Australian Army Journal

CONTENTS

CONTENTS

EDITORIAL

INTELLECTUAL MASTERY AND PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNALS

At the beginning of the 21st century, advanced armies all over the world are grappling with the complexities of preparing to meet the demands of future armed conflict. The Australian Army is no exception to this trend, and, in the shadow of East Timor, Afghanistan, Iraq and the Solomon Islands—along with the uncertainties flowing from the ongoing war on terror—the land force is about to embark on a path towards transformation. This transformation initiative, known as Hardening the Army, will involve moving the land force from being a light infantry towards being a light armoured organisation.

The operational, organisational, cultural, educational and training features of the Hardening the Army initiative are likely to present the land force with a string of complex intellectual challenges. These challenges will include the following questions: What kind of soldiers do we need in the 21st century? If we are to field 'strategic corporals and privates', what balance should there be between education and training? How large should the 21st-century Australian Army be and how best can we design our combined arms structure for multidimensional operations across a spectrum of conflict? What is the future of the close battle and of the levels of war in an age of networks? What are the implications of effects-based operations for military force development? How do we adapt advanced technology to serve us in asymmetric conflicts?

Such questions need to be vigorously debated by members of the Australian Army, and the *Australian Army Journal* (*AAJ*) intends to be the main forum for such an exchange of ideas. As the American scholar, Peter Paret, observed in his 1962 study, *Innovation and Reform in Warfare*, 'the most important problem of innovation

is not the development of new weapons or methods, nor even their general adoption, but their intellectual mastery'. Since Paret wrote in the early 1960s, the place of intellectual mastery in preparing armies for warfighting is now well established and Western military journals have often played a key role in shaping change.

Three examples are worth noting. In March 1974, in the *RUSI Journal*, Michael Howard's seminal article, 'Military Science in an Age of Peace', provided an analysis of the difficulties of planning for war in 'a fog of peace'. This article has become a standard text. Howard warned that 'it is in discerning operational requirements that the real conceptual difficulties of military science occur'.

In March 1977, the American analyst, William S. Lind, used the US Army's *Military Review* to compare the American doctrine of Active Defense to that of French inter-war thinking based on the Maginot Line. Lind's article helped to spark a debate on military innovation that would take the US Army from a legacy of defeat in the jungles of South-East Asia to the formulation of the AirLand Battle doctrine and triumph in the Persian Gulf. In 1983, one of the most important American military reformers of the 20th century, General Donn A. Starry, also used *Military Review* to publish his influential essay, 'To Change an Army'. Starry argued that the key feature in securing organisational change in armies was to establish 'cultural commonality of intellectual endeavour'—something that, as Starry recognised, can only be achieved by a consensus that comes from vigorous debate.

In the December edition of the *AAJ*, we present a variety of articles that we trust will contribute to the debate on how the Australian Army might best respond to the demands of 21st-century military operations. In *Point Blank*, our section for sharp, critical material, we present two contrasting pieces. Christopher Flaherty examines the use of mimicking operations in information warfare, while Michael Evans seeks to explain the meaning of the Bush Doctrine and the rise of military pre-emption in American strategic thought.

In our main articles, the Chief of the Defence Force, General Peter Cosgrove, provides a valuable scene-setter in his important article on the experience of the recent war in Iraq. He highlights the complexities of the art of command and the speed of operational decision-making in an age of instantaneous communications, and goes on to outline the challenges that may confront the Australian Defence Force (ADF) in developing a network-centric approach to modern war. Remaining on the theme of Iraq, Lieutenant Colonel Chris Field follows the Chief of the Defence Force by examining the role of embedded planners during Operation *Iraqi Freedom,* drawing on his experience serving in the Coalition headquarters in the Middle East.

The *AAJ* then presents another important section on the role of special operations in contemporary warfare. In two valuable and complementary articles, Major General Duncan Lewis, Australia's Special Operations Commander, reflects on the creation of Special Operations Command and on the reasons for the rise to prominence in joint

warfare of the Special Forces community. Major General Lewis's articles are followed by a perceptive cultural analysis of modern terrorism by Professor John Carroll of La Trobe University. Professor Carroll's essay is a timely reminder to us that the challenge of terrorism is not so much technical as ideological in character.

In the realm of tactics, Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen analyses combined arms in the close battle in complex terrain, focusing on an ongoing debate in the infantry corps on suppression and small-unit manoeuvre. Lieutenant Colonels Michael Ryan and John Hutcheson then take up aspects of force development, assessing the prospects for an expeditionary taskforce and in the organisation for a motorised battle group respectively. In the areas of command and leadership, Lieutenant Colonel Dan Fortune analyses some of the implications of recruiting members of the post-1977 Net Generation into the Australian Army. Looking at training and doctrinal issues, Captain G. A. Chisnall examines some of the lessons of deploying modern military advisory groups based on the Australian experience of service in Sierra Leone. Moving on from Sierra Leone to the Solomons, Michael O'Connor reflects on the background to, and some of the features involved in, collaborative nation-building in what he calls conditions of 'permissive intervention'. Two interesting articles in the journal's *Military History* section consider Australia's military links with North America. Major Russell Parkin provides an overview of Australian–American military relations in the 20th century and Lieutenant Colonel John Blaxland assesses the extent to which the armed forces of Australia and Canada can be considered to be strategic cousins in their military outlooks.

The *AAJ* is also proud to publish the winning essay in the 2003 Chief of Army's Essay Competition at the Australian Command and Staff College. The competition is jointly conducted by the directing staff of the Army component of the Staff College and by the academic staff of the Land Warfare Studies Centre (LWSC). This year's winner, Major Robert Worswick, provides an interesting examination of the force structure issues facing the ADF in the new millennium. In the *AAJ's Insights* section, we present two short articles by Lieutenant Colonel Jason Thomas and Flight Sergeant Martin Andrew of the Royal Australian Air Force. They focus on aspects of reconnaissance in urban warfare and on the Russian experience in urban combat respectively.

In the *Retrospect* section, dedicated to reproducing interesting articles from earlier Australian military journals, we reprint an edited excerpt from Colonel (later Major General) Stuart Graham's important study entitled, 'Tanks Against Japan', first published by the *AAJ* in 1955. Colonel Graham's work has lasting value, in that it explodes the myth that armour cannot be used in South-East Asian conditions. Graham demonstrates how, in adverse tropical conditions, Australian forces successfully employed tanks during World War II in the South-West Pacific campaign against the Japanese. Readers should note that Graham's study is a useful

companion piece to a recent essay by Robert Hall and Andrew Ross on the use of tanks by the Australian Task Force in the Vietnam War, published in an LWSC Working Paper on combined arms in July 2003. This edition of the *AAJ* also includes a review essay on the history of swordsmanship by Michael Evans, along with book reviews by Michael O'Connor, Brigadier John Essex-Clark, Captain Brett Chaloner, Major General Adrian Clunies-Ross, Lieutenant Colonel David Schmidtchen, Alan Ryan and Major Russell Parkin. The December edition concludes with letters to the editors and with information in our *Diary* section.

In his celebrated essay, 'Military Science in an Age of Peace', Michael Howard called for armed forces establishments seeking intellectual mastery of the profession of arms to engage in a triangular dialogue based on operational requirement, technological feasibility and financial capability. He noted that, although it is always impossible to verify warfighting ideas in peacetime, the real value of these ideas lies in the intellectual debate that they generate. Howard wrote, 'it does not matter that they [military professionals] have got it wrong. What does matter is their capacity to get it right quickly when the moment arrives'. It is this intellectual process of 'getting it right' that the *AAJ* wishes to foster by publishing the views of Australian soldiers, both serving and retired, of ADF joint warfighters, and of those scholars and other writers with an interest in land operations. We trust that in the second issue of the 2003 *AAJ*, our readers will find the articles published to be an eclectic and thought-provoking collection that will be of great value in stimulating the Army's professional development in an era of change and uncertainty.

INFORMATION WARFARE AND MIMICKING OPERATIONS

CHRISTOPHER FLAHERTY *

In the 21st century, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) cannot afford to ignore the role that mimicry will play in contemporary conflict, particularly in unconventional or asymmetric warfare. This article argues that the Australian Army needs to develop an information warfare concept based on mimicking operations—that is, the imitation of an adversary's methods in order to facilitate deception. The development of a concept of mimicking operations by the ADF has the potential to elevate the more generic notion of deception into the realm of a precise operational concept for use in a networked force structure.

MIMICKING IN INFORMATION OPERATIONS

The phrase 'mimicking operations' is commonly used in modelling and scientific simulation and is connected to the idea of shielding friendly forces from detection and deception. For example, the Australian Army's keystone doctrine,

The Fundamentals of Land Warfare, identifies the concept of 'shielding' as a combat function in the application of land power.[1] Shielding, the manual points out, 'is achieved by measures that include avoiding detection, and [ensuring] protection against physical or electronic attack'.[2] In short, shielding is viewed as an action that contributes to combat effectiveness. The connection between mimicking in scientific research and the use of deception in the military application of information operations has been described in a paper delivered by two researchers, Carlo Kopp and Bruce Mills, at the 2002 Australian Information Warfare and Security Conference. Kopp and Mills pointed out:

> Deception and Mimicry/Corruption is the insertion of intentionally misleading information … [deception and mimicry] amounts to mimicking a known signal so well, that a receiver cannot distinguish the phony signal from the real signal.[3]

Kopp and Mills define mimicry as one of 'four canonical offensive information warfare strategies'.[4] The authors go on to develop a methodology that is influenced by biology, ecology and the workings of the natural world. The authors point out that 'a species evolves the appearance of another to aid its survival'.[5] For example, animals or insects that develop a physical similarity to predators are engaged in avoiding danger. Mimicry is also found in the behaviour of more aggressive species. For instance, 'Portia spiders strum the webs of other spiders to imitate mating behaviours or the actions of distressed prey'.[6] In this case, the target is given confusing information and is encouraged to walk into what appears to be a safe situation.

In essence, then, mimicry manipulates information through the simulation of behaviour or of physical appearance. In military terms, the employment of mimicking operational strategies has the potential to create a more

… mimicry manipulates information through the simulation of behaviour or of physical appearance.

sophisticated understanding of the way in which information operations might be applied in combat. In addition, mimicking operations may represent an increasingly cost-effective way of achieving a desired operational effect using superior information to exploit concealment, deception and imitation techniques.

Information-based mimicking operations using principles of non-linearity have the potential to extend military action beyond traditional tactical approaches. For instance, most conventional 20th-century operations have been traditionally planned and executed by commanders using sequential methods of decision making, often in traditional headquarters. In sequential decision-making, staff organisations are hierarchically organised and employ linear models of command and control. Conventional military doctrine tends to neglect intuitive and non-linear thinking

because the command-and-control implications of such an approach require decentralisation. Effective mimicking operations demand a networked structure in which component groups are either loosely connected or are almost autonomous, but where all concerned have access to common information.

The American researchers, John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, have developed a netwar model for 'swarming' attacks in warfare whose features are similar to non-linear organisations. They note that 'network formations can reinforce the original assault, swelling it; or they can launch swarm attacks upon other targets, presenting the defence with dilemmas about how best to deploy their own available forces'.[7] The 'Netwar' concept developed by Arquilla and Ronfeldt is concerned with how widely distributed forces may operate collaboratively. A netwar approach requires an ability to work in a relationally based mode and to retain the ability for coordination, without the need for hierarchically based command and control.

For a non-linear network model to succeed, networked groups and individuals must be capable of pooling information and knowledge, and of undertaking swift decision-making. To date, it is those that practice unconventional, rather than conventional, warfare who have been most successful in mimicking an adversary. For instance, the al-Qa'ida movement appears to be a prime example of a non-state group that possesses a networked character based on autonomous cells that infiltrate and mimic their enemy. These cells are distributed globally, but remain connected by information systems that are common to those used by the societies that the movement aims to attack. Islamic religious schools or *madrassas* and assorted training camps in the Middle East represent the key ideological–military institutions for preparing cadres for decentralised *jihad* operations in infiltrated societies. In this sense, these schools and camps seem to operate as 'network hubs' on which a cellular structure of cadres can operate globally as a virtual army.

Networks of the type envisaged in the RAND netwar concept are predicated on a belief that, ideally, human relations are fluid and non-linear in character. Participants in a network system perform any collaborative function necessary for success and treat each other as peers rather than as superiors or subordinates. The networked, cellular structure of an organisation such as al-Qa'ida confers tactical advantages since there is a reduced need for communication, control or command coordination. Such a decentralised yet connected structure aids in the launch of mimicking operations against target societies. For instance, the al-Qa'ida cells that launched the 11 September 2001 attacks

> Effective mimicking operations demand a networked structure in which component groups are either loosely connected or are almost autonomous …

on the United States mimicked normal flight passengers. During the operation, the attackers were indistinguishable from their victims and the surprise they achieved was total. Dispersed tactical measures in a decentralised operational plan were coordinated to achieve strategic effect through the power of information networking.

CONCLUSION

The concept of mimicking operations simulates activity that resembles a bacterial attack on a large and complex organism. Attacking cells mimic the behaviour of their victims, but remain dormant while awaiting an opportunity to launch an attack. In order to counter a connected, non-linear enemy, the ADF needs to investigate the use of the concept of mimicking operations as a counter-strategy in its evolving network-centric warfare doctrine. Such an approach may require a radical new direction in operational art, one that empowers a dynamic networked military organisation based on non-linear units and decentralised military activity. The challenge for the 21st-century ADF will be to reform its organisation and command-and-control methods in order to make such a military approach a reality.

ENDNOTES

1   Australian Army, *Land Warfare Doctrine 1: The Fundamentals of Land Warfare*, Land Warfare Development Centre, Puckapunyal, Vic., pp. 70–2.
2   *Ibid.*, p. 72.
3   Carlo Kopp and Bruce Mills, 'Information Warfare And Evolution', paper delivered at the 3rd Australian Information Warfare and Security Conference, 2002, p. 3.
4   *Ibid.*, p. 3.
5   *Ibid.*, p. 6.
6   *Ibid.*, p. 4.
7   John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, *The Advent of Netwar*, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 1996, p. 11.

THE AUTHOR

Dr Christopher Flaherty worked as a lawyer and Australian Aboriginal ethnographer before moving to the University of Melbourne to take up a position as a researcher. He has held appointments in the Department of Defence since 2000, and received his doctorate from the University of Melbourne in 2002.

OF SMOKING GUNS AND MUSHROOM CLOUDS

EXPLAINING THE BUSH DOCTRINE AND THE RISE OF MILITARY PRE-EMPTION*

MICHAEL EVANS

The American doctrine of pre-emptive military action, outlined by President George W. Bush during 2002, is a realistic and morally justified response to dangerous, new security challenges in the 21st century. This article identifies two basic reasons for the rise of such a doctrine and discusses their implications for international order. First, the idea of pre-emptive strike has come about because of the globalisation of security and the revolution in military affairs that it has created. The second reason for the rise of pre-emptive military thought is connected to the unfortunate gulf that has developed between strategy and the law. While the world of contemporary strategy has been forced to adapt to the harsh realities of global change, international law has failed to adjust to new conditions. As a result, the United Nations (UN) Charter is increasingly unable to provide a legal framework to guide the use of force in the 21st century.

---

* This article is based on an address to the Socratic Forum on 'Pre-emptive Wars: Legal? Ethical? In the National Interest?' supported by the Key Centre for Ethics, Law, Justice and Governance, Griffith University, Brisbane, on 1 December 2003.

If international law, as embodied in the Westphalian principles of the UN, does not meet the challenge presented by the rise of the Bush Doctrine of pre-emption, then the UN, like the League of Nations before it, will fade into irrelevance. The core of this article's argument, then, is that the rise of a strategy of pre-emption is a symptom of both a changing security order and the failings of international law to provide a realistic basis for collective security.

THE GLOBALISATION OF SECURITY AND THE MILITARY REVOLUTION

The dramatic changes in the international security environment manifested themselves with surreal power on our television screens on 11 September 2001 in the form of the al-Qa'ida attacks on New York and Washington. On that terrible day we saw demonstrated the reality that it is now possible to organise violence outside a state structure on a scale that is potentially devastating to an entire society. The rise of mass-casualty terrorism has challenged the 20th-century paradigm of modern war in which armed conflict was the monopoly of states and governments. Since the Peace of Wesphalia in 1648, our norms of diplomacy, war and international law have been predicated on armed conflict as a phenomenon that occurs between sovereign states.

> … it is now possible to organise violence outside a state structure on a scale that is potentially devastating to an entire society.

Today, the Westphalian nation-state model of statecraft, which links military power to legal sovereignty and territorial borders, has been challenged by the four great new realities of the age of globalised security. First, recognition of universal human rights now requires adherence by all countries, irrespective of a particular state's internal laws and physical sovereignty. In the 1990s, in the wake of such Balkan massacres as Srebrenica, we saw the rise of a new doctrine of humanitarian military intervention based on the conviction that, if a state permits the slaughter of its citizens, it forfeits its rights of sovereignty. Like the concept of pre-emption, such a doctrine challenges normative principles of international law based on non-intervention.[1] We saw this doctrine enunciated in the war over Kosovo—a war fought by the NATO powers against Yugoslavia in order to prevent the Serbs from ethnically cleansing the Kosovars.

Second, there is the reality of a proliferation of global and transnational threats such as mass-casualty terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. These new threats bypass the barriers of national geography and state borders, and undermine the nation-state's monopoly over violence. In short, the modern state

has lost its basic ability to ensure the safety of its citizens from non-state forces and transnational dangers. In this way the military balance between state and non-state organisations has changed. Third, there is the reality of a global economic system that ignores national frontiers. The global economy brings with it the trappings of Western modernity, yet creates widespread social dislocation that fuels armed conflict.

Fourth, there is the reality of a global communications network that penetrates all borders electronically, ensuring that a modern sense of global consciousness will be resisted by countervailing forces of cultural and religious fanaticism. It is a striking irony that the interconnectedness of our new age provides a web of networks and nodes for the creation of extremist and clandestine non-state armies such as al-Qa'ida, enabling their cadres to wield destructive power through non-territorial space.

The above trends from the globalisation of security have been recognised by strategic analysts and defence policy makers from Washington through Moscow to Beijing. In 1999, the bipartisan US (Hart–Rudman) Commission on American Security in the 21st Century reported that, as a result of the globalisation of security, the Cold War strategies of nation-states—notably deterrence, containment, retaliation and mass military forces—were increasingly irrelevant to the maintenance of international order in the new millennium.[2] In his magisterial study of strategic change, *The Shield of Achilles*, the leading American strategic analyst, Phillip Bobbitt, has observed that in the 21st century 'national security will cease to be defined in terms of borders alone because both the links among societies as well as the attacks on them exist in psychological and infrastructural dimensions, not on an invaded plain marked by the seizure and holding of territory'.[3] Bobbitt has crystallised the strategic revolution in a striking passage:

> We are at a moment in world affairs when the essential ideas that govern statecraft must change. For five centuries it has taken the resources of a state to destroy another state; only states could muster the huge revenues, conscript the vast armies, and equip the divisions required to threaten the survival of other states … This is no longer true, owing to advances in international telecommunications, rapid computation, and weapons of mass destruction. The change in statecraft that will accompany these developments will be as profound as any that the State has thus far undergone.[4]

Such views of international security trends are not confined to Americans. British, French and Russian defence experts now speak of the rise of multi-variant warfare. They speak of a spectrum of conflict marked by unrestrained 'Mad Max' wars in which symmetric and asymmetric wars merge, and in which Microsoft coexists with machetes and stealth technology is met by suicide bombers.[5] Chinese strategists, meanwhile, have developed the theory of unrestricted warfare in which they state, 'there is no territory that cannot be surpassed; there is no means which cannot be used in war; and there is no territory or method which cannot be used in combination'.[6]

What the above views of security have in common is a conviction that, in the age of globalised security, the greatest danger to advanced technological nations is no longer the threat of military invasion of the territory of the sovereign nation-state, but an assault on its modern, complex, networked societies by non-state organisations. Faced by a spectrum of global threats that know no geographical boundaries, we are compelled to move towards a new strategic paradigm. Such a paradigm does not abandon deterrence and containment but supplements both, at least in the United States and many Western arsenals, by adding new policies of military prevention and pre-emption. As Secretary of State, Colin Powell, put it in September 2002, 'A doctrine of preemption in our strategy is appropriate... but don't see it as a new doctrine that excludes or eliminates all the other tools of national security'.[7]

It is, then, the globalisation of security that provides the essential background to the 2002 Bush Doctrine and the US *National Security Strategy*, which together elevate pre-emption to the centre of American strategic thought.[8] President Bush has simply articulated what many professional strategists now accept: that Western nations face a new threat that emanates from 'the perilous crossroads of radicalism and technology'.[9] Nor should we be surprised by the statement that 'America is threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones. We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few'.[10] Many defence intellectuals in both Britain and Australia—America's two closest allies—would now accept such a view.

> Faced by a spectrum of global threats that know no geographical boundaries, we are compelled to move towards a new strategic paradigm.

The Bush Administration's philosophy reflects a growing strategic consensus that, in an era of globalised security, prevention and pre-emption are necessary because we cannot deter or contain an attacker whose armed struggle is existential and millenarian, and is expressed through mass-casualty suicide terrorism against innocent civilians. Nor can we ignore the quest of non-state fanatics for nuclear, chemical and biological weapons in order to maximise their means of destruction. Such a dangerous adversary must be subject to preemption by both the intelligence services and the armed forces of Western nations.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE NEW STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

The realities of the new strategic environment outlined above have not been matched by necessary changes in international law. Pre-emption, or anticipatory self-defence, has not yet been adapted to meet the non-state threat of new weapons technology and mass-casualty terrorism. Instead, the rules of pre-emptive war remain governed in customary international law by the famous 1837 *Caroline* Doctrine enunciated by US Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, after a dispute with Britain over the use of force against Canadian rebels on American soil.[11]

The *Caroline* Doctrine states that a pre-emptive war is justified only when a state faces a threat in which the necessity for self-defence is 'instant, overwhelming and leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation'.[12] Webster's formulation, which emphasises the *imminence of threat*, served to set the standard for permissible pre-emptive action until the formation of the UN in 1945. Under the UN Charter, Article 2(4) and Article 51 justify anticipatory self-defence only if special conditions of necessity and proportionality are met.[13]

Anticipatory self-defence has, of course, a long history. The doctrine was used by the United States to blockade Cuba by naval means during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. It was also employed by the Israelis to forestall Arab attack in the 1967 Six Day War and to prevent the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak from becoming operational in 1981. The rise of pre-emption since the end of the Cold War, however, has much to do with the rise of the deadly trinity of weapons proliferation, rogue states and terrorism. That trinity was first identified as a serious global danger by the Clinton Administration in 1993.[14]

> … we cannot deter or contain an attacker whose armed struggle is existential and millenarian, and is expressed through mass-casualty suicide terrorism against innocent civilians.

Indeed it was President Clinton who brought pre-emptive strike to the fore when he seriously considered a strike against North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear reactor in 1994. In 1998, Clinton actually employed pre-emptive strikes, using cruise missiles against Saddam Hussein's weapons sites in Operation *Desert Fox*, and against al-Qa'ida facilities in Sudan and Afghanistan. Clinton justified the use of pre-emptive strikes against both Sudan and Afghanistan by stating: 'these strikes were a necessary and proportionate response to the *imminent* threat of further terrorist strikes'.[15]

Given this background, and the reality of the 11 September attacks on the United States, it is not surprising that the Bush Administration should have formally adopted a doctrine of pre-emption. The philosophical challenge that the Bush Doctrine

poses to the international community is that of adapting the concept of imminence embodied in the *Caroline* Doctrine and Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter in order to meet new 21st-century strategic realities. The September 2002 US *National Security Strategy* throws the gauntlet down when it states, in a key phrase: 'we must adapt the concept of *imminent threat* to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries'.[16] How does a state define the concept of imminent attack when the enemy is faceless, indiscriminate and suicidal, and may be armed with weapons that can kill thousands of people?

The difficulty that we face is that the threat from mass-casualty terrorism is being judged by too many UN members according to outmoded legal standards drawn from Westphalian interstate norms and according to the provisions of a UN Charter that was drawn up in 1945 for a very different world. Properly applied, pre-emption is a legitimate aspect of a state's apparatus of self-defence. Thus, there is an urgent need for a broader interpretation of the issues of imminence, necessity and proportionality in dealing with non-state threats and the possible use of destructive technology.[17]

> Pre-emptive military action is akin to the practice of controlled burning in bushfire fighting: one wants to create an effective firebreak but not at the expense of a conflagration.

We need a new calculus for pre-emption because it is absurd to expect any state to have to sustain mass destruction in order to prove an immaculate legal conception of self-defence. In the memorable words of US National Security Adviser, Condoleeza Rice, if America waits for incontrovertible evidence of the smoking gun, it may instead witness a mushroom cloud hovering over one of its cities.[18] Neither the United States nor its allies can permit the shield of state sovereignty—especially in rogue or failing states—to become a sanctuary behind which messianic Islamic terrorists can plan the destruction of Western democratic civilisation. Yet in stating this reality, how do we justify territorial intrusion without unleashing anarchy? Pre-emptive military action is akin to the practice of controlled burning in bushfire fighting: one wants to create an effective firebreak but not at the expense of a conflagration. Accordingly, nations need to undertake an international security dialogue in order to bring greater analytical and political clarity to the concept of imminence, which is the key determinant of pre-emptive action.

As that distinguished scholar of the just-war tradition, Michael Walzer, has pointed out, if a state faces the probability of unseen attack, 'the line between legitimate and illegitimate first strikes is not going to be drawn at the point of imminent threat but at the point of sufficient threat'.[19] Sufficient threat may involve a situation

in which waiting, or inaction, greatly magnifies the risk of sudden attack. We need, therefore, to establish more intelligible criteria of the nature of threat in the 21st century—criteria that can provide a basis for collective pre-emptive action, whether by the UN Security Council or by a coalition of the willing.

Achieving an international consensus on pre-emptive military action will be a daunting challenge, but it is not impossible for three reasons. First, a close reading of the Bush Doctrine reveals that the document is not simply an appeal to unilateralism and American exceptionalism. Bush's message upholds universal moral values in that it calls for all civilised nations to cooperate. Such cooperation is necessary in order to make the world safe for democracy because otherwise democracy will not be safe in the world. The rhetoric used is thus neo-Wilsonian in tone; it is not couched in the language of Thucydides' Melian Dialogue.[20]

> … informed discussion on pre-emption can draw on the precedent of humanitarian military intervention in breaching state sovereignty.

Second, an informed discussion on pre-emption can draw on the precedent of humanitarian military intervention in breaching state sovereignty. After all, NATO's action in Kosovo was technically illegal, but few would argue that it was not legitimate. The lesson of Kosovo is that there may be circumstances in which acting illegally is more just to humanity than failing to act at all. This moral logic is a useful basis on which to begin to discuss the legal complexities of pre-emptive military action.[21]

Finally, we need to define the differences between pre-emption and prevention, because much of the controversy surrounding the Bush Doctrine conflates preventive war with pre-emptive war. For instance, the recent war against Iraq was not pre-emptive but preventive in character. Military intervention in Iraq was based on an incipient contingent threat rather than a credible imminent threat.[22] Ultimately, the war was justified by twelve years of defiance of UN Security Council resolutions 678, 687 and 1441 that compelled disarmament on pain of military force. However, it may also be, as Michael Walzer has suggested, that the gulf between pre-emption and prevention has so narrowed in practice, that there is little strategic or moral difference between them.[23] If he is right, then the case for a security dialogue and reform of the international laws governing armed conflict is even more compelling.

CONCLUSION

In 1995, the leading French military intellectual, Philippe Delmas, observed: 'this world is without precedent. It is as different from the Cold War as it is from the Middle Ages … Tomorrow's wars will not result from the ambitions of States; rather from their weaknesses'.[24] Delmas has been proven right, but our dilemma is that the international community has failed to come to grips with a new age of globalised security in which lethal, privatised non-state violence can penetrate borders and threaten entire societies.

As a result, the United States and its closest allies will justifiably resort to the doctrine of pre-emptive military action if, and when, they can identify a deadly threat against themselves. It is pointless for the UN to complain that such a course of action violates the traditional notion of sovereignty of the nation-state. The truth that the UN must confront is that there are no realistic post-Westphalian security procedures available to counteract the transnational nexus of terrorism, messianic revolution and advanced technology.

New security threats require new legal rules. Both the UN Charter and international law must be updated and modernised in order to reflect the underlying geopolitical realities of our age. In particular, the law must incorporate a more flexible justification for the role of pre-emptive action in the protection of a state's citizens. Unless UN member nations meet the grave intellectual and ethical challenges posed by the lethal trinity of weapons proliferation, messianic terrorism and rogue states, they will begin to resemble a modern version of Cervantes' Don Quixote. Like the Knight of the Mournful Countenance, they will be condemned to fighting windmills and to losing their way in the real world, while all the time risking the lives of the innocent and compromising the moral values of our democratic civilisation.

ENDNOTES

1 Catherine Guicherd, 'International Law and the War in Kosovo', *Survival*, Summer 1999, vol. 41, no. 2, pp. 19–34.

2 US Commission on National Security/21st Century, *New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century, Supporting Research and Analysis, Phase 1 Report*, The Commission, Washington DC, 15 September 1999.

3 Philip Bobbitt, *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2002, p. 813.

4 *Ibid.*, p. xxi.

5 Michael Evans, 'From Kadesh to Kandahar: Military Theory and the Future of War', *US Naval War College Review*, Summer 2003, vol. 61, no. 3, pp. 132–50.

6 Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare*, People's Liberation Army Literature and Arts Publishing House, Beijing, 1999, p. 199.

7 Quoted in Robert S. Litwak, 'The New Calculus of Pre-emption', *Survival*, Winter 2002, vol. 44, no. 4, p. 59.

8 See The White House, 'President Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point', 1 June 2002 at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases>. This speech is generally regarded as being the first major public occasion on which pre-emption was officially outlined by President George W. Bush. Many of the ideas in the West Point speech were subsequently codified in *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>.

9 'President Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point', 1 June 2002.

10 *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, p. 1.

11 Anthony Clark Arend, 'International Law and the Preemptive Use of Force', *Washington Quarterly*, Spring 2003, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 89–102.

12 Letter from Mr Webster to Lord Ashburton, 6 August 1942, cited in Arend, 'International Law and the Preemptive Use of Force', pp. 90–1.

13 *Ibid.*, pp. 91–3.

14 For the background to pre-emption in US policy, see Melvyn P. Leffler, '9/11 and the Past and Future of American Foreign Policy', *International Affairs*, May 2003, vol. 79, no. 5, pp. 1045–63.

15 Quoted in Litwak, 'The New Calculus of Pre-emption', pp. 65–6. Emphasis added.

16 *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, p. 15. Emphasis added.

17 For discussion see Litwak, 'The New Calculus of Pre-emption', pp. 53–74; Abraham D. Sofaer, 'On the Necessity of Pre-emption', *European Journal of International Law*, April 2003, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 227–40; and George R. Lucas, Jr., 'The Role of the "International Community" in Just War Tradition—Confronting the Challenges of Humanitarian Intervention and Preemptive War', *Journal of Military Ethics*, 2003, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 122–44.

18 Condoleeza Rice, 'Anticipatory Defense in the War on Terror', *New Perspectives Quarterly*, Fall 2002, vol. 19, no. 4 at <http://www.digitalnpq.org/home.html>; and Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Gregory A. Raymond, 'Preventive War and Permissive Normative Order', *International Studies Perspectives*, 2003, vol. 4, p. 386.

19 Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, 3rd edn, Basic Books, New York, 2000, p. 81.

20 Lucas, 'The Role of the "International Community" in Just War Tradition—Confronting the Challenges of Humanitarian Intervention and Preemptive War', p. 125.

21 *Ibid.*, pp. 122–44. See also Adam Roberts, 'NATO's "Humanitarian War" over Kosovo', *Survival*, Autumn 1999, vol. 41, no. 3, pp. 102–23.

22 Kegley and Raymond, 'Preventive War and Permissive Normative Order', pp. 388–93. See also Adam Roberts, 'Law and the Use of Force After Iraq', *Survival*, Summer 2003, vol. 45, no. 2, pp. 31–56.

23 Michael Walzer at the Pew Forum on Religious and Public Life, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 'Iraq and Just War: A Symposium', 30 September 2002, p. 15 at <http://pewforum.org/events>.

24 Philippe Delmas, *The Rosy Future of War*, The Free Press, New York, 1995, p. 213.

THE AUTHOR

Dr Michael Evans is Head of the Land Warfare Studies Centre and coeditor of the *AAJ*.

RACING TOWARDS THE FUTURE

REFLECTIONS ON IRAQ, THE ART OF COMMAND AND NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE*

GENERAL PETER COSGROVE

The brevity, violence and spectacular speed of the second Iraq War demonstrated that armed conflict in the information age is likely to coexist with older aspects of industrial and even pre-industrial warfare. Kinetic effect—that is, the collective impact of blast, heat and penetration from the force of modern munitions—will remain the ultimate expression of violence in war and is always magnified by the ability of the modern media to capture images of destruction. Kinetic effect on screen was shown in abundance through the television coverage of the recent Iraq War. However, as information-based and network-related warfighting techniques begin to dominate the battlespace, we should expect combat to become speedier and certainly more complex than the 20th-century force-on-force paradigm between opposing armed forces. The interconnected dimension of 21st-century warfare is less obvious to the public eye, but almost certainly represents the future.

---

* This article is based on an address to the Australian Defence Organisation's Network-centric Warfare Conference in May 2003, in the immediate aftermath of the warfighting phase of Coalition operations in Iraq.

During the 2003 war with Iraq, Coalition forces employing what were mostly first-generation network-centric technologies and concepts beat Saddam Hussein's military. Using Special Forces and advanced aircraft, the Coalition was able to conduct deep raids, exploiting information gained from human intelligence sources. The latter frequently used mobile phones to relay vital information to Coalition forces. As a result, in some cases, the operational targeting cycle was compressed from days to hours and then even to minutes.

During the Iraqi campaign, ships in the Royal Australian Navy's (RAN) Maritime Interception Force employed network-centric concepts. While naval ships in modern Western fleets have been able to share basic situational awareness data for many years, what has changed recently is the ability of navies to derive real-time interpretative value from an information-based common operational picture. In 2003, Coalition vessels made extensive use of naval intranet chat rooms from ship to ship in order to facilitate operations. Naval vessels were able to employ a wide range of sources in order to maintain the blockade of Iraq's ports. The networking of information, combined with the professional expertise of the RAN, proved vital in preventing the Iraqis from releasing deadly mines into the Gulf in the first days of Operation *Iraqi Freedom*.

The linking of sensors with command-and-control techniques allowed the RAN to achieve outstanding results in the Persian Gulf. Nonetheless, we need to recognise that we are only in the early stages of networked operations. In many respects, our current command-and-control system might be described as 'Generation One of Network-centric Warfare—the Australian way'. Our first major challenge during the 2003 Iraq War was to obtain sufficient satellite bandwidth to facilitate communications over a dispersed operational area. We needed bandwidth both in and out of the Gulf area of operations in order to be able to transmit quick, accurate, high-density data for twenty-four hours a day. Once we had acquired sufficient bandwidth, we were able to network the Australian Defence Force's (ADF) command-and-control system across the three levels of war: from the strategic level through to the operational to the senior tactical levels. In Operation *Bastille* (the operation involving the forward deployment of Australian forces) we used a home page as a major tool of information. Then, during actual hostilities, in Operation *Falconer*, the ADF posted a large variety of information material to the website. This information was vetted, catalogued, updated and archived throughout the course of the war. All persons in the command and staff chain had access to virtually all of the database and they could browse, or refer directly to particular issues.

> … our current command-and-control system might be described as 'Generation One of Network-centric Warfare—the Australian way'.

As Chief of the Defence Force, I spent the first two hours of every day poring over the website, reading the various reports and following up on them by e-mail communication, telephone calls or through face-to-face meetings with colleagues and subordinates. Brigadier Maurie McNarn, stationed in Qatar as Commander of ADF forces in the Middle East, could read intelligence reports from the Defence Intelligence Organisation in Australia seconds after they had been lodged. Simultaneously, the strategic-command element in Canberra was able to analyse Brigadier McNarn's notes from his meetings with senior Coalition commanders almost immediately after these had taken place.

As a commander, one of my apprehensions about such a networked command-and-control regime was the danger of what I describe as 'information obesity syndrome'. Australian Special Forces in Iraq could send their commanders extraordinary amounts of data, including images, from within enemy territory. Conversely, ADF Headquarters in Canberra and Qatar could send forces in the field information and intelligence from almost any level of command, ranging from military orders to the local football scores. As a consequence, I became concerned about the possibility of the sheer volume of information leading to 'paralysis by analysis', so inhibiting decision making. Anyone with experience of operational command knows that the temptation to acquire more and more information in a quest for

> … piercing the veil of operational obscurity is not a science as much as an art. The art of command lies in realising when enough information has been received to make a sound decision.

perfect knowledge of the enemy is a constant risk for military commanders. The great British military theorist, Sir Basil Liddell Hart, put it succinctly when he wrote of how every general wanted to know what was happening on the 'other side of the hill'. Yet, ultimately, piercing the veil of operational obscurity is not a science as much as an art. The art of command lies in realising when sufficient information has been received to make a sound decision. Moreover, the art of command requires refinement of a number of professional and personal attributes, including mental discipline, operational experience, a clear sense of professional judgment and a rigorous approach to the use of time. Information is important in war but it must be interpreted, measured and assessed by the human mind, not by technology.

During Operation *Falconer*, I refrained from bombarding our troops with orders from the strategic level, although I did not hesitate to send appropriate congratulations and encouragement down through the chain of command. The key point to be grasped is that, in military command in the age of networks, the tactical level can

critically affect the strategic level. It is quite possible that occasion, means and oppor-
tunity will coalesce and allow a tactical element to achieve a strategic outcome—a
situation that was improbable in the annals of warfare up until the arrival of the
information age at the end of the 20th century.
The impact of the tactical on the strategic
and the compression of the levels of war are
philosophical issues that the world's advanced
militaries are only just beginning to address.

During operations in Iraq, the various
controlling, monitoring and supporting
headquarters in diverse locations around the
region were able to monitor the location and
movement of our people by dint of Global

> … in military command
> in the age of networks, the
> tactical level can critically
> affect the strategic level.

Positioning System (GPS) technology—the main agent of what has been called the
precision revolution. The use of GPS was a huge advantage to commanders and their
staff from both an intelligence and fire support stance. GPS technology prolifer-
ated in the Coalition ground forces since it is cheap, simple and works effectively
(provided its users acknowledge some environmental limitations). GPS is a capability
that must be extended quickly in modern militaries in order to prevent the danger
of fratricide of friendly forces. We need to develop a common operational picture of
our dispositions that assists in minimising any loss of life on our own side.

There is, of course, a tendency to view network-centric warfare as an esoteric theory
of war reflecting glib military 'new-speak' and to see it as the preserve of postmodern
military theory. Yet all that network-centric warfare seeks to achieve is the timeless
quest of all militaries since the time of Alexander and Caesar—that of shared omnis-
cience. Ultimately, network-centric warfare will stand or fall on its ability to move
from the realm of theory to the realm of operational reality. A networked approach
to war must envisage a transition from a philosophy of connectivity to an operational
expression of 'shared omniscience'. There are some technologies available—notably
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)—that can assist in this transition. UAVs, in partic-
ular, represent a powerful tool for networked militaries. These vehicles broadcast infor-
mation, are potentially ubiquitous and are on the Australian Defence Organisation's
(ADO) 'A list' for acquisition under the 2000 Defence Capability Plan.

Within the ADF, we may require different kinds of UAVs in the future. Unmanned
vehicles might range from large to supplementary, or serve to replace manned
aircraft and smaller, long-endurance aircraft in the littoral sea–land environment.
These unmanned platforms are not exotic, or 'high end', experimental technology.
In the early 21st century, the UAV is a mature component of any modern, flexible
warfighting force. We need to examine whether we can accelerate the delivery of the
UAV Project outlined in the 2000 Defence Capability Plan.

Within the ADO, we require more commercial off-the-shelf technologies in order to reduce our research and development time. It is important for the ADF to reduce its experimentation and field trial time in order that we can provide ourselves with an initial but usable UAV capability. UAV technology makes it possible for not only commanders, but also front-line troops in the field, to understand what is happening on Liddell Hart's 'other side of the hill'. For the benefit of Australia's warfighters, the ADO needs to examine both local and overseas tactical UAVs, and their available sensor mix and payload capacity.

> … network-centric warfare will stand or fall on its ability to move from the realm of theory to the realm of operational reality.

On balance, the new information age in warfare holds great opportunities for a small force such as the ADF—provided we are prepared to harness our strengths and minimise our weaknesses. The ADF needs to bring a network-centric warfare approach to the forefront of our thinking about future armed conflict simply because networking of weapons and systems promises to make us more effective at warfighting. However, a networked approach depends on how successful we are in developing technology, cherishing our people, and forging partnerships with industry. Only a balanced approach to these three areas will provide us with a lasting warfighting advantage.

INNOVATION: PREPARING FOR FUTURE ROLES

There has been some important work completed in the field of innovation in recent years. In particular, there has been some promising concept analysis to develop the ADF as a flexible, adaptable and effective force that can win the nation's future conflicts in independent, joint inter-agency and coalition operations. The methodology that we have adopted involves developing, and then experimenting with, a range of concepts that are based on future missions, adversaries and environments.

In 2002, we examined in the *Australian Approach to Warfare* the way in which we fight, and we set out a vision for the ADF in *Force 2020* and the publication *Future Warfighting Concept*. The latter publication puts our primary task of warfighting in its political, technological and strategic context, and identifies a future concept, called Multidimensional Manoeuvre, as an aspiration for the way in which the ADF would like to fight in the future.

In terms of innovation, a network-centric approach to war must deliver more effective warfighting capability. Achieving this goal requires preparing the ADF to meet strategic uncertainty, particularly in the form of asymmetric threats. The latter threat makes flexibility and adaptability essential characteristics of the future ADF, both in planning and in budgetary consideration. We will need to consider how best to allocate the funds within the Defence Capability Plan, tailoring capability to strategy and synchronising ways, ends and means. A networked military means more than delivering a new radar, computer or weapons; it means developing areas such as air defence and offensive fire support as authentic networked systems. We need to investigate how much we will spend to create a networked system. There are some compelling questions that we will have to be prepared to confront. For example, do we invest in cooperative engagement capability? And again, would we gain a significant advantage if Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft could provide target designation to the RAN's proposed new air-warfare destroyers? What capabilities do we select to modernise in order to create an effectively networked force? Is it necessary to equip the entire ADF to a single common set of standards? In short, if we are to succeed in transforming our military into a networked force rather than a force that uses multiple platforms, there will have to be significant changes to our acquisition philosophy and military culture.

> On balance, the new information age in warfare holds great opportunities for a small force such as the ADF …

In particular, we will have to be careful about the methods that we employ to harmonise sophisticated technology with our human resources in networked systems. In this respect, *Air 7000*, the future maritime surveillance and response project, shows promise, as does our work on a joint-command support system. The ADF's adoption of a standardised J series message system; the introduction of key links, such as AEW&C aircraft into our network; and our recent move into space through the Optus Satellite system are all important developments in the long march towards establishing a networked culture within the Australian military.

PEOPLE: THE CRITICAL INGREDIENT OF NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE

A network-centric approach to warfare involves passing information between different parts of the ADF in a rapid and seamless way. Achieving an efficient degree of connectivity offers the Australian military a future in which our personnel can detect, identify and engage targets, using a broad range of sensors and weapons. More importantly, however, relevant, accurate and protected information will allow ADF personnel to collaborate and to achieve a level of synchronisation superior to that of any adversary.

The Australian approach to network-centric warfare has two dimensions that are closely related and mutually reinforcing. First, there is the human dimension, based on mission command and professional mastery. While neither of these ideas is new in the ADF lexicon, they assume greater importance in a network-centric approach to warfare. In a networked approach to the military art, ADF personnel will receive clear information regarding the commander's intent and may be required to make decisions that have broad repercussions beyond the level of their 'pay grade'. Mission command is essentially about professional trust between commanders and subordinates, and network-centric warfare has the effect of bringing the quality of this interaction into a sharp and unrelenting focus.

> … if we are to succeed in transforming our military into a networked force … there will have to be significant changes to our acquisition philosophy and military culture.

The second dimension is the dynamics of the network itself. The network represents the technical side of connectivity and serves to link our major military systems, permitting new ways of drawing vital information together. Operating in this new environment, however, demands more than better connectivity and information management techniques. In the ADF of the future, we will also have to make hard decisions about our education, training, doctrine and organisational structure. Education and training, for instance, is the touchstone of effective capability. In the future, joint education and training institutions will be major partners in ADF efforts in order to develop a comprehensive, integrated approach to warfighting. In recent years, we have made major advances in progressing joint education through new institutions such as the Australian Defence College and the Defence Force School of Signals.

In the future, we will almost certainly use these education and training establishments for much more than 'chalk and talk'. For example, it is assessed within the ADF that technical input from the School of Signals will assist in the development of some thirty-five computer and information systems projects planned over the next decade. Moreover, future students at the Australian Defence College can expect to be involved in experimentation, thus helping to create a coherent, learning culture with the ADF.

Change, then, will be a permanent feature in the future, and although change may threaten some individual 'rice bowls', it is necessary to ensure that we adapt ourselves to constant transformation. If we fail to do so, we will almost certainly pay an unnecessarily high price in blood on the battlefield in times of crisis and war.

PARTNERSHIPS

In the future, industry will be a key partner of the ADF. Industry has driven, and continues to drive, the information and communications revolution. Just as the militaries of the first half of the 20th century reflected the industrial techniques of mass production developed by Henry Ford and others, so in the information age will militaries reflect the impact of Bill Gates's communications revolution on armed conflict. The Department of Defence has established a Capability Development Advisory Forum with several subcommittees—including a Defence Information and Electronic Systems Association and an Armed Forces Communications and Electronic Association—to liaise with industry and commerce, and to keep the ADO abreast of new ideas and trends in the private sector.

A network-centric approach to warfare will need to be encouraged within the ADO, particularly by such areas as those of the Chief Information Officer, the single Services, the Defence Materiel Organisation, the Defence Science and Technology Organisation, and Defence Personnel and Corporate Services. Cooperation with our overseas partners and allies is also important. While we cannot make the entire force interoperable with everyone, we will need to tackle this issue by identifying with whom we need to be interoperable—sometimes by service or function—and then working out the way to achieve the required effect.

CONCLUSION

In the lead-up to the Iraq War, we witnessed a refrain from a Grecian Chorus who predicted that the Coalition forces were too few to succeed and that the whole military endeavour would become a battle of attrition, culminating in a Mesopotamian Stalingrad in Baghdad. What the critics did not understand was that it was the Coalition's war-winning lead in network-centric operations that led to the rapid decapitation of the Iraqi regime.

A network-centric approach to warfare will help the ADF of the future to ensure that it possesses a strategic advantage over any possible rival. In order to accomplish such an advantage, we will continuously modernise our forces in a way that both achieves and maintains a warfighting advantage. As we build a networked force and use it to enhance our combat power, we will need to balance resources between command and control, sensors, and engagement systems in order to ensure maximum operational efficiency. It is vital, however, that as we implement network-centric warfare we realise that we are not dealing with merely an array of technology, but rather a unified, holistic system that serves the needs of the human being in warfare.

The Iraq War reaffirmed the toughness, resourcefulness, excellent training and self-confidence of Australian military professionals. The ADF has participated in what historians will probably describe as an 'early network-centric war'. What we learnt in Iraq was the potential of applying a network-centric approach to warfare in 21st-century conditions. In the deserts of the Gulf, we saw information shared, refined and exploited in order to enable good men and women to achieve swift operational success. Our task in the ADF for the rest of the first decade of this new millennium is to race towards the future and create a networked approach to armed conflict. We must move firmly from theory to practice in order to empower our military personnel to succeed in complex operations on the unknown and unexpected battlefields of the information age.

> The ADF has participated in what historians will probably describe as an 'early network-centric war'.

THE AUTHOR

General Peter Cosgrove, AC, MC, is Chief of the Defence Force. A graduate of the Royal Military College, Duntroon, he has held many appointments throughout his career, including Commandant of the Infantry Centre, the Australian Defence Warfare Centre and the Royal Military College, Duntroon. He has commanded the 6th Brigade and the 1st Division and has seen active service in Vietnam. As Commander of the Deployable Joint Force Headquarters, General Cosgrove led the International Force in East Timor in 1999. On his return to Australia, he was appointed Chief of Army before assuming the position of Chief of the Defence Force.

PLANNING IN OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

OBSERVATIONS OF AN AUSTRALIAN LIAISON OFFICER

LIEUTENANT COLONEL CHRIS FIELD

In late 2002, the Australian National Headquarters Middle East Area of Operations attached the author as an ADF liaison officer to Third US Army's Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) to support campaign planning for what was to become Operation *Iraqi Freedom*. The author was embedded (integrated) in CFLCC as a lead planner and this article describes ten observations made during the experience of working in a coalition headquarters. The views outlined are not offered as formal solutions to the problems involved in military planning at the operational level of war. Rather, they are presented as personal observations and are designed to encourage debate within the ADF on the conditions Australian military professionals might expect to confront in the vital area of coalition operational planning.

> Defining the battlespace and establishing a clear command-and-control system should be regarded as the very essence of effective planning at the operational level of war.

OBSERVATION 1: DEFINING THE BATTLESPACE AND ESTABLISHING CLEAR COMMAND-AND-CONTROL PROCEDURES

Defining the battlespace and establishing a clear command-and-control system should be regarded as the very essence of effective planning at the operational level of war. All other operational functions—including manoeuvre, fires, logistics, intelligence and force protection—rely on a clear demarcation by an operational headquarters of battlespace parameters and command-and-control organisation. Yet, in Operation *Iraqi Freedom*, such procedures faced frequent challenges. For example, the establishment of appropriate battlespace parameters for CFLCC during the war in Iraq was impeded by the Coalition's undertaking operations too close to the vicinity of international boundaries. There was also poor liaison between CFLCC and the Coalition Forces Special Operations Component Command, especially during preparations to invade Iraq from Kuwait. Some planners in CFLCC felt that Central Command (CENTCOM) had largely abdicated its responsibility for deciding the extent of battlespace jurisdiction between CFLCC and Special Operations command. There were, for instance, misunderstandings over operational and tactical control between Land Component Command and Special Operations elements.

CFLCC was overly burdened by command responsibilities that included two corps-level headquarters and ten brigade-sized units. Consequently when CFLCC prepared to attack Iraq on D-Day, 19 March 2003, it found management of two corps level headquarters, namely those of US V Corps and the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, to be difficult. CFLCC's actual land power amounted to only three divisions, the US 3rd Infantry Division, the US 1st Marine Division and the British 1st Armoured Division. Such a force really only required a single corps-level headquarters. By having two subordinate corps headquarters in the field, CFLCC faced complexities in assigning an appropriate battlespace to each command because of the realities of restricted terrain and limited lines of communication.

OBSERVATION 2: THE DYNAMICS OF THE PLANNING PROCESS

The C5 Plans Operational Planning Group and the C35 Future Operations Operational Planning Team were the centres of gravity for CFLCC planning during Operation *Iraqi Freedom*. Many of the planners in the C5 Plans Operational Planning Group had experience from Operation *Enduring Freedom* in Afghanistan. As a result, the group became an ideal forum for dealing with complex, long-term operational issues arising from the complexities of the planning process, and represented a key agency in supporting the Commander CFLCC, Lieutenant General David McKiernan.

In contrast, the C35 Future Operations Operational Planning Team was staffed by much less experienced officers, some of whom were captains. The C35 Team was established in February 2003, only weeks before the commencement of operations and was expected to provide quick solutions to problems for a corps commander. These solutions often had to conform to the corps commander's decision cycle of ninety-six hours—a cycle of time that parallels that of an Air Tasking Order used to shape the deep battle.

The role of lead planners in both the planning group and team was critical. Lead planners were responsible for preparing the agenda for planning sessions and for any preparatory research. Prior to planning sessions, lead planners would reconcile the work of their groups with the specified tasks laid down by CENTCOM and Commander CFLCC. This approach had the effect of stimulating the activities of the planning staff in areas such as intelligence, aviation, engineering, topography and imagery.

OBSERVATION 3: BRANCH AND DECISION POINT PLANNING

During Operation *Iraqi Freedom*, branch planning based on contingency options became synonymous with the process of decision point planning. For example, on D-Day on 19 March 2003, Lieutenant General McKiernan could list seven decision points in support of his operational plan. These decision points remain classified in their particulars, but in general they dealt with synchronising operations, exploiting tactical opportunities in the field and controlling operational phases. In the headquarters, each decision point was outlined by means of a graphical representation overlaid on a map. In addition, Commander CFLCC's Critical Information Requirements were carefully related to dealing with each decision point in turn, and this process enabled the battle staff to track the progress of field operations as they unfolded.

The C35 Future Operations Planning Team developed the system of issuing fragmentary orders for each of the seven decision points. Each of these fragmentary orders was then staffed throughout the headquarters and placed in a 'warm status', pending any requirement for their use. This system of pre-prepared fragmentary orders was useful, in that it served to give CFLCC's subordinate commands the opportunity to provide direct input before orders were issued as formal documents. However, it was discovered that the process of converting decision points from a graphical and text representation into a fragmentary order that defined tasks appropriate to the operational level of war required a concentrated intellectual effort by the C35 Team. A clear danger in writing fragmentary orders at the operational level is that planners may be tempted to list too many tactical tasks for execution by subordinate commands.

CFLCC planners tried to write fragmentary orders that synchronised operational functions. However, once the land campaign commenced, there was little that Commander CFLCC could do to influence operational events, especially south of Baghdad as V Corps and the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force attacked their objectives. Once battle commenced, all that Commander CFLCC could concentrate on was influencing selected decision points. He could exert influence in areas such as operational intelligence, by reassigning his collection assets to support a specific decision point, and by attempting to shape the battlespace by redirecting operational fires.

A key observation to be drawn from Operation *Iraqi Freedom* is that, in a dynamic military environment, there may not be time to develop branch plans fully, and therefore planners must consider developing decision points to support a Commander's operational vision. The Decision Point method worked effectively for CFLCC during the Iraq campaign and decision points were often a focus for planners to consider events in a campaign framework and not merely as a sequence of disaggregated tactical engagements.

OBSERVATION 4: PROVIDING A PLANNER'S OPERATIONAL VIEW

Operation *Iraqi Freedom* demonstrated that planning is never a neat and tidy process. The Iraq campaign tended to draw many commanders and their planning staff into the dynamics of the unfolding battle and its likely course over a ninety-six-hour period. The integrity of planning was also affected by pervasive intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets that now allow any participant—from the President of the United States or the Prime Minister of Australia down to at least battalion command level—to understand the course of events. Excellent situational awareness throughout the battlespace facilitates operational success but it also raises the real possibility of interference in military planning by politicians.

Based on observations of Operation *Iraqi Freedom*, it is clear to the author that military planners are morally obliged to insist that optimum warfighting solutions be followed at all times. The CFLCC war

> … Ralph Peters has called Power Point 'a tool of the anti-Christ' and, in the context of clear planning procedures, he is largely correct.

plan for Phase III, the military hostilities phase of the invasion of Iraq, was excellent, but planning was clearly underdeveloped for Phase IV, the post-hostilities period. Military planners need to be prepared to challenge assumptions and orthodoxies even if this challenge leads to disagreement. In Operation *Iraqi Freedom*, there was, for instance, planning disagreement over battlespace responsibilities and command-

and-control procedures between V Corps and the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force. It was nevertheless important to air these issues, given that operations aimed against the enemy's centre of gravity depended on planning clarity.

OBSERVATION 5: THE CONTINUED NEED FOR WRITTEN ORDERS

When it comes to military planning tools, Microsoft Power Point seems to have become a lifeblood in the 21st century. Power Point enables fast, accurate and effective relaying of complex material in a graphical form to large bodies of people. For example, prior to D-Day on 19 March 2003, the entire Operation *Cobra II* plan could be briefed in less than sixty minutes to any audience, regardless of size, using Power Point slides. Yet, there comes a time when military planners must begin the actual process of preparing detailed orders—often a reluctant enterprise in CFLCC.

When trying to convert hundreds of megabytes of computer-generated slides into a 'five-paragraph' written order—the American equivalent of the Australian military's SMEAC (Situation, Mission, Execution, Administration and Logistics and Command and Signal process)—planners struggled with both brevity and clarity. The American military writer, Ralph Peters, has called Power Point 'a tool of the anti-Christ' and, in the context of clear planning procedures, he is largely correct.[1] The lesson is clear: military planners must, for the sake of clarity of purpose, ensure that operational teams write concise fragmentary orders. The process of clear writing is vital, in that it often starkly illuminates important issues that require guidance, such as 'deconflicting' the battlespace, ensuring careful subordinate tasking and streamlining command-and-control procedures. Because of its brevity, a five-paragraph order quickly focuses the staff mind on the requirements of operational synchronisation—something that can become lost in the electronic blizzard of a computer-driven headquarters.

> During *Operation Iraqi Freedom*, the currency of value in CFLCC ultimately became, not the much-lauded computer slide, but the old-fashioned written fragmentary order.

During Operation *Iraqi Freedom*, the currency of value in CFLCC ultimately became, not the much-lauded computer slide, but the old-fashioned written fragmentary order. The latter was used to direct all actions within the CFLCC battlespace and became the only product after D-Day on 19 March 2003 that the generals serving in CFLCC had either the time, or the inclination, to read carefully. In the opinion of the author, after D-Day, CFLCC staff could have saved hundreds of hours of labour, if they had simply concentrated on writing orders, rather than producing complicated and ultimately redundant Power Point slides.

OBSERVATION 6: THE NEED TO MENTOR PLANNING STAFF

Isolation in a military headquarters puts a premium on positive human and military interaction and can make a significant difference to a planning team's morale and performance. Many of the mid-ranking planners at CFLCC were expected to work with little guidance and some lacked a Command and Staff College education. Often planners had the huge responsibility of writing fragmentary orders that were responsible for the actions of the Third United States Army, and its attached Joint and Coalition forces. Many mid-ranking planning officers at CFLCC only communicated with their superiors when mistakes were made or when tasks were completed.

This impersonal, relentlessly outcome-driven environment called for mentoring of staff teams by the lead planners. During Operation *Iraqi Freedom*, mentoring of staff was often neglected in the 1600-strong CFLCC headquarters. The CFLCC Commander, Lieutenant General McKiernan, noticed this problem and informed his principal staff at Camp Doha in Kuwait on 19 May 2003 that officers should, as he put it, 'never be too busy to lead soldiers, check the small details, and correct mistakes'.[2]

> … commanders must ensure that key members of their planning staff are not driven into ineffectiveness by unrelenting demands on their time and by crushing workloads.

OBSERVATION 7: THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF PLANNING IS IMPORTANT

The 'back-to-back' US-led Coalition campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq between 2001 and 2003 had the combined effect of exhausting the energy and creativity of many expert planners. By May 2003, many of the military planners in CFLCC and other US warfighting headquarters in Iraq had spent almost two years in continuous planning and were under enormous psychological and physical pressure. These problems were exacerbated by the tendency of lead planners within CFLCC to compromise their skills and judgment by working hours that were beyond normal endurance. During Operation *Iraqi Freedom*, the author witnessed many planners reach fatigue point due to their inability to manage overwhelming workloads or to create a phased system that balanced effort with rest.

The lesson is clear: commanders must ensure that key members of their planning staff are not driven into ineffectiveness by unrelenting demands on their time and by crushing workloads. Planning tasks must be carefully phased in time so that

individuals can continue to be effective over the long term. Given the character of the War on Terror, future military operations are likely to be complex, demanding and unpredictable. As a result, the human dimension of military planning requires careful consideration.

OBSERVATION 8: THE PROBLEM OF ACCESS TO THE US SECURE INTERNET PROTOCOL ROUTER–NETWORK (SIPR–NET)

Despite Australian and British involvement in Operation *Iraqi Freedom,* there were restrictions placed by the United States on non-American use of the SIPR–NET (the US military's top-secret Intranet system). To compensate for this communication restriction, CENTCOM developed an alternative joint American, British and Australian Intranet system known as CENTRIX–X. The aim was to create a communications interface between the top-secret US SIPR–NET and the Coalition allies.

However, when used in CFLCC by allied planning staff, the new system proved to be an abject failure, with difficulties experienced in registering foreign planning officers with CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa, Florida.

Rather than attempt to set up an entirely new system such as CENTRIX–X, it would have been far easier and more practical to have modified the US SIPR–NET in order to permit Coalition nations special limited access to the network. Such a modification would have allowed basic e-mail connectivity within CFLCC between embedded Anglo-Australian planners and their US counterparts. Without e-mail connectivity, it proved difficult to participate fully as an embedded allied member of a US warfighting headquarters. For the author, lack of access to SIPR–NET facilities meant that information had to be moved around between American machines and allied laptop computers by means of compact or floppy disks. Such an approach was a time-consuming and inefficient method of communication.

> A Coalition officer who is not embedded within the US staff system as a fully-fledged member becomes nothing more than an observer of events.

In terms of modifying the US SIPR–NET in order to permit American allies limited access to American communications traffic, there needed to be a virtual fence or firewall created. A firewall system could also have been combined with use of an access-monitoring system in the American secret network. The technical creation of a virtual fence or firewall system needs to be pursued as a long-term standardisation project by American allies such as Britain and Australia.

OBSERVATION 9: THE ADVANTAGES OF A US MILITARY EDUCATION

In terms of serving as an allied planner in a US-dominated headquarters, there is an advantage in possessing an American military education, particularly in a course such as advanced warfighting. The author was fortunate to have possessed such an education and found that it was invaluable in understanding American military mores as well as the character of joint and single-service US doctrine. The military planning for Operation *Iraqi Freedom*, in CFLCC, V Corps and the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force was dominated by US Advanced Warfighting Program graduates from the US Army and the US Marine Corps. Given a common intellectual background, graduates of the US Army's School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) and the US Marine Corps' School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW) quickly identified with one another during the Iraq conflict.

> … it is only through the system of embedding an officer within the US command-and-staff system that an allied nation can achieve an intimate understanding of American military objectives.

Indeed, within CFLCC alone, there were fourteen US Army or US Marine Corps advanced warfighting graduates. Two of the generals serving in CFLCC—Major General William Webster, Deputy Commanding General, Operations, and Major General James Marks, the headquarters' intelligence chief—were SAMS graduates. It is noteworthy that the CFLCC Chief of Plans, Colonel Kevin Benson, a SAMS graduate, followed his service in the Middle East by becoming Director of the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth in Kansas in July 2003. Colonel Steven Brown, the Chief of Future Operations Plans, was a SAW graduate. The lead planner for Operation *Cobra II*—the plan that was executed by CFLCC during Operation *Iraqi Freedom*—Major Evan Huelfer, was not an advanced warfighting graduate. He was, however, a high-calibre officer who had attended the Command and General Staff College and who possessed a doctorate in history.

Despite the advantages of an American military education, allied military personnel need to exploit their special knowledge meaningfully. It must be realised that a US advanced warfighting education will be only of passing interest if a Coalition officer cannot work alongside American colleagues as an embedded planner. A Coalition officer who is not embedded within the US staff system as a fully-fledged member becomes not much more than an observer of events. In a busy headquarters fully preoccupied with war planning, observers tend to be viewed as

extraneous by senior American officers. Major General James Thurman, the CFLCC Operations commander, described a liaison officer without embedded functions as being similar to '[the] dog [that] won't hunt'.[3]

OBSERVATION 10: THE NEED TO EMBED LIAISON OFFICERS EARLY AND OFTEN

The nation that chooses to embed its military planners within the American military system—and to do this early and often—has an opportunity to contribute significantly to the development of a coalition war plan and, ultimately, to the success of any ensuing campaign. Given the compartmentalised nature of current American war planning, it is only through the system of embedding an officer within the US command-and-staff system that an allied nation can achieve an intimate understanding of American military objectives.

> … it is of the utmost importance that we collect a body of knowledge that can assist Australian officers in preparing for multinational operational planning.

Once integrated into a US headquarters, American commanders will usually employ an allied country's military planner in a variety of functions. Inside the environment of a US-dominated headquarters, a foreign planner will be embraced as an equal and will be trusted to lead planning teams, write detailed plans and conduct liaison on behalf of the particular US warfighting headquarters. In short, because of the multinational character of many contemporary military operations, the US armed forces welcome embedded or integrated planners, especially from its closest allies, Britain and Australia.

CONCLUSION

This article has attempted to detail the observations of one Australian lead planner who served in CFLCC headquarters during Operation *Iraqi Freedom*. Since it is highly likely that the ADF will be involved in more coalition warfighting operations with the United States in the future, it is of the utmost importance that we collect a body of knowledge that can assist Australian officers in preparing for multinational operational planning. Issues such as battlespace definition, US-allied secret communications difficulties, planning group dynamics, branch and point planning and the requirement for clarity in written orders are elements of the environment that ADF officers can expect to confront in a coalition warfighting headquarters. Above all,

the management of the human dimension must be better appreciated. Operation *Iraqi Freedom* demonstrated that it is not by computers that campaigns are fought, but by human beings, and it is with the latter's intellectual capital, their sense of duty and, above all, their dedication that wars are ultimately won.

ENDNOTES

1 Ralph Peters, 'The West's Future Foes: Simplification and Slaughter', presentation at the Chief of Army Conference, Canberra, 11 October 2001.
2 Lieutenant General David McKiernan to his Principal Staff, Camp Doha, Kuwait, 18 May 2003.
3 Major General James Thurman to Principal Staff, Camp Doha, Kuwait, 16 May 2003.

THE AUTHOR

Lieutenant Colonel Chris Field is a graduate of the Australian Defence Force Academy and the Royal Military College, Duntroon. He has served with the 2nd/4th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment and with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation in Israel, Syria and Southern Lebanon. Lieutenant Colonel Field saw operational service with the International Force in East Timor. From late 2002 until May 2003, he was the lead Australian Army Operational Planner with the Third US Army/Coalition Forces Land Component Command as part of Operation *Bastille-Falconer* and Operation *Iraqi Freedom*. He is currently posted to Future Land Warfare Branch in Army Headquarters.

GUARDING AUSTRALIANS AGAINST TERRORISM

THE ROLE OF THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE'S SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND*

MAJOR GENERAL DUNCAN LEWIS

The task of counter-terrorism has sometimes been compared to that of goal keeping in a soccer World Cup final. The keeper may save a hundred shots—relentlessly angled from every direction, height and velocity—aimed at the mouth of the goal, but his professional skill, tenacity and anticipation will pass largely unnoticed by spectators. What the public will remember, probably forever, is the goal that the keeper lets through. The analogy with counter-terrorism is compelling: a stream of terrorist shots aimed at a country and 'saved' by its national security agencies are likely to remain undeclared and unreported in what is essentially a silent war. Yet, a single terrorist action that succeeds in penetrating the security goal mouth can create a media blizzard and enter the public consciousness permanently. The reality that months, even years, of clandestine success can be compromised by a single incident that captures public attention is the philosophical dilemma of all professionals engaged in the counter-terrorist business.

This article examines the role of the Australian Defence Force's (ADF) new Special Operations Command in Australian security. Both the legal basis for, and the background to, the ADF's role in counter-terrorism in Australia are analysed. The article goes on to describe the formation of Special Operations Command in 2002 and concludes with several observations on the character of contemporary terrorism.

THE LEGAL BASIS OF ADF INVOLVEMENT
IN COUNTER–TERRORISM

There are two ways in which the ADF contributes to the security of the nation with regard to the threat posed by terrorism. The first way is the ADF's traditional role as the defender of the state—a role that is enshrined in the Australian Constitution. Under the Constitution, military forces may be deployed on the executive order of the Government in the defence of the nation. A recent example of the ADF's performance of this warfighting role is the deployment to Afghanistan, where Special Forces conducted protracted combat operations against the al-Qa'ida movement and the Taliban regime during 2002. The second role that the ADF performs in the national counter-terrorism effort is through the support that it provides to Australia's civil authorities.

The 1903 Defence Act and subsequent 2001 amendment make provision for the ADF to deploy domestically in support of the civil authorities. Australian law is highly prescriptive and clear in this respect. The law provides that the ADF may be called on to assist civil authorities in contingencies where there is no prospect of the use of armed force. These types of contingencies include the provision of flood relief, or the conduct of high-risk searches at a major venue in a sporting event such as the 2000 Olympic Games. Such operations, in which the use of armed force is not a consideration, are referred to as Defence Force Aid to the Civil Community (DFACC). There is, however, a second, more serious category laid down in the constitutional legislation, known as Defence Force Aid to the Civil Authority (DFACA). The latter regulation provides that the ADF may be called on to assist in the maintenance of public order when situations arise in which there is a strong possibility that the use of armed force will be required in a manner that is beyond the normal capacity of the civil authorities. When the ADF is employed under conditions of DFACA, the use of force by the military is guided by four overarching principles: necessity, proportionality, primacy of the civil authority, and the retention of military command over troops.

The use of military forces in a situation of civil disorder requires formal authorisation by the Governor-General-in-Council. A request for military forces may be made by State or Territory jurisdictions, or by the Commonwealth acting in defence

of its own interests. Whatever the circumstances necessitating military support, there will always be a requirement for extensive consultation between Federal and State authorities and meticulous adherence to the call-out legislation.

THE ADF'S ROLE IN AUSTRALIAN COUNTER–TERRORISM, 1978–2001

The ADF first became engaged in domestic counter-terrorism following the bombing of the Hilton Hotel in 1978. This event presented Australia with the first indication that it was not immune to the rise of terrorism as a global phenomenon during the 1970s. As a direct consequence of the Hilton bombing, the ADF formed the first specialised counter-terrorist force, the Tactical Assault Group. Established in 1980, the Tactical Assault Group was drawn from, and subsequently embedded in, the Special Air Service Regiment in Perth, Western Australia. The Tactical Assault Group provided the Australian Federal Government with a force of last resort for the resolution of terrorist siege–hostage situations and hijacking incidents. Over the past two decades, funding, hard training and international standards of performance have seen the Tactical Assault Group become one of the finest of its type in the world. It is a quick-response force maintained at extremely high levels of readiness and capable of dealing with a variety of operational contingencies. From 1980 onwards, subsequent public events—notably the 1982 Brisbane Commonwealth Games, the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games, and the 2002 Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting held in Queensland—provided further impetus for refining Australia's counter-terrorist capability both as a deterrent and as a high-readiness, quick-reaction force. Providing security for the Sydney Olympics, in particular, represented a high point in the development of the ADF's anti-terrorist capability. To draw a term from classical music, the Olympic experience placed the ADF in a strong position from which to segue to a new post–11 September 2001 security environment—one characterised by the phenomenon of transnational, mass-casualty terrorism.

> … the establishment of an ADF Special Operations Command dramatically increased Australia's ability to use unconventional warfare methods …

While in terms of counter-terrorist preparation and organisation the Olympics left the ADF well prepared to meet the transformed security situation of the new millennium, there could be no complacency in protecting the Australian public against the menace of global terrorism. On 13 September 2001, only two days after the al-Qa'ida attacks on New York and Washington, the ADF had commenced

immediate planning to raise a second Tactical Assault Group, based on the East Coast in Sydney. In addition, a newly formed Incident Response Regiment supplemented both assault groups. In technical terms, this special regiment is an Army engineer unit, with special skills in the detection and neutralisation of chemical, biological and radiological devices. In addition, the regiment deals with contamination and specialises in confronting the danger of large-scale explosive devices. Along with a new assault group, the creation of a special engineer regiment to counter the use of weapons of mass destruction effectively doubled the size of the ADF's counter-terrorist forces.

THE CREATION OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, DECEMBER 2002

The Bali bombing of 12 October 2002 reinforced the point that Australia was not immune to the rise of global terrorism. This incident led directly to a decision by the National Security Committee of the Cabinet to create a new Special Operations Command announced by the Prime Minister on 19 December 2002. The Government's aim was to enhance the ADF's Special Forces capability still further, and to strengthen effective joint, inter-agency and international counter-terrorist planning and capability. The new command ensured that the ADF could support Federal and State police and counter-terrorist agencies, and provide an effective mechanism for synchronising ADF special operations with the requirements of emerging national coordinating bodies, such as the National Counter-Terrorism Committee. In essence, the establishment of an ADF Special Operations Command dramatically increased Australia's ability to use unconventional warfare methods to respond to the growing asymmetric threat of terrorism.

The ADF's Special Operations Command is a joint command staffed by members of the three services. The Command Headquarters is split between Sydney and Canberra. The Sydney Headquarters is based on the already established Army Special Forces Group, while in Canberra a new section of the headquarters has been established and has responsibility for counter-terrorist coordination and future capability development. The new command comprises a number of special operations units, including the Special Air Service Regiment, the 4th Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment (Commando), the Incident Response Regiment and a Combat Support squadron. The command will also have a rotary-wing squadron in direct support along with assigned Royal Australian Navy and Royal Australian Air Force assets. Among the current priorities of the command is the integration of naval and air support into special operations. The command also maintains a matrix of important linkages with a variety of Federal and State agencies, with the peak body being the National Counter-Terrorist Committee. Through this committee

and the Protective Security Coordination Centre that supports it, the ADF's anti-terrorist forces are able to participate in a comprehensive range of exercises across Federal, State and Territory jurisdictions. While much has been written about the concept of Homeland Security involving multiple agencies, it is important to note that Special Operations Command is a military organisation with a direct focus on countering terrorism.

The command-and-control functions of Special Operations Command are unique. The Special Operations Commander is in the unusual position of being responsible to three different headquarters. For warfighting functions, such as operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, Special Operations Headquarters is responsible to the Commander Australian Theatre, who is the ADF's lead, joint operational-level commander. In terms of responsibilities for raising, training and sustaining forces, the Commander Special Operations takes direction from the Chief of Army, since it is through Army Headquarters that the Special Force Command's funding is managed and allocated. Finally, in the execution of counter-terrorist operations, the Special Operations Commander is directly responsible to the Chief of the Defence Force. While such a command-and-control arrangement might be considered unusual in a classical military sense, given the complexities and peculiarities of Special Forces' organisation and the flexibility required in the conduct of operations, the system works well. For instance, in the short period of its existence, the Command has successfully executed warfighting operations in the Middle East, and has provided support to civil agencies such as the Australian Customs Service and the Australian Federal Police in the boarding and recovery of the North Korean vessel, the MV *Pong Su*.

> … Special Operations Command is a military organisation with a direct focus on countering terrorism.

THE CHARACTER OF CONTEMPORARY TERRORISM

Within Special Operations Command, there exists a growing appreciation of the character of 21st-century terrorism. Our assessment is that terrorism is both chameleon-like and viral in its approach and behaviour. It is chameleon-like in that it adapts its characteristics to surrounding circumstances. Modern terrorism assumes different manifestations—from jets used as cruise missiles to truck bombs and suicide attacks—making it difficult to anticipate. Terrorism is also viral in behaviour, in that it changes both its form and direction across time and space, requiring continuous monitoring of its condition. It is the dynamic character of

terrorism as an operational phenomenon that requires the ADF in general, and Special Operations Command in particular, to maintain a flexible and agile force structure that is capable of conducting multidimensional missions.

For over twenty years, the Tactical Assault Group has maintained a siege and hostage resolution force, but in 21st-century conditions we have recognised that the new strain of international terrorism will not necessarily confront us with a familiar *modus operandi.* For example, the potential confluence of transnational terrorism with weapons of mass destruction may create a deadly cocktail and presents us with sobering operational and strategic challenges. Herein lies the nub of our problem: we cannot rest content to simply monitor current strains of terrorism. Rather, we must attempt to anticipate new manifestations of terrorist activity and, to stay ahead of the phenomenon, we must develop sophisticated levels of intelligence to support ADF operations.

> Within Special Operations Command … assessment is that terrorism is both chameleon-like and viral in its approach and behaviour.

Since the beginnings of recorded warfare, when the Hittites fought the Egyptians at Megiddo and Kadesh, and when Babylon and Assyria were great powers, military forces have been aware of the value of intelligence in gaining information superiority in combat. In early 2003, when Australian special forces were operating in Iraq—the ancient land of the Babylonians—we saw, once again, the critical importance of intelligence and information dominance in destroying Saddam Hussein's military forces. In the ongoing war against terror, the role of intelligence is vital since the conflict is, first and foremost, an intelligence-led struggle.

Special Forces are often the instrument of choice in modern conflicts, particularly in the War on Terrorism, and this development is a peculiarly modern phenomenon. The rise of Special Forces to prominence in contemporary military operations is largely the result of three fundamental changes in armed conflict. These changes are the availability of improved situational awareness, the use of precision fires and the growing transparency of the battlespace.

Despite the pervasiveness of Clausewitz's friction in war, superior information is critical to success in modern combat. It is the rise of information technology in producing situational awareness across the battlespace that has shaped the way in which war is waged in the early 21st century. In an age of information dominance, smaller, highly flexible and expertly trained Special Forces, which are armed with near-perfect situational awareness, have adequate force protection and can achieve disproportionate success in combat. As a result, such forces are attractive to strategic policy makers.

A second feature that has facilitated an increased use of Special Forces has been the ubiquity of precision strike. General Ronald R. Fogelman, a former Chief of Staff of the US Air Force, once predicted that, 'in the first quarter of the 21st century, you will be able to find, fix or track, and target—in near real time—anything of consequence that moves upon or is located on the face of the Earth.'[1] Recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have certainly moved us closer to Fogelman's vision, given the astonishing accuracy achieved by stand-off precision weapons systems. Once again, the military requirements of reconnaissance, intelligence, and targeting for the employment of precision munitions have contributed to the increasing use of Special Forces throughout the modern battlespace.

> Special Forces are often the instrument of choice in modern conflicts, particularly in the War on Terrorism, and this development is a peculiarly modern phenomenon.

The third change in the character of modern combat has been the increased role that politics plays. As classical military theorists such as Machiavelli and Clausewitz recognised, warfare is an extension of diplomacy. War may have its own grammar but its logic must be supplied by political objectives. In an age of globalised communications, a mass television audience can watch military operations unfold in their lounge rooms in near real time. The rise of the global electronic media represents a revolution in the sociology of war. No longer is the violence of armed conflict witnessed only by combatants; we are all now witnesses to the waging of war. As a result, governments are highly sensitive to the political impact of televised bloodshed. One has only to recall the effect of the bloody images of Coalition air attack on Iraqi ground forces along the 'Highway of Death'—from Kuwait City to Basra in the first Gulf War of 1991—to understand that no responsible government wants to wage an unrestricted war that is captured on camera. In recent operations in Iraq, Special Forces provided an effective means of finding and destroying enemy forces, or negotiating the capitulation of such forces without scenes of wholesale slaughter or of death and injury to innocent civilians.

CONCLUSION

The increasing use of Special Forces in contemporary armed conflict should not be seen as constituting ready-made panacea for all security contingencies. On the contrary, the ADF will always require a balanced range of military capabilities, currently including ships, aircraft, armour and artillery, along with ground forces

in combined arms teams that can execute joint warfare. What Australia's Special Forces have accomplished in recent years is to establish themselves as an important capability in the joint fight and can achieve disproportionate effects in operations in the war against terrorism. It is the growing importance of Australia's Special Forces in an effects-based approach to strategy that has contributed to the formation of the ADF's Special Operations Command. Moreover, the new command has been designed to assist the ADF to support Australia's post-Bali 'whole of government' approach to national security.

Finally, we need to appreciate that, in Western systems of democratic government, the use of military force is generally a last resort. In a domestic sense, this last resort approach is particularly applicable when deciding to request military aid to the civil power. In Australia, terrorism is first and foremost a criminal matter that is the responsibility of our law enforcement agencies. Thus, despite the creation of the Special Forces Command—with its increased military capabilities, higher readiness and emphasis on preparedness—it ought never to be forgotten that, in the war against terrorism, the ADF is not the first but the last line of defence.

ENDNOTE

1   Quoted in Michael O'Hanlon, *Technological Change and the Future of War*, The Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 2000, p. 13.

THE AUTHOR

Major General Duncan Lewis, DSC, CSC, became the inaugural Commander Special Operations Command in January 2003. He is a graduate of the Royal Military College, Duntroon, the British Army Staff College and the US Army War College. His postings include service with the 6th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment and with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation. Major General Lewis commanded the Special Air Service Regiment between 1990 and 1992. He subsequently served as Director of Strategy and International Engagement in Army Headquarters, as Army Attaché in Jakarta, Indonesia and as Commander Sector West in East Timor.

INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE BATTLESPACE

UNDERSTANDING THE RISE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN AUSTRALIA*

MAJOR GENERAL DUNCAN LEWIS

Special operations have now become central to the conduct of joint operations in many advanced Western armed forces. However, this was not always the case, and in the past there was frequent disagreement on the resource requirements between Special Forces and their conventional counterparts. When I joined the Australian Special Forces twenty-six years ago, the Special Air Service Regiment (SASR) was composed of about 300 soldiers and our numbers were dwindling. There was also a possibility that the SASR might be struck off the Army's order of battle in the post-Vietnam era of reduced force levels. In 2003 the situation is very different from that which I encountered in 1977. The Commander of the Special Operations Command controls a force of nearly 2000 personnel consisting of three major regular units, a reserve unit and supporting agencies. Moreover, Special Operations has become an equal component in the joint operations arena, equivalent in status to the Land, Maritime and Air Commands.

---

* This article is based on a presentation by Major General Lewis to the United Service Institution of the ACT on 12 November 2003 at the Spender Theatre, Australian Defence College, Weston Creek.

This article examines the role of special operations both inside and outside the modern battlespace. While most military forces have as their principal function the conduct of military operations inside the battlespace, those same forces often have utility in areas that are clearly outside the battlespace. For example, No. 36 Squadron of the Royal Australian Air Force, comprising C-130 transport aircraft, concentrates on tactical air transport within the battlespace, and played an important role in the transport and recovery of burnt and maimed Australian citizens following the 2002 Bali bombing. In addition, 8/12 Medium Regiment of the Royal Australian Artillery (RAA) makes a clear contribution to ground and joint fires in the battlespace, but on many occasions the regiment has also been used to assist in fighting bushfires that threaten the civil community. Military forces can therefore possess dual functions and, in this respect, special operations forces have a particular duality. While special operations forces focus on warfighting inside the battlespace, they also remain ready to conduct operations outside the battlespace by providing counter-terrorist support to the civil authorities if, and when, required.

> … Special Operations has become an equal component … to the Land, Maritime and Air Commands.

When one examines the role of special operations inside the battlespace, one sometimes hears the critique that conventional forces could have undertaken the missions that Special Forces undertook in Afghanistan and Iraq. Such a proposition is misguided and comprehensively fails to understand the character of operations in both campaigns. While there were some aspects of the campaigns that might have been conducted by conventional forces, these missions were carried out by special operations forces simply because they were the deployed force element from the Australian Defence Force (ADF). The majority of the missions accomplished in both Afghanistan and Iraq, however, required specialist capabilities. The duration of patrols, the distances to be covered, the long-range communication requirements, the calling of precision air strikes, the use of stealth and agility, and the liaison role with Afghan indigenous forces demanded skills that are not generally available in our conventional forces.

Afghanistan was an unusual campaign in that it lent itself to special operations. During the campaign, a strategic alliance was developed between special operations and air power, while the presence of opposition forces to the Taliban offered an opportunity to utilise armed proxies to moderately good effect. In addition, the peculiar terrain of Afghanistan was well suited to small-group operations.

While the campaign in Iraq in 2003 differed considerably from that waged in Afghanistan in 2001–02, the central importance of special operations remained. In desert conditions, Special Forces were able to operate largely unimpeded. The Special Forces harassed the enemy flanks and rear, and operated in conditions distinguished

by complex and inhospitable terrain. The linkage between special operations and airpower forged in Afghanistan was reinforced in Iraq. Moreover, the relationship between special operations and conventional force capabilities, particularly the combined arms team, were rediscovered during Operation *Iraqi Freedom.*

There are three basic operational factors that have contributed to the rise to prominence of Special Forces over the past decade: situational awareness, precision fires and the growing transparency of the battlespace. In considering the role of situational awareness, it is useful to recall that, when Julius Caesar entered Gaul in 59 BC, he could see no farther than the hill in front of him. In addition, Caesar's cavalry used for scouting had limited range and vision. For all of Caesar's brilliance in the field, he was, by today's standards of situational awareness, almost blind. In the early 21st century, information technology provides small groups of once vulnerable soldiers with high-grade situational awareness. We can now see not only over Liddell Hart's 'other side of the hill' but deep into the enemy's territory. The old adage of 'five men, alone and unafraid' is no longer a phrase of bravado; it represents the reality that small groups of properly equipped soldiers can operate in a potentially high-threat battlespace in a way that was not possible before the coming of the information age in the 1990s. While there is no such phenomenon as perfect situational awareness, there is now suffi-cient knowledge of conditions in a battlespace to permit small groups of highly specialised soldiers to operate with great effectiveness.

In the case of precision fires, it is again useful to reflect on Caesar's experience in Gaul. In Caesar's Gallic Wars, Roman legionnaires carried several *pileum* (spears) and a *gladius* (short broadsword), and moved massive siege machines and ammuni-tion by horse and human muscle power. In Caesar's day, a soldier had to carry whatever he used, whether it was spears or ballistae. Today, advanced communications and munition technologies have conferred on soldiers the power to call for indirect fires and have these delivered on time and on target. Accordingly, Special Forces soldiers, although few in number, can now unleash disproportionate effect through precision fires delivered by remotely located forces. The Special Forces soldier is now not only better protected through situational awareness, but is also more lethal because of precision-guided munitions. It is the nexus between situational awareness and precision guidance that has facilitated a parallel strategic alliance between special operations and air power.

Added to situational awareness and the precision revolution is the transparency of the battlespace. When Caesar fought against the Gauls, he often prosecuted the war with great brutality, severing the hands of prisoners from Uxellodunum, and

> The old adage of 'five men, alone and unafraid' is no longer a phrase of bravado …

then releasing the victims to serve as a warning to those that continued to resist subjugation. Today, such brutality would be captured by ever-present television cameras and would not be tolerated by any responsible, democratic government. In the West, the threshold for 'acceptable destruction' is low, and under such conditions, Special Forces who specialise in the application of discriminate force have great attraction for political leaders. Inside the battlespace, then, it is this troika of situational awareness, precision fires and battlespace transparency that has propelled special operations into playing a central role in joint operations.

What of special operations outside the immediate confines of the battlespace? In this context, the rise to prominence of Special Forces has been accelerated by the blurring of war and peace. In a classical Westphalian sense, wars between nations are usually declared, fought according to rules, and are ended by negotiation and treaty—as was the case when Britain and Argentina fought over the Falklands in 1982. Increasingly, however, the application of military force occurs without such formality, in a shadow world that is neither war nor peace. For countries that face complex missions across a spectrum of conflict with a high risk of violence and considerable political risk, the employment of high-performance military forces has become essential.

Terrorism, of course, is the classic threat that occurs outside the formal battlespace but, because of its lethality, occasionally demands a military response. The complexity of the threat of terrorism was a prime deter-

> Increasingly … the application of military force occurs … in a shadow world that is neither war nor peace.

minant in the creation of an ADF Special Operations Command in 2002 as part of a national 'whole of government' approach. One of the important components of Special Operations Command is the second Tactical Assault Group on the east coast. Some commentators have questioned the wisdom of raising such a force, suggesting that, with tactical assault groups on both the east and west coasts of Australia, we are unnecessarily duplicating a limited capability. Several critics have also suggested that the concept of tactical assault groups trespasses on the domestic police role in counter-terrorism. Yet such a view ignores the reality that tactical assault groups based on the east and west coasts—TAG-E and TAG-W—while being largely mirror images of each other, have differing geographic responsibilities. For instance, TAG-E is primarily responsible for providing a domestic counter-terrorist response to deal with onshore incidents in areas of high population concentration on the Australian eastern seaboard. On the other hand, TAG-W—while retaining responsibility for quick response to a domestic onshore terrorist incident in Western

Australia—concentrates on the recovery of offshore gas and oil platforms, and operations involving ships underway. Most importantly, however, the Perth-based TAG-W represents Australia's overseas counter-terrorist response-and-recovery force.

Moreover, with regard to the domestic role of Special Forces in counter-terrorism, it needs to be appreciated that, in the Australian Commonwealth, police resources differ greatly in the various States and Territories. Larger States such as New South Wales and Victoria can afford to create police forces with dedicated special operations groups. However, smaller States with much more limited police forces often lack the full range of capabilities needed to confront a serious terrorist incident. As a result, there is clearly a need for a uniform level of national counter-terrorist capability that is available to support all Australian citizens, irrespective of their location. It is the ADF that provides that national capability support through the possession of tactical assault groups. In addition, the Commonwealth reserves the right to act in its own interest should the Federal Government make a determination that, in a terrorist situation, a military capability is essential to support the civil authorities.

It is the national counter-terrorist requirement that has led to Special Operations Command's being composed of three major full-time units: the Special Air Service Regiment; 4th Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment (Commando); and the Incident Response Regiment. The part-time 1st Commando Regiment also contributes to special operations. As Special Operations Command evolves, the Army is developing a Combat Service Support Company and is basing a squadron of helicopters at Holsworthy in order to provide a rotary-wing capability that is 'in direct support and at priority call' to the command. Some of our major challenges include the issues of personnel, inter-agency coordination, and investment in new technology and techniques.

In terms of personnel, it must be appreciated that Special Operations Command has nearly doubled in size over the past twelve months. In this respect, we confront the dilemma that there is only a finite pool of individuals with the qualities

> … much of Special Operations Command's staff effort is devoted to fostering a web of inter-agency linkages.

and attributes required to become special operations soldiers. Accordingly, we have attempted to reach out directly into the community for recruits through the agency of the new Special Forces Direct Recruiting Scheme (SFDRS). Another major challenge lies in ensuring national coordination in a 'whole of government' approach to counter-terrorism policy. While there has been significant progress in Federal and State coordination, there is always room for improvement, and much of Special Operations Command's staff effort is devoted to fostering a web of inter-agency linkages.

Finally, there is the challenge of maintaining sufficient investment in emerging technologies and new capabilities. Here the equation is a simple one: in order to remain 'special', all special forces require resources. For example, the US Special Operations Command currently possesses an annual operating budget of some US$1.8 billion (less personnel costs). Because the US Special Operations Command has emerged as the lead element in the American response to global terrorism, the command has received a further appropriation in excess of US$7 billion to fund a variety of capability enhancements over the next five years. In Australia we cannot match such expenditure, but the point to note is that, if a country seeks to maintain an effective special operations capability, it must commit appropriate resources. Over the past few years, Australia's Special Forces have been well resourced and, as a result, we have developed world-class capabilities for unconventional warfare. Our challenge in the future will be to ensure that we continue to invest in new and emerging technologies and capabilities that increase our military effectiveness.

It is worth noting that the Special Operations Command currently costs the Australian taxpayer a little over two cents in every dollar allocated to the Defence vote. The return is impressive when one considers the Special Forces' contribution to operations in East Timor, Afghanistan, Iraq, the Solomon Islands; the management of incidents at sea involving the vessels MV *Tomi*, MV *Tampa*, MV *Pong Su*; and security for the Olympic Games and the Commonwealth Heads of Government. In recent years, the Australian Government and the community that it represents have received good value for the treasure that they have committed to ensuring that Australia maintains a world-class Special Forces capability. It is the firm intention of the Special Operations Command to ensure that this tradition of outcome-matching-investment continues well into the 21st century.

THE AUTHOR

Major General Duncan Lewis, DSC, CSC, became the inaugural Commander Special Operations Command in January 2003. He is a graduate of the Royal Military College, Duntroon, the British Army Staff College and the US Army War College. His postings include service with the 6th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment and with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation. Major General Lewis commanded the Special Air Service Regiment between 1990 and 1992. He subsequently served as Director of Strategy and International Engagement in Army Headquarters, as Army Attaché in Jakarta, Indonesia and as Commander Sector West in East Timor.

TWIN TOWERS REVISITED

A CULTURAL INTERPRETATION OF MODERN TERRORISM*

JOHN CARROLL

In some ways I feel like an impostor addressing a military audience because I have been warned that the only people whom the armed services take seriously are those with a long line of ancestors who have demonstrated distinguished military service. I can trace my ancestors back on my mother's side to Charles II, but I am afraid that it is a line that is rather lacking in military distinction. However, perhaps I can say in a timid defence that the Duke of Wellington is one of my heroes and that on the bookshelves in my study the only multi-volume works that I have are Charles Bean's twelve-volume study, *History of Australians at War*, and Winston Churchill's six-volume *History of the Second World War*.

One of my degrees is in mathematics. The only benefit to me from spending four years at the University of Melbourne doing an Honours Degree in mathematics was perhaps the lesson that, whenever in doubt, go back to first principles. Those of you connected with Australia's defence would certainly know that returning to first principles is a very important rule to follow. I am going to adopt a broad-brush approach to the problem of terrorism in which I attempt to isolate what seem to

---

* This article is based on a paper delivered in the Deputy Chief of Army's Occasional Seminar series in Canberra on 2 April 2003.

be the first principles that should govern our thinking on the subject. The aim is to provide a cultural interpretation of the new phenomenon of mega-terrorism and the impact on the West of waging a war on terrorism.

As of 11 September 2001 we are in a new world—a very different world from the one that any of us have known before. There can be little doubt that the fifty-year Golden Age that lasted from the end of World War II to the brink of the new millennium—that Golden Age in the West of prosperity, relative peace, economic growth, social harmony and security—is now over. We have to take on a deadly new organisation—al-Qa'ida—and destroy it. While practical challenges that we face are clearly linked to such vital issues as the use of intelligence and the development of a suitable military strategy, my interest is in examining the cultural consequences of the attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States.

The first principle is obvious, but one needs to state it nonetheless: the mega-terrorism of the early 21st century is quite different from anything that has come before, and in order to deal with it we require

> … the mega-terrorism of the early 21st century is quite different from anything that has come before …

a different style of thought. Of course, we have experienced modern terrorism since the Russian anarchists and Narodniks operated in the 19th century. Yet what happened when two hijacked planes were used to bring down the Twin Towers in New York was terrorism of a quite different order and scale—a new phenomenon. The Twin Towers were 110 storeys high and contained thousands of people. The war on terrorism in which we are now engaged is very different from the war on communism during the Cold War. Basically, the war on communism was a struggle between two competing materialisms. The Soviets wanted to become as powerful and materially rich as the rival consumer societies of the West, but the Soviets lost because the West's politico-economic system was far superior at generating wealth and prosperity than anything Marxism–Leninism could offer.

In cultural terms, the long war against communism was easy to understand. In contrast, the new war on terrorism is difficult to comprehend. The West's struggle against terrorism requires great subtlety of thought because the challenge that it presents penetrates the very heart of the democratic way of life. Let me illustrate the complexity of the challenge that we face by citing a speech that Osama bin Laden delivered on the day the Americans started bombing Afghanistan in 2001. The phraseology in bin Laden's speech is highly unusual—indeed, it is quite extraordinary. We have not heard anything quite like it in the West since Martin Luther during the Reformation. In his speech, bin Laden outlines the parameters of his struggle. He says that the war against the West is between the Camp of Belief (Islam) versus the Camp of Unbelief (the West).

Bin Laden goes on to state, 'My God Allah created the skies without pillars'. The subtext in this statement is quite clear. Bin Laden is basically equating pillars with New York's Twin Towers. His charge against us is this: the West's understanding of the meaning and the nature of the human condition is summed up in material progress and comfort. If all Western civilisation believes in can be summed up by the Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre in New York, then the West's culture can be destroyed. The bin Laden challenge is existential: 'I can destroy your culture; with disciplined men who are not afraid of death, I can bring down the pillars of your culture'.

For most of us in the West, Osama bin Laden is a satanic monster. Although this is true, one must admit that he is a brilliantly rational, technocratic monster with an almost poetic cultural genius.

> The bin Laden challenge is existential: 'I can destroy your culture; with disciplined men who are not afraid of death, I can bring down the pillars of your culture'.

After 11 September, how was the al-Qa'ida leader portrayed in the West, particularly in the American media? He was portrayed on horseback, as the lone man riding through the wastes of Afghanistan. These images unconsciously tapped straight into imagery out of the American western—from *Shane*, showing 'the man with no name', the John Wayne figure, the lone rider who can either restore or destroy law and order. In the case of Osama bin Laden, he is a rider of vengeance entering the frontier town to destroy, not preserve, civilisation.

If you look at the media imagery by which Saddam Hussein is portrayed, it is, of course, quite different. Hussein, an Arab dictator from the Cold War era, is easy to read—a creature of secular Middle East politics. The truth is that Osama bin Laden is highly difficult to interpret as a political figure. It is a very bad sign from a cultural point of view that we in the West have switched our attention from al-Qa'ida's bin Laden to Iraq's Saddam Hussein. Then there is the question of bin Laden's name. The most accurate spelling of his first name is Usama rather than Osama. The US media were, however, disturbed, if not spooked, by the first three letters of Usama that spell USA and soon switched to the use of Osama.

Osama bin Laden wishes to be the nemesis of the West. He is not a revolutionary who is interested in the act of creation. Bin Laden is no Ayatollah Khomeini rebuilding Muslim society. Despite rhetorical flourishes, there is no evident al-Qa'ida drive to create a caliphate or a fundamentalist Islamic state in the Middle East. Rather, the al-Qa'ida leader's whole drive, his passion, is to destroy the West. It is, of course, easy to shrug off the implications of a cultural analysis of Osama bin Laden. After all, the principal challenge posed by al-Qa'ida is practical: we have to find its

leaders and kill or capture them, and for these tasks we need intelligence agents and military forces. Yet we underestimate the cultural phenomenon of al-Qa'ida at our peril. The very fact that we have witnessed the rise of virulent anti-Americanism in non-American Western societies such as Australia relates directly to Osama bin Laden's challenge to the West.

Consider bin Laden's use of imagery—the Twin Towers imagery, the vision of the pillars. One of his accusations is: What do you believe in the West, you who are soldiers without courage, who leave the moment one of your company is killed? What are the real Twin Towers of Western culture? In Ancient Greece the central sacred site was Delphi. Apollo's temple at Delphi had two injunctions carved over the doorway. The first injunction was 'Know thyself' and the second was 'Nothing too much, no excess'. These two instructions, these twin pillars, are warnings to Western culture from antiquity. Today the greatest weakness of the modern West is its excess. At its worst, our culture is based on greed and acquisition. The moment an individual feels anxious or empty, the moment he or she feels that life does not have meaning is the moment we are urged to consume, to eat, to purchase a new apartment, to build 220-storey skyscrapers rather than 110-storey skyscrapers. We are a culture that has contravened, and is increasingly contravening, the Delphic Oracle's two commands, 'Nothing in excess' and 'Know thyself'. These should be our real Twin Towers.

> … we underestimate the cultural phenomenon of al-Qa'ida at our peril.

If you think that this line of thought is fanciful and exaggerated, let me remind you of a 1999 American film, *Fight Club*, which many of you would have seen. *Fight Club* is, if nothing else, a brilliant and prescient film in that it ends up with American skyscrapers being blown up by young disaffected radicals, and in particular the skyscrapers that house financial institutions. In terms of 11 September 2001, *Fight Club* is a prophetic film that foreshadowed what was going to occur on that fateful day. The first half-hour of the film is a biting satire of modern Western city life and represents a very dark reading of the absurdity of a life that values skyscrapers and material comfort over the quest for inner meaning. The central character, Jack, is employed by a car insurance company, trying to work out the statistics of faulty motor cars. He has no interest in his job whatsoever and he exists in a highly charged, anxious state whereby he cannot sleep. As a result, he spends his whole existence either half-asleep or half-awake.

This semi-comatose, half-sleepwalking condition is a metaphor for a complete lack of engagement with life at any level. Nothing gives Jack true pleasure. His one pride is his apartment, which he furnishes out of the IKEA catalogue. In fact, he spends most of his spare moments flicking through IKEA catalogues. The refrigerator, meanwhile, is full of condiment jars but there is no food in it. The only time Jack finds any emotional release, any real engagement with anything, is when he goes to therapy groups at night, especially a therapy group for men with testicular cancer—and he does not have testicular cancer. It is another metaphor, of course, this time for an emasculated culture—a culture that no longer believes in anything serious, a culture of images, materialism and trivia. In this way the film reflects the essence of bin Laden's charge against the West.

Fight Club poses the question: 'If the most pleasure one can get is by embracing other men who are castrated, then how can one escape such a fate?'. The dilemma is not a new one. It was investigated a century ago by Joseph Conrad in his brilliant *Heart of Darkness* and in Francis Ford Coppola's Vietnam film *Apocalypse Now* (which is based on Conrad's *Heart of Darkness* novella). If one wants to understand the cultural crisis of the modern West, then the starting point is Joseph Conrad. All that *Fight Club* does is update *Heart of Darkness* and relocate it in the urban jungle of New York. In the film, the Kurtz figure, a great charismatic leader, arrives as a new saviour for those who live without meaning. In *Fight Club* the new leader creates clubs composed of men who fight at night beating each other to a pulp. According to the film, it is the act of fighting that makes men's blood move, validates their masculinity and tests their strength.

> In terms of 11 September 2001, *Fight Club* is a prophetic film that foreshadowed what was going to occur on that fateful day.

The problem is that the fight club leader does not believe in anything beyond fighting. He is a nihilist. Ultimately, all of the people who join his fight clubs turn into fascists. For when you do not believe in anything, in the end your only pleasure will lie in the act of destruction. *Fight Club* is an eerie foreshadowing of tragic reality, in that the protagonists end up destroying American skyscrapers. While the charismatic leader in the film is not an Arab with fundamentalist Muslim beliefs, he is similar in character and outlook to Osama bin Laden. *Fight Club*'s subtext is that, if you have been born into a world that teaches you that the IKEA apartment is 'as good as it gets', if you are fearful that your life has no meaning and the only consolation is a refrigerator full of condiment jars, then disillusionment quickly follows. If you grow up with such feelings, then you will feel betrayed by your elders, those who should have initiated you into a culture with deeper meaning.

If you feel betrayed, you will inevitably act out of self-hatred with hostility against the leading symbols and authorities in your own culture. We saw this self-hatred in the 1960s, with student protests against presidents, prime ministers, university vice-chancellors and a whole range of authority figures—to the ludicrous degree that Chairman Mao Tse Tung became a great hero to many Western students. We now know that Chairman Mao was one of the most brutal tyrants of the 20th century. He who is fighting against your culture becomes a hero only once members of that culture start to indulge in self-hatred. A major dynamic in current anti-Americanism in countries such as Australia, France and Germany is precisely a form of cultural self-hatred that is projected on to America simply because the United States happens to be the centre of Western power. When people complain about the vulgarity of American tourists or America's clumsiness in foreign relations, it is usually a mask for resentment against a culture that has failed.

As *Fight Club* and before it *Heart of Darkness* imply, we in the West have become very bad at confronting the great questions of life. Consider the symbolism of the huge hole in New York where the Twin Towers used to be. The frenzy, the almost demented speed, with which the Americans decided to clean up the hole was extraordinary. Some 100 000 dump trucks of rubbish were used to remove rubble from the Twin Towers site. Moreover, every fragment of rubble was supposed to be DNA-tested like something out of a bizarre Grimm's fairytale. Over three thousand people are dead and yet we do not know how to mourn. The site of the Twin Towers has become not a shrine to the dead but a place of great unease and discontent. The ridiculous range of architectural designs that were put forward to replace the Twin Towers were a symptom of paralysis about how we now handle the reality of death and tragedy in a world where the IKEA apartment culture dominates popular consciousness.

Bin Laden's terrorist challenge asks deep questions about the character of Western culture. The great threat to the West that has come out of the al-Qa'ida attacks of 11 September 2001 is fear of paralysis. One of the American motives behind the campaign in Iraq may have been a cultural and psychological need to prove that we are still powerful and that we are not figuratively a society suffering from a collective syndrome of testicular cancer as in *Fight Club*.

> Bin Laden's terrorist challenge asks deep questions about the character of Western culture.

In the West, we have become dependent on the wrong kind of knowledge. Technical knowledge has helped us to build our skyscrapers and to create the extraordinary military arsenals that are being deployed in Iraq. Scientific and technological knowledge has created the splendours of our civilisation. Yet this is the wrong kind of knowledge for probing the questions about the meaning of life and death, and for giving us an understanding of the discontent of political Islam. We must return to self-knowledge and draw our strength from the true Twin Towers of Western culture, the Delphic injunctions of 'Know thyself' and 'Nothing in excess'. Only when we have regained such knowledge will we be properly armed to fight Osama bin Laden and the new phenomenon of mega-terrorism.

THE AUTHOR

John Carroll is Professor of Sociology at La Trobe University in Melbourne and author of *Terror: A Meditation on the Meaning of September 11*. He has degrees in mathematics, economics and sociology from the universities of Melbourne and Cambridge. Prof. Carroll is the author of numerous books, essays and articles, and delivered one of the Alfred Deakin lectures in 2001. His work focuses on modern Western society and, in particular, on the forces of social integration and disintegration.

THE ESSENTIAL DEBATE

COMBINED ARMS AND THE CLOSE BATTLE IN COMPLEX TERRAIN

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DAVID KILCULLEN

This article reflects a vibrant and ongoing professional debate within the Army's combat arms, particularly the infantry corps, about appropriate tactics for the close battle in complex terrain. In particular, this essay's content updates and expands material in a previous article entitled, 'Rethinking The Basis of Infantry Close Combat', published in the June 2003 issue of the *Australian Army Journal*, which suggested that we should attempt to refine our tactical thinking about dismounted close combat.[1] That article proposed an approach to combined arms warfare based on point suppression by semi-autonomous, small teams, rather than linear manoeuvre by large formations. Since the June 2003 essay appeared, there has been significant discussion within the infantry and other combat arms on combined arms tactics. The purpose of the present article is to outline the recent evolution of the Australian Army's tactical debate and to identify its possible implications for the future development of the land force.

CLOSE COMBAT AND POINT SUPPRESSION TACTICS

Before describing the latest tactical thinking in the Army, it is worth summarising the author's original article, which argued that our doctrinal tactics are slow, costly, and often unsuccessful when applied to close combat in complex terrain. Our

current doctrine suggests the application of fire in order to support movement. Hence, we have developed the notion of 'fire support' for manoeuvre in order to enable victory in battle. In short, we fire in order to support manoeuvre, then we manoeuvre in order to win. In practice, however, infantry using such tactics in complex terrain (such as villages, towns, and mountainous or heavily forested areas) tend to lack firepower within the assigned 'fire support group'. This inadequacy of organic firepower often compels an attacking infantry force into a series of time-consuming, limited assaults that may be costly in terms of casualties, collateral damage and fighting power. Traditional tactics continue to apply linear concepts, such as axes of advance, limits of exploitation and lines of departure.

In complex terrain, however, points rather than lines seem to be more important factors in the calculus of combat. For example, troops engaged in close combat seldom advance in neat linear movements, or in set formations along pre-planned lines of exploitation. Instead, as operational experience and training simulation demonstrate, troops move from point to point, establishing a series of positions from which they can observe, suppress and attack the enemy by delivering fire. Soldiers in close combat engagements tend to move using covered approaches that are often non-linear in character while fighting in a cycle of 'observe–suppress–move–clear–observe'. In the close fight, soldiers tend to operate in small, semi-autonomous teams that 'flock' or 'swarm', rather than move forward in large linear-based groups. Because of the reality of close combat, it probably makes more sense to consider terrain in terms of representing a network of points and nodes, rather than as a sequence of lines. Under a point or nodal model of attack, *manoeuvre supports fire*. In other words, troops manoeuvre in order to generate effective fire, and then apply this fire in order to neutralise the enemy and achieve victory.

In traditional doctrinal tactics, it is normal to regard the reserve force as a body of troops held under the commander's immediate control and committed when required to consolidate military success. However, the development of high-fidelity simulation through the use of the individual weapons effects simulation system (IWESS), combined with recent operational experience, now provides us with a body of empirical evidence that may help to change the way in which we view the role of the reserve. Evidence from both IWESS and recent operations tends to confirm what most combat-experienced leaders have been warning about for many years, namely that the act of committing more troops seldom guarantees tactical success in complex terrain. On the contrary, the use of greater numbers of infantry in an assault often simply means that the attacking force will suffer higher casualties.

> In the close fight, soldiers tend to operate in small, semi-autonomous teams that 'flock' or 'swarm' …

While reserve forces remain critically important, their use in conditions of complex terrain requires generating *reserves of fire* rather than of mass. Committing a reserve to the battle may mean manoeuvring by delivering greater direct or indirect fires, or moving troops into attack-by-fire positions that surprise an enemy.

Using such methods, forces engaged in close combat aim first to 'win the fire-fight', and only then do they concentrate attention on manoeuvre. Volume of fire is applied to try to suppress the enemy, weaken his morale and inflict casualties. It is only when the enemy has been 'softened' in this way, and 'fire superiority' achieved, that the attacking commander begins to move forward aggressively in order to clear enemy positions and consolidate, through manoeuvre, a victory already won by the use of firepower. The troops employed in the manoeuvre stage may be quite small—perhaps only a quarter of the overall force—while the forces engaged in winning the firefight may be much larger in numbers. Moreover, the assault group may consist of pioneers or assault engineers, rather than riflemen.

There is nothing new or original about the above tactical approach, which has been commonplace in various land forces—notably the German Army—for many years. Such tactics demonstrate that 'classical' fire and manoeuvre methods tend to be rarely employed in complex terrain where movement is slow, ammunition consumption is heavy, and non-linear 'infiltration tactics' are essential. Yet, historically, such a non-linear fire-manoeuvre approach has not been emphasised in Australian tactical doctrine.

THE INFANTRY COMPANY IN THE URBAN ATTACK

After reading the author's initial article in the June 2003 *AAJ*, some Australian commanders asked for a more detailed example of the 'point suppression' methodology. Consider an infantry company, supported by mortars, direct fire support weapons and reconnaissance assets, attacking an enemy platoon in a village. Such a scenario is useful to consider, both as a hypothetical worst tactical case and as a baseline for determining the requirements for effective combined-arms teams. The stages of such an attack might unfold in the following ways.

The first stage would involve *investment*. In this sequence, reconnaissance elements, patrols, snipers and mobile blocking forces would seek to 'invest' (or cordon off at distance) the enemy position inside the village. The aim would be to conduct observation over the perimeter of the area, secure its approaches, and dominate points of entry and exit from the village. The cordon is not constituted as a continuous line surrounding the objective, but should be viewed as a series of points that dominate specific features. This approach permits the attacker to deny the enemy any reinforcements and to cut off the possibility of withdrawal. Such methods also allow the attacking force to identify non-combatants and to be in a

position to receive early warning of any attempted enemy countermoves. Investment may include electronic warfare, the use of aviation or airborne fire support, satellites, fixed-wing aircraft and the employment of Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).

The next stage in the attack is the *break-in*. In this sequence, attack from mortars, machine-guns, heavy direct-fire support weapons and snipers is delivered against a key break-in sector. The aim of the attacker is to neutralise a selected tactical point, allowing assaulting forces to break into the village. In this stage, deceiving the enemy with respect to the whereabouts of the actual break-in point is a key objective. Smoke and dust, electronic attack, bad weather or darkness, and deliberate deception measures can be exploited in order to allow the attacking force to gain entry into the village and to occupy a series of points from which the assault can commence in earnest.

Following the break-in, the attacking force conducts *infiltration* in order to suppress enemy positions. The attackers ideally move on a broad front using small, semi-autonomous teams that exploit covered approaches, probing forward until the enemy is detected. Simultaneously, the investing elements provide radio commentary on enemy movement and on the evolving tactical situation. As the assault teams come into contact with enemy forces, they seek consolidation in covered positions such as houses or other buildings from which they can observe the adversary and use fires to suppress his activity. The assault force progressively feels its way forward until the enemy's main positions have been located in what is, in effect, a 'reconnaissance in force'. Such an action is extremely difficult in complex terrain, and airborne observers, intelligence sources, thermal sensors or electronic warfare elements can be valuable in this process.

The use of infiltration has the effect of creating a non-linear deployment at the forward edge of the battle, with the attacking force forming a series of points from which the enemy can be observed and suppressed. On a standard map, such a deployment may resemble a 'high-tide mark', but on the ground it is not a continuous front; rather, it is a series of mutually supporting strong points. These strong points have the potential to communicate with each other, to suppress enemy positions, and to provide cooperative self-defence. By this stage in the battle, the attacking force is likely to have assumed suppression positions, with perhaps 50 per cent of its strength engaged in combat. In our company attack scenario, this situation might mean that there are two platoons and the headquarters engaged in contact, with another platoon uncommitted and assault groups standing by for orders to commit to battle.

The next, critical, stage is *winning the firefight*. This stage will be the most time consuming, and is likely to absorb large amounts of ammunition. The infantry company seeks to *attack by fire* all key enemy positions, applying direct-fire weapons and mortars, using observation from investing forces and employing its own lead

elements in order to react to any enemy countermoves. However, enemy positions cannot be destroyed unless they can be targeted. As a result, sensor and reconnaissance technologies and deception measures become critical in 'unmasking' hidden positions so that they can be destroyed. Assault teams may now conduct limited and local manoeuvre in order to generate more effective fire against enemy positions. While ammunition resupply is important in supporting the close fight, the infantry company—by consciously adopting a point suppression approach—ensures that its leading platoons carry large ammunition loads. In a linear assault, such extra ammunition loads would hamper an attack and would be likely to require classical 'fire and movement' techniques. However, in the point attack scenario being outlined, the assault platoons infiltrate to first contact with the enemy and then apply fire from relatively static positions. Each suppressive element conserves an ammunition 'assault reserve', which it retains for use later in the action.

As the *suppression battle* continues, the enemy will become progressively incapable of dealing with the flow of the attack, or of manoeuvreing and applying counter-fire. If concealed enemy positions do open fire, their locations can be quickly identified and then suppressed by the attacking force's fire superiority. When the attacking commander judges that the enemy has been comprehensively suppressed and is about to 'crack', he then commits the *assault team*. The latter may comprise between twelve and sixteen assault troops equipped with grenades, breaching charges, flame weapons, CS gas and white phosphorous grenades. Assault troops may also include pioneers, engineers and infantry, but should always seek to operate as a combined arms team. The assault group must be committed under the heaviest possible weight of supporting fires, with the company 'shooting in' the assault team.

Company elements unable to support the assault directly should concentrate on neutralising enemy in-depth positions in order to prevent any of the latter from engaging the attackers. Offensive support also provides smoke and suppressive fire in order to isolate each successive position as it is engaged by the assault troops. Offensive support elements can occupy enemy positions once the latter are secured, thus relieving the assault troops of mounting defensive tasks. The company should constitute at least two 'mirror teams' of assault troops capable of rotation in action.

Throughout the assault, the commander monitors progress and decides when to order *exploitation*. An exploitation force may be drawn from another platoon, or from suppressive elements of the company. The commander may seek to commit his exploitation force in depth so that it is able to reinforce the cascading collapse of the enemy's positions under the impact of the assault force. At this point, tactical coordination becomes critical because the intention should be to use the exploitation and assault forces as mutually reinforcing elements in order to ensure the

enemy's collapse. There is, however, always a risk that the exploitation force may become overextended, resulting in a danger of fratricide among the attacking troops. Investment forces (including air observers) that employ combat identification techniques and radio communications become essential in these conditions. The commander should order a *reorganisation* when he judges that his attacking force is becoming spent and ammunition is running low, or when he is confident that the enemy has been destroyed. In a larger battle, the commander may also call a reorganisation in order to allow another combat team to conduct a forward passage of lines to continue the fight.

In summary, the tactical approach outlined above uses infiltration and offensive support in order to move small groups along multiple non-linear routes to a series of points from which the enemy can be attacked. The attacking force then uses point suppression and attack by fire in order to win the fight before committing a small assault group followed by a larger exploitation force. Following a reorganisation, the entire force then consolidates its new positions. This tactical description is, of course, oversimplified, largely because it describes a hypothetical assault involving primarily infantry rather than combined arms teams. Such an assault represents a worst-case scenario and serves as a baseline for developing combined arms manoeuvre.

INSIGHTS FROM THE 2003 AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY CORPS CONFERENCE

The idea of using point suppression tactics was analysed in detail at the 2003 Australian Infantry Corps Conference and generated considerable debate. The conference brought together present and past members of the Australian infantry, including Special Forces personnel and retired officers. Nearly every participant at the conference possessed operational experience and many had recent combat experience.

One important observation came from veterans who had experienced close combat in Vietnam during the 1960s. In his June 2003 article, the author speculated that the Australian Army might have adopted a linear approach to tactics partly because of a tradition of jungle warfare, which favours linear formations and allows a force to 'shake out' into extended line while concealed by tree cover. Yet the infantry elders at the corps conference disagreed with this assessment. Several Vietnam veterans recalled jungle firefights in South-East Asia in which the whole force immediately 'went to ground' in a tight group. One veteran recalled this process as forming a 'blob'—a useful way of describing a non-linear formation. A number of veterans outlined situations in which the application of fire suppression occurred without significant manoeuvre until the enemy's resistance appeared to crack. Only at the point of the enemy's wavering, and often only after calling for armoured and engineering support, would Australian assault troops seek to under-

take manoeuvre. Other veterans outlined the process of fighting in built-up areas with small teams that advanced on narrow frontages, employing every available fire suppression asset as they probed forward. A close reading of the Army's 1988 Training Information Bulletin no. 69, *Infantry Battalion Lessons from Vietnam*, hints at some of these ideas—which are similar to those described in the point suppression model—but for reasons that remain unclear, Australian tactics since Vietnam have not emphasised such an approach.[2]

Several other useful insights came from officers and non-commissioned officers with operational experience in East Timor and Afghanistan. These veterans helped to clarify thinking at the conference about the meaning of 'complex terrain'. They argued that complex terrain should be regarded as 'any terrain where you cannot see as far as you can shoot'. Such a definition would include theoretically 'open' terrain such as mountains; low, sparse scrub; coastal areas; or sand dune country. This type of topography might appear open from the air, but with restricted lines of sight and fields of vision, it is effectively 'complex terrain' to the ground soldier. Moreover, such terrain would be complex for a force without air assets, yet be open for a force with UAVs or helicopters. In other words, terrain itself is not inherently 'complex'. Rather, complexity should be seen as a relative term that depends on what reconnaissance assets a force can apply in the field. The distinguishing feature of complex terrain is, therefore, what might be called a *detection threshold*—that is, the point at which a ground force, depending on its reconnaissance assets, is likely to detect the presence of an enemy force.

Another idea that became prevalent at the infantry corps conference was the notion of a *disaggregated battlespace*. The latter is the type of battlespace that is common in complex terrain. In such terrain, even large engagements between major forces tend to dissolve into a series of 'mini-battles' between small groups in restricted areas of open space, such as streets, tunnels, courtyards and rooms in houses. If a thousand troops attack a hundred in complex terrain, what ensues is not one large, single battle, but several dozen individual duels and small-group engagements fought over a dispersed area. One only has to recall the description of the 1993 American–Somali Mogadishu battle in Mark Bowden's study, *Black Hawk Down*—and the images conveyed in Ridley Scott's later film of that book—to realise that a restricted environment demands small-team skill and individual capability rather than large-unit sophistication. The urban maze of Mogadishu is, in effect,

> … no sensible commander would commit forces to battle without first organising available troops into a balanced combined-arms team.

exactly the kind of environment that we can expect to confront in close combat in complex terrain. In such conditions, semi-autonomous teams fighting mini-battles in a disaggregated battlespace would effectively become *miniature battlegroups*.

A point made strongly by readers of the author's original article in the June 2003 *AAJ* was the critical importance of adopting a combined arms organisation in close combat. Such an approach is critical, and no sensible commander would commit forces to battle without first organising available troops into a balanced combined-arms team. It is important, however, to emphasise that what a combined arms team represents is a tailored, mission-specific, agile task-grouping that can rapidly reorganise to deal with a changing situation and exploit fleeting tactical opportunities. A modern army fighting in complex terrain will usually incorporate tanks, dismounted infantry, mechanised infantry, engineers, artillery, reconnaissance and aviation. However, these traditional military assets may be task-organised at a much lower level than contemplated in current Australian doctrine. The combined arms team is also likely to include more novel elements such as electronic warfare, human intelligence assets, civil–military operations teams, deployable logistics and networked communications. These are 'non-traditional' assets in the sense that they have usually been held at the higher-force level, rather than be allocated to fulfilling the task of small-team manoeuvre. Yet modern armies are increasingly realising that, for military effectiveness, these very assets must be present at the small-group level as well as at the higher-force level.

Close combat in complex terrain requires small, networked, mutually supporting semi-autonomous teams. As a result, the principles of battle grouping and task organisation to create combined arms teams need to be applied at a much lower tactical level in the future. Frequently, we have battle grouped at battalion–regiment and company–squadron levels. Yet in a disaggregated battlespace, such high-level battle grouping is of little assistance in maximising combat power. Irrespective of how comprehensive a battalion commander's situational awareness may be, or how effective his supporting assets are, if these advantages cannot be brought to bear at the critical time and place, they cannot be considered to be combat multipliers. In the complex conflict environment outlined in this article, the critical time may be little more than a fleeting opportunity while the critical place may be a 'mini-battle' that occurs at the fire team or section level. These new combat conditions mean that we must begin to consider battle-grouping troops at a much lower tactical level, possibly at intra-platoon or even intra-section level.

> Close combat in complex terrain requires small, networked, mutually supporting semi-autonomous teams.

COMBINED ARMS LESSONS FROM RECENT OPERATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The clear need for small-team, combined-arms battlegroups for operations in a complex disaggregated battlespace has been one of the main lessons to emerge from recent operations in the Middle East. These operations include the 2002 Israeli experience in Jenin in the ongoing conflict with the Palestinians, and the British Army's experience in Basra during the 2003 Iraq War. The lessons revealed in Israeli and British military operations provide further evidence for the point suppression approach to tactics for the close battle.

THE ISRAELI EXPERIENCE: THE BATTLE OF JENIN

In April 2002, the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) attacked the Jenin refugee camp as part of an incursion into the Palestinian Territories. Initially, the Israeli operational approach was tentative, with the IDF issuing warnings to non-combatant inhabitants to evacuate the camp. The IDF's use of warnings effectively telegraphed their intentions to Palestinian fighters and eliminated any surprise during the tactical break-in phase. Despite this drawback, Jenin was effectively invested by the IDF and the Israeli break-in was ultimately successful, although costly in terms of casualties. The Israelis deployed snipers, Special Forces, infantry, and attack helicopters, using *ad hoc* groupings of force elements at about platoon size. There was no artillery or fixed-wing offensive support but tanks were committed late in the operation when Israeli infantry began to suffer significant casualties from lack of armoured protection. Once deployed, Israeli tanks were used as a mobile base of fire, equipped with machine-guns and sensors rather than their main armament.

> … we must begin to consider battle-grouping troops at a much lower tactical level, possibly at intra-platoon or even intra-section level.

The IDF's tactical approach changed on 9 April 2002, when thirteen Israeli soldiers were killed in an ambush. The number of casualties convinced the Israeli commanders to apply much greater force. That same evening, the IDF began using D9 armoured bulldozers that were impervious to small-arms fire and explosives. The bulldozers pioneered assault routes for other armoured vehicles and destroyed buildings from which hostile fire had been directed at the Israeli ground troops.[3] Eventually, the IDF used a combination of armoured bulldozers, tanks, and attack helicopters to reduce the remaining strongpoints in the centre of Jenin.[4]

The Jenin battle showed the adaptability of the IDF in being able to change its tactics in the middle of the operation. After initially employing unsupported infantry that manoeuvred through an urban maze and suffered casualties, the Israeli military assembled combined arms teams, which, although larger than the teams that have been considered in this article, worked relatively autonomously. These combined arms teams centred on the D9 bulldozer, which was used in the role of an assault detachment, with infantry and tanks providing suppression and support. While the battle of Jenin was inconclusive in terms of the overall Israeli campaign, the action represented a tactical success for the IDF.

THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE IN IRAQ: THE BATTLE OF BASRA

In April 2003, British forces attacked the southern Iraqi city of Basra as part of the US-led Coalition advance into Iraq. The original operational plan did not envisage the occupation of Basra, and as a result, the city was never fully invested by invading Coalition forces. The British Army initially broke into the urban area by securing the town of As Zubayr and the airport on the city outskirts. As British forces penetrated the city, they relied on suppression from organic direct-fire weapons, aviation support and precision air weapons rather than blanket indirect fires. British troops operated in small groups, with armoured vehicles grouped down to platoon and sometimes section level. Special Forces worked closely with intelligence personnel to generate situational awareness, although most units still needed to 'fight for information'. British artillery pieces never entered Basra, although mortars were employed.

Once enemy Iraqi centres of resistance were identified and suppressed, British forces attacked from three directions, neutralising the Ba'ath party headquarters and then beginning a transition towards security operations.[5]

Participants in the battle for Basra have highlighted the small-team approach adopted by the British Army. A battalion headquarters became a 'clearing house' for fires, support and information, while the fight itself was largely a company and platoon commander's battle. A typical British Army section organisation included two dismounted fire teams, each consisting of four men; a Warrior Infantry Fighting Vehicle, possibly a tank; and some indirect-fire observers and engineers. Within the infantry fire teams, the weapons mix favoured an 'attack by fire' tactical approach. In at least one battalion, dismounted fire teams included no riflemen. Rather, the fire teams consisted of a gunner with a 7.62 mm MAG 58 General Purpose Machine-

> … the close battle in complex terrain is a decentralised phenomenon: a subaltern's war that is built around small, mobile teams that need all-arms representation …

gun, two Minimi gunners with 5.56 mm Light Support Weapons, and one grenadier with a 40 mm grenade launcher. During the fighting, the British made extensive use of snipers armed with 7.62 mm and .50-calibre weapons.

The British tactical approach at Basra proved extremely expensive in ammunition, and the Warrior fighting vehicle was used as a mobile ammunition resupply point. However, the invulnerability of both the Warrior and the Challenger tank to portable anti-armour weapons proved to be a critical factor in British military success.[6] The battle at Basra was one of the most successful actions of the entire Coalition campaign in Iraq. The operation resulted in the successful capture of Basra against signifi-cant opposition, but with minimal loss of life and limited damage to the infrastructure of the city. The success of British tactics reportedly influenced the American military's approach to the subsequent battle for Baghdad.[7]

The above examples from recent Israeli and British military operations demonstrate that several armies have adopted a combined arms organisation for close combat in complex terrain. The Israeli and British methods resemble the techniques proposed earlier in this article—that is, non-linear infil-tration by small, semi-autonomous combined-arms teams, moving from point to point, applying firepower to win the suppression battle. The success of this tactical approach in contemporary military operations suggests that it is worth considering within the Australian Army and the ADF.

> The infantry battalion needs to become an organisation geared to providing task-organised groups for dismounted close combat as part of a combined-arms team.

FUTURE COMBINED−ARMS TACTICS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY

The central implication that stems from the analysis advanced in this article is that the Australian Army force elements must operate as combined arms teams. While such a conclusion may be self-evident, there are organisational and doctrinal features that require close attention. The Army should expect combined arms teams to be smaller in future, leading to increased reliance on the initiative, professional judgment and tech-nical skill of our junior commanders. The Army should also expect smaller combined-arms teams to include a mixture of traditional and non-traditional elements—not simply combat-arms elements, but also specialist detachments that may be joint service or inter-agency in composition. A key requirement in our doctrine will be the need to train and rehearse as we intend to fight: in small, semi-autonomous combined-arms teams.

Another implication that arises from this article is that the infantry achieve the best results when operating within a balanced combined-arms team. While most Australian infantry specialists would agree theoretically with this statement, in practice there has been a tendency in Australia to view the infantry battalion itself as a miniature combined-arms team. The infantry battalion is often considered as an organisation that incorporates offensive support, reconnaissance, engineering, signals and intelligence elements as well as dismounted combat specialists. As a result, there is an assumption that an Australian infantry battalion can fight on its own, or if grouped alongside other arms, the battalion will be the lead partner, providing a framework for the other arms. Yet, as we have seen, the close battle in complex terrain is a decentralised phenomenon: a subaltern's war that is built around small, mobile teams that need all-arms representation at platoon or even section level.

The infantry's unique contribution in this tactical situation is its capability for dismounted close combat and its flexibility in dealing with complex situations on the ground. In reality, modern infantry are dismounted combat specialists that operate within a combined arms team. As a consequence, we should consider structuring the Australian infantry battalion to reflect this new reality. The infantry battalion needs to become an organisation geared to providing task-organised groups for dismounted close combat as part of a combined-arms team.

A related implication is that the tactics being employed by other armies—such as the American, Israeli and British armies— are beyond the Australian land force's current combat capability. Despite the

> Without appropriate armoured protection, the Army cannot hope to function effectively in complex terrain where lethal weapons proliferate.

capability improvements generated by the 2000 Defence Capability Plan, the Army currently lacks many of the critical elements for an effective combined-arms team. Projects Land 17/18, Land 125 and Land 40 will deliver enhanced artillery and give the infantry individualised communications, sensors, optimised combat equipment and enhanced organic firepower. In addition, other projects will provide protected mobility for deployed infantry. Such assets represent a step in the right direction.

The Australian Army nevertheless continues to face the problems of combat weight and protection. Our current tank, the Leopard I, cannot survive against any opponent armed with cheap and portable antitank weapons. Without appropriate armoured protection, the Army cannot hope to function effectively in complex terrain where lethal weapons proliferate. In this respect, our current Australian light armoured vehicles (ASLAVs) and personnel carriers are highly vulnerable in combat

operations in complex terrain. These vehicles rely on speed, good sensors and, in the case of the ASLAV, weapons systems that detect and destroy the enemy at stand-off range. Unlike tanks, however, such light armoured vehicles cannot loiter in a street, storm a bunker, or survive short-range hits from anti-armour weapons. Ultimately, it is only the modern, well-armoured tank that can act as a mobile point-suppression device, and be brought to bear at the right time and place to operate simultaneously in both fire suppression and assault roles.

Besides new tanks, the Army requires a genuine assault engineer capability. Assault engineers, including armoured engineers and dismounted assault specialists, provide a potent spearhead for assault breaching, combat demolitions, and mounted mobility in urban operations. Assault engineers of this type are reminiscent of the Viet Cong 'sappers' of the 1960s, or the German glider-borne engineers who captured the fortress of Eben Emael in 1940. Armoured bulldozers may also be critical in future urban operations, but again, this is a capability that we currently lack within the Australian Army.

There are also organisational questions that must be resolved. In order to be effective in complex warfighting, we need

> … the four-man fire team may become the true building block for the close fight in the first quarter of the 21st century.

to task-organise at the intra-section and intra-platoon levels. Such an organisational shift may demand the creation of more modular structures that can be 'sliced and diced' in different ways in order to enable rapid and flexible regrouping of forces for any given mission. A related issue is that the section organisation of ten men may no longer be capable of forming the basic building block for close combat. Given the development of enhanced weapons systems and sensor technology, and the need to operate in small, flexible groups, the four-man fire team may become the true building block for the close fight in the first quarter of the 21st century.

As the Israelis found in Jenin, the need for unit cohesion is the Achilles heel of the small fire team. When troops have not trained together, or are unused to rapid reorganisation, battle grouping at too low a tactical level may simply damage unit cohesion and general morale. For these reasons, there needs to be a focus on ensuring habitual training relationships, while tactical education—the ability to apply judgment creatively, in situations where no doctrinal approach is apparent—will become essential.

Devolved situational awareness—that is, the ability for junior commanders to access the situational awareness that they need to conduct the fight—is also increasingly important. Such awareness involves equipping soldiers with personal communications, providing capable sensors at section and individual level, and

devising effective combat identification in order to prevent fratricide. A culture based on allowing junior commanders to act on 'decision superiority' must be fostered. While using information from a common situational awareness picture, higher commanders must trust subordinates to run their own battles without micro-management.

Another important factor that must receive consideration by the Army is devolved firepower. Section and fire team battles and individual duels are the main focus of close combat in complex terrain. Hence, good firepower at support company or brigade level is of little assistance since it cannot be brought to bear at the critical point. This reality does not mean that we do not need such higher-level firepower for combat in open terrain and in the manoeuvre tactics that set the conditions for close battle. However, in the close battle itself, we must devolve effective firepower through such techniques as regrouping, the use of observer teams, reachback methods, or through the employment of more capable individual weapons at the small-team level.

A final observation concerns the way in which we teach tactics to commanders. Combat training centres, such as the Combined Arms Battle Wing, are of critical importance because such institutions use high-fidelity simulation in combat exercises in complex environments. In the future, Tactical Exercises Without Troops need to emphasise the realities of complex terrain, the requirement for firepower, and the advantages of small-group initiative. These exercises are for all members of the Army, and must be conducted with less emphasis on assessment and more concentration on developing good judgment in ambiguous situations where doctrinal tactics do not easily apply.

CONCLUSION

The Australian Army's tactical debate is ongoing and is far from resolved. From the 1940s until the 1960s, jungle warfare was the prime challenge that the Australian Army painstakingly mastered in order to become one of the foremost jungle-fighting armies in the world. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Army became primarily a light infantry force designed for continental defence involving dispersed operations against a low-level enemy in northern Australia. In the first decade of the 21st century, we need to focus intellectual and professional military effort on mastering combined arms operations in urbanised and complex terrain. As this article has sought to demonstrate, a variety of ideas and operational experiences are circulating throughout the land force for refinement into current tactical and force development thought. The whole of the Army owns the debate over tactics; this debate should be seen as an ongoing journey rather than as a final destination. It is a journey that lies at the heart of our professional existence as warfighters, and it is not too late to contribute to the process of developing new tactical thought.

ENDNOTES

1   Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen, 'Rethinking The Basis of Infantry Close Combat', *Australian Army Journal*, vol. 1, no. 1, June 2003, pp. 29–40.

2   Australian Army, *Infantry Battalion Lessons from Vietnam 1965–71*, Training Information Bulletin no. 69, Headquarters, Training Command, Sydney, 1988. This bulletin was drawn up in the early 1970s by the Directorate of Infantry but was only formally published sixteen years later.

3   Yagil Henkin, 'Urban Warfare and the Lessons of Jenin', *Azure*, Summer 5763/2003.

4   See *Time* magazine reportage of the battle at <http://blackwaterusa.com/btw/articles/opjenin.html>.

5   United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, *Operations in Iraq: First Reflections,* DCCS Media, Ministry of Defence, London, July 2003, pp. 11 *et seq.*

6   This information is based on interviews with British Infantry commanders, unclassified portions of a report by an Australian Infantry Captain attached to a British mechanised unit during the Basra battle, and detailed input from the Centre for Army Lessons, Puckapunyal, Vic.

7   See J. Fitchett, 'British Influence U.S. with Tactics in Iraq', *International Herald Tribune*, 9 April 2003.

THE AUTHOR

Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen is a graduate of the Royal Military College, Duntroon, the Australian Command and Staff College and the Australian Defence Force School of Languages. He has served with the 6th Battalion and the 2nd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, commanded a Mobile Training Team with Indonesian Special Forces, and served as a tactics instructor at the British School of Infantry. His operational service include deployments with the United Nations Force in Cyprus; the Peace Monitoring Group in Bougainville; and as a member of the International Force in East Timor. Lieutenant Colonel Kilcullen holds a PhD from the University of New South Wales and is a Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society. He is currently posted to future Land Warfare Branch in Army Headquarters.

PREPARING FOR COMPLEXITY

THE CASE FOR AN EXPEDITIONARY TASK FORCE IN THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY OF 2020

LIEUTENANT COLONEL MICHAEL RYAN

The Army of the future will be characterised by the following qualities: extraordinary strategic agility, high-precision lethality and almost omniscient situational awareness. Our present C3 systems will have given way to sophisticated, yet robust, networks of sensors and shooters, seamlessly integrated throughout the battlespace.

Lieutenant General Peter Leahy, AO, Chief of Army[1]

Whatever labels we adopt to describe future conflict, the reality of war will be complex and will combine the characteristics of pre-industrial-, industrial- and information-age combat. In order to be able to prevail in land warfare, the Australian Army must seek to identify the factors that it is likely to confront in a modern battlespace—a battlespace increasingly defined by information networks, advanced munitions and lethal weapons systems. At the same time, the Army must be aware that potential adversaries will also be adapting to new technologies and new operating conditions.

This article proposes the creation of an Expeditionary Task Force (ETF) based on a combined arms organisation and designed to fight in multidimensional conflict. It is argued that a smaller taskforce organisation should replace the industrial-age infantry brigade system. In contemporary security conditions, the ADF requires offshore or expeditionary capabilities in order to be able to execute contemporary multidimensional manoeuvre warfare. Yet our current industrial-age organisations are not optimised to respond rapidly to meet threats. In order to be able to respond rapidly in the 21st century, the Australian Army requires a reformed organisational structure that meets the challenges of complex, information-age warfighting.

CONTOURS OF FUTURE CONFLICT

Despite the presence of highly advanced reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities and the use of networked, effects-based warfighting concepts, future conflict will not become a Nintendo-style activity. Rather, war is likely to remain a chaotic 'Mad Max' activity for, as Clausewitz reminds us, 'war is … an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will'.[2] Friction, chance and danger will almost certainly continue to be pervasive elements throughout the future battlespace. Victory in such conditions will go to the side that best exploits uncertainty and chaos, and achieves decision superiority over an adversary.

Technology is, however, a great enabler in war, and in the modern 21st-century battlespace, networked operations are becoming more significant. As Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, the American architect of network-centric warfare, has stated: 'the real fight is over sensors'.[3] Because the majority of contemporary weapons systems have a greater range than their supporting sensors, if a target can be located, it can almost certainly be attacked. The increased vulnerability to a 'sensor–shooter' equation has led military organisations to try to adopt measures to deny or degrade an adversary's sensor capability. In the future, rival forces are likely to compete in an effort to improve the effectiveness of their own sensors while neutralising those of their adversaries.

The future battlespace is likely to be non-linear, and both symmetric and asymmetric in character. In these conditions, older linear tactical concepts such as the Forward Edge of the Battle Area will no longer be applicable because land forces will use advanced communications and weapons systems to operate in dispersed depth.

> In contemporary security conditions, the ADF requires offshore or expeditionary capabilities in order to be able to execute contemporary multidimensional manoeuvre warfare.

The non-linear battlespace will also be characterised by simultaneous operational activity in the physical, temporal and cyber realms and will require the deployment of forces capable of delivering decisive effects.[4] Such operations are likely to require smaller force units capable of self-protection and logistical self-sustainment. In many respects, it is not mass that counts, but the ability to deliver an effect, and in this respect the smaller the force, the more agile it can become and the quicker it can strike across the battlespace.

LAND OPERATIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY

The Australian Army's keystone doctrine, *The Fundamentals of Land Warfare*, states that future operations will be based on defeating an enemy's will.[5] In this struggle, the contest over sensors will be a central element in the clash of wills and in achieving a 'knowledge edge' over an adversary. In addition, the land force must be able to operate concurrently across the spectrum of military conflict using an agile and adaptable organisation. The future land force must be capable of conducting warfighting, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and humanitarian relief, which may occur simultaneously. In most circumstances, the requirement for agility and versatility will be best achieved through the precise application of smaller, but highly trained and well-equipped forces. Conflict too has moved beyond state-versus-state contests. In the 21st century, we face merging forms of conflict—state, non-state, conventional and unconventional conflicts. Such conflicts will see armed forces confronted by highly complex missions in which modern high-technology may be used by militias, guerrillas and terrorists.

To retain agility in a chaotic battlespace, a land force must possess excellent tactical mobility. Forces must be capable of rapid dispersion or concentration in order to shape the battlespace and conduct joint precision fires utilising the air and sea assets that the ADF is projecting for the 2020 joint force.[6] The future land force must, above all, seek to conduct effects-based operations rather than take ground. The operational focus must be on disruption rather than destruction, employing secure communications that are fully integrated with the networked systems architecture of a joint-force command. Finally, the future land force must be protected and sustained on operations, particularly if entry points such as ports and airfields are unavailable.

> The future land force must, above all, seek to conduct effects-based operations rather than take ground.

TOWARDS A NEW WARFIGHTING ORGANIZATION: THE ETF

The Australian Army of 2003 is essentially an industrial-age army, with some information-age additions. The Army's current structure would still be recognisable to soldiers and officers of the World War II era. The battalion, brigade and division structures that continue to exist are products of what the American analyst, William S. Lind, has called 'second generation' warfare, where massed firepower and manoeuvre dominated.[7] In order for the Australian Army to compete in the chaos of the information-age battlespace—where pre-industrial, industrial and post-industrial conflict methods may converge—a new warfighting organisation is required.

Given the small size of the ADF, the future Australian land force must achieve a combat effect that is disproportionate to its size. The central warfighting organisation of today's Army—the brigade—must be transformed into a smaller but more lethal and precise instrument of combat: the ETF.

An ETF needs to be adopted as the principal warfighting organisation for the Australian Army by 2020. This new combat organisation would, over the next fifteen years, replace the light infantry and light mechanised brigades around which the Army

> An ETF needs to be adopted as the principal warfighting organisation for the Australian Army by 2020.

Figure 1: Organisation of the Expeditionary Task Force.

is currently structured. Such a taskforce formation would be smaller than a brigade, with approximately 2000 troops, but it would be structured and equipped to achieve combat effects greatly superior to the Army's current combat structures.

A proposed ETF would be designed in such a way that it could be employed across the spectrum of conflict in scenarios ranging from low- to mid-intensity conflict. The taskforce's organisation would be designed to be structurally flexible, and capable of being reorganised depending on the scale, intensity and duration of any given conflict.[8] In addition, the proposed taskforce would be able to operate independently or as part of a larger joint or combined force. Figure 1 depicts how such a force might be organised. The ETF is envisaged as possessing five components: a Headquarters, a Reconnaissance–Strike Group, a Close-combat Group, a Manoeuvre Support Group; and a Force Sustainment Group.

THE ETF HEADQUARTERS

For the effective command and control of a future ETF, it is proposed that its headquarters consist of four elements: the commander, the command-and-control component, and command-and-control support and sustainment elements respectively. The taskforce's command-and-control arrangement should seek the maximum integration of staff functions in order to avoid the conventional model that dominates existing staff systems. Successful integration would require only three headquarters branches: those of Operations, Plans and Intelligence.

The command-and-control support element would be responsible for the provision of operational support to the headquarters, including the provision of communications and security. The command-and-control sustainment element would, on the other hand, be responsible for such functions as transport, and miscellaneous administrative, medical and logistical requirements.

THE RECONNAISSANCE–STRIKE GROUP

The struggle for situational awareness would be a core activity of the taskforce. It would be the responsibility of a Reconnaissance–Strike Group consisting of four key elements: a ground-based, manned reconnaissance element (augmented with unmanned ground vehicles and sensors); an aerial reconnaissance element (augmented with unmanned aerial vehicles); an information operations element; and a fire support element. A reconnaissance–strike group would exploit two integral capabilities. First, a robust, timely, and accurate reconnaissance system to direct the taskforce commander to the adversary's dispositions in the field. The second capability would be the means to support the taskforce commander's plan through the coordination and provision of fires.

By 2020, it is likely that significant advances in reconnaissance and surveillance systems will allow a land force to achieve optimum situational awareness of the battlespace. In the future, the Reconnaissance–Strike Group will probably be capable of collecting information from a wide variety of automated assets, particularly unmanned ground and air vehicles and unattended ground sensors.

The Reconnaissance–Strike Group would not only seek out the adversary's vulnerabilities, but it should also be organised to capitalise on superior knowledge. The cycle of collection, analysis, dissemination and target attack is likely to become compressed in the future, and the group would require an integral capability to direct and undertake a range of precision strike and fire support missions. Such capabilities would support the taskforce in both the deep and close battles.

The Reconnaissance–Strike Group's integral ability to 'strike' would be based on armed reconnaissance and surveillance platforms—both manned and unmanned—as well as dedicated lethal fires, cyber and electronic attack assets. Both air and ground reconnaissance

> By 2020, it is likely that significant advances in reconnaissance and surveillance systems will allow a land force to achieve optimum situational awareness of the battlespace.

systems must, in future combat, possess the ability to conduct immediate strike operations. By integrating a range of strike capabilities within a single organisation, an ETF reconnaissance–strike group would establish a clear 'knowledge edge' over the adversary across the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war.

It might be important to enhance a future reconnaissance–strike group's conduct of precision strike and fire support missions by assigning a fire support element to the group. A fire support element would provide highly responsive indirect fires in order to ensure an efficient and rapid 'sensor-to-shooter' linkage. The provision of a specially layered system of fire support would help to shape the battle and assist in the conduct of close combat. Such layering of ETF fire support would best be achieved through the employment of a three-tier system. The first tier of fires would be based on a medium-range, mobile system capable of firing a range of ammunition to strike at both point and area targets. The focus of first-tier fires would be to support the conduct of the close battle. The second tier of fires would concentrate on long-range precision strike and on achieving area effects. A second tier might incorporate mobile rocket-propelled systems or long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicles armed with precision munitions. The focus of the second tier of fires would be to support the deep battle. Finally, a third tier of firepower would use

directed-energy weapons—lasers that may be able to achieve highly controlled, line-of-sight accuracy and so destroy high-speed targets such as aircraft, artillery shells, and missiles.

THE CLOSE-COMBAT GROUP

In the Australian Army, the infantry is the premier close-combat element. Australian Army doctrine has long upheld that the role of the infantry is to 'seek out and close with the enemy, to kill or capture him, to seize and hold ground and repel attack by day and night, regardless of season, weather or terrain'.[9] In the future, however, if the infantry are no longer required to focus on seeking out the enemy, it might be argued that the traditional concentration of infantry battalions within a legacy brigade (two to four battalions) is no longer required in 21st-century conditions.

If the proposed ETF's reconnaissance–strike group is able to provide a robust information collection and 'hard–soft' kill capability, infantry will no longer be required to expend much of its effort 'feeling' for, or moving to contact with, the enemy. Rather, the infantry battalion can concentrate on developing a precision strike capability that responds to the targeting information provided by the Reconnaissance–Strike Group.

A close-combat group should be created in order to provide the taskforce of the future with the ability to close with and destroy an enemy in both normal and complex terrain, including urban areas. In order to ensure that this group can be 'cued' on to a target quickly by intelligence from information supplied by the reconnaissance–strike group, the close-combat group must be capable of undertaking rapid, mobile and highly dispersed operations. The need for dispersed operations suggests that the Close-combat Group should consist of several sub-units, each possessing a capability to close with a target. As a consequence, it is argued in this article that the support company elements of an existing infantry battalion be embedded within the rifle companies. In order to be able to respond in at least two dispersed locations concurrently while maintaining a reserve, the close-combat group should possess four companies. Each close-combat company would consist of light infantry with integral short-range direct and indirect fire support, and close reconnaissance and communications assets.

In addition, the Close-combat Group should also possess a light mechanised sub-unit that would be capable of mounting at least two of the close-combat sub-units in addition to providing direct fire support. This light mechanised sub-unit of the Close-combat Group could be equipped with vehicles capable of being transported by C130 Hercules aircraft and by heavy rotary-wing aircraft. Such vehicles should also be capable of traversing the various types of terrain found in both Australia and South-East Asia during the dry and wet seasons. In this way, the ETF would be capable of conducting air-mechanised operations.[10]

THE MANOEUVRE SUPPORT GROUP

A future taskforce must be able to acquire knowledge of the enemy and then shape its physical environment. It is in this realm that manoeuvre support becomes important for the provision of such capabilities as combat engineers, and nuclear–biological–chemical response elements. On the future battlespace, a manoeuvre support group would be formed in order to provide combat support functions in the modern battlespace. Such support would enhance the mobility and survivability of the taskforce.

A key role for the Manoeuvre Support Group would be Organic Real-time Battlefield Shaping (ORBS), employing 'tactical deception by means of visual, acoustic and other sensory signals (tactile, smell) to disrupt an opponent's situation assessment process, and to modify his behavior'.[11] Essentially, this type of shaping involves the application of advanced 'special effects' to the battlespace. This 'special effects' approach aims to deny manoeuvre; and to introduce uncertainty, confusion, delay or diversion, causing the enemy to make a rational but wrong decision that may prevent a direct firefight. Through the employment of in-place and remote-response sensors, mobile robots and various other obstacles, the manoeuvre support group would employ ORBS in order to produce a superior effect to that generated by traditional minefields and fortifications.

A manoeuvre support group would directly assist the taskforce's combat elements (the reconnaissance–strike group and the close-combat group) and provide a degree of support in general operations. The direct assistance supplied by the manoeuvre support group would consist primarily of combat engineers. The group's more general support to the ETF might involve an operations support element, providing capabilities that support generic operations such as chemical, biological, radiological responses (CBRR); ORBS; and military police. The CBRR element would be responsible for nuclear, biological and chemical reconnaissance; decontamination operations; and explosive ordnance disposal. A military police contingent would be needed to supervise efficient battlespace movement. Finally, another component that would be required for general operations would be an engineer support element.

THE FORCE SUSTAINMENT GROUP

In future operations, the need for combat service support is likely to remain a critical military requirement. Within the proposed ETF, both unit (first-line) and formation-level (second-line) combat service support will be required for self-sufficiency, necessitating the creation of a force sustainment group. The latter should be organised to enable rapid capability to be generated across extended lines of communications. Both first-line and second-line support require integral services such as health, technical repair facilities, and collection of stores and equipment.

In the light of the expeditionary focus of the proposed new land force, a Force Sustainment Group would require additional capabilities not held in current brigade logistic organisations. Accordingly, extra personnel and equipment will be required to conduct port operations and/or logistics-over-the-shore (LOTS) operations.

Any future force sustainment group should be composed of four elements: transportation support, health services support, supply support and field repair. The basic principles of logistical planning—simplicity, cooperation, economy of effort, foresight, flexibility and security—are almost certain to remain as applicable to an ETF in 2020 as they are to the current Army.[12]

THE ADF AND THE EXPEDITIONARY TASK FORCE

The proposed taskforce is not intended to operate by itself, without reference to other elements of the ADF. On the contrary, the ETF would form part of a joint (or combined) force. Any future taskforce organisation would have to demonstrate its ability to respond to Australia's emerging 21st-century strategic needs. As a result, situational awareness that is derived from national and allied information sources would be essential, as would the maintenance of a joint command-and-control support infrastructure. The ETF would also need to be able to rely on a layered joint-fires capability as well as air superiority over areas of operation and lines of communications. In addition, the ability to move troops and supplies by sea and air to an area of operations rapidly and without interference would be crucial to the success of the ETF. Tactical mobility using troop-lift helicopters and armoured personnel carriers would also need to be ensured in any offshore mission. Finally, there would have to be adequate logistical support in order to sustain ETF operations in Australia's littoral environment. The levels of support that may be required for ETF operations are depicted in Figure 2.

> The ETF would also need to be able to rely on a layered joint-fires capability as well as air superiority over areas of operation and lines of communications.

CONCLUSION

The only certainty we can expect in future conflict is uncertainty. Napoleon once said that 'an army ought only to have one line of operation. This should be preserved with care.'[13] Unfortunately, land warfare is no longer linear, and the armies of the future must be capable of undertaking a wide range of concurrent operations in

Figure 2: Generation of ETF Combat Power

austere conditions and in potentially hostile environments. In order to meet new conditions of complex warfighting, the Australian Army must consider the future of its combat organisation that remains 20th century in character and ethos.

The force model of an ETF outlined in this article acknowledges that, despite the high technology of information-age conflict, the focus of warfare remains the clash of human wills. Our challenge is not simply the sophisticated cyber-warrior, but also the road warrior who may be a tribal warlord equipped with a cell phone and modern missile technology. As a result, the flexibility, mobility, firepower, and networked communications of a future land force will be the keys to Australian military success in the future.

The model of a future Australian land force described in this essay seeks to address the impending crisis that all Western military organisations will face if unre-formed industrial-age structures are used to meet the multidimensional demands of future conflict. As Australian society changes under the impact of information-age networks, decentralised work practices and the increasing emphasis on developing intellectual capital, so too must the Australian Army also transform. The threats that the Army will confront in 2020 will be unlike those of the late 20th century in that they will be more complex, diffuse and interconnected, and may cross borders and penetrate societies. Meeting and overcoming such challenges demands the right mix of personnel, reformed organisation, new equipment, innovative doctrine, and imaginative training. The Army cannot wait passively to react to new challengers. Instead, we must seek to anticipate the future and shape our responses to meet emerging realities.

ENDNOTES

1   Lieutenant General Peter Leahy, 'Future Wars, Futuristic Soldiers', a speech to the Land Warfare Conference, Convention Centre, Brisbane, 23 October 2002.

2   Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Everyman's Library, London, 1993, p. 83.

3   Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, a speech given to the Center for Naval Analyses, Virginia, 20 November 2002.

4   Kenneth McKenzie, *The Revenge of the Melians: Asymmetric Threats and the QDR*, McNair Paper 62, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., 2000, pp. 65–80.

5   Land Warfare Doctrine 1, *The Fundamentals of Land Warfare*, Doctrine Group, Land Warfare Development Centre, 2002, pp. 63–73.

6   Department of Defence, *Force 2020*, Public Affairs and Corporate Communication, Canberra, June 2002.

7   William Lind, 'The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation', *United States Marine Corps Gazette*, November 2001, pp. 65–6.

8   For a detailed explanation of the categorisation of conflict in the Australian context, see *The Fundamentals of Land Warfare*, p. 34.

9   See Australian Army, Manual of Land Warfare 2.1.1, *The Infantry Battalion*, Department of Defence, Canberra, 1983, p. 1-1.

10 For a review of the concept of air mechanisation, see David Grange, Richard Liebert and Chuck Jarnot, 'Air Mechanization', *Military Review*, July–August 2001.

11 Kathy Harger, John Bosma, Wayne Martin, James Richardson and Rosemary Seykowski, *Antipersonnel Landmine Alternatives: Organic Real-time Battlefield Shaping*, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Arlington, VA, 1999, p. 4.

12 The Australian doctrinal publication Training Information Bulletin, Number 70, *Brigade Administrative Support Battalion*, 1995, has been consulted extensively in the preparation of this section of the paper.

13 David Chandler, *The Military Maxims of Napoleon*, Da Capo Press, Cambridge, MA, 1995, p. 59.

THE AUTHOR

Lieutenant Colonel Michael Ryan graduated from the Royal Military College, Duntroon, in 1989 to the Royal Australian Engineers. He has served in a variety of postings, including language training with the Australian Defence Force School of Languages, and as Officer Commanding the 1st Field Squadron, the 1st Combat Engineering Regiment. In 2000 he served with the 6th Battalion Group in East Timor. Lieutenant Colonel Ryan is a Distinguished Graduate of the United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College and the Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting. He is currently posted to the Directorate of Future Warfighting Concepts in Defence Headquarters.

FUTURE CONCEPTS AND FORCE DEVELOPMENT

A SHIELD FOR A HARDENED ARMY

THE INFANTRY MOBILITY VEHICLE AND THE CONCEPT OF A MOTORISED BATTLE GROUP

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN HUTCHESON

Battle implies mobility, strategic and tactical. The Army which seeks to fight another must be able to move quickly against it … Battle also implies immobilisation of the enemy—the paralysis of his powers of movement so that, in the first place, he may not be able to slip away, and second, that he may not be able to counter your strokes.

B. H. Liddell Hart, *Thoughts on War* (1944)

In an era of early 21st-century strategic ambiguity, the Australian Army faces the challenge of meeting what the 2003 strategic update called an 'increased emphasis on readiness and mobility, on interoperability [and] on the development and enhancement of important capabilities'.[1] In response to the rise of new operational demands, the Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Peter Leahy, recently outlined a vision for a hardened and networked Army that will possess the 'capacity to survive, adapt, fight and win against a diverse range of threats in an increasingly complex environment'.[2] This article analyses the implications of the development of motorisation

for our current concept of operations. Many of the ideas discussed are drawn from the work of the 2003 Motorisation Writing Team in developing doctrine to guide the introduction and use of the Infantry Mobility Vehicle (IMV) or Bushmaster in mid-2004. The article outlines a proposed Motorised Battle Group structure and discusses the considerations that planners will need to consider in employing this new capability. Finally, consideration is given to the role that a modern Motorised Battle Group might perform in the Chief of Army's 'Hardening the Army' initiative.

THE ROLE OF MOTORISED FORCES IN MODERN WAR

The modern view of motorisation was outlined by the British military theorist, Major General J. F. C. Fuller, in 1943. Fuller noted that there were two types of land forces: those that were motorised and formed a protective shield, and those that were mechanised and acted as a protective sword.[3] While a mechanised force fights in and from vehicles, a motorised force manoeuvres into a position of advantage in order to engage in dismounted tactics. However, a motorised force must have support from a mechanised 'sword' containing armour, and firepower to destroy an adversary. The basic concept governing motorised operations in the Australian approach to war is one of movement out of the line of fire. When such movement occurs, the motorised force is able to manoeuvre to advantage in both attack and defence.[4]

> … a motorised force must have support from a mechanised 'sword' containing armour, and firepower to destroy an adversary.

In the Australian Army, the idea of motorisation was introduced in the 1994 Force Structure Review, which identified a requirement for increased infantry mobility. Motorisation subsequently became part of the Restructuring of the Army (RTA) process in the mid-1990s. The idea that mobility, protection and firepower would provide a clear advantage in any land operation is now entrenched in the Army's keystone doctrine, *The Fundamentals of Land Warfare*.[5] The introduction into service of the Australian-designed and locally built IMV, the Bushmaster, in 2004 represents the final stage of a seven-year program to introduce a protected motorised capability to the land force. The Bushmaster capability supports the Army's need to possess increased infantry mobility as part of Manoeuvre Operations in the Littoral Environment (MOLE) concept. Infantry mobility is mechanised, motorised and airmobile in character, and it is unlikely that any motorised force will move on its own in the future. Rather, motorised units will be task-organised with other force elements—including armour, cavalry, mechanised infantry, and armoured reconnaissance helicopters—operating as a Motorised Battle Group.

When the IMV is introduced to the 7th Brigade in late 2004, the vehicle will provide the Australian Army with a capability that is a 'protected shield', in terms of its ability to protect and deploy infantry. While the Bushmaster is not a 'fighting vehicle', it does provide selected infantry battalions with the necessary protected mobility to exploit tactical advantages. The Bushmaster also allows land forces to disperse quickly, thus negating the effects of an adversary's fires and lowering the possibility of casualties. However, there is likely to be an ongoing debate within the Australian Army about the virtues of the Australian Light Armoured Vehicle (ASLAV-25) versus the Bushmaster IMV. The ASLAV is often seen as being more useful for reasons of interoperability and increased firepower. Nonetheless, the Army's decision to adopt the Bushmaster was made on the basis that the Army could either transport a single battalion with ASLAVs or two with Bushmaster IMVs.[6]

The Bushmaster IMV is designated as a Protected Mobility Vehicle (PMV). The IMV is a wheeled armoured vehicle designed to provide protected mobility with an airconditioned interior for an infantry section of nine personnel. The vehicle provides protection from small-arms fire, mines and mortar blasts, and is capable of achieving speeds of up to 110 km per hour and over a range of at least 600 km. The troop-carrying variant of the IMV can mount a 7.62 mm machine-gun with the potential for a grenade launcher system fitted in the future.

> The Bushmaster … supports the Army's need to possess increased infantry mobility as part of Manoeuvre Operations in the Littoral Environment (MOLE) concept.

In considering the use of the IMV, it is important to realise that a motorised unit is neither a mechanised nor a transport organisation. Rather, a motorised force represents 'a unit equipped with complete motor transportation that enables all of its personnel, weapons and equipment to be moved at the same time without assistance from other sources'.[7] A motorised unit employs organic vehicles for the purpose of conducting dismounted operations. The introduction of improved motorisation in the Army will increase the combat capability of the infantry battalion and enhance its capacities for concentration and survival. In addition, once integrated as part of a wider network of sensors and information management processes, a motorised force will possess greater situational awareness. Motorisation also contributes to a manoeuvrist philosophy of operations by increasing infantry mobility, protection and sustainability.

MOTORISED FORCES AND THE CONCEPT OF MANOEUVRE OPERATIONS IN A LITTORAL ENVIRONMENT

The ADF's current approach to warfare is based on the philosophical underpinning of 'multidimensional manoeuvre' in a range of operational scenarios, especially MOLE.[8] The main roles for the Army within this overarching concept are to contribute effective land forces to warfighting operations, carry out Military Operations Other than Conventional Warfare (MOOCW), and to conduct activities to shape Australia's strategic environment. Recent examples of the latter two categories of operations have been the missions to East Timor and the Solomon Islands. In meeting the demands of manoeuvre operations, the Chief of Army has directed that land forces 'must be highly mobile, well prepared and able to manoeuvre effectively in a littoral environment'.[9]

A motorised force is particularly useful in the context of two of the four phases of the current MOLE concept. While there is limited scope for motorised forces in the first two phases of MOLE, shaping the operational environment and entry

> Motorisation … contributes to a manoeuvrist philosophy of operations by increasing infantry mobility, protection and sustainability.

from the sea and air becomes important during the last two of the four phases, namely decisive action and the transition from combat to stability operations. Once ground forces are lodged in a littoral operation, the use of a motorised force will increase the ability of the commander to move into a decisive-action phase deeper inland. In the fourth, or transition, phase towards stability operations, a motorised force permits a protected wide-area presence. In this context, the Bushmaster IMV is an ideal vehicle in missions to support a handover to a United Nations or inter-agency force.

MOTORISED INFANTRY AND COMBINED ARMS: THE MOTORISED BATTLE GROUP

In Australia's current threat environment, it is likely that the Army will encounter both traditional and non-traditional threats in operations. Motorised forces in isolation are best employed at the low and medium levels of the spectrum of conflict. However, as part of a combined arms force based on elements of a cavalry regiment, a mechanised infantry battalion or a tank regiment, a motorised infantry battalion can operate at the higher end of the spectrum. The grouping of different combat

arms and services into a task-organised motorised battle group based on 'capability bricks' of motor infantry, armour, cavalry, mechanised infantry, and/or armed reconnaissance helicopters multiplies the overall effect of combat power.

A combined arms motorised battle group has the potential to field a unique combination of mobility, protection and sustainability. Moreover, the protected tactical mobility of the motorised battle group will enable its elements to disperse quickly and, should conditions permit, allow for the rapid massing of combat effects. The key is to achieve overmatch through the motorised battle group's possessing manoeuvre sub-units such as mechanised, cavalry or armour elements. For example, if a motorised battle group had deployed to East Timor, it would have consisted primarily of the force elements contained in a standard motorised infantry battalion. Yet in the case of Iraq, a motorised battle group would probably have included a motor infantry battalion headquarters and cavalry, armour and armed helicopter sub-units.

A motorised battle group should be task-organised under a manoeuvre headquarters, while the combat elements should be designed to suit the tactical

> The key is to achieve overmatch through the motorised battle group's possessing manoeuvre sub-units such as mechanised, cavalry or armour elements.

situation. The 'capability bricks' or combat teams based on combined arms should ideally consist of three to five combat sub-units, each possessing an integral joint offensive support team and their own combat service support. In determining the particular composition and arms combinations of combat teams, it is important to realise that a motorised battle group would also require a range of capabilities that enable it to conduct reconnaissance, provide security, deliver stand-off firepower and engage in close combat. In terms of combat support, there should be engineer and signaller elements attached and a close support battery. A motorised battle group must be capable of conducting independent operations for up to seventy-two hours. Accordingly, it will require first-line combat service support, and the capacity to link directly into third- or fourth-line support.

CHARACTERISTICS OF A MOTORISED BATTLE GROUP

A motorised battle group can be employed in a range of operations across the spectrum of conflict. However, it is important for staff planners to acknowledge that motorised forces use the Bushmaster vehicle to offer protected mobility only, which means that the transition from a mounted to a dismounted role will affect tactical momentum.

MOBILITY AND FIREPOWER

A motorised battle group is capable of operating in environments ranging from the desert to the tropics. The Bushmaster is more mobile than a UNIMOG and can operate on firm to hard ground, and rudimentary as well as developed road and track systems. The vehicle is also capable of traversing medium-density vegetation and of fording some watercourses by means of an adjustable tyre-pressure system. In terms of firepower, the Bushmaster is fitted with a pintle-mounted 7.62 mm general-purpose machine-gun for local protection and for limited offensive or defensive use in a dismounted role. However, the limited range and stability of any vehicle with pintle-mounted weapons, as well as the need to operate it in the dismounted role, are likely to restrict the use of such weapons. Nonetheless, if a motorised group is task-organised, then its combined arms fires will make it a formidable force.

INDEPENDENT OPERATIONS AND COMBAT SURVEILLANCE

A motorised battle group should be capable of undertaking sustained independent operations over a wide area of operations. Once deployed, the group should be able to dominate an area of 200 km by 200 km, and be capable of influencing an area 400 km by 600 km. Indeed, with further development, it is possible that the Bushmaster could act as a 'mother ship' to facilitate soldiers 'plugging in' to networks in order to download situational awareness information or recharge batteries.

COMMUNICATIONS

The Bushmaster can be fitted with tactical voice communications systems (three in the troop variant), and a vehicle condition monitoring system that is capable of limited communications with other vehicles. Individual vehicles of the force can be fitted with a battlefield information management system or Battlefield Command Support System (BCSS). When linked to a network of sensors and the other combat force elements of a motorised battle group, these systems will increase situational awareness. The command variants of the IMV have the capacity to monitor up to five networks; this capacity allows for mobile command posts and effective command and control on the move. This type of capacity suggests that the motorised battle group would be a candidate for adaptation to network-centric warfare as part of the LAND 5000 project.

VULNERABILITY

Motorised vehicles are vulnerable to attack by armour, anti-armour, artillery, and aircraft missiles. It has been noted that the IMV will be easily detected by radar and thermal imagery. However, wheeled vehicle vulnerability can be diminished by use of the battle group design that is task-organised for a specific mission. It is vital to

recognise that a protected mobility vehicle relies on secure routes, speed and agility for its survival rather than on its armour protection. As a consequence, an IMV should not be employed in decisive close combat.

CONCLUSION

Historically, success in the execution of land operations has always been determined by the ability of a commander to unite the elements of mobility, protection and fire-power into a tactical system of combined arms. The 'Hardening the Army' initiative enhances combined arms capability to execute warfighting operations in complex environments. Organising motorised forces into a battlegroup will help to optimise the advantages of an all-arms approach to future combat and may assist in outweighing the increased logistic challenges that the Bushmaster presents to the Army.

> Organising motorised forces into a battlegroup will help to optimise the advantages of an all-arms approach to future combat …

Two doctrinal publications, *LWP-G 3-3-2 Motorised Operations Developing Doctrine* and *LWP-G 3-3-13 Motorised Battalion Tactics, Techniques and Procedures*, will be released in mid-2004 to guide the use of the IMV in the land force. The Bushmaster has a capacity to contribute to many types of infantry operations in the future. The vehicle provides a protected mode of transport to deliver troops quickly to a position of advantage from which to execute dismounted operations. The key challenge may be to persuade conservative 'foot' infantryman to accept the philosophy of battle grouping for operating motorised force elements. We need to avoid developing the profile of the British Army of the Victorian Age—a small professional force adept at fighting light infantry brushfire wars but one that, over time, lost sight of its primary role of combined arms warfighting. An overconcentration on brushfire wars with light forces contributed to the slaughter of a generation of British soldiers in World War I. The introduction of the Bushmaster should be viewed as an opportunity to develop a protective shield in the land force in the form of an all-arms motorised battle group. Such a capability will support the Army's 'offensive swords' represented by armour, mechanised infantry, and armed reconnaissance helicopters in the future. In short, motorised innovation can only increase the options available to a genuinely 'hardened Army'.

ENDNOTES

1   Department of Defence, *Australia's National Security: A Defence Update 2003*,
     March 2003, p. 6.
2   Address by Lieutenant General Peter Leahy, Chief of Army, to members of Project
     Bushmaster, Bendigo, 29 August 2003. Notes taken by author.
3   J. F. C. Fuller, *Armoured Warfare*, Eyre and Spottiswoode, London, 1943, p. 64.
4   Department of Defence, *The Australian Approach to Warfare*, Public Affairs &
     Corporate Communication, Canberra, June 2002, pp. 23–4.
5   Australian Army, *Land Warfare Doctrine 1: The Fundamentals of Land Warfare*,
     Land Warfare Development Centre, Puckapunyal, Vic., 2002.
6   Address by Lieutenant Colonel Louise Abell to 7th Brigade personnel, 4 June 2003.
7   Australian Army, *LWD 3-3-2 Motorised Operations (Developing Doctrine)*,
     Land Warfare Development Centre, Puckapunyal, Vic., 2003, p. 1-1.
8   *The Australian Approach to Warfare*, p. 20.
9   *Land Warfare Doctrine 1: The Fundamentals of Land Warfare*, 2002, p. 2.

THE AUTHOR

Lieutenant Colonel John Hutcheson is a graduate of the Royal Military College, Duntroon and has served in a number of regimental postings, including the 5th/7th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, and the 49th Battalion, Royal Queensland Regiment. He has instructed infantry platoon commanders in the United Kingdom, served in Army Headquarters and the Defence Personnel Executive, and been seconded to IBM. A graduate of Command and Staff College, Lieutenant Colonel Hutcheson has also served in the Land Warfare Studies Centre as a Visiting Military Fellow. He was Commanding Officer of the 25th/49th Battalion, Royal Queensland Regiment, prior to assuming his current appointment in Headquarters 1st Division.

COMMANDING THE NET GENERATION

AN ARGUMENT FOR MENTORING JUNIOR LEADERS IN THE 21st–CENTURY AUSTRALIAN ARMY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DAN FORTUNE

One of the most important challenges facing the Australian Army at the beginning of the 21st century is to ensure that its leaders of the future are appropriately trained and educated to face a military environment that will be uncertain, complex and multidimensional. This article argues that a key leadership and command challenge facing the Army at the beginning of the new century is the integration into the land force of recruits born after 1977—known as the 'Net Generation'. It is the members of the Net Generation that will be the officers and 'strategic corporals and privates' of the future, and they are the ones that will be charged with the great responsibility of fighting in a decentralised battlespace.

This article outlines some of the main characteristics and aspirations of the Net Generation. The essay goes on to suggest that, in the future, the development of junior leaders from this demographic group is likely to be best

> It is members of the Net Generation that will be the officers and 'strategic corporals and privates' of the future …

achieved by the use of mentoring and by the associated development of an improved organisational climate, rather than by the tenets of a traditional command-and-control culture.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NET GENERATION

In 1995, Graham Glenn, in *Serving Australia*, his report on the nature of Australian military service, reaffirmed the role of service men and women as 'managers of violence':

> Those who join the Services make a professional commitment quite unlike any other. They undertake to maintain the security, values and standards of the nation against external threat. They train for the *application of extreme violence in a controlled and humane fashion, whilst accepting the risk of serious injury or death in the achievement of the mission …* In short they undertake to train for and, if required, undertake duty beyond the bounds of normal human behaviour.[1]

Although the unique nature of military service means that the armed forces are not a laboratory for social experimentation, the Army cannot afford to become isolated from society and must seek to maintain a responsive organisational culture. As the social commentator Hugh Mackay has pointed out, since the early 1970s nearly every Australian institution or convention has been subject to either serious challenge or radical change. As a result, 'the social, cultural, political and economic landmarks which have traditionally been used as reference points for defining the Australian way of life have either vanished, been eroded or shifted'.[2] With respect to the Net Generation, the ADF in general, and the Army in particular, is not immune from these trends.

What are the characteristics of the Net Generation? According to the writer Don Tapscott, key features of Net Generation behaviour include interactivity based on participation rather than observation, a tolerance for social diversity, a propensity for challenging conventions of authority, and acceptance of economic insecurity and career change as norms.[3] These social trends tend to run counter to the Australian Army's culture of 'top down' leadership. The current Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Peter Leahy, has laid down the leadership challenge facing Australia's land forces of the future as follows:

> Because of conditions of strategic uncertainty, an Army that looks only at today will not be the Army we require tomorrow. We are facing not just the challenge of equipment modernisation and information networking—important though these are—*but a deeper cultural challenge: that of learning to be ready to confront unpredictable operational conditions.* And this is a challenge that will eventually have far-reaching effects on our doctrine, training and force structure.[4]

THE ROLE OF MENTORSHIP

It is important to note that many members of the Net Generation appear to give little regard to the structured formality that is associated with the traditional concept of military organisation, which emphasises the imperative of hierarchy and the rule of discipline over discussion. In contrast, many individuals of the Net Generation prefer a leadership and command style that is based on a 'decisive transformational methodology'. The main features of this transformation methodology are the roles played by emotional inspiration, intellectual stimulation and individualised consideration. As a result, mentorship is an important consideration in Net Generation thinking about employment and career development. The ADF in general, and the Army in particular, will not be able to ignore the role that mentorship will need to play in shaping the professional military experience and expertise of Net Generation recruits.

… many members of the Net Generation appear to give little regard to the structured formality … of military organisation …

An important feature of mentorship is the role played by a situational style of leadership in which a leader concentrates on harnessing the abilities of his or her followers rather than simply issuing orders. A central element in situational leadership theory is a concentration on relationship behaviour—that is, on the leader's providing guidance and support to the subordinate as the foundation of experience. Situational leadership, supported by careful mentoring, seeks a 'partnering for performance' between leaders and subordinates. It is an organisational approach that is more individualised, informal and is based on a greater belief in trust than the largely collective techniques used in the mass armies of the first half of the 20th century.

In situational leadership and mentoring, organisational climate is as important as organisational culture. Whereas an organisational culture tends to reflect ingrained traits of behaviour, the creation of a climate in an organisation concentrates on appropriate 'thinking and doing'. An organisational climate tends to embody the members' collective perceptions with respect to key areas such as the level of autonomy that can be achieved by individuals, the character of trust, and traits such as cohesiveness, support, recognition and fairness. The relationship between organisational climate and individual effectiveness in the ADF is arguably already established. The aim is to create a high-performance climate that fulfils individual aspirations and career satisfaction. However, in the future this approach will require greater emphasis to attract Net Generation members to a military career.

Important elements in creating a high-performance organisation involve an emphasis on innovation and initiative. In the Australian military realm, the requirements of high performance have manifested themselves in the doctrinal philosophies of mission command and professional mastery in tactics and operations. These approaches give subordinates discretion in accomplishing objectives according to the direction and intent of the commander. Initiative and trust underpin mission command, and it is this climate that must be encouraged to attract the 'strategic corporals' who will emerge only from the Net Generation. Senior leaders must define their intent, and trust subordinates to execute it creatively. What is missing in mission command at present, however, is consistent institutional adherence to its decentralised features. In the information age, it is all too easy for a commander to reach down and intervene in a subordinate's decisions. While no senior officer can be expected to tolerate incompetence, commanders need to avoid micromanagement and the creation, by default, of a risk-averse military culture.

> What is missing in mission command … is consistent institutional adherence to its decentralised features.

Many successful commanders tend to be those who display the characteristics of a powerful intellect and a well-developed sense of human intuition. Members of the Net Generation possess intellect, but there must be some doubt as to whether many of them are at ease with the notion of human intuition. Many members of the Net Generation have grown up in an atomised environment dominated by information technologies in which the emphasis is on simulation and virtual reality to formulate and develop responses and reactions to circumstances. The world of the *Matrix* films, in which the real and the virtual interact, is a metaphor for the post-1977 Net Generation. Self-discovery for many Net Generation members is achieved through simulation of real-world events, rather than real-world experience itself, still less by an imagination honed by immersion in history, literature and the classics.

The impact of one-dimensional technological education and computer culture on Net Generation decision-making may be that junior military leaders—both officers and non-commissioned officers—from that demographic group will lack intuitive skills. It is, after all, intuition that often provides a leader with a critical advantage in the uncertain and high-stress environment of combat. The capacity for Net Generation officers to develop intuition and military *coup d'œil* will largely depend on their military-education experience in 'learning through doing' and by shedding the legacy of a technocentric civilian social environment. In this respect, there is a clear role for mentoring in the tutelage of junior leaders in the Army's

future leadership programs. The more a military organisation mentors its future leaders, the less will be the tendency of the former to micromanage, so creating risk-averse behaviour when on operations.

In encouraging a climate of mentoring, there might be grounds to remove, or at least modify, the current requirement for summative judgments of junior officers at the rank of captain and below through an annual Performance Appraisal Report. This document is the assessment tool used to rate an officer's performance and provides the basis for selection in career streaming and for suitability in future appointments. The document provides the formal feedback mechanism from superior to subordinate, but does not permit a 'subordinate to superior' nexus or exchange of views. Changing the Army's emphasis in performance assessment from a philosophy of reporting to one of mentoring would allow junior officers increased latitude that would help to hone their intuitive decision capacity through 'learning through doing'. In this respect, the Army might consider encouraging a more relationship-oriented style of leadership that exploits the Net Generation's desire to be treated as trusted colleagues and team players. Such an approach may, however, challenge some of the underlying tenets of the current Army officer reward mechanism that is based on the performance appraisal reports.

> … the Army might consider encouraging a more relationship-oriented style of leadership that exploits the Net Generation's desire to be treated as trusted colleagues …

In a managerial sense, the officer assessment system represents a closed rather than an open system. As the writer Peter Senge has pointed out in his examination of 'learning organisations', it is openness and the 'norm of speaking openly and honestly about important issues *and* the capacity to challenge the leader's own thinking continually that allows an organisation to focus on doing *what is right* instead of *who wants what done*'.[5]

In the Australian Army of the future, it is arguable that empowering the Net Generation could be better achieved by instituting 360-degree (subordinate to superior) reporting, commencing at sub-unit command—that is, at the rank of major and above. Such a process would assist in establishing better feedback mechanisms in order to achieve a form of 'leadership through partnership' that is based on shared commitment and open communication. More importantly, such an approach would have great symbolic importance, in that it would signal that the Army has embraced the ideals of a 21st-century 'learning organisation' and seeks to develop future leaders based on an understanding of social change. After all, competent and respected commanders have nothing to fear and much to gain from formal, 360-degree interaction with their subordinates.

CONCLUSION

If we are to create a mobile, agile and versatile 21st-century Australian Army, it must be characterised by adaptability and relevance. With respect to recruiting, training and retaining members of the Net Generation, such an approach will demand changes to both our military culture and our organisation. The identity of the Net Generation has been shaped primarily by social diversity and by unparalleled access to information technology. The Australian Army needs to consider adopting a decisive transformational style of leadership and organisational change in order to entice Net Generation individuals into military service. Three measures that might be considered are the removal of summative reporting requirements for junior officers, the establishment of a mandated mentoring program for junior officers and the implementation of 360-degree reporting for officers at sub-unit command level and above.

> The Australian Army needs to consider adopting a decisive transformational style of leadership … in order to entice Net Generation individuals into military service.

Modern leadership, especially on a decentralised battlespace, requires a more personalised relationship between leader and follower. This relationship should not be seen as representing a 'New Age' or postmodern aspiration, but should be seen in the context of establishing improved warfighting command in future units that will be composed of the Net Generation. Achieving collective organisational goals must be underpinned by collaborative rewards based on individual motivation. The youth of the Net Generation is likely to demand a greater share of interaction and commitment with society's organisational leaders in every profession and walk of life. Increasingly, many Net Generation members tend to view themselves as partners that are empowered to interact and serve in a cause rather than act as blind subordinates in an old-fashioned hierarchical force.

In order to exploit and develop the qualities of the Net Generation, the Army's leadership needs to blend the best of the past with the requirements of the future. Such a transformative approach would encourage innovation and agility and inculcate competence. The next generation of the Army's leaders will have to operate in an operational environment characterised by change, uncertainty and great risk, and it is imperative that we consider the necessary cultural and organisational changes sooner rather than later.

ENDNOTES

1   Graham Glen, *Serving Australia: The Australian Defence Force in the Twenty First Century*, Department of Defence Publishing, Canberra, 1995, p. 61. Emphasis added.

2   Hugh Mackay, *Reinventing Australia: The Mind and Mood of Australia in the 90s,* Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1993, p. 17.

3   Don Tapscott, *Growing Up Digital: The Rise of the Net Generation*, McGraw-Hill. New York, 1998, p. 78.

4   Lieutenant General Peter Leahy, 'Opening Address at the Chief of Army Conference', Canberra, 1 October 2003.

5   Peter Senge, *The Fifth Discipline—The Art & Practice of the Learning Organisation,* Random House, Sydney, 1990, p. 274. Emphasis in original.

THE AUTHOR

Lieutenant Colonel Dan Fortune served as a soldier in the 6th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, before being selected for service in the Special Air Service Regiment. He entered the Royal Military College, Duntroon, in 1989, and was posted to the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, on graduation. He returned to the Special Air Service Regiment, was posted on exchange to the United States Special Forces in 1996, and assumed command of the 2nd Special Air Service Squadron on his return. A graduate of Australian Command and Staff College, Lieutenant Colonel Fortune is currently posted as Staff Officer to the Vice Chief of the Defence Force.

THE VALUE OF MILITARY ADVISORY TEAMS

LESSONS FROM THE AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE IN SIERRA LEONE

CAPTAIN G. A. CHISNALL

In January 2001, Australia responded to a British request for advisers to assist the International Military Advisory Training Team mission in Sierra Leone (IMATT–SL) in its task of rebuilding the newly raised Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) in West Africa. Codenamed Operation *Husky*, the Australian commitment lasted for two years and consisted of an infantry captain and an infantry major deployed to act as a battalion and brigade adviser respectively. Each contingent deployed for a six-month tour of duty and, following two years of involvement, the Australian mission concluded in March 2003. Although Operation *Husky* has been overshadowed by larger contemporary operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, Australian Army officers played an important role in rebuilding the Sierra Leone military under extremely arduous and at times dangerous conditions.

The use of advisory teams offers an excellent medium for international engagement at relatively little cost and can contribute to the process of conflict management. Australia's expenditure on defence cooperation with neighbouring countries in 2001–02 was valued at A\$79.568 million.[1] Despite this expenditure, the training and preparation of military advisers has received insufficient attention within the Australian Defence Force (ADF). For example, at present, there is no dedicated

training regime or written ADF doctrine for the conduct of advisory missions. This article uses the author's experience in Sierra Leone to discuss the characteristics and skills required to fulfil a military adviser's role. With the demands of an ongoing War on Terrorism likely to lead to increased military liaison globally, it is possible that advisory missions may play an increasingly important role in attempts to shape Australia's strategic environment. Given these conditions, it is important that the ADF ensure the adequate preparation of its personnel for that responsibility.

BACKGROUND TO AUSTRALIAN MILITARY ADVISORY INVOLVEMENT IN SIERRA LEONE

Sierra Leone, a former British colony in West Africa, fell into crisis during the 1990s due to a series of *coups d'état*. In April 1992, a 26-year-old soldier, Captain Valentine Strasser, seized power. Control was briefly returned to an elected civilian government under President Kabbah, but in 1997, Major General Johnny Paul Koroma deposed Kabbah and civil war broke out. In 1998, a Nigerian-led West African intervention force stormed the capital Freetown and restored Kabbah to office. However, fighting, fuelled by a struggle over diamond production, between Kabbah loyalists and rebels resumed until a ceasefire was reached in July 1999.

A UN force then entered Sierra Leone but was opposed by the rebel chief, Foday Sankoh, whose forces unleashed a wave of killing, rape and mutilation. Some 300 UN troops were abducted in early 2000 and in mid-June 2000, a British task force intervened to restore law and order, killing twenty members of the main rebel militia force, the Revolutionary United Front, while securing Freetown. In September 2000, eleven British soldiers from the Royal Irish Regiment were captured by another militia force known as the West Side Boys and were rescued by a 150-strong British force from the Parachute Regiment. As the civil war petered out, some 400 British troops began training the Sierra Leone military, and in 2002 elections were held. Although fighting has diminished greatly, parts of the country, especially the Sierra Leone – Liberian border remain dangerous in 2003. It was against this background that Australia committed military advisers to IMATT–SL from 2001 until 2003.

DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN MILITARY ADVISORY AND MILITARY TRAINING MISSIONS: INSIGHTS FROM SIERRA LEONE

Careful distinction must be made between the roles of military advisers and those of military training personnel because each has different functions. By definition, a training officer is one who instructs other people, usually in a secure base or reserve area. On the other hand, a military adviser may serve on the command staff of an

active unit and may deploy with that unit on combat operations. Generally speaking, the difference between training team missions and advisory missions is one of risk. Military advisory roles generally involve greater risk to foreign personnel than military training roles.

In Operation *Husky*, in Sierra Leone, the Australian approach to an advisory role was influenced by the experience of the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATV) in the early 1960s. In Vietnam there was a clear distinction laid down in Australian doctrine between training functions and the delivery of operational advice.[2] While the task of providing military training usually precludes an operational advisory role, the reverse does not apply. Military advisers who are embedded in supported units can become involved in helping to facilitate and organise collective training activities.

During his service in Sierra Leone, the author served as a battalion adviser to the commanding officer of the 3rd Battalion of the RSLAF while also fulfilling the role as a training adviser for the 5th Brigade. As the Brigade Training Adviser, the author was responsible for the development of a training regime in accordance with the Brigade Commander's Directive. This appointment demanded gaining a rapid understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the Sierra Leone military. In order to define training needs, the author routinely accompanied RSLAF unit patrols and undertook assessments of the soldiers and their operating conditions.

At the time of the author's deployment to West Africa, the RSLAF was engaged in a rebuilding phase. However, long months on operations, combined with poor living conditions for soldiers and perceptions of corruption and nepotism at the higher command levels, had led to a loss of morale in the Sierra Leone military. The author advised the 5th Brigade of the RSLAF on the establishment of a new unit that focused on developing the leadership qualities of the junior non-commissioned officers. This approach involved the establishment of a training camp with facilities such as rifle ranges, accommodation buildings and classrooms. Administrative personnel were selected and instructed in how to run the training camp.

At the same time, the author also fulfilled the role of adviser to the 3rd Battalion of the Sierra Leone military. In this role, the author provided advice on every aspect of the battalion's day-to-day activities, including operational matters, morale and discipline, hygiene and sanitation, logistics and resupply, and general leadership issues. The basis for the advice that the author provided to the Commanding Officer was largely drawn from his own professional experiences, tempered by the lessons learnt by other international IMATT–SL personnel.

The author's experience in Operation *Husky* highlighted the need for foreign military advisers to be permitted to participate in tactical operations in order to assist in evaluating both the capabilities and the limitations of indigenous troops. Making an operational assessment enables an adviser to provide useful advice

where it most matters—in the field. The dual approach of training and advising has not always been accepted within the Australian Army. For instance, in the early 1960s, Australian training advisers in Vietnam were initially restricted from direct operational involvement with their South Vietnamese colleagues. As Ian McNeill has written:

> The Australians found themselves in an anomalous position because of their explicit instructions to remain on training activities and not become involved in operations. To do their job properly, they felt a need to accompany units on operations where they could get a good feel for the type of war, and the problems experienced by the ARVN [Army of the Republic of Vietnam]. [3]

In many instances, such a restriction is appropriate, particularly in the case of combat operations. Nonetheless, experience in Sierra Leone suggested that the ability of a military adviser—who might also be involved in training functions—to accompany the troops on operations was an invaluable means of building up a rapport with, and assessing the capabilities of, indigenous troops. However, the two distinct tasks of providing advice and providing training demand different types of support and preparation. In an advisory role, the military adviser needs to consider closely such issues as infrastructure and administrative support, force protection arrangements, reporting, duration of deployment, type of predeployment training, handovers, legal coverage, medical support and conditions of service.

In Sierra Leone, it became evident that the national armed forces were incapable of providing appropriate support to IMATT–SL personnel. As a consequence, medical support, vehicles, weapons and communications were provided by IMATT–SL headquarters commanded by a British Army brigadier, who also acted as the Military Adviser to the President of Sierra Leone.

CHARACTERISTICS OF MILITARY ADVISORY OPERATIONS IN SIERRA LEONE

In many developing Third World armies, leadership is often confined to officers and is based on a barracks-style deference to drill and ceremonial duties, rather than focusing on expertise in training and operations. Sierra Leone was no exception to this rule. There was often a distinct lack of leadership shown by junior officers and non-commissioned officers, a situation complicated further by ethnic differences. Due to nepotism and ethnic rivalries, commanding officers tended to surround themselves with their most trusted lieutenants in the battalion headquarters. This complex ethnic situation often meant that battalion infantry companies were not staffed by suitably trained officers. Because of local military weaknesses and a lack of professionalism in indigenous units, there is always a temptation for

foreign military advisers to view matters through the prism of their own experience and training. However, it is always necessary for a military adviser to remember that he is on temporary detachment and his mission is to advise, not to attempt to direct activities.

MANAGING EXPECTATIONS WITH A SENSE OF REALISM

It is important to note that the expectations of military advisers and those of the indigenous military may differ considerably. Foreign advisers from modern armies are likely to seek solutions to problems based on 21st-century military standards. This modern approach may, however, not work in the context of Third World military cultures and may lead to frustration among advisory staff. As one experienced British senior non-commissioned officer put it, a military adviser must possess a sense of realism based on local conditions and 'set achievable tasks and get the simple things right'.[4] Ultimately, the test of a successful advisory mission is whether the indigenous troops adopt and then adapt the procedures and measures learnt. An adviser must seek to persuade members of the unit in which he is serving that his success can only be measured by their own application of his advice.

ADAPTING TO LOCAL CONDITIONS: ADVISE, DO NOT COMMAND

For advisers, adaptation to local conditions remains a key issue. It is counterproductive to build expectations in an indigenous force based on an over-reliance on foreign support. Managing expectations is closely related to an understanding of the difference between advising and commanding. One Australian officer recounted his first meeting with the commanding officer of his battalion in Sierra Leone in the following terms:

> He [the Sierra Leone commander] leaned back in his chair, put his hands behind his head and said, 'Yeeees [sic] Captain Tim. Welcome to 10 Battalion. So if you want to run the Battalion … no problems!'[5]

On many occasions, military commanders in Sierra Leone were content to allow IMATT–SL advisers to assume command responsibility and then claim the credit for any good results achieved. Complying with such an approach was both patronising and counterproductive in that, by assuming a command role, an adviser fails in his principal task, which is to empower local officers and encourage them to resolve their own military problems. It is necessary for advisers to avoid the temptation to take charge and to work towards ensuring that, when the advisory mission is complete, indigenous commanders possess self-reliance and improved

professional knowledge. In essence, a successful military adviser is an officer who facilitates progress by ensuring that the local commanders and their senior staff 'own the solutions' reached in the professional administration of a unit.

THE POLITICS OF MILITARY ADVISORY MISSIONS

It is also important to realise that the deployment of a handful of military advisers can have significant political implications. Foreign advisers, who can often be relatively junior officers, may assume enormous responsibilities often under minimal supervision. The level of responsibility in advisory missions places a premium on the selection of officers who possess both maturity of judgment and a self-reliant character. The reality is that advisory missions in Third World countries, while providing a stabilising influence, are also fraught with political risks. For instance, in Sierra Leone, the mere presence of IMATT–SL personnel helped avert an attempted coup in January 2003. Because military advisers were embedded within the regional brigades throughout Sierra Leone, the international training team was able to play a major role in preventing the attempted coup. In particular, the 4th Brigade Advisory Support Team, commanded by Major Paul Kenny of the Australian Army, was able to gain valuable information relating to a coup attempt. Kenny's intelligence contributed to the formulation of a British contingency plan that succeeded in preventing military intervention in Sierra Leone's political system.

DEVELOPING APPROPRIATE INDIGENOUS DOCTRINE

Military advisers to Third World armies should concentrate on establishing doctrine and tactical procedures early in their mission. In the case of Sierra Leone, British doctrine was introduced to the armed forces through the employment of short-term training teams. British small-unit tactics were based on sections of eight men, broken into two fire teams, each of which was armed with light support weapons. The RSLAF adopted the British platoon and section model in their training; it proved unsuitable, however, largely because the RSLAF did not possess compatible weapon systems. Moreover, Sierra Leone military leadership culture did not seek to entrust responsibility to non-commissioned officers and, as a result, British doctrinal teachings were not followed by the Sierra Leone military when on operations.

In advisory missions, the doctrine and tactics developed must meet indigenous requirements, particularly if advisers are to succeed in synchronising the activities of a local unit. The difficulty, however, arises when missions are multinational in character, leading to different doctrine and tactics being taught by a variety of advisory and training teams. The Australian Army has yet to develop doctrine on the conduct of military advisory operations. Individual advisers are responsible for gathering information for specific missions prior to their deployment. This specialised knowledge is then supplemented through generic country and information

briefings as part of standard predeployment training. Yet, as this article has sought to demonstrate, there are enough recurring lessons in advisory missions to form the basis for developing common doctrine. By capturing the lessons learnt from diverse advisory missions and absorbing them into doctrine, the ADF would create a useful database for the future. This doctrinal aspect of military advisory operations requires urgent attention within the ADF so that the loss of valuable corporate knowledge may be avoided.

SELECTION AND TRAINING OF MILITARY ADVISERS

The level of political responsibility frequently encountered in advisory missions places a premium on the selection of officers who possess maturity of judgment, a self-reliant character and a sense of tact and cultural sensitivity. In addition, because of the isolated conditions in which advisers often work, such officers must be capable of using their personal initiative to meet new challenges.

In Sierra Leone, the British soldiers sent to the international training team are posted as Loan Service Personnel for a six- or twelve-month period of service and are managed by the Directorate of Overseas Military Affairs in the British Ministry of Defence. Unfortunately, there is no selection process and in many cases the military personnel prove to be unsuited to advisory work. The British approach differed from that used in the Australian and Canadian militaries. In both the Australian Army and the Canadian Land Forces, officers were nominated for advisory and training missions by their respective career management organisations. As a consequence, Australian and Canadian military personnel were generally better qualified for the type of advisory mission in Sierra Leone than their British counterparts.

Predeployment training is essential in preparing for military advisory missions. In Australia, while the Deployed Forces Support Unit currently provides all predeployment training, there is no specialist training or doctrine available to prepare an Australian officer for service in a foreign country as an adviser. In the past, the Military Adviser Regional Training Assistant Course provided a means for training individuals in the skills required by an adviser. This course was discontinued several years ago, although a proposal is currently being developed to revive it based on four modules. The first module is intended to provide cultural familiarisation; language training; and demographic, geographic and intelligence briefings for officers posted on specific advisory missions. The second component involves a training module that addresses the issue of teaching techniques in a foreign language, or how to use interpreters in training. The third and fourth modules of the proposed Military Advisory Course focus on operational issues and the use of intelligence.

SOME SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR MILITARY ADVISORY MISSIONS

In preparing for military advisory missions, armies should also give consideration to incorporating several special requirements, notably self-protection skills, advanced driving instruction, instinctive shooting techniques, advanced medical training, escape and evasion techniques, and possibly some counter-interrogation training. Such measures may be necessary because the reality of advisory deployments is that they involve a range of considerations that rarely arise on conventional operations. In the first place, advisers are required to adapt to standards and conditions of personal security that depart from the ADF's usual *modus operandi*. In Sierra Leone, force protection was provided initially by a company of Gurkhas in support of the deployed teams, with contingency plans for extraction utilising United Nations or privately contracted helicopters. However, the force protection company was eventually withdrawn and military advisory staff were forced to improvise plans for evacuation based on escape and evasion in the case of mutiny or rebellion. One aspect of these contingency plans involved heading north by vehicle towards the Sierra Leone – Guinea border in the event that extraction by air was not possible. The biggest threat faced by military advisers in Sierra Leone was that of capture by rebel forces in the event of the security situation deteriorating.

A second requirement is the need for efficient medical evacuation procedures in order to maintain the confidence of the advisers who may be working in regions with poor hospital facilities. In the south-east of Sierra Leone, there was a high threat from Lassa fever, a rat-borne disease with symptoms similar to the deadly African Ebola virus. A British medic serving in the area contracted Lassa fever, and only rapid evacuation from Sierra Leone to Britain saved his life.

A third consideration involved in advisory missions concerns the issue of deployment duration. Currently, six months is the accepted duration of deployments in the ADF. However, for advisory operations, it is arguable that twelve-month deployment is required in order to permit an effective relationship to be formed with both indigenous troops and the local populace.

CONCLUSION

The use of military advisers and training teams represents an effective means of 'military diplomacy' and international engagement. Advisory teams also have the potential to provide the Australian Army and the ADF with an improved capacity in the area of cultural knowledge, especially if such missions are employed in the Asia-Pacific region in the future. Given the new conditions of the War on Terror, advisory teams may be an excellent measure of our commitment to the development of improved security in our region.

It needs to be appreciated, however, that advisory missions place heavy demands on deployed personnel. Consequently, there is a need for careful selection based on individual merit. Consideration should also be given to reinvigorating the predeployment training of selected individuals in order to ensure that they are adequately prepared for the rigours of life as an adviser in a foreign country. Although it might be argued that the ADF has succeeded without specialist training for advisory roles in the recent past, the author would contend that we have been fortunate that no major incidents have occurred to test this proposition.

By reinstituting appropriate training such as the military adviser's course, we can ensure the quality of the adviser while fulfilling our duty of care towards the individuals deployed on such operations. Finally, the issue of doctrine for advisory missions needs to be addressed in order to ensure that we adequately prepare our personnel for future operations. Ultimately, careful selection procedures, advanced training courses and good doctrine will help Australian service personnel deployed in advisory roles. In the context of advisory operations, such measures will assist in maintaining our excellent reputation for military professionalism and promote our influence both globally and regionally.

ENDNOTES

1 Department of Defence, *Defence Annual Report 2001–02*, October 2002, p. 114.
2 Ian McNeill, *The Team—Australian Army Advisers in Vietnam 1962–1972*, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, Qld, 1984, p. 24.
3 McNeill, *The Team*, p. 24.
4 Author's discussion with Warrant Officer Class Two Kevin Carlin (Royal Scots, British Army), Adviser 4th Battalion RSLAF in 2003.
5 Personal communication from Major T. Curtis, 4 September 2003.

THE AUTHOR

Captain G. A. Chisnall is a graduate of the Australian Defence Force Academy, the Royal Military College, Duntroon and the Australian Defence Force School of Languages, where he studied Khmer. He served in the 2nd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, with the International Force in East Timor. Other postings include the 25th/49th Battalion, Royal Queensland Regiment and deployment as a battalion adviser in Sierra Leone with the International Military Advisory Training Team from August 2002 to March 2003. Captain Chisnall is currently posted as an instructor to the Royal Military College, Duntroon.

REBUILDING THE SOLOMONS

A CASE STUDY IN DEVELOPING PRINCIPLES FOR PERMISSIVE INTERVENTION

MICHAEL O'CONNOR

The Australian Government's decision to go to the assistance of the beleaguered government of the Solomon Islands represents an interesting case of a 'permissive intervention'. Such an intervention may be defined as a situation in which a government requests assistance in restoring order in circumstances where normal governance and the ability to maintain law and order has broken down. Missions of this nature pose particular challenges to civil–military organisation and liaison support. In this respect, we can learn much from the recent experience in the Solomon Islands in such areas as defence aid to the civil power, military–police relations and, above all, in the realm of civil affairs.

THE BACKGROUND TO THE SOLOMONS CRISIS

The Solomon Islands is an archipelago of ten large islands and four groups of small islands in the South-West Pacific, with a total, mostly forested, land area of some 28 000 km² and a population of some 520 000, consisting mostly of Melanesians. In 1978, the Solomon Islands became an independent nation within the British Commonwealth after almost a century as a British protectorate. It has a democratic system of government based on a unicameral parliament of fifty single-member constituencies, with some devolution to nine provincial assemblies. There is no

strong system of political parties, and eighteen Members of Parliament are independents. Despite this situation and frequent changes of government, the country has until recently been politically stable.

Until the late 1990s, the Solomon Islands was a Pacific mini-state dependent on a limited range of primary exports and foreign aid for its economic existence. The great bulk of the population was concentrated in rural villages as subsistence farmers, while economic growth was hampered by the reality of a rapidly growing population. Alongside a rural subsistence economy was the problem of urbanisation. The capital of the Solomon Islands, Honiara, was increasingly plagued by urbanisation caused by a surge of partially educated and usually unemployed squatters from outlying areas of the country.

National security was vested in the Royal Solomon Islands Police, and in the absence of external enemies, there were no armed forces—at least until a spill-over from Papua New Guinea's Bougainville conflict sparked a move to build a nascent defence force within the police force. During the 1990s, social unrest in the Solomons was fuelled by land hunger and the pressures on land availability, propelled not only by population growth and by lack of modern agricultural techniques, but also by an increase in the numbers of squatters on traditional lands around the capital. Many of the squatters came from the neighbouring large island of Malaita, regarded by other Solomon Islanders as the home of an assertive and overconfident people, who in Papua New Guinea would be called 'big heads'. Resentment at the influx of squatters by local landowners on the home island of Guadalcanal generated attempts to expel the interlopers and led in turn to retaliatory resistance by the Malaitan squatters. This social unrest was compounded by the fact that a large proportion of the police force, including the mini-defence force, were Malaitans who tended to ally themselves with the various squatters' militia forces, taking their relatively advanced weapons with them.

Faced by what was, in effect, a mutiny by its only security force, the elected government of the Solomon Islands lost control of events in mid-2000. The then Prime Minister, Bartholomew Ulufa'alu, appealed to Australia for help in restoring internal security. Initially, the Australian Government declined to intervene but did conduct an evacuation of Australians and other expatriates. Following the resignation of Prime Minister Ulufa'alu, the Australian Government facilitated the negotiation of a peace agreement, including a supervised surrender of weapons, between the warring militias and the police. It became clear, however, that the most significant weapons were not surrendered into the custody of peace monitors, and over the succeeding three years, the island of Guadalcanal became plagued by a low-grade insurgency. There was a collapse of law and order in Honiara, a flight of capital from the country and an effective 1500 per cent devaluation of the Solomon dollar.

THE 2003 MISSION TO THE SOLOMONS

In July 2003, at the request of the Solomon Islands Government and endorsed unanimously by its Parliament, the Australian Government provided a combined military and police force of some 2000 personnel, and a number of administrative experts to assist in the restoration of internal security and a stable administration.

Australia's involvement is a clear case of a permissive intervention, a phenomenon that may occur more frequently in the future as advanced states within the international system grapple with the issue of rescuing countries that fall into endemic disorder. The recent cases of Haiti and Sierra Leone spring to mind. The danger of a collapsed state in an age of non-state actors and networked operations is that such countries might be used as a base for criminal or terrorist groups. The classic case of this phenomenon was Afghanistan, where al-Qa'ida was able to hide behind the legal sovereignty of the Taliban regime and pursue a global terrorist campaign. Preventing such situations is clearly in the West's long-term interest. While the crisis in the Solomons certainly resembles that in Sierra Leone or Haiti rather than Afghanistan, the conditions of disorder in the island-state do pose a problem to Australia's national security. It is in our long-term interest to facilitate a stable Solomons Islands state whose system of parliamentary government succeeds. In the Solomons we are faced with the task of cooperative nation-building and re-establishing law and order.

Such a situation requires a subtle combination of enforcement, disarmament and civil–military cooperation. The smooth progress of Australia's mission to the Solomons demonstrates the most valuable lesson in any permissive intervention: the need for popular support. Widespread popular support from the Solomons people has proven to be critical to both the success of the intervention force and to the credibility of the Solomon Islands Government.

> The danger of a collapsed state in an age of non-state actors and networked operations is that such countries might be used as a base for criminal or terrorist groups.

Although media reporting in Australia has tended to focus on the restoration of internal security by Australian police supported by ADF elements, it is the task of restoring the administrative structure that is arguably the key to long-term success in the Solomons. Administrative reconstruction is, however, not an undertaking for a handful of senior experts but for a corps of Australian-led administrative personnel from all levels, working with their Solomon Islands colleagues. The challenge in reconstruction lies in demonstrating that government is community-wide

and not simply a mechanism that is confined to the urban population of the capital. Permissive intervention may involve a degree of shared sovereignty and therefore nation-building tasks need to be applied with a recognition that such missions will take place in a globalised world and under media scrutiny.

Permissive interventions such as that undertaken in the Solomons require a balancing of the modernisation imperative against the realities and needs of indigenous governance. Part of the problem in failed states has been the problem of sustaining structures of administration that were bequeathed by colonialism. These structures were often strong but too complex in their workings, and required a cadre of apolitical and skilled civil servants to sustain them—a feature that was often missing in many societies where ethnicity was a major feature of politics. New states such as the Solomons and Sierra Leone faced difficulty in building strong democracies in the context of populations that were ethnically diverse and caught in the vice between subsistence agriculture and urbanisation.

As a result, governance often faltered as aspirations multiplied but were unmatched by administrative and economic growth. Aid programs that were excessively bureaucratised

> … nation-building tasks need to be applied with a recognition that such missions will take place in a globalised world and under media scrutiny.

in the interests of the donor or were not well administered by civil servants sometimes compounded these problems. A common pattern in failed states has been the steady erosion of health, education and developmental projects followed by a general decline in internal security.

Another problem contributing to the administrative and political decay of some new states was the character of the Cold War. The latter contributed to the rise of a socialist or nationalist ideology that was aligned either to the Eastern or Western bloc rather than to indigenous requirements. Non-alignment was sometimes an option for new states but, overall, the Cold War was not a positive influence on the evolution of many Third World countries that assumed their independence in the 1960s and 1970s.

What then is to be done in restoring failed states, and how? The answer does not lie in recolonisation but in finding solutions that are attuned to the problems of permissive intervention that we face in the 21st century. The Solomon Islands should be viewed by Australian security specialists as a case study in cooperative nation-building and ought to be seen as a basic template for future regional challenges of this nature.

The most obvious requirement in a permissive intervention is to resolve the question of legitimate authority. In the case of the Solomon Islands Government, there was a request for assistance made from Honiara to Canberra and, as a result, there was no question of Australia's acting unilaterally. Since there are two parties involved in a permissive intervention, there needs to be a clear understanding by both as to the limits of authority. If an intervention is to be effective, there needs to be substantial joint agreement on a wide range of political issues, defined by the basic objectives of the intervention.

If the objectives in a permissive intervention are simply to restore internal security and some degree of fiscal and administrative discipline, such an approach may succeed in deferring a long-term resolution of the main problems of stability. What is required in an intervention to which two or more parties agree is a clear understanding of the main objectives to be achieved, along with a timetable that lays down milestones and appropriate end states. Without such joint understanding, the likelihood for future disagreement and failure is high.

In a permissive intervention, the issue of an overarching political, legal and military authority is not one that should be ignored or lightly dismissed. For instance, a reconstruction initiative might consider principles that cover the following six issues. First, there must be a recognition that the restoration of internal security is the primary objective of the intervention mission. Second, there has to be an understanding that civilian control of the process is fundamental to success. A third factor must be a recognition that there can be only one authorised armed force in the country. This may be constituted as a combined military–police force, but the key rule is that there must be no exceptions. Robust rules of engagement may be necessary to permit forcible disarmament of rebel individuals or groups. Fourth, operations committees comprising the local police and military commanders need to be created and chaired by a senior civilian administrator. Fifth, every military operation or patrol needs to be accompanied by an indigenous police officer as an adviser. Finally, the role of the military should be strictly limited to supporting the police and the civil authorities.

In practice, the restoration of internal security in the Solomons has been a practical success largely because of the presence of popular support. If, in the longer term, the primary task of the intervention process is the restoration of effective government services, then macro-economic tasks will have to be addressed. These might encompass examining the stability of government finances, and stabilising the economic infrastructure, the currency, and the civil administration. A restoration of governance, of course, goes far beyond the provision of internal security. Good civil administration requires service delivery in such fields as policing, agricultural extension, forestry and mining, along with social services such as public health and education. Returning administration to a society such as the Solomons, which

is strongly based on a rural society of villages, demands what might be called a 'dirty boots' approach. This type of approach would involve the employment of such personnel as administrators, policemen, teachers, health workers and agricultural extension officers, who can and will work to improve the living conditions of local villagers.

A main cause of social unrest has often lain in attempts to rationalise land rights in Third World nations. In the author's view, the Solomon Islands' problems are rooted in a basic clash between traditional land rights and the pressures on land acquisition imposed by a rapidly growing population. In this respect, the challenge is clear: in the future, Solomons society must modernise traditional agricultural practices while the administrative and legal systems must become capable of resolving disputes. Land issues cannot be legislated out of existence or ignored; they are real and, in the minds of traditional and aspiring owners, remain of fundamental and overriding importance.

> In the author's view, the Solomon Islands' problems are rooted in a basic clash between traditional land rights and the pressures on land acquisition imposed by a rapidly growing population.

As in parts of Africa, the overriding interest of villagers in Melanesia has been the security of their land. An administration that fails to recognise this interest or deal effectively with disputes over land simply invites at best social unrest and at worst armed rebellion. Providing a group of senior Australian administrative experts to assist in the reconstruction of the Solomons will be valuable. It will, however, not be enough unless junior and middle-ranking indigenous civil servants can be persuaded to work at the regional and village levels, thus bringing government to the people and people to the government. Another useful Australian aid program that might be developed for use in Melanesia would be to fund a special team of academics and administrators familiar with Melanesian culture in order to assist in developing an effective public administration system and associated training programs for middle- and senior-level public servants.

CONCLUSION

By comparison with the East Timor commitment, any permissive intervention in the future might take several forms. As with other such operations in the Caribbean or Africa, regional nations or friendly powers have come together in order to share sovereign authority and the costs of government with a local administration. In any event, considerable cultural sensitivity needs to be exercised in such circumstances since the aim should be to assist and supplement, but never to replace, indigenous sovereignty.

The Solomon Islands intervention is an interesting case in that it provides a study in collaborative nation-building at the beginning of the new century. While such a task is more civil than military in nature, the military are important as the ultimate guarantor of security. As a consequence, there is probably a good case in the future for the establishment of an inter-agency taskforce to develop a coherent policy for permissive interventions. In the case of the Australian Army, there is clearly an important future role for the nascent Civil Affairs project.

THE AUTHOR

Michael O'Connor, AM, was Executive Director of the Australian Defence Association between 1981 and 2003 and recently conducted a wide-ranging study of international peace operations. He served as a district administrator in pre-independence Papua New Guinea and is a graduate of the Australian School of Pacific Administration. Mr O'Connor also served as a full-time reservist on the staff of the Director of Naval Intelligence and is currently a member of the Editorial Advisory Board of the *Australian Army Journal*.

THE REALIST TRADITION OF AUSTRALIAN–AMERICAN MILITARY RELATIONS

MAJOR RUSSELL PARKIN

Twenty-five centuries ago, in his *History of the Peloponnesian War*, the Athenian soldier–historian, Thucydides, wrote that the three strongest motives for states to engage in war were 'fear, honour and interest'.[1] Athens went to war with Sparta because the growth of the latter's power threatened the status and interests of the former. In later centuries, Thucydides' formula influenced both the work of Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes, and by the 20th century had become the philosophical basis of the realist tradition in international relations. This article examines some of the military aspects of the alliance between Australia and the United States, employing the Thucydidean *Realpolitik* formula that nations are motivated in their calculations by a combination of 'fear, honour and interest'.

FEAR: THE DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA

The element of fear has always been a powerful factor in determining Australian security policy. The combination of a large continent and a small population in an Asia-Pacific location relatively isolated from English-speaking nations with a similar ethnic, cultural and political heritage created a sense of insecurity in Australia for much of the 20th century. As a result, Australia sought security not through isolation or neutrality, but through cooperation and alliance with greater powers, first Britain

and then the United States. Australia fought as part of a coalition in both world wars alongside both the British and the Americans. The decline of British power in the Far East, signified by the Japanese offensive of 1941–42, led to Prime Minister John Curtin's appeal for assistance from the United States. This event marked the beginning of the Australian–American security relationship, although such a relationship was not formalised until the ANZUS Treaty of 1951.

It is useful to understand how Australia viewed its strategic position in the lead-up to the ANZUS Treaty. In 1946, Australia undertook a review of its post-1945 strategic position. The Australian Chiefs of Staff drew up an appreciation of the nation's

> The chiefs … concluded that a policy of strategic isolation based on continental defence would only lead to disaster.

strategic circumstances in which they stated that the choices open to Australia were policies of either isolation or cooperation. The chiefs rejected what they called the fallacy of strategic isolation because, as 'an island continent with a small population and limited resources, [Australia] is unable to defend herself unaided against a major power'.[2] They concluded that a policy of strategic isolation based on continental defence would only lead to disaster. National security policy, they argued, 'must be built on co-operation with other nations'.[3] It followed, then, that the nation's preparations for war 'must be such that her forces can co-operate with those of other nations [and that] overseas commitments may be necessary and in fact unavoidable in … a future war'.[4]

The 1946 Appreciation outlined a clear need for Australia to conceive of its defence in alliance terms. This requirement was increased by the outbreak of the Cold War at the end of the 1940s when Soviet and Chinese communism appeared to pose a monolithic threat to the West. During the 1950s, under the Menzies Government, Australia developed a 'forward defence' policy aimed at keeping war and revolution as far away as possible from Australia's shores and avoiding any repetition of the events of 1942—the only occasion when Australia's physical security seemed imperilled.

Fear of communism led the Menzies Government to seek a long-term security relationship with the United States. In Cold War political conditions, Menzies was determined that, if revolutionary war was to threaten Asia, the business of Australian foreign policy was 'to see that we enter it with great and powerful friends'.[5] By identifying her national interests firmly with those of the United States as the guardian of the liberal West, Australia sought to underwrite ultimate guarantees of her own national security. It was against this background that Australia signed the ANZUS Treaty in 1951, formally establishing the Australian–American alliance.

HONOUR: 'A FRATERNITY OF GREAT MUTUAL ADVANTAGE'

Honour has been a major factor in Australia's approach to its relationship with the United States. In a modern sense, honour should be interpreted as a willingness by Australia to engage in the defence of common Western liberal democratic values. In 1951, when Australia, the United States and New Zealand signed the ANZUS Treaty, military personnel from all three nations were fighting as part of the United Nations Forces in Korea in defence against communist aggression. The common military effort in Korea by Australia and the United States merely confirmed a deep and honourable bond between Australian and American fighting men that had begun on the battlefields of France in World War I and had continued in the South-West Pacific during World War II.

In his postwar memoir, *Australian Victories in France 1918*, General Sir John Monash recalled how, at the battle of Hamel, Australian and American soldiers had become 'blood brothers'. Monash wrote:

> Among other aspects of this battle [Hamel] which was worthy of mention is the fact that it was the first occasion in the war that American troops fought in an offensive battle. The contingent … [that] joined us acquitted themselves most gallantly and were ever after received by the Australians as blood brothers—a fraternity which operated to great mutual advantage.[6]

Just over two decades later, in the South-West Pacific, this 'fraternity of mutual advantage' was renewed as American and Australian forces fought the Japanese—this time under the leadership of an American, General Douglas MacArthur.

Despite its common cause, the Australian–American military relationship in the South-West Pacific theatre was not always a happy one. For the first two years of the campaign, Australians formed the majority of MacArthur's ground forces; yet the United States Supreme Commander did everything in his power to keep Australian officers from commanding American formations. Senior Australian officers, many of whom had already seen combat in the Middle East, found MacArthur's attitude perplexing. As General Robert Eichelberger, one of MacArthur's army commanders, noted, '[the Australians] though they were usually too polite to say so, considered the Americans to be—at best—inexperienced theorists'.[7]

… Monash recalled how, at the battle of Hamel, Australian and American soldiers had become 'blood brothers'.

While this would not be the last time that Australian and American forces would have to confront professional differences, the frictions generated by variations in doctrine or operational practices were generally overcome by the exercise of goodwill and commonsense in a common cause. For the most part, there were few barriers to effective military cooperation between the armed forces of both nations. Indeed, long before the outbreak of the Cold War, US and Australian servicemen had developed a mutual respect for each other's qualities as soldiers.

In the Korean War of 1950–53, there was a similar degree of mutual respect between Australian and American fighting formations. In October 1950, the 3rd Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment (3 RAR) took part in the pursuit operation, which followed MacArthur's victory at Inchon and the breakout from Pusan. The Australian battalion was the lead force in the attempt to link up with the US 187 Airborne Regimental Combat Team, which had been parachuted behind the retreating North Koreas to act as a blocking force.

Attacking a numerically superior force in extended line, Diggers from 3 RAR shot and bayoneted their way through the North Koreans to link up with the Americans. In the course of this action, they killed 150 of the enemy, wounded 239 and captured 200 prisoners.[8] Shortly afterwards, 3 RAR was awarded a Presidential Citation for its performance at the Battle of Kapyong in April 1951. In this action, 3 RAR, A Company of the 72nd US Heavy Tank Battalion and the 2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, supported by New Zealand artillery and the Middlesex Battalion, halted a Chinese offensive aimed at retaking Seoul.

A decade after Korea, defence of common values saw both the United States and Australia enter operations in Vietnam. In late-April 1965, Menzies committed a battalion group to the war in Vietnam. As Menzies put it, a communist takeover of South Vietnam 'would be a direct military threat to Australia and all the countries of South and South-East Asia'.[9] The unit sent to Vietnam was the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (1 RAR). Because of the light equipment scales of the Australian infantry, 1 RAR was attached to the US 173rd Airborne Brigade (Separate) and the defence of the air base at Bienhoa. The commander of the 173rd, Brigadier General 'Butch' Williamson, recalled that the Australians had 'a good reputation for jungle fighting' and that he 'was glad to have them aboard'.[10] One Australian officer found much to admire in Williamson's 'style and supreme confidence and battle experience'.[11] He also noted, however, 'a dangerous contempt for the guerrilla and little understanding of the Viet Cong's objectives and how he fights.'[12]

In fact, no amount of mutual admiration could mask the significant professional differences between the two armies in Vietnam. Essentially, the US Army, which was trained for operations with North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) on the Central European front, concentrated on operations at the battalion level and

above, while Australian training and experience in counterinsurgency operations stressed the importance of operations at the battalion, platoon and even squad level. Australian Official Historian and Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV) veteran, Ian McNeill, believed that these variations in national style came down to emphasis on different principles of war: concentration of force by the Americans and economy of effort by the Australians.[13] These differences caused a certain amount of frustration for both coalition partners.

From mid-1966, for political and military reasons, the Australian Government increased its commitment in Vietnam to a two- (and later three-) battalion task-force. A consequence of this escalation was that the Australian force now comprised large numbers of short-term conscript national servicemen, as well as long-term Regular Army volunteers. The 1st Australian Task Force (1 ATF) was allocated its own tactical area of responsibility in the province of Phouc Tuy under the operational control of the US Army's II Field Force Vietnam. While US commanders were generally content to let the Australians conduct their own war in Phouc Tuy, on occasion the differences in doctrine and operational style became a source of annoyance.

During 1966 and 1967 the Australians were slowly consolidating their hold on the province and weakening the Viet Cong's grip on the population. However, in January 1967, on a visit to 1 ATF, General Westmoreland was critical of the Australian approach, labelling it as 'very inactive'.[14] Two years later, another senior US officer, Lieutenant General Julian J. Ewell, a passionate believer in attrition warfare and a 'body count' strategy, expressed the opinion that Phouc Tuy was a 'disaster' because the Australians were failing to meet his daily quota of kills.[15] Yet, as one senior Australian officer explained,

> In his memoir … General Westmoreland generously refers to the Australians as 'the most thoroughly professional foreign force serving in Vietnam.'

> For the last two years the operations of the force [1 ATF] had been almost a waste of time—the enemy had been neutralised to such an extent that seeking them was like looking for a needle in a haystack.[16]

Coalition operations are noted for the many difficulties that they present. Churchill's remark that 'in working with allies it sometimes happens that they develop opinions of their own' aptly covers the difficulties caused by differences in doctrine and techniques between the Australian and US armies in Vietnam.[17] Despite occasional problems, however, the Australian–American relationship was a generally

harmonious one. In his memoir, *A Soldier Reports*, General Westmoreland gener-ously refers to the Australians as ' the most thoroughly professional foreign force serving in Vietnam.' [18] Indeed, he compares them with the post-Versailles German Army 'in which even men in the ranks might have been leaders in some less capable force.' [19]

INTEREST: 'ALL THE WAY WITH LBJ'

In July 1966, during a speech made in the grounds of the White House, Australian Prime Minister Harold Holt told his listeners that, when it came to Australia's commitment to Vietnam, his country was 'all the way with LBJ'. Holt's clear intention was to indicate support for US policies in Vietnam, once again linking America's interests with those of Australia. Yet, despite Holt's rhetorical flourish, Australia's troop commitment remained modest and consistent with national rather than American interests.

In the unpredictable environment of the Cold War, the nature and size of Australia's commitment to Vietnam was commensurate with her national interest in regional stability and a prudent counter to communist aggression in South-East Asia. However, the events of the late 1960s and early 1970s illustrated how rapid changes in the international environment can alter the manner in which a nation such as Australia perceives and pursues its interests.

> … despite Holt's rhetorical flourish, Australia's troop commitment remained modest and consistent with national rather than American interests.

A statement on future US policy in Asia made by President Nixon on Guam in July 1969 is now barely remembered in the United States, but it proved to be a watershed in Australian security policy. In essence, the Nixon Doctrine announced that America's allies in the Asia-Pacific region would need to take on the principal responsibility for their own defence.

This new and apparently restricted definition of US interests in South-East Asia had immediate implications for the ANZUS Treaty because the extent to which these new conditions applied to Australia was unclear. The interpretation placed on the Nixon Doctrine by Australian policy-makers in the two decades following the Vietnam War was that, with regard to the highly remote contingency of a 'funda-mental' threat to Australian security, the nation could have every confidence in large-scale US support. In matters of lower-level threats, however, Australia would need to be self-reliant. While US support for Australia through ANZUS had thus

become in one sense 'conditional', the Nixon Doctrine implied that, to gain any support, allied states, including Australia, were still required to maintain their alliance responsibilities.

The 1969 Nixon Doctrine unravelled the basic logic on which Australia's policy of forward defence had been based. With Australia's major ally now unlikely to commit forces to military operations in South-East Asia, the deployment of Australian forces into the region became less important. American rapprochement with China after 1970 also significantly decreased Cold War tensions in Asia, undermining the necessity for regional pacts such as SEATO, which rapidly became moribund. Without a discernible threat, but still feeling vulnerable, Australia was forced to review her strategic circumstances and developed a national security policy to meet these new and challenging conditions.

The very conditions that had undermined the rationale of forward defence now allowed Australia to pursue a national security policy of self-reliance based on a force structure designed for continental defence. The ability to pursue this policy of self-reliance and continental defence was significantly aided by the stability of the Suharto regime in Indonesia, which secured Australia's northern approaches. In addition, Australian–American rapprochement with China and a progressive lessening of Cold War tensions around the world enabled continental defence to be sustained as the cornerstone of Australian defence policy for over two decades.

By the 1990s, however, rapid changes in the international security environment that had begun with the end of the Cold War greatly undermined continental defence. As international security again became fluid and unpredictable, recalling the 1950s, circumstances suggested that it was once more in Australia's interests to deploy her armed forces overseas—as in East Timor in 1999. In 2001, in the wake of the 11 September terrorist attacks on the United States, Australia invoked the ANZUS Treaty and sent Special Air Service soldiers to the campaign against al-Qa'ida in Afghanistan. As the leading US scholar, Eliot Cohen, has recently written, 'the partnership first sealed at the battle of Hamel has been renewed in blood through World War II, Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf and Afghanistan'.[20] In the case of the 2003 Iraq crisis, Australia, along with Britain, became America's major ally—a clear indication that in important matters of international security, the national interests of Australia and the United States are seen to coincide.

CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF AUSTRALIAN–US DEFENCE COOPERATION

Thucydides, father of the realist tradition in statecraft, wrote that 'the events which happened in the past and which (human nature being what it is) will, at some time or other and in much the same ways, be repeated in the future'.[21] In other words, the past will always shape the future. Australia's military history since World War II demonstrates how Thucydides' triangular political logic of fear, honour and interest has dictated national involvement in wars as a coalition partner of the United States. In general, even though there may not be common agreement between Canberra and Washington, there has always been a basic correlation of interests between Australia and America.

Looking back on his career, Sir Robert Menzies considered the ANZUS Treaty to be the most significant foreign policy achievement of his sixteen-year premiership. Menzies liked to characterise the treaty, and the close partnership between America and Australia that it represented,

> Menzies liked to characterise the treaty, and the close partnership between America and Australia that it represented, as a contract …

as a contract—one 'based on the utmost goodwill, the utmost good faith and unqualified friendship. Each of us will stand by it'.[22] His confidence was founded on the knowledge that liberal, democratic nations that face shared fears tend to honour common values and work to protect the same interests. As Richard Armitage, the US Deputy Secretary of State, put it in August 2003 in the wake of the war in Iraq, in words that surely would have pleased Menzies:

> Australia and my nation have many shared common characteristics—history and culture, politics and demography—but I think nowhere do we have better ties that bind than in the twin pillars of perspective and action ... There will be great continuity in our cause—this cause which was forged out of the bones of our fathers and grandfathers and now of the blood of our children.[23]

ENDNOTES

1   Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. R. Crawley, ed. R. B. Strassler, The Free Press, New York, 1996, p. 43.

2   National Archives of Australia (NAA), Canberra, Item 1645/9, Series A5954/69, An Appreciation by the Chiefs of Staff on the Strategical Position of Australia, February 1946, Part 1, Introduction, paragraph 6.

3   *Ibid.*

4   *Ibid.*

5   R. G. Menzies, *The Measure of the Years*, Cassell, Melbourne, 1970, p. 44.

6   John Monash, *Australian Victories in France 1918*, 2nd edn, Hutchinson, London, 1920, p. 64.

7   Robert Eichelberger, *Our Jungle Road to Tokyo*, Viking Press, New York, 1950, p. 29.

8   See B. O'Dowd, *In Valiant Company*, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, Qld, 2000, pp. 11–12.

9   F. F. Crowley, *Modern Australia in Documents 1939–70*, vol. 2, Wren Publishing, Melbourne, 1973, p. 480.

10   Bob Breen, *First to Fight: Australian Diggers, N.Z. Kiwis and US Paratroopers in Vietnam, 1965–66*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1988, p. 10.

11   John Essex-Clark, *Maverick Soldier: An Infantryman's Story*, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1991, p. 6.

12   *Ibid.*

13   Ian McNeill, 'Australian Army Advisers: Perceptions of Enemies and Allies', in *War: Australia and Vietnam*, ed. K. Maddock, Harper & Row Publishers, Sydney, 1987, p. 56.

14   Ian McNeill, *To Long Tan: The Australian Army and the Vietnam War 1950–1966, The Official History of Australia's Involvement in South-East Asian Conflicts, 1948–75*, Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial, Sydney, 1993, pp. 427–9.

15   Jeffrey Grey, *The Australian Centenary History of Defence, Vol. I: The Australian Army*, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2001, p. 220.

16   Lieutenant General D. Dunstan, quoted in R. W. Cable, *An Independent Command: Command and Control of the 1st Australian Task Force in Vietnam*, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 2000, p. 89.

17   W. S. Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate*, MacMillan, London, 1950, p. 376.

18   W. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, Da Capo Press, New York, p. 258.

19   *Ibid.*

20   Eliot Cohen, 'World won't get fooled again', *Australian*, 17 February 2003.

21   Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. R. Warner, Penguin Books, London, 1972, p. 48.

22   R. G. Menzies, *The Measure of the Years*, Cassell, Melbourne, 1970, p. 54.

23   Richard Armitage, 'Bound to stick together', *Weekend Australian*, 16–17 August 2003.

THE AUTHOR

Major Russell Parkin is a graduate of the Australian Command and Staff College and has served in the Directorate of Army Research and Analysis and the Land Warfare Studies Centre. He holds a PhD from the University of New South Wales and in 2001, was a Fellow at the United States Military Academy's annual seminar on Military History. In March 2003, Major Parkin was posted to the Australian National Headquarters in Qatar as the leader of a tri-Service field history team to record Australia's participation in the war in Iraq. He is currently the CDF Fellow posted to the Australian Defence College.

STRATEGIC COUSINS?

AUSTRALIAN AND CANADIAN MILITARY OUTLOOKS COMPARED

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN C. BLAXLAND

Both Canada and Australia have similarly sized armed forces and spend virtually the same amount of their gross domestic product (1.9 per cent) on defence.[1] Both countries also possess military cultures that have been shaped by the experience of the British Empire and by the experience of Anglo-American coalition warfare. Yet Australia and Canada are rarely compared in contemporary military literature. The differences between Canada (with its North American location and its membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)) and Australia (with its Asia-Pacific position and its membership of ANZUS) seem to suggest that strategic differences far outweigh strategic similarities.

Despite these perceptions, this article argues that, in military terms, Australia and Canada continue to be 'strategic cousins'. There are persistent similarities in military heritage, force development programs and operational methods between the Australian and Canadian militaries. When these similarities are combined, they provide a lasting basis for increased cooperation in the 21st century.

AUSTRALIA AND CANADA: THE MILITARY LEGACY OF EMPIRE

The first half of the 20th century saw a remarkable similarity between the Australian and Canadian military experience in serving the British Empire. Both Canada and the Australian colonies contributed contingents of volunteers to Britain's conflicts, such as the Boer War of 1899–1902. During the Boer War in South Africa, Australian and Canadian mounted units fought alongside each other as part of General E. T. H. Hutton's 1st Mounted Rifles Brigade.[2] In World War I, Australia and Canada again underwent similar military experiences fighting in France. On the Western Front in 1917–18, Australians and Canadians earned formidable reputations as the shock troops of the British Empire, notably at the battle of Amiens on 8 August 1918. At Amiens, on the famed 'black day of the German Army', both the Australian Corps (under General Sir John Monash) and the Canadian Corps (under General Sir Arthur Currie) played major roles in defeating the German Army in the field.[3]

In World War II, although Australian and Canadian forces fought in different theatres for most of the conflict—Australia in the Pacific and the Canadians in Europe—both countries were in the position of being junior partners in the Grand Alliance led by the United States. The armed forces of both countries saw fierce fighting: Australia at Milne Bay and on the Kokoda Track, and Canada at Dieppe and Normandy. During the Korean War, Canadians and Australians were part of an American-led United Nations (UN) force. As in World War I, Australian and Canadian units were deployed alongside each other, this time as part of the 27th Commonwealth Brigade. When the latter fought against the Chinese at the Battle of Kapyong in April 1951, both the Canadian 2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, and the 3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (3RAR), earned United States Presidential Unit Citations for their actions.

After Kapyong, Australia and Canada both contributed forces to the 1st Commonwealth Division in Korea. An Australian-born World War II commander, Brigadier John M. Rockingham, led Canada's main contribution, the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade.[4] The Commonwealth Division consisted of three brigades: one British, another Canadian and the third predominantly Australian (with British and New Zealand troops included). These brigades were deployed in defensive positions along the Imjin and Sami-ch'on rivers near the Korean 38th

> *The first half of the 20th century saw a remarkable similarity between the Australian and Canadian military experience in serving the British Empire.*

Parallel—a region that included the notorious 'Hook' combat zone. Canadian troops also supported Australians in the Battle of Maryang Sang, one of the most important actions in the history of the Australian Regular Army.[5]

AFTER KOREA: DIVERGING AUSTRALIAN AND CANADIAN STRATEGIC INTERESTS

After the Korean War, the common military experience of Australia and Canada began to dissipate. In the wake of Britain's decline as a world power and the shedding of imperial responsibilities, Canada turned its defence policy towards the United States and Europe, as symbolised by its membership of NATO. The 'long peace' of the Cold War in Europe also encouraged Canada to experiment with its military organisation. In the 1960s, Canada integrated its separate military services into a single, unified structure. Moreover, during the Cold War era, Canadian forces began to develop a strong national peacekeeping profile.

Canada's modern peacekeeping reputation began in Egypt in 1956 during the Anglo-French intervention at Suez. Canada helped resolve the Suez crisis by providing troops under a UN mandate, and the

> After the Korean War, the common military experience of Australia and Canada began to dissipate.

Canadian External Affairs Minister, Lester B. Pearson, won the Nobel Peace Prize for his diplomatic efforts. Among others, John English has argued that failure to preserve the institutional basis of Canadian military professionalism in terms of maintaining the integrity of the single services and 'ceaseless involvement' in peacekeeping led to the Canadian military's becoming a tool of the External Affairs Department. For critics such as English, the path trodden by the Canadian military after Korea reached its logical conclusion in 1993 in Somalia, when soldiers from the elite Canadian Airborne Regiment, in defiance of all the tenets of military professionalism, tortured a prisoner to death.[6]

Australia's military path after Korea was quite different from that of Canada's. In the 1950s, Australia transferred its strategic attention to Asia, negotiated the ANZUS Treaty and engaged in a series of anticommunist counterinsurgency campaigns. The Australian military also retained a much more traditional military outlook emphasising warfighting skills. As a result, during the Cold War, while Canada focused on its role in NATO and on peacekeeping, Australia was involved in protracted military conflict in Malaya, Borneo and Vietnam. By the time the Cold War ended in the late 1980s, it seemed as though Australia and Canada had developed very different strategic outlooks. By the time of the Somalia crisis in 1993, it appeared that, in

comparison with the Australian Defence Force (ADF), the Canadian Forces (CF) were overly concerned with peace operations and were insufficiently 'muscular' in their military outlook. In the post–Cold War era, it seemed to observers such as Graeme Cheeseman that Australia and Canada had little in common militarily.[7]

Yet, despite differing strategic outlooks and policy agendas, there remained areas of useful cooperation between the Australian and Canadian armed forces. For instance, in East Timor in 1999, the International Force in East Timor's (INTERFET) 'Westforce' (based on the Australian 3rd Brigade), embraced a reinforced company of Canadian 'Van Doos', New Zealander troops, British Gurkhas and some Irish Rangers. In some respects, Westforce is reminiscent of the multinational 27th Commonwealth Brigade during the Korean War. In 2001–02, Canadian and Australian troops also served together in the campaign against the Taliban regime and the al-Qa'ida movement in Afghanistan. Moreover, in the 1990s, Canada's approach to interoperability also tended to parallel that of Australia's and was, and remains, facilitated by membership of the quadripartite America–Britain–Canada–Australia (ABCA) armies working group.[8] For both Australia and Canada, ABCA encourages doctrinal and materiel–technical standardisation and provides opportunities to participate in field exercises at formation level and above.[9] Australian and Canadian military force structures and equipment inventories also reveal remarkable resemblances.

An examination of the force structures of the current ADF and CF reveals that there is a degree of similarity. Such similarity suggests that, if Australia and Canada were to be involved in a Korean-style campaign again, there would be good grounds for cooperation at every level. In terms of land forces, Australia and Canada both possess German-built Leopard 1 tanks, light armoured vehicles, and modified American M113 armoured personnel carrier variants. The regular land force of each country also embraces a three-brigade regular force structure supported by Special Forces and regionally based volunteer reserve (or militia) forces. Moreover, both the Australian Army and the Canadian Land Forces have maintained up to a battalion of airborne troops. Australia maintains a three-rifle company airborne battalion. Canada's three-rifle company battalion was disbanded in 1995 but has maintained the capability in dispersed company-level units. Australian Army and Canadian Land Force tactical command-and-control systems also bear a high degree of commonality and interoperability, due in part to the membership of both nations in the Multilateral Interoperability Program (MIP).[10]

> By the time the Cold War ended in the late 1980s, it seemed as though Australia and Canada had developed very different strategic outlooks.

In terms of air power assets, both the Royal Australian Air Force and the Royal Canadian Air Force use the FA/CF-18 (Hornet) fighter, the C130 (Hercules) and P3 (Orion/Aurora) aircraft.[11] More recently, both nations have joined the US Joint Strike Fighter Program as third-tier international partners, with a view to purchasing the joint-strike fighter as a 'next-generation' combat aircraft. Both Australia and Canada have also explored the prospect of acquiring larger transport aircraft in order to enable greater strategic lift of troops and equipment.

In terms of naval force structure, both the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) are remarkably similar organisations. For example, both the Australian and Canadian fleets have parallel two-ocean fleet configurations. Both navies possess almost an equal number of heli

> An examination of the force structures of the current Australian Defence Force (ADF) and Canadian Forces (CF) reveals that there is a degree of similarity.

copter-equipped frigates, replenishment ships, conventionally powered submarines, and coastal defence vessels. Both the RAN and the RCN have also achieved virtually the same degree of interoperability levels with the United States Navy (USN). Indeed, the Australian and Canadian fleets have become, in the words of one writer, 'as close to being fleet units of the USN as the [British] Admiralty [at the beginning of the 20th century] wished the new Dominion navies to be'.[12] Unlike Australia, however, Canada has a smaller fleet of patrol boats and no significant amphibious vessels.

In military terms, then, both Australia and Canada are middle powers with compatible medium-weight armed force structure and types of equipment. In one sense, the various similarities between the forces' equipment and organisations might be described as coincidental. From an historical perspective, however, the military parallels between Australia and Canada suggest that they are 'strategic cousins' due to the presence of many enduring geo-strategic fundamentals. It is these fundamentals of heritage, geographic size and population that have driven Canadians and Australians to develop force structures and acquire weapons and equipment with comparable capabilities.

Undoubtedly, in military terms, there remain numerous and significant differences between Australia and Canada. Three obvious differences that condition Canada's military outlook are proximity to the United States, the country's Anglo-French political tradition and its membership of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Unlike Australia's, Canada's strategic outlook is not affected by the 'tyranny of distance' since the guardian of Western civilisation and world order, the United States, is on the doorstep. On the other hand, Quebec's predominantly

French culture and language, along with a history of secessionist referenda, have made one of Canada's main concerns that of national unity. In this respect, Canada more closely resembles old South Africa rather than modern Australia. Between 1910 and 1961 differences between English South Africans and Afrikaners affected national unity and consensus on defence issues in ways not dissimilar to those between English and French Canadians. Membership of NAFTA also shapes Canada's strategic outlook by creating an American regional bloc based on the United States, Canada and Mexico.

One might argue that a combination of geography, politics and economics has made Canada comfortable with its region and therefore able to adopt a postmodern view of defence. Australia, on the other hand, does not enjoy such a benign region. The Asian economic crisis of the 1990s, the fall of the Suharto regime in Indonesia, the crises in East Timor and the Solomons, unrest in the South Pacific and the rise of political Islam in South-East Asia have no parallels in Canada's North American region. For this reason, Australia's defence policy and armed forces remain traditionally focused on military power and warfighting. In addition, the ANZUS alliance remains vital to Australia and the United States in a way that NATO does not since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Indeed, one might argue that it is not so much the ADF and the CF that are different as the policy processes at work that have shaped the destiny of the two armed forces over the past fifty years.

> … the remarkable military parallels between Australia and Canada suggest the presence of enduring geo-strategic fundamentals as 'strategic cousins'.

CONCLUSION

This article has argued that the armed forces of Canada and Australia have similar predispositions, force structures and common historical roots that provide a useful and ongoing basis for 21st-century cooperation. Although these similarities appear to be greatly outweighed by the strong geopolitical, political and economic policies of Australia and Canada, focused on the Asia-Pacific and the Americas respectively, they may yet prove useful in the early 21st century because of the unpredictability of events in the global 'war on terror'. The common ties and interests that led Australian and Canadian forces to work together in the first half of the 20th century from the Boer War to Korea—and to cooperate more recently in East Timor and Afghanistan—may increase in the future, given unforeseen operational requirements. In this sense, Australia and Canada are 'strategic cousins', albeit distant ones.

ENDNOTES

1   Canada and Australia spent US$7.6 billion on defence in 2002. See *The Military Balance 2002–2003*, IISS, London, 2002.

2   See A. J. Hill, *Chauvel of the Light Horse: A Biography of General Sir Harry Chauvel*, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1978, pp. 22–3 and 28–9; and Carman Miller, *Painting the Map Red: Canada and the South African War 1899–1902*, Canadian War Museum and McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal & Kingston, 1993, pp. 224–30.

3   Gregory Blaxland, *Amiens: 1918*, Frederick Muller, London, 1968, pp. 159, 163 and 191.

4   David Bercuson, *Blood on the Hills: The Canadian Army in the Korean War*, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1999, pp. 37–40.

5   Gregory Blaxland, *The Regiments Depart: A History of the British Army, 1945–1970*, William Kimber, London, 1971, p. 190.

6   John A. English, *Lament for an Army: the Decline of Canadian Military Professionalism*, Contemporary Affairs number 3, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto, 1998.

7   Graeme Cheeseman, *Canada's Post–Cold War Military Blues and its Lessons for Australia*, Working Paper no. 60, Australian Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, August 2000.

8   Grant A. Johansen, *The ABCA Program: Rhetoric to Reality*, The Occasional number 44, Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, Wiltshire, January 2002.

9   Major-General Bill Leach, 'ABCA and the Future Battlefield: A Canadian Perspective', in J. Mohan Malik (ed.), *The Future Battlefield*, Deakin University Press & Directorate of Army Research and Analysis, Geelong, 1997, pp. 263–70.

10 Personal communication from Lieutenant Colonel Mick Brennan, Australian Liaison officer to US Communications Electronics Command, 1 May 2003.

11 Alan Hinge, *Australian Defence Preparedness: Principles, Problems and Prospects*, Australian Defence Studies Centre, Australian Defence Force Academy, 2000, p. 286.

12 Rear Admiral Fred W. Crickard, 'A Tale of Two Navies: United States Security and Canadian and Australian Naval Policy During the Cold War', unpublished Master of Arts thesis, Dalhousie University, Halifax, September 1993, p. 262.

THE AUTHOR

Lieutenant Colonel John Blaxland graduated from the Royal Military College, Duntroon, in 1986. He has served in a number of staff, instructional and intelligence postings, including as a member of the International Force in East Timor, where he served as Intelligence Officer on Headquarters 3rd Brigade. He is a graduate of the Royal Thai Army Staff College and, most recently, a Visiting Defence Fellow at Queen's University and a War Studies PhD candidate at the Royal Military College in Kingston, Ontario, Canada.

NEW STRATEGY FOR NEW TIMES

THE FAILINGS OF 'DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA' *

MAJOR R. J. WORSWICK

It probably never made sense to conceptualise our security interests as a series of diminishing concentric circles around our coastline, but it certainly does not do so now.

Senator Robert Hill[1]

The White Paper, *Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force*, affirms the 'defence of Australia' (DOA) paradigm as the strategic foundation and primary force-structure determinant for the Australian Defence Force (ADF).[2] Despite this commitment, the Minister for Defence, Senator Robert Hill, made it very clear in a recent address to the Australian Defence College that he considers Australia's current defence strategy to be inappropriate given new strategic circumstances. Citing the presence of a mismatch between strategic policy and operational reality, the Minister stated that purely geostrategic considerations should no longer define Australia's defence strategy because of the globalised nature of contemporary security concerns.[3]

---

* This article is based on the author's winning entry in the Chief of Army's Essay Competition 2003.

The Minister's address to the Australian Defence College represented not only a significant departure from Australian strategic thinking built up over the past twenty-five years, but it was also a rejection of the Government's extant defence policy espousing strategic geography as the foundation of Australian military strategy.

Senator Hill is not the only critic of the geographical construct of DOA. Other critics, such as Australian National University academic, Alan Dupont, have argued that Australia's defence strategy is an anachronism and that most contemporary Western states are reordering their priorities in order to put less emphasis on conventional conflict in favour of the diverse range of security and constabulary tasks dominating the global strategic landscape.[4] Traditionalists, such as Paul Dibb, have replied to the criticism by arguing that previous successful deployments in operations in Cambodia, Somalia and East Timor demonstrate that forces structured for DOA can meet all the tasks required of the ADF. This article argues that the strategic paradigm of DOA is too narrowly conceived and is inappropriate as a force structure determinant for the ADF in the new millennium. An examination of the evolution of Australia's defence strategy, and of the current regional and global security environment, suggests that DOA is temporally and functionally disconnected from the reality of contemporary security challenges. In short, DOA doctrine has been exposed as containing too many weaknesses to serve as the strategic foundation for, and force structure determinant of, the ADF.

> *… purely geostrategic considerations should no longer define Australia's defence strategy because of the globalised nature of contemporary security concerns.*

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STRATEGIC GUIDANCE AND FORCE STRUCTURE

Before embarking on an analysis of Australia's defence imperatives, it is necessary to examine the nexus between strategy and force structure. Strategic guidance is the foundation from which defence capability decisions are derived. Strategic guidance stipulates the tasks expected of the ADF and allows defence planners to formulate the most appropriate force structures in order to achieve strategic aims. Unfortunately, there are three inherent conceptual problems at work in the relationship between strategic guidance and force structure. Firstly, inappropriate or faulty strategic guidance risks distorting the process of force structure determination. In simple terms, if Australian strategic guidance is flawed, then the ADF risks finding itself structured for the wrong military tasks. Second, because strategic conditions are based on the

ebb and flow of politics, strategy will always change faster than a new force structure can be developed.[5] The sudden end of the Cold War in the early 1990s and the unexpected terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in 2001 provide classic examples of the politics of strategic unpredictability affecting force structure planning. Third, if strategic guidance is not accompanied by sufficient funding, no satisfactory force structure can be realised. Over the past fifteen years Australia's defence budget has fallen from 2.5 per cent to 1.9 per cent of gross domestic product, with corresponding difficulties in meeting force structure requirements.[6]

THE EVOLUTION OF AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE STRATEGY SINCE 1972

During the 1970s, following withdrawal from Vietnam, Australia's strategic thinking changed from an emphasis on forward defence towards the adoption of a continental strategy, based on the defence of geography. There was considerable debate in Canberra between the Australian military and the Defence civilian bureaucracy as to how the ADF should realise a new continental defence strategy. By the mid-1980s the inability of ADF and Department of Defence staff to agree on basic force structure concepts, and the level of conflict against which the ADF should be structured, ultimately led to the commissioning of a special review into Australia's Defence capabilities.[7] The 1986 *Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities* by Professor Paul Dibb provided the philosophical basis for the 1987, 1994 and 2000 White Papers. In all essentials, the 1986 Dibb Report remains the foundation stone of Australia's strategic policy in 2003 and is reflected in much of the ADF's current force structure.

By balancing Australia's unique geostrategic position, the lack of any defined threat, and the ADF's legacy force structure and capabilities, Dibb succeeded in outlining a strategy for the development of future ADF capabilities for DOA, thus appeasing both military professionals and civilian bureaucrats within the Department of Defence. With only minor changes, Dibb's Review became the basis for the 1987 Defence White Paper. The latter aimed to defeat all credible threats to Australia through denial of the sea–air gap to the north out to a distance of 1000 nautical miles. Yet it was perhaps prophetic that, within weeks of the release of the 1987 White Paper, a military coup in Fiji revealed significant shortfalls in the force structure and readiness of the ADF for offshore contingencies.[8] The Fiji coup foreshadowed the kinds of challenges that would emerge in the late 1990s and early 21st century—challenges that were not properly appreciated under Dibb's narrow geostrategic approach to defence policy.

THE PERCEIVED STRENGTHS OF A DOA STRATEGY

Dibb's DOA strategy of the late 1980s was popular for four reasons. First, the notion that the primary role of the ADF was to defend continental Australia made sense to an Australian public generally uninformed about defence issues. Second, DOA was widely accepted by the Australian military largely because the doctrine accommodated the legacy force structures and equipment of the 1970s. At the same time, the new strategy could also be used to justify the acquisition or replacement of equipment ranging from small arms to strategic strike weapons.[9] Third, the DOA paradigm was defensive and was perceived by most Australians as unlikely to offend regional sensibilities. Fourth and finally, in the absence of a defined threat and significant operational challenges, DOA facilitated a consistent and long-term approach to force structure and capability development. The ability of DOA to appease all interested parties was particularly useful for the government of the day. Although the end of the Cold War was only two years away and the fall of the Soviet Union a mere four years in the future, the idea that Australian forces designed to defend Australia would soon be called on for offshore tasks, such as peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, was afforded little importance as a force structure determinant.

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union between 1989 and 1991 fundamentally altered the global balance of power, and resulted in the emergence of new and a much more fluid international security environment. Throughout the 1990s, successive Australian strategic reviews acknowledged these changes, albeit often slowly. However, the strategic judgment that Australia faced no identifiable threats remained central to Australia's defence policy.[10] This judgment occurred despite clear shortcomings in DOA strategy between declaratory policy and operational reality. From the early 1990s, it was evident that there were tasks for the ADF that did not fit neatly into the DOA geostrategic paradigm. These tasks included peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Rwanda and Cambodia; coalition operations in the Persian Gulf; and disaster relief in Indonesia and Papua New Guinea.

Thus, the first half of the 1990s presented some fundamental dilemmas for Australian defence planners seeking to come to terms with a much more fluid strategic environment. Official guidance nonetheless steadfastly stood by the DOA paradigm. The 1993 Strategic Review noted that, '[while] some operations have necessitated adjustments to peacetime unit structures and equipment acquisition priorities ... they have not caused major force structure changes'.[11] As late as 2001, Paul Dibb, the principal architect of continental defence, warned that any change to the defence strategy adopted in 1987 and refined by subsequent White Papers would downgrade the ADF and leave Australia vulnerable to future military challenges.[12] Nonetheless, the ADF's deployment to East Timor after 1999 and the subsequent demands of the War on Terror in Afghanistan and Iraq between 2001 and 2003 have steadily undermined confidence in the Dibb approach to defence policy.

THE 2000 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER

With the 1999 INTERFET deployment to East Timor fresh in the minds of Australian defence planners, the 2000 White Paper, *Defending Australia*, appeared to represent a major shift in official strategic thinking. Prime Minister John Howard described the document as being 'the most comprehensive reappraisal of Australia's defence capability for decades'.[13] The review appeared to break the hold of strategic geography over Australian force structure by recognising that turbulent conditions in the Asia-Pacific—that which Defence Minister John Moore referred to as a 'sea of instability'—would be of increasing military importance in the future.[14] Yet, despite the appearance of change, a closer examination of the 2000 White Paper suggests that DOA (a denial strategy based on defending the sea–air gap) remains the foundation of Australian strategic doctrine. Although the White Paper attempted to address such shortcomings highlighted during ADF operations in East Timor—notably limited force projection and inadequacies in logistic sustainment—in reality the document failed to address DOA as the root cause of these problems. In the words of one critic, the 2000 White Paper was 'more the culmination of the government's recent drive for greater efficiency and account-ability in Defence, than a comprehensive review of strategic policy'.[15]

Australia's subsequent commitments to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Solomon Islands between 2001 and 2003 highlight the conceptual problems and contradictions that are inherent in extant defence strategy. For example, *Defence 2000* continues to assign relatively low priority to offshore operations, stating that such activities '[should not] detract from the ADF's core function of defending Australia from armed attack'.[16] Yet offshore missions such as peace enforcement and coalition operations are also 'core tasks' for the ADF since they impose a substantial burden on military forces structured for two decades for DOA. Similarly, *Defence 2000*'s continued emphasis on maintaining high-end capabilities in order to meet the needs of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is somewhat inconsistent with repeated assertions in the document that Australia faces no credible conventional threat.[17] The content of the February 2003 *Defence Update*—with its focus on terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and non-state threats—is perhaps the most compelling evidence of a mismatch between Australia's strategic desires and the structural realities of the ADF.[18] It now appears crucial

> The content of the February 2003 *Defence Update* ... is perhaps the most compelling evidence of a mismatch between Australia's strategic desires and the structural realities of the ADF.

that the contradictions inherent in the 2000 Defence White Paper be addressed since the document provides neither consistent nor coherent guidance for future force-structure development.

IMPLICATIONS OF A NEW GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Over the past three years, the rise of a new global security environment has overtaken the content of the 2000 Defence White Paper. Increasingly, global security is resembling the non-state, unconventional conflicts conducted by warlords, insurgents, paramilitary militias and criminal cartels outlined by such thinkers as the Israeli scholar, Martin Van Creveld, during the 1990s.[19] As General Charles Krulak, Commandant of the US Marine Corps, once put it, future wars are likely to be 'the stepchild of Somalia and Chechnya, rather than the son of *Desert Storm*'.[20] Such views predated the al-Qa'ida terrorist attacks on the United States, and if anything the global security of the early 21st century has become even more complicated by adding pre-emption as a tool to counter unpredictable transnational threats. In response to the rise of globalised security, the Minister for Defence, Senator Hill, has stated, 'the ADF is both more likely to be deployed, and increasingly likely to be deployed, well beyond Australia'.[21] In overseas missions such as Afghanistan and Iraq, forces structured and equipped to defend Australia's geography in conventional conflict have only been deployed in 'niche' contributions. A niche strategy is necessary because much of the ADF is not optimised to meet unconventional or offshore threats such as those posed by terrorism and instability in the Asia-Pacific. Local defence commitments, such as the missions to East Timor and the Solomon Islands, suggest that Australia needs much greater capacity for force projection, strategic lift and logistic support if it is to secure its interests in its own immediate region.

> A niche strategy is necessary because much of the ADF is not optimised to meet unconventional or offshore threats …

TOWARDS A NEW DEFENCE STRATEGY

The problem with Australian strategy lies in the construct that Defence of Australia is synonymous with continental defence. There are three fundamental failings in such a construct. The first of these is what Alan Dupont describes as 'misplaced geographic determinism'.[22] Put simply, *Defence 2000* focuses too narrowly on structuring forces for operations within the sea–air gap. Yet in recent years operational deployments beyond Australia's immediate neighbourhood have become the norm

rather than the exception. These offshore operations are directly concerned with the Defence of Australia. The harsh reality is that the strategic environment of the early 21st century bears little resemblance to that described in the 2000 Defence White Paper. The current global security environment demonstrates that threats can arise well beyond the sea–air gap and still impact on Australia's security. In an age of globalised security, threats cannot be easily deterred by either distance or borders.

The transnational activities of al-Qa'ida and the international dynamics of the evolving nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula are two examples of the realities of globalised security. Increasingly, contemporary threats may need to be dealt with at their source, and this reality repudiates the notion that Australia's security interests can be determined by the dictates of geography.[23]

The second fundamental failing of DOA is that it has not adequately prepared the ADF for the tasks required of it. The DOA concept structures the ADF to defeat conventional threats against Australia even though all Defence White Papers since 1976 have stated that such a threat is highly unlikely. Critics of DOA find it increasingly untenable that Australia consistently affords the highest priority and most resources to the least likely threat.[24] Forces structured for DOA are clearly not optimised for the contemporary security challenges confronting the ADF, particularly the emerging phenomena of transnational threats. Recent force-structure changes such as increases in the numbers of Special Forces and the establishment of a chemical, biological and radiological defence capability are attempts to meet such shortcomings. There are also problems in the ADF with respect to readiness. While intelligence assessments state that major threats would be preceded by a warning time of approximately ten years, extant preparedness directives require that conventional forces be at 180 days (or less) notice to move. Similarly, ADF platforms 'fitted for, but not with' weapons capabilities under the DOA paradigm are unable to meet contemporary short-notice security tasks.

The third fundamental failing of DOA thinking is its failure to accurately address emerging global security trends, and the growing importance and prevalence of coalition operations. The 2003 *Defence Update* identifies this trend, noting that ADF involvement in coalition operations further afield is now more likely.[25] In the evolving 21st-century strategic environment, Australia's credibility will not be enhanced by reluctant or token contributions to coalition forces raised on the initiative of other, more proactive nations. Yet this is the situation bequeathed by DOA philosophy and the 2000 Defence White Paper. The increasing requirements

> The problem with Australian strategy lies in the construct that Defence of Australia is synonymous with continental defence.

of interoperability, logistic sustainment and force protection demonstrate that the DOA paradigm does not structure the ADF to contribute effectively within a multi-national coalition. Changes to force structure are required to provide the capabilities desired by the Australian Government, which needs such capabilities in order to meet an unpredictable and highly fluid strategic environment.

CONCLUSION

In the late 1980s, Paul Dibb's DOA paradigm provided solace for Australia's uniformed and civilian planners in the Department of Defence who endured considerable criticism for their lack of unified direction and coherence in strategic thinking. However, during the 1990s the rigidity implied by DOA became increasingly evident. By the end of the decade, there was a growing realisation that operational successes in missions to Somalia and East Timor had occurred not because of DOA force structures, but in spite of them. With this realisation came growing criticism of the DOA paradigm, particularly with respect to the evident mismatch between declaratory strategic policy (defence of continental geography) and operational realities (overseas deployments).

In 2003, with the ADF committed to East Timor, the Persian Gulf, the US-led 'coalition of the willing' against Iraq, and the Solomon Islands, it is apparent that the foundations of the DOA paradigm are fatally flawed. As the Minister for Defence implied in his recent address to the Australian Defence College, a strategy of defence-in-depth to counter conventional threats in the air–sea gap—the very essence of the DOA strategic paradigm—has little relevance to current and projected ADF operational activity.

The imperatives of a DOA philosophy based around geography should not be the primary force-structure determinant for the ADF. Such a construct places too much emphasis on geostrategic factors that may have been important during the static years of the Cold War but which are, in 21st-century conditions, no longer relevant to Australia's security in an era of transnational threats. Persisting with a DOA approach based on strategic tradition and orthodoxy is to persist with a strategy that is temporally and functionally disconnected from contemporary security challenges. As the 2003 *Defence Update* notes, 'the prospect of conventional military attack on Australian territory has diminished … there is less likely to be a need for ADF operations in defence of Australia'.[26] With the ADF stretched by deployments to Iraq, East Timor, and the Solomon Islands, and by border protection tasks, it is necessary to develop an appropriate defence policy based on 'a new strategy for new times'.

ENDNOTES

1   Senator the Hon. Robert Hill, 'Beyond the White Paper: Strategic Directions for Defence', Address to the Australian Defence College, Canberra, 18 June 2002, viewed 24 February 2003, <http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/HillSpeechtpl.cfm?CurrentId=1605>.

2   Department of Defence, *Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force*, AGPS, Canberra, 2000, p. xi.

3   Hill, 'Beyond the White Paper: Strategic Directions for Defence'.

4   Hugh White, 'Australian defence policy and the possibility of war', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, July 2002, vol. 56, no. 2, p. 253.

5   Alan Hinge, *Australian Defence Preparedness: Principles, Problems and Prospects*, ADSC, Canberra, 2000, p. 130.

6   Australian Strategic Policy Institute, *Sinews of War: The Defence Budget in 2003 and How We Got There*, Australian Strategic Policy Institute Ltd, Canberra, 2003, p. 16.

7   I. M. Cumpston, *Australia's Defence Policy 1901–2000*, vol. 2, I. M. Cumpston, Canberra, 2001, p. 261.

8   Alan Hinge, *Australian Defence Preparedness: Principles, Problems and Prospects*, Australian Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 2000, p. 31.

9   *Ibid.*, p. 131.

10 Ian McLachlan, Michael O'Connor, Stewart Woodman and Derek Woolner, *Australia's Strategic Dilemmas: Options for the Future*, Australian Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 1997, p. 128.

11 Department of Defence, *Strategic Review 1993*, AGPS, Canberra, 1993, p. 46.

12 Paul Dibb, 'Tinker with defence policy and risk attack', *Australian*, 30 October 2001, p. 13.

13 Peter Chalk, *Australian Foreign and Defense Policy in the Wake of the 1999/2000 East Timor Intervention*, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2001, p. 64.

14 *Ibid.*, p. 63.

15 Stewart Woodman, 'Not quite the full Monty?: Analysing Australia's Defence White Paper', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, April 2001, vol. 55, no. 1, p. 29.

16 *Defence 2000*, p. 13.

17 Chalk, *Australian Foreign and Defense Policy in the Wake of the 1999/2000 East Timor Intervention*, p. 66.

18 Department of Defence, *Australia's National Security: A Defence Update*, AGPS, Canberra, 2003.

19 Martin Van Creveld, *The Transformation of War*, The Free Press, New York, 1991, pp. 16–32.

20 General Charles C. Krulak, 'The United States Marine Corps in the 21st Century', *RUSI Journal*, vol. CXLI, no. II, August 1996, p. 25.

21   Hill, 'Beyond the White Paper: Strategic Directions for Defence'.

22   Alan Dupont, 'Modern wars can't be based on obsolete battle plans', *Australian*, 22 November 2002, p. 11.

23   Alan Dupont, 'Straitjacket off as defence gets real', *Australian*, 27 February 2003, p. 13.

24   M. Beeson, 'Debating defence: time for a paradigm shift?', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, November 2000, vol. 54, no. 3, p. 257.

25   *Australia's National Security: A Defence Update*, p. 23.

26   *Ibid.*

THE AUTHOR

Major Robert Worswick is a graduate of the Australian Defence Force Academy and the Royal Military College, Duntroon. He was posted to the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment and saw operational service in Somalia. He has also served with the 1st Recruit Training Battalion, Headquarters Australian Theatre and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation in the Middle East. While posted to the 2nd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment he deployed as a member of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor. He completed the Australian Command and Staff College course in 2003.

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE ROLE OF RECONNAISSANCE IN URBAN OPERATIONS

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JASON THOMAS

In the future, the use of reconnaissance is likely to be an important feature in the Australian Army's approach to conducting urban operations. Yet reconnaissance for the urban military environment is underdeveloped in current land-force doctrine. This is a paradox in an army with a heritage of strong patrolling and intelligence gathering stemming from the time of World War I. The aim of this article is to discuss the significance of the art of reconnaissance in modern urban operations and to examine what requirements might be necessary in the future.

UNDERSTANDING URBAN OPERATIONS

The Australian Army's understanding of urban warfare is strongly influenced by a 'human meat grinder' mode of analysis that reflects the experience of Stalingrad and Berlin in World War II, of Hue in the Vietnam War and of Grozny in the post–Cold War era. This analytical approach, however, may have limitations for Australian soldiers in the new millennium. As Ralph Peters has pointed out, the complexity of the urban environment in the 21st century means that there are different types of cities that may become battlegrounds: the hierarchical Western-style city such as London; the multi-cultural, factional city such as Jerusalem; and the tribal city such as Mogadishu.[1]

While much can be learnt from an operational analysis of Grozny and Hue, the future Australian experience of urban operations is more likely to resemble a Dili rather than a Stalingrad. This is because, as a 2002 DSTO Land Operations Division study *Urban Operations in the Regional Littoral* showed, in South-East Asia and the Pacific, most people reside in urban areas of less than 100 000 people.

> The Australian Army's understanding of urban warfare is strongly influenced by a 'human meat grinder' model of analysis …

Australian soldiers rightly see the urban military environment as representing a highly complex operational area. Urban warfare features include limited line of sight, restrictive rules of engagement, a degraded capability for mobility and reduced situational awareness. The challenge posed is outlined in doctrinal thinking, with urban operations defined as:

> Operations planned and conducted, across the full spectrum of conflict, on or within urban and adjacent natural terrain, where the dominant features are the densities of population, structures, potential firing positions, combat and non-combat activity, friendly and enemy forces, line of sight difficulties and compression of time available for military tasks.[2]

EMPLOYING RECONNAISSANCE: PUSH OR PULL?

Essentially there are two basic methods for the employment of reconnaissance assets in an urban operation. The first is to employ reconnaissance in the environment of 'command push', in which a commander uses information collection and processing to refine his battle plan. 'Command push' is an approach in which the friendly force seeks to shape its own operational posture. It is also an approach that is probably well suited to the Australian Defence Force's future world of network-centric warfare.

The second approach to the use of reconnaissance is to apply the manoeuvre theory principles of surfaces and gaps in order to exploit an enemy's dispositions. This approach represents a 'reconnaissance pull', in that the emphasis is concentrated on discovering the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy. In a 'pull' approach, the friendly force's planning process is largely based on its perceptions of enemy activity and acceptance of a degree of

> … any reconnaissance force must possess sufficient protection and firepower to survive in a hostile urban environment.

uncertainty in operations. In the combined arms world of the standing professional army, reconnaissance 'pull' tends to remain the preferred method. The use of 'pull' is viewed as conferring on commanders greater ability to deal with friction and allows greater latitude to the local commander at all levels. In the clutter of the urban environment, it is likely that 'reconnaissance pull' operations will be the preferred method for the Australian Army in the future. Such a method is regarded as being better suited to the tenets of mission-oriented command and conforms to Australian military cultural mores.

FORCE CONFIGURATION IN URBAN RECONNAISSANCE

For reconnaissance assets to succeed in urban operations, the question of force configuration must be considered and reconciled. One approach is to conduct reconnaissance on the basis of careful force preparation, with a heavy reliance on light forces and stealthy techniques for infiltration. However, the use of light and stealthy reconnaissance elements is risky in that lighter forces may sacrifice combat worth for the sake of intelligence gathering and may not survive in urban combat conditions. A second approach to configuring reconnaissance forces for urban conditions is to make the assigned forces heavy by providing a combined arms component that will allow survival in a combat encounter. Ultimately, any reconnaissance force must possess sufficient protection and firepower to survive in a hostile urban environment. It is possible that a combination of the lighter–stealthier force and of the heavier–combined arms force may be required in future reconnaissance missions.

> New technologies may assist in the process of a convergence between light and heavy forces in urban operations.

New technologies may assist in the process of a convergence between light and heavy forces in urban operations. Such technologies include enhanced 3-D mapping, the use of global positioning systems (GPS), more multi-spectral surveillance suites (which may be capable of reliable building or foliage penetration) and sophisticated pattern analysis processors. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with long endurance capabilities are also likely to prove useful, along with thermal imaging and image intensification sensors.

In terms of weapons systems, the likelihood of improved chemical and kinetic energy weapons capable of greater stand-off range are likely to be useful in the urban battlespace. There is also scope in urban operations for manned and unmanned rotary-wing assets and an array of non-lethal technologies to aid in crowd control. It is highly unlikely, however, that remote and stand-off assets will replace the need for

deployed forces in close reconnaissance. What new technology really offers reconnaissance forces is a much greater chance of successful deployment and enhanced survivability in high-risk urban areas. In the future, it is likely that sensors will reveal up to 30 or 40 per cent of the battlespace, thus permitting a greater continuum of action between operational reconnaissance and main force activity.

One challenge emanating from such greater transparency will be to reconcile the Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR)—used by the major English-speaking Western armies—with greater freedom of action. Reconnaissance assets could be used to 'cue' multi-spectral analysis of detected urban targets. It should be noted, however, that new technological advances will not occur without friction simply because enemy counter-reconnaissance and deception capabilities are also likely to benefit.

> What new technology …
> offers reconnaissance forces
> is a much greater chance of
> successful deployment and
> enhanced survivability

In urban operations, the need for 'nodal take down'—that is, the neutralisation of enemy leadership, troops or communications systems—to shape the battlespace may require a heavier reconnaissance effort. Covert methods of reconnaissance and greater deployment of stand-off surveillance assets at the operational level may also be necessary. 'Nodal take down' operations may occur with a high degree of simultaneity in time, or be staggered over the framework of a campaign.

Clandestine infiltration and the use of stand-off assets and weapons systems tend to involve a mix of close and wider area surveillance, making coordination of information requirements critical. In all but the largest of cities, reconnaissance forces will always need to be aware of the human geography and type of critical infrastructures available in order to establish infiltration routes and to create friendly areas for replenishment.

CONCLUSION

This article has attempted to raise some of the challenges that the Australian Army may face in the area of future reconnaissance missions in the urban environment, where tactics are always defined by short observation and engagement ranges. None of the challenges discussed in this essay are insurmountable and not all of them require high-technology solutions. It is likely that, for the foreseeable future, reconnaissance 'pull' operations, supported by the tenets of mission command, will dominate military thinking about infiltration methods and the collection of intelligence in urban environments. Ultimately, however, land forces have to decide between 'push' and 'pull' operations and between 'light' and 'heavy' reconnaissance approaches, and the extent to which a blend between the two force configurations is practical in urban warfare conditions.

ENDNOTES

1   Ralph Peters, 'The Human Terrain of Operations', *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*, vol. XXX, no. 1, Spring 2000, pp. 4–12.
2   Australian Army, LWD 3-9-4, Urban operations (Draft), 2001, p. 5.

THE AUTHOR

Lieutenant Colonel Jason Thomas is a graduate of the Royal Military College, Duntroon, the Australian Defence Force Academy, the Royal Military College of Science, Shrivenham, United Kingdom and the Australian Command and Staff College. He has served in a variety of regimental positions with the School of Armour and the 1st Armoured Regiment. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas served with the 1st Brigade, before undertaking a tour of duty with the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor. He is currently serving as the Staff Officer Grade One Science and Technology in the Office of the Scientific Adviser—Army within Army Headquarters.

THE RUSSIAN EXPERIENCE OF URBAN COMBAT

SOME LESSONS FROM CENTRAL ASIA

FLIGHT SERGEANT MARTIN ANDREW, RAAF *

Recent conflicts in the former Soviet Republics of Central Asia have demonstrated the difficulty of dealing with insurgent forces that are well equipped with small arms, especially the rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) in urban operations. This article seeks to show how the Russian military has dealt with the challenge of urban combat in Chechnya and Dagestan by the use of combined arms tactics, thermobaric weapons and heavier-calibre small arms. Lessons from the Russian experience are useful since, as current operations in Iraq now reveal, Western forces need to devise new tactics and techniques to meet the threat of cheap, portable stand-off weapons in urban areas that can be used to destroy helicopters and vehicles that are unprotected by infantry.

URBAN WARFARE IN CENTRAL ASIA: THE ROLE OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS

In recent urban conflict in Central Asia, insurgents have made extensive use of the RPG. Long regarded as the poor man's howitzer and the 'guerrilla's artillery', the RPG is particularly effective when used in complex terrain. With a bursting radius of four metres, the RPG kills by blast and shrapnel.[1] In skilled hands, especially in the confines of urban terrain, this relatively unsophisticated device excels as a destructive weapons system. In 1992, rebels fighting the Russian Army in Tajikistan found that, while they lacked the modern PG-7VR tandem warhead that was necessary to destroy Russian T-72 tanks equipped with reactive armour, they could still destroy Russian armour. Because the Russians were reluctant to deploy sufficient screening infantry, RPG gunners employed 'double teaming' against Russian T-72 tanks. The first gunner would fire at the tank in order to create a breach in its reactive armour. The second and third gunners would then fire multiple 'kill shots' at the exposed area. These rounds would often destroy the tank crew's line of vision, ensuring that the crew would be unable to counter the enemy even if the vehicle survived multiple rocket hits. Inflicting such 'blindness' on a tank then allowed the RPG gunners time to reposition and resume their attack until the vehicle was disabled. Another technique employed by Tajik rebels was to fire a fragmentation round, or a white phosphorus grenade, at the T-72's front deck in order to disable the driver's vision before massed groups of fighters employing RPGs fired on the tank, aiming to disable the rear section of the turret.

The assault on Grozny in Chechnya by the Russian 131st Maykop Brigade on New Year's Eve 1995 is an instructive example of what can occur if a

> In Grozny, Russian tanks and armoured vehicles, unsupported by dismounted infantry, became easy prey for Chechen forces …

modern army engages in urban warfare against well-armed insurgents without using proper combined-arms tactics and weapons systems. In Grozny, Russian tanks and armoured vehicles, unsupported by dismounted infantry, became easy prey for Chechen forces employing three- or four-man fire teams composed of an RPG gunner, a machine-gunner and a sniper.

The Chechen hunter–killer teams, like wolf packs searching out an isolated member of a family of deers, frequently attacked a single armoured vehicle simultaneously from several different directions, peppering it with rockets, grenades and Molotov cocktails. Areas that might be targeted included the crew hatches, the engine transmission compartment, decking and the area behind the turret.[2] Because of the absence of significant numbers of dismounted Russian infantry,

the Chechen fighters turned the streets of Grozny into death traps for Russian armoured vehicles.[3] By early January 1995, the Maykop Brigade had suffered extraordinary casualties of 800 dead and wounded. The brigade had also lost twenty out of twenty-six tanks, 102 out of 120 BMP infantry fighting vehicles and all six of their ZSU-23 self-propelled antitank guns.[4]

RUSSIAN COMBINED ARMS AND WEAPONS IN CHECHNYA

In late 1999 and early 2000, when the Russians again attacked Grozny, they adopted different tactics and weapons. The Russian Army deployed combined arms teams composed of tanks, infantry, engineers and artillery. In particular, the Russians employed specialised *troika* fire teams comprising a sniper, a machine-gunner and a soldier equipped with a grenade launcher.[5] Two other soldiers, acting as ammunition carriers or assistant gunners, supplemented these teams.[6] The use of Russian fire teams forced Chechen fire teams to abandon fixed positions on upper floors of buildings, on balconies and in attics. The clearing and screening action of Russian all-arms teams led to greater protection for the armoured forces. Using manoeuvre by fire against buildings, apartment blocks and strong points, Russian troops were able to counter the supremacy of Chechen urban tactics. The Russians also discovered that, in conditions of short-range urban operations, anti-armour rounds lacked impact. As a result they adopted the OG-7V fragmentation round and the TBG-7V thermobaric for use in urban combat.

Ignoring the issue of collateral damage, the Russians employed direct-fire weapons with incendiary and thermobaric warheads against Chechen positions in Grozny. A thermobaric warhead, more accurately described as a 'volumetric' weapon, uses expanding gases or aerosols. Thermobarics are essentially slow-burning explosive slurries that compound the damage they cause in three ways. First, they burn very slowly for an explosive, causing much greater 'dwelling' times of their explosive impulses on a target. Second, the burning plasma cloud that is generated by the warhead can penetrate even the smallest cracks of a building or a vehicle, killing the occupants in a blast wave.[7] Third, when the slurry is totally consumed, a 'vacuum bomb' is created in the form of a massive back-blast that destroys human beings in the area.

> The clearing and screening action of Russian all-arms teams led to greater protection for the armoured forces.

In Chechyna the Russians deployed RPO-A *Shmel* rocket-powered flamethrowers with a 'capsule' warhead containing 4 L of liquid that produced a flame 4 m wide by 40 m long. The RPO-A *Shmel* was first employed during the Soviet–Afghan War against *Mujaheddin* cave complexes, where it earned the ominous nickname, the 'Devil's Tube'.[8]

The 2.1 kg thermobaric warhead of the rocket-powered flame has the equivalent power of a 122 mm shell. A new version of the weapon was employed in Tajikistan and Chechnya to knock out rebel bunkers and strong points in buildings. So important was the *Shmel* to the Russians in their Central Asian urban warfare operations that their current military doctrine states, 'light structures which interfere with observation and the conduct of flamethrower or other fires should be destroyed'.

In its operations in Chechnya and Dagestan in 1999 and 2000, the Russian military also expressed a preference for organic heavy-calibre weapons in combined arms sub-units. As a result of the poor penetrating power of lower-calibre munitions, Russian soldiers in Chechnya called for the replacement of the 5.45 mm RPK light machine-gun with the full-power 7.62 mm PK series general-purpose machine-guns.

Thus, the global trend towards equipping forces with smaller and lighter munitions has been found wanting in the urban battles in Chechnya and Dagestan. Russian soldiers have preferred small arms that use larger-calibre ammunition, such as the 7.62 mm AKM assault rifle, the 7.62 mm SVD sniping rifle, the GP-25 40 mm under-barrel grenade launcher, the *Pecheng* machine-gun (a modernised PKM machine-gun), and the *Vzlomshchik* 12.7 mm heavy-calibre sniper rifle.

> … the global trend towards equipping forces with smaller and lighter munitions has been found wanting in the urban battles in Chechnya and Dagestan.

CONCLUSION

Recent Russian operations in Central Asia demonstrate the danger that cheap and mass-produced technologies such as the RPG pose in urban conflict. When the Russian military sought to fight in a one-dimensional manner with mainly armoured vehicles, they suffered large casualties at the hands of the Tadzhiks and Chechens. Ultimately, it was the use of combined arms teams in Chechnya, along with superior firepower, that restored the Russian military's fortunes. However, the Russian use of indiscriminate firepower that reduced Grozny to a shattered hulk of a city is not a technique that Western armies should emulate. In this respect,

Russian methods represented a variant on the American adage used in Vietnam that 'it was necessary to destroy the village in order to save it'. Studying the recent campaigns in Central Asia shows how both positive and negative aspects can flow from a close analysis of the Russian approach to urban warfare. The positive aspect lies in the Russian reintroduction of combined arms teams; the negative aspect lies in the Russian tolerance for a level of collateral damage and civilian casualties that could not be accepted by any Western democracy operating under the law of armed conflict.

> Ultimately, it was the use of combined arms teams in Chechnya, along with superior firepower, that restored the Russian military's fortunes.

The effect of stealthy attacks using low-cost weapons is being painfully relearnt by Coalition forces in Iraq and reflects the need for contemporary forces to possess levels of protected mobility that can ensure dominance in an urban battlespace. Western forces also need to consider the application of combined arms tactics and procedures that will enable them to counter lethal small arms and light anti-armour weapons now used by insurgents. Russia's Central Asian conflicts also suggest that there remains a requirement for larger-calibre small arms on the modern battlefield. For all of these reasons, Russia's recent experience of urban combat remains relevant to future military operations and is worthy of close study by Western armies.

ENDNOTES

1   D. H. R. Archer, *Jane's Infantry Weapons 1976*, Macdonald and Jane's, London, 1976, p. 590.

2   O. Vladykin, 'Russian Tanks Did Not Let Us Down in Chechnya. But Fewer of Them Could Have Been Lost …', *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 22 February 1995, pp. 1, 3.

3   L. A. Grau, 'Russian-Manufactured Armored Vehicle Vulnerability in Urban Combat: The Chechnya Experience', *Red-Star*, January 1997, p. 2.

4   L. W. Grau and T. L. Thomas, *Russian Lessons Learned From the Battles for Grozny*, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2000, p. 3.

5   T. L. Thomas, *Grozny 2000: Urban Combat Lessons Learned*, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2000, p. 4.

6   L. A. Grau, 'Technology and the Second Chechen Campaign: Not All New and Not That Much', in A. C. Eldis (ed.), *The Second Chechen War*, Conflict Studies Research Centre, Camberley, 2000, p. 108.

7   L. W. Grau and T. Smith, *A 'Crushing' Victory: Fuel–Air Explosives and Grozny 2000*, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1998, p. 1.

8   L. W. Grau and M.A. Gress (eds), *The Soviet–Afghan War: How a Superpower fought and lost: The Russian General Staff*, University of Kansas Press, Lawrence, KS, 2002, p. 257.

THE AUTHOR

Flight Sergeant Martin Andrew, Royal Australian Air Force, is an external studies student at the Australian Defence Force Academy, where he is writing a dissertation on the operational art of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. His postings include the Australian Joint Warfare Centre and the International Military Liaison Office in Darwin during Operations *Warden* and *Tanager*. Flight Sergeant Andrew was a 2002 Affiliate in Research at the Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University, where he researched the People's Liberation Army, terrorism and Central Asia.

RETROSPECT

The *Retrospect* section of the *Australian Army Journal: For the Profession of Arms* (*AAJ*) is designed to reproduce interesting articles from the Australian Army's earlier journals, notably the *Commonwealth Military Journal* and the *Australian Army Journal* from the 1940s to the mid 1970s. In this edition of the journal, we are reprinting an edited excerpt from Lieutenant Colonel S. C. Graham's study on the use of tanks in tropical conditions. The study first appeared in the June 1955 edition of the *AAJ* and was reprinted by the Armoured Centre in February 1968 during the Vietnam War. The Army is about to undergo a transformation from a light infantry to a light armoured force. It is therefore both timely and relevant to reproduce part of Lieutenant Colonel Graham's analysis of how Australians employed tanks in combined arms warfare in jungle conditions against the Japanese during World War II. Readers should note, however, that, although Graham examined the entire Allied experience in using armour in the South-West Pacific theatre in his original article, for reasons of space, only an edited version of the Australian experience is reproduced here.

TANKS AGAINST JAPAN*

LIEUTENANT COLONEL S. C. GRAHAM

At first sight, tropical or jungle areas would come under the category of tank-proof country. A closer examination of the conditions prevailing in New Guinea suggests a greater scope for the employment of tanks than may at first have been considered possible.

Report by Headquarters 1st Australian Corps

The tanks had more than proved their worth during the long advance from Aitape, and most of the critics were converted to the need for armour in this type of warfare. The infantry were loud in their praises, as the Tillies had saved them many casualties. The Engineers did a splendid job in clearing the path of mines. The infantry also gave the tanks the fullest support, and their co-operation was excellent in every way.

Tank Tracks—Official History of 2/4 Australian Armoured Regiment

In arguing the case for tanks in jungle warfare, I do not suggest that they are the cure-all that will guarantee victory. I do suggest, though, that when considering armour there are certain fundamentals that must be carefully evaluated. Firstly, any army fighting in the jungle against an enemy with unlimited manpower must have some 'equaliser' if it hopes to win. Secondly, we are told that the atomic bomb is not the effective weapon in the jungle that it is in open warfare. Nor is air power the 'equaliser'—as was shown by the conflicts in Korea and Indo-China. Thirdly, the effectiveness of an army is always measured in terms of the firepower that can be delivered at the right time and place against an enemy.

---

*   This article is based on an essay written for the original *Australian Army Journal* and published in June 1955.

Whether we like it or not, then, we come back to tanks. An armoured regiment on tropical establishment has the gun power of one-and a-half regiments of field artillery, the machine-gun power of six infantry battalions, and the light machine-gun power of three infantry companies. An armoured regiment achieves this fire-power with 360 men. Yet, say the critics, the effort to move armour through the jungle is prohibitive. In reply to a question on these lines at the Staff College in 1954, Field Marshal Sir William Slim said that tanks could be used in the jungle provided that the necessary effort to use them was made. Such an effort might be considerable, but would usually be repaid.

> An armoured regiment on tropical establishment has the gun power of one-and a-half regiments of field artillery …

I believe in tanks. I believe that they are an essential, integral part of any army in any theatre. However, one swallow does not make a summer; I have therefore resurrected the files [from Australia's World War II campaigns in the South-West Pacific] to write with the simple, unabashed ambition of converting a few more adherents to the faith. Whether the lessons are learnt or not, at least the excuse of ignorance will no longer be valid.

BUNA

The Australian–American operation in Buna was aimed at reducing the coastal perimeter area of Gona–Buna–Sanananda and ending the Japanese grip on Papua. Fighting lasted from 20 November 1942 until 3 January 1943 over a front of eight miles. There were 5500 Australian and US casualties, while the Japanese suffered the loss of their 11 000-strong garrison.

At Buna the main advance was through coconut groves and overgrown airstrips, which allowed limited tactical manoeuvre. The tanks used in Buna were Lights (from a squadron of 2/6 Armoured Regiment). The terrain was swampy and thick with undergrowth and the tanks generally used line ahead on a track. In the Cape Endiadere area, water-filled shell holes, stumps and logs caused bellying and bogging among armour. Eight tanks were used at Cape Endiadere on 18 December 1942; during the sixteen-day advance that followed, the armoured squadron saw continuous action. Due to enemy action and the effects of the terrain, only eleven of the squadron's nineteen tanks were available at any one time, and of these six were knocked out in the fighting.

In actions at Buna, the tactics employed involved tanks leading the assault, spaced across the battalion front, with each individual tank being closely followed by a specially detailed protective party of infantry. The bulk of the remaining infantry

followed in open order. Depending on visibility, the distance between the tanks and the main body of infantry varied from between 5 and 50 yards. Standard troop organisation was not always used with tanks fighting in pairs, threes and fours.

Although light tanks were unsuitable for the operation, they succeeded due to surprise. A heavier tank was required—one that would be able to take punishment, crash through undergrowth, mount a bigger gun and travel slowly. In addition, a short range, high angle high explosive weapon was required.

SATELBERG

After the fall of Lae in September 1943, Australian plans called for converging thrusts by the 7th Division through the Markham and Ramu Valleys and by the 9th Division along the coast to Finschafen. The reduction of the fortress of Satelberg was necessary for the protection of the line of communications and began on 18 November 1943. The tanks used were Matildas from C and A squadrons of the 1st Australian Army Tank Battalion and operated in November and December 1943, with infantry battalions of the 4th Brigade.

These operations were completely successful, largely because of the high standard of the tank crews, the cooperation between the armoured squadrons and the infantry, and the lack of enemy antitank weapons. Satelberg itself was a steep mountain, thickly covered with bamboo and undergrowth, which concealed sticky red mud. A track led up to the cleared top, where the old Lutheran mission was situated. The advance along the coast was through a kunai flat dotted with patches of virgin jungle and coconut plantations and crossed every mile or so by steep-sided creeks.

Infantry, tank troops and engineer sections or platoons were employed. For the early operations, the tanks stayed mostly on tracks, moving in line ahead. The first tank had no accompanying infantry, but was covered by the second tank (15 yards in rear), behind which walked a section with the platoon or company commander and a tank officer. The third tank was 40 yards behind, followed by the remainder of the infantry, except for protective parties, who made their way through the jungle on either side of the tanks. More orthodox tactics were possible during the advance along the coast. Tanks moved two, three and even four up, with infantry 100 yards in rear (though infantry led sometimes because of the obstacles). Engineers rode on the rear tanks, armed with explosives and tools for rapid action on obstacles. Targets were indicated by the use of walkie-talkie radios from the ground.

BOUGAINVILLE

American marines landed on Bougainville on 1 November 1943 and established a beachhead. This beachead was developed into an advance base at Torokina, and was taken over by 2nd Australian Corps at the end of 1944. Subsequent operations on Bougainville were designed to mop up Japanese troops on the island. Matilda squadrons from 2/4 Australian Armoured Regiment were continuously in action in southern Bougainville until the end of the war. One tank troop also operated at Soraken in the north from July 1945.

Probably because of the lessons learnt from earlier operations, this campaign was the best example of infantry and armoured cooperation in the jungle. The country was almost universally inhospitable, comprising mainly terrain with thick undergrowth. Swamps were common, and deep mud from incessant rain was the normal ground surface. Rivers were met every few miles. The Buin Road, the main axis of advance, was really an overgrown mud track, and was mostly avoided by tanks in order to prevent its complete disintegration.

A standard team consisting of an infantry company, a tank troop and an engineer section was used in operations. Infantry (with engineer mine-clearance parties) normally led any advance and covered the flanks, followed by the tanks

> Matilda squadrons from 2/4 Australian Armoured Regiment were continuously in action in southern Bougainville until the end of the war.

and the remainder of the engineer section with its bulldozer. The troop commander on foot, the infantry company commander, engineer section commander and artillery/mortar forward observers stayed together. In order to obtain surprise and avoid antitank measures, great imagination and effort was spent in moving the tanks through 'impenetrable' areas, often in long outflanking roles. Invariably, these moves were successful, and the confidence of everybody that the tanks would 'get there' was almost unlimited. In addition to normal tasks, tanks were also used for contact patrolling, clearing lines of communications, armoured reconnaissance, the extrication of forces caught in ambush and carriage of stores.

BORNEO

The recapture of Borneo was an Australian operation with US naval support. It was the most ambitious, coordinated operation undertaken by Australian forces in the Pacific War. The aim was to take the island with its rich resources as part of the general plan for the reduction of the Japanese occupation of the East Indies and Malaya. Landings by troops from the 9th and 7th divisions occurred at Tarakan, Brunei Bay and Balikpapan between May and July 1945.

Matilda tanks were employed from 2/9 Armoured Regiment at Tarakan, Brunei and Labuan. Flamethrowers, tank dozers, tank bridge layers and rocket tanks were used by the 2/1 Reconnaissance Squadron and two squadrons from the 1st Armoured Regiment supported the 7th Division at Balikpapan. However, the campaign was not notable from an armoured point of view. This was because, except for Tarakan, Japanese opposition was weak and much reduced from preliminary bombardment. Because of the limited area of operations on Tarakan, tanks operated from a central harbour area and stayed mainly on the roads being used as a reserve.

WEWAK

The Australian 6th Division took over the Wewak–Aitape sector of western New Guinea from the Americans in November 1944 in order to deal with the 22 000 remaining troops of the Japanese 18th Army. Fighting occurred mainly in the coastal belt in the first few months until enemy forces retreated inland. The 17th Brigade then carried out pursuit inland, while the 19th Brigade advanced along the coast. By the end of the war, the Japanese had been driven from the Prince Alexander Range, and 14 500 troops surrendered.

Matilda tanks of C Squadron, 2/4 Armoured Regiment were employed in Borneo and, from the first operation on 6 January 1945, were in action until the end of the war. The biggest single effort of the fighting was the attack on Wewak itself on 10 May 1945 in which engineers, infantry and tanks operated as combined teams. In the Wewak attack, tanks were called forward to deal with enemy positions holding up the infantry assault.

TANKS IN THE JUNGLE: A SUMMARY OF LESSONS LEARNT

With the military emphasis once again on South-East Asia, it will be interesting to see how many of the lessons from World War II will be rediscovered in training and operations. One can only hope that they will be few, although the saying that 'the only thing we learn from military history is that we don't learn from military

history' cannot entirely be discarded as cynicism. In any case, junior officers should remember that, although the lessons may appear rather obvious, they were learnt at a heavy cost and should not be ignored.

ARMOURED MOBILITY

The ideal tank for jungle warfare should have maximum weight (consistent with transportation) to permit the carriage of heavy armour. Such a tank would be able to take punishment, give a good 'jungle-bashing' performance and it should have at a minimum a 75 mm, short-barrelled gun and low track pressure. For ease of movement, the fitting of grousers and track extenders on tanks are also desirable. Mobility depends largely on an ability to judge expertly the capacity of the tank to negotiate ground. Accumulated foliage must be cleared at every opportunity otherwise its drag will hinder (if not stop) the tank, or the foliage will damage the tank's suspension and tracks.

If a heavy preparatory bombardment is used in operations, then an impact on tank mobility from craters and fallen trees must be expected. For the best tank movement, prior ground reconnaissance must be carried out and may necessitate special patrols. Tank officers should keep themselves informed of infantry patrol schedules so that they can either go along themselves, or have specific armoured questions included in the patrol briefing. Where possible, routes should be marked, avoiding signal cables and, where time is short, infantry guides should be used. While on the move, tank guns must remain positioned between eleven and one o'clock on the clock face in order to avoid damage. If good foresight is used in choosing the right lines of advance for armour, then the trail blazed by tanks can often be used by jeeps without further engineering reconnaissance being required.

Engineer support depends mainly on the number of lines of advance available rather than the number of tanks being deployed. Sappers must be specially trained with tanks, particularly in clearing mines and improvising methods of crossing natural obstacles. Bulldozers and tractors are essential, preferably with light armoured protection provided for the drivers. In armoured training, seemingly impossible tasks should be attempted, so that tank crews will know exactly what their equipment can or cannot do in the jungle. Almost no ground is impassable to tanks if imagination and determination are used. The mental attitude of commanders may be a greater obstacle than the jungle itself.

> The ideal tank for jungle warfare should have maximum weight (consistent with transportation) to permit the carriage of heavy armour.

The rate of an armoured advance is normally decided by the speed of the infantry. Tanks bogged in mud or broken down in the jungle must not be allowed to hold up the advance (their superior speed will enable them to catch up), but a protective party must be left with them. Tanks must also operate 'closed down' in action in order to protect their crews from sniper fire, explosive bursts, grenades and bombs.

FIRE AND MOVEMENT

The use of armour should always be aimed at getting tanks where the enemy does not think they can go or to a position where his preparations are likely to be the least. Within reason, the more tanks are used in an action, the greater will be the exploitation of surprise and shock action. Target indication will always be a problem. The troop leader on the ground, directing fire by radio, is probably the best method that can be used. Canister is most effective for clearing jungle and for engaging personnel or ill-defined targets.

In jungle engagements, closing with the enemy should be avoided. Fight the enemy with tank fire and allow the infantry to 'mop him up'. However, a suitable signal, such as a long burst of machine-gun fire, is needed in order to show the troops when fire has ceased. On such a signal, the infantry must move in quickly if the benefits of supporting fire are not to be lost. When attacking pillboxes and bunkers, the tank's main armament should be employed against the slits, if necessary with armour-piercing shells followed by high-explosive rounds or smoke. Flanks should be sprayed with machine-gun fire since the enemy may well try to weather the storm by moving outside the bunker and then try to get back in before the infantry advance begins. The supporting fire plan for an attack must, therefore, cover both tank and infantry requirements. With the added effectiveness of short-range weapons, such a unified fire plan is more necessary than ever before.

> Almost no ground is impassable to tanks if imagination and determination are used.

INFANTRY–ARMOUR COOPERATION

Infantry must accept the responsibility for dealing with close-quarter antitank weapons and with fire from snipers. These requirements will normally mean that infantry should precede tanks and protect their flanks, but in any case, some infantry must be within sight of the armour at all times. In fact, infantry must be prepared to operate without tanks, but tanks should never operate without infantry. Time must be allowed in planning an attack for armoured personnel to reconnoitre terrain and service their vehicles. Early inclusion of armoured commanders in all planning likely to involve tanks is therefore vital.

Distances are governed by visibility, and infantry who keep unnecessarily close to armour risk becoming casualties from mines, shell splinters, and fire aimed at the tanks. Tanks do save infantry casualties, but infantry must not become 'tank-minded' to such a degree that they expect, as a right, armoured support for any action. The morale effect of tanks on the enemy is enormous,

> When attacking pillboxes and bunkers, the tank's main armament should be employed against the slits …

but this effect will naturally decrease if an armoured force is used improperly or is deployed in an unsuitable role that highlights the force's limitations. In defence, tank weapons should be given a definite arc of fire but they must still be well protected by the infantry. Armour firing in defence should also be well camouflaged, and allowance made for their muzzle blast.

COMMUNICATIONS

Sound and alternative means of communication between tanks and infantry must be available. The telephone and wireless are normal, but visual signals and personal contact will also be required. Infantry must be able to recognise tanks from their markings. A thorough understanding of each other's capacity and limitations is required of infantry and armour. Regimental and squadron commanders should always be with the divisional, battalion or brigade headquarters being supported. Tank troop leaders must be able to control their personnel from positions on the ground, since the troops will often have to move on foot with the infantry commanders. A 'mopping-up' drill on a position is also necessary if friendly casualties are to be avoided.

> … infantry must be prepared to operate without tanks, but tanks should never operate without infantry.

ADMINISTRATION

Where supply is difficult, it may be necessary to have replenishment areas with ammunition and spare crews close behind the scene of action. Ammunition expenditure must be carefully controlled by fire discipline. The infantry should not request that targets be engaged by tanks if they can be better dealt with by aircraft or artillery.

An armoured reconnaissance vehicle for each squadron is necessary in the forward area, but a heavy tractor can also do a great deal of work to keep tanks moving out of small-arms range. As normal maintenance is very difficult in the

jungle, it is imperative that tanks go into action in the best condition, and that a crew and troop rotation system is in operation. Pulling tanks out of action should be abnormal. Having fought laboriously forward, it is obviously unsound to go back with the added risk of ambush on the way. For maintenance and replenishment purposes, however, it may be desirable to move armoured vehicles to a reserve company area. As engine front idlers are the most commonly damaged parts of tanks, a good supply of spares is necessary.

Because recovery over any distance is a problem in the jungle, armour should be repaired on the spot by Royal Australian Electrical and Mechanical Engineer (RAEME) flying squads whenever possible. RAEME equipment must therefore be designed with immediate repair in view (the use of the helicopter may be an answer in the future).

CONCLUSION

The Malayan campaign has not been covered in this article because tanks were not used in the defence of Singapore. Malaya was the only campaign that Australia and the Allies lost, and it is interesting to speculate as to what might have occurred if we had possessed tanks on the Malayan peninsula in 1942 and used them boldly. What, for instance, would have happened if the Japanese tanks that smashed the 11th Indian Division and started the Allied collapse had met British and Australian armour? Would that have happened had we used tanks in the more open areas to cover our withdrawal and give us much needed time? What would have happened to the Japanese landing parties on Singapore Island if they had been hit by a couple of hundred tanks? The answer to these questions is partly given by Brigadier C. H. Kappe in his *Fall of Singapore*. Kappe says, 'what was needed [in Malaya] was a squadron or two of tanks to track the tired and disintegrated Jap[anese] units as they emerged into the more open country north-west of the Tengah aerodrome, but we didn't have the tanks'.

THE AUTHOR

Major General Stuart Graham, AO, DSO, OBE, MC (1920–96), served in the Australian Army for thirty-nine years. He entered the Royal Military College, Duntroon, in 1938 and retired in 1977 as a major general. He distinguished himself in the Pacific theatre in World War II as a member of the 24th Australian Infantry Battalion and was awarded the Military Cross. In 1967, Major General Graham went to South Vietnam as Commander of the 1st Australian Task Force in Phuoc Tuy province. Major General Graham's later appointments included Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Chief of Operations, General Officer Commanding Northern Command and Head of the Australian Defence Staff in London.

THE FEEL OF STEEL

THE HISTORY OF SWORDSMANSHIP

MICHAEL EVANS

Richard Cohen, *By the Sword: A History of Gladiators, Musketeers, Samurai, Swashbucklers and Olympic Champions*, The Modern Library, New York, 2002, 519pp.

It is well known that sword fighting is an excellent training ground for developing the reflexes of military professionals. In 1954, the International Council for Military Sports placed fencing at the top of recommended sports for military elites, particularly modern air-combat pilots. Long before the American strategist, Colonel John Boyd, developed the theory of the competitive decision cycle, a perceptive Italian military officer wrote, 'there is a profound analogy between aviation and fencing … Fencing is a particularly good sport because it accustoms [the pilot] to an evaluation of the strength of the opponent, to the use of reasoning and the exercise of courage'. In World War II, when Free Polish fighter pilots arrived in Britain to fly with the Royal Air Force, one of their first requests was for a fencing master and a place to train in order that they could maintain their combat reflexes. The International Council for Military Sports also noted that all those military professionals faced with the prospect of close combat could benefit from swordfighting. 'Fencing', the Council observed, 'develops serenity under fire, because the fencer does not have to deal with an object but with a thinking person—his opponent—in a struggle fought at terribly close quarters and with movements of lightning rapidity'.

The above insights are taken from Richard Cohen's fascinating history of swordsmanship, justly praised around the world as the definitive study of an art that is at once a deadly form of military combat, a cultural ritual and a martial sport. Cohen, a former British sabre champion, brings unparalleled authority to an analysis of the role of swordplay in both military and social history. His discussion ranges from the use of the sword as a battle weapon, to its employment in the rise and fall of duelling, through to the emergence of fencing as a modern Olympic combat sport. In the words of British military historian, John Keegan, *By the Sword* is an enormously learned but gripping book that 'describes the part sword fighting has played in the history of male society … and succeeds in conveying the sensations, excitement, and sometimes terror of the contest'.

The sword is deeply etched in human culture, not least in the military realm. We speak of men having the strength of Damascene or Toledo steel—famous places of swordsmiths. Throughout Western military history, it has been common to give young soldiers swords of honour for outstanding achievement; yet, when an officer was disgraced, his sword was always broken. Whole armies have been surrendered by the symbolism of a general giving up his sword to a victor. Battles have been won and lost, from Hastings to Omdurman, by the actions of cavalry wielding the *arme blanche*. The military salute is derived from knights armed with sword and shield on horseback lifting the visor of their helmets. As late as 1939, the British War Office sent out a special order: 'all officers will sharpen swords'. In 1942, a US Army field manual warned American soldiers that their Japanese enemies should be regarded as highly trained in classical swordsmanship of the foil and épée.

> … in World War II, Japanese *kamikaze* pilots took their samurai swords into their cockpits in order to go to their deaths with honour.

More broadly, many of the social mannerisms of our everyday life owe their origins to the cultural role of the sword. For example, we shake hands to demonstrate that we are not reaching for our swords; a gentleman traditionally offers a lady his right arm because his sword was always at his left hip. A gentleman's coat always buttons left over right so that in a duel he may unbutton it with his left, unarmed hand. Politics and sport freely borrow from what Cohen calls 'the linguistic romance of steel'. Politicians and sporting teams regularly speak of thrust and parry, lunge and riposte. In the British political tradition, the two main parties in the House of Commons are separated by exactly two sword lengths—a legacy of an age in which men wore rapiers and disagreements might have meant more than an exchange of heated words. Moreover, European knighthood was conferred by the touch of a sword on the shoulder.

The romance of the sword is, of course, not confined to the West. In Japan, swordsmanship is one of the classic disciplines of Zen Buddhism, while in World War II, Japanese *kamikaze* pilots took their samurai swords into their cockpits in order to go to their deaths with honour. The sexual symbolism of swords also resonates throughout human history. In ancient Rome, the Latin term *vagina* originally meant a sword's sheath, while *gladius* (sword) became the popular slang term for the penis. Popular culture is also saturated in what Cohen calls 'blade worship'—from the sword of Damocles, through King Arthur's fabled Excalibur, to the light sabres employed in the *Star Wars* films.

Cohen traces the origins of the sword as a military weapon to Minoan Crete and Celtic Britain between 1500 and 1100 BC. Although Greek hoplites used swords, it was the Romans that first viewed the edged blade as a distinct weapon with special uses and rules. The Romans elevated the art of swordplay both through their legions that specialised in the close-quarter, short-sword fight and through the pursuit of gladiatorial combat. The Roman philosopher, Seneca, made an observation that has echoed down the centuries: that the way a man uses a sword reveals his essential character. As he put it, 'the swordfighter reveals himself only when he gets in the arena'.

In the ancient world, alongside the Romans, the Celts of Gaul and the Spanish were renowned swordsmen. The Celtic Gauls favoured cutting and slashing, but the Spanish pioneered the use of the thrust. In the history of war, however, the evolution of the sword as a military weapon owed much to the battle of Adrianople in 378 AD. At Adrianople, a mounted Visigothic army decisively defeated the Roman infantry legions under the Emperor Valens. The Visigothic cavalry, greatly assisted by a new invention, the stirrup, used their horses as mobile platforms to wield long swords and cut the Romans to pieces. After Adrianople, the age of heavy cavalry replaced the age of the infantry and the long, slashing sword largely eclipsed the short, thrusting blade. Above all, the sword earned equality with both the spear and the lance, especially when used by cavalry employing shock tactics.

Following the fall of Rome, the sword became a token of mythic power and majesty throughout the Europe of the Dark and Middle Ages. In the famous *Chanson de Roland* of 778, the Emperor Charlemagne's champion, Roland, wields a great sword called Durendal, that symbolises chivalry and honour. As the two Frankish heroes, Roland and Oliver fight a doomed rearguard action against a horde of Saracens, Roland declares, 'I will smite with Durendal, my good sword that Charlemange gave me. If I die, he who inherits it will say, "It was the sword of a noble vassal"'.

The *Chanson de Roland* became the emblem of an age of chivalry in which the sword lay at the heart of a medieval code of honour. It represented inner power and nobility, and was the weapon of the aristocratic knight. During the Middle Ages, the broadsword was used mainly to cut and slash opponents in battles such as Crecy and Poitiers. By the 15th century, however, the long reign of the mounted knight

wielding sword and lance was being challenged by missile weapons such as the English longbow, by new gunpowder weapons and by the rise of the Swiss pikemen. However, another invention, that of the printing press had the revolutionary effect of disseminating knowledge of swords and the art of swordplay from the confines of the privileged aristocracy to a broader cross-section of European society.

In the Renaissance Europe of the early 16th century, printing permitted a variety of informal fencing techniques to be widely studied and then transformed into a systematic doctrine for the use of the sword as a combat weapon. As with science and literature, Renaissance Italy led Europe in the art of swordsmanship. In 1553, the Italian writer, Camillo Agrippa, published his *Treatise on the Science of Arms with a Philosophical Dialogue*, which included engravings of sword play by Michelangelo. Agrippa described the use of the thrust and the lunge, and systematised the four basic guard positions: *prima*, *secunda*, *terza* and *quarta*—parries that served to quarter a swordsman's chest: upper and lower left, upper and lower right. Agrippa described the extended-sword arm thrust and discovered the 'disengage'—that is, moving the blade from one line of attack where it is blocked to another that is not protected. Another Venetian theorist, Giacomo di Grassi, produced *The Art of Defence* analysing the need in sword fighting for parrying, footwork, speed and balance.

In the 17th century, a succession of Italian masters further developed the structure of swordplay. The Spanish *espada ropera* (dress sword)—a slender, double-edged four-foot sword (dubbed the rapier in English)—emerged and was quickly adopted throughout Italy, France and England. The specialised rapier—with its thin, deadly fifty-inch blade encased in a swept hilt—was designed for thrusting and was often used in conjunction with a foot-long dagger. The rapier's general adoption throughout Renaissance Europe led to the triumph in sword fighting of the thrust over the cut. In an age in which privatised violence was unregulated, the Italian *duello* (duel), derived from the Latin words *bellum* (conflict) and *duo* (two), flourished. There were frequent 'killing affrays' or *duelli alla macchia* between groups of swordsmen and such Renaissance figures as Benvenuto Cellini and Michelangelo Caravaggio were inveterate duellists.

Spanish rapiers became both weapons and fashion accessories for gentlemen. Elizabethan London was full of swordsmen, mercenaries and assorted military adventurers, and the swagger they brought to the city streets led to their being called swashbucklers. Not surprisingly, with hordes of swordsmen on the streets, public duelling was widespread, and the watchmen of London frequently found 'dead men

> The rapier's general adoption throughout Renaissance Europe led to the triumph in sword fighting of the thrust over the cut.

with holes in their breasts' in doorways and alleys. Shakespeare's plays capture the prevalence of violent swordplay. In *Romeo and Juliet*, Mercurio and Tybalt duel with rapiers and daggers, as do Hamlet and Laertes in *Hamlet.* Duelling died hard in Britain. In 1720 in London, a mass swordfight involving 100 men had to be dispersed by a troop of Horse Guards, while during the reign of George III, there were 172 duels and ninety-one fatalities. It was only in 1844 that the practice was finally banned in Britain.

Cohen reveals that, in France, in the thirty years between 1559 and 1589, duelling was so popular that between four and five men were killed per week from sword fighting—an extraordinary death toll. In the 17th century, governments found that trying to ban sword fighting was like trying to ban adultery. The French saying that 'divorce is the sacrament of adultery' was modified as 'duelling is the sacrament of murder'. The Chevalier d'Andrieux, a notable French champion for hire, killed seventy-one men before he was aged thirty. When his next opponent boasted, 'Chevalier you will be the thirteenth I have killed', d'Andrieux coolly replied 'and you my seventy-second'—and he was true to his word.

> In the 17th century, Governments found that trying to ban sword fighting was like trying to ban adultery.

In the 17th century, France was a nation of duellists. In 1652, the English Ambassador to Paris was moved to report to London that 'there is scarce a Frenchman worth looking on who has not killed his man in a duel'. It was the French that developed the art of fencing with *phrases d'armes* or sequences of specialised moves and countermoves—attack, parry, riposte—in what they styled a 'conversation of blades'. It was this culture of swordplay that the great French novelist Alexandre Dumas immortalised in his famous books, *The Three Musketeeers* and *The Man in the Iron Mask.*

Duelling proved extremely difficult to outlaw in Europe because it was considered to be a form of 'heroic archaism' and served to introduce young men to the ancient ways of society. The practice persisted into the 19th century. In 1837, Alexsandr Pushkin, the Russian Byron, who excelled at both poetry and swordplay, was killed in a duel. In Italy between 1879 and 1889 there were 2759 duels recorded (93 per cent fought with swords) with 3901 wounded and fifty killed. Georges Clemenceau, Prime Minister of France in the years 1906–09 and 1917–20, fought five duels with the sword and seven with pistols. It was said that French parliamentarians feared him for his sword, his pistols and his tongue in that order. Clemenceau's politics reflected his skills with the sword—aggressive and persistent with a penchant for the unexpected *coup de main.*

In the 17th century, the rapier was gradually replaced by the shorter 'town sword' or 'small sword'—ideal for attack and defence in confined space—which led to the abandonment of the dagger. In France, the small sword became known as the *épée courte*, a 'transition rapier'. The foil, the first purely sporting sword, and the fencing mask made their appearances in the first half of the 18th century, as did the sabre—a weapon descended from the Turkish scimitar. First adopted by the Hungarians in their wars against the Turks, the sabre spread throughout the armies of Europe. European infantry officers who commanded troops using first the plug and then the socket bayonet on their muskets soon carried sabres in combat. Today, the three weapons that emerged in the 17th and 18th centuries—the épée, the foil and the sabre—are the basic weapons of fencing as a modern combat sport.

> Clemenceau's politics reflected his skills with the sword—aggressive and persistent with a penchant for the unexpected *coup de main*.

One of the most interesting aspects of Cohen's book is the way in which he deals with the mysticism and romance surrounding the sword. He explains the quest by Italian theorists of fencing for the *botta segreta* (the perfect thrust), a special killing manoeuvre long sought by expert swordsmen. There is also an excellent chapter on Japan's relationship with the sword. In Japan, the way of the sword and the way of Zen were seen as identical—both aim to kill the ego. Sword fighting for the Japanese samurai was essentially a spiritual activity and the perfect Japanese samurai was the 17th-century swordsman–philosopher, Miyamoto Musashi. As a *kensei* (Holy Man of the Sword), Musashi wrote *The Book of Five Rings*, much admired today by Western strategists and businessmen as a primer on competitive behaviour. It is no accident that one of the most admired Japanese films in the West, Akira Kurosawa's *The Seven Samurai*, is an epic about honour, duty and swordsmanship.

One of the finest American swordsmen was none other than George S. Patton. Acknowledged as the foremost expert on the use of the sword in the US Army, Patton redesigned the 1840 US cavalry sabre and wrote a manual for its use. In 1912, Lieutenant Patton represented the United States in fencing at the 1912 Stockholm Olympics, beating twenty-one opponents out of twenty-four and narrowly missing becoming an Olympic champion. Reports on Patton's fencing are fascinating to read since they serve as metaphors for his later approach to strategy in World War II. One observer wrote, 'Patton's pugnacious slashing, give-no-quarter attacking style easily made him a crowd favourite [at the Olympics] but tactically often left him vulnerable to the finesse of his competitors … To attack was to succeed, to defend was to invite defeat'. Another instructor commented that Patton's defence 'was the

despair of his teachers for the aggressive Patton was interested only in offense. His method of parrying was to counterattack'. Seneca would not have been surprised at the close analogies between the character of Patton's swordsmanship and the character of his generalship.

Swordplay entered popular culture through two media: the romantic novel and the cinema. In the 19th century, Sir Walter Scott's novels, such as *Rob Roy* and *Ivanhoe,* and Alexandre Dumas's musketeer romances brought the world of military adventure, chivalry and swordplay to the mass public. Other writers such as Captain Marryat, P. C. Wren and Anthony Hope followed in this tradition, producing a series of swashbuckling novels that influenced generations of young men. Following the invention of cinema, many of these stories were adapted to the screen and the swashbuckler movie emerged as a major attraction at the box office.

> Seneca would not have been surprised at the close analogies between the character of Patton's swordsmanship and the character of his generalship.

Despite clear differences between classical sword play and screen duelling, film became a powerful medium for conveying what the French call *sentiment de fer* (the feel of steel). What made the celluloid swashbucklers so popular was the atmosphere conveyed by the involvement of professional masters of the sword, such as Fred Cavens, Bob Anderson, Ralph Faulkner and William Hobbs. Both Cavens and Anderson were ex-military professionals—the former a Belgian Army officer and the latter a British Royal Marine. Faulkner was an American Olympic sabre fencer, while Hobbs was Australian swordsman. Between them, these four sword masters choreographed many of the greatest fights of the silver screen, including Douglas Fairbanks Snr in the silent version of *The Three Musketeers*, Errol Flynn in *Captain Blood*, Ronald Colman in *The Prisoner of Zenda* and Tyrone Power in *The Mark of Zorro*. Who can resist the duelling scene in that almost perfect 1937 film, *The Prisoner of Zenda*, when Ronald Colman as the hero, Rudolf Rassendyll, and Douglas Fairbanks Jr as the villainous Rupert of Hentzau match blades and words in the bowels of a castle:

> *Rupert:* Why don't you let me kill you quietly?
> *Rudolf:* Oh, a little noise adds a touch of cheer. You notice I'm getting you closer to the drawbridge rope?
> *Rupert:* You're so fond of rope, it's a pity to have to finish you off with steel. What did they teach you on the playing fields of Eton? Puss in the corner?
> *Rudolf*: Oh, chiefly not throwing knives at other people's backs.

Many professional fencers consider that the finest sword fight ever filmed occurs in the 1940 version of *The Mark of Zorro* between Tyrone Power and Basil Rathbone. Rathbone, an English actor, was a natural swordsman who did his own fencing on screen, but Power had to be extensively doubled by Fred Cavens' son, himself an expert sword fighter. Nick Evangelista's *Encyclopedia of the Sword* declares the duelling scene in *The Mark of Zorro* to be 'the finest example of movie swordplay Hollywood has ever produced'. Errol Flynn, although often doubled by professionals for more complex sword fights, is rated in the same publication as 'the most convincing swordsman ever to have appeared on screen'—largely because of his all-round athletic ability.

For many cinemagoers, however, the most famous sword fight in movie history is that between Stewart Granger and Mel Ferrer in the 1952 film version of Rafael Sabatini's novel, *Scaramouche*. In visual if not technical terms, *Scaramouche* is the classic film of swordplay. The film's climactic six-and-a-half-minute final duel between Granger and Ferrer, both of whom performed their own work on screen, remains impressive, even today in the age of special effects. More recently, the most realistic portrayals of sword fighting on the screen occur in Ridley Scott's 1977 film *The Duellists*, based on a Joseph Conrad short story. Tracing the rivalry between two French cavalry officers during the Napoleonic wars, *The Duellists*—choreographed with great attention to technical detail by the Australian fencer, William Hobbs—is arguably the most accurate and bloody portrayal of military swordsmanship ever put on camera.

Other films notable for their simulated sword fights include the 1995 version of *Rob Roy*, featuring tense duelling scenes with Tim Roth and Liam Neeson, and the interesting 1999 Spanish film, *The Fencing Master*. Although, on screen, the highly technical, austere and minimalist thrusting movements of professional swordsmanship are often sacrificed to create an athletic spectacle, it is film that has kept the sword alive in the popular consciousness. Some of the most successful contemporary films from the *Star Wars* series through *Gladiator* to *The Lord of the Rings* explicitly identify codes of military honour with the symbolism of swords and swordplay.

Thus, while the substance of combat may be abandoned in favour of flamboyant style, of all art forms, it is cinema that has succeeded in conveying the spirit, if not the reality, of swordsmanship. This spirit is captured by Jeffrey Richards in his 1977 tribute to cinema swashbuckling, *Swordsmen of the Screen*. Richards writes nostalgically, 'never to have sailed the Spanish Main with Errol Flynn, never to have ridden the King's Highway with Louis Hayward, never to have fought the Cardinal's Guard with Douglas Fairbanks is never to have dreamed, never to have lived, never to have been young'. This romance of the sword is not confined to males. In December 2000, the Australian writer, Helen Garner, wrote in the London *Guardian* of her love of fencing. Describing her Hungarian instructor, Garner admitted, 'what he taught me was a way of formalising aggression and defence, of making fighting beautiful'.

The second half of Cohen's study covers the *Mensur* duelling culture of Germany, where sabre scars were marks of honour for regimental officers and university students. It is interesting to note that, just as the samurai tradition can be detected in the competitive culture of corporate Japan, so too is *Mensur* duelling important in the world of today's German business executives. There is also a fascinating discussion of how Fascism and Nazism, in their rejection of 20th-century social norms, took inspiration from the warrior culture of sword play. As a young man, Spain's future dictator, General Francisco Franco, won a decoration for killing a Moroccan tribesman in a hand-to-hand combat with swords.

> … Fascism and Nazism, in their rejection of 20th century social norms, took inspiration from the warrior culture of sword play.

In Italy, Benito Mussolini sought to make fencing 'the Fascist sport', while Oswald Mosley, the British fascist leader, was a leading exponent of the épée. Finally, Reinhard Heydrich, head of the internal security section of the Nazi SS, was an outstanding sabre fighter and one of the most formidable swordsmen in Germany. When the Germans conquered Western Europe, Heydrich assumed the presidency of the International Fencing Federation (FIE) by summarily removing its Belgian president. Heydrich was still FIE president when he was assassinated by Czech partisans in Prague in May 1942.

The final chapters of Cohen's study are devoted to the development of fencing as a modern Olympic sport and are perhaps of less interest to the military reader. As Aldo Nadi, the great Italian fencer once noted, real combat with a sword—the most military of weapons—and fencing as a sport cannot be easily compared: 'one is a world of hate, courage and blood; the other of courtesy, courage and skill'. Nonetheless, for readers curious about the role that the blade has played in history from Roman short-sword through Spanish thrusting sword to rapier, épée, foil and sabre, Cohen's masterly study is at once a work of military social history and of intellectual and cultural analysis. By the final pages, one is convinced of the truth of the famous words of the French Nobel laureate, Anatole France, who in 1921, described the sword as 'the first tool of civilisation, the only means man has found to reconcile his brutal instincts and his ideal of justice'.

THE AUTHOR

Dr Michael Evans is Head of the Land Warfare Studies Centre and coeditor of the *AAJ*.

BOOK REVIEW

Alan Powell, *The Third Force: ANGAU's New Guinea War 1942–46*, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2003, 292pp.

Reviewed by Michael O'Connor

Arguably, the most ubiquitous and perhaps the most neglected unit of the Australian Army in World War II's New Guinea campaigns was the Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit (ANGAU). The Army History Unit deserves commendation for sponsoring this excellent history of ANGAU just at a time when the need for a civil affairs capability in the ADF is becoming more apparent.

Alan Powell is Emeritus Professor of History at the Northern Territory University. His contributions to Australian military history have included the highly regarded *War by Stealth*, a study of Australians in the Allied Intelligence Bureau.

At the outbreak of the Pacific War, Australia administered two territories in New Guinea quite separately. Papua was an Australian territory, acquired from Britain in 1906 and maintained at absolutely minimal cost to the Australian taxpayer. The Territory of New Guinea had been captured from Germany in 1914 and was administered as a League of Nations Mandate. Thanks to large discoveries of gold and an expatriate-controlled plantation industry, New Guinea was wealthier, but it was administered mainly in the interests of the expatriate community. The Papuan Administration was largely indifferent to the expatriate community and pursued a remarkably benevolent, paternalistic policy towards the Papuan community; in New Guinea, the reverse was generally the case.

History tells us that Australia and the Army were quite unprepared for the Japanese challenge in Papua New Guinea. This was certainly true of the two civil administrations. In New Guinea—as with the small Rabaul garrison—a *sauve qui peut* mentality prevailed. An excessively legalistic policy promptly disarmed the civil police and, in many cases, simply abandoned them.

In Papua, a clash between the civil administration and the Army led to the dismissal of the former and the establishment of martial law. Some of the field personnel of the Administration were told that they were out of a job; others were simply ignored.

For its part, the Army, with no experience of military government, had made no preparations for administering a population assumed to number some hundreds of thousands, many of them in enemy-controlled territory. Its most urgent task was to stem the Japanese advance and, for this, they needed carriers for the trained troops and supplies that were slowly beginning to trickle in to Port Moresby. The 8th Military District Commander was Major General Basil Morris, a regular gunner not very highly regarded by his peers. Morris did, however, try to make a silk purse from a very tatty sow's ear. Part of the manufacturing process was to establish ANGAU.

ANGAU's priority task was to recruit labourers to carry for the Army. Somewhat to its surprise, the Army found that the transport infrastructure of the New Guinea of 1942 was almost totally unfamiliar with the internal combustion engine. Supply from, and evacuation to, bridgeheads, airheads and road heads for the forces in contact with the enemy depended on the broad backs and stamina of thousands of ill-nourished, poorly clothed, usually unpaid and overworked Papua New Guineans. These were normally conscripted in a fairly ruthless process that ANGAU was only slowly able to ameliorate as the emergency diminished.

Powell suggests that this labour conscription was unfair if only because the people of Papua New Guinea owed little or no loyalty to Australia. That may be, but it can also be said that Australia owed an obligation of just treatment to the people of Papua New Guinea and that defeating the Japanese was the best way to achieve that objective. Indeed, this is the strongest argument for the late war operations in the north-west, New Britain and Bougainville, criticised by many as unnecessary and wasteful. Powell's discussion of the loyalty question is substantial and well balanced.

After the Japanese defeats in Papua, ANGAU steadily developed as a broad-based military government. Powell notes that the labour administration section always accounted for around half of ANGAU's total strength, which reached 366 officers and 1660 other ranks, not including the 2700-strong police or the still larger labour force. ANGAU was also responsible for such tasks as civil law enforcement, district administration, health services and coastal shipping. Many of the key personnel, especially in the District Services branch, were former administration officials but, equally, many were drawn from volunteers sought from Army units.

The District Services personnel—the 'kiaps'—and their colleagues of the Royal Papuan Constabulary, who best knew the country and its peoples, were increasingly drawn into active military operations against the Japanese as advisers, scouts and guides. ANGAU was partly responsible for the administration of the alphabet soup of irregular units that operated in enemy-occupied territory. Indeed, many of the personnel were so interchangeable that some of my own superiors in postwar Papua New Guinea freely admitted that they were never quite sure for whom they worked at any given time.

Powell describes a wide range of ANGAU operations and devotes two excellent chapters—one on the Australians, and the other on the Papua New Guineans—to ANGAU's people. He touches only briefly on the role of Colonel Alf Conlon's Directorate of Research and Civil Affairs that played the principal role in establishing the comparatively radical postwar national policy for Papua New Guinea as a single entity. Such neglect is a pity, but it may well have been considered outside the scope of the study. Nonetheless, the job was done largely by the Army under the benevolent direction of the Commander-in-Chief, General Blamey, often in spite of the traditional political indifference to Papua New Guinea. From the Army's perspective, this study of ANGAU reinforces the not well-understood view that ending the fighting does not guarantee the peace. Professor Powell has given us an excellent and balanced study of a unit that was as well known as any to those who served in New Guinea but the scope of whose operations was seriously underestimated at the time and continues to be underestimated to this day.

BOOK REVIEW

Patrick Lindsay, *Spirit of the Digger*, Pan Macmillan,
Sydney, 2003, 293pp.

Reviewed by Brigadier John Essex-Clark (Retd)

Patrick Lindsay, who also wrote *The Spirit of Kokoda*, now gives us this
293-page exposition of the quality and character of Australian servicemen
by a carefully selected use of lucid anecdotal cameos from the Boer War to
Iraq in order to illustrate the qualities of the Digger which, as he describes, are no
more than the essence of Australianism. This approach is appropriate because any
military force is a mirror image of the society that it serves.

The author commences by using the bombing at Bali to show that the spirit of
the Digger is synonymous with the best Australian qualities of mateship, courage,
compassion. In war, Diggers tend to demonstrate endurance, selflessness, loyalty,
resourcefulness, devotion, independence, ingenuity, audacity, coolness, larrikinism
and good humour. These are, of course, all qualities that are needed by any good
soldier or citizen of whatever race or creed. The author then turns the Digger 'myth'
into a reality. What is surprising to the reader, militarily experienced or not, is how
little these qualities appear to have changed in our Diggers over the years. To use
a current buzzword, those qualities now appear to be 'embedded' in our national
character, irrespective of cultural or ethnic background. This raises the question of
nature versus nurture: are these qualities intrinsic in our nature, or are our attitudes
and qualities developed by nurture, learning and training? Readers might ponder
this interesting conundrum as they absorb the contents of this book.

Lindsay illustrates these qualities by taking us through many vignettes on a
potted history of Australian military activity, starting even before the word 'Digger'
was first coined. We hear the words of observers and war correspondents. We read
the thoughts of many of our Diggers who fought in our efforts at Brakfontein on
the Elands River in what is now Mpumalunga, South Africa, Gallipoli, and on
through the horrific battles such as Fromelles on the Somme in World War I. We
are then guided through Crete, Bardia, Tobruk, Alamein, the Kokoda Track and

Balikpapan in World War II, and the horrors faced by our prisoners of war. Moving on to Korea, the author surveys the extraordinary battles of Kapyong and Maryang San. The author then presents anecdotes from Vietnam, and snapshots of peace-making and peacekeeping operations, before culminating in a scene from Operation *Falconer* in Iraq.

In order to give us this panoramic overview, Lindsay has had to delve deeply and broadly to borrow from Bean's magnificent volumes on World War I and from a large collection of official war histories and volumes about our ubiquitous military actions. Therefore, for the military historian there is little new, but for readers searching for an Australian identity, this book puts many ideas in a useful framework. Perhaps the author overemphasises the 'other ranker'-versus-officer challenges and the 'pommy bashing'—both of which reflect our Australian egalitarian quirk.

The author sensibly and understandably avoids any mention of controversial actions that might detract from the Digger myth, perhaps because there are so few. However, he also omits to illustrate some of the obvious faults of the Australian Digger, such as the 'tall poppy' syndrome, looking for weaknesses in others, and avoiding personal or group guilt by blaming others. Moreover, Lindsay too lightly glides over what might be considered as other primary qualities in our Diggers, such as pragmatism, stoicism and self-confidence. The author's narrative could have done with some firm editing, since there is some jarring and incorrect military terminology. Ultimately, however, none of these minor deficiencies detract from the essence of the book.

Lindsay's smooth narrative should be read by all interested in our national char-acter when we are under pressure, and by those seeking to identify our national identity and style. The book should be studied by those who may be losing confidence in our youth of today, for most of our youngsters still show the best qualities of our Diggers, and, of course, some of them become Diggers. Finally, the book should also be read by any who aspire to lead Australians in war or in any other major venture—be it business, sporting, educational or recreational. Lindsay succeeds in making a myth real and accessible, and probably describes the essence of our Australian character as well as anything recently written.

BOOK REVIEW

Christopher Wray, *Sir James Whiteside McCay: A Turbulent Life*, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2002, 280pp.

Reviewed by Brigadier John Essex-Clark (Retd)

'One of the greatest soldiers ever to have served Australia … greater even than Monash'

So wrote General Brudenell White. This is an honest book that should be read by those who aspire to understand leadership and the pitfalls of egocentricity. It highlights the weaknesses of a strict, dogmatic, non-empathetic and management-oriented leadership style. The book is well worth reading in order to view the life of a man who too often squandered great opportunities through self-aggrandisement rather than teamwork.

The story of Major General Sir James Whiteside McCay KBE, KCMG, CB, by Christopher Wray, is thoroughly researched—a task made more difficult by the fact that McCay burnt all his personal records in a bonfire. The inevitable comparison of McCay and Monash is an invidious one, particularly as the author attempts often to justify the above statement by General Brudenell White. At times, the book becomes more of an apology for McCay's military leadership weaknesses, rather than an endorsement of his many fine achievements.

Following the career of a driven man who was a lawyer, an artful politician, and ambitious military commander can be interesting. He was, at one time or another, an alderman in local government, a Member of both State and Federal parliaments, and Minister for Defence. As a politician, he was supposed to have 'a clear and sagacious mind'. McCay was an intensely focused, hard-working and brilliant university student—traits that never left him. Within his legal and political activities, he also managed an army career, reaching the rank of Major General and command of the 5th Division AIF on the Western Front during World War I. He also had been Director of Intelligence. There are good descriptions of the 'fog of war', and the flawed planning process and subsequent shambles during the landings and

the battles for Krithia on the Gallipoli Peninsula, plus the battles at Fromelles and Flers on the Western Front. The chaos of the march of McCay's brigade from Tel el Kebir to Ferry Post on the Suez Canal is interesting, as are the descriptions of the well-known lack of tactical commonsense during many of the Australian battles on the Western Front. The maps are imprecise but adequate.

We know that the warfighting culture of British forces in the 'Great War' were too often the callous attritional 'up-and-at-em' legacies of the previous colonial and European wars. However, it is difficult to excuse the use of any tactics that caused severe casualties, and gained nothing. Many senior British commanders did so for their personal aggrandisement and to gain military kudos. But using the excuse that he was only obeying orders is a poor explanation in the case of a commander such as McCay, to whom was attributed the characteristic of being overly inclined to question orders from his superiors.

Early in the book McCay is described as having *ego-idealism*—a trait that involves 'defending one's ideological position without compromise, even when external criteria strongly indicate that the case will thereby be lost'. Further, the author indicates that McCay lacked 'luck' compared with Monash, and that he did not gain the respect and confidence of the men under his command or by those who commanded him. The book touches on the developing power of the media (Keith Murdoch) and the political intrigue and jealousies that plagued the Australian senior officers in London during the war. McCay was unpopular at all levels and was accused of being a demanding leader with a tendency to be a martinet. The worst single criticism he faced, and never quashed, though he was well supported by such as Pompey Elliott and C. E. W. Bean, was his 'ordering such foredoomed inanities as the Fromelles slaughter in 1917, when he should have refused to do so'. My impression is that McCay was a man imbued with the callous British military leadership culture of that time, and it is perhaps unfair to draw a comparison with today's softer, inclusive leadership style. However, though he was brave, and wounded twice, he was most unpopular with the men under his command and there are lessons to be learnt from his style—if only to understand what not to do or be.

More than anything I have read recently, this book convinces me that leadership is an art and management is a science or, more significantly, that good 'management' is a tool of sound military leadership—not vice versa. Perhaps the book also shows that the same relationship between leadership and management applies equally to political and business leadership. Therefore, to mix these two distinct essentials of command thoughtlessly, or impetuously, can cause failure.

Though not of the same stature as Geoffrey Serle's magnificent *John Monash*, Wray's book deserves to nestle aside it on a bookshelf—if only for historical balance. This must have been a difficult book to write because, for all McCay's brilliance, bravery, knowledge, dedication, ambition and willpower, he appeared to lack two essential elements of a good leader and commander—commonsense and empathy. Perhaps most significantly, he lacked compassion—recently mentioned by General Peter Cosgrove as an important attribute for commanders to possess.

On the dustcover it states that the book seeks an answer to the enigma of McCay—was he brought down by the failure of others or by his own personality? The militarily experienced reader will most probably plump for the latter, as perhaps does the author in his final sentence.

Robin Moore, *Task Force Dagger: The Hunt for Bin Laden*,
Random House, New York, 2003, 372pp.

Reviewed by Captain Brett Chaloner, Royal Military College, Duntroon

Robin Moore will never be renowned as one of the world's great military historians; however, as the author of *Task Force Dagger*, he does what only an American author can do. He tells a story with great passion and fervour, sprinkled with good old 'Uncle Sam' ideology. This is a story of which the World War II and Vietnam War storyteller Brigadier S. L. A. Marshall would be proud. *Task Force Dagger* is not another *Bravo Two Zero*. It is, nonetheless, an engaging study that, when stripped of its hyperbole, outlines the detailed and complex story of the 5th Special Forces Group's operations in Afghanistan between October 2001 and April 2002.

The 5th Special Forces Group (5th Group) is responsible for the conduct of Special Operations in the US Central Command Area of Operations, which includes the Middle East and Afghanistan. By the admission of their Commander, Colonel John Mulholland, '… Afghanistan was new to the 5th Group … [it] was not an area that the United States had focussed on since the end of the Soviet era after they pulled out at the end of the 80's'. Following the bombing of the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001, Joint Special Operations Task Force 'Dagger' (TF Dagger) was the organisation spearheaded and commanded by 5th Group. It was assembled from predominantly US Army, Navy and Air Force Special Operations components with elements of the British SAS attached. Its mission was to defeat the Taliban and kill or capture Osama bin Laden.

Moore uses the first fifty pages of the book to set the scene for the establishment of TF Dagger and the initiation of Special Operations in Afghanistan. He is careful to concentrate on the human face of the taskforce and 5th Group. Moore introduces the reader to a number of the key personalities of the Group, including Colonel Mulholland and Master Sergeant John Bolduc, the first Green Beret to marry up with the Northern Alliance. As is typical of the rest of the book, Moore moves between narrative and explanation. He reflects on the history behind the units and

the linkages between the original and the modern-day SF Operators. One could say that Moore is doing his best to put the reader into the role of a first-person witness to the daily operations as they unfold. This approach is adopted at the expense of focusing on a detailed factual and chronological account of the major actions.

Once Moore is satisfied that the reader is comfortable in the presence of TF Dagger and its personalities, he breaks each of the next eleven chapters into a story about the operations that TF Dagger's elements prosecuted in coordination with a particular warlord. The first example is Chapter 8, titled 'Northern Alliance—General Dostum'. Throughout this chapter, readers find themselves attached to the twelve-man A-Team 595, codenamed TIGER 02 as they are inserted into Afghanistan and marry up with General Dostum's forces. Dostum, originally from Uzbekistan, is one of the most powerful and arguably most barbaric of the Afghan warlords. TIGER 02 goes on to participate in a rapid succession of operations with Dostum's forces. These operations result in the liberation of six Northern Provinces including the key city of Mazar-e-Sharif, well known for the battle at its fort that resulted in the death of over 450 Taliban and al-Qa'ida prisoners. In this way, Moore guides the reader through all the major contacts between TF Dagger teams—as they fought alongside Northern Alliance commanders (including the current Afghan President, Hamid Karzai)—and Taliban–al-Qa'ida forces. From this point, Moore takes the reader through the other major actions of the campaign, including the seizure of Kabul and Kandahar, as well as the siege of the Tora Bora cave complex where bin Laden was said to be operating.

Among the final chapters, Chapter 23 is worthy of individual note since it covers the operation that came to be known as *Anaconda*. Moore tells the story behind this particular operation not only because of the severity of the fighting that took place throughout this Taliban stronghold, but also because it was officially 'the last hurrah' of TF Dagger. For its efforts during the operation, 1 SAS Sqn, SASR gets a small but honourable mention.

As Australians, we have a tendency to scoff at the American perspective on life, the way in which they gush with patriotism and their capacity to talk up a story. Robin Moore's *Task Force Dagger* will give the reader plenty of opportunity for that. However, it is difficult for the reader not to get caught up in the remarkable efforts of the men of TF Dagger. There are without doubt many exceptional examples of heroism, cool decision-making under fire, and mateship. All these qualities appeal to Australians. Colonel Mulholland sums up the efforts of TF Dagger in an interview that he conducted with the US television program *Frontline*:

> Was it perfect? No, it wasn't perfect … In hindsight maybe would we have liked to have done more? Absolutely … we would like to walk out of the mountains with Bin Laden and his cronies in hand.

BOOK REVIEW

Anne Blair, *Ted Serong*, Oxford University Press,
Melbourne, 2002, 238pp.

Reviewed by Major General Adrian Clunies-Ross (Retd)

Brigadier Ted Serong was a unique Australian soldier, and the essence of any biography of him would be to capture this uniqueness. This Anne Blair does to a considerable degree.

Serong is most widely identified with the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV); this is not surprising since he led the first team to South Vietnam in 1962 and remained its nominal head until he left the Army in 1965. This connection with the team was, however, only one element of his career, which spanned a wide range of unusual activities and in which he wielded at times totally disproportionate influence.

The most significant landmark in Serong's early career was the re-establishment of the of the Jungle Training Centre (JTC) in Queensland. Using techniques developed from World War II and the Malayan experience, JTC became the Army's most important training institution at company level for Malaya, Borneo and South Vietnam, and continued for many years in much the same form that Serong had established. Nevertheless, as Anne Blair recounts and the Team experienced, its tactics and techniques required some modification for the much more substantial and intense conflict in South Vietnam.

Serong's highly unusual service in Burma—first as a military attaché and then as a special advisor to the Burmese Government—is well covered, but it is not until he arrived in South Vietnam in 1962 that he began to exercise extraordinary influence over the course of events and also over his allies. This influence is surprising in that, although he was appointed as a Special Advisor to the Commander of the Military Assistance Command (MACV), General Harkins, he commanded only thirty Australian Army advisors on the ground.

Anne Blair has dealt with the complexity of this appointment in some detail and with commendable insight. Serong had to deal not only with the initially skeptical Harkins, but also with the intrigue-ridden Vietnamese high command and more importantly with the suspicious President Ngo Dinh Diem, who was anxious to cultivate an ally as a counterweight to the Americans. That Serong was able to deal effectively with all three elements and to gain their trust and confidence was a tribute not only to his skill as a negotiator but also to his professional competence and extensive knowledge of counter-guerilla warfare. This influence was not limited to the players on the ground but extended to lecturing senior officer courses in the United States and face-to-face discussions with the highest in the land, including the Secretary of State and the President himself. It is obvious that the author regards this period as the high point of Serong's career.

The book gives a detailed account of Serong's activities after leaving the Army, including his establishment of a Police Field Force Training Centre at Trai Mat in the central highlands. This centre, based on Canungra-style training, was designed to produce a force capable of protecting the local population of the area from the Viet Cong (VC). Initially successful, this farsighted initiative went the way of many good ideas in Vietnam, destroyed by infighting and turf wars.

The closure of the training centre was followed by a gradual decline in Serong's influence with both the Americans and the South Vietnamese, and in some cases open hostility to his ideas towards the end in 1975, although these ideas were still freely given. He was convinced that he had found the best tactical methods to be adopted by the South Vietnamese Army for the final battles of the war. Whether he was right or wrong did not matter at this point because, in marked contrast to the early years, no-one was listening.

What the book does not fully cover was Serong's somewhat stormy relationship with his superiors. He was undoubtedly a difficult subordinate with a profound conviction in his opinions and judgment, and a highly independent streak. These characteristics did not always sit easily with those who had to deal with him. At the same time, as many will attest, he was generous to his subordinates, allowing them great flexibility and giving them unquestioning support. The book is a most readable account of a very unusual Australian soldier and should be consumed by all those who have an interest in the wider aspects of the Vietnam conflict. It does justice to a man whose unshakeable faith in his cause was the most compelling aspect of his character—a faith that sustained him through thirteen years of success and failure in South Vietnam.

BOOK REVIEW

George E. Kearney, Mark Creamer, Ric Marshall and Anne Goyne (eds), *Military Stress and Performance: the Australian Defence Force Experience*, Melbourne University Publishing, Melbourne, 2003, 294pp.

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel David Schmidtchen, Directorate of Retention Policy, Defence Personnel Executive, Canberra

Of the 52 000 Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel who served in Vietnam between 1962 and 1972, approximately 3000 were either killed or wounded in action. In 2002, the Department of Veterans' Affairs recognised one in five of those that had seen service in Vietnam as suffering from Post-traumatic Stress Disorder. What does this tell us? First, that psychological injury is the most prevalent form of injury suffered in armed conflict. Second, that the debilitating effect of operational stress persists beyond the life of the incident or operation. Third, that postwar psychological injury is likely to be the greatest personnel cost borne by the ADF and Australian society. Since the Vietnam War, a more inquisitive and informed public has watched as the social and emotional costs borne by ADF personnel and their families have been revealed.

Military Stress and Performance brings the current state of operational stress research and practice to our attention. It provides a comprehensive review of the ADF experience and practice. A range of professionals—including psychologists, psychiatrists, medical doctors, social workers and chaplains—are struggling to understand the source, scale and dimension of the problem of stress on operations and its consequences. In Australia, professionals approaching the problem have deliberately adopted a multi-disciplinary approach that supports a healthy balance between research and practice. *Military Stress and Performance* reflects this tradition by drawing on a range of professional disciplines to provide an account of the ADF's experience.

The book covers treatment methods, debriefing practices and first-hand accounts and observations. It is structured around four themes: 'The Stress Phenomenon'; 'Enabling Resilience'; 'Health and Welfare after Deployment'; and 'Caring for Casualties'. I was particularly drawn to Commodore Lee Cordner's personal account of the stresses encountered by a commander at sea. Commodore Cordner moves from his experiences in preparing the *HMAS Sydney* to participate in the 1990–91 Gulf War and the Maritime Interception Force in the North Red Sea through to being 'bemused by all the fuss' on their return home. The value of commanders documenting their experiences of stress in command cannot be emphasised enough.

The contribution of four experienced Australian Army Psychology Corps (AAPSYCH) psychologists on the advances made in delivering psychological support during the 1990s is revealing. Their reflections bring together the collective experiences of the AAPSYCH Corps and the Defence Force Psychology Organisation in order to demonstrate how the theory and practice of psychology in operations has evolved. They also provide a clear statement on where practice can be improved. On finishing the book, it became clear to me why the methodology of the ADF's success in dealing with operational stress is in demand from military forces around the world.

Professor Kearney does a commendable job of bringing together the main conclusions of the book. He does so by showing that the problem of operational stress has a long and difficult history that parallels society's struggle to acknowledge, accept and address the problem. In Professor Kearney's words, 'This book contains advice on the best treatment methods; suggestions for the optimal method of debriefing; and accounts of first-hand observations. Highlighted throughout is the conclusion that there is a need for better understanding and more carefully controlled research.' I agree, with the addition that it also shows how far the ADF has come in addressing the problem.

The editors acknowledge the difficulties of structuring the material to allow an easy flow from one section to the next. This book is best approached as a compendium of stand-alone articles that together contribute to a better understanding of a diverse topic. It can be distinguished from others addressing similar topics by the experience of the authors and the currency of the information. It combines the insights of some of Australia's foremost researchers and practitioners in the field with the experiences of currently serving officers. The book left me with the sense of a work in progress in that we have come a long way, but considerable distance remains before we can claim to have solved the problem. I recommend this book to scientists and practitioners working in the area of operational stress, as well as to commanders, who will, after reading the book, benefit from a better understanding of how stress on operations affects people, the process of treatment and the factors that influence recovery.

BOOK REVIEW

Dayton McCarthy, *The Once and Future Army: A History of the Citizen Military Forces 1947–1974*, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2003, 303pp.

Reviewed by Alan Ryan, Senior Research Fellow, Land Warfare Studies Centre

This excellent book is required reading for anyone who wants to understand how our present-day Army came to be. In that sense it is not only a history of the Army's reserve forces since the end of World War II, but it is also an account of how the Army as a whole adjusted to the complex realities of the Cold War. It is clear from this account that various lobby groups fought hard and long for their vision of the future Army, and that we still live with the result of their reasoning, passions and prejudices.

When it comes to making an Army, nothing is 'meant to be'. However, in retrospect we can learn much from the decisions and most importantly the errors of the past. For those with any experience of force structure planning it is disheartening to see how often we have faced the same problems and made the same mistakes. This book contains a warning to future force-planners, policy-makers, strategists and politicians that the Army is bigger than any of them. Perhaps most importantly, if we want the Army to be capable of undertaking the tasks we place on it, we need to pay more attention to what Wellington called 'that article'—the soldier. Anything else—whether it is tradition, professional pride, social ambition or political patronage—is just baggage.

One might gather from the foregoing that this book is an interesting read. In a way this is surprising, because it started life as a doctoral thesis, which the author completed at the Australian Defence Force Academy. This reviewer had the privilege to read the original thesis, which was a first-class piece of scholarship. Dayton McCarthy has done an excellent job of translating his research and turning his academic dissertation into an accessible and gripping book.

The book effectively picks up where Craig Wilcox's history of citizen soldiering in Australia left off. Wilcox brought his book to a close at the end of World War II and only made some brief observations about the Citizen Military Forces (CMF) in the postwar period. McCarthy picks up the reformation of the Australian Army and takes it through to the Millar Inquiry in 1974, which resulted in the wholesale restructure of the part-time component of the Army. He even goes a little further—the all-too-brief conclusion provides one of the best summaries of force structure development over the past thirty years that is available.

McCarthy uses the story of the rise and fall of the postwar CMF to chart the progress of Australia's changing strategic priorities and defence needs. The book is a catalogue of a widening gap between aspirations and reality. Because of resource constraints, CMF part-timers had to operate within a framework of limitations. The resulting lack of credibility was a shocking testimony to a wasted national resource and an insult to those who committed a large portion of their lives to voluntary national service.

The book demonstrates that 'a combination of government inaction, military bureaucratic disinterest, and a partial failure by the CMF to adapt to changing defence environments, coupled with societal ambivalence towards it, reduced the strength, role and prestige of the CMF between 1947 and 1974'. Sadly, there are few villains and quite a few flawed heroes. What is clear is that few involved with the Army had a large enough vision to see how the regular and part-time components could complement and supplement each other to achieve the common mission. The failure to use the CMF as a source of manpower during the Vietnam War was fatal to the 'one Army' concept. It is particularly interesting to read how the CMF Member of the Military Board, Major General Paul Cullen, campaigned to get a CMF battalion to Vietnam. The subsequent development of the Army might have been very different had he succeeded.

One of the most interesting themes in the book is McCarthy's analysis of the concept of the 'brilliant amateur'. This idea was built on the performance of the citizen soldiers of the First and Second AIFs. The idea that a trained citizen could rapidly deploy on operations was a sustaining myth for the part-timers in their darkest times. It was a notion founded on historical reality. The postwar leadership of the CMF was not short of inspirational officers and non-commissioned officers who possessed extraordinary experience of battle in theatres around the world. However, the tempo of operations in Korea and the counterinsurgency campaigns of the 1950s and 1960s favoured the regular army, so that over that period the balance of professionalism finally and irrevocably shifted to the regulars.

McCarthy ends the book on an up-beat note. The notion of a mass citizen army organised as the basis for national mobilisation to fight an industrial-age war has now been abandoned. Reservists are finally an essential part of the total force. Not only do they represent a 'surge' capacity to enable the Army to sustain operations at a time of high operational demand, but they possess many essential skill-sets that the Army cannot afford to maintain on a full-time basis. As the intellectual demands of complex information-age conflict proliferate, there will be an even greater demand to utilise the skills of citizen soldiers. Perhaps most importantly, we should not be thinking about 'surge' capacity—which suggests a short-term, limited commitment. If the signs are right, we may need access to an assured supply of short-service, part-time professionals to meet the operational demands of an uncertain future.

BOOK REVIEW

Ian Kuring, *Redcoats to Cams: A History of Australian Infantry 1788–2001*, Australian Military History Publications, Loftus, NSW, 2003, 572pp.

Reviewed by Alan Ryan, Senior Research Fellow, Land Warfare Studies Centre

Although this book will not be available until just before Christmas, its value to the Army is such that it is worth providing an advance review. The reviewer has been fortunate enough to receive the page proofs of the book and has no hesitation in recommending the book to all students of Australian military history. Given the central role played by the infantry in almost every conflict in which we have been involved, there has never been an exhaustive history of the corps. This book rectifies that deficiency admirably. The product of extensive research and detailed personal knowledge, the book is a complete account of where Australian infantry have served, their exploits, and how they were organised and equipped. Perhaps more importantly, it charts the evolution of infantry training, tactical doctrine and operating methods. Many readers, including infantrymen, will be surprised to learn of the extraordinary advances in the functions and capabilities of infantry in living memory.

Extensive annexes, diagrams and photographs back up this book. These resources provide a relief from the niggardly publishing standards of many commercial publishers. This book is the product of a lifelong passion—and it shows. The author's own life experience reflects part of the infantry corps' own history; Ian Kuring served as an officer and warrant officer in South Vietnam and later in Somalia. As a long-time curator of the Infantry museum at Singleton and service with the Army History Unit, Kuring is definitely one of the guardians of the history of the infantry 'tribe'.

This valuable study, however, is not a light read, or one of those regimental-style histories that revel in anecdotes but lack substance. This is a serious, though very readable, reference work that can be dipped into for pleasure, but which will find a place on the shelf of anyone who conducts research into the evolution of our Army. There is nothing that you might want to know about Australian infantry that will not be found in the pages of this rather hefty volume. Infantrymen will want to have this book because, unless they know where they have come from and the changes that they have already made, they are unlikely to discern where they are going. Those who are involved in determining the future structure, roles and functions of the infantry battalion are already using it as a resource. It appears likely that this book will find its way into more than a few socks this Christmas and it is well recommended as a sound investment for those who will pursue their careers with the 'queen of the battlefield'.

BOOK REVIEW

Dennis E. Showalter (ed.), *Future Wars: Coalition Operations in Global Strategy*, Imprint Publications, Chicago, 2002, 184pp.

Reviewed by Major Russell Parkin, Australian Defence College, Weston Creek

Previous volumes of the United States Air Force Academy's Military History Symposium Series have produced some excellent studies. Volume 7 in the series contains a collection of essays on the subject of coalition warfare that very successfully fulfil Sir Michael Howard's injunction that military history be studied in breadth, depth and context. The breadth is provided by the chronological scope of the essays, which span the classical period to the 1991 Gulf War, while the scholarship evident in the individual contributions provides the necessary depth of study. The prologue written by editor Dennis Showalter (with William J. Astore) and Showalter's epilogue provide the context for the collection. The essays are presented in chronological sequence, forming a brief history of alliance and coalition warfare that has considerable contemporary significance.

The subject matter of the individual essays ranges widely through history to cover politico-military, operational and cross-cultural aspects of coalition warfare. While most of the collection deals with coalitions from the 19th century onwards, Alfred S. Bradford's essay on asymmetrical coalitions in Greek and Roman times is a reminder that, for most of the history of warfare, coalitions have been the norm rather than the exception. The essay also suggests that the models provided by ancient asymmetrical coalitions have some bearing on those found in the modern world. Donald D. Horward's essay on the often faltering European coalition against Napoleon underlines the importance of national self-interest in determining the fate of coalitions. The point is reinforced by an excellent essay from Andrew Lambert writing on the Crimean War, and Holger H. Herwig and Keith Neilson writing respectively on the Austro-Hungarian and Anglo-Russian alliances in World War I. Essays on the Anglo-American special relationship by Warren F. Kimball and Marc Trachtenberg's discussion of relations between the United States and Europe during the first decade of NATO resonate strongly with recent events, as does Thomas A. Keaney's study

of US involvement in the 1991 Gulf War. Addressing a specifically operational issue, Adrian R. Lewis considers the negative influence of the compromise between the United States and Britain over amphibious doctrine and how this shaped the planning and conduct of the Normandy invasion in 1944. Xiaoming Zhang's essay on Chinese and Russian involvement in the Korean War draws parallels between the early 1950s and issues confronting contemporary US–China relations. Carl Boyd's essay on Nazi Germany's hollow alliance with Imperial Japan presents an instance of how two nations divided by interests, geography and culture failed to cooperate effectively.

Although it is principally a work of military history, this collection will be of interest to scholars from a variety of fields because the insights it provides span the disciplines of military history, political science and international relations. This volume is a most useful study of an area with substantial relevance in the current international defence and security environment. In particular, the topic of coalition warfare is of special relevance to Australia and the Australian Defence Force.

LETTERS AND COMMENTARY

TO THE EDITORS

I have just commenced reading the new *Australian Army Journal*. I note that the Introduction states that the *AAJ* is to be 'a professional Journal in which officers can record their ideas, views and experiences'. The Introduction goes on to state that 'the *AAJ* welcomes articles, review essays and letters from all serving officers'. Are these phrases meant to suggest that the Army's enlisted soldiers will never have anything to offer the revived journal?

Warrant Officer M. Levine
Regimental Sergeant Major
9 Brigade

THE EDITORS' REPLY

The *AAJ* welcomes contributions from all members of the Army. All contributions to the *AAJ* are assessed for publication solely on merit and not on rank—a policy outlined by the Chief of Army in his Message in the inaugural edition. The Chief stated, 'I want to appeal to all members of the 'Army family'—serving members, reservists, retired members, civilian writers and all academics with an interest in military affairs—to throw their weight behind the new journal'. Furthermore, one of the most powerful and well-received articles in the June edition of the *AAJ* was former Army corporal Paul Jordan's article on the 1995 Kibeho massacre in Rwanda.

TO THE EDITORS

In the inaugural edition of the excellent *Australian Army Journal*, I noted with interest the 1957 article written by Field Marshal Slim on leadership. The article describes Slim, a British soldier, as a Field Marshal in the Australian Army. Is this status claimed because as, Governor-General of Australia, Slim was also Commander-in-Chief or is it simply an error on the part of the *AAJ*?

Lieutenant Craig McGuire
Royal Australian Navy

THE EDITORS' REPLY

Slim was a Field Marshal in the British Army. The only Field Marshal in the Australian Army has been Sir Thomas Blamey, who was appointed in 1950. The *AAJ* believes that to try to claim Slim as a Field Marshal in the Australian Army on the basis of his tenure as Governor-General of Australia and role as Commander-in-Chief is an inaccurate representation of his constitutional status. The Editors regret the error.

TO THE EDITORS

Alan Ryan's excellent review of Carol Off's book, *The Lion, the Fox and the Eagle: A Story of Generals and Justice in Rwanda and Yugoslavia*, highlights the merits of undertaking a closer examination of the Canadian military experience, and its ethical and operational lessons for Australia. The tragedy of Major General Romeo Dallaire in Rwanda and the difficulties faced by Major General Lewis Mackenzie in Sarajevo in Bosnia have much to teach about the complexities of modern soldiering.

Australian 'warfighting' professionals have an unfortunate predisposition to be dismissive of the Canadian military because of its 'peacekeeping' focus, and due to operational shortcomings revealed in both Rwanda and Somalia. Yet, to dismiss recent Canadian experiences as irrelevant overlooks the fact that later peacekeeping missions have reflected many lessons learnt from both Rwanda and Bosnia. For example, in Kosovo in 1999, Canadian forces clearly recognised the value of the combined arms team and the need for force protection and deployed several Leopard tanks as part of KFOR.

Lieutenant Colonel John Blaxland
Australian Army, Visiting Defence Fellow
Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada

TO THE EDITORS

Lieutenant Colonel Michael Krause's article on the use of tanks in combined arms warfare reinforces the arguments first made in Major-General R. N. L. Hopkins' excellent, albeit now dated book, *Australian Armour*. Krause's article is valuable because it brings Hopkins' argument up to date in a short and cogent manner for today's soldier. Reading Krause's article suggests that Australian tactical doctrine does not sufficiently emphasise lessons learnt from own combat experience. Whenever we have successfully used our tanks—in Amiens in World War I, in New Guinea in World War II and in Vietnam in the 1960s—they have always been a significant combat-multiplier and have reduced casualties. Australia has never employed tanks in the traditional 'Fulda Gap' or 'Kursk' manner of massed armour. Yet, on IOC TEWTs and throughout my military career, I have always been told by instructors: 'Don't penny-packet your tanks'.

We need to redefine an 'Australian way' of armoured warfare. The fact is that we do penny-packet our tanks—and with good reason. For our operational purposes, 'penny-packeting' is the way to keep armour not only relevant for the Asia-Pacific 'arc of instability', but uppermost in ADF force-planners' minds. If we stress concentrated armour, no-one will seriously contemplate deploying tanks anywhere. While we do not expect to use our armoured forces in Korea or the Gulf, we need to stress the utility of tanks as individual platforms, or in small groups in support of other troops in operations in our region. By doing this, we will not only help to validate the case for the retention of medium armour within the Australian Army, but we may eventually see Leopards employed on future operations.

Lieutenant Colonel John Blaxland
Australian Army, Visiting Defence Fellow
Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada

TO THE EDITORS

General Sir Francis Hassett, AC, KBE, DSO, LVO, has asked me to write his biography. The Army History Unit has assured publication. I ask that any reader of this journal who has any anecdotes that can assist me to 'fill out and colour' the character and experiences of the General to contact me by phone, fax, e-mail or snail-mail at the RAR Foundation, P.O. Box 3112, Canberra ACT 2601; tel./fax (02) 6265 9842; e-mail<essexc@optusnet.com.au>.

All will realise that I face an enormous but wonderful challenge to do justice to the extraordinary military career and life of the General but I look forward to the spiritual rewards from the task, and to your help.

Brigadier John Essex Clark (Retd)

THE CHAUVEL ESSAY PRIZE

The Chief of Army has introduced the Chauvel Essay Prize to encourage writing on all aspects of land and joint military operations. The prize is named in memory of General Sir Harry Chauvel, commander of the Desert Mounted Corps during World War I and subsequently Chief of the General Staff from 1923 to 1930.

The Chauvel Essay Prize will be administered by the Head of the Land Warfare Studies Centre, with the Editorial Advisory Board of the *Australian Army Journal* forming a panel of judges. Any candidate who wishes to discuss the eligibility of a particular topic for the competition should contact the Head, Land Warfare Studies Centre. The Chauvel Prize consists of the Chauvel Light Horse Medallion and a $1000 cash award to be presented annually by the Chief of Army. The prize will be awarded for the best essay entered in the competition and will be published in the *Australian Army Journal*.

TERMS AND CONDITIONS

1. Entry to the Chauvel Essay Prize competition is open to all serving members of the Australian Army, to defence civilians working for the Army and to currently registered university postgraduate students in the fields of strategic studies and military history.

2. Essays should be approximately 3000 words in length, with footnotes and academic citations kept to a minimum.

3. Entries will be accepted from 1 March until 1 September of each year.

4. Entries will be judged by the Editorial Advisory Board of the *Australian Army Journal*.

5. The winning author will be awarded the Chauvel Light Horse Medallion, presented by the Chief of Army, along with a $1000 cash prize.

6. The winning essay will be published in the *Australian Army Journal*.

7. Entries should be accompanied by a covering letter providing the author's name, address and personal details. Candidates should not list on their names on essays.

8. Entries using service essay format are not acceptable for the Chauvel Prize.

9. Essays are to be the original work of the author. Collaborative or jointly written work will not be accepted.

10. Entries should be one and half spacing on A4 paper in hard copy and be accompanied by an electronic disk copy. Only IBM-compatible disks can be accepted.

11. The decision of the judges' panel shall be final.

12. Entries should be sent to:

    Dr Michael Evans
    Head, Land Warfare Studies Centre
    Ian Campbell Road
    Duntroon ACT 2600

DIARY

2004 ROWELL PROFESSION OF ARMS SEMINAR

Ethics, Moral Values and the Australian Military Profession in the 21st Century

Thursday, 15 July — Telstra Theatre, Australian War Memorial

The Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Peter Leahy, AO, will open the second Rowell Profession of Arms Seminar on Thursday, 15 July 2004 at the Telstra Theatre in the Australian War Memorial. The one-day seminar series is conducted by the Land Warfare Studies Centre (LWSC) and is named in honour of Lieutenant General Sir Sydney Rowell, Chief of the General Staff (CGS) between 1950 and 1954. Lieutenant General Rowell was the first Duntroon graduate to become CGS and, along with Lieutenant General Sir Vernon Sturdee, was the architect of the present Australian Regular Army.

Rowell seminars are designed to look in detail at areas of the profession of arms that are of particular interest to serving officers and which do not often receive attention in larger Army and ADF conferences. The subject of the 2004 Rowell Seminar is 'Ethics, Moral Values and the Australian Military Profession in the 21st Century'. The seminar will examine such subjects as the changing character of the professions in Australia, the meaning of military professionalism in an age of moral relativism and secularism, and the code of the warrior and approaches to the development of character and honour. There will also be presentations on the moral dimension of military leadership, the use of moral philosophy in professional military education and a focus on aspects of the law of armed conflict. The seminar will conclude with an expert panel discussion on the future of military ethics in Australia, followed by a cocktail function for all participants.

The program includes two overseas speakers: Dr Martin L. Cook, Professor of Ethics at the United States Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, and a Visiting Fellow at the Australian Defence College; and Dr Shannon E. French, Professor of Philosophy at the United States Naval Academy, Annapolis. Australian speakers include Professor Simon Longstaff, Director of the St James Ethics Centre in Sydney; the Reverend Tom Frame, Bishop of the ADF; Mr Claude Neumann, Inspector-General of the ADF; Associate Professor Hugh Smith of the Department

of Politics at ADFA; and Brigadier Jim Wallace (Rtd). The three Deputy Service Chiefs and several speakers from the Defence Legal Service have also been invited to present at the Seminar. Flyers for this event will be sent out early in 2004 and further details can be obtained from Lieutenant Colonel Susan Smith of the LWSC at <susan.smith2@defence.gov.au> and telephone (02) 6265 9890.

NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS

The editors of the *Australian Army Journal* welcome submissions from any source. Two prime criteria for publication are an article's standard of written English expression and its relevance to the Australian profession of arms. The journal will accept letters, feature articles, review essays, e-mails and contributions to the *Point Blank* and *Insights* sections. As a general guide on length, letters should not exceed 500 words; articles and review essays should be between 3000 and 6000 words, and contributions to the *Insights* section should be no more than 1500 words. The *Insights* section provides authors with the opportunity to write brief, specific essays relating to their own experiences of service. Readers should note that articles written in service essay format are discouraged, since they are not generally suitable for publication.

Each manuscript should be sent by e-mail to <army.journal@defence.gov.au>, or sent printed in duplicate together with a disk to the editors. Articles should be written in Microsoft Word, be one-and-a-half spaced, use 12-point font in Times New Roman and have a 2.5 cm margin on all sides. Submissions should include the author's full name and title; current posting, position or institutional affiliation; full address and contact information (preferably including an e-mail address); and a brief, one-paragraph biographical description.

The *Australian Army Journal* reserves the right to edit contributions in order to meet space limitations and to conform to the journal's style and format.

GENERAL STYLE

All sources cited as evidence should be fully and accurately referenced in endnotes (not footnotes). Books cited should contain the author's name, the title, the publisher, the place of publication, the year and the page reference. This edition of the journal contains examples of the appropriate style for referencing.

When using quotations, the punctuation, capitalisation and spelling of the source document should be followed. Single quotation marks should be used, with double quotation marks only for quotations within quotations. Quotations of thirty words or more should be indented as a separate block of text without quotation marks. Quotations should be cited in support of an argument, not as authoritative statements.

Numbers should be spelt out up to ninety-nine, except in the case of percentages, where arabic numerals should be used (and *per cent* should always be spelt out). All manuscripts should be paginated, and the use of abbreviations, acronyms and jargon kept to a minimum.

BIOGRAPHIES

Authors submitting articles for inclusion in the journal should also attach a current biography. This should be a brief, concise paragraph, whose length should not exceed eight lines. The biography is to include the contributor's full name and title, a brief summary of current or previous service history (if applicable) and details of educational qualifications. Contributors outside the services should identify the institution they represent. Any other information considered relevant—for example, source documentation for those articles reprinted from another publication—should also be included.