Superior or novel weapons have occasionally, but not uniformly, led to tactical success. The challenge for the innovator is to turn the fleeting advantage offered by innovative combinations of technology into a more enduring advantage. In the attacks of 11 September 2001, box cutters and willpower created cruise missiles. These conferred a local and temporary tactical advantage which was in the end counterproductive for al-Qaeda. This simple example illustrates the limits on the importance of technology. In *War Made New* Max Boot quotes J F C Fuller and Napoleon Bonaparte and warns against both of them as representing the poles of two dangerous 'determinisms': the technical 'what can be done will be done', and the psychological 'where there is a will there is a way'. In this he is wrong, war is not about battles, it is about defeat and victory, which are perceptions rather than facts. Moral factors—perceptions, beliefs, willpower—dominate war completely. Where there is a will, war will find a way.

There are no silver bullets; at best, technology offers fleeting advantages to those that adopt and apply it and, in the constant search for advantage, consistent technological inferiority represents a major, but seldom fatal, weakness. The more advanced and specialised technologies become, the easier they are to subvert. Certainly, there is no sense in which it is true to say that the outcome of wars will be determined or even largely influenced by technology. On the contrary, it is fair to say that any view of future war that rests on a technological argument is probably in error.

CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

The limited impact that technological advantage has on the outcome of wars cannot hide the fact that the use of weapons separates war from political competition and remains the central activity of warfare. Furthermore the type and quantity of

weapons available to the belligerents fundamentally shapes the character of any particular war.

There is a growing consensus that states are losing their previous monopoly on the best, most lethal weapons and that non-state actors will increasingly dispose of comparable arsenals. This is only partially true. It is the scale, wealth and organisation of states that has given them logistic capabilities which have enabled them to design, construct, field and support an array of weapons and to sustain and expand this array through the course of a war. The more sophisticated the weapons the more that this is true. This is the truly decisive advantage that states will continue to exercise over non-state actors. This does not mean, however, that wars against non-state enemies will be constrained to primitive grappling with unsophisticated weapons. Some wars, against groups that are ideologically or geographically isolated, totally impoverished and fighting against a universally acclaimed 'white knight' may be so constrained. More commonly, non-state groups will find state supporters able to provide these advantages for them. Well developed relationships of this kind enable organisations such as Hezbollah to wield anti-shipping cruise missiles, advanced surface-to-air missiles, anti-tank guided missiles and large calibre artillery rockets.

Non-state actors that are more isolated from such state support—such as al-Qaeda—have correspondingly less choice in the array of weapons available to them and, in practice, are therefore more constrained to the least sophisticated weapons and, by extension, the softest targets. This has more than merely a tactical effect—their inability to tactically confront US forces, for example, has been the principal shaper of al-Qaeda strategy in Iraq. Poor weapons limit the strategic options available to them. In contrast, Iranian support for Jaysh Al Mahdi means that they are provided with improvised explosive devices able to penetrate US armour. On this basis, Iranian state support was directly responsible for 60 per cent of US casualties in Iraq despite the fact that the war against al-Qaeda was the 'hot' one.

Without state support, non-state actors will be constrained to relatively primitive weapons or, if they do gain access to sophisticated weapons, they will not be able to field or sustain sufficient quantities to have more than a local tactical effect. States will continue to exercise a practical monopoly over the most sophisticated weapons and will channel them to non-state actors in pursuit of state interests.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD)

WMD fall into two main groups: nuclear weapons and chemical/ biological weapons. Chemical and biological weapons are relatively easy to produce and disseminate but they are of limited effectiveness. Nuclear weapons, in contrast, are difficult to produce and deliver but are so astoundingly effective that, since their advent in 1945, they have fallen into a class of their own.

Nuclear weapons are presently the exclusive possessions of a small group of states. They are such powerful weapons that no state, except for Hiroshima and Nagasaki, has found the political logic to justify their use and, in practice, the possibility of their use has been a powerful factor in limiting the ends sought in wars. There can be no wars of national survival fought between nuclear armed states. At the same time, there has been a perception that the use of nuclear weapons on a non-nuclear state would be so far beyond the pale that coercion by nuclear threat is not a practical tool of state-craft. As a result, nuclear weapons have had a major dampening effect on international relations.

> Nuclear weapons are presently the exclusive possessions of a small group of states.

On this basis there is an argument that attempts to counter-proliferate are unnecessary and undesirable. If all states were nuclear-armed, war between them would become illogical. Therefore, if states were allowed to develop nuclear weapons in accordance with their perceived security needs there would be greater stability amongst the community of states. Unfortunately logic is a poor lens through which to examine history and entirely inappropriate as a prognostic tool.

The reality is that the greater the number of nuclear armed states the greater the likelihood that rogue individuals or rogue states will pass either the expertise or functioning weapons to third parties or find within themselves the logic to employ the weapons directly. This would establish the possibility of a connection between the psychology of the suicide bomber and the employment of nuclear weapons that represents a complete departure from our experience to date.

The history of the Geneva and Hague Conventions stretching back to the 1860s has been one of attempts by the community of states to limit the viciousness and horrors of war. Under pressure, either as acts of policy or because of local decisions, most of these constraints have, from time to time, been ignored but the trend has been generally towards wider observance. If nuclear weapons were to fall into the hands of an ideologically motivated state or group, unconstrained by a culture or history of restraint in the application of force, and engaged in what it perceived as an existential conflict with an unmitigated evil, then the application of nuclear weapons would have found the logic that has hitherto been missing.

Proliferation control is failing and there is little reason to think that this trend will reverse in the future. The threat of retaliation and the consequences of near universal condemnation remain restraints on the employment of nuclear weapons by any state, no matter how rogue or how ideologically motivated, but the provision of weapons to proxies willing and able to use them could achieve the same ends

while maintaining plausible deniability. As a result, the use of nuclear weapons by non-state actors becomes more likely with each passing day.

In a 1980s commercial war game simulating the defence of NATO, both sides had the option of resorting to nuclear weapons after the fifth game turn. If either side took up this option, the game finished on the roll of the dice with a 50/50 chance of victory or defeat. To some extent the same calculus could be applied to nuclear use by a non-state actor today. The limitations on the number, yield and targeting of terrorist-delivered bombs precludes anything resembling strategic bombardment. Instead a nuclear attack would be an upscale terrorist incident, devastating to those involved and damaging to the target state but far from sufficient to destroy or even cripple it. In the end all a terrorist organisation (and its state sponsor) get is a really angry and energised global community and an enemy, more powerful than them, from whom all practical restraints have been removed, thereby undermining the terrorists' first line of defence.

In future wars it would be overly optimistic to anticipate the continued non-use of nuclear weapons. Although direct state use remains

> … the use of nuclear weapons by non-state actors becomes more likely with each passing day.

unlikely, indirect delivery by proxies is becoming more likely. Although such an eventuality would be appalling and every action should be taken to avoid it, such an attack would be one blow in a war, and not the complete war.

PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT

Since war is a violent battle of wills, war termination relies on disarming the enemy's will. This might be done by physically destroying their means of continued resistance or by threatening to impose costs on the enemy that are broadly perceived as outweighing the potential benefits of continued resistance. The desire to attack the national will of the enemy directly, rather than through the proxy of the fielded army, lies at the core of the air power theories of Douhet and his successors.

Globalisation brings with it greater economic interdependence between states, a proliferation of international organisations and transnational corporations and large numbers of people travelling or working in countries other than their own. The economies of both individual states and of the world increasingly rely on the free movement of commodities and products, pervasive communications, networked computers and the Internet. Clearly such interdependency creates a dampening effect on international conflicts by making the attendant costs and risks apparent to a wide audience from the start.[18] The counterpoise is that interdependency also

provides levers that can impose costs directly onto a government or population without, supported by, or in support of, direct military pressure. Economic, informational and cyber attacks are therefore widely touted as a means to deliver what air power theorists have promised, but been unable to deliver, since 1917.

The power of such manipulation is difficult to judge. Even with massive resources, comprehensive opinion polling and control over many aspects of day to day life, democratic governments are unable to confidently manipulate their publics on any issue of importance. Societies are complex systems that react to stimuli in unique and unexpected ways. For example, there is no evidence that in 1945 Japan succumbed in the face of the atom bomb. Rather the atom bomb—combined with the practical destruction of the army, navy and air force; interdiction of supplies of raw material; the collapse of Japanese industry; the apparent inevitability of an invasion of the home islands; and the continuing series of massively destructive fire raids—eventually convinced some elements of the Japanese polity that further resistance was futile. Similarly, the shared hardships of the Blitz in London and even fiercer bombing campaigns in Germany apparently served to strengthen a sense of community and tighten the bonds between the people and their fielded military forces rather than convince them that they should or could cease to resist.[19]

> … democratic governments are unable to confidently manipulate their publics on any issue of importance.

The point here is that given the limitations of the military instrument, and the similar limitations of the other elements of national power, success is most likely (but not certainly) to flow from a careful combination of all of the elements of national power in a mutually reinforcing way—hoping that the whole is more effective than the sum of the parts. Therefore, although attacks on financial, industrial or social targets in isolation seem unlikely to be decisive and may well be counterproductive, carefully orchestrated attacks on all of these targets, in conjunction with thoughtful application of military pressure, may compel an enemy population into concession.

The Anarchist movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries divided their activities into propaganda of the word—the articulation of an agenda and the explanation of their actions with propaganda of the deed—and actions to demonstrate their potency, reach and determination. In their view, word without deed was merely rhetoric and the deed without explanation was pointless. This is not a bad model for the combination of military and non-military actions that is being prescribed by the more thoughtful pundits on modern war. In it there is a dominant message, or informational theme, encapsulating the issues at stake and the costs and benefits that accrue to a target population from the actions they might take.

All of the elements of national power would be subordinated to demonstrating and reinforcing this dominant message with a view to using rewards and punishment to condition desirable behaviours from an enemy.

This looks fine on paper, and was incorporated into the Australian Army's view of future war as 'perception management' in 1999. It remains an admirable aspiration but it is hard to imagine under what circumstances it could be made to work. In reality, the world is simply too complex, humans too imperfect and their institutions too frail to allow this type of nuanced and orchestrated application of effort from thousands of independent workers—none of whom have the absolute ability to make something work and all of whom can cause it to fail. At best, attempts at perception management are likely to be of the 'two steps forward, one step back' variety with dissonant actions constantly threatening to overwhelm the dominant message. Even if applied as planned, the impact on the enemy's remarkable trinity would be entirely conjectural and the outcomes practically unknowable.

Despite the limited prospects for success, attempts to manage the perceptions of enemy populations seem sure to be a central organising principle in the planning of future wars—at least at the start. Clausewitz would warn us that the control and coordination required to be successful is almost certainly unattainable and that the endeavour was based on moral weakness in the first place.

WHAT WILL FUTURE WARS LOOK LIKE?

To bring these themes together in some way, it may be possible to describe the elements of a 'typical' future war that might occur in the mid-term.

States and statehood will continue to be the organising principle for the international community, and wars will continue to be predominantly about the distribution of political power expressed variously as global or regional hegemony, or more locally.[20] Although future wars will generally be in pursuit of limited objectives, globalisation offers the opportunity to engage other protagonists who are globally applying all of the elements of national power and are exploiting propaganda and economic and international organisations in a way that is, at least in conception, more indirect, synchronised and comprehensive than has been our experience to date. *Indirectness* is the strategic catch-cry.

Within this indirect confrontation, military force will be applied to impose costs on an enemy and to provoke it into responses that either provide propaganda opportunities or reduce its strategic freedom of action. These globalised wars are not bound by geography. The objective will be exhaustion rather than annihilation, and most likely military force will be applied through proxies in the form of terrorism or insurgencies. In this context, terrorist use of WMD is likely but the risks to both the terrorist organisation and the state sponsor are substantial.

Non-proxy small wars will occur around purely local issues but they will either be amenable to local solutions or will be sustained but contained within tolerable levels of violence. Without state support, both military and diplomatic, localised insurgent or terrorist groups will continue to be unsuccessful and, over time, will either be destroyed or will lose relevance and gradually fade away.

This conflict environment will be extremely difficult for any democracy. Its very indirectness will make it hard for leaders to establish in the minds of their own populations a strong link between the expenditure of national blood and treasure and clear national interests. Azar Gat has said that when it applies force, the West's 'heightened awareness of the elusiveness of victory and of the intricacy of military and political causes and effects—as well as self-imposed restrictions on ruthlessness …—result in half-way measures, stop go strategies, and a general indecisiveness'.[21] On this basis, in response to an indirect confrontation, democracies are reasonably likely to exhaust their attention spans and lose interest in the competition before it is resolved in their favour.

The US 2005 National Defense Strategy identified four threat components: *irregular threats* that arise from the employment of unconventional methods, such as terrorism, insurgency or civil war, by both non-state and state actors; *catastrophic threats* arising from state and non-state actors employing WMD; *traditional threats* arising from direct military state-on-state confrontation; and *disruptive threats* arising from competitors developing or employing novel technologies or capabilities that supplant US domination in particular domains of operation. Tukhachevski and the other Soviet theorists who developed deep operations theory (and the idea of operational art) began with the realisation that the nation-state was so robust it could not be defeated in a single climactic battle but would require a succession of mutually reinforcing crippling blows if it were to be defeated. This idea, read in conjunction with the US threat matrix, makes Hoffman's argument particularly interesting. What Hoffman is saying is that future war will not comprise any one of the listed threats, but will be an infinitely variable amalgam of them all and that they will be connected by an approach to operational art which is both wider and deeper, seeking perception management, than our current experience. Hoffman's view is strongly reflective of the arguments contained in *Unrestricted Warfare* and entirely consonant with the analysis in the Australian Army's *Complex Warfighting*. The strong message from each of these sources is that where there is a will, war will find a way. Ralph Peters adds further emphasis to this when he argues that 'we need to prepare for governments to wage war in spheres now forbidden and still unimagined'.[22]

> … wars will continue to be predominantly about the distribution of political power …

The 2006 conflict between Hezbollah and Israel is considered by some an exemplar of future wars and this is partially true but needs to be dealt with cautiously. In many ways Hezbollah is a special case. It enjoys a permissive government giving it a quasi-state role in southern Lebanon; for a number of years it has been sedentary in strong defensive terrain with very few avenues of approach for a single, clearly identified and well known enemy and has taken the opportunity to fully prepare that terrain for defence. Although also employing local levies, the core of Hezbollah consists of fully trained, long-service, professional fighters. It enjoys comprehensive financial, training and technical support from Syria and particularly Iran. These factors put it at the extreme end of the 'reasonable worst case' spectrum. Despite these special factors there are a number of lessons that can be drawn from this conflict and which might be typical of future wars:

> … where there is a will, war will find a way.

- The local Hezbollah/Israeli conflict was recruited into the broader Iran versus Israel and Iran versus US competition. This type of exploitation of local grievances to further more expansive aims is not new but will likely become the norm.
- The conventional forces of nation states no longer necessarily enjoy a direct technological advantage over irregular forces. State sponsors provided Hezbollah with a full array of the very latest and most modern weapons. These included uninhabited aerial vehicles, anti-shipping and anti-tank missiles, modern surface-to-air missiles, and the latest rocket propelled grenades and mines.
- Air power proved largely ineffective when operating independently of ground forces. Despite involving over 9000 sorties, the air offensive failed to decapitate or seriously hinder Hezbollah's leadership or manoeuvre. Shrouding themselves in cities or other population centres will become the norm for both state and non-state military forces, as failure to do so will expose them to weapons against which many will have no defence.
- Hezbollah aggressively manipulated credulous global media to provide a strategic safety net which played a large role in preventing Israel from developing its military advantage into strategic success. Polished and orchestrated propaganda campaigns, supported by, rather than in support of, military action may well be the dominant line of operation in future wars.
- Despite the advantages it enjoyed and the poorly planned and executed Israeli offensive, Hezbollah was tactically defeated—but this did not matter.
- Hezbollah was able to coordinate its actions to be mutually reinforcing across a number of lines of operation. In this they demonstrated a competence in operational art that was superior to that of the Israelis and surprising in an organisation that has not benefited from generations of staff college attendance and essay writing.

CONCLUSION

Complex Warfighting, published in 2003, describes war diffusing across many of the conceptual boundaries we use to describe and analyse it. Combat has diffused across the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war so that actions at one level have a direct effect at another. Non-state actors have always been part of warfare; however, the military characteristics of state and non-state actors are becoming increasingly similar. The geographic definition of theatres of operation or of allocating geographic priorities to national interests is increasingly invalid—strategic geography is irrelevant. Many of our putative enemies will try to make our home front the battlefront. The distinction between combatants and non-combatants is eroding with consequent blurring of the applicability of the laws and norms of war. Wartime is diffusing into 'peacetime'. Since it was written, the diffusion described in *Complex Warfighting* has continued and accelerated, and will test our abilities to understand and control the conflicts to which we may be party.

The indirectness with which we will be engaged in the future, the nuanced use of proxies and 'causes of convenience' will hamper our ability to identify when, with whom and about what, we are at war—let alone how we should proceed to win. We will attempt, probably unsuccessfully, to manage the perceptions of the enemy and the enemy will be equally unsuccessful in managing ours. Once initiated, future wars, like their forebears, will take on a life of their own and rapidly escape reasoned control.

States have such power and permanence that they are not easily brought undone in war. They retain a total monopoly on the production of the most advanced weapons, sensors and communications technologies and their logistic capacities mean they are able to sustain effort through the various vicissitudes of lengthy conflicts. In contrast, non-state actors are able to impose pinpricks on the fabric of states—they can annoy, even hurt them, but they cannot do genuine damage. This is true even of those that gain access to WMD. Wars will remain state-on-state affairs.

> Many of our putative enemies will try to make our home front the battlefront.

Today, Boot, Hoffman and Smith are all being freely quoted in discussion about the character of future war. At their core, none of these authors has much to offer that is new but all are worth reading. Smith is telling us that wars are decided by the political will of the belligerents not by the results of battles; Boot that good soldiers with good weapons will do a good job; and Hoffman is telling us that all of the elements of the national power of our enemies will be arrayed against us. Boot's arguments are not wrong, but equally, they are not important. Smith's and Hoffman's

arguments have more meat in that there is a strong theme that, in future wars, there will be more 'play away from the ball'—enemies will use all of the levers they have against us but they will attempt to use them in a much more indirect and nuanced way than we might (unreasonably) expect.

Ultimately, future war will contain elements of all of our past wars but will see them jumbled together until they threaten to be unrecognisable. The type of operational and strategic coordination necessary to prosecute these wars successfully will be exceedingly difficult and so they are even less likely to go according to plan than previous wars—a terrifying statement indeed. Furthermore, attempts to engage the population directly and the immediacy of modern communications will cause the remarkable trinities of the belligerents to be even more volatile—another scary thought. The prospect of these globalised indirect wars remaining within any of the geographical or conceptual limits that we try to impose on them, or to remain linked to any sort of rational means-ends calculations are very small. Future wars—even more than our previous wars—will be 'more than true chameleons'.

ENDNOTES

1   Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti-War*, Warner Books, New York, 1995.

2   Martin Van Creveld, *The Transformation of War*, The Free Press, New York, 1991.

3   John Keegan, *A History of Warfare*, Hutchinson, London, 1993.

4   Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare*, PLA literature and Arts Publishing House, Beijing, 1999.

5   Frank G Hoffman, *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Arlington, 2007.

6   Max Boot, *War Made New,* Gotham Books, New York, 2007.

7   Australian Army, *Complex Warfighting*, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2004.

8   Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force*, Alan Lane, London, 2005.

9   C S Gray, *Another Bloody Century*, Phoenix, London, 2006, p. 373.

10 For an expanded explanation of this reading of Clausewitz' trinity see: E J Villacres and C Bassford, 'Reclaiming the Remarkable Trinity', *Parameters*, Autumn 1995.

11 This is the view taken by the Tofflers, Lind, Van Creveld and Keegan.

12 Edward N Luttwak, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace*, The Belknap Press, Cambridge, 1987.

13 Engels argued in the 1890s that 'the State is not "abolished", it withers away' in the face of the global revolution of the proletariat. On present trends its demise in the face of globalisation seems equally unlikely.

14   *The Wall Street Journal* contained an article which argued that, far from declining in importance, there was in fact a resurgence of nationalism and that this movement represented a challenge to globalisation. See Bob Davis, 'World No Longer Flat', WSJ.com, 28 April 2008.

15   Another example is al-Qaeda's exploitation of Sunni unrest in Iraq, and Iran's covert war exploiting Shia nationalism there, which together have been the principal shapers of the way that the war in Iraq has evolved.

16   Perhaps the most often cited example of this is the Vietnam War, in which the United States was militarily dominant but was still defeated. Similarly, in southern Lebanon in 2006, Israeli forces captured each geographic objective they fought for but failed to achieve any of their political objectives. It would be fair to say that the jury is still out in Afghanistan and Iraq. Military dominance in these countries can remove or suppress enemies but cannot, of itself, ensure desirable political outcomes.

17   There are arguments for good technology which extend beyond direct military utility. In any democracy that has chosen to gambit its young people there will be close public scrutiny of how well they are equipped and sustained. Good weapons are also important in the maintenance of morale among soldiers.

18   In his book *The World is Flat,* Thomas Friedman proposes the 'Dell Theory of Conflict Prevention' which stipulates that no two countries will ever fight a war against each other as long as they are both part of the same global supply chain. He goes on to say, however, that this does not mean that such countries will not go to war, but that the very heavy economic costs attendant on such decisions will constrain their actions. See <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dell_Theory_of_Conflict_Prevention>. Friedman's thesis attributes to war a degree of rational instrumentality that has not been historically demonstrated.

19   A subtle comprehensive and nuanced propaganda (of the word) campaign to manipulate public opinion is inevitably a component of future wars but is likely to be effective only insofar as the target population as a whole is only vicariously committed to the issues at stake. When the issues remain less than compelling, propaganda can sway public opinion very effectively. The Kosovar and Hezbollah manipulation of global media was effective in isolating their enemies (Serbia and Israel respectively) from international support and in constraining the means employed against them.

20   At first glance, given the current world situation, this is a bold claim, but the conflict in Afghanistan, for example, is the continuation of a state versus state war that began in 2002 with the objective of regime change. Fighting today is about removing the remainder of the old regime and properly putting in place the new one. The same is true of the war in Iraq and the war against al-Qaeda is about denying them statehood. If al-Qaeda were able to achieve the foundation for a caliphate, their relative power, and the threat they would present, would be of an entirely different magnitude.

21   Azar Gat, *A History of Military Thought – From the Enlightenment to the Cold War*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, p. 828.

22   The character and role of operational art in this type of conflict needs to be carefully considered. The independence previously granted to operational commanders that has been cogently argued for, and variously preserved, may be increasingly inappropriate and we may be approaching the situation where the direct connection between tactics and strategy should be re-established—without the intervening layer of command.

THE AUTHOR

Brigadier Justin Kelly (Retd) graduated from RMC in December 1977 and was commissioned into the RAAC. Following initial employment as a tank troop and reconnaissance troop leader in 1st Armoured Regiment, he enjoyed a number of regimental postings in tank, reconnaissance and armoured personnel carrier units and at the School of Armour. In 1995–96 he commanded 1st Armoured Regiment. He commanded the Peace Monitoring Group on Bougainville in 2000–01, was Deputy Force Commander of the Peace Keeping Force in East Timor in 2002–03 and Director of Strategic Operations in the Multi-National Force – Iraq in 2006–07. He attended a number of training institutions including the UK Armour School, the UK Royal Military College of Science, Australian Command and Staff College, Joint Services Staff College and US Army War College. As well as a BA(Mil) he has a Masters in Defence Studies and a Masters in Strategic Studies.

ADAPTIVE CAMPAIGNING

ONE MARINE'S PERSPECTIVE

MAJOR CHARLES DOCKERY, USMC

ABSTRACT

This article outlines three separate critiques of the Australian Army's new *Adaptive Campaigning* concept. The author argues that both the 'Adaptive Action' and 'Adaption Cycle' elements of the new concept are superfluous given that other sound concepts like JMAP and the OODA loop already exist. The author also takes exception with the Joint Land Combat vision, which he perceives as being 'inwardly focused and process driven', and which he maintains too readily cedes the initiative to the enemy.

The common soldier wears the dress of the country; with his gun he is a soldier; by hiding it and walking quietly down the road, sitting down by the nearest house, or going to work in the nearest field, he becomes an 'amigo', full of good will and false information for any of our men who may meet him.

US Army Brigadier General James Wade
Philippines, August 1901[1]

INTRODUCTION

Former US Marine Corps Commandant, General Charles C Krulak describes it as the 'stepchild of Chechnya'. General Rupert Smith calls it 'war amongst the people'. Current Australian doctrine has applied the label 'complex warfighting'. All three terms describe the current battlefield as diffuse, lethal, timeless and complex. It is broadcast into millions of homes around the globe by CNN, BBC and YouTube and represents a change in the types of wars for which Western armies have traditionally trained and been equipped. However, this condition does not mean that complex warfighting is entirely new. There are countless examples of past conflicts that exhibited some or most of the characteristics described above. For this reason we must be wary of any impulses to introduce multiple new concepts in our development of capability, training and doctrine to fight the 'new' war. While new concepts may be necessary, sometimes all that is required is to look at proven concepts in a new light.

Adaptive Campaigning is the response to the Australian Army's Future Land Operating Concept (FLOC), *Complex Warfighting*. While the document as a whole adds constructive detail to the discussion started in the FLOC, there are concepts presented that need to be replaced or modified. Using three of the four components of the command and control continuum of planning, decision-making, execution and assessment (PDE&A), this article will critically examine the concepts of 'Adaptive Action', the Adaption Cycle, and the Joint Land Combat response to 'fighting for, and not necessarily with' information.[2] I will offer a perspective on these concepts based on US Marine Corps doctrine, personal research and personal opinion. I will also link the planning processes to implicit decision-making and high tempo execution through the Joint Military Appreciation Process (JMAP), the Boyd cycle and the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory's 'Combat Hunter' experiment. Underlying threads of shared situational awareness, mental models, orientation and initiative will be common throughout each section.

> There are several flaws to the concept of Adaptive Action and its manifestation in the Adaption Cycle.

PLANNING AND ADAPTIVE ACTION

The concept of Adaptive Action is proposed as an alternate approach to land operations in the complex environment. It is an 'iterative process that combines the process of discovery (the problem is 'unknowable' until we prod it) and learning'.[3] In

this context, the land force will *act* first to stimulate a response, *sense* to observe and interpret reactions, *decide* on when and how to adapt, and *adapt* based on changes in the adversary and the environment.

There are several flaws to the concept of Adaptive Action and its manifestation in the Adaption Cycle. Most glaringly is that *act* precedes all other steps, implying action without planning. This may not be intentional and is somewhat at odds with the actual description of Adaptive Action and will be covered in more detail in the next section. The argument for the need for the Adaptive Action process states:

> Traditionally the Land Force has conducted deliberate planning with the aim of arriving at a solution prior to interacting with a problem. This approach is based on the belief that the more time spent planning prior to an operation the greater the likelihood of success. Unfortunately, this process fails to account for the complexities and adaptive nature of the environment.[4]

There are three inaccuracies in this argument: that the 'solution' is the aim of the planning process, that deliberate planning fails to account for the complex environment, and that deliberate planning does not provide interaction with a problem.

The first two inaccuracies are related. First, the aim of deliberate planning is not to generate a solution; the solution is the least important output of any planning process. Second, a planning process cannot fail to account for complexity; it is the planners that make this mistake. Marine Corps Doctrine Publication (MCDP) 5 *Planning* lists the four key functions of the planning process as directing and coordinating action, generating expectations of how actions will evolve, developing shared situational awareness, and supporting the exercise of initiative.[5] There is no mention of a solution. The latter two listed functions may be of the most value in the complex battlespace. Colonel Clarke Lethin, Assistant Chief-of-Staff (Operations and Training) for the 1st Marine Division (MarDiv) during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM found that the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP) placed 'everyone on the same playing field, providing a common point of departure and set of procedures'.[6] For 1st MarDiv planners, the shared situational awareness brought about through deliberate planning provided for adaptation and initiative in execution. This experience shows the true value of shared situational awareness in generating desired emergent behaviours that are manifest in battlefield initiative. Emergence and emergent behaviours are key components of complex systems theory. The beneficial emergent behaviours of synergy, adaptability and opportunism will develop the self-synchronisation that is vital to the 'swarming' concept outlined in the Joint Land Combat section of *Adaptive Campaigning*.[7]

> Deliberate planning *is* interacting with the problem.

Deliberate planning is the process that develops shared situational awareness and enables desired emergent behaviour on the battlefield. These outputs are much more important than a solution.

The assertion that traditional planning does not provide interaction with the problem is false. Deliberate planning *is* interacting with the problem. From mission analysis to wargaming, manoeuvre warfare emphasises planning as a continuous learning and adapting process, not a means to write a script. The reality is that military operations have always had an adaptive nature and have always been learning environments that require interaction with the problem in a planning process. From Sun Tzu: 'Thus, one able to gain the victory by modifying his tactics in accordance with the enemy situation may be said to be divine'.[8] Scharnhorst believed that 'in the field the officer must almost constantly discover, compare, and select the appropriate means', and in his opinion the successful general 'initiated his campaign with a pre-meditated plan that contained many contingencies, each corresponding to a hypothesis he had made about the enemy's probable and possible intentions'.[9] This was written into Marine Corps doctrine as recently as the mid-1990s: 'War is an even more complex phenomenon—our complex system interacting with the enemy's complex system in a fiercely competitive way'.[10]

Where does this leave the concept of Adaptive Action? As a new but unnecessary concept, it is confusing and should be removed from *Adaptive Campaigning*. The Joint Military Appreciation Process (JMAP) already provides what Adaptive Action promises: 'a means to arriving at a start point with a mental model of the problem and how it is likely to adapt'.[11] The JMAP does need to be updated with informa-tion from the Population Protection, Population Support, Public Information and Indigenous Capacity Building lines of operation presented in *Adaptive Campaigning*. This will provide planners a different prism through which to view the JMAP and will provide a better means of planning in an inter-agency environment. The Australian Army and the Australian Defence Force are not the only organisations facing this problem as there is also a recognised need to update the MCPP to reflect the application of non-military elements of national power. To accomplish this, Steven Hardesty proposes 'focusing on those elements—tenets, Mission Analysis, and Course of Action development—where revising is most urgently needed and will have the greatest effect on the entire planning process'.[12] The deliberate planning process does not need new concepts; it just needs to be looked at in a new light.

DECISION-MAKING – ADAPTION CYCLE VS BOYD CYCLE

Before entering an in-depth discussion of the Adaption Cycle and the Boyd cycle, more commonly referred to as the Observe, Orient, Decide and Act (OODA) loop, it is important to understand what they represent. The OODA loop has been described

in military circles as a decision cycle and a command and control process. At their foundations, both cycles represent a method for interacting with the surrounding environment. The Adaption Cycle could be thought of as a variation of the OODA loop, but it possesses seemingly minor differences that actually represent drastic changes to decision-making fundamentals. The Adaption Cycle also carries a potentially dangerous undercurrent into the Joint Land Combat concept in that it cedes the initiative to an enemy that is always below the discrimination threshold.

The Adaption Cycle (Figure 1) is presented in *Adaptive Campaigning* as a response to the 'complex adaptive system' that exists on the modern battlefield. It is a decision-making process that stems from the Adaptive Action planning process:

> The complexities of this system are such that it cannot be understood by remote analysis alone; rather, detailed situational understanding will only flow from physical interaction with the problem and success will only be achieved by learning from this interaction.[13]

The assumption is that detailed situational understanding will only come after multiple iterations of the cycle where the Land Force continuously and rapidly adapts to a changing situation. *Adaptive Campaigning* thus characterises complex war as a 'continuous meeting engagement' in a competitive learning environment.

As shown in Figure 1, the Adaption Cycle is a four-step process of *act-sense-decide-adapt*. *Adaptive Campaigning* states that this is because 'land forces will have to fight for and not necessarily with' information.[14] As a result, this hypothesis places *act* as the first step in the process. Action in the context of the Adaption Cycle is undertaken to stimulate a response and to test the Land Force understanding of the battlespace. The Land Force must then *sense* and interpret enemy reactions before it can *decide* when and how to adapt. This third step in the process, along with understanding what the response means and what should be done, appears to be the

Figure 1. The Adaption Cycle

most critical as described in *Adaptive Campaigning*: 'Once we have understood, we can *decide* what is happening and *decide* what should be done'.[15] Finally, the Land Force will *adapt*. To do this, the Land Force must learn how to learn, know when to change, and challenge understanding and perceptions.

What about the OODA loop? It is a product of the late Colonel John Boyd, a US Air Force fighter pilot who made significant contributions to developing US Marine Corps manoeuvre warfare philosophy in the 1980s. He theorised that a participant in any conflict will engage in four activities: he must *observe* the environment, *orient* himself to what it means, reach a *decision*, and *act* on that decision.[16] Marine Corps doctrine depicts the OODA loop as shown in Figure 2.[17] Unfortunately, even this is not totally correct as, like the Adaption Cycle, it is oversimplified. Boyd's final OODA loop is represented in Figure 3.

> … the Land Force must learn how to learn, know when to change, and challenge understanding and perceptions.

Why is the Boyd cycle better than the Adaption Cycle? First, a cursory glance at the depiction and the description of the Adaption Cycle shows *act* as the first step. As stated above, this is necessitated by the concept of fighting for, not with, information. The implication is that action will take place before sensing or even planning and represents a process that no military commander would undertake. Accepting that this may be a limitation of the conceptual explanation given in *Adaptive Campaigning*, is it not true that military commanders over the past two millennia have had to fight for information? This is not a new characteristic of

Figure 2. The OODA Loop as presented in MCDP 6.

the battlespace and certainly does not warrant the development of a new decision-making construct.

Second, the Adaption Cycle provides no pathway to produce increased operational tempo via mission command. The OODA loop does. *Adaptive Campaigning* states that mission command 'promotes a faster and more effective learning cycle and therefore lends itself to greater levels of adaptation.'[18] This statement is incorrect as mission command has little or nothing to do with learning and everything to do with orientation and decision-making. Orientation allows for unpredictable events, which promotes a faster decision cycle through mission command. The inputs into orientation are varied: cultural and genetic heritage, previous experience and many others. It provides the filter through which we move directly from *observe* to *act*. In Figure 3 it is shown as 'implicit guidance and control'. In military circles it is known as mission command. The Adaption Cycle does not include this mechanism.

> Learning is reorientation.

So where does learning fit into the OODA loop? Learning is reorientation. Agility, defined as the ability to change one's orientation rapidly in response to external influences, is the main output of Boyd's theory of manoeuvre warfare. This is what will enable the Land Force to conduct operations at a higher tempo than the enemy. In the OODA loop, decisions are only necessary when action does not flow directly from observation via mission command. A decision therefore is a hypothesis and becomes part of the learning process. As a consequence, the necessity of having to make decisions slows down the process. It then becomes vital to feed the results of the decision back into orientation to re-enable implicit guidance, and control and

Figure 3. Boyd's Final OODA Loop

further develop shared situational awareness. The organisation that can do this faster will hold a great advantage.

The OODA loop is just as relevant on the complex battlefield as it was on the conventional battlefield. *Orientation* is the *schwerpunkt*, the most important step in the process. Boyd described orientation as a 'many sided, implicit cross-referencing process' that has its foundations in genetic heritage, surrounding culture and previous learning. This is where success in the complex battlespace will be achieved. Army values, previous experiences and outputs from the planning process such as shared situational awareness will combine to create mental models that every soldier will take to the fight. These mental models of the environment are necessary for the cross-referencing process to take place. In this process, the 'observer' is looking for mismatches between what was predicted and what is actually happening so that orientation can be changed and follow-on action can be derived. These mental models are one of the outputs of the deliberate planning process and are critical to generating operational tempo and enabling tactical execution and mission command. They will also play a critical role in execution and creating *baselines*, as explained in the next section.

In the end, the Adaption Cycle is unnecessary at best, misleading at worst. The development of this concept indicates that the OODA loop is inadequate in the complex environment. In fact, the premise can be supported that it is more relevant now than ever before as Western militaries push decision-making down to the lowest level. It is also important to note that multinational corporations such as Toyota have proven that the OODA loop is a credible tool in the business world, an environment that is arguably more complex and diverse than the modern battlefield. The Adaption Cycle should be removed from *Adaptive Campaigning* and should be replaced by a fresh look at existing methodologies, such as Boyd's final OODA loop and its applicability in the complex environment.[19]

EXECUTION − JOINT LAND COMBAT AND THE COMBAT HUNTER

The final point of weakness in *Adaptive Campaigning* is in the approach to Joint Land Combat. This line of operation describes an inwardly focused process, driven by the concept of the Adaption Cycle. It is based on utilising the Adaption Cycle at the tactical level and is described as a 'continuous meeting engagement'.

> Therefore, manoeuvre elements must be prepared to cope with an enemy who will often fire the first shot. As a result the Land Force must be prepared to absorb that shot, survive, and then develop the battle in contact.[20]

These statements are factually correct and the theme of 'surviving first contact' has taken hold in Army development circles. It is hard to argue with any of the above rationale, especially in the context of an enemy that can lie below the discrimination

threshold until he chooses to expose himself. The weakness of *Adaptive Campaigning* in this approach is a sin of omission rather than a sin of commission. There is no mention of how manoeuvre forces will lower the discrimination threshold, maintain the initiative and engage the enemy first. We are left with only the tactical Adaption Cycle where action is taken to stimulate the enemy (get him to fire the first shot and raise himself above the discrimination threshold), first contact is survived, and the battle is developed. Joint Land Combat seems to be describing a process to be executed rather than a problem to be entered. One can almost picture a young infantry platoon commander giving orders before a patrol: 'Okay boys, we're going to go out there and survive the first shots and then we'll execute our game plan'. This is not a morale boosting concept for the young soldier on point. More importantly, the Army has ceded the initiative to the enemy before the first soldier has arrived in theatre by focusing inwardly on the effect on the Land Force of the enemy remaining below the detection threshold.

> Joint Land Combat seems to be describing a process to be executed rather than a problem to be entered.

The Marine Corps is taking a different approach to this problem. Going back to first principles, MCDP 1 *Warfighting* states:

> Orienting on the enemy is fundamental to maneuver warfare…. We should seek to identify and attack critical vulnerabilities and those centers of gravity without which the enemy cannot function effectively. This means focusing outward on the particular characteristics of the enemy rather than inward on the mechanical execution of predetermined procedures.[21]

The Marine Corps is looking at ways to maintain the initiative through an outward focus on the enemy and the ability to stay below the discrimination threshold. Rather than ceding this advantage as *Adaptive Campaigning* does, the Corps is striving to lower the threshold.

The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) has recently concluded the Combat Hunter Project, a field user evaluation focused on enabling a Marine to gain and maintain enhanced situational awareness in order to develop an offensive 'hunter' mindset. The goal of Combat Hunter is to 'improve combat efficiency while reducing combat casualties through the application of skills used by hunters as they pursue their quarry'.[22] The project specifically seeks to enhance the Marine's ability to observe, move and act. Of note, a specific goal for the individual Marine is to act always as the hunter and never in reaction to the enemy. Every Marine will be trained and equipped to confidently seek the enemy and will engage them before they are themself engaged.[23]

While the fine details of Combat Hunter are beyond the scope of this article, the concept of *baselines* is relevant to the discussion of mental models, shared situational awareness and lowering the discrimination threshold. Combat Hunter defines a baseline as a reference point or series of points against which a Marine can evaluate his surroundings.[24] Quite simply, it is a mental model carried forward from the orientation process of the OODA loop. Any individual must first have an under-standing of what is normal for the opera-tional environment before a baseline can be established. Every culture, town, neigh-bourhood and street has a baseline. Here we see how planning and decision-making are inextricably linked to execution. A good planning process will facilitate the development of shared situational awareness and common baselines. An established baseline will clearly be injected into the *orient* box in Figure 3. From this point, the combat hunter looks for distur-bances to the baseline, or things that 'just don't seem right'. Combat Hunter breaks these disturbances down into two categories: additions and subtractions to the baseline. An addition is something that is 'there' that should not be there. A subtrac-tion is something that is not 'there' that should be. It is up to the individual Marine and their small unit leaders to determine whether the detected disturbances are indicative of a threat. Functionally, a Marine must be able to identify disturbances in the baseline, assess whether that disturbance constitutes a threat, communicate and move to negate the threat and act to eliminate it.[25] Again, we find ourselves back with the Boyd Cycle.

> A good planning process will facilitate the development of shared situational awareness and common baselines.

It is this lack of even a mention of retaining the initiative that makes the current description of Joint Land Combat inadequate. By focusing inward instead of on the enemy, the Australian Army is at risk of taking a concept into doctrine, training and capability development that neglects the fundamental aspects of initiative and the hunter mindset, and will allow the enemy to make the first move every time. While it will always be necessary to survive the first contact, the preferred method should always be to seek the enemy and kill them first. The Army would be well served by closely examining the conduct and results of Combat Hunter for possible inclusion in future training and doctrine.

CONCLUSION

While *Adaptive Campaigning* lays out some good frameworks for joint and inter-agency operations in the current environment, the concepts of Adaptive Action and the Adaption Cycle should be removed from the document. Both concepts are unnecessary and flawed. Adaptive Action is based on misunderstandings of the purpose and outputs of the planning process. The Adaption Cycle is thought to be necessary because of an incomplete understanding of the OODA loop, a tried and proven concept that has been used, knowingly or unknowingly, for centuries. Both of these concepts have led the Army down a dangerous path in Joint Land Combat which has resulted in an inward focused, process driven warfighting construct that does not meet strategic end states. As written, Joint Land Combat removes the emphasis from attacking enemy critical capabilities at the operational level and channels efforts away from finding ways to maintain the initiative at the tactical level. It is not too late to change our current thinking on these subjects and make sure the most effective concepts are integrated into capability development, doctrine and training.

Disclaimer: This article contains the author's views and is not representative of official views of the United States Marine Corps or the United States Department of Defense.

ENDNOTES

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DOCTRINE AND TRAINING

ADAPTIVE CAMPAIGNING

IMPLICATIONS FOR OPERATIONAL HEALTH SUPPORT

SJ NEUHAUS, NI KLINGE, RM MALLET AND DHM SAUL

ABSTRACT

This article explores the role that Army health capabilities could play in an Adaptive Campaigning operational framework. The authors argue that, as the Army begins to recognise the importance of health support to the population, Army health personnel must take on responsibilities additional to their normal combat health role. These include the temporary provision of obstetrics, paedeatrics and midwifery to the indigenous population, the adoption of more flexible health unit organisations, and the provision of medical training to the local populace. The authors argue that without additional resources, a broader skill-set, more agility and more flexibility, Army's health forces will not be positioned to adequately support future operations.

'Today's armed conflicts are essentially wars on public health.'

Dr R Russbach, former ICRC Chief Medical Officer[1]

INTRODUCTION

*A*daptive Campaigning – The Land Force Response to Complex Warfighting provides a philosophical framework to meet the complexities and demands of current and future military operations.

The role of combat health support has traditionally been seen as the conservation of combat power. To meet the challenges of Adaptive Campaigning, operational health support must move beyond the traditional combat health support boundaries and revisit the unique challenges and opportunities that 'health effects' can bring to help achieve operational success. Under an Adaptive Campaigning framework, military health support assets must not only provide combat health support to deployed troops but be postured to respond to the needs of a wider dependency (including civilian populations) as a primary role. To meet these challenges, deploy-able health elements will need to fundamentally adapt their current organisation, equipment and training.

This article highlights the implications for operational health support inherent in *Adaptive Campaigning* and details doctrinal, organisational, philosophical and equipment challenges that will be required to meet operational health demands in complex operations. The article will cover:

a. A summary of the conceptual basis of Adaptive Campaigning

b. Suggested health effects across the five lines of operations

c. Considerations for defining and achieving strategic success

d. The effects of Adaptive Campaigning on operational Land health capabilities.

ADAPTIVE CAMPAIGNING

Earlier tactical doctrines distinguishing between low, medium and high-intensity conflict have lost relevance; recent deployments have shown that forces simultaneously face a combination of tasks, such as counterinsurgency, stabilisation, peace support, conventional warfighting and humanitarian responsibilities. In 2006 the then Chief of Army Lieutenant General P Leahy identified that tactical elements require access to an appropriate array of lethal and non-lethal weapons; they need to be protected, equipped and structured to operate and survive in a potentially lethal environment; and they need to retain the ability to perform diverse concurrent humanitarian, counterinsurgency and peace support tasks.[2] This requirement to adapt doctrine

> … the outcome of future conflict will increasingly be decided in the minds of these populations rather than on the battlefield.

from solely warfighting to include reconstruction, counterinsurgency, security, peace support operations, civil-military cooperation and humanitarian support gave rise to the concept of Adaptive Campaigning.[3]

In its publication, *Adaptive Campaigning – The Land Force Response to Complex Warfighting*, the Future Land Warfare Branch identified that contemporary operations will involve multiple diverse actors competing for the allegiances and behaviours of targeted populations. Consequently, the outcome of future conflict will increasingly be decided in the minds of these populations rather than on the battlefield. As a result, a comprehensive approach to future Land Force operations is required, thus Adaptive Campaigning.

Adaptive Campaigning is defined as: 'Actions taken by the Land Force as part of the military contribution to a Whole of Government approach to resolving conflicts'.[4] Adaptive Campaigning comprises five interdependent and mutually reinforcing lines of operation, shown in Figure 1.[5]

1. Joint Land Combat – actions to secure the environment, remove organised resistance and set conditions for the other lines of operation.
2. Population Protection – actions to provide protection and security to threatened populations in order to set the conditions for the re-establishment of law and order.


Figure 1. The Adaptive Campaigning lines of operation

3. Public Information – actions that inform and shape the perceptions, attitudes, behaviour, and understanding of target population groups.
4. Population Support – actions to establish/restore or temporarily replace the necessary essential services in effected communities.
5. Indigenous Capacity Building – actions to nurture the establishment of civilian governance, which may include local and central government, security, police, legal, financial and administrative systems.[6]

HEALTH EFFECTS ACROSS THE FIVE LINES OF OPERATION

Fundamental to Adaptive Campaigning is the ability to influence populations and their perceptions, which is becoming the central and decisive activity of war.[7] The provision of health services to indigenous populations offers a potent tool for shaping perceptions, and improving quality of life and personal safety. Enhancing the ability of the existing government to provide sustainable infrastructure and basic health care delivery systems builds trust and creates a tangible link between a central government and the people. Health care is a pillar of civil stability.

It is important to distinguish between humanitarian assistance and 'medical engagement' in an Adaptive Campaigning context. Humanitarian assistance provides limited service delivery assistance and meets a political purpose, but is not provided by the host nation and is therefore seen as external assistance. Medical engagement involves using health care to shape a particular health effect. This may be a short-term crisis intervention, a 'hearts and minds' campaign or a longer term focus on capacity building and reconstruction within the host nation. Health effects need to be viewed as an extension of 'non-kinetic' or 'soft power' in achieving whole-of-government objectives.

Adaptive Campaigning recognises that tactical actions taken along one line of operation will likely have an impact on one or more of the other lines of operation.[8] Operational experience has shown that the ability to orchestrate effects across all five lines of operation is a key ingredient to generating success for the Land Force, and each of these lines of operation hold specific implications for health support.

JOINT LAND COMBAT

Joint Land Combat recognises that to achieve a persistent, pervasive and proportionate presence in urban terrain, it will be necessary to utilise relatively large numbers of small combined arms teams that have the capacity to 'swarm' in support of specific surge operations.[9] In terms of health effects, the key factors that will predicate Land health success in Joint Land Combat operations are discussed below.

a. **Protected health assets:** Adaptive Campaigning will see large numbers of small combined teams (supported by joint assets) operating in complex terrain, resulting in increasing pressure on the Land health unit's ability to effect casualty

evacuation. Small numbers of casualties dispersed amongst complex terrain make protected surface evacuation assets essential. Further, operational experience in modern theatres has demonstrated that displaying the Red Cross symbol offers little protection against insurgent attack, and as such health capabilities—particularly those involved with casualty collection and transportation—require greater levels of protection than in previous conflicts.

b. **Combat health:** Combat health must be able to support many small teams, while retaining the ability to quickly surge in support of swarming operations. Air evacuation from the point of injury directly to Level 2+ facilities is now a routine process, implying that Level 1 and 2 health capabilities must be located closer to the point of injury to remain relevant, or risk being over flown.

> 'Our people are not just a fundamental input to capability—they *are* our capability.'

c. **Manning limitations:** Increased lethality, improved communication capabilities and enhanced mobility of Australian Forces has resulted in reduced force densities in recent years. Health is not immune to manning restrictions and financial constraints, and each position deployed must be weighed up against a perceived loss of combat power or reduction in the total number of combat arms. 'Our people are not just a fundamental input to capability—they *are* our capability.'[10]

d. **Evolution of trauma care:** The nature of casualties sustained during current expeditionary operations differs from previous campaigns. Although the casualty load is low by comparison with previous conflicts, the injuries are complex, society's expectations of outcomes has changed, and injury management is vastly more resource intensive.[11] The predominant injuries amongst coalition troops in Iraq are burns and blast effects related to improvised explosive devices.[12]

Trauma care has undergone a revolution in the last two decades and this is particularly evident on the battlefield. The move to 'damage control' philosophies, combined with better personnel protection such as enhanced combat body armour, has seen significant improvements in overall survival of often seriously injured casualties. Damage control, however, comes at a cost, including the ability to provide well trained 'first responders' armed with novel haemorrhage control measures (such as combat applied tourniquets and haemostatic agents), capable of instigating action not in the 'golden hour' but rather the 'platinum ten minutes' following initial trauma. Effective damage control is predicated on the provision of far-forward intensive care and resuscitation capabilities, proximate trauma surgery, and intensive care-level strategic evacuation to an appropriate facility, usually well outside of the theatre of operations.[13] Definitive and highly sophisticated surgical intervention

should be achieved within 48–72 hours of initial wounding. This is also reliant on the ability to source and provide often massive amounts of blood and blood products as a part of the resuscitation phase, which carries a significant logistical burden. Such highly sophisticated trauma facilities meet the needs of the coalition casualties but are rarely postured to deal with the vast civilian dependency.

POPULATION PROTECTION

Population protection operations require large-scale collective action. This line of operation will require a robust, sustainable and flexible Land health structure that facilitates, amongst other things, the following tasks:

a. Provision of combat health support.

b. Provision of primary health care to local law enforcement elements, security agencies, non-government organisations (NGOs), other government agencies (OGAs), host nation personnel and contractors. This dependant population can be considerable and is often underestimated during planning processes.

c. Within an Adaptive Campaigning construct, Army retains its moral and ethical obligation to provide health support to sick and injured civilians who access military treatment facilities, regardless of their combatant status and is still governed by International Humanitarian Law and the provisions of the Geneva Conventions.[14] This includes responsibility for civilian casualties resulting from Australian/coalition kinetic actions.

Army retains its moral and ethical obligation to provide health support to sick and injured civilians …

d. While providing security to civilian health assets is not the responsibility of military forces, the freedom of movement (or otherwise) afforded to civilian health organisations will considerably influence the level of support required by Land health units. Land health units can enhance the capacity of indigenous health assets through the provision of equipment, training, administration, logistics, supervision, and the coordination of task management and personnel.

e. Protection of health personnel poses challenges in interacting with local communities. One of the keys to effective counterinsurgency operations is presence. Moving freely amongst a community to achieve presence requires careful consideration of the security implications for health care providers. Cultural expectations can have an impact on health care delivery and may require variance from traditional gender roles or an increased participation of the female health workforce in order to gain access to and influence certain sectors of the community (women and children).

f. During population protection operations Land health elements will be required to provide medical treatment for prisoners of war, a function that is covered within existing doctrine. However, medical care is also likely to be required for civilian prisoners, political prisoners, issue-motivated groups, insurgents, indigenous VIPs, contractors and nationals. The Australian Defence Force's (ADF) current doctrine and training models do not well support these tasks.

PUBLIC INFORMATION

Personal contact and proximity are fundamental components of human interaction, and while technology offers mechanisms for influencing public perception through the distribution of mass information, the subtleties that exist in intimate association with others often proves the most effective tool in a public perception campaign. People are influenced by people. Health elements have a unique opportunity to demonstrate the humanitarian aspect of a deployment and individual acts of health support can positively influence the attitudes of a population. There is a 'need for our deployed Land Forces to work among the people, and to establish a broad relationship with the supported population'.[15]

Health service personnel interact with indigenous populations in intimate forums, offering strong opportunities to influence and support perceptions of success across all lines of operations. Health planners should remain cognisant of the ability for tailored health effects to influence the information battle positively, as perception management is an important pillar of Adaptive Campaigning.

> … the ability for the health services to support the public information campaign is certainly significant.

The credibility and legitimacy of the security forces, as viewed by the indigenous populations, will be greatly enhanced if appropriate health effects are employed to shape perceptions, attitudes and understanding of the targeted groups. While the use of health capabilities as part of an integrated public information campaign might raise ethical and legal questions in terms of the Geneva Conventions and the International Committee of the Red Cross, the ability for the health services to support the public information campaign is certainly significant. For example, the deployment of relatively inexpensive primary health care capabilities (including dental) can generate significant public support, while maintaining a light operational footprint.

While health care can meet strategic military objectives in a subtle manner, the effect of overt campaigns may have unforeseen consequences. Suggestions that medical assets are being used to support factional allegiances or as sources

of intelligence can gravely undermine the validity and neutrality of both medical personnel and the overall force.[16] This is well demonstrated by the Yugoslav Government's allegations of spying against a CARE Australia worker in Kosovo having a detrimental effect not only on CARE but on all NGOs in the region. Although General Sir Michael Rose has stated that '*there is no such thing as impartial humanitarian assistance*'[17] this is in conflict with the ethical requirement to provide health care based solely on medical need regardless of political, military, cultural or other biases.

One of the key elements to avoid allegations of bias is consistent provision of health standards, which demonstrates that Land health components will not provide one level of care to one element of the community, while treating other groups with less vigour. Accepting responsibility for even a relatively small element of an indigenous population's health requirements necessitates careful planning, reinforcing the need for strategic health outcomes to be integrated with the strategic goals across all five lines of operation.

POPULATION SUPPORT

Population support includes actions to provide essential services to affected communities to relieve immediate suffering and positively influence the population and their perceptions. By necessity, actions taken along this line of operation are closely aligned to public information. The aim of population support is to conduct integrated civil operations that:

a. Reduce the likelihood of humanitarian crises
b. Mitigate the effects of the damage to key infrastructure as a result of combat
c. Reduce the internal displacement of populations
d. Encourage a return to normalcy within communities, and
e. Build confidence in the viability and effectiveness of the governance arrangements that are in place.

In complex operations, health facilities are often the first to be destroyed and the last to be rebuilt.[18] Local health care providers may still be operating in some areas but their services may be inadequate due to lack of personnel, facilities or resources.[19] Insurgent action may target health providers, relief convoys and health facilities in an attempt to undermine confidence in the intervention force and create fear and uncertainty.

Civilian populations also have significant underlying dependencies with health issues which are non-conflict related, reflecting the consequences of a breakdown in the standards of living and chronically inadequate health care systems.[20] Layered into this are the realities of human rights violations, competition for limited health assets, the rise in malnutrition and infectious disease, and an increase in infant and maternal mortality rates that are associated with refugees or internally displaced

populations.[21] Military forces have historically taken on roles in providing commitment to public health interventions such as engineering support, provision of clean water, and road repairs to allow access to rural areas, but are rarely configured to meet the complex need of a civilian population dominated by the elderly, women and children.

Within an Adaptive Campaigning construct, Army retains its moral and ethical obligation to provide health support to sick and injured civilians who access military treatment facilities, regardless of their combatant status as governed by International Humanitarian Law and the provisions of the Geneva Conventions.[22] This includes responsibility for civilian casualties resulting from Australian/coalition actions.

Army's operational health units, however, have *no* obligation to provide health care to civilians presenting with chronic or non-acute conditions, or to provide care when satisfactory host nation or NGO health capabilities are available. This requires a stringent casualty regulation system, clear agreement and task allocations between different health care providers and strict adherence to medical rules of engagement (ROE). Tensions often exist and philosophical differences regarding the use of military health care as a tool of government must be acknowledged.

> Military forces have historically taken on roles in providing commitment to public health interventions …

Population support operations require integrated action across military forces, NGOs and OGAs. In the early phases of an operation it is likely that the Land Force will be the lead agency in health care provision, simply because the combat resilience of this component makes it better suited to the rigours of an operational setting, compared to NGOs and OGAs.[23] A disciplined, military response during the initial period can do much to set the preconditions for success for subsequent NGO/OGA providers. Understandably, integration between Land Forces and NGOs and OGAs (along with restoration of host nation facilities) is a key factor for longer term solutions and disengagement.[24] The importance of effective interoperability between Land health components and relevant NGOs and OGAs cannot be understated.

Military health involvement in population support operations requires careful planning. The level of care provided should be affordable, achievable and sustainable, and must not interfere with the provision of health care to the military force. Access, egress and resource usage by civilians entering military medical chains must be controlled to prevent the system becoming rapidly overloaded. This can only occur in the setting of mutual assistance between humanitarian, host nation and military medical staff.[25]

Strict adherence to accepted local and NGO treatment protocols when treating civilian patients facilitates standardisation of treatment, minimises perceptions of differential standards of care, and facilitates transfer of patients from military to civilian health facilities. Military casualties will generally be rapidly evacuated beyond the immediate operational area to sophisticated 'home nation' medical facilities; however, this option is not available for 'non-designated' civilian personnel. A robust civilian evacuation chain is essential, as this will help to prevent Land health assets from becoming committed to managing longer-term civilian patients.

Treatment eligibility matrixes and medical ROE need to be carefully articulated to avoid perceptions of bias. In providing health care to civilians, which extends beyond our international obligation, ethical conflicts may exist if restrictions are applied to determine who may or may not access the full capabilities offered by Land health facilities. Discriminators are likely to include national origin, VIP status (i.e. local leaders and politicians) and Security Sector Reform status.

Provision of military health services must be balanced against the need to minimise the operational health footprint. This is best achieved by utilising low footprint interventions whenever possible. In long-term engagements within a fragile security situation it may be necessary for the defence force to contribute to rebuilding civilian health infrastructure to facilitate Land health disengagement. An example of a much underutilised capability is dental, which is attractive in terms of its ability to define and limit tasks, it offers minimal ethical dilemmas, and it is characteristically easy to define in terms of treatment matrices and exit strategies.

> Provision of military health services must be balanced against the need to minimise the operational health footprint.

INDIGENOUS CAPACITY BUILDING

Indigenous capacity building from a health effects viewpoint includes provision of transferable skills, restoration of confidence in local health providers, equipment repair and maintenance, facility management and strategic health planning.[26] Indigenous capacity building is relatively low cost and high benefit compared to ongoing 'service provision'; it offers a greater long-term benefit and facilitates military disengagement.

While it is usually preferable for civilian or national government agencies to lead and for the army to assume a role in facilitation, health reporting and administrative support in the early phase of a mission, there may be a vacuum of resolve in which the army must assume primacy. Strategic health planning and health administration

is an under-recognised role in reconstructing fractured health capability. Army's health planning ability could be utilised in multi-agency planning to enable the host nation to enact and govern a developing and integrated health structure. This avoids inherent inefficiencies and duplication of effort, and enables mutually agreed plans and solutions that work in a specific cultural context to be implemented.[27] It is crucial that the sustainability and appropriateness of health standards within that population are recognised, respected and used as the basis of planning.

Transferable medical skills can be provided at all levels of the health continuum, from basic community first aid and education campaigns, nurses aide training, re-skilling or credentialing of specialist health officers and strategic health planning and administration. Health education and training provides good value for money and represents an ongoing future investment.

In a community model, obstetric support and midwifery, paediatrics and care of the aged are more important than a traditional military combat health support trauma model. Generally the best effects can be achieved if curative care receives the lowest emphasis, with effort instead placed on supporting and enabling existing health capability rather than replacing it with a military (or NGO) model. Provision of sophisticated and unsustainable military health assets risks undermining confidence in the local health providers and does not support an emergent government's role in service provision.

> During times of conflict, health practitioners have often suffered skill degradation …

The ADF is well positioned to engage in transferable health skills, having a robust training structure with experience in internationally recognised and credentialed health programs. Courses that move from individual training to 'train the trainer' should be embraced. Health courses that exceed one month in duration may prove impractical (due to indigenous attendance and the normal deployment rotation of ADF forces); however, shorter courses should prove manageable. While the UK's Battlefield Advanced Trauma Life Support, Battlefield Advanced Resuscitation Techniques and Skills, and Advanced Trauma Life Support courses offer good models, these may not be appropriate for the environment. A good model for this type of approach is the ADF obstetric course. During times of conflict, health practitioners have often suffered skill degradation, and the confidence gained by attending such skills courses combined with the opportunities to mentor and influence should not be underestimated—joint professionalism and expertise in delivering health care has the ability to override ideological differences and support joint reconstruction objectives. However, any teaching roles must be undertaken with a clear understanding of what level of care is sustainable and appropriate within

the local community. Additionally, ongoing support in the form of access to journals or mentoring programs (such as those provided by the Royal Australasian College of Surgeons' Interplast program) concentrate on both transferring experience and individual mentoring, and should form part of any capacity building initiatives.

Transferring skills that enable indigenous populations to repair principal medical items, such as an anaesthetic machine, ventilator or key laboratory analyser, is preferable to donations of equipment that are unsustainable; however, equipment repair and maintenance is generally poorly resourced across Army's Land health units. Medical equipment is particularly expensive and carries a significant maintenance liability requiring specialist technical inspections, tooling and repair. As Land health has increasingly moved to contracted solutions for medical equipment maintenance, this skill set has degraded, particularly in combat health support settings. Indigenous capacity building initiatives should remain cognisant of Army's limited ability to support medical and dental equipment, and appropriate measures should be taken to facilitate this service. In addition this needs to be linked with other equipment aid programs such as Department for International Development and AusAID.

Indigenous capacity building sets the conditions for transition to indigenous health frameworks, and as such is fundamental to shaping the Land Force's exit strategy.

DEFINING AND ACHIEVING STRATEGIC SUCCESS

The success or otherwise of a force in combat has traditionally been the benchmark against which success is defined. Recent operational experience, however, suggests that how the fight is fought is as important, if not more so, than the numbers of enemy units destroyed. While gains can be made from short-term tactical victories, strategic implications can be catastrophically affected as a consequence of quite isolated incidents, particularly in terms of how the Land Force's actions are perceived by the local population. Success is therefore not simply a measure of tactical advantage, but instead requires consideration across all five lines of operation.

Understanding how indigenous populations assess success in terms of health effects is an important pillar for Adaptive Campaigning. The ability to adapt to a changing environment requires robust measures of effectiveness. Defined measures of health effectiveness facilitate the political dimension both at home and abroad and provide transparency. Traditionally health reporting and analysis is often limited and military health projects are poorly linked with other projects.[28]

Perceptions of improvements in health care need to be interpreted within the cultural framework of the society under review, and expectations must be shaped against realistic and sustainable benchmarks. For example, improvements in basic infection rates are more relevant performance metrics than cancer treatment or trauma outcomes.

From a Land health perspective, success needs to be measured across all five lines of operations, as the international community rightly has significant expectations of our health capability. While this paper does not seek to develop formal key performance measures for measuring how successfully health effects have been applied within an Adaptive Campaigning environment, indicative factors for each line of operation are offered as follows:

a. **Joint Combat Operations.** A range of data is available to determine the success of the combat health support in supporting joint combat operations, particularly in terms of casualty evacuations achieved within 30 minutes, wound surgery conducted with 60 minutes (from the time of injury), survival rates of combat casualties, and post-surgical infection rates.

b. **Population Protection.** The health support requirements for the Land Forces do not differ significantly between joint combat operations and population protection operations, accepting that casualty rates will probably differ. However, implicit in population support operations is the need to meet lower-order needs, suggesting that provision of basic health services is an important factor in influencing the indigenous population's perceived levels of safety.

> … implicit in population support operations is the need to meet lower-order needs …

c. **Public Information.** This means that all health service personnel within the area of operations must be trained in basic cultural, linguistic and media skills, and must have a reasonable understanding of local issues as they apply to implementing ADF health effects. Health commanders must foster a regular and open flow of information, and all staff must be aware of how their actions in dealing with indigenous populations, NGOs, OGAs and contractors can directly affect the perceptions of success. The many fleeting chances afforded to health staff where they can advance informational objectives should not be discredited. Human Intelligence staff have a variety of methods available for assessing the effectiveness of the public information campaign—such as questionnaires, discussions and feedback tools—and the success of the health effects components can equally be assessed via these methods.

d. **Population Support.** Disease epidemics, infectious diseases, dysentery and malnutrition are predominant in refugee and internally displaced personnel (IDP) camps and require commitment of environmental health assets such as vector control, childhood immunisation and engineering assets (e.g. clean water and sewerage) to minimise the increased risks of transmissible disease. Standardised reporting and outcomes measures exist and should be utilised.[29]

e. **Indigenous Capacity Building.** Understanding the health needs of the indigenous community is essential. Appreciating what is an 'acceptable' level of health support is a key factor in determining what indigenous capacities are required and Land health units need to accept that their goal is not necessarily a mirror image of Australia's civilian health capabilities. It is also necessary to critically appraise the value of medical assistance given and to disseminate this information and 'lessons learned' into the international humanitarian community. Measures of health effectiveness should consider the relevance and effects of any health interventions. Post-deployment reports tend to focus on the *number* of patients treated in a facility, but this is inadequate without measures of how the intervention changed the health status of the patients or populations.[30] For example, if equipment donations were made, relevant effectiveness indicators include whether the equipment was needed, used, and if problems were experienced with maintenance and education. Surrogate markers of effectiveness, such as peri-natal mortality and adverse outcomes, can also be useful indicators of effectiveness.[31]

Regardless of the indicators used, ultimately the desired health effects must have relevant measures of success to ensure that false dependencies, hollow successes and/or unrealistic expectations are not created.

ADAPTIVE CAMPAIGNING – EFFECTS ON LAND HEALTH CAPABILITIES

HEALTH PLANNING

To deliver on the challenges of adaptive campaigning, Land health must demonstrate an increased focus on health needs assessment, health intelligence and inclusion of health planners at strategic levels to foster increased cooperation with NGO, OGA and civilian agencies. Operational health capability as a shaping effect also requires an increased focus on preventive medicine, vaccination programs, specialist capabilities that target civilian health-need groups (such as paediatrics and midwifery), and a robust ethical debate on treatment eligibility matrixes.

> Integrated health planning and training offers the opportunity to foster trust and interoperability …

Health planning for a complex operation should include relevant government and humanitarian agencies prior to any deployment, which ideally would form part of an integrated training regime within Australia. Integrated health planning and training offers the opportunity to foster trust and interoperability between ADF capabilities, NGOs and OGAs, improving understanding of mandates, increasing the flow

of health intelligence, and jointly contributing structures and health assets to a meet a common vision. This level of coordination requires a functioning medical coordination cell to act as the executing body for health support for all Australian Joint operations. A single medical planner embedded into the Joint Task Force Headquarters is unable to meet the breadth of coordination responsibilities or to identify and exploit health opportunities. The existing NATO model of Med Ops/Plans and Patient Evacuation Coordination Cell provides a workable solution as a modular structure to be employed within an Australian CJTF.[32]

HEALTH INTELLIGENCE

One of the tenets of Adaptive Campaigning is the ability to detect and respond to changes in the environment and use them to best advantage. In a health setting this requires effective health intelligence gathering and the ability to rapidly redirect health assets.

The ability to demonstrate incremental improvements in the standard of health care delivered by indigenous health facilities supports and validates the government and builds confidence in the community. This requires significant health intelligence pre-intervention and an acceptance that benchmarks may not be available, or may be subject to cultural variations. Agreement on uniform, achievable standards of care and performance metrics needs to involve all providers in the health care 'space'. For longer duration interventions activity and intelligence data gathered during the operation becomes critical to demonstrating the effectiveness (or otherwise) of the mission.

Medical staff are, by virtue of their unique role under the Geneva Conventions, precluded from engaging in any information gathering activity. However, information can be gained from health capabilities regarding wounding patterns. For example, analysis of data obtained from the Joint Theatre Trauma Registry, combined with the observation that in 2005 in Iraq there was a dramatic increase in burns-related mortality, led to additional protection (Nomex) for deployed troops. Similarly, observation that insurgent snipers were targeting unprotected body areas led to enhancements (collars, side and groin protection) to combat body armour.[33]

FORCE STRUCTURE, SURVIVABILITY AND AGILITY

Rationalisation of operational health assets has occurred during extended periods of peace and recent low-level operations, and now threatens the ADF's ability to meet the agility required by Adaptive Campaigning. Reliance on reservists to provide key health personnel for the ADF while providing a capability that cannot be generated within the permanent force also offers its greatest vulnerability.[34] A further consideration is the effect of sub-specialisation in medicine which has

resulted in an increased age and limited skill sets amongst key specialist personnel. Military planners must decide if the capability gap that now exists is to be met by recruitment or training of military personnel or contracted civilian professionals.

Current operations have seen an emergent focus on employing smaller operational teams to achieve particular effects within the battlespace.[35] To meet the demands and agility required by Adaptive Campaigning, health should also move toward a task organised structure with the flexibility to provide combat support and non-combat health support modules and the ability to switch effort between capabilities. This requires a broadening from a traditional trauma model to include obstetrics, paediatrics, physicians and care of the elderly as core elements of operational health support. Provision of combat health care and trauma capabilities will retain primacy for 'own forces', but other aspects of health care need to be integrated into whole-of-government effects.

… sub-specialisation in medicine … has resulted in an increased age and limited skill sets amongst key specialist personnel.

One of the key enablers to effective Land health operations is survivability. Current operations demonstrate the need to push resuscitation elements forward as far as possible (for example the medical early response teams utilised by the British in the Middle East Area of Operations (MEAO)). While this practice has no doubt saved lives and resulted in increased number of 'not expected survivors' it is a strategy that inherently increases the risk to health staff and carries a significant liability in terms of self protection training, improvised explosive device and counter ambush drills, increased weapon confidence, and the acceptance of health casualties.

Traditionally, the Land health capacity has been designed to sustain the force and assigned elements. This capacity, although it can be stretched to meet surge requirements, needs to be enhanced to adequately cope with the additional demands of population support operations. To meet these demands, Army's operational health capability must undergo a subtle structural and philosophical change. Combat health support elements need to readjust to provide a damage control based capability. Current operations have demonstrated the need for this capability to be agile, well protected and well supported by strategic intensive care level aero medical evacuation.

To address population support and public information operations, health structures should include capability bricks for medical functions that have not historically been catered for in our planning. Capacity should be grown in areas such as paediatrics, public health obstetrics and gynaecology. While some of these skills exist within our Reserve specialist body, the ADF does not actively foster these capabilities as part of the force structure.

In supporting indigenous capacity building, an increased focus on health effects that support health reconstruction carries implications for equipment and training, which need to reflect a focus on delivery of transferable health skills, health education, equipment maintenance and repair, and mentoring local health providers in host nation facilities.

A consideration for operational planners is that while the health services look to generate capabilities that can better support all five lines of operation, these capabilities will create their own range of challenges in terms of recruiting, training and gender balance. Once deployed, health effects in support of population support operations will be limited if health assets cannot securely move around the area of operations to the various indigenous communities. In particular it must be appreciated that combat health capability and population support require specific and distinct capabilities and individual skill sets, and it is not possible to simply shift effort between the two.

> … combat health capability and population support require specific and distinct capabilities and individual skill sets …

The key to the Land health force's success will be its ability to orchestrate effectively health effects across the five lines of operation within the battlespace. As a result, the Land health component must develop and maintain an inherent ability to shift its main effort rapidly within or across a line of operation, often responding in an environment of uncertainty where little information is available to the operational health planners. This ability to adapt is predicated on an agile force structure that generates flexibility across all five lines of operations, as well as the ability to sense and adapt the Land health's responses to ensure that the right services are being provided, at the right place, at the right time. The ability to focus appropriate effort is founded on the following key capabilities:

a. **Operational flexibility** is the ability to maintain effectiveness across a range of tasks, situations and conditions. For example, the structure and capability of the health component can be reconfigured in different ways to do different tasks, under different sets of conditions. This implies a broader range of skill sets than currently exists at the combat health support level. Despite deploying a balanced operational health capability, it is reasonable to anticipate that the adaptive environment will require significant flexibility from a force structure perspective. This necessitates the ability to recognise that if the appreciation was wrong, more health assets may need to be completed to ensure that both combat health support and population support tasks are catered for. This may require involvement of contractors in base support tasks enabling uniformed health providers to move forward.

b. **Operational agility** is the ability to manage the balance and weight of effort dynamically across all lines of operation in space and time. This relies heavily on an effective (and ongoing) health intelligence campaign, on flexible force structures and on integrated health planning functions. Operational agility will also be enhanced by fostering the continued development of coordination mechanisms between the Land Force, indigenous groups, NGOs and OGAs.

> Operational resilience is the capacity to sustain loss, damage and setbacks and still maintain essential levels of capability across core functions.

c. **Operational resilience** is the capacity to sustain loss, damage and setbacks and still maintain essential levels of capability across core functions. This implies a depth of skills that does not presently exist in all areas of operational health, suggesting that specialised health bricks (such as obstetrics, paediatrics or midwifery) should be replicated across selected combat health support units, most suitably in the Health Service Battalions.

d. **Operational responsiveness** is the ability to rapidly identify then appropriately respond to new threats and opportunities within a line of operation. Like operational agility, this capability is largely predicated upon comprehensive health intelligence, coupled with integrated and robust health planning methodologies.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Rationalise Australian combat health capability to ceiling of Role 2 enhanced (requires acceptance that individual *sub*-specialist capability is available to be integrated into coalition operations rather than inherent in Australian capability).
- Designate specific assets for mission tasking (in targeted humanitarian assistance, shaping effects) separate from those employed for force preservation.
- Develop capability bricks that specifically address the range of tasks required across the five lines of operations. Likely bricks include:
  - Humanitarian assistance
  - Obstetrics
  - Paediatrics
  - Public health
  - Indigenous capacity building (i.e. health contract managers, health logistics, health administration and health planners).

- In developing health capability bricks that address likely tasks within Adaptive Campaigning operations, consideration also needs to be given to enabling NGOs and OGAs to fill specialised roles and functions within capabilities.
- Closer coordination, consultation and support between commanders, operations staff and medical planners.
- Integrate humanitarian assistance within formation operations, perception management and psychological operations plans.
- Focus health support on prevention and education, integrated with local health infrastructure.
- Land health personnel should receive formal training in NGO and OGA liaison.
- Indigenous capacity building requires health specialists (including Royal Australian Army Medical Corps General Service Officers) with contract management experience. The Reserve force offers an excellent opportunity for this role.
- Protection of health capability needs to be addressed.
- The impact of strategic aero medical evacuation across all lines of operation requires further consideration.
- Contractors have an evolving role in the provision of health support, and the implications of employing contractors within an area of operations requires careful consideration.

CONCLUSION

As the vast majority of conflicts around the world are unconventional it is important to recognise and adjust the strategies required. Delivery of medical capacity is an important adjunct to achieving whole-of-government outcomes in Adaptive Campaigning operations. Effective use of health assets as a form of 'soft power' may allow the operational commander to build confidence and trust within local communities and assist in achieving strategic and operational objectives.

> … flexibility must exist to allow Land health elements to adapt as the ground situation changes.

Currently, Army's combat health support does not have a doctrinal framework to support Adaptive Campaigning. Conventional combat health support may meet the needs of the military force but does not have the depth, agility or capability required to maximise health effects within an Adaptive campaign. New doctrine must be developed to describe how Land health components can be employed within an Adaptive Campaigning framework, with particular regard to the complexities

surrounding treatment of civilian populations and to providing flexible and focused solutions to effects-based operations.

The primary role of Army's combat health support elements remains the provision of health support to our own forces. Health effects, humanitarian assistance and other-than-direct combat health support can very quickly overwhelm military capacity. Medical planners have a responsibility to ensure that assets are not overextended or compromised, and that the treatment and legitimacy of military personnel is not jeopardised. At the same time, flexibility must exist to allow Land health elements to adapt as the ground situation changes. Executing health effects across all five lines of operations requires unconventional solutions not reflected in our current 'conventional' force structure.

To effectively utilise health assets in support of Adaptive Campaigning, the implications for doctrine, training, materiel, personnel, organisation and systems need to be assessed. This paper recommends that Army adopts a task organised and health effects based structure which will provide it with the flexibility and agility required to meet the operational health demands of the twenty-first century.

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DOCTRINE AND TRAINING

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HOW THE ARMY LEARNED TO PLAN BUT FORGOT HOW TO THINK

LIEUTENANT COLONEL RICHARD KING

ABSTRACT

This article examines the dichotomy of planning versus thinking. Examining a diverse range of historical factors, the author concludes that planning—with its comfortable certainty—has replaced the troublingly uncertain act of thinking. This trend must be addressed if the Army is to have the best chance for success in the uncertain future that lies ahead.

One Marine officer remembered walking into the Army's big operations center at Camp Victory that spring (2004) and being appalled. He surveyed the ascending rows of desks, as in a modern movie theater, each with multiple laptops, each with an unencumbered view of several screens displaying troop locations or showing live video from Predator drone aircraft surveilling convoy routes. It was enough to give a staff officer the illusion that he knew what was going on out there.[1]

T he past four hundred years have witnessed a growing emphasis in the military on the importance and value of 'planning'. However, it is my opinion that this has come at the expense of 'thinking'. In this article I will outline why I believe this has happened, speculate on the impact of the trend, and suggest what we need to do about it.[2]

WHY PLANNING GREW IN IMPORTANCE

Planning grew in importance for modern armies due to a combination of operational and environmental factors. Operationally, the military has grown to realise that it faces conditions that are increasingly volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous. At the same time, the broader environment within which the military exists has also become much more complex, particularly the relationships between the military, society, the economy and the body politic. In the past, soldiering was a relatively simple vocation. Armies were usually small, could be manoeuvred into and during a battle by a single leader, and lived off the land. During the seventeenth century things began to change.

Evolving nation-states increased their level of control over their military forces.[3] Armies grew too big to be manoeuvred with ease, and they were too big when static to live off the land. Weapons and equipment became more complex and expensive, and needed increasing levels of technical support. However, even with larger armies and more modern weapons and tactics, the average failure rate for the two sides in a battle remained stubbornly at 50 per cent (except for the occasional Pyrrhic victory).

The losers rarely blamed their failure on the competence of their leaders or the bravery of their soldiers. They blamed the complexity of warfare, a mismatch of technology or the failure of those who planned and managed the campaigns. The winners attributed their success to their warrior ethos, their superb organisation and the professionalism of their leaders and planners. The losers modelled themselves on the winners. The winners believed the good press they wrote for themselves. The professional military staff system evolved, and planning grew to be the ultimate activity for the managers and leaders of armies.

If we look at some of the factors in play over the last four hundred years we can see more clearly why planning has grown to achieve such prominence.

Size. The 'industrial' era brought numerous problems for armies.[4] As they became bigger, armies caused a range of problems for their leaders. Armies were too big for a leader to view from a single point on a battlefield—communication with dispersed force elements was vital, and that took planning. Armies became too big to be manoeuvred easily on a battlefield—coordinated tactical manoeuvre was vital, and that took planning. Armies were too big to be housed, fed and

maintained in a single location—logistic support was vital, and that took planning. Large, permanent, professional militaries grew and needed to be supported through recruiting, training, equipping, accommodating and deploying—and all of these took planning.

Technology. Technology came to be viewed as a guarantor of success. If your army had better transportation, communications and weapons then, other things being equal, an enemy force would generally lose to you in battle. Technological superiority became a key goal of the industrial military. But newer, more complex technology brought with it a range of unfamiliar problems. The potential failure of technology and the huge cost of complex weapons systems was a significant limitation on strategic, operational and tactical freedom. The more expensive, complex and rare the technology became, the less willing armies were to risk losing it through enemy action, physical absence at a crucial time or technical failure. The solution was planning: planning the tactical employment of technology so that the enemy could be defeated without placing your technology at too great a risk; planning the deployment of technology so it would be where it was needed and at the right time; planning the maintenance and technical support of technology so it would not break down at the wrong time.

> As they became bigger, armies caused a range of problems for their leaders.

Firepower. Weapons have increased significantly in terms of rate and weight of fire,[5] lethality, accuracy and discrimination. Lethality is obviously attractive because if your army had machine guns then an enemy force armed with spears would generally lose to you in battle. The range and accuracy of artillery has trended upwards, while the terminal effectiveness and discrimination of so-called 'smart' bombs and missiles have also improved. The military now has the ability to keep death and destruction at arms length. Thus firepower has become seductively attractive to both military and civilian technocrats.

> Firepower … is the approach preferred by most modern elites. Its attractiveness lies in its abstract and quantifiable nature. It removes the unpleasant need for physical contact and visible violence. The only difficulty is that massive shelling and bombing didn't work in World War I. They didn't work in World War II either. They failed in Indochina and Vietnam and were marginally relevant in Iraq. But technocrats tend to reject the idea of linear development. Memory is irrational. Each problem is proper unto its own argument. If someone were to point out that bombs had already been dropped in massive quantities in other places at other times and failed to have the desired effect, the technocrat-officer would simply explain that, until the moment at hand, the explosives had been wrongly used.[6]

Lethal, accurate and discriminating firepower, however, is expensive and not yet as commonplace as we might wish—its employment requires careful planning.

Society. Societies have become more interested in the pursuit of personal happiness than in the selfless sacrifice of life for the common good. It is hard to imagine any developed democratic society today coping with the allied casualty figures from the first day of the Battle of the Somme in 1916 (20 000 dead and 40 000 injured) while retaining the ability to function. People in developed societies—quite understandably—want comfort and enjoyment. Comfort and enjoyment require resources. Society's resources, at least in the short term, are finite and limited. Therefore, the resources given to the military are precious and any suggestion of wastage is viewed with alarm. The way to avoid wasting resources is through planning.

> Lethal, accurate and discriminating firepower, however, is expensive and not yet as commonplace as we might wish …

Economy. As a nation we are forced to play the 'economics' game: allocating scarce resources among unlimited wants. The military, in most democratic societies, has to compete with growing wants in the areas of health care, education and social welfare. An ongoing trend is to try to squeeze more military capability out of existing (or reducing) budgets. That requires greater degrees of certainty, and planning is viewed as the way to achieve certainty. Even if you can increase the military budget, through persuading the decision-makers that an unanticipated and unplanned-for threat exists, you still need to manage the budget you are allocated. A myriad of governance measures are applied to ensure that every dollar is spent responsibly. The consumption of every scarce resource is planned judiciously to maximise value.

Body Politic. Our political leaders want to be re-elected. Successful military campaigns are viewed as enhancing the popularity of governments. Military campaigns, however, bring with them the risk of casualties and defeat. Suffering defeat and heavy casualties reduces the probability that a government will be re-elected, so losses are unacceptable. Because of this, the military is pushed to ensure that it does not lose. In the recent past we could ensure that we would not lose if we engaged in conventional (force-on-force) conflict with forces that were markedly inferior to our own in terms of equipment, numbers and training. The problem with current military operations is that they are not conventional military operations. The actions of a single terrorist or junior soldier can be broadcast in the media and have strategic consequences. Consequently, military deployments are increasingly planned to minimise risk.

THE PROMINENCE OF PLANNING

The impact of the factors outlined above has been to elevate planning to a position where it dominates the military. Planning is (relatively) easy, quantifiable, measurable, and gives the illusion of certainty. This is because many of the elements of planning involve certainty. Many of the components of plans are knowable. Capacities, capabilities, timings in predictable (repeatable) situations—all of these are knowable and can be incorporated into plans. Plans look good and are easily explained and assessed. Success against plans can be measured. Successful planners can be rewarded. All this was understandable during the era of industrial-age armies, but that era is rapidly shrinking in our rear-view mirrors. A continuing devotion to planning is no longer a guarantee of success.

> Problems arise when planning becomes a substitute for thinking.

Planning, meanwhile, remains the principal tool of management. Management is very important to the military because it involves doing things right, being efficient and not wasting resources. The problem is that thinking is the tool of leadership, which involves being effective by doing the right thing. To be truly successful the military has to combine both activities, selecting the effective thing to do (through thinking) and then doing it efficiently (through planning). Problems arise when planning becomes a substitute for thinking. The prevailing mindset is that the Army has to be 'efficient and effective'. This is completely the wrong way around. We need to be effective first before we seek efficiency. The challenge is knowing when and how to transition between planning and thinking.

THE DECLINE OF THINKING

Size, technology, firepower, society, economics and politics offer insights into why planning has grown in importance during the last four hundred years, but they do not explain why 'thinking' has declined. Before looking at this aspect, however, I need to define what 'thinking' is. Dictionary definitions are not particularly useful in informing discussion about 'thinking'. I propose my own working definition: "*thinking is the process through which we apply knowledge, skills and experience to arrive at a decision or action*". If we accept this definition[7] then thinking can be viewed as the synthesis of intelligence, education and experience.

I would argue that people in the Army are intelligent, educated and experienced; they are just not as clever[8] as they think they are, or are capable of being. The main tool we have for thinking is our brain, and our brains are not as good as we might believe.

Our brains are limited in many ways by inherent weaknesses built into them, and by poor habits of thinking that have developed during our lives.[9] The habits of thinking that we develop are often suited to simple, short-term and stable situations.

> Failure does not strike like a bolt from the blue; it develops gradually according to its own logic. As we watch individuals attempt to solve problems, we will see that complicated situations seem to elicit habits of thought that set failure in motion from the beginning. From that point, the continuing complexity of the task and the growing apprehension of failure encourage methods of decision making that make failure even more likely and then inevitable.[10]

The good news is that we can overcome, or at least reduce the impact of many of these limitations. The bad news is that it will take time, effort and support to do this at the levels of individuals, teams and the organisation. There is an old joke: 'How many social workers does it take to change a light bulb? Only one…but the light bulb really has to want to change.' For the Army to become a better thinking organisation, to become more clever, it has to want to change. Unfortunately, most people in the Army do not yet see a need for change. Persuading them that there is a need to become more clever is in itself a significant challenge.

> For the Army to become a better thinking organisation, to become more clever, it has to want to change.

Some of the barriers to becoming more clever involve how people regard thinking. During the past ten years I have taken part in many discussions on the subject of thinking. The following points summarise some of the 'conceptions' that exist, and some (intentionally) provocative responses to those conceptions.

1. Army people are already good thinkers. I have no particular issue with this statement. The key point to highlight here is: how much better could we be if we tried? Imagine that you are driving along a road. You see a speed limit sign which reads 60kph. Glancing down you see that you are only going 40kph, and you notice that your handbrake is partly on. To make yourself go faster you can push down harder on the accelerator, release the handbrake, or do both. A set of techniques for thinking are available and can be taught, learned and practised. Think of this as pushing down harder on the accelerator. At the same time, all thinking takes place within an environment that either encourages or discourages thinking. Think of this as releasing or applying the handbrake. I believe that very few people in the Army know and routinely use the techniques of thinking, while the environment is generally not supportive of thinking. We are not pushing hard enough on the accelerator, nor are we releasing the handbrake.

2. The Army supports 'thinking'. Actually, the Army supports 'planning' and 'doing'. We reward observed effort and apparent achievement—regardless of how much better the job might have been done had we really thought about it. People become skilled at defending their own ideas and attacking the ideas of others. While this might appear to be an example of the classical dialectic, it is not. Good quality thinking thrives on debate; the Army thrives on argument. Only as a last resort do we actually 'think', and then often badly. The problem is only partly caused by the high operational tempo and the general 'busyness' of our work. I believe that a major contributor to the problem is that we do not recognise the importance of thinking. The average soldier puts more time and effort in a month into maintaining or building physical fitness than he or she puts into maintaining or building mental fitness in a decade. Unless the Army encourages, recognises and rewards thinking it will always be difficult to motivate people to want to do it better.

3. Education (school and university) teaches people how to think. Actually, education teaches people how to succeed in education. Education teaches them how to study (with a heavy emphasis on what to study) to pass exams. Education teaches

> While the development of thinking skills through education might be improving, it is not there yet.

them how to research previous exam questions to allow them to focus their study. Education teaches them how to write essays that their assessors will grade favourably. Many educators believe that education no longer teaches people to think critically, or reflect on the experiences and information that they are exposed to. While the development of thinking skills through education might be improving, it is not there yet. Programs in critical thinking, unless supported by environments that encourage thinking, are doomed to failure. The American philosopher and educator, Mortimer Adler wrote:

> The misconception that underlies the now widely prevalent educational vogue is that thinking is a skill that can be acquired in isolation from all the other skills that enable us to use our minds effectively, in the performance of which we are involved in judging, reasoning, problem-solving, arguing, and defending or rejecting conclusions.

> Since that is not the case, we should not be developing programs in critical thinking to achieve the educational objective about which we all agree. Instead, we should try to be sure that students are coached in thinking in every course that is taught — taught, one hopes, by teachers who know how to think. Such coaching will, of course, pay attention to the laws or rules of thought that are taught in courses on formal logic,

but it will not be regarded as effective coaching simply because students can recite the logical lessons they have learned.

In short, if all teaching required students to think about what is being taught, that by itself would suffice. Teaching that fails to do this is nothing but indoctrination. Learning that does not involve thinking is nothing but the memorization of facts not understood, resulting in the formation of mere opinions, not the possession of genuine knowledge and understanding. To turn out thoughtful citizens and learners—persons able to think well and critically in everything they do, no program of instruction in critical thinking is required.[11]

4. The Army has an educated workforce. In reality the Army has a workforce with a commendable quantity of academic qualifications, but lacking in the ability (or organisational will) to make the best use of those qualifications. Academic qualifications are seen as both an end in themselves (you have a Masters degree, so now you are clever) and a means to an end (you have a Masters degree, so now we will consider you more favourably for promotion). The true value of education is less about what the qualification does for the person; it should be about what the person does with the qualification. If you finish a degree, frame the certificate, hang it on your wall and get back to doing 'military stuff', then you have wasted the education.

5. Our leaders are good thinkers. Actually, our leaders are intelligent, vastly experienced, and very well educated. However, they are frequently lacking in higher-level decision-making

> Good quality decision-making requires collaboration; the Defence committee system encourages competition.

and problem-solving skills and techniques. They are flawed human beings like the rest of us. Leaders can accept this reality, or they can believe in their own infallibility. Leaders are most dangerous if they believe that because they are senior to their staff, they therefore (have to) know more (or know better) than their staff. The most able leaders are those who make the best use of the collective talent they lead.

6. The committee system supports high quality decision-making in Defence. The reality is that the committee system does not support thinking. The committee 'process' is overly mechanistic and far too busy. Very little actual thinking goes on during committee meetings. Most of the thinking occurs before the meetings and consists of staff officers applying their organisational or individual perspectives and prejudices to try to 'win' for their part of the organisation. The participants in the committee meetings are often simply representing whatever argument has been sold

to them in their briefing package. Good quality decision-making requires collaboration; the Defence committee system encourages competition.

My hypothesis for the reason why thinking has declined during the last four hundred years is that it has been 'crowded out' by the rising prominence of planning. This should be a cause for concern because, in an environment that is increasingly complex and uncertain, plans are of limited value. Only by thinking can we make sense of the issues we have to deal with. Better thinking should lead to better, more relevant plans. Planning should never be used as a substitute for thinking.

THE PROBLEM WITH 'THINKING' IN THE ARMY

Effective thinking requires a balance between convergent thinking, through which we seek to identify the best option, and divergent thinking, through which we seek to broaden our understanding of the problem and generate a wide range of options.

The biggest problem with thinking in the Army is a disproportionate emphasis on analysis, the tool of convergent thinking and hindsight. It is not that analysis is necessarily bad, it is just that it is the only thing we do. The American psychologist Abraham Maslow is credited with saying: 'If the only tool you have is a hammer, you tend to see every problem as a nail.' Our (Western) system of education stresses analysis. Our work culture stresses analysis. Our standard approach to dealing with problems stresses analysis. It is no wonder we favour analysis as a style of thinking.

We make mistakes, analyse exactly what went wrong, and then build a better process to avoid making the same mistake again. The problem with this, however, is that experience tells us that it has not stopped us from making mistakes. While we might not make the same mistake again, dealing with an increasingly complicated process pretty much assures that we will make a new mistake soon, leading to a fresh round of analysis and 'process improvement'. Analysis is the tool for looking backwards and finding the 'right' answer. For simple problems, analysis is effective and efficient. In our complex world, however, there is frequently no single 'right' answer.

By contrast, synthesis is the tool of divergent thinking and foresight. Synthesis helps us to explore a problem and generate the right questions. It requires us to think about what might be possible, and requires experimentation and the acceptance of risk. Synthesis is not stressed in our education or work culture, and has therefore atrophied. Yet synthesis is exactly what we need to do more frequently if we are to deal with problems that have no 'right' answer, and for which every attempt at imposing a solution simply stirs up further problems.

We currently put too much emphasis on telling people how they *should* do things (having analysed the issue to get the best answer), instead of allowing them to 'play'

and discover how they *might* do things (through synthesising a new solution). I do not mean to imply that we should turn everything into a game; rather, we should try to allow scope for people to discover and try out new ideas. There are many things in the Army that absolutely must be done a certain way, such as operating weapons. However, instead of giving a new piece of equipment to soldiers and telling them exactly how, when, where and why to use it, we should consider giving the equipment to the soldiers and letting them discover how to make the most of it for themselves.

> … synthesis is the tool of divergent thinking and foresight.

HOW WE CAN IMPROVE 'THINKING' IN ARMY

> *The illiterate of the 21st century will not be those who cannot read or write, but those who cannot learn, unlearn and relearn.*
>
> Alvin Toffler

Even if you do not accept some of my previous points, improving the quality of thinking in the Army is still a worthwhile goal. If we are to develop the Army's ability to think, we must deal with two aspects of thinking: education and the environment.

We must educate our people about thinking. This involves making them more aware of their limitations, and teaching them to use a range of tools and techniques to encourage more divergent thinking. Thinking techniques come from a wide variety of sources and can overcome some of the limitations we all have due to weaknesses in our brains' construction, as well as overcoming the bad habits of thinking developed during a lifetime of exposure to education, training, social and work cultures. Training people to use these techniques is relatively easy and addresses 'thinking' by individuals and teams.

Army must develop an environment that supports and encourages thinking. In many ways the environment is the most important, and difficult, challenge. If we train people to use techniques that improve their thinking, but then do not support the use of those techniques within the workplace, we will fail. Changing the environment will take a long-term, consistent effort throughout the Army.

Training Command–Army is currently working to develop a 'thinking' approach to training. Instructors will become facilitators, coaches and mentors to students. Students will be encouraged to think more about what they are doing. If the Army is to improve its ability to think, we must all play our part by supporting the application of thinking skills and techniques. We also need to encourage, recognise and reward good thinking.

ENDNOTES

1   Thomas E Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*, Allen Lane, Victoria, 2006, p. 330.

2   This is primarily an opinion piece, based on my interpretation of history, with the aim of identifying broad trends consistent with my argument.

3   MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray (eds), *The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300–2050*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001, pp. 6–9.

4   John A English, *Marching Through Chaos: The Descent of Armies in Theory and Practice*, Praeger, Westport, 1996, pp. 17–19.

5   Martin Van Creveld, *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton*, second edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, pp. 233–34.

6   John Ralston Saul, *Voltaire's Bastards: The Dictatorship of Reason in the West*, Penguin Books, Ringwood, 1992, p. 203.

7   I propose this as *a* definition of thinking, not *the* definition.

8   In the context of this article, cleverness is our ability to apply our intelligence, education and experience to arrive at a decision or action.

9   See: Thomas Kidda, *Don't Believe Everything You Think: The 6 Basic Mistakes We Make in Thinking*, Prometheus Books, New York, 2006; and Gary Marcus, *Kluge: The Haphazard Construction of the Human Mind*, Houghton Mifflin Company, New York, 2008.

10 Dietrich Dorner, *The Logic of Failure*, Metropolitan Books, New York, 1996, p. 10.

11 Mortimer Adler, 'Critical Thinking Programs: Why They Won't Work', <http://radicalacademy.com/adlercritthinkingpro.htm>.

THE AUTHOR

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DOCTRINE AND TRAINING

WELFARE WARFIGHTERS AND ADAPTIVE CAMPAIGNING

COLONEL CHRIS FIELD

ABSTRACT

This article examines the role that chaplains could possibly play in the future Army. The author argues that, if properly resourced, tomorrow's chaplains could be employed as inter-agency leaders of the 'Welfare Warfighter' community on operations. This arrangement could provide commanders with a valuable capability applicable across *Adaptive Campaigning*'s five lines of operations.

How can Army enhance the contribution that chaplains make to our warfighting capabilities, and how do Australia's 'Welfare Warfighters' play a role within an army that must fight in accordance with the five *Adaptive Campaigning* lines of operation?

DEFINITIONS

The following definitions are required prior to examining the two issues germane to this article:

Army Chaplain: The designated role of the Royal Australian Army Chaplaincy Department is to:

- provide religious and pastoral support to commanders at all levels in accordance with established policy and guidance
- collectively provide a religious ministry and character development program to all elements of the Army
- provide religious ministry to denominational members.[1]

Welfare Warfighter: This is not an official Australian Army or Australian Defence Force (ADF) term. For the purpose of this article, the author has grouped many of the welfare agencies that are available to assist Army's people under the banner of Welfare Warfighter. These may include chaplains, medical staff, psychologists, physical training specialists, philanthropic services, Defence Community Organisation, Defence National Welfare Coordination Centre, Vietnam Veterans Counselling Service, Department of Veterans Affairs, community based organisations such as the Returned Services League and Legacy, and unit, regimental and corps associations.[2]

Examining the above eclectic description of welfare organisations in the ADF and the wider Australian community, it is apparent that Australia is fortunate to be associated with diverse organisations that nominate 'welfare' as either their main or at least a key responsibility. This diversity in Australian and ADF welfare capabilities is an advantage that Army can develop, nurture and enhance under the Welfare Warfighter concept, especially when combined with *Adaptive Campaigning*'s five interdependent and mutually reinforcing lines of operation.

> When it comes to caring for Army's people, we cannot afford to rely solely on a whole-of-government approach …

This article teams Army's traditional view of welfare with the seemingly contradictory concept of the 'warfighter'. In common usage, 'warfighter' is narrowly defined as an 'armed forces member: a soldier, sailor, Marine, or airman who is engaged in combat against an enemy force'.[3]

The requirement to orchestrate Australia's welfare agencies to support Army's people results in the expression: Welfare Warfighters. A Welfare Warfighter 'nurtures and supports ADF people, and where possible non-ADF people, so that the ADF may successfully engage in combat against an enemy force'.

In the ADF's current deployments the complex, competitive environment generated by agile and adaptive adversaries denies any opportunity for the ADF to continue to narrowly define its warfighters.[4] In fact, *Adaptive Campaigning*, the Army's response to *Complex Warfighting*, identifies the requirement for Army to consider 'actions taken by the Land Force as part of the military contribution to a Whole of Government approach to resolving conflicts'.[5] In terms of soldier welfare, a whole-of-government approach insufficiently energises the resources available for, and needed by, our people. Many key welfare agencies are community based non-government organisations.[6] When it comes to caring for Army's people, we cannot afford to rely solely on a whole-of-government approach; our people come from the community, and our community must be engaged in a manner that is orchestrated with all welfare agencies to look after our people.

ADAPTIVE CAMPAIGNING'S FIVE LINES OF OPERATION

> *Combat operations can no longer be seen as the decisive phase of conflict and as a result an alternative approach to land force operations is required—Adaptive Campaigning.*[7]

Adaptive Campaigning comprises five interdependent and mutually reinforcing lines of operation:

- Joint land combat
- Population support
- Indigenous capacity building
- Population protection
- Public information.[8]

This article will argue that Army's Welfare Warfighters, given a broad and flexible role, have significant capabilities available to support an army that is to fight in accordance with *Adaptive Campaigning*'s five lines of operation.

Enhancing the contribution chaplains make to Army's warfighting capabilities requires the Army chaplaincy to modernise. This modernisation may involve two areas of reform: a) a revised role for the Royal Australian Army Chaplaincy Department, and b) the introduction of chaplain's assistants into the Army.

REVISED ROLE FOR THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN ARMY CHAPLAINCY DEPARTMENT

A recommended revised role for Army chaplains would be to:

- *support* commanders at all levels by providing expert religious and pastoral advice relevant to mission success;
- *lead* religious ministry, character development, and pastoral and welfare support to all Australian Defence Force personnel and when necessary, other government agencies and coalition partners;
- *innovate* using denominational and non-denominational frameworks, and synchronise the effects of Defence and non-Defence welfare support agencies to enhance Army's operational effectiveness.

This revised role aims to ensure that chaplains not only support commanders, but are also involved in Army's mission success. In particular, under this modernised role, chaplains would be required to lead other Welfare Warfighters from government, non-government agencies and coalition partners. Army chaplains, as leaders under this proposed new role, would be well positioned to be responsible for orchestrating Australia's welfare agencies in support of Army's people.

Why should Army chaplains be singled out as leaders of the Welfare Warfighters? What makes chaplains so special that they may, in increasingly secular Western democracies such as Australia, be the leaders of welfare support for Army's people? Arguably, other Welfare Warfighters could assume leadership positions in orchestrating welfare support.

The above questions are valid and, in many circumstances, chaplains may not be the ideal source of leadership to orchestrate the efforts required from Welfare Warfighters. Indeed, there is an opposing view to appointing chaplains as the 'default welfare man [or woman]'[9] in a unit, noting that while chaplains play a key role in assisting to provide welfare effects, the lead Welfare Warfighter should be determined by a commander, just as a commander in accordance with the premise of mission command may organise tasks for any mission. In addition, a chaplain's specific religious affiliation may potentially inhibit a chaplain's selection for the role of lead welfare effects officer, especially when operating in a foreign culture that is not amenable to a particular religion.

Notwithstanding the above perspectives, the advantage held by uniformed chaplains, ahead of many other traditional welfare agencies, is that they are generally assigned permanently to one or more Army units. Through this arrangement, a

> … a good chaplain who demonstrates strong leadership can share burdens, develop a strong rapport, and gain trust …

good chaplain who demonstrates strong leadership can share burdens, develop a strong rapport, and gain trust from unit personnel.

The twenty-first century has proven to be a time of high operational tempo for the Australian Army. Units and commanders are becoming increasingly reliant on unit chaplains as a key component of operational capability dealing with unit welfare, morale, counselling, mental health and wellbeing of unit personnel.

CHAPLAIN'S ASSISTANTS

Leading Welfare Warfighters will, if implemented, place further burdens on already overworked Army chaplains, and in many cases the chaplains' families. It is perhaps time for Army unit establishments to modernise by including positions for chaplain's assistants. Chaplain's assistants are employed in the United States military, and provide many services, including:[10]

- support to chaplains during missions and everyday activities
- maintain physical security of the chaplain
- driving duties
- arrange religious events and ceremonies
- assist the chaplain in maintaining readiness
- maintain chaplain vestments, religious items
- general administration.

Chaplain's assistants could be soldiers or junior non-commissioned officers who show an aptitude for religious issues and an interest in the welfare of fellow soldiers and their families. For the cost of a single additional person on a unit establishment, a chaplain's assistant could assist the unit chaplain to improve support exponentially to unit personnel and their families, and further free chaplains to comprehensively lead and orchestrate other Welfare Warfighters while continuing to innovate and perform the tough work of Army chaplaincy.

WELFARE WARFIGHTERS' ROLES WITHIN ADAPTIVE CAMPAIGNING'S FIVE LINES OF OPERATION

LINE OF OPERATION 1: JOINT LAND COMBAT

> *Joint land combat describes close combat under contemporary conditions in complex, and particularly urban, terrain. The purpose of joint land combat is to remove organised resistance in order to enable effective interaction with the population.*[11]

Welfare Warfighters, as members of a military, government or non-government organisation, who nurture and support ADF and non-ADF people so that the ADF

may successfully engage in combat against an enemy force, have a background role in supporting joint land combat.

This line of operation may result in casualties, which will place more demands on Welfare Warfighters from soldiers and their families who require and seek support in an environment complicated by transparency to the media, the general public and our adversaries. Joint land combat requires well orchestrated welfare plans in order to provide Army's people and their families robust, agile and timely support.

Importantly, Welfare Warfighters who find the capacity to support non-ADF people provide an additional dimension to this and the other four *Adaptive Campaigning* lines of operation. This welfare dimension, when integrated and orchestrated with joint land combat and with Welfare Warfighters acting as additional joint land combat sensors, presents an almost unique capability, especially if the ADF seeks to develop and enhance the already strong base Australia enjoys regarding Welfare Warfighters, assisted by a wide range of organisations that nominate 'welfare' as a key responsibility.

> Welfare Warfighters' ability to deliver almost simultaneous welfare support to areas of greatest need represents a significant tactical advantage for ADF warfighters.

Joint land combat in urban terrain is demanding for ADF personnel, and particularly disruptive for the residents of those same urban environments. Welfare Warfighters' ability to deliver almost simultaneous welfare support to areas of greatest need represents a significant tactical advantage for ADF warfighters. Welfare Warfighters can ease the 'three-block war' demands on ADF personnel, especially in environments of intense close combat among significant populations, which will allow ADF personnel to concentrate on their joint land combat core business of 'removing organised resistance in order to enable effective interaction with the population'.[12]

LINE OF OPERATION 2: POPULATION SUPPORT

> *Population support includes actions to provide essential services to effected communities. The purpose of these actions is to relieve immediate suffering and positively influence the population and their perceptions.*[13]

Arguably, Welfare Warfighters are tailor-made to operate in conjunction with Army, ADF, government, non-government and, on occasion, coalition capabilities in support of the population support line of operation. The first priority for Welfare Warfighters should always be Army's people, with excess welfare capacity and expertise being applied to population support.

Put simply, Welfare Warfighters are capable of orchestrating welfare effects in support of the ADF's people, and are also capable, when capacity allows, of orchestrating welfare effects for non-ADF populations. Commanders should consider including Welfare Warfighters early in their planning processes, so that these welfare specialists can lend their expertise to assist in the development of population support. By gaining the early input, trust and support of Welfare Warfighters, commanders should be able to develop plans that are appropriately wargamed against multiple contingencies involving population support, and are therefore more likely to be balanced for operations in rapidly changing complex operational environments.

LINE OF OPERATION 3: INDIGENOUS CAPACITY BUILDING

> *Indigenous capacity building includes actions taken by the Land Force to assist in the development of effective indigenous government, security, and police, legal, financial and administrative systems. It sets the conditions for transition to indigenous governance and as such is fundamental to shaping the Land Force exit strategy.*[14]

Many Welfare Warfighters possess unique skills that will significantly assist commanders in achieving this line of operation. Consider uniformed and non-uniformed Catholic priests working in predominantly Catholic Timor Leste; non-government workers permanently resident in a war or disaster ravaged region; consular staff, with language and cultural skills, posted to world trouble spots; charitable organisations, such as the Salvation Army, with worldwide organisational support; and even medical staff practicing the universally accepted Hippocratic oath.

Armies can build indigenous capacity. The Reconstruction Task Force in Afghanistan is currently passing important trade skills to Afghani people, and the Australian Army Training Team in Iraq is passing important warfighting skills to the Iraqi people. Welfare Warfighters bring another dimension to Army's indigenous capacity building abilities.

… the standard of Welfare Warfighters will vary greatly between operations and theatres.

Admittedly, the standard of Welfare Warfighters will vary greatly between operations and theatres. This variation is partly unavoidable, especially for Welfare Warfighters who just happen to live in the area of operation. However, a comprehensive operational level approach to develop Australian, and perhaps coalition, Welfare Warfighters could reduce the risk of wild variations in Welfare Warfighter standards.

If the ADF is to be successful in undertaking *Adaptive Campaigning,* then Army needs to take the lead to ensure that the non-Army elements who are Welfare Warfighters possess the appropriate skills, standards and ethos to ensure their successful integration into the indigenous capacity building and other lines of operation.

LINE OF OPERATION 4: POPULATION PROTECTION

Population protection operations include actions to provide immediate security to threatened populations in order to control residence, identity, movement, assembly and the distribution of commodities, therefore setting the conditions for the re-establishment of law and order.[15]

Welfare Warfighters who actively support the ADF in population protection may also find themselves in situations where their knowledge, insights and experience can assist in creating environments that independently enhance the security of local populations.

Examples may include the information that Welfare Warfighters gain during their daily course of business at the local church, orphanage, market, government offices, or media outlet; or community projects commenced or supported; or food aid distributed to needy people. If Welfare Warfighters are effectively integrated into the Army's planning cycle then they may act to provide information, opportunities or situations that may be inserted into the unit's adaptation cycle, and enable forces to rapidly sense changing situations, decide on new courses of action, and effectively adapt tactics, techniques and procedures.[16]

LINE OF OPERATION 5: PUBLIC INFORMATION

Public information is a collection of capabilities brought together and focused to inform and shape the perceptions, attitudes, behaviour and understanding of targeted population groups in order to reinforce actions within the other lines of operation. Public information underpins every element of Adaptive Campaigning and is an essential prerequisite for success.[17]

Welfare Warfighters are commonly associated with organisations that need to self-promote to ensure their very survival. Examples include the various annual campaigns conducted by welfare organisations to secure financial support or membership from the community. Even ADF-based Welfare Warfighters are organisations that frequently experience reductions in resources. Medical, philan-thropic, religious and community service personnel in the ADF are frequently below authorised numbers, which reflects not only the lack of those same personnel in

Australian society as a whole, but the ADF's inability to generate enough resources to recruit, train and retain appropriate numbers of Welfare Warfighters.

Adaptive Campaigning emphasises that public information 'reinforces actions within the other [four] lines of operation'.[18] Welfare Warfighters can provide natural mediums through which the public information and the other four lines of operation are developed. In many cases the main contribution a Welfare Warfighter makes to any line of operation is information. Examples may include the chaplain who provides pastoral care, the psychologist who provides counsel, the doctor who provides advice, and the non-government charity that provides school books.

Especially early in a military operation, Welfare Warfighters may not have access to humanitarian stores, vehicles or even their tools of trade. They will therefore be solely reliant on their ability to enhance public information. Army commanders who plan and work closely with Welfare Warfighters to ensure that all public information is synchronised with key messages that support the military operation will gain two advantages.

First, Welfare Warfighters will be aligned with the operational aims and not work against, or at cross purposes to, the commander's intent. Second, the message from the Australian or coalition force will be

> … the main contribution a Welfare Warfighter makes to any line of operation is information.

consistent, thus giving our forces a better opportunity to act, sense, decide and adapt against an enemy who may be executing their own public information operation. Failure to synchronise the messages presented by Welfare Warfighters with the messages of the fighting force will only serve to slow down our force's ability to deal with complexity and a rapidly evolving operational environment.

CONCLUSION

This article has aimed to address two issues: first, how can Army enhance the contribution chaplains make to our warfighting capabilities? Second, what roles do Australia's Welfare Warfighters have within an army that is to fight in accordance with *Adaptive Campaigning*'s five lines of operation?

The answers are as complex as the environments in which the ADF fights.

Chaplains are a significant asset to Army, and by modernising their roles and introducing chaplain's assistants, a real opportunity exists to ensure that chaplains predominate as lead Welfare Warfighters. Further, chaplains are uniquely positioned to orchestrate other Welfare Warfighters and hence exponentially enhance their influence in the modern battlespace.

Adaptive Campaigning's five interdependent and mutually reinforcing lines of operation—joint land combat, population support, indigenous capacity building, population protection and public information—are areas within a campaign where Welfare Warfighters can make a significant contribution.

The key is for commanders to ensure that Welfare Warfighters, whether Army, government, non-government or coalition elements, are integrated into planning early and often to ensure that the aims of Welfare Warfighters are aligned with those of the fighting force. This integration will at times be a challenge. Fortunately, *Adaptive Campaigning* provides a framework for commanders to consider, across all five lines of operation, how this integration can be achieved. This article has given examples where the integration may be successful, and there are certain to be situations where integration is not successful.

Adaptive Campaigning's five lines of operation will, to a certain extent, compensate for some unsuccessful options selected by Army in this long and complex war. In other words, we will make misjudgments and mistakes. It is the intent of this article to raise awareness so that lack of success is not caused by poor synchronisation between our warfighters and our Welfare Warfighters.

ENDNOTES

1   Defence Jobs website, <http://www.defencejobs.gov.au/> accessed 4 September 2007.

2   A 'unit' in the Australian Army is defined as an organisation commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel (Equivalent), and may be designated as a battalion or regiment.

3   <http://encarta.msn.com/dictionary_701711493/warfighter.html>, accessed 10 January 2008.

4   Bradley Graham and Josh White, 'Abizaid Credited With Popularizing the Term "Long War"', *Washington Post*, 3 February 2006.

5   Future Land Operational Concept, *Adaptive Campaigning – The Land Force Response to Complex Warfighting*, Department of Defence, Canberra, 24 November 2006.

6   Lieutenant Colonel Pat Sowry, 5 February 2008, noted to the author that attempting to include community based organisations under the rubric 'warfighter' may 'ultimately compromise the integrity of those organisations and their ability to deploy their resources in an independent manner'. This is probably correct, which serves to emphasise that the management of community based welfare organisations will need to be carefully, and continuously, managed by commanders at all levels.

7   *Adaptive Campaigning*, p. 1.

8   Ibid.

9   Quote from Lieutenant Colonel Trent Scott, 5 February 2008.

10 US Army Website, <http://www.goarmy.com/JobDetail.do?id=3> accessed 11 October 2007.

11   *Adaptive Campaigning*, p. 11.

12   Ibid; 'The [Marine] Corps has described amorphous conflicts [military operations-other-than-war] as—the three block war—contingencies in which Marines may be confronted by the entire spectrum of tactical challenges in the span of a few hours and within the space of three contiguous city blocks': General Charles C Krulak, quoted in 'The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War', *Marine Corps Gazette*, January 1999.

13   *Adaptive Campaigning*, p. 16.

14   Ibid., p. 18.

15   Ibid., p. 20.

16   Ibid., p. 7.

17   Ibid., p. 23.

18   Ibid.

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MILITARY HISTORY

OPENING ADDRESS

2008 CHIEF OF ARMY'S MILITARY HISTORY CONFERENCE

LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEN GILLESPIE AO DSC CSM

Distinguished guests, colleagues, friends, ladies and gentlemen. It gives me great pleasure to welcome you to this year's Chief of Army's Military History Conference. I have watched the progress and development of these conferences over the years and regard them now to be a major element in both the development of Army's professional military education and in our interaction with the Australian community.

The study of military history is important. It forms a part of our learning cycle. What is happening on operations today is the history of tomorrow. For that reason we need to be attentive to the preservation of operational records, both as the raw material of future historians, but also as vital element of our lessons learned process.

The recent changes that I introduced to overhaul our command and control structures are designed in part to improve our learning and adaptation cycles. They are also with the changes in Australian Defence Force command and control most visibly represented by the establishment of Joint Operations Command at Bungendore. The reality of Army's operational culture is that we collaborate closely with the RAAF and RAN. We need to, most urgently in my opinion, bring that joint focus to bear in the way that we record and study our history.

The days when individual unit histories really tell us very much about an operation are long gone. A challenge for us is to bring Army History into the era of 'jointery' along with all our structures and systems, especially those which gather and analyse the information from our operations.

For that reason I am delighted to introduce this year's theme, which considers the issue of the media and the military. This is a topic that has immediate contemporary relevance to us as we conduct operations both in the immediate region and further afield.

Of course the concept of journalists embedded with our units in the Middle East is not a new one. The great chronicler of the exploits of the 1st Australian Imperial Force—Charles Bean—was a working journalist. Through the intervention of Bridges' Chief of Staff, Cyril Brudenell White, he enjoyed a level of access to the leadership of the First Australian Division from the time it embarked for Egypt, that modern journalists can only envy. His record speaks for itself.

> The speed and pervasiveness of media coverage today is breathtaking.

However, both warfare and the media have undergone enormous changes since that time. The speed and pervasiveness of media coverage today is breathtaking. In an era where armies take pride in their agility, responsiveness to events, and devolved decision-making—'mission command' in our jargon—the media leaves us for dead.

Our processes look ponderous by comparison with the instantaneous transmission of images and information of which the reporter on the ground is now capable. And media structures are leaner and flatter than ours. In Iraq and Afghanistan today the roles have been reversed. Commanders often first receive operational information from open sources, whereas the old paradigm was that the media used every device at its disposal to try to elicit operational information from commanders.

This has produced tensions in a relationship that by its very nature makes uneasy bedfellows. There is an element of fundamental incompatibility between the soldier's emphasis on secrecy and operational security, and the media's desire for maximum transparency. However, we cannot allow this to force us into an adversarial relationship, nor can we adopt a siege mentality. One of the unfortunate legacies of the Vietnam War was the popular myth that the media undermined the war effort. I do not think such recriminations are useful nor are they factually correct.

The media is now a permanent fixture in the very cluttered and dynamic battlespace in which we are obliged to operate. Soldiers need to allow for and mitigate 'friction', rather than complain about it. The presence of the media merely adds one more element of unpredictability to the complexity of the battlespace.

Modern commanders need to understand better the imperatives which drive journalists, just as we need to provide the media with an ethical and military rationale for our actions. I would like to think that this more outward culture will actually assist us in lifting our performance.

But like any relationship that is going to endure the shock and complexity of the operational environment, the military–media relationship needs to be exercised in peacetime. We need to focus on how to develop those aspects that we have in common rather than stereotyping one another. We both serve the public interest and we both want to bring all our people safely home if at all possible. Our planning and decision-making processes now routinely take into account the presence of the media, along with a host of other non-government actors. I believe that we need to exercise and rehearse with the media more before we go on operations. Some level of trust and confidence building will benefit both parties to this arrangement.

While there are no easy solutions to the way media and military organisations interact in the battlespace, I am confident that this conference will provoke serious discussion of these issues through the study of how they have been handled in the past. We have assembled a world class field of experts for that purpose.

Before formally opening this conference, however, I do wish to raise an issue that is a growing concern for historians and soldiers alike. In discussing the role of the media in the battlespace, I alluded to the speed with which information is transmitted and recorded. In the past the cliché was that the journalist was writing the first draft of history. But we need to be vigilant that it does not become the only draft of history. There is a risk that the era of instant communication becomes the era of transient information storage.

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I have real concerns about the future capacity of historians to write the history of Army's operations and development today. I perceive that a growing and largely unforeseen consequence of the evolving technology of command and communication will be the complete absence of the essential building blocks of the historian's trade. Most of you here have some understanding of the process: finding and collecting evidence, weighing its relevance, assembling it and presenting it as the justification for an assessment of what happened. And most of you will be familiar with the basic components of this trade—written records.

Can I ask you all a question? How would you operate in an environment in which there were no records? How would you analyse, for example, the operations of the Reconstruction Task Force in Afghanistan if none of the material, files, records,

maps, intelligence summaries, signals, operations orders and so on existed? It would be a challenge. It has happened before.

For example, I understand that one of the most difficult periods for historians is the early medieval period, where the lack of substantial primary source written records can only be partially offset by archaeological or similar hard physical evidence. Given the way the military conducts its business today, I am concerned we are preparing to impose on future historians our own version of the 'dark ages'.

You are all well aware of the impact of electronic communication on our private lives. Few people write letters—email reigns supreme. Mobile phones are now the preferred means of interpersonal communication. Facebook has even started to push mass email into redundancy as a means of people keeping their friends informed of developments in their lives. We all know this. We also all know that the military, especially the military on deployment, is just as switched on to communications technology as today's youth. Indeed, telecommunications contractors arrive on the battlefield almost simultaneously with the lead scout and installs satellite communications for the diggers to call home on what we call welfare phones.

The problem, as we all know, is that when the phone call ends the hard disc is wiped clear for the next day, or when the Facebook page is updated the data in that communication is gone. We all recognise this as a problem, but no one has yet devised a solution. As a consequence, I am concerned that the history of the Australian Army of the late twentieth to early twenty-first century is going to be a work of fiction—or of deduction and reconstruction if you prefer. Only minimal holdings of written records may survive to provide the essential underpinning evidence. Without this evidence, history is, essentially, fiction.

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It is not as if we are not creating records. If anything, modern operations seem to generate even more words. The word processing power of the computer has encouraged the production of enormous quantities of reports, analyses and administrative returns. The power of the Internet to send copies of this material everywhere compounds the phenomenon.

My concern is not with the production of the written evidence, it is with the capture and retention of it. And my concern is for all types of records, not just the official ones. Those of you who specialise in the social history of conflict face a daunting challenge in the age of electronic communications. What is going to substitute for the boxes full of letters home from individuals (from privates to generals)? My own mother complains that I don't write letters home like I did when I was in Namibia.

What is going to substitute for the diaries such as Pompey Elliott left us or the exercise notes of young officers on field staff training courses? The troops in the field still make incisive observations about the mission, its conduct and command. They still voice their opinion about the food, their equipment and their interaction with the local people. How do we capture and preserve this so some future Charles Bean can write the equivalent of six volumes on the private soldier's contribution to the war? It is a real challenge and I don't at this stage have any answers.

If a solution to the problem of capturing personal opinions and recollections is elusive, it is equally so for official records. You may find this hard to accept—after all, the official records of our wartime operations held in the Australian War Memorial are comprehensive and extensive. But by and large, these are the records of a technologically less-advanced time. Back then, orders were written on paper, and the orderly room clerk would file copies. The copies would then be attached at the end of every month to the monthly report that was prepared and sent back to the next highest headquarters and eventually found its way to the Memorial.

> Part of the problem is that we often forget the importance of good record-keeping until too late.

In theory, that should still happen, but electronically. It sometimes does but my advice is that this is more the exception than the rule. Even if it does occur, the potential for loss or destruction along the way is much greater than for a paper record. For a start, the individual can see at a glance what is on a paper record. A disc is just a disc.

Part of the problem is that we often forget the importance of good record-keeping until too late. I am advised that our records from Vietnam are, for example, poor. I do not envy the official historians of that war their task. I am concerned though about the impact the problems with the records cause our veterans of that war in relation to their repatriation entitlements.

The new way of waging war has contributed to the problem as well. Today, we fight as both joint and combined forces. In the old days of single Service operations, we had an evolved structure of operations staff, administration staff and even records staff to prepare, collect and repatriate the records.

In Army, the war diary was explained in staff duties in the field and every officer was expected to know of its existence and the process to be followed. There was a clear hierarchy of command and a complementary hierarchy of records responsibility. Even though each Service may have had a different way of doing it, it didn't matter as the same process was contained within the same Service.

That is not the case now. Even very junior headquarters can now be comprised of a mix of the three Services, each used to conducting the records management task differently. With headquarters individually structured for the specific task, coupled with the entirely justifiable desire to ensure that all of the headquarters' limited staff resources are focused on the successful conduct of that task, taking along someone whose responsibility is the collection and repatriation of the records is usually not a priority.

This generally means it is done as an afterthought and as a secondary task, by busy people with other concerns, and often who have had no training and therefore possess little understanding of the responsibility. It is unfair on them but, with constraints on the numbers permitted in the deployed force, it is now a standard situation. While we still manage to sometimes deploy specialist teams into the field for limited periods, gone are the days of the AIF Historical Records Section within the AIF Headquarters in London. Yet as the staff resources available to deal with the task decline, the scale of the task is increasing. Both the actual volume of records, as I alluded to earlier, but more importantly, the way they are kept is providing a real challenge.

Let me provide some context. When Army deployed to East Timor, to INTERFET, a history field team was included. It was located within the headquarters and managed to capture pallet loads of paper records, files and maps. It also brought back numerous CDs containing downloads of computer records.

The same team, on the basis of short-term limited deployments to the Middle East, has brought back—so far anyway—mainly CDs or DVDs. In less than ten years, the method of administering and recording an operation had gone from a mix of paper and electronic medium to almost complete electronic in its nature. Even the hard copy maps on the command post wall are merely one-off prints to support a specific activity.

First World War historians have innumerable copies of base data maps, many of which have hand drawn data superimposed upon them, to employ when explaining the

> ## The problem of format change is a major concern for the archivists.

battlefield and individual operations that occurred. Current maps are produced from geospatial data and overlaid with specific data for a specific purpose. Only enough copies are made to support the mission. Unless someone literally thinks to pull one off the wall, secure it and repatriate it home, that data will be lost.

The challenge, though, is much greater than the simple matter of remembering to take down a map from a wall. The problem of format change is a major concern for the archivists. For those charged with collecting them it adds much to their task.

Culling a paper file is tedious but at least each page is a self-contained document: intelligible and assessable simply by reading. A CD with thousands of pages of data is still just a CD. If the capability to read what is on it is lost, then it is useless.

Yet the military, by virtue of its need for, amongst other considerations, operational security, embraces format incompatibility. We use specialist command hardware and software that is incompatible with civilian systems. We use electronic security measures that, if we don't cancel them before that system is changed, can permanently block access to the information. In the old days, a 'Top Secret' stamp on a document and locking it in a safe controlled access but when the need for secrecy has passed, simply taking it out of the safe makes it accessible. As the Army History Unit is currently finding, receiving data on a password protected disc poses entirely different sets of access problems when the password is lost. They are still trying to crack some CDs from East Timor, and that was less than ten years ago.

Clearly this is a potential problem that won't be solved overnight or by any one individual, but it is a problem that must be solved. I am happy to advise that within the records management areas in Defence, and in the Joint Operations arena, the problem has been recognised and is being addressed. However, you people are the experts in what records need to be retained. You are the subject matter experts on this. If you have a view, I urge you to pass it on to me through the Army History Unit. I will certainly be giving this as a task to the Army History Advisory Committee, but I would welcome any suggestions for a solution.

THE PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS AND THEIR PART IN 'STABILISATION'

WHAT'S IN A NAME?*

LIEUTENANT COLONEL MATTHEW JACKSON & DOCTOR STUART GORDON

The interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have highlighted the difficulties in building a sustainable peace and a conceptual and institutional 'gap' in the UK's peacebuilding capabilities. Consequently, both operations have witnessed the introduction of new approaches to managing stability operations. Whilst these are unlikely to resolve the broader strategic challenges, they represent a range of useful developments in the delivery of a 'stabilisation' effect.

Arguably the current arrangements for managing 'stabilisation' are insufficient and lack institutional predictability. The debates framed by this paper do not reflect a revolution in thinking within the either the MOD or the wider government departments, but they do propose a range of enhancements rooted in some of the positive innovations witnessed in 2006 and 2007.

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The core ideas are the focus on 'stabilisation' as an activity that takes place within a different framework of priorities from either 'development' or 'hearts and minds' activities. The paper also argues for a sharpening and to some extent a returning to basics for military CIMIC whilst also recognising that 'operational CIMIC' requires the Ministry of Defence to 'up its game'. It also highlights the need for new and predictable institutions that enhance the capacity for comprehensive and integrated (rather than sequential or co-ordinated) interdepartmental planning whilst also stressing the difficulties with stabilisation models that imply a generic sequencing of activities rather than approaches that represent a mixture of simultaneity and critical path analysis.

Perhaps the most significant of these has been the introduction of the 'Provincial Reconstruction Team' (PRT) concept. Whilst originally a US innovation, the UK has made significant adaptations and currently runs two, one each in Afghanistan (Lashkargar) and Iraq (Basra).[1] PRTs do not come with a fixed structure; rather they comprise mixed military and civilian staff from a range of Government departments (principally the Foreign Office and Department for International Development) and are charged with organising and delivering 'reconstruction' and 'development'. Whilst they offer a range of benefits, they have also been plagued by controversy and criticism. Nevertheless, this paper argues that whilst they appear to be an 'inevitable' feature of the operational environment there is a requirement to situate them within a more considered doctrinal and institutional framework.

ORIGINS AND ISSUES

The PRT concept was originally a US initiative, developed in Afghanistan in late 2002 and employed initially as part of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). They were intended as vehicles for kick-starting the stalled development process and building consent in areas where US combat forces operated. The original label, 'Joint Regional Teams' was changed at the behest of the Afghan President, Mohammed Karzai, who inserted 'Provincial' in order to emphasise their role in coordinating and contributing to donor and military support to the Afghan regions. However, and critically, their roles and organisational structures were never defined with any degree of precision.[2]

Subsequently several NATO states adopted PRTs as a part of their contribution to the UN authorised International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) mission. Their utility was essentially political, providing a mechanism for reconciling visible support to NATO and, to a lesser extent, to the United States, with an absence of political will to deploy conventional troops in a combat role. In a more practical sense PRTs also offered a means for stimulating development work in contexts where insecurity was so profound that civilian development agencies were unable

to function. Subsequently, the concept was extended to Iraq in a belated attempt to invigorate the stalling reconstruction programme, generate economic activity, build Iraqi provincial government capacity and extend the rule of law.

The PRT concept was controversial from the outset.[3] At their unveiling, US military commanders appeared to imply a hegemonic military role in the co-ordination of humanitarian NGO work; implicitly threatening to usurp the UN's coordination role whilst symbolising the unwillingness of NATO states to provide sufficient numbers of combat troops. Humanitarian organisations also raised a range of practical concerns; arguing that the military did development work poorly, that this represented a diversion from their primary security provision role and that their presence contributed to a blurring of the lines between military and humanitarian actors that potentially threatened the lives of aid workers. The supposed ineffective-ness of military led reconstruction was also cited as having the potential to create destabilising social tensions amongst beneficiary communities that raised the possibility of undermining 'stabilisation' through the very instrument created to achieve it.

The functional and organisational diversity that characterised the OEF and ISAF PRTs exacerbated many of these controversies.[4] Whilst NATO states frequently justified the organisational variation and their refusal to be prescriptive as a reflection of the very different local conditions in which PRTs operated, many critics were suspicious that this was a ruse for justifying both national agendas and the absence of an effective strategic framework in which the PRTs could function. Furthermore, there was a sense that the variation in structure, funding, purpose and the tenuous linkages with Afghan development priorities appeared to reflect and amplify, rather than reduce the dysfunctional forms of coordination that plagued relationships between the Afghan government and donor states.[5]

The label 'Provincial Reconstruction Team' also created confusion within Governments. For some, and quite understandably, the phrase conjured visions of an organisation that provided a hub for project managing 'physical' reconstruction. Others welcomed the mechanism as a means for simplifying the 'civilian' aspects of the battlefield, creating a 'one stop shop' for the delivery of 'civilian lines of operation.' Even the use of words such as 'Provincial' and 'Reconstruction' muddied the waters, encouraging the sense of PRTs as tactical level instruments for consent building rather than vehicles for bringing together (often) national civilian and military instruments in order to build a sustainable local capacity to govern.

Confusion, some understandable, some pedantic, also arose from the range of apparently similar structures that could be described as PRTs. How, for example, did one differentiate a PRT from any of the other headquarters structures that combined

> The PRT concept was controversial from the outset.

support from Defence and Civilian Ministries? Did the provision of military staff officers through the Coalition Provisional Authorities' Governorate Support Teams in 2004 create *de facto* PRTs? Would, the arrival of DFID and FCO officials in *any* military headquarters make this into a PRT?

Such definitional challenges translated into difficulties in locating PRTs within the intervening states own 'organisational' and 'institutional' hierarchies (felt in terms of difficulties in defining organisational jurisdictions, levels of autonomy, capacity to shape policy and operational responses, etc) and in defining their role with respect to host nation Government's regional development priorities. This generated a range of practical questions related to issues of 'transition'. How and by what process, for example, should capacity within the PRT transfer to a suitable host nation provincial structure? Should PRTs begin as largely military structures, becoming increasingly dominated by civilian officials from the intervening state before transitioning to staff appointed by the host nation itself—in effect PRTs remaining in existence but as host nation structures? Alternatively, should PRTs progressively transfer their own capacity directly to host nation regional development and governance structures (such as Provincial Reconstruction and Development Committees); effectively withering away as local or provincial capacities grew? Similarly, and related more to Iraq than to Afghanistan, what should be the relationship between the transfer of security responsibilities to host nation control and the evolution of the PRT structures? Should PRTs, for example, remain in existence as a form of 'operational' or 'strategic' over-watch when Iraqi provinces are granted 'Provincial Iraqi Control'—perhaps even remaining in circumstances where the Iraqis themselves have the capacity to replicate PRT development capacity? Such questions continue to invite policy makers to more clearly define the purpose, organisation and function of PRTs.

> … definitional challenges translated into difficulties in locating PRTs within the intervening states own 'organisational' and 'institutional' hierarchies …

CONCEPTUAL GAPS?

The use of PRTs reflected the limits of existing tools, both military and civilian, for managing the problems of 'stabilisation.' Increasingly, neither military led 'Civil-Military Cooperation' (or CIMIC) nor traditional civilian 'development' instruments had proven to be adequate instruments.

Historically, 'CIMIC' had focused on maximising the Commander's freedom of manoeuvre through 'liaison' and a range of consent building or 'hearts and

minds' activities. It served as an 'observation post' on the civil community; warning commanders of limitations or threats that derived from the civilian population and, wherever possible, mitigating them. As such CIMIC was a limited instrument that focused on the tactical level mission. But, CIMIC staff, steeped in the military 'will do' culture and pressured into dealing with all aspects of the civilian environment by the need 'to do' something were frequently unsure of the boundaries of their own role and slowly drifted into either humanitarian work or the management of more complex issues such as local government or economic reform.

However, as the demands placed upon, and the requirements for greater expertise on the part of, CIMIC troops increased, the wider Army clung to the mistaken belief, derived from a misreading of its own experiences in Malaya and Aden and reinforced by its Peace Support doctrine, that CIMIC did not require any *particular* knowledge. Rather there was a widespread sense that everyone could 'do' CIMIC. They were not wholly mistaken in this—but only if you defined CIMIC in a particular way, basing it around a very limited form of 'friendly interaction' with the civil population designed to build a sense of legitimacy for the military presence. Experiences in theatres as diverse as Malaya, Aden and Northern Ireland appeared to teach that such interaction was crucial and did not require any particular expertise. However, increasingly CIMIC troops were not being tasked to manage this simple interaction and 'bottom up', military led 'hearts and minds' activities did not equate either to a 'stabilisation' or 'state building' strategy and failed to systematically develop the legitimacy and capacities of local administrative structures linked to national political and development priorities. Furthermore, when the military did engage in more sophisticated 'hearts and minds' programmes linked to 'capacity building' objectives they were frequently criticised for failing to sustainably link these with longer term development objectives. Consequently, the tactical level, piecemeal, *ad hoc* and traditional form of CIMIC have increasingly proven insufficient for dealing with the challenges that Iraq and Afghanistan have generated.

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However, the problems with CIMIC have been paralleled in 'development' circles. During the summer of 2006, DFID's activities in Afghanistan were criticised for failing to demonstrate that the UK military's arrival in Helmand was linked to immediate and tangible development benefits. In part this arose from a perception that DFID's longer term development approach did not provide the type of

'quick win' that military commanders and politicians demanded. The causes of this problem were difficult to identify. Some within the UK military argued that they believed DFID's priorities were too strongly shaped by a culture of long term development, free of the immediate demand for political effect and overly constrained by security concerns. However, whilst problems undoubtedly existed, the scale was often exaggerated and DFID staff were increasingly aware both of the need to rapidly implement projects and to link these to local 'political' effects within the context of a 'stabilisation plan.' Quick Impact Project (QIP) money flowed in the autumn, managed by a PCRU project manager, and facilitated by DFID's own financial gymnastics, placing money within the framework of the Global Conflict Prevention Pool in order to bypass the spending restrictions derived from the International Development Act.

AN EMERGING GAP?

These controversies highlighted the powerful pressures to achieve demonstrable 'stabilisation' effects through QIP projects as well as the unreality of expectations as to what could be achieved and in what time frame. They also hinted at an underlying conceptual 'gap' between traditional development strategies and the military led 'hearts and minds' or 'consent' winning work. Arguably, what is required to fill this is a new 'stabilisation' strategy that differs in its priorities and principles from both traditional 'development' and 'hearts and minds' approaches; being more ambitious and timely than the former and more 'political' than the latter. Such an approach would require a mix—quick impact projects, political engagement with and the empowerment of moderate actors, outreach to isolated communities, programmes to resuscitate and extend key institutions and essential services—in effect the employment of instruments that focus on creating a space which is conducive to the emergence of moderate voices given the capacities to manufacture a stable and sustainable peace. Whilst many of these instruments are not new, there is a pressing need to improve the way in which government departments collectively wield them.

POSSIBLE STRUCTURES?

A new 'stabilisation' strategy obviously requires considerable interaction between government departments prior to and during the deployment of troops. However, whilst a 'comprehensive' plan can be prepared before the deployment of military forces, the security situation may prevent civilian officials from delivering their part (at least initially) in theatre. Hence there will almost certainly be an increased reliance on the military, particularly in the short term. In such cases there is a danger

that the original plan will not be delivered by its authors and will be granted a much lower priority than the military commanders' immediate military objectives. In order to avoid the distortions that this inevitably introduces there is a need for some type of interdepartmental and operational level co-ordination structure that can take ownership of, implement and develop the initial plan. Finally, as a part of the exit strategy, there needs to be a two part handover from the (probably) largely military led structures to other civilian government departments and then to sustainable host nation institutions. Posing the problem in this way allows one to identify the necessity for three stages of stability planning (pre operational, operational and disengagement) and two generic structures for its management.

Arguably the first of these is an operational level, (largely) national planning structure that can bring together the FCO, MOD, DFID and Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) in the pre-deployment phase in order to develop an *interdepartmental* or 'comprehensive' plan that will shape subsequent departmental planning. A similar structure, an 'Inter Agency Planning Team' or IAPT, was employed in autumn 2005 prior to the extension of the British presence into Helmand province. Such a planning capability would need to be owned directly by the Cabinet Office and able to impose its authority, challenge departments that develop plans that undermine the 'comprehensive plan' or fail to balance adequately the 'stabilisation' and their individual 'departmental' objectives.

> A new 'stabilisation' strategy obviously requires considerable interaction between government departments prior to and during the deployment of troops.

Ideally the resulting plan would be handed on to a second structure: an operational level, national interdepartmental planning and stabilisation 'delivery' structure that operates through the 'deployment' and 'operational' phases. This could be labelled an 'Inter Agency Transition Team' (or IATT) but in effect it would do what the PRTs do. In situations of chronic insecurity this could initially be established within the senior military formation deployed, as a part of the J5 branch, but also drawing on the capabilities frequently found in the C/J/G9 and staffed by an interdepartmental civil-military team. This structure would be located at the level of the most senior national military headquarters deployed to the theatre, but would separate and 'civilianise' as soon as the situation permitted. Again the intention would be to create a structure that was able to 'manage' and husband an interdepartmental 'stabilisation' plan rather than implement the implied civilian tasks that support an essentially 'military' plan. Hence, the IATT structure, embedded initially within the military planning branch, would need to report back to a structure in

Whitehall that could provide it with sufficient 'bureaucratic space' and authority to ensure its capacity to maintain the 'interdepartmental' nature of the stabilisation plan whilst remaining sufficiently 'connected' to the military to ensure that it remains relevant to the operational situation. The IATT should therefore remain as a planning and co-ordination tool rather than a vehicle for implementing reconstruction tasks delegated by a military commander.

Thirdly there is a need to create sustainable host nation structures prior to and after the withdrawal of international troops, and their creation is largely beyond the British Government's remit to dictate.

JUSTIFYING THE IATT CONCEPT?

Superficially the IATT concept may appear to be a simple re-branding of the PRT but it does have the potential to deliver a fundamental change in the way in which states' manage 'stabilisation operations.' Within Ministries of Defence traditional approaches to crises have tended to characterise civilian government departments as initially supporting a defence ministry and only gradually shifting into the lead as the security situation improves. In this role they also leverage international organisations and NGOs. The 'sequential' nature of the model implies that the creation of a 'secure environment' will precede all other stabilisation and state building activities both in timing and its significance within the strategic plan. This model has a number of flaws: firstly 'security' is not the most important planning factor in the development of the strategic plan; secondly intervention strategies cannot be planned according to an essentially linear model, and thirdly, planning processes and organisations need to stress the identification of 'critical paths' and iterative approaches to planning.

> … traditional approaches to crises have tended to characterise civilian government departments as initially supporting a defence ministry …

In terms of the former, whilst security is a priority, it is one of several and is often compromised by the pursuit of political objectives that are externally imposed. The mass sacking of the Iraqi Army, the prioritisation of the reform of the Afghan National Army over that of the Police, the low numbers of international troops deployed in both Afghanistan and Iraq are good examples of external political settlements that are largely unrelated to the prioritisation of the security strand within a stabilisation plan.

Secondly, military campaign planning tends to envision parallel and broadly sequential 'lines of activity.' This approach does not always recognise sufficiently that

all lines of operation are not immediately possible, that many are contingent on a range of other, often unrelated, occurrences, and that some actions will have devastating and unintended consequences for others. Clearly 'multifunctional' interventions encompass activities that cause changes within a wide range of political, tribal, social, economic and security systems—changes affecting one of these frequently cannot be understood in isolation from changes in the others. Such an analysis implies a need for an operational level strategy co-ordination mechanism that is able to move beyond the delivery of reconstruction 'services' and identify, reflect upon and manage the complex (often political) interaction between the differing lines of national and international 'stabilisation' activity as well as the consequences of externally imposed political constraints and processes—that is, it is able to manage critical paths.

However, the argument for an 'Inter Agency Transition Team' does not equate either to a justification of the PRT concept, nor does it imply the 'militarisation' of stabilisation planning and delivery. Rather it is related to ensuring that government departments have a *predictable* institutional mechanism for engaging in the day to day and operational setting of priorities within a framework that is genuinely *interdepartmental* yet potentially flexible enough to incorporate coalition and other partners.

ACTIVITIES AND OWNERSHIP

After having established a case for thinking about interventions differently, the issue then becomes one of defining what the IAPTs and IATTs do. Ideally the IAPT would create an interdepartmental framework plan in which the separate

ministries would frame their own responses. The IATT would deploy alongside the military intervention force, inheriting the plan developed by the IAPT as well as several of the key staff that had initially formulated the plan. As a staff, perhaps headed by or reporting directly to some form of special government representative (ideally the senior British official in theatre, such as the UK Ambassador) it would become the first custodian of the 'stability' plan. The IATT could also become the principal vehicle for *delivering* (that is identifying need, determining funding, linking implementation and donor agencies) projects that go beyond military 'hearts and minds' and 'population control' type activities but fall well short of traditional development activity. This approach would result in a range of benefits not least of which would be to bring coherence between tactical, military delivered 'consent winning' activities, much longer term 'development' strategies and the more significant operational level 'stability' type activities. It would also enable the IATT to better resist pressure to deliver short term consent building projects (paint that school!) rather than stabilisation activities (initial governance, 'first stage' Security Sector Reform, etc). Similarly it has the potential to provide a framework that would enable 'hearts and minds' and development activities to contribute more coherently to stabilisation priorities, without undermining either, and taking place within an overarching information campaign that can leverage the political benefits.

In practical terms the IATT should be owned by the PCRU but would be staffed by a mixed military and civilian (FCO, DFID, Home Office, PCRU and MOD civilian) staff, the military predominating in the early stages of the crisis but the composition moving to favour the civilian component as the security situation improved. Initially it would almost certainly have to be physically located within the senior military HQ for 'life support' reasons[6] but also reflecting the simple reality that it needs to be a part of a mechanism that can influence the operational level military decision making. It would be separated as soon as possible from this military headquarters in order to create a sense of progress and of the civilianisation of the campaign as well as maintaining its role as the principal

> … the issue then becomes one of defining what the IAPTs and IATTs do.

mechanism for coordinating and delivering stabilisation effects on behalf of a *range* of Government departments. At no point would it be subordinate to any military headquarters, but its relative importance would change over time as the campaign evolved and became less focused on 'hard' security and more focused on stabilisation and development.

MORE CAPACITY BUILDING, LESS RECONSTRUCTION

The IATT arrangement would differ from the PRT approach in the sense that it is envisaged as being a more 'strategic' tool for the co-ordination of (largely) national stabilisation and development capabilities—and far more resistant to pressures that transform PRTs into reconstruction management vehicles. In a sense it is not without recent precedents. In Iraq the Southern Iraq Steering Group and, in Afghanistan, the Helmand Executive Group drew together the key planners and decision makers whilst having access to PRTs that served as a secretariat as well as coordinating the delivery of stabilisation effects (rather than short-term reconstruction). The IATT also echoes the historical experiences of the Malayan counter insurgency campaign, paralleling the Briggs' plan's reorganisation of the colonial Malay states' capacity to combat the communist insurgency. This established largely police and civilian-led mechanisms for directing and coordinating the entire war effort through linked civil-military executive committees at federal, state and district levels. These structures resulted in a far more cohesive effort, drawing together the hard security and intelligence plans (plans for patrols, ambushes, intelligence gathering) with punitive elements (population and food control) and development, largely under the direction of a series of regional and ultimately national war executive committees.[7]

ADDITIONAL ADAPTATIONS

The MOD should also rethink its approach to delivering its CIMIC capability. However, the key questions are also almost certainly the most basic—what is CIMIC, who does it and how is it managed? In terms of the former, many of the basic definitions work already, in particular the NATO and UK

> The key change is to separate the broader operational planning and stabilisation CIMIC function from the tactical CIMIC function …

definitions[8] conceive of CIMIC as essentially a support function for the military commander. The key change is to separate the broader operational planning and stabilisation CIMIC function from the tactical CIMIC function, but without losing either or separating them so completely that they lose synergy. In effect CIMIC requires doctrine and capabilities for its two emerging branches—traditional or 'tactical CIMIC' and 'stabilisation CIMIC.'

Who does this is more challenging. Tactical CIMIC, defined in this way is every soldier's responsibility, but experience shows that within the commander's staff it is managed most effectively by individuals with specialist training and who are

located within the 'Operations Support' (C/J/G3) staff branch for 'delivery' and within the planning branch (C/J/G5) to ensure inclusion in longer terms 'plans'. The delivery of projects (when appropriate for the military to do so) is best performed by whomsoever has a clearly defined comparative advantage, but the management of the projects and the co-ordination of the military implementation of the overall plan needs to be dealt with in the operations branch (C/J/G3). The purpose underlying this arrangement is to firmly situate tactical CIMIC as a part of the Commander's 'non-kinetic' armoury alongside information operations, psychological operations and within an information campaign that seeks to deliver consent and minimise civil interference within a broader stabilisation plan formulated and husbanded at higher levels by the IATT.

Meanwhile, 'stabilisation CIMIC' would orientate itself to initially supporting the work of the IAPT and its subsequent transition to an IATT. In this role it provides a transition mechanism that seeks to promote and protect the IAPT plan during the period in which governmental civilian staff may be absent from the operational theatre and military planning structures and more insular forms of military logic may be hegemonic. In effect, 'stabilisation CIMIC' staffs function as interlocutors between the MOD and other government departments, not in the sense of providing an external strategic 'liaison' mechanism but through acting as custodians of and advocates for the broader components of the IAPT plan within a military headquarters. Their purpose is to champion the 'implications' of the IAPT plan during the military planning process whilst also seeking to create the conditions necessary to effect a transition to civilian and more importantly to host nation control of the stabilisation plan. Whilst transition may be one of the principles guiding their activities they should also pursue more tangible objectives. In particular, within the framework of the IAPT plan operational CIMIC should seek to change the conflict dynamic through creating an environment in which moderate voices can flourish and populate legitimate institutions that deliver effective and appropriate public services. Stabilisation CIMIC is unashamedly a political conflict resolution strategy.

The second part of 'who does it' is the issue of augmentees. The overwhelming majority of commissioned and non-commissioned officers involved in CIMIC in the past 4 years have been augmentees with little or no training. Even where individuals from the UK's Joint CIMIC Group are present, the marked differences in the way in which formations organise CIMIC make it difficult to apply best practice. In addition to formalising CIMIC as an Operations Support staff function there is a requirement for a more clearly defined stabilisation CIMIC sub-specialisation and a deepening of the training provided. Defence needs to recognise that CIMIC, however defined, has generally not been performed well and requires more effective investment.

ENDNOTES

1   The latter as part of the initial US State Department plan to create PRTs in each of the Iraqi provinces.

2   For a useful discussion of the development of the PRT concept see B Stapleton, 'The Provincial Reconstruction Team Plan in Afghanistan: A New Direction?' Bonn, May 2003 (authors' copy); see also Peter Viggo Jakobsen, 'PRTs in Afghanistan: Successful but not sufficient' Danish Institute for International Studies Copenhagen 2005:6 at http://diis.dk/sw11230.asp

3   See PV Jakobsen, Op.Cit.

4   See S Gordon, *'The Changing Role of the Military in Assistance Strategies'* in A Harmer and V Wheeler (Eds), Resetting the Rules of Engagement, HPG Report 21, Overseas Development Institute, March 2006. See also See Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Op.Cit.

5   Ashraf Ghani and Claire Lockhart, '*State Building as an Answer to Global Insecurities: Europe's Ro*" unpublished mimeo.

6   It would almost certainly be dependent on the military headquarters for intelligence, information support, accommodation and force protection.

7   For coverage of the administrative arrangements see Anthony Short, '*Communist Insurrection in Malaya* (London: Muller, 1975 pp. 378–85); John Coates, '*Suppressing Insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency, 1948–1954* (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1992) pp. 116–119; Richard Stubbs, '*Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency, 1948–1960* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1989) pp. 98–101.

8   The NATO definition is 'The coordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the [NATO] Commander and civil populations, including national and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.' Ratified in MC 411/1 'NATO Military Policy on CIMIC.' See also AAP-6 '*NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*' and UK Joint Warfare Publication 0-01.1 '*UK Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions*'. The UK MOD defines CIMIC as 'a function of operations conducted to allow the Commander to interact effectively with the civil environment in the Joint Operations Area (JOA). It provides for co-operation, co-ordination, mutual support, joint planning and information exchange between military forces and in-theatre civil actors. It thereby assists the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) with the achievement of the *military* mission and maximises the effectiveness of the military contribution to the *overall* mission.' UK Joint Doctrine Publication 3-90, para 108.

THE AUTHORS

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AVOIDING THE ISSUES

DAVID BURING'S REVIEW OF THE MINEFIELD: AN AUSTRALIAN TRAGEDY IN VIETNAM

GREG LOCKHART

While it is flattering that a former officer of Brigadier David Buring's seniority has written a six-page review of my book, it is remarkable that he has overlooked the first requirement of book review writing: to understand the work under review. Buring's misreading of *The Minefield* begins in his first sentence where he states that the book is 'on the Australian Army's mine warfare experience in Vietnam'. The subject is, rather, the minefield Brigadier Stuart Graham ordered First Australian Task Force (1ATF) to lay with over 20 000 M16 anti-personnel in Vietnam in 1967 and the related tragedy. Buring does refer to 'the barrier fence and minefield'. He adds that the consequences of laying it were 'extensive and serious'. But still, he never effectively engages with these issues.

Buring's review misses or ignores my main storyline. He shows no awareness that Graham laid what he imagined was a barrier minefield to protect people in the most densely populated villages of the province without realising that those villages largely contained his enemy. He misses my key point that the patrol program and other measures Graham designed to protect the minefield were never going to be effective because he did not know who or where his enemy was. In other words, he never realises that what he described as Graham's 'barrier minefield' could never have been one. He misses my close analysis of Graham's 'tactical confusion', and

garbles my account of how people from the relevant villages—initially teenage girls—entered the minefield and lifted thousands of M16 mines. Naively, he still wonders why the people lifting the mines 'were remarkably exposed, yet they were not challenged'.

What about the 'extensive and serious' consequences of Graham's blunder? Nowhere does Buring say that, from around late 1967 to early 1971, the M16 mines from the 1ATF minefield were the lightly armed guerilla enemy's number one strike weapons in the province. Nowhere does he clarify the fact that over 500 Australians and their allies were killed or dismembered and mutilated by re-laid M16 mines from the minefield. And nowhere does he note that these mines seriously skewed 1ATF operations and enabled 1ATF's enemy to defend successfully its vital population and base areas.

What then of the question my book is built around? How could a capable officer like Graham turn over to his enemy the extensive arsenal of M16 mines and other ordnance that had such a heavy impact on 1ATF? Buring's opines that 'deficiencies in … execution' were to blame for the outcome of Graham's decision and remarks vaguely on the 'loss of intent' and 'lack of capability' to patrol the minefield. Yet Buring is unable to offer any indication of why the deficiencies existed in the first place—especially not knowing who the enemy was. His suggestion that Graham 'actually deserves credit for the attempt' forgets what he actually did.

My argument is that a combination of ambition and great operational stress caused Graham to act unwisely. Yet he could not have made the decision he did, if he had understood who or where his enemy was. The question about why he did not have this vital information then raises large questions about the nature of Australian strategic policy. No one in the high command knew who Graham's enemy was either. Hence, the political and strategic analysis of this problem I present in the opening chapters of my book, which Buring attempts to dismiss by declaring that their 'wide net … catches more than was really necessary to do justice to the subject'.

So how might we understand Buring's efforts to review a book with which he seems so singularly unable to engage? A reasonable explanation is that he is marching past and avoiding confrontation. While not accepting the need to cast a wide net, but being sufficiently expansive to indulge the romance of the Australian Government's fight for 'freedom' in Vietnam, he fails to confront the fact that it didn't know who its enemy was.

The Minefield offers the following explanation of why the Australian Government sent token forces to a war about which it had such inadequate strategic intelligence. At a time of Western, especially British imperial decline, conservative Australian governments fearfully opposed independent Asian nationalist movements, but could not say so. Blinded by wilful ignorance of the political and military force

of Asian nationalism, those governments sought to erect diplomatic and military barriers against political change in the region. The deployment of token Australian forces to encourage and support the suppression of Vietnamese nationalism by US forces thus followed. Buring's review chimes with that failed policy and a desire to turn the clock back on history.

His defence of Graham's decision thus precludes the best explanation for and fairest mitigation of it: his reaction to the insoluble military problems created by the blind political impulse that drove the government. Institutionalised ignorance of Vietnamese conditions in Canberra precluded an adequate appreciation of the battlefield and enemy. Graham's misreading of the political allegiances and military capacities of the people he tried to protect with the minefield went with the unbalanced, under strength, and far too lightly armed force he was sent to command in Vietnam in 1967. It was in an attempt to compensate for 1ATF's incapacity to deal with the array of military problems it faced in Phuoc Tuy that Graham personally faltered in an inherently stress generating situation. So much for Buring's trite assertion that I 'expand' Graham's 'limited purpose' in laying the minefield into 'a much wider barrier philosophy' in order 'to criticise it'. I see Graham as a victim of that policy—and also of his own weaknesses.

Among other major errors and inaccuracies Buring claims that I criticise the Army for not applying sanctions to Graham, and for issuing what he describes as an understated press release about mine laying casualties. These claims are inaccurate. I show in detail that, for various bureaucratic reasons including the then Chief of the General Staff's ignorance of the situation in Vietnam, he was neither in a position to veto Graham's decision nor later sack him. In relation to the press release, far from criticising it for being merely understated, *The Minefield* demonstrates that it contained 'misleading' and 'untruthful' statements and that it constituted a 'betrayal' of the sappers who were killed in the laying of the minefield. The nonsense Buring goes on with here is all too revealing. He claims that, in the propaganda struggle for worldwide opinion, a public airing of command and casualty issues would have resulted in what he absurdly calls a 'pre-emptive capitulation'. No matter how little information the press received, there was no need for a betrayal.

'Strategic Implications' further reveals Buring's support for lost causes. In the final paragraph of that section we have this: 'To argue that because [campaigns] did not succeed, they should have not been attempted is too facile'. Again his review is pretentiously off-beam. I argue that, because of its colonial foundations in the period of decolonisation, the Vietnam campaign ran in Canberra on institutionalised ignorance about the battlefield, such that Graham could not have known his enemy. Once more, Buring places himself in the invidious position of attempting to defend the indefensible.

Traditionally, Australian officers have had a weak feel for strategy, because in the conduct of imperial expeditions their focus has been/is overwhelmingly tactical. Buring's inability to comprehend my strategic as well as tactical analysis of Graham's decision is consistent with that tradition. But more than that, we need to note his assertion that in relation to Vietnam 'Australia's strategic choices expired with the decision to join the conflict'—and so ended where the campaign started. Wittingly or unwittingly, that assertion works to obscure what *The Minefield* shows was a critical point: the High Command's colonial construction of the battlefield and the serious difficulties that construction caused 1ATF and Graham. Avoiding key issues, Buring keeps the conversation tactical and loads all responsibility for the minefield disaster on the battlefield commander, Graham—whose 'attempt' he nevertheless praises.

No aspect of Buring's review transcends this confusion. The section he calls 'Soldiers and Mines' is one in which we might have expected a former engineer officer like him to have revealed an understanding of his sappers. But all we get is some old imperial rhetoric. Unlike sappers, who see mine laying as 'a completely normal task', he claims 'outside observers' are more likely to perceive the work as being 'much more hazardous'. These remarks fly cheaply in the face of the evidence I present in the book. I am certain that the amputee sappers and other mine warfare practitioners I interviewed in and out of clinics around 2002–03 did not think the risks involved in laying mines, especially for Graham's minefield, made it a 'completely normal' task.

The review is no more successful in the field of semantics. Here Buring claims I use 'far too many coloured and emotive words', but only provides three examples that all turn out to be wrong. One involves his double displeasure with the expression 'we thought the hierarchy were Dickheads'—and this 'from a former officer', he exclaims in horror. But Buring's dismay not only shows that he doesn't understand the conventions of quoting, it reveals again that he has misread the text. The 'Dickheads' comment was a direct quote from a statement by a sergeant I interviewed, not an officer. Buring also seems unaware that the other examples he gives—my use of the word 'dummy' and of the metaphor 'the blind leading the blind' in relation to Graham—involve standard *Macquarie Dictionary* Australian English usage.

Buring's review falls apart on the philosophical front too. Quoting British historian John Keegan he reproduces the following sentence from page 298 of the 1994 edition of Keegan's 1976 classic *The Face of Battle*: 'Battle is a historical subject, whose nature and trend of development can only be understood down a long historical development'. Referring to *The Minefield*, Buring adds in his own words 'maybe it is still too soon'. But Keegan is not saying that a historian cannot consider recent battles. He is saying that battles have to be understood in historical

context and in relation to other battles. Apparently, Buring doesn't yet know that the subtitle of Keegan's 2003 book *Intelligence in War* is *From Napoleon to Al-Qaeda*. He also seems to have missed Keegan's 2004 book *The Iraq War*!

This embarrassment also draws attention to Buring's affinity for the old positivist idea that, ultimately, in the fullness of time, history will deliver its verdict. This view had its heyday around 1900 at the height of the British Empire. Therein, the imperial project did not sit comfortably with the reality that historical discourse can begin any time after an event and remains open ended. Buring forgets that each generation writes its own history.

So as his review crumbles, it comes down to the old imperial sigh: 'so much depends on the attitudes of the time'. Of course it does. That is why, for example, *The Minefield* details the influence of failed French colonial military models on Australian tactical thinking. In a final whimper we have this: 'the southern zone of Vietnam was arguably entitled to self-determination without military or terrorist coercion'. Of course they were entitled; there is no argument about that. The argument is in the adage that one person's terrorist is another's freedom fighter. The villagers Graham so tragically thought he was protecting were the ones who lifted the mines because they thought 1ATF was in the province to terrorise them. That Buring is still unaware of this salient point—plus the point of even greater salience that those villagers were on the side that won the war—shows that his review of *The Minefield* has its ethos in the fearful political bias that still seeks validation in old imperial attitudes.

Greg Lockhart

LETTERS AND COMMENTARY

TO THE EDITORS

We were surprised and disappointed that Brigadier David Buring, in his review of Greg Lockhart's *The Minefield – An Australian Tragedy in Vietnam*, misunderstands the book's central point.

The book addresses the question that has angered and intrigued Vietnam veterans since the war: 'How could Brigadier Graham, an intelligent, capable and experienced army officer, make what is probably the greatest Australian military blunder since World War Two?'

Brigadier Graham was the Commander, 1st Australian Task Force. He was under pressure. He had too few troops for the job at hand. His solution was to lay a minefield so as to separate and thus protect the province's main populated and rice growing area from the Viet Cong. The minefield would substitute for the troops he did not have.

He was not universally supported in his solution. His battalion commanders, both wary of the two-edged nature of minefields because of their Korean War experience, warned against it. So did the Graham's engineer advisor.

But he gave the order and the minefield was laid.

That Graham was in error soon became apparent. Before the laying was completed, the Viet Cong were lifting mines and soon re-laying them in the path of Australian patrols and in places Australian troops might rest or seek cover.

In time, thousands of mines were lifted and re-laid as the Viet Cong's primary strike weapon and as weapons defending their base areas. Over five hundred Australians, Americans, New Zealanders and South Vietnamese were killed or wounded on these re-laid mines. There were long periods between 1969–70 when some 50 per cent of task force casualties were caused by mines from the minefield, with the figures probably peaking at 80 per cent at some points.

One important result was that the area around the minefield, which included the Viet Cong base area of the Long Hai Hills, was avoided by some Australian commanders who thought it too dangerous for their troops to operate in. So ironically, the minefield came to protect the Viet Cong against our incursions into their base areas even to the extent that, during the eventual lifting, Viet Cong bunkers were discovered in the middle of the minefield.

Over the years, there has been much speculation about how Brigadier Graham could have made such a disastrous mistake. Some accuse him of an ignorance of guerrilla warfare; others accuse him of arrogance in ignoring expert advice; some suggest ideological blindness; yet others suggest it was really not Graham's fault but the fault of South Vietnamese troops breaking their promise to protect the minefield.

Greg Lockhart finds all these explanations at least partly wanting. Without absolving the Task Force Commander of personal responsibility, the author success-fully argues that Brigadier Graham's decision must be viewed in the context of the flawed strategic thinking of the whole military hierarchy. It was that flawed strategic thinking that blinded Graham to the main danger in laying a minefield to keep the enemy out of the province's main population and rice growing area. He believed the enemy was on only one side of the wire. In other words, he assumed the people in the 'protected' villages, by and large, were not Viet Cong.

This assumption was wildly wrong.

The Viet Cong who lifted the M16 mines for re-laying in the path of Australian soldiers were villagers. Platoons of Saigon Government troops recruited to defend their own villages routinely failed to prevent Viet Cong entering, often to visit their families. Viet Cong political rallies using public address systems were held at one end of village while the village defence platoons stayed in their bunkers at the other. Villagers continually passed intelligence to the Viet Cong military units about Australian movements.

There is the instructive case of 8 RAR telling a Vietnamese district office it was withdrawing ambushes from round a village knowing the word would get to the local guerrilla unit. The 8 RAR ambushes moved only slightly and caught the inflow of the misadvised Viet Cong.

Brigadier Buring, in claiming that it was 'deficiencies in … execution' that turned the minefield into a disaster, has missed the book's central point. That point being that flawed strategic thinking blinded the Task Force Commander as to who and *where* his enemy was, condemning him to the ridiculous action of laying a minefield with the enemy on both sides.

Infantry soldiers on patrols were not the only Australian victims of our own M16 jumping jack mines; five Army engineers were killed and six wounded in three separate incidents while laying them.

A government press release claimed that the first two incidents had been caused by 'momentary lack of concentration and attention to detail by an individual…'. A similar claim was made for the third incident with the qualification that it was just possible a mine malfunction could have been the cause.

Greg Lockhart's careful analysis shows two of these claims to be untrue or at least misleading. The second explosion may have been human error but the cause could not actually be determined, while the third explosion may either have been

a fuze malfunction or human error. He also shows that the government was aware of this uncertainty.

As well as unequivocally blaming the sappers, the press release failed to mention the difficulty under which they worked. They had not trained using the mine before arriving in Vietnam. The need to finish the minefield before the harvest led to hurried and inadequate in-country training. It also led to the inclusion of untrained sappers in laying parties and an unrealistically ambitious laying rate. The use of sensitive anti-lifting devices greatly increased the danger of laying the mines. Some mine mechanisms were also found to be faulty in the testing process. All this plus the stress of stifling heat and the constant threat of enemy action inevitably led to casualties.

Not only did the press release fail to mention these circumstances, it also made the false claims that sappers had received relevant basic training in Australia and that they underwent 'further intensive training and rehearsals' just prior to the laying.

Worse still, the press release unfairly claimed that 'more rigid control by Non Commissioned Officers [may] have resulted in fewer casualties'.

In short, the government press release was a betrayal of the sappers who, far from bearing responsibility for the accidents, were doing a remarkable job under the most adverse of conditions.

Brigadier Buring justifies this betrayal saying: '…high profile public and political argument about mine casualties would have handed the enemy a major propaganda victory'. More likely, we feel, was the government's fear that argument about the reliability of the mines and the adequacy of the sappers' training might damage it electorally.

If, however, Buring is correct, the question must be asked why, after Australia's participation in the war ended, was the record not corrected; why were those so unfairly blamed not briefed on the need for the sacrifice of their reputations for the national good. One of these non-commissioned officers interviewed by the author was troubled by that unfair accusation for nearly forty years; he is no doubt not alone.

The Minefield is, we believe, the most important book about Australia's participation in the Vietnam war published so far. It has not only given many, many soldiers a believable context into which to understand their individual experiences, but also explores issues of vital importance to the prosecution of current conflicts.

Yours sincerely,

Tim McCombe, OAM
National President
Vietnam Veterans' Federation
29 July 2008

TO THE EDITORS

I write to address a number of issues arising from the two articles submitted by Infantry officers in the Autumn 2008 edition of the *Australian Army Journal* and a number of subsequent comments, spoken and written, responding to these articles. As such, I wish to deal with a number of issues: the official response to these officers' comments, the ramifications for debate and discussion within professional circles, and the long-term consequences of the rise of Special Forces in Australia.

The Canadians and Americans, and most importantly, the past masters of counterinsurgency warfare, the British, have all deployed conventional infantry on high intensity operations in the Krulakian environment of nation-building and counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Of course, the ultimate irony is that our Special Forces have conducted much lauded *conventional* actions in this supposedly changed environment. So what is being argued here? If warfare has changed so much, what have our allies been doing all this time? More to the point, what have our own Special Forces being doing? It seems that our Special Forces get to fight on the 'Third Block', but do not have to conduct the more mundane operations on the other two blocks—that is handled by the conventional Infantry.

This is *not* a repudiation of the principles argued by Smith in *The Utility of Force* or by Caldwell, Galula, Nagl *et al*. Nor am I arguing that soft skills such as empathy for the enemy (which is equally useful across the entire spectrum of conflict) should not be central in modern training regimens. The regular battalions *have* been acting on these principles and *have* been developing these skills in the Solomon Islands, East Timor, Iraq and Afghanistan. Most serving infantrymen could navigate the labyrinthine streets of Dili blindfolded and point out every internally displaced person camp, non-government organisation office and United Nations Police station; but what they cannot do is conduct a quick attack in a built-up area, conducting sustained city block clearances in contact. Why? It is because we have neither trained for this, have tested Urban Operations TTPs in place nor even the organic logistics framework present for sustained combat. Put simply, our battalions' *warfighting* skills have atrophied, not because combat has disappeared from conflict—it clearly has not and will not—but because they have been deliberately excluded from combat. Moreover, they do not have time to train for conventional warfighting due to the dysfunctional rotation system. The Infantry have a right to be confused and angry. The Army itself sends mixed messages. For example, infantrymen are told to develop the 'soft skills' yet they have witnessed the Army purchase of one of the heaviest main battle tanks in the world, the Abrams; they are told that Infantry cannot expect to see 'traditional' conflicts but read about their brethren in the British, American and Canadian armies in action.

I feel the second *ad hominem* attack was both more disappointing and far more serious in terms of the Army's intellectual standing. The editorial in the Autumn *AAJ* rebuked Hammett and Colton for raising their issues because they somehow did not understand Smith's thesis in *The Utility of Force*. A brief look at their respective operational careers would suggest that they do in fact understand and have implemented Smith's dictums. The point here is that no amount of sophistry or word-play can hide the fact that the 'face of warfare' experienced by our conventional battalions *vis-à-vis* the Special Forces has been vastly different. The type of war Hammett and Colton referred does, and will continue to, exist. To make matters worse, the editorial noted that it would include, grudgingly it seems, the two articles 'in a spirit of professional debate'. Why would the editors deem it necessary to add that remark? Surely it is a given that articles are included to curry debate? It should be noted that when Brigadier Essex-Clark raised the almost identical concerns about the use of 'niche forces' in the June 2003 edition of the *AAJ*, no such opinion was expressed by the editorial. The *AAJ* must be more than just a repository for essays earnestly regurgitating the latest vogue in military theory. Officers who challenge the orthodoxy should not be derided but actively encouraged. We will not develop and learn if we accept and only produce uncritical submissions in our professional journals. In a journal of ideas on warfare, no one person's word should be the last word.

Special Forces in Australia have done very well in the last few years. It now has an ever-burgeoning bureaucracy headed by no less than a major general; it has guaranteed lifeblood with the SFDR Scheme, which allows civilians off the street to enter the Special Forces without ever having served in the wider Army; and it has earned a cachet due to its exposure to combat operations (the same type of operations that do not exist anymore supposedly). This should raise real concerns for a number of reasons, the least of all being what role the Infantry has in the future. The Army should also be extremely concerned with the lack of morale in the battalions and the flight to the Special Forces. The vast majority of Infantry soldiers do not apply for the Special Forces because they want to be SF soldiers *per se*, but because they want an opportunity to ply their trade. If their battalions were conducting conventional operations, these soldiers would, for the most part, opt to serve with their own proud battalions.

Perhaps the most pernicious aspect of the rise of Special Forces in Australia has been the introduction and use of the term 'direct action'—a catch-all phrase that seems to cover all tactical tasks that a cynic might suggest have the common element of deliberate contact with enemy combatants. One of the main types of 'direct action'—the 'raid'—is, in the most basic tactical terms, a 'destroy' mission that does not seek to hold ground. How is this task the sole preserve of the Special Forces? If only the Special Forces can execute 'direct actions', one assumes therefore that the regular battalions are deemed fit to handle only 'indirect actions'—whatever

they may be. I hazard a guess they look a lot like the type of operations relegated to the conventional battalions recently. We are told that the Commandos fill a capability gap between the conventional battalions and the SAS; it is absolutely clear by the type of operations conducted by our infantry brothers in other armies and the well-documented actions of the Commandos, that this 'gap' is an artificial construct. If the conventional battalions were given the same operational opportunities, their 'capability' would be demonstrated and the 'gap' erased.

In essence, the history of the post-Second World War Australian Army was about the struggle of the Regular Army for ascendancy over the 'brilliant amateurs' of the Citizen Military Forces and Army Reserve. The narrative of the Australian Army in the first half of the twenty-first century seems to be shaping up to be about another struggle for ascendancy—this time between conventional Infantry and the Special Forces. It was the CMF's inability to deliver highly trained units for short notice Cold War tasks that forced it to cede primacy to the ARA. No such charge could be levelled at the conventional battalions today, as anyone who has suffered through endless pre-deployment checks or Ready Company Group leave restrictions can testify.

Instead the canard of a 'new type of warfare' will be used, along with the preferment of 'niche capabilities' to undermine, emasculate and degrade the conventional battalions. Warfare's character and face evolves but its nature is unchanging. To argue that only a 'niche' capability can operate in future conflict is nonsense. Capability, in its basest form, is a function of good training realised with operational opportunity. Infantry officers and their men *do* understand that finesse, discretion, empathy, compassion and intelligence are to be valued as much as raw martial ability. They understand the need to work with police forces and civilian agencies in a whole-of-government approach. They understand it so well because they have been doing so in a number of operations overseas. But currently, the battalions are not getting opportunities to train in high-end warfighting and they are not getting the combat exposure enjoyed by the Special Forces community. This creates a vicious circle of skill degradation, plummeting morale and soldiers leaving *en masse*. The Infantry battalions of the Royal Australian Regiment, the custodians of the battle honours of Maryang San, Kapyong and Long Tan, deserve better than this.

Dayton McCarthy

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BOOK REVIEW

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Roger Pauly, *Firearms: The Life Story of a Technology*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2008, 180 pp.

Reviewed by Antony Trentini

Firearms are obviously central to the Army—and are critical to the business of the Infantry and Special Forces. Roger Pauly's book is an excellent introduction for those interested in better understanding the firearms used by the warriors of yesterday and today.

This book examines the history of firearms, and their development from the primitive 'firelances' of ancient China into the sophisticated assault rifles of today. Pauly has chosen a simple overarching framework to guide his study, examining the development of firearms by analysing their ability to increase range, accuracy or rate of fire over previous firearms. The history of firearms is fraught with many counter-intuitive developments and historical oddities that can be difficult to group together in any meaningful way. Pauly's organisational framework succeeds in developing and maintaining coherence despite this, and is clear and well justified.

In examining the actual firearms themselves, Pauly has managed to strike a fine balance, offering just enough detail to explain the devices in question clearly, but presenting it in sufficient depth to avoid oversimplification or triviality. Pauly's writing style showcases these explanatory sections well, offering an easily digestible and sometimes humorous style with plenty of anecdotes to convey the reader from one span of technical detail to the next.

However, his style is also one of the few drawbacks of Pauly's work as it does not lend itself well to efficient and effective division into sections. *Firearms*, therefore, is of accordingly limited value as a reference text. While the comparatively extensive

> … an excellent introduction for those interested in better understanding the firearms used by the warriors of yesterday and today.

index does alleviate this problem somewhat, the book's chapters are fairly broad and thus of questionable value in identifying matters for future reference. Pauly's treatment of referencing is similarly problematic, with many facts such as dates, names, technical descriptions and points of contention not specifically referenced. This makes his work frustrating to verify independently, as large parts of the text are not clearly referenced.

In essence, if taken as an introductory text to a subject that is thoroughly treated in other literature, these shortcomings can be overlooked. Students wishing to gain some benefit from this text should delve into more thorough works on the subject. This way, they can draw on Pauly's book as a valuable source of historical context for the technical and factual minutiae that often fill other works on the topic.

BOOK REVIEW

Wolfam Wette, *The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality*, translated by Deborah Schneider, preface by Peter Fritzsche and forward by Manfred Messerschmitt, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2006, 391 pp.

Reviewed by Russell A Hart

Originally published in German in 2002, the appearance of an English translation of this important book is overdue. Wolfram Wette exposes the deeply racist and anti-Semitic character of the modern German military that conditioned it to embrace the genocidal, racial war of extermination that Hitler and National Socialism unleashed on the world during the Second World War. Nazism did not seduce officers and soldiers into genocide, Wette argues; it co-opted willing co-perpetrators who widely shared Nazism's violent, racist, and anti-communist world view. Published on the heels of the wide ranging German domestic debate in the 1990s on the role of ordinary German soldiers in the Holocaust and other Nazi atrocities, Wette continues the scholarly assault on the Cold War myth perpetrated by German generals and soldiers of the 'clean', apolitical German military uninvolved in Nazi excesses committed by a minority of Nazi fanatics in the SS, SD, and *Einsatzgruppen*. This myth has been shattered in the last two decades by scholars such as Omar Bartov, Christopher Browning and Hannes Heer, among others. Wette reinforces their conclusions with a passionately compelling, sometimes even angry, denunciation of the historical and cultural roots of Nazi genocide in the modern German military.

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This study begins with an examination of the pervasiveness of anti-Russian, anti-Slavic and anti-Communist sentiments in the Imperial German military that in the wake of Germany's defeat in the Great War allowed National Socialism to conflate

its greatest ideological enemies together as the nonsensical 'Jewish-Bolshevik menace'. Wette then turns to examine the pervasiveness of anti-Semitism in the Imperial German officer corps of the late nineteenth century. Wette emphasises how Jews in particular came to be blamed for the defeat of Imperial Germany in the Great War—the infamous 'Stab in the Back' legend—even though they served in the military in proportionate terms and were the most decorated constituency in First World War German society (p. 37). The *Freikorps* movement that emerged as the empire collapsed, Wette illuminates, was virulently anti-Semitic and the military commanders of the new inter-war *Reichswehr* eagerly embraced the 'Stab in the Back' legend to escape their own culpability for German defeat in the Great War. All of this paved the way for Nazism, which inexorably instilled its violent, racist and anti-Communist world view in the German military. The opposition of senior officers to the atrocities that accompanied the ethnic cleansing of occupied Poland demonstrates that Nazification was not yet complete in 1939, Wette argues. However, the silence that accompanied atrocities in Yugoslavia and the USSR shows that by 1942, Nazism had succeeded in transforming much of the *Wehrmacht* into a compliant instrument of genocide. For Hitler, 'Operation Barbarossa' was a brutal racial-ideological war of extermination and Nazism encouraged German troops to indulge their most savagely inhuman proclivities in dealing with the 'Jewish-Bolshevik menace' in a just defence of Western, Christian civilisation.

In the last and most important chapter, Wette demonstrates the concealment and obfuscation of the 'truth' of the *Wehrmacht*'s past in post-Second World War Germany and the embryonic *Bundeswehr*, a dynamic facilitated by the imperatives of the Western Cold War ideological struggle against Communism. Finally, he documents how the post-war memoirs of German generals fundamentally distorted scholarship on the *Wehrmacht* and the Second World War for much of the Cold War. Wette's conclusion that the legend of the *Wehrmacht*'s 'clean hands' now belongs to the past (p. 297) may be true of most young Germans. But many English speakers continue to romanticise and glorify the 'virtuoso' performances of great *Wehrmacht* commanders and soldiers, while dismissing or deemphasising the appalling crimes that characterised the war in the east, as well as the racist, genocidal character of the regime for which they fought.

Criticism of Wette's study lies in its broad generalisations about German soldiers of the Second World War. True, Wette's characterisation does not apply to large numbers of them. But it is an accurate portrayal of a significant proportion—enough to propel the *Wehrmacht* on a brutal and vicious six-year war that left tens of millions dead and maimed across the world. As a study of German military institutional character, it documents the *Wehrmacht*'s cultural roots that often made it a compliant and willing instrument of Nazism. It also presents a compelling analysis of how after 1945 German soldiers carefully constructed and cultivated a legend

of the *Wehrmacht*'s non-involvement in Nazi war crimes. Much of the rest of what Wette has to say has been said before; but the work's true value lies in its synthesis of previous scholarship into a coherent analysis of the cultural roots of Nazi genocide in the institutional culture of the modern German military. Moreover, it represents the most extensive and sustained examination of the cultivation of the legend of the *Wehrmacht*'s innocence of wartime atrocities and the concomitant disintegration of this legend during the last three decades. This translation brings a very important piece of German scholarship to an English speaking audience, though as is often the case, some of its original impact and nuance is lost in translation. Overall, a very thought provoking study that is a must read for anyone interested in the German military of the Second World War as well as how military forces create and distort their own histories to serve their own purposes.

BOOK REVIEW

Brian Holden Reid, *Robert E Lee: Icon for a Nation*, pbk, Prometheus Books, 2007, 271 pp.

Reviewed by Scott Hopkins

Any study of General Robert E Lee confronts the interplay of myth and historiography. Lee, a Southern hero of the US Civil War, was almost deified in the 'Lost Cause' revisionist process in the second half of the nineteenth century. Interest in the Civil War has not faded, demonstrated by the crowded summer tourist trail around Virginia and Pennsylvania. Nor is it a peculiarly American fascination, for this war sits astride the Napoleonic and Industrial Ages of war, the first modern war. Schools of thought, on Lee specifically and the Civil War generally, have emerged and engaged over the last 150 years. Facts, opinions and the spectrum of soldierly and scholarly interpretation still contend.

Brian Holden Reid, Professor of American History and Head of the Department of War Studies at King's College, London, is clearly in the pro-Lee camp. He describes Lee as 'the perfectly attired and stately *beau sabreur*'—this is not a dispassionate study, but neither is it self-serving. Lee's gentlemanly demeanour and equanimity go to the heart of his command and leadership style, something Holden Reid both challenges and explores. He considers the key issues around Lee's command with an even hand, such as Lee's failure to remove incompetent subordinates, not afraid to criticise or condemn where he sees folly or foible. A picture emerges of a modern commander, empowering subordinates with an ethos of what the Australian Army calls 'mission command', but also a general focused on outmoded battles of decision and employment of line and column against Ernst Junger's 'storm of steel'.

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Holden Reid neither subscribes to the school of thought that transfers culpability for Lee's failures to his subordinates, such as James Longstreet ('an easy scapegoat'), nor does he seek singular reasons or explanations ('Gettysburg was a battle that Lee could and should have won'). This biography takes issue with the complexity facing Lee, not blaming or excusing but identifying and clarifying. The fateful days in July 1864, when Lee threw the Army of Northern Virginia at prepared Union defences at Gettysburg, get a careful and patient treatment. Holden Reid criticises Lee's failure to learn from earlier experiences, such as Malvern Hill or Antietam, and builds a convincing explanation as to the causes and factors of this great military tragedy. Moreover, Holden Reid deftly avoids a common trait of other books about Lee, Grant and the Civil War—that pernicious trap of 'what if'. He does not indulge in historical counter-factuals or musings on 'what might have been' or 'if only', a sure sign of considered scholarship and reasoned analysis.

Whether the Confederacy could have prevailed in the war has not been decided with more than 150 years of historiography; all we know is that General Robert E Lee did a remarkable job in challenging circumstances, and his relevance to commanders continues today and into the future. Brian Holden Reid has produced an accessible, fascinating examination of a complex leader that will be of interest and use to the contemporary military audience. Lee embodies the operational commander, constrained by strategic imperatives and encumbered with tactical realities: 'Lee still ranks among the very finest of American generals, for like his hero, Washington, he managed to achieve much with the most meagre resources.'

BOOK REVIEW

Peter Barham, *Forgotten Lunatics of the Great War*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2004, 451 pp.

Reviewed by John McCarthy

Peter Barham is a psychologist and a historian of mental health. *Forgotten Lunatics of the Great War* is a very successful attempt to rediscover the largely forgotten men who were certified as lunatics as a result of their 1914–18 war experiences. Wilfred Owen, killed in action on 4 November 1918 and awarded a posthumous Military Cross, noted such mental wounds in his poem 'Chances':

> But poor young Jim, e's livin and e's not,
> E's wounded, killed and pris'ner, all the lot,
> The ruddy lot all rolled in one, Jim's mad.

Barham's book analyses a segment of British social history. He discusses how the ordinary psychotic soldier was treated by the military medical officers, how they became absorbed inside the British asylum system and, importantly, how they were regarded by the English bureaucracy. The book thus is also an administrative history. As one civil servant in the Ministry of Pensions noted, the state should not be expected to support '…a man who becomes a lunatic because he is a coward and fears to undertake the liability which falls upon him as an Englishman'. Barham argues that it was popular pressure which contributed greatly to modifying such opinion.

The English class system often directed policy. As Barham points out: 'The club of war psychotics is mainly populated by ordinary soldiers, but it also turns out there were rather more mad captains, barking brigadiers and other brass hats lurking in the psychiatric undergrowth than at first meets the eye'. Much has been written about the experience of officers suffering from shell shock. Owen himself, trapped for three days in a shell hole, was a mental patient. However, in Edwardian English society, officers were given preferential treatment. The term 'shell shocked', which removed the psychotic and lunatic stigma borne by the mentally afflicted common soldier, was largely reserved for the 'officer class'.

Barham is surely right in resurrecting the injustices suffered by lower socio-economic families as a result of the almost incomprehensible experience of the Great War. A question might be, however, what relevance might this book have for the present day Australian reader?

The book reminds us it is now axiomatic that 'battle stress', 'battle fatigue', 'battle shock' or whatever term might be used will always be part of a given battlespace. Examples are plentiful.

In the First World War it has been estimated some 25 per cent of discharges were labelled 'psychiatric casualties'. In the Second World War the figure might have reached as high as 35 per cent. In Korea a soldier was twice as likely to become a psychiatric casualty as to be killed by enemy fire. Of those who returned home from the Vietnam War, at least 54 per cent claimed to have suffered or are suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. In the 1990–91 Gulf War, 34 per cent of American troops reported themselves as having been subjected to significant psychological stress. Even the much vaunted, and in some eyes, almost hallowed, Israeli army is far from immune. In the Yom Kippur war, 30 per cent of all Israeli casualties were psychiatric cases. Large casualties were suffered in the 1984 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Psychiatric casualties exceeded those killed by 150 per cent.

> The book reminds us it is now axiomatic that 'battle stress', 'battle fatigue', 'battle shock' … will always be part of a given battlespace.

There is no reason to believe the Australian soldier of the twenty-first century will prove immune from the stress of battle, even if such conflict is limited to so-called 'fourth generation' engagements without set-piece battles. The Australian Army has five active battalions. It is currently 2000 personnel under strength. If the suggested proposal to increase the size of the Army by two battalions is adopted, it will have to recruit and retain some 4000 soldiers over the projected decade of expansion. Given the current retention rate, this target might not be met. What the Army cannot afford, therefore, is to suffer a high percentage of avoidable psychiatric casualties. Peter Barham offers some insights into the way such casualties were treated in the past and what policies might be avoided today. While one might well be confident that current planning is fully aware of the psychological problems of modern warfare, a glimpse into the past might still be rewarding.

BOOK REVIEW

Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (eds), *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*, Osprey Publishing, Oxford, 2008, 304 pp.

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Mark O'Neill

Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian have much more in common than editorship of this topical anthology. They completed their doctoral studies at Oxford under the supervision of Professor Robert O'Neill (known to many readers of this journal, not only as a former Australian Army officer but also as a pre-eminent Australian military historian, writer, teacher and adviser). Both men subsequently developed considerable field experience in the subject matter of this book. Marston has taught counterinsurgency at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, been an adviser to British Army forces operating in Iraq and Afghanistan and was an instructor at Multi-National Force Iraq's Counterinsurgency Center for Excellence. Malkasian's experience is equally impressive—spending a total of nearly two years, over several tours, as an adviser to the United States Marine Corps' 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (1 MEF) in Iraq. The value of this experience is reflected in the chapters Malkasian and Marston contributed on Iraq and Afghanistan respectively. The combination of first-rate academic credentials, sound individual publication records and contemporary practical experience in the field of counterinsurgency has positioned the editors well for this book.

Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare presents the reader with a wide ranging selection of 'modern' historical counterinsurgency examples, written by thirteen disparate but credible authors. The theme that unites each chapter within the context of the book is an examination of the strategy that was devised for each counterinsurgency presented, and analysis of why it was or was not successful. Marston and Malkasian set up this structure well in their succinct introduction,

> The theme that unites each chapter within the context of the book is an examination of the strategy that was devised for each counterinsurgency presented …

and it is generally carried adequately throughout the book. This reviewer was disappointed that the book failed to carry this through to the inclusion of a concluding chapter. The lack of a conclusion leaves the reader to derive their own summary as to the lessons offered about counterinsurgency in modern warfare. Ultimately this is a minor issue, as each chapter clearly sets up the premise for its conclusions. The writing style, often a problem for edited works such as this, remains consistent and easy to read throughout.

Each chapter in the book is sound; but as is invariably the case in most edited works, there are a few chapters that stand out. This reviewer's personal interest was piqued by three chapters. Professor Charles Townshend's chapter, 'In Aid to the Civil Power', with its examination of examples from British actions in Ireland and Palestine, provides good analysis into the origins of thought regarding civil primacy and the use of military force to support it in counterinsurgency that informs Australian and Allied counterinsurgency doctrine to this day. Doctor Richard Stubb's chapter about the evolution of British strategy in Malaya between 1948 and 1960 is notable for its clarity and cutting through the hagiography that has grown around contemporary accounts of British success in that campaign. The chapter by Colonel Richard Iron, 'Britain's longest war: Northern Ireland 1967–2007', should also be of interest to Australian readers. Iron's straightforward narrative and logical analysis of Britain's most difficult modern counterinsurgency operation is an informative and concise insight into a war that most Australian soldiers know little about.

Works about counterinsurgency published since 2003 invariably fall into one of three categories: the 'ripping yarn' school of war stories; socio-political–cultural–religious polemics; or that of the historical, sequential narrative. *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare* is none of these. It is a good book that addresses its subject from a sound academic and analytical basis. It is obviously tempered by the practical experiences in the field of both the editors. It is well written and would be a useful addition to any student of counterinsurgency or military professional's library. *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare* addresses a hitherto unsatisfied gap in contemporary writing about counterinsurgency.

Full disclosure: The reviewer was an associate of Daniel Marston at the MNF-I COIN CFE in early 2008.

BOOK REVIEW

Jim Molan, *Running the War in Iraq: An Australian general, 300,000 troops, the bloodiest conflict of our time*, HarperCollins Publishers, Sydney, 2008, 358 pp.

Reviewed by Albert Palazzo

Major General Jim Molan has written a compelling, riveting, and fast paced memoir of his year in Iraq as a senior officer with the Headquarters Multi-National Force – Iraq. Molan's primary position was Chief of Operations to the US Commander, General George G Casey, although he also played an important role in safeguarding Iraq's infrastructure and organising the nation's first free election. From April 2004 to April 2005 Molan was a central figure in the war, an Australian soldier taken into the inner circle of the US war effort.

While it is a memoir, *Running the War in Iraq* rises above the level of a personal snapshot of a conflict viewed through one man's experiences. Instead, this is a sweeping story that delves into the essentials of modern generalship. For most of the Australian Army's history its leaders have excelled at the tactical level, but few of its commanders have had first hand experience in the art of operations. Molan thought at the theatre level, and had to balance resources and opportunity with the ever present need to move towards a strategic goal. At the same time he had to assess every proposed operation, making sure that coalition troops acted within correct legal and moral boundaries. This was a rare responsibility for an Australian general.

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Molan also brings home the complexity of modern counterinsurgency. In recent literature much has been made by military professionals and thinkers of General Charles Krulak's 'three-block war' concept. While the Australian Army has considerable experience in counterinsurgency, the reality is that since the end of the Vietnam War most of the institution has operated only on Krulak's less dangerous 'blocks': humanitarian relief and peacekeeping. One of the lessons of this book is that even in an unconventional war the 'third block' can be an extremely

dangerous and unforgiving sector, whose intensity rivals that of a state-on-state conflict. Consequently, if friendly troops are to succeed they must have the ability, both in education, training and equipment, to bring to bear the full arsenal of modern war. Molan had first-hand experience with this fact as he and his staff planned and then watched unfold the second Battle of Fallujah. For Australia, Molan's lesson is that it is the enemy who decides the intensity of unconventional war, and that the Army must improve its ability to wage violent battle if it is to meet the challenge when it arrives.

The book does have some weaknesses, but they do not overly detract from its value. At times Molan appears slightly in awe of his US colleagues, but perhaps this is only a result of the depth of his acceptance, the access he was provided, and the real responsibilities he was given. The book could also have been shortened by the deletion of the chapter on Molan's back-story. Military professionals will find this book a rewarding read, while for the public *Running the War in Iraq* offers what is still far too rare an insight into Australia's role in the Iraq War.

TITLES TO NOTE

Listed below is a selection from the review copies that have arrived at the *Australian Army Journal*. Reviews for many of these books can be found online in the relevant edition of the *Australian Army Journal* at: http://www.defence.gov.au/army/lwsc/Publications/journal/journal.htm

- *34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah and the War in Lebanon*, Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, Palgrave Macmillan, ISBN 9780230604001, 287 pp.

- *A Good War*, Patrick Bishop, Hodder & Stoughton, ISBN 978034095171, 392 pp. (Distributed in Australia by Hachette Livre)

- *Americans and the Wars of the Twentieth Century*, Jenel Virden, Palgrave Macmillan, ISBN 9780333726617, 203 pp.

- *Battleground Iraq: Journal of a Company Commander*, Todd S Brown, Department of the Army (US), ISBN 9780160787065, 292 pp.

- *Blood & Rage: A Cultural History of Terrorism*, Michael Burleigh, HarperPress, ISBN 9780007241279, 545 pp.

- *Bradley: A Biography (Great Generals Series)*, Alan Axelrod, Palgrave Macmillan, ISBN 9780230600188, 204 pp.

- *Carry Me Home: The Life and Death of Private Jake Kovco*, Dan Box, Allen & Unwin, ISBN 9781741752748, 290 pp.

- *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry*, P W Singer, Cornell Paperbacks, ISBN 9780801474361, 348 pp. (Distributed in Australia by Footprint Books)

- *Defeat: Why They Lost Iraq*, Jonathan Steele, I B Tauris, ISBN 9781845116293, 294 pp. (Distributed in Australia by Palgrave Macmillan)

- *Desperate Stand: The Battle of Buena Vista*, Stephen A Carney, US Army Center of Military History, ISBN 978016079423, 40 pp.

- *Dusty Warriors*, Richard Holmes, HarperCollins, ISBN 9780007212859, 385 pp.

- *East Asian Multilateralism: Prospects for Regional Stability*, Kent E Calder and Francis Fukuyama (eds.), The John Hopkins University Press, ISBN 9780801088496, 281 pp. (Distributed in Australia by Footprint Books)

- *Empty Casing: A Soldier's Memoir of Sarajevo Under Siege*, Fred Doucette, Douglas & McIntyre, ISBN 9781553652915, 228 pp.

- *Military Transformation Past and Present: Historic Lessons for the 21st Century*, Mark D Mandeles, Praeger Security International, ISBN 9780275991906, 157 pp. (Distributed in Australia by DA Information Services)

- *More than an Ally? Contemporary Australia–US Relations*, Maryanne Kelton, Ashgate, ISBN 9780754673675, 226 pp.

- *Mr Double Seven: A Biography of Wing Commander Dick Cresswell, DFC*, George Odgers, Air Power Development Centre, ISBN 9781920800307, 170 pp.

- *Myth and the Greatest Generation: A Social History of Americans in World War II*, Kenneth D Rose, Routledge, ISBN 0415956773, 361 pp.

- *North Korea on the Brink*, Glyn Ford with Soyoung Kwon, Pluto Press, ISBN 9780745325989, 249 pp. (Distributed in Australia by Palgrave Macmillan)

- *Operation Broken Reed: Truman's Secret North Korean Spy Mission that Averted World War III*, Arthur L Boyd, Carroll & Graf, ISBN 9780786720866, 280 pp. (Distributed in Australia by Palgrave Macmillan)

- *Peace Operations: Trends, Progress, and Prospects*, Donald C F Daniel, Patricia Taft and Sharon Wiharta (eds.), Georgetown University Press, ISBN 9781589012097, 271 pp. (Distributed in Australia by Footprint Books)

- *Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: The Story of UNAMSIL*, 'Funmi Olonisakin, Rienner, ISBN 9781588265210, 203 pp. (Distributed in Australia by Palgrave Macmillan)

- *Pompey Elliott*, Ross McMullin, Scribe, ISBN 9781921372018, 718 pp.

- *Power and Military Effectiveness: The Fallacy of Democratic Triumphalism*, Michael C Desch, The John Hopkins University Press, ISBN 9780801088014, 232 pp. (Distributed in Australia by Footprint Books)

- *Prisoners of the Japanese: POWs of World War II in the Pacific*, Gavan Daws, Scribe, ISBN 9781921215919, 462 pp.

- *Reporting the War: Freedom of the Press from the American Revolution to the War on Terrorism*, John Byrne Cooke, Palgrave Macmillan, ISBN 9781403975157, 272 pp.

- *Responding to Terrorism: Political, Philosophical and Legal Perspectives*, Robert Imre, T Brian Mooney and Benjamin Clarke, Ashgate, ISBN 9780754672777, 239 pp.

- *Rethinking Japanese Security: Internal and External Dimensions*, Peter J Katzenstein, Routledge, ISBN 9780415773959, 290 pp. (Distributed in Australia by Palgrave Macmillan)

- *Second Chance: Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower*, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Basic Books, ISBN 9780465003556, 249 pp. (Distributed in Australia by Palgrave Macmillan)

- *Stonewall Jackson: A Biography (Great Generals Series)*, Donald A Davis, Palgrave Macmillan, ISBN 9781403974778, 204 pp.

- *Technology and the American Way of War Since 1945*, Thomas G Mahnken, Columbia, ISBN 9780231123365, 244 pp. (Distributed in Australia by Footprint Books)

- *Terrible Victory: First Canadian Army and the Scheldt Estuary Campaign*, Mark Zuehlke, Douglas & McIntyre, ISBN 9781553654049, 545 pp.

- *The Costs of War: International Law, The UN, and World Order After Iraq*, Richard A Falk, Routledge, ISBN 0415955092, 203 pp. (Distributed in Australia by Palgrave Macmillan)

- *The Mind of the Terrorist: The Psychology of Terrorism from the IRA to Al-Qaeda*, Jerrold M Post, Palgrave Macmillan, ISBN 9781403966117, 311 pp.

- *The Secret War: A True History of Queensland's Native Police*, Jonathan Richards, University of Queensland Press, ISBN 9780702236396, 308 pp.

- *The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China*, Ralph D Sawyer (ed.), Basic Books, ISBN 9780465003044, 568 pp. (Distributed in Australia by Palgrave Macmillan)

- *Three Passions and a Lucky Penny: An Autobiography*, Eric Stephenson, Air Power Development Centre, ISBN 9781920800291, 160 pp.

- *Three Victories and a Defeat: The Rise and Fall of the First British Empire 1714-1783*, Brendan Simms, Penguin, ISBN 9780713994261, 802 pp.

- *To Conquer Hell: The Meuse-Argonne, 1918*, Edward G Lengel, Henry Holt, ISBN 9780805079319, 491 pp.

- *Toward the National Security State: Civil-Military Relations During World War II*, Brian Waddell, Praeger Security International, ISBN 9780275984083, 200 pp. (Distributed in Australia by DA Information Services)

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MILESTONES

IN MEMORIAM

GENERAL SIR FRANCIS HASSETT, AC, KBE, CB, DSO, LVO
(1918–2008)

After a distinguished and grand life of service dedicated to the nation in war and peace, General Sir Francis Hassett died peacefully in his sleep at his home in Canberra on the morning of Wednesday 11 June 2008. Admired and respected by all soldiers with whom he served, and deeply loved by his family, he graduated from the Royal Military College, Duntroon, in 1938, and thirty-seven years later led the Australian Defence Force as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the three Services.

Hassett's life was one of hard living and tough fighting as an infantryman, fighting in North Africa, New Guinea and Bougainville in the Second World War; and later in Korea, and then, as a senior officer, as the Commander of the Commonwealth Brigade in Malaysia.

He was born in Marrickville and went through the harshness of the Depression with his family when, at the age of sixteen, he was spotted for his leadership potential by the Royal Military College, where he trained to be an officer between 1935 and 1938 before an enriching but short posting to the Darwin Mobile Force in 1939.

Hassett was a fine sportsman, and excelled as an athlete, boxer and rugby player—and few Australians can say that they scored a winger's try against the All Blacks.

At the outbreak of the Second World War, he served with the 2nd/3rd Battalion of the AIF and, after being wounded in action in the attack on Tobruk, he was mentioned in dispatches. His leadership, administrative and tactical skills were clearly noted, and he accelerated through the ranks to become the brigade major of

the Australian 18th Brigade in Syria, which was preparing for an axis assault from the north through Turkey.

He then returned to Australia to prepare for the final ejection of the Japanese forces in New Guinea and Bougainville. He was a staff officer planning operations for most of this period and became an Officer of the British Empire (OBE) for his work in doing so; ending the war as a lieutenant colonel (GSO1), with the Headquarters of the 3rd Division AIF in Bougainville. He was again mentioned in dispatches for this. At the age of twenty-three, he was then the youngest Australian officer in that rank.

Gifted with abundant commonsense, Hassett would often reject convention and custom to reach innovative and achievable solutions to tactical challenges in war and administrative problems in peace.

As a result, his ability as a warrior leader, administrator and logistician had now been well recognised by the 'powers that be', and Frank Hassett became an instructor of budding senior officers at the Australian Army Staff College at Toowoomba, where he met, courted and married Miss Hallie Margaret Roberts (now Lady Hassett). They had a daughter, Lyndal, three years before he was posted to Korea to command the Third Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment (3RAR).

While commanding 3RAR at the Battle of Maryang San in October 1951, and after a superbly led and brilliantly manoeuvred action with his under-strength battalion against a superior Chinese force, Hassett and his men won an extraordinary victory for which Hassett was awarded an immediate DSO (Companion of the Distinguished Order). That victory was described by the eminent historian, Dr Robert O'Neil, as 'probably the greatest feat of the Australian Army during the Korean War', and is now one of the 'Battle Honours' of the Royal Australian Regiment. This battle is now well displayed and described in the new post-Second World War section of the Australian War Memorial.

After his return from Korea, Hassett notably accomplished a variety of challenging staff appointments, and became the Director of Military Art at Duntroon, a position that was responsible for the development of leadership and military skills of the cadets at the college. While in that appointment, he also became an ADC to the Queen and Prince Philip during their visit to Australia For this accomplishment, he was appointed as a Lieutenant of the Royal Victorian Order (LVO) in 1954.

Also, his family had now increased with two sons, Michael and Jonathon, and a second daughter, Sandra.

In 1960 he was selected amongst many strong contenders for the appointment as Commander of the 28th Commonwealth Brigade in Malaysia, and was promoted to brigadier. In recognition of his leadership and preparation for war of that brigade, consisting primarily of Australians, New Zealanders and Gurkhas,

he was made a Commander of the Order of the Bath (CB). Also, the Malaysian Government awarded him the Pingat Jasa Kebaktian for his leadership and service of value to Malaysia. His innovative methods of defeating guerrilla forces are still valid today.

After attending the Imperial Defence College in London, Hassett was promoted to major general and served on the Military Board in Canberra before returning to London to be Head of the Australian Joint Services Staff, in which appointment he also became Gentleman Usher to the Queen. It was when he was in London that, unfortunately, his inherited ill-health finally caught up with him and he fell seriously ill. He fought doggedly against his illness and recovered well.

On return to Australia, Hassett rose to the top due to his all-encompassing leadership, wide military knowledge, commonsense, organisational ability, and unquenchable dedication to his responsibilities. He was first appointed GOC Northern Command in Brisbane, after which appointment he headed the team selected to reorganise, pragmatically, the command and control structure of the Australian Army. It was from this task that he was promoted lieutenant general and appointed Chief of the General Staff (now titled Chief of Army), where he skilfully implemented the functional change. For this, and his leadership, he was appointed as a Commander of the Order of Australia (AC).

In 1975, he was appointed Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (now titled Chief of the Defence Force) and was promoted to general in 1977, for which duty he was appointed as a Knight Commander of the British Empire (KBE).

Hassett's eldest son, Michael, died tragically in a vehicle accident in 1975. On 20 April 1977, he resigned from the Australian Defence Force for reasons of ill-health.

Hassett's organisational legacy to the Australian Army was its reorganisation along functional lines as it still is to this day, rather than the previously archaic and complicated geographic organisation that it was.

However, his personal and primary legacy was as a paradigm of inspirational leadership, gravitas and quiet charisma, unflappable planning and crisp decisions, extreme willpower under pressure, and a belief in the wisdom and ability of his fellow men. The challenge of his favourite poem, 'If' by Rudyard Kipling, typified this powerful character trait.

After retiring Sir Francis and Lady Hassett farmed near Canberra, and he became the Colonel Commandant of the Royal Australian Regiment, its father figure; and later still, he became a Life Governor and a stalwart of the Royal Australian Regiment Foundation, that annually presents a 'Hassett Award' for junior leadership. The general was an exemplar of the Regiment's motto: 'Duty First'.

He is survived by Lady Hassett and his son Jonathon, daughters Lyndal and Sandra, and their families. Lady Hassett has been a champion in her constant, robust

and loving support for the general. The general also leaves a further legacy of three grandsons serving in the Australian Defence Force.

A man with compelling gravitas, the general was much respected and admired, even loved, by all who served with or under him. He will not be forgotten.

We say farewell to a warrior chief, a husband, father, great-grandfather, friend and absolute gentleman. Australia has lost an admirable man, and the Defence Force a living and vital legend.

Rest in Peace, Sir Francis.

Eulogy as delivered by Brigadier John Essex-Clark, DSM (Retd)

ALEC JEFFREY HILL AM, MBE, ED
(1916–2008)

Alec Jeffrey Hill was born on 2 July 1916 and educated at Sydney Grammar School, the University of Sydney and Balliol College, Oxford. He was proud of the latter in particular, and remained a 'Balliol man' all his life. His father served in the Great War and died while Alec was still a boy. In 1936 Alec received a commission in the Militia, joining the NSW Scottish Regiment. He joined the 2nd Australian Imperial Force when the war came, and served for the duration. He was a 'Rat of Tobruk', serving as a company commander with the 9th Division there and at El Alamein, and subsequently in the war against Japan in New Guinea and Borneo as brigade major of the 20th Brigade. Alec returned to Sydney after demobilisation, and taught geography and history at his old school, Sydney Grammar, becoming senior history master, and was heavily involved with school cadets and with the post-war Citizen Military Forces. He also served a term as Honorary ADC to the Governor of New South Wales.

In 1966 he accepted an appointment at the Royal Military College, Duntroon, as a lecturer in history. The 1960s saw the transition from the old pattern military education that was more or less unchanged since the college's foundation, to the establishment of a university faculty—the Faculty of Military Studies—under the auspices of the University of New South Wales. While it represented a major change for RMC, and was not without its difficulties, the faculty nonetheless still reflected the certainties and stabilities of the existing patterns of university life, and with his military and educational backgrounds Alec Hill was an outstanding fit whose contributions were appreciated by both the uniformed and civilian sides of the house. Until his retirement in 1979, Alec taught military history to an entire generation of staff cadets, along the way shaping individuals who would become the leading

Australian military historians of their day; notably amongst them David Horner, Chris Clark and Peter Pedersen. While doing so, he worked on a major biography of the commander of the Desert Mounted Corps in the Great War, General Sir Harry Chauvel. Published in 1978, *Chauvel of the Light Horse* is claimed to be the first modern scholarly biography of a senior Australian military figure, and a book that advanced military historiography in this country through the then unfashionable notion that generals were at least as important as privates in winning battles.

Alec was awarded an MBE during the war. In January 2006 he was made a Member of the Order of Australia 'for service to education in the field of military history, to the Australian War Memorial as a writer and mentor to historians, and as a contributor to the *Australian Dictionary of Biography*, for which he wrote some thirty-eight articles. Alec Hill died on 27 August 2008, and is survived by his wife, Patsy, and by many friends, admirers and former students who will long remember his gentle manner, incisive mind and great personal charm.

Professor Jeffrey Grey

Australian Army Journal

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'The quill as a force multiplier in urban environments'

NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS

The editors of the *Australian Army Journal* welcome submissions from any source. Two prime criteria for publication are an article's standard of written English expression and its relevance to the Australian profession of arms. The journal will accept letters, feature articles, review essays, e-mails and contributions to the *Point Blank* and *Insights* sections. As a general guide on length, letters should not exceed 500 words; articles and review essays should be between 3000 and 6000 words; and contributions to the *Insights* section should be no more than 1500 words. The *Insights* section provides authors with the opportunity to write brief, specific essays relating to their own experiences of service. Readers should note that articles written in service essay format are discouraged, since they are not generally suitable for publication.

Each manuscript should be sent by e-mail to <army.journal@defence.gov.au>, or sent printed in duplicate together with a disk to the editors. Articles should be written in Microsoft Word, be one-and-a-half spaced, use 12-point font in Times New Roman and have a 2.5 cm margin on all sides. Submissions should include the author's full name and title; current posting, position or institutional affiliation; full address and contact information (preferably including an e-mail address); and a brief, one-paragraph biographical description.

The *Australian Army Journal* reserves the right to edit contributions in order to meet space limitations and to conform to the journal's style and format.

GENERAL STYLE

All sources cited as evidence should be fully and accurately referenced in endnotes (not footnotes). Books cited should contain the author's name, the title, the publisher, the place of publication, the year and the page reference. This issue of the journal contains examples of the appropriate style for referencing.

When using quotations, the punctuation, capitalisation and spelling of the source document should be followed. Single quotation marks should be used, with double quotation marks only for quotations within quotations. Quotations of thirty words or more should be indented as a separate block of text without quotation marks. Quotations should be cited in support of an argument, not as authoritative statements.

Numbers should be spelt out up to ninety-nine, except in the case of percentages, where arabic numerals should be used (and *per cent* should always be spelt out). All manuscripts should be paginated, and the use of abbreviations, acronyms and jargon kept to a minimum.

BIOGRAPHIES

Authors submitting articles for inclusion in the journal should also attach a current biography. This should be a brief, concise paragraph, whose length should not exceed eight lines. The biography is to include the contributor's full name and title, a brief summary of current or previous service history (if applicable) and details of educational qualifications. Contributors outside the services should identify the institution they represent. Any other information considered relevant—for example, source documentation for those articles reprinted from another publication—should also be included.