


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


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THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY







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The discursive element of this centenary journal characterises the keenness of members of the Australian military to engage in debate on topical issues. Mick Ryan's discussion of manoeuvre theory is enlivened by his use of historical examples which are surprisingly applicable to the current climate. The underlying concept that drives this discussion is that there is nothing new about manoeuvre warfare and that it comprises time-honoured tactics under a new guise. David Coghlan explores Australian Defence policy in the post-Cold War era up to the drafting of the latest White Paper, noting the folly of pursuing a one-dimensional approach to defence policy. In this current climate, his warnings of Australia's need for a defence policy framework that allows it to respond appropriately to the security challenges that may lie ahead are both pertinent and timely.

Jim Truscott's 'Special Operations in the Urban and the Ether Domains' also presents a chilling and timely reminder of the potential SAS role in urban operations and unconventional warfare. Lessons learnt and the role of industry in fashioning the SAS-in-being and the SAS-after-next form the mainstay of compelling arguments for re-designing the SAS for those tasks which are becoming its modern *raison d'être*.

'A Modicum of Substance' is an article of indulgent reminiscence. It is also a timely reminder of the birth of the original *Army Journal*. It conveys the angst of every officer who has ever been tasked with the impossible by a senior and finds himself pathologically unable to refuse. Fortunately, Eustace Keogh was also unable to refuse and the story of the rise and rise of the *Journal* is now history. In an interesting reflection of the current thoughts of many senior officers and academics, Keogh emphasises the need for an intellectual medium for debate as crucial for the growth of the Army. This is the very essence of the *Journal*. It is very much the Army's journal and must stand as the Army's foremost vehicle for discussion, particularly given the maelstrom of conflicting issues that confront today's soldier.

The final article in this the centenary journal is Anthony John's incisive review of the first volume of the Army's *The Australian History of Defence* series, by Dr Jeffrey Grey. This is a book that does much to debunk the ANZAC myth of the larrikin digger, replacing it with a vision of the way in which the Australian people view their Army. It is very much a book for those who have served in the Army itself, for those who have an abiding interest in issues of defence and security or for those who value the opportunity to learn about one of the oldest national institutions in this country.

The centenary journal is very much about what characterises today's Army. It celebrates those essential qualities of the soldier that forge the traditions that the Army holds dear. It celebrates the triumph of the Australian soldier over adversity, the depth of compassion, the ingenuity and resourcefulness, the courage and humour that are the stark signposts of survival. They are also the signposts of success, previously in battle, more recently in peace operations and for those substantial and unpredictable challenges that lie ahead.

The *Journal* also celebrates the ability of the Army to intellectualise, to challenge policies, ideals and processes and to think ahead, pursuing possibilities into future dimensions. The *Journal* is the Army's litmus. It is the leveller, promoter and devil's advocate. It is the path to preserving the traditions that forged the Army of today, it is the active mindset of its members and it is the blazing precursor to the future.



M.W. Trafford
Colonel

FOREWORD

This, the centenary *Army Journal* is a celebration of the Australian Army. It celebrates the uniqueness of the Australian soldier and those traditions held so dear that are born of the mud and the blood of this Army's historical pageant. From the first forward step of the Australian volunteer, ready to serve on foreign soil under a flag not his own and for a cause that he little understood, the Australian soldier has forged his own battle honours, on his own terms, always characterised by those qualities that have forged his reputation the world over. Australian soldiers are renowned for their courage, resourcefulness, initiative and sheer resilience in the face of overwhelming odds. In the same way, they fly the flag of compassion, generosity, empathy and above all, humour and irreverence in the most adverse of circumstances. Australian literature is replete with discussion of the much-vaunted ANZAC legend, regarded by some as a cherished myth and by others as a campaign legend. However it is regarded, the story of the diggers who fought at Gallipoli bears the hallmarks of any tale of any Australian campaign. Australian soldiers thrive on adversity, love a challenge and are at their best when confronted with overwhelming odds. From the Boer War through the two World Wars, Vietnam, Korea, to the current crop of peacekeeping and observer missions, Australian soldiers have made an indelible mark on each campaign and have contributed to the Army they are proud to serve today. Australian soldiers are proud soldiers. Australian veterans are likewise proud of their service and of the Army they played a significant role in moulding and shaping. The Australian people are proud of their army and proud of its achievements. The young faces that pray quietly at the Gallipoli memorial at ANZAC Cove every year bear silent testimony to this pride. The increasing numbers at ANZAC Day parades in tiny country towns and city streets, the gatherings at lonely windswept memorials and the poignant tributes at the funerals of veterans as the ranks gradually thin tell the tale of a nation that is determined not to forget. The Australian Army is truly of the people and for the people and a century of tradition is the proud flag bearer which signifies this bond.

This centenary journal tells the tale of the people's army. It tells of the ordinary soldier, be that soldier an Army nurse, dispensing courage and compassion against overwhelming odds, or a World War I company commander, lost literally, in the fog of war. As always, the *Journal* also acts as a vehicle for the discussion of current topics of debate and this

issue presents a smorgasbord of discussion, spanning the Gallipoli campaign through to the SAS in the urban and ether domains. This issue commences its march appropriately, with the traditional Australian military herald, the Gallipoli campaign. Anthony John's keen analysis of the failure of the August offensive focuses firmly on the issue of the operational art and the crucial role of the commander. Battle leadership and clarity of vision are the essential elements that spelt victory for the Turkish forces and ultimately, defeat for the ANZACs. The 'Troopship *Southland*' is Rob McClure's tribute to the Australian troops aboard the *Southland* and their extraordinary courage and resourcefulness in the face of a torpedo attack and a mutinous crew. He describes the reaction of those who watched torpedos approach and lifeboats fail and yet volunteered to stay aboard a sinking vessel on the slim chance that they could nurse it to port.

The tale of Captain Edward Harnett is the story of his descent literally into the fog of war as a company commander during the Battle of Amiens in World War I. Lost in the mist and confusion of the battlefield, Harnett musters his courage, rallies his few remaining troops and doggedly heads for his objective, displaying the dichotomy of nonchalance and determination that often characterises such accounts. Determination is also the hallmark of Judith Spence's moving account of the return of World War II Australian Army nurses to Banka Island, the scene of a massacre of which Vivian Bullwinkel was the only survivor. The anguish of the Army nurses at having to leave their posts in the last days before the fall of Singapore, their harrowing experiences as prisoners-of-war and the incredible legacy that they pass to their modern-day successors are the basis for this poignant tribute to Army nurses then and now.

Lorna Todd continues this tribute as she writes of her experiences in Rwanda. The compassion and desperation with which Australian Army nurses struggled to tend the injured and traumatised Rwandan people is truly reflective of the spirit of mateship that Australian soldiers bring to any peacekeeping operation of which they are part.

Continuing the medical theme, 'Out Amongst the Tangled Wire', is a poignant description of the role of stretcher-bearers and those courageous volunteers who ministered first aid under the horrendous circumstances that characterised the World War I battlefield. The lament of the stretcher-bearer and the total feeling of hopelessness pervade what is truly an account of the resilience and stoicism of the Australian soldier in the direst of adversity.

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JOURNALESE

The *Army Journal* welcomes submissions of articles and book reviews for the next issue, scheduled for 2003. As a guide, the approximate length for articles is 3 000-3 500 words and 1 000 words for book reviews. Authors are responsible for their manuscripts' accuracy and source documentation. All quoted materials are to be in quotation marks, and citations and bibliographies are to be used (where appropriate). Submissions can be E-mailed to catherine.mccullagh@defence.gov.au. Original photographs and diagrams with details of their intended placement in the manuscript should be submitted. Submissions are to include the author's name, workplace address, contact number and a brief biography. All contributions to the *Journal* will be considered for inclusion.

The *Army Journal* accepts no responsibility for errors of fact. The views expressed in articles and reviews are the author's own. Views are not to be construed as the official Army position or policy, and they do not change or supersede any information in other official Australian Army publications.

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
Gender: Words importing gender refer to both male and female, unless specifically stated otherwise.

Page 1 Illustration: The ANZAC Medallion was introduced by the Holt Government in March 1967 to commemorate the landing at Gallipoli. All surviving veterans of the Gallipoli campaign and next of kin of those who fell during the campaign or who had died since were entitled to claim the medallion. The medallion was cast in bronze and features Simpson and his donkey on the obverse (pictured), bordered on the lower half by a laurel wreath above the word ANZAC. The reverse shows a relief map of Australia and New Zealand superimposed by the Southern Cross. The lower half is bordered by the New Zealand fern leaves. This medallion is inscribed with the name Captain Edward Harnett. Captain Harnett is featured in the article 'On the Road to Warfuséc'.



'A call from the Dardanelles' H.M. Burton, 1915, lithograph.

Photo Courtesy of the Australian War Memorial
Poster Number: ARTV05167



BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL ANTHONY JOHN

Criticism severe and searching has been applied to many aspects of the Battle of Suvla Bay... It is rarely that opportunity [once lost] returns.

Winston Churchill

Damn the Dardenelles. They will be the death of us.

Admiral Lord Fisher

INTRODUCTION

In the pantheon of military failures, the name 'Gallipoli' conjures up the very antithesis of lost opportunity and gallant, yet ultimately wasted, effort. In any analysis of twentieth century military blunders, Gallipoli often warrants a specific section or chapter. Books ranging from the scholarly and analytical Gooch and Cohen's *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failures in War*¹ to John Laffin's – as the title suggests – blunt and forthright *British Bunglers and Butchers of World War One*,² continue the fascination with Gallipoli, no doubt due to its great promise but consequent failure. Gallipoli provides a valuable case study in the conduct of the operational art along with the linkages and impact of, and by, the strategic and tactical levels of war. Although ultimately unsuccessful in its objective, the Gallipoli campaign embodies the axiom that as much can be learned from the analysis of failure as from success.

AIM

This article will conduct an operational level analysis of the failure of the August Offensive of the Gallipoli campaign. It proposes that the August Offensive and ultimately the campaign, were unsuccessful due to failure in the operational art. The article commences with the placement of the Gallipoli campaign in its strategic and operational context. The situation which resulted from the initial amphibious assault and the genesis of the August Offensive will then be described. Finally, an analysis of the execution of the Breakout and its subsequent results will be conducted, specifically in terms of the role of command in the operational art.

The key to operational art is the commander. Operational art consists of those aspects of campaign design and campaign execution as practised by the operational-level commander. In designing a campaign, the operational commander must reconcile the strategic ends and the tactical means. As Clausewitz observed, the art of the general lies in 'managing a campaign to exactly suit his objectives and his resources'.³ Campaign execution is the art of using tactical actions to achieve strategic goals. It includes, but is not limited to, commander's intent, use of tempo, synchronisation of actions, selection of objectives, perspective of the battlefield, and plain battle leadership.⁴

BACKGROUND

STRATEGIC CONTEXT

By 1915 the Western Front in Europe had quickly reached what is usually described as a deadlock. With no flanks to turn, each belligerent was confined to costly and ultimately futile frontal assaults with little or no manoeuvre space. However, in the East, the Germans and their allies engaged Russia in a large-scale war of manoeuvre, which the Russians were losing. A means was sought, materially and morally, to support Russia in tying down a large proportion of German and Austro-Hungarian forces, while at the same time, taking the fight to the Central Powers.

Winston Churchill, the then First Sea Lord of the Admiralty and political head of the Royal Navy, was a member of the British War Cabinet. He subsequently recorded the deliberations of the War Cabinet in addressing this strategic problem in his *World Crisis*:

...if fronts or centres of armies cannot be broken, their flanks should be turned. If these flanks rest on the seas, the manoeuvres to turn them must be amphibious and dependent on sea power.⁵

Against this strategic background, the plan for forcing the Dardenelles and capturing the Turkish capital, Constantinople, was enticing. As well as knocking Turkey out of the war and providing a logistic line to Russia, the Gallipoli campaign appeared to provide the added bonus of gathering allies in the Balkans and so, in Lloyd George's celebrated phrase, 'knocking the props from beneath Austria-Hungary'.⁶ Moreover, British Prime Minister H.H. Asquith reflected that, even in retrospect, 'If we had succeeded ... in my judgement, it would have produced a far greater effect on the conduct of the war than anything in any other sphere of the war'.⁷ As the British Official War historian has pointed out, the campaign objective, at this point, 'was one of the few strategically great conceptions of the World War'.⁸

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

While strategically sound, the task of physically forcing the Dardenelles and threatening Constantinople was constrained by geography (see Figure 1). Constantinople lies on the Sea of Marmara and access from the Mediterranean is through the constricted waterway of the Dardenelles. At its narrowest point, accurately known as 'The Narrows', a series of forts and minefields block any attacking forces. The Turkish defences and force disposition had been restructured and upgraded by the German Military Mission under the direction of German General Liman Von Sanders.




Figure 1. Dardanelles Campaign – Initial Landings, April 1915.

Von Sanders accurately assessed the intentions of the Allied (British and French) forces to exploit their naval superiority and to force a passage into the Straits of the Dardenelles. However, he recorded that 'even in case the allied fleet forced a passage and won the naval battle in the Sea of Marmara, I judged that it would be in a nearly untenable position so long as the entire shores of the Dardenelles Straits were not held by strong allied forces'.⁹ Accordingly, he designed the Turkish defences on the assumption that 'a decisive success could not be won by the enemy unless the landing of large forces in the Dardenelles was coincident with, or antecedent to, the passage of the fleet'.¹⁰

This assessment appears to have been made in December 1914, prior to the Allies reaching the same conclusion.¹¹ On 1 March 1915, under Churchill's direction that 'a naval decision should be provoked at the earliest opportunity'¹² the Allied fleet began its attempt to reduce the Turkish forts and force the Straits. However, despite the sense that the Straits could be forced, the assumption that this alone would cause the Turkish Government to capitulate was tenuous.¹³ The Dardenelles Commission of 1917 noted that there was 'an atmosphere of vagueness and want of precision that seemed to have characterised the proceedings of the War Council'.¹⁴ The concept of a fleet capturing and occupying a city without a landing force seemed, in retrospect, a faulty strategic planning assumption.

THE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT

The decision to undertake an amphibious assault to support a naval operation was carried out after the abandonment of the 'naval only' option of 18 March 1915. General Sir Ian Hamilton was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (MEF) and he seemed to combine all the qualities necessary to make the operation a success.¹⁵ The short notice of assembly and circumstances under which the British War Council at the strategic level had arrived at the decision of the amphibious assault however, were hard to reconcile with Churchill's earlier principle that 'no offensive on land should be launched until an effective means – numbers, surprise, munitions or mechanical devices – of carrying it through has been discovered'.¹⁶

The amphibious assault took place at dawn on April 25, 1915 (see Figure 1). Although Von Sanders claimed only to be deceived by the ANZAC landings (which surprised the ANZACs themselves, as it was the wrong beach), his actions belie this assertion.¹⁷ At least 24 hours passed before he released his operational reserves from Bulair. However,

once the Allied intention was clear, he moved quickly and this higher tempo, combined with the initiative of the local commander, Colonel Mestpha Kemal, at the ANZAC landing, confined the assault to three narrow beachheads.

By the end of June 1915 it was evident that the Allies did not have the combat power to break out of their beachheads and the Turks did not have the combat power to force the Allies out of their position. It was, however, in the interests of both sides to bring the campaign to a decision. Hamilton recognised that the MEF had neither the manpower (almost parity within the theatre) nor – given the inadequacies of naval gunfire and the lack of artillery and ammunition – the firepower to attack into the teeth of the Turkish defences. This was to be proven (again) at the Battle of Krithia in June 1915. Hamilton sought to maximise 'surprise...the old original idea of war' and exploit his superior operational manoeuvre since 'our troops on the sea could move thrice as fast as the Turks on their one or two bad roads'.¹⁸

For his part, Von Sanders came to similar conclusions. Surveying the Gallipoli Peninsula, the German General viewed Cape Helles as able to 'be reinforced, but not extended'. At Anzac however, activities on the northern flank 'were of some significance'. The region of Bulair he assessed as being threatened with the 'possibility of attack' and so positioned a strong theatre reserve in that location, whereas the southern Asiatic shore, he completely dismissed.¹⁹

THE AUGUST OFFENSIVE

PLANNING FOR THE BREAKOUT

The genesis of what became the August Offensive began as a local plan at the ANZAC position by ANZAC Corps Commander, Lieutenant General William Birdwood. Its aim was to seize dominating terrain on the left or northern flank in order to turn the Turkish right flank and force the Turks out of their defensive line (see Figure 2). According to the Official Australian Historian, the 'freshness of the conception, the surprise, the night attack ... [and], above all, the chance of striking the enemy in an area not barred by continuous trenches' appealed to Hamilton.²⁰ It presented a stark contrast to the Commander of the 29th Division, Major General Horace Hunter-Weston's, advocating 'hammering away at Achi Baba' in a series of costly frontal attacks.²¹




Figure 2. Dardanelles Campaign – Second Attack, August 1915.

After the failure of the Krithia attack to seize the Achi Baba heights in the Cape Helles sector in June, Allied attention turned to the ANZAC position. Von Sanders records that both the southern and northern Turkish flanks at Anzac were open. Of the two options, it was the Turkish left or southern flank which 'was the source of greatest anxiety [for Von Sanders]...because a landing in that space would have endangered the rear of the south front'.²²

Birdwood however, was focussed on the seizure of the northern summit of Chunuk Bair and its attendant heights as the main objective of the attack. The southern flank was to be a supporting deception attack at the Lone Pine strongpoint.²³ In consideration of both these objectives his view was not universal. The British Official History notes that, as early as June, due to Turkish entrenchments, 'New Zealand officers ... were soon suggesting that the chances of a successful turning movement by way of the ravines (on the approach to Chunuk Bair) had already disappeared'.²⁴ Moreover, the plan relied upon a bold night march by physically weakened troops across rough unmapped terrain. Birdwood was clearly aware of the risks involved as evidenced when he wrote to Headquarters (HQ) MEF on 1 July: 'I realise that, owing to the difficulties of the country, a night attack will involve a certain number of troops losing their way. This, however, is not a matter of consequence'.²⁵ Further, he noted in his memoirs that his 'greatest anxiety was whether men, weak from dysentery and the strain of many months fighting, could answer the enormous calls to be made on them'.²⁶

The deception attack at Lone Pine also had its critics. The Australian Official History records that 'in enforcing the decision, he had to overrule stiff opposition from successive commanders of the 1st [Australian] Division'.²⁷ Birdwood indicated that he 'hoped the 1st [Australian] Division's attack would draw towards itself all the reserves ... including those at Anafarta'.²⁸ The Chief of Staff of the 1st [Australian] Division, Colonel Brudenell White, an extremely capable officer, felt the 'probable value of the objective was doubtful [and] he was involved in what he believed to be a blunder'.²⁹ The Divisional Commander, Major General Legge made his thoughts clear and in the Official History's words, 'the prospect that [the attack] would have to be carried out by a commander who was strongly opposed to it was unwelcome'.³⁰ Legge was, therefore, relieved of command of the 1st [Australian] Division and sent to command the 2nd [Australian] Division in Egypt. This in no way silenced Birdwood's critics. Major General Walker, who subsequently took over the 1st [Australian] Division, wrote to Birdwood opposing the Lone Pine

operation suggesting 'that the 1st Division be allowed instead to seize Chocolate and W Hills [north of Anzac] and thus form outposts for the troops landing at Suvla'.³¹ Birdwood overruled all this and forwarded the plan with its inherent risks to Hamilton for approval.

Having accepted a limited objective attack, albeit risky, the operational level planning for the breakout of the beachheads at Gallipoli was influenced by a drifting strategic direction from the British War Council. This was to influence the operational commander and, as a consequence, inadequacies in operational art were magnified at the tactical level. The British War Council, at the strategic level, was pressing for results, partly to convince Bulgaria to enter the alliance, and partly to prove to the French that they were committed to the war effort. On 12 June 1915, coupled with the offer of additional troops, the War Council solicited Hamilton's views on cutting off the Gallipoli Peninsula by '...extending to the north the present Australian position. Or can you devise any other project to effect it?'³² In a telling point, Hamilton notes in this exchange that the War Council, clearly erroneously, quotes a manpower strength double that of the effective strength of the MEF (205 000 presumed versus 120 000 actual) and appeared oblivious to the shortage of artillery and ammunition.³³ The strategic ends did not match the tactical means.

Hamilton conferred with Birdwood on the use of additional troops in the attack. Birdwood demurred at any extra troops in the Anzac sector as being logistically insupportable. Alternatively, he suggested that an extra division could conduct a 'raid from Suvla' and destroy the isolated Turkish gun batteries at W Hills which had been harassing the ANZAC northern flank.³⁴ As more troops became available, the plan continued to mature. In a memo dated 1 July, Birdwood's third elaboration of the plan was for a force to land at Suvla and seize the Tekke Tepe ridge which extended in an arc from W Hills (see Figure 2).³⁵ Hamilton concurred, adding that the Suvla Bay landing and objectives would now be the responsibility of a separate force – IX Corps.³⁶ This decision indicated a poor grasp of perspective.³⁷ In addressing the tactical problem of breaking out of the Anzac beachhead, both Birdwood and in turn, Hamilton failed to see the wider dimension. Given extra troops and shipping, the Suvla Bay operation had much more potential and arguably, less risk than the plan finally conceived.

The overall operational design for the August Offensive was flawed from conception. The operational objective became to 'seize a position across the Peninsula from Gaba Tepe to Maidos with a protected line of supply from Suvla Bay'.³⁸ This, however, contrasted with the original objective of

'assisting the fleet to force the Dardenelles'.³⁹ Secondly, the IX Corps landing at Suvla Bay was viewed as a secondary operation and, as such, did not receive the full attention of Hamilton's staff that it initially, and certainly subsequently, warranted.⁴⁰

This supervision should have been more obvious given the choice of Corps Commander of IX Corps, General Sir Frederick Stopford. Never a commander of note on active duty, Stopford, then over sixty years of age, had been brought back to active service (as had Hamilton himself) after six years of retirement. Hamilton chose him, after his initial choices had been rebuffed, because he had the requisite seniority over one of his divisional commanders. Due to the lack of security in the April landings, Hamilton had insisted upon maintaining a high degree of secrecy in planning for the August offensive. This resulted in a lack of synchronisation within the staff planning branches and between superior and subordinate headquarters. To illustrate just one example of this, Stopford himself was briefed on the plan on 22 July 1915, 15 days before he was scheduled to execute a corps-level amphibious landing.⁴¹ In turn his subordinate commanders were not informed of their missions until, in some cases, they embarked for the objective. The folly of this policy was soon proven.

A consequence of this inherent lack of coordination lies in the development of the IX Corps planning process and its failure to adequately communicate the commander's intent. In the MEF General HQ Orders to IX Corps, it was emphasised that Chocolate and W Hills were key objectives in supporting the ANZAC assault, and 'it was of *first importance* that they were to be captured by a *coup de main* before daylight in order to prevent the guns, which they contain, being used against our troops'.⁴² Further, Stopford was to *deny* the enemy the use of Tekke Tepe ridge (see Figure 2). Stopford, in the IX Corps Operation Order, communicated this urgency as 'the troops will secure Suvla Bay as a base of supply ... having accomplished this primary objective, the GOC IX Corps will *endeavour* to give direct assistance to GOC A and NZ Corps ... [forces] are to be *in a position to deny* the enemy [Tekke Tepe] ridge...11th Division [under its task list] is to *occupy* Chocolate and W Hills'.⁴³ No explicit mention is made of the inherent urgency in a *coup de main* operation and no allusion to supporting the ANZACs by destroying the Turkish artillery. In turn, the 11th Division operation order further weakens Hamilton's intent to 'secure Suvla Bay for disembarkation of 10th Division and stores ... then subsequently attack Chocolate Hill and, *if possible*, Green Hill' [all emphases added].⁴⁴

The 'first importance' of a *coup de main* night assault operation is lost. The denial of Tekke Tepe ridge is not mentioned and W Hill – previously a key objective – is deleted.⁴⁵ Not only can this lack of congruence with Hamilton's intent be traced through the chain of command, but Stopford himself wrote to Hamilton warning that his security concerns made it 'improbable' that he could render Birdwood any assistance.⁴⁶

As a consequence of the lack of supervision of IX Corps by HQ MEF, and the natural pessimism of Stopford prior to the landing, the urgency of seizing key objectives was minimised and lack of precision in orders magnified. As a result, Hamilton failed to develop a scheme of manoeuvre that accommodated the idea of capitalising on local success, such that when these opportunities were presented it was neither recognised nor acted upon.

THE BREAKOUT

Preparations for the breakout at Anzac had been well thought out and showed considerable evidence of analysis of the April landings. The forces at Cape Helles were to stage a fixing attack on 6 August in order to draw Turkish operational reserves to the south of the Peninsula. At Anzac, an attack on the Turkish left flank at the Lone Pine strongpoint was intended to draw the local tactical reserves in order to facilitate the assault on the Turkish right flank (see Figure 2). Emphasis on synchronisation with the Suvla Bay operation was evident in General HQ MEF Instructions to HQ IX Corps that in 'no case must your approach be disclosed to the enemy till 10 pm, the hour at which the outposts on the left flank of the ANZAC position are to be rushed'.⁴⁷

The plan did not make it to Z hour before events went awry. Von Sanders, once again, had strong indicators of an allied assault, but again, while operational surprise was lost, tactical surprise was achieved. The fixing attack at Cape Helles failed to achieve its objectives. The Cape Helles attack was designed to merely fix the Turkish southern reserves. The British Official History states that the commander of the VIII Corps 'apparently overlooked' this limited role and envisaged a far greater purpose as outlined in his special corps order of 6 August when he advocated the 'advance of the VIII Corps [as a] turning point ... towards final victory'. These were, the Official History notes, 'rash words'. The amount of artillery shells supplied at Helles was inadequate for even the first day's tasks.⁴⁸ The commander designate of VIII Corps, viewing the operation, was 'horrified at the total inadequacy of the British bombardment'⁴⁹ and its objectives, which were far too ambitious.

In turn, the ferocity of the ANZAC attack at Lone Pine caused the local Turkish commander, Essad Pasha, to call the southern reserves to Anzac instead of being fixed at Cape Helles.⁵⁰ Birdwood's plan of attracting the Turkish reserves had worked too well. Von Sanders, however, recognised by 7 August that the decisive attack was on the northern end of Anzac and directed the arriving Turkish reinforcements from the southern operational reserves to that point.⁵¹ The German general assessed the relative danger points and closure rates of his own forces and that of the British. He recognised that 'the first crisis we have to overcome [was] to retain possession of the summits of these massive heights and [then] attack in the Anafarta Plain ... at daybreak on August 8'.⁵²

A combination of the Turkish reserves arriving 'at the vital point with a handful of men in the nick of time'⁵³ and a too ambitious movement plan by the ANZACs saw the assault of Chunuk Bair repulsed. The ANZAC forces found their fresh troops too inexperienced and their experienced troops too exhausted to achieve their objectives. A number of tactical-level errors combined to delay the assaulting forces so that the attack took place close to daybreak instead of being a night assault. Men were separated, forces were lost, and it took longer than anticipated to traverse the rough terrain. Birdwood admits in his memoirs that the task 'was more difficult than I had realised myself... I had assessed the physical capacity of my troops too high'.⁵⁴ The Dardenelles Commission was to explicitly note that the 'country over which the main attack had to be made was difficult... [however] the plan was decided upon... with the concurrence of the commander of the ANZAC Corps'.⁵⁵ In the final irony, as a detachment of Gurkhas finally seized the crest of the objective, they were destroyed by one of the few accurate salvos of naval gunfire employed that day.⁵⁶ In order to retrieve the situation, Hamilton offered Birdwood the committal of the MEF reserve – the 54th Division – at that time dispersed on ships and nearby islands.⁵⁷ Birdwood declined, claiming that it would take too long to get to the objective and that he was unable to logistically support them (especially with water). It is significant to note here that the operational reserve was neither positioned to influence, nor able to be received by, the MEF main effort. This further suggests an incorrect selection of the main tactical objectives and inadequate foresight.

In contrast to the mental agility displayed by Von Sanders and the heroic efforts of the Australian troops at Lone Pine, the performance of the IX Corps at Suvla Bay on 7 August, in Churchill's words, 'fell far short of reasonable performance'.⁵⁸ Despite initial confusion as a result of landing

at the wrong beaches, the IX Corps soon built up a ten-to-one superiority over the Turks in the area. The security policy enforced prior to the assault and the lack of clear orders in the seizure of objectives soon told. Officers of the 11th Division had been at the Greek island of Mytilene, partly as a deception and partly to disperse the force. They had not been briefed on the operation nor seen a map of Suvla Bay until enroute, the day prior to the assault.⁵⁹ After landing on the wrong beach at night with no specific time to reach their objective, the momentum, understandably, faltered. Thus, when ordered to seize Chocolate Hill – previously of vital importance – the aptly named Brigadier Sitwell detailed one battalion to 'proceed if possible'.⁶⁰ This clearly contradicted the operational commander's intent, which was neither understood nor implemented.

Tactical success alone does not guarantee the attainment of strategic goals; rather it is the operational art that combines a series of tactical combat actions to achieve larger objectives.⁶¹ Conversely, it follows that a failed tactical action should not suffice to guarantee the failure of the overall plan. An operational plan should be robust enough to accept setbacks and reverses and still attain its objectives. Further, campaign design should allow for a supporting attack to become the main effort if required. After the initial failure of Anzac, a window of opportunity was available to capitalise on the potential of Suvla Bay, however, the operational tempo set by IX Corps was far less than that of the Turks.

On 8 August, with the vital objectives of the high ground at Tekke Tepe still not seized, Hamilton himself visited the area of Suvla Bay. In a telling vignette, Hamilton records in his diary finding Stopford absorbed in supervising the construction of his HQ ashore. When questioned as to the situation, he gloomily remarked to Hamilton 'we should probably be here for a very long time'.⁶² A clearer example of lack of perspective, leadership and understanding of commander's intent would be hard to find. Noting the lack of activity and urgency, Hamilton interviewed the commander of the 11th Division, Major General Hammersley as to why his objectives had not been seized. Hammersley explained that he was unable to move prior to the following morning because of fatigue and lack of water. Hamilton subsequently recorded in his diary 'we might have the hills at the cost of walking up them today; the Lord only knew what would be the price of them tomorrow'.⁶³ The next day he found out. In an example of higher operational tempo, the Turks reinforced the hills overnight with newly arrived reinforcements and easily repulsed the attack by the British 32nd Brigade. With it went all hopes of leveraging the Turks out of their defensive line and 'the outstanding opportunity of

the campaign ... which was open on the night of August 8th, passed without attainment'.⁶⁴

CONCLUSION

Although the evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula did not take place until 9 January 1916, the events of 6-8 August proved to be the death knell of the campaign. The August Offensive failed due to inadequacies in the operational art in both campaign design and execution. The role of the operational commander, General Sir Ian Hamilton, looms large in culpability for these shortfalls. However, his corps commanders, Stopford and Birdwood, also share the burden.

In designing the campaign, Hamilton never satisfactorily reconciled the differences between strategic ends and tactical means. Drift and lack of precision at the strategic level were magnified when translated to tactical actions. Both Hamilton and, in turn, Birdwood, did not take a broader perspective of selection of objectives and main and supporting efforts. Thus, when the main effort failed, the supporting effort was never envisaged as being capable of assuming the role of main effort. Further, the position of the operational reserve meant that it was unable to manoeuvre to exploit the success of, or overcome the failure of, either the main or supporting efforts.

The deception plan failed. The fixing attack to draw the Turkish reserves to Cape Helles was ignored and the deception attack at Lone Pine, while heroic, attracted too much of the Turkish commander's attention. Operational surprise was not achieved. However, due to the perceived need for security, vital information regarding the plan was protected to the point where the damage exceeded the benefit. Staff branches and subordinate HQ were unable to properly synchronise their efforts and the timeframe did not allow for lower echelon commanders to provide feedback on proposed field operations.

Finally, the importance of the commander's intent being clearly understood and implemented at all levels was not recognised. Evidence of this can be traced through the operations of the various command echelons where key objectives and imperatives were ignored or minimised. Presuming that the MEF received copies of these orders and knowing of Stopford's remarks to Hamilton, the commander's intent should have been reinforced.

While the campaign design was flawed in conception, inadequacies were magnified in execution. Just as tactical success alone will not achieve strategic objectives, conversely, campaign execution should prove sufficiently robust to withstand some tactical failure and still succeed. When the main effort at Anzac failed, a window of opportunity existed at Suvla Bay. Stopford proved by his words and actions that he did not communicate or implement his superior commander's intent. Thus, when the situation could still be retrieved, Stopford and his subordinate commanders in IX Corps failed to recognise or act upon it. Von Sanders' Turkish forces however, through a higher operational tempo, won the race for the ridges and arguably, the campaign. At this critical moment, Hamilton, Stopford and the IX Corps Divisional commanders failed to display the battle leadership and clarity of vision of their opposite numbers – and consequently paid the price.

The August Offensive of the Gallipoli Campaign provides lessons in the failure of operational art writ large. The message for operational planners of the future is clear:

Lest We Forget.

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BIOGRAPHY

Lieutenant Colonel Anthony John, CSC, graduated from the Officer Cadet School, Portsea, in 1985 and was commissioned into the Royal Australian Infantry Corps. His postings have included service with the 1st Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment, the Special Air Service Regiment and the British Special Boat Service. He was Staff Officer Grade One, Land Operations, at Strategic Command in 2001 and in 2002 undertook operational service in the War on Terror. In late 2002, he took an appointment as Chief of Army Visiting Fellow at the Land Warfare Studies Centre. Lieutenant Colonel John holds a Bachelor of Arts from Melbourne University, a Master of Defence Studies from the University of New South Wales and a Masters of Military Studies from the Marine Corps University. He is a distinguished graduate of the United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College and the School of Advanced Warfighting. His article, 'Lost Opportunity: An Operational Level Analysis of the Failure of the August Offensive of the Gallipoli Campaign 1915' was awarded first prize in the Chief of Army's essay competition in 2000.



BY ROBERT MCCLURE

On behalf of all the comrades now serving on the Peninsula, I wish to convey to the Australian unit concerned our general feelings of admiration for the gallant behaviour of all the ranks on the Transport Southland. All the troops of Army Corps have heard with pride of the courage and discipline shown at the moment when the nerves of the bravest are liable to be so highly tried. Not only was there no confusion on the part of the troops, who quietly fell in and prepared to meet whatever fate might be in store, but later, when there was prospect of the Southland being able to make way under her own steam and stokers were called for, the men at once came forward and successfully helped in getting the Southland into port.

Official Letter from
General Birdwood, AIF

The men who performed so gallantly on the Troopship *Southland* belonged to the 21st Infantry Battalion, which was formed at Broadmeadows in Victoria on the 14th of April 1915. Together with the 22nd, 23rd and 24th Infantry Battalions, a machine gun company, and a light trench mortar company, the 21st comprised part of the 6th Australian Infantry Brigade, 2nd Australian Division, AIF.

Leaving Melbourne aboard His Majesty's Transport *Ulysses*, the unit set sail for Egypt amid the usual fanfare and tears, on the 8th of May 1915. Arriving at Alexandria on the 8th of June, the 21st Battalion went straight into camp at Heliopolis, near Cairo. The next three months were spent in intensive training prior to the battalion's departure for Gallipoli, aboard the Transport B11 *Southland*, scheduled to sail on the 30th of August.



Troopships at anchor in the harbour at Alexandria, Egypt.
Photograph taken on the 9th September, 1915.

*Photo Courtesy of the Australian War Memorial
Negative Number: P00176.003*

The Troopship *Southland*, under its former name of *Vaderland*, was a steamship built by John Brown & Co of Glasgow for the Red Star Line, and was first launched on 12 July 1900. The ship made its maiden voyage on 8 December 1900 from Antwerp to New York via Southampton. The four-masted, double-funnelled ship of 12 000 tons was well known on the trans-Atlantic run prior to the war. The British acquired her from her Belgian owners after the fall of Antwerp and renamed her *Southland*. In 1915, the vessel was fitted as a troopship.

The Troopship *Southland* departed Egypt for the Island of Lemnos, some 40 miles west of the entrance to the Dardenelles. Most members of the 21st Battalion were eagerly looking forward to a few days' rest after many months of arduous training in the desert. Other contingents on board included the 2nd Australian Division and 6th Brigade Headquarters, Major General J.G. Legge and the Headquarters Staff of the 5th Australian Division, as well as various smaller elements of ANZAC units. In addition, and of most importance to the soldiers, was a supply of cash for the troops serving at Gallipoli.

Two days out of Alexandria brought the ship into the danger zone, as the Crete archipelago was known to harbour at least two U-boats. Wednesday morning, the 2nd of September, broke fine and clear. The morning parade was ordered for 10.00 am and would see the issue of three days' rations and a full load of ammunition. Thus, all would be ready for transhipping at Mudros Harbour later in the day.



2nd Lieutenant Harold Maughan Pullin of the 6/24th Battalion, Australian Imperial Forces, aboard the troop transport SS *Ulysses* bound for Egypt. Photograph taken in October, 1915.

*Photo Courtesy of the Australian War Memorial
Negative Number: P00620.001, Donor W.M. Godbehear*

At 9.50, some of the men congregating on parts of the deck allocated to them, noticed the wake of a torpedo heading straight towards the ship. They watched, hopelessly fascinated. Although the alarm was given, there was not enough time to alter the ship's course sufficiently to take a glancing blow. There was a tremendous explosion and a hole 23 feet by 34 feet was blown in the port side. The hatchways and gratings were thrown some distance into the air. The men in charge of the mounted 4.7-inch gun fired at what they thought was a periscope. With one chance in a million of scoring a hit, they missed, unsurprisingly, given that the barrel split on firing. A second torpedo then raced towards the ship. Despite the damage caused by the first torpedo, the *Southland* had not lost steerage, and the captain was able to alter the course of the ship sufficiently to let the missile pass astern. The ship's position at the time was about 10 miles south west of the Island of Strati and some 40 miles south of Mudros Bay.¹




11 Platoon, C Company, 21st Battalion, AIF, pushing a collapsible boat away from the torpedoed *Southland* – 2nd September 1915.

*Photo Courtesy of the Australian War Memorial
Negative Number: A00746 Lent by Capt. Brown, MC, 21st Battalion*

Moments of chaos ensued before a few calls of 'steady men' proved sufficient to calm the ranks. The time spent on boat drill was now put to good use, as the men went quickly and calmly to their positions as ordered. The standard of discipline was exemplary. The ship was now listing heavily to port side, however all stood calm and cool despite the order 'Ship sinking! Abandon ship!' A large number of troops had to stand for nearly two hours on the enclosed promenade decks of what, during the first 30 or 40 minutes, was believed to be a sinking ship.

The *Southland* carried some 42 lifeboats, however given that some of these were merely collapsible rubber dinghies, it was soon obvious that there would not be enough room to accommodate everyone. In the typical Australian spirit of resourcefulness and ingenuity, the Australian troops quickly began cutting up some horseboxes and turned them into rafts. The lowering of boats continued slowly and quietly although some craft capsized. Many of the lifeboats had been freshly painted and stuck to the side of the vessel as they were lowered. The task was made even more difficult by the fact that the engine room crew and some of the stewards had panicked, and upon rushing the boats, they cut the davit ropes to speed their launching. The captain reportedly made good use of his revolver against this group of individuals. Later accounts indicate that some of the crew were also shot for looting. To replace the stokehold crew who had deserted their posts, the captain called for volunteers from amongst the Australian soldiers. Rushing him with willing hands, 18 men, mostly from the 21st Battalion, under Lieutenant Billy Pearce, performed stoically in the bowels of the stricken ship at what was a desperate and almost hellish task. Pushing themselves to the absolute limit, when each man must have thought every shovel of coal was to be his last, they stripped to boots and breeches and descended into the engine room, raising the steam pressure from 80 to 200 pounds. A salvage crew from a passing destroyer then boarded the stricken vessel to try to nurse the *Southland* to Mudros Harbour.



The Troopship *Southland*, torpedoed on the 2nd September 1915, at 9.51 am.
Photograph taken about 11.10 am after most of the boats had left the ship.

*Photo Courtesy of the Australian War Memorial
Negative Number: A00743 Lent by Capt. Brown, MC, 21st Battalion*

By 11.00 am, all the lifeboats were launched and the few troops left on board were taken off by the hospital ship *Neuralia*. *Neuralia* arrived on the scene a little before noon in the company of a number of other vessels. The loss of several good comrades provoked considerable sadness in what was an otherwise exhilarating and exacting morning for the troops. Had the torpedo struck the ship about 15 minutes earlier however, the casualties would have been heavy, as many of men were down in the troop decks. The final toll amounted to one officer and seven other ranks killed, with 27 other ranks missing. The Brigade Commander, Colonel R. Linton, with others, was thrown into the water, and later died of exhaustion and shock after being picked up by the French Destroyer *Nassue*. By the time they were rescued, some of the men had been drifting for five hours.



Aegean Sea, the 2nd September 1915. The first boatload of Australian soldiers to reach the hospital ship *Neuralia* after the Troopship *Southland* was torpedoed near Strati Island while it was carrying troops to Gallipoli.

*Photo Courtesy of the Australian War Memorial
Negative Number: H12828 Donor Dr. F. Apperly*

For the rest of the day, the *Southland* crept sluggishly over the Aegean Sea until she finally beached at Mudros Harbour at around 7.00 pm. All the small boats were picked up by 3.30 pm with the help of *Neuralia* and the *Ben-My-Cree*, a seaplane supply ship. The troops were given their first hot meal for some considerable time while on the *Neuralia* and arrived at Lemnos around 4.00 pm. That night at 9.00 pm, one of the life boats fell from the top deck with a terrible crash. Many men raced for the upper decks, thinking that they had been torpedoed again!

The battalion boarded His Majesty's Transport *Transylvania* in Mudros Harbour, 65 kilometres from the entrance of the Dardanelles. The *Transylvania* had a carrying capacity of 5 000 troops. All the baggage from the *Southland* was brought over and re-issued. The men were also issued with three days' rations and ammunition. Colonel Linton was buried at East Mudros at 7.30 am on the 3rd of September. A memorial service was held two days later with 100 officers and men from the brigade attending.



Mudros Island, Greece, 1915. A Military Cemetery containing the graves of Allied soldiers killed in the Gallipoli Campaign. Mudros village is in the background.

*Photo Courtesy of the Australian War Memorial
Negative Number: H10407 Donor British Official Photograph Q13757*

The *Southland* was given two more years to live. Retired from active service, she made her first voyage for the White Star - Dominion line sailing from Liverpool to Montreal via Quebec in August 1916. On the 4th of June 1917, she was torpedoed and sunk by the German Submarine U70 near Tory Island off the north coast of Ireland. This time casualties were light, as only four members of the ship's company of 140 were lost. She was remembered with some affection by the men of the 21st Battalion as providing considerable excitement in the often tedious voyage involved in the transport of troops. The bravery and resourcefulness of the men of

the 21st Battalion stands also as a tribute to the Australian soldier, as echoed in the words of General Birdwood when he spoke of their 'courage and discipline shown at the moment when the nerves of the bravest are liable to be so highly tried'.

TABLE 1. TROOPS ON BOARD

Units	Officers	Other Ranks
2nd Australian Division HQ	11	47
6th Australian Brigade HQ	5	15
2nd Australian Division HQ Signal Company	1	22
6th Australian Brigade Signal Section	1	31
21st Australian Infantry Battalion	31	968
2nd Brigade NZ Field Artillery HQ	1	42
23rd Battalion 'B' Company	5	231
6th Australian Field Artillery	1	5
16th Australian A.S.C	2	18
Other details	29	16
TOTAL	87	1 395

TABLE 2. SHIP'S OFFICERS

Master	J.B. Kelk	1st Officer	J.H. Jones
2nd Officer	W. Robinson	3rd Officer	B. Harrison
Chief Steward	J. Hatrick	Crew	202 men

TABLE 3. VOLUNTEER STOKEHOLD PARTY

21st Battalion	23rd Battalion
Captain Nelson Wellington	Private H.V. Issard
Captain H. Garrett	Private L.A. Homeward
Lieutenant H.A. Crowther	
2nd Lieutenant J.W. Pearce	2nd Divisional Signal Company
Sergeant F.S. Forss	Lieutenant J.T. Hamilton Aram
Lance Corporal R.W. Ahern	Sapper Slade
Private V.C. Williamson	
Private D.M. Paterson	29th Divisional Train
Private G.A. Sellway	Lieutenant R.V. Stewart
Private E.L. White	
Private A.G. Waugh	Australian Engineers No. 1 Field Company
Private G. Brown	Sapper J. H. Fishburne

TABLE 4. KILLED

23rd Battalion	2nd Brigade NZ Field Artillery HQ
Private W. Johnson	Driver A.R. Morrison
Private F. Sargeant	
Private H. Harton	21st Battalion
Private W. Stewart	Private A.L. Healey
Private S. Kalman	Private O.M. Holmes
Private H. Withers	
Private D. Chisholm	6th Infantry Brigade HQ
	Colonel Richard Linton

TABLE 5. MISSING

21st Battalion		
Private D. Harris	Private T. Sloan	Private T. O'Byrne
Private P. Gorman	Private A. Waugh	Private L. Mahon
Private H. Bowen	Private J. Sloan	Private H. Johnson
Private W. Copeland	Private A. Haywood	Corporal C. Gunn
23rd Battalion		
Private L. Deckery	Private W. Morgan	Private V. McDonough
Private E. Best		
2nd Division HQ		
Private L. Adams	Corporal A. Wilson	
16 Company A.A.S.C		
Private F. Pell		
2nd Brigade NZ Field Artillery HQ		
Private J. Warde	Private J. Taine	
Otago Mounted Rifles NZ Forces		
Trooper J. McMurtrie		

TABLE 6. MEN INJURED BY EXPLOSION

21st Battalion	Private C. West
23rd Battalion	Private J. Mclean

ENDNOTES

1. Interestingly, the commander of the German submarine later wrote in his memoirs that his ship came under heavy fire from the *Southland* and that his submarine had eventually sunk the troopship.

DEDICATION

This article is dedicated to the memory of Julia Chalmers, a close friend of Rob's. Julia was working in the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001. She has not been found and is thought to have perished along with the thousands of others who were victims of terrorism on that day. Her friendship is one of the cherished memories that will stay with Rob forever. This article is for her...an Australian who faced adversity and will long be remembered.

BIOGRAPHY

Rob McClure is an ex-serving member of the Australian Army. His postings included the Australian Defence Force Academy, where he served from 1993-95 and 1 Command Support Unit, which saw him deployed to East Timor as part of the Communications Management Team from February to July 2000. He has spent time on the Gallipoli Peninsula and walked the Kokoda Track twice. He is currently a Federal Officer of the Australian Protective Service.



BY MAJOR CATHERINE MCCULLAGH

The fog descends upon the battlefield. The soldier is lost. He wanders, a living island in the noise and din of the fighting, yet miraculously untouched by the deadly chaos that surrounds him. The soldier is disoriented, separated from his comrades, drifting, searching for a visual symbol of familiarity to allay his deepest fears. It is a nightmare scenario, one that has been repeated many times over in wars since time immemorial. It is the favourite of the Hollywood director and is used with even greater effect by the novelist; witness the suffering of the soldier in Erich Maria Remarque's *All Quiet on the Western Front*, who stumbles into a shellhole only to find that he is not alone.

But the fog-shrouded nightmare is real. A glance at the diaries of any number of soldiers who fought on the Western Front in World War I will reveal that fog was a common enough phenomenon on the battlefield and was used to great effect to mask troop movement by both sides. For the soldier, it was both a loyal ally and a deadly enemy. One such soldier was Captain Edward Harnett, who fought with the 17th Battalion, AIF, during Monash's masterly advance of 8 – 9 August 1918. This was an offensive the like of which had never been seen. The battlefield resounded with the din of 100 000 assault troops, 600 tanks¹, massed artillery and aircraft. For the Germans, who were not expecting such an assault for another four days², the advance must have been an awesome sight, except that they neither saw nor heard it until it was upon them. Wishing to preserve the element of surprise, Monash abandoned the usual artillery barrage precursor, electing to fire the first salvos at 'zero' hour as the advance began. In a stroke of ingenuity, he used his aircraft to mask the noise of the harbouring tanks. At the same time, the battlefield was shrouded in a thick fog, which, in Harnett's words, 'was the densest I had ever experienced and made worse by the dust and smoke of the terrific barrage. Visibility was practically nil'. This is Captain Harnett's personal account of the day described by the German General Ludendorff as 'the black day of the German Army'.³Harnett's description

of his part in this operation is characterised by an almost surreal feeling of total isolation created by the dense fog that descended prior to the advance and also by his unbelievable nonchalance while performing deeds of utmost bravery in the face of extreme danger.



Captain Edward Harnett during his passage back to Australia in 1919.

Photo Courtesy of Major Roger Hancock



Group portrait of C Company, 17th Battalion, AIF.

*Photo Courtesy of the Australian War Memorial
Negative Number: P00353.001*

'I served in the Great War of 1914-1918 as a Captain in the 17th Infantry Battalion, AIF, in Gallipoli, Egypt, France and Flanders. On the 8th and 9th of August 1918, I was Officer Commanding C Company, 17th Battalion, AIF.

In the attack of the 8th of August, the four companies of the battalion were to capture the German trenches north of the main Villers-Bretonneux – Warfusée road, and then immediately attack Warfusée village. A and D companies were to assault through the village. B and C companies were to attack round the south of the village and, fighting their way forward, were to establish a line running practically north and south of the eastern side of the village.

Zero hour was fixed at 4.20 am on the 8th of August 1918. Punctually at 'zero', the artillery crashed down and I gave my order to my company to advance. The fog was the densest I had ever experienced, and it was

made worse by the dust and smoke of the terrific barrage. Visibility was practically nil.

I had under my personal control, the following men of my company headquarters:

- Company Sergeant Major (CSM) Dulhunty
- Corporal Poole
- Private O'Brien (company runner)
- Private Rozea (company runner)
- Private Walsh (company runner)
- Lance Corporal Foy (signals NCO)
- Private Irving (my batman)

In addition, I had three privates who were signallers, bringing the total to 10 men.

Owing to the fog, smoke and dust, I could not contact anyone on either of my flanks. It was most difficult to keep direction, but with the aid of my compass and my torch, and by closely observing the fall of our artillery's shells, I gained a fair idea of my movements.

The men moved in single file behind me, the CSM being nearest to me. The visibility was so bad that I could not see the man immediately behind him, but by passing orders through the CSM, I kept the men under my command.

After proceeding in this fashion for about 1 500 yards, I ran into what had been our outpost line and found two men of the 18th Battalion in a dugout. I ordered them to come with me, which they did. I referred to my compass and pushed on southwards down the outpost line. In the next outpost I met Lieutenant Richardson and Sergeants Ford and O'Keefe. I called to them to come along with me, but evidently, owing to the noise, they did not understand my order for, on inquiring a few minutes later if they were in the rear, I received the reply, 'No'.

The enemy's barrage was now very heavy and we were most fortunate in escaping casualties. Shell after shell burst almost on top of us and yet we escaped. Our own barrage was also perilously close, but I decided that we should remain as we were, advancing in its wake.

I now pushed forward to the German outpost line and took three prisoners. They were utterly demoralised and did not offer resistance. I moved south among the German trenches and met a tank which had

broken down. I gave the tank officer the two men of the 18th Battalion to protect him while he effected repairs. I checked my direction by compass and found that I was moving due south, and knew that, eventually, I must strike the main Warfusée road, which runs due east and west. I had only my 10 men with me, and was completely out of touch with any other troops. There was still a large amount of shelling in our vicinity.

I eventually reached and crossed the Warfusée road, and pushed on in the direction of the village with a tank which was moving due east. It trailed a huge mass of barbed wire behind it which swished about as the tank frequently turned, and I had to give it a wide berth. On the south side of the road, I entered a German trench, which was about 200 yards west of the 19th Battalion objective. I found Lieutenant Lillie and another officer of the 19th Battalion there. The 19th Battalion officers considered they were on their objective, but I assured them that this was not so, and they should be about 200 yards further east. I then inquired as to whether they had mopped up a deep dugout in the trench close to where they were standing. They replied that they had not. On hearing this, I led a couple of men in a search of the dugout and secured 20 German prisoners.



August 1918: Villers-Bretonneux. Supply tank en route to the line at Villers-Bretonneux.
Note the rolls of barbed wire in the right foreground.

*Photo Courtesy of the Australian War Memorial
Negative Number: C04889*

Enemy machine-gun fire was very heavy against us, and any further advance seemed quite impossible with my little handful of men. The fire was coming from two machine guns on our immediate front, from another on our left flank, and from a fourth gun on our extreme right. It was obvious that, until these guns were silenced, any further advance in the area was impossible.

I decided to attack the left gun first, and went out under fire to locate it. Having done so, I returned to where I had left my men. I led them very carefully round the right flank of this gun, and suddenly opened rapid fire on the Germans and charged the trench. The Huns bolted, leaving their gun and we killed them as they ran. I then led my men back to the trenches we had just left, in preparation for the attack on the two machine guns in front.

A tank appeared and was subjected to heavy machine-gun fire from the enemy guns. I decided to risk venturing out to seek the assistance of the tank commander. He promised to help, and I returned through the fire to my men, the only damage being a chip off the handle of my Colt pistol.

The tank fired a round or two and left, but I led my little party through the machine-gun fire and we killed some of the crews, captured the two machine guns and about 20 prisoners. From this position the fire of the fourth gun on the extreme right did not trouble me.

About this time Lieutenant Rod Pettit with 30 men and Lieutenant 'Jess' Willard with 20 men, all of my battalion, reported to me near the east-west road, a little west of Warfusée-Abancourt. The shelling at the time was extremely heavy, with 4.2 inch and 5.9 inch shells falling very close to us. I explained the state of affairs to them.

The mist was clearing and I could plainly see that there were no troops on our front. Other than us, there did not appear to be any troops about at all. A and D companies should have been there about this time to push straight through the village of Warfusée, while B and C companies – the latter my own – should also have been there to attack round the south of the village. The lack of visibility had, to my mind, disorganised things generally, in the early stages of the attack.

I decided to do the best I could with the handful of troops available. I therefore instructed Lieutenants Pettit and Willard with their 50 men to push on through Warfusée and Lamotte, the job of A and D companies, while I, with 10 men, would do the job allotted to B and C companies. I warned them about a German machine gun I had just located at the entrance to the village, on the south side of the east-west road, some

distance ahead. These young officers never faltered at my orders, and I greatly admired their courage and later recommended them to my Commanding Officer. They both received the Military Cross.

I was intent on undertaking the task allotted to B and C companies, to circle round the south side of the villages of Warfusée and Lamotte, establishing a line on the eastern end of Lamotte. I pushed on round the south of the village but could see none of our troops about. I then met tank number B 21, and pushed on with it for about 300 or 400 yards. I collected about six stray men who caught up with me.

In a sunken road south of the village, I located a 4.2 inch field battery, the one that had been firing at us. I led my party against the four guns. The Germans were trying to get the southern gun out with horses. The horses were killed, and the four field guns and crews of about 20 were captured. I found on pushing forward again that the extra men who had joined me had disappeared, apparently with prisoners, and I was left with my men only.

I noticed two Lewis Gun sections of the 7th Brigade away to my right rear and gathered them under my command, including the 7th Brigade Lieutenant, and led the little party forward.

A few minutes later I saw a party of over 100 Germans make a rush in the direction of the 7th Brigade front, for a bank at the western edge of the valley to the south of us - and we felt that things were going badly for us. The position was desperate and shelling now incredibly heavy. I determined that they would hold up the left flank of the 7th Brigade which was operating immediately on our right, and decided to straighten things out. I sent the 7th Brigade officer out to my right flank to look after things. I brought my left flank forward and we moved into the valley and, with the Lewis guns and rifles, put a withering enfilade fire into the Germans. They rushed back in two large batches in the direction of their own lines, and we practically wiped them out as they re-crossed the valley. We estimated that not more than 15 got away. The 7th Brigade Lewis gun sections then went off south with their officer.

On nearing the south-eastern end of Warfusée, I noticed a battery of 5.9 inch German Howitzers, firing over open sights at the 7th Brigade troops some distance to the south of where I was. I also located a German machine gun which was firing at us from just beyond the village, from a position which would make it impossible for us to occupy the objective. Our objective was between the 5.9 inch Howitzer battery and this machine gun. I now had no troops other than about eight of my own men.



German Army 5.9 inch gun on the Western Front.

*Photo Courtesy of the Australian War Memorial
Negative Number: 1409147, Donor British Official photograph*

I decided to take the 5.9 inch battery myself, and told CSM Dulhunty to follow behind me. I ordered Corporal Poole to take the balance of the men and capture the machine gun. I rushed the first gun-pit and captured the officer and 12 gunners working the gun. The CSM arrived and I handed the prisoners over to him.

I then rushed into the second gun-pit. The crew of about 12 were feverishly working the gun and had just loaded a shell into the breech. I put my hand in the breech, preventing them closing it and firing the gun, and captured the lot. A third gun was taken, bringing the total prisoners captured from this battery to one officer and 45 German gunners.⁴

A few minutes later I was joined by Lieutenant Harries and a few men of my company, and also by Corporal Poole and the men whom I had sent to take the machine gun. I took the battalion objective at 6.50 am – after two and a half hours' fighting – and within a few minutes of the scheduled time. I forwarded to my Battalion Headquarters a receipt from the prisoner-of-war cage for 196 prisoners.

ACTION ON 9TH AUGUST 1918 AGAINST FRAMERVILLE

After breakfast on the 9th of August, the Commanding Officer instructed me to take the battalion to a certain map reference north of Bayonvillers, stating that he would return and meet me there at 12.00. I took the battalion there. He did not return and several times I had the map reference checked by the officers of the battalion.

As the day progressed, I heard a steady stream of rumours from troops passing through to the rear, that an attack on our Brigade at Framerville was to take place later that afternoon. At 3.30 pm, I decided to move the battalion further forward in case we were needed. About this time, Lieutenant Edmondson, one of our officers who was attached to Brigade Headquarters, came over to me and said he was surprised to see us where we were, as orders had been sent to us to go into an attack on Framerville. I explained that I had no orders, nor had I seen our Commanding Officer, who was then three and a half hours overdue at the rendezvous. I then decided I would move without orders on towards Framerville. I worked out the bearing on to the church in that village and found I had three miles to go, and one hour to cover the distance. I gave the Adjutant the bearing, handed him my compass and an officer as check reader. I ordered the battalion to be formed into artillery formation,⁵ broken down to sections and, taking up a position about 100 yards in front of the battalion, ordered the advance and controlled the movement by visual signals.

There were large numbers of planes dogfighting above us, including a couple of flights of Hun planes. One German plane about 100 feet up came out of formation, and apparently seeing me directing the show, deliberately had a go at me with his machine gun.⁶ He sprayed bullets all around me and then went on spraying bullets over the battalion. Thank God I escaped.

About five minutes before what turned out to be 'zero hour' (4.30 pm), I ran into some trenches occupied by the 30th Battalion, AIF, and seeing my friend Lieutenant 'Bill' Daniels of Newcastle there, asked him, 'What trenches are these?' He replied, 'Front line'. I said, 'Good God!' and immediately signalled to the battalion to lie down. Just then the Commanding Officer arrived on a horse carrying only one stirrup. He had worn out two horses in his efforts to find us.⁷ He said, 'Thank God you've come, Teddy. Get the company commanders'.

We had five minutes to go to zero and received the briefest orders. They were to attack and take Framerville, the church being the dividing line between companies. I was on the right flank in the attack and the Commanding Officer warned me to 'watch the orchard - it's bristling with machine guns'!



Framerville, August, 1918, camouflaged German transport captured by troops of the 5th Infantry Brigade at the Battle of Amiens, 8 August, 1918.

*Photo Courtesy of the Australian War Memorial
Negative Number: E029114*

Just as the attack started, I was wounded by a shell which, as far as I am aware, wounded all those splendid men of mine who were with me through the previous day's attack at Warfusée. I stayed until I saw my company taken over and the attack well under way and was then taken from the field by stretcher-bearers. Private Walsh, one of my runners, walked beside my stretcher - he was wounded about the forearm.

Thus it was that there was no-one left to give a full and detailed account of what I had done on the 8th of August 1918 at Warfusée. I received no decoration for my actions, though certain recommendations were made at the time by my Commanding Officer, based on the limited evidence available within my battalion'.

On Captain Harnett's return to the battalion on 31 October 1918, he met Sergeant O'Keefe, whom he knew to have received a Military Medal. He chided O'Keefe for not wearing the ribbon of his decoration. The sergeant replied, 'I'll wear it when you get yours, Sir'.

Harnett was recommended for the Victoria Cross, although he himself had no knowledge of the fact. Following his wounding on 9 August 1918 during the attack on Framerville, he spent a period convalescing in Wandsworth Hospital in England. During his convalescence he was visited by two lieutenants who, as they departed said to him, 'Keep smiling Teddy, you are in for the best you can get'. It was not until the 1940s that Harnett knew exactly what they meant. He had thought he might be recommended for some decoration, but certainly not the Victoria Cross. Unhappily, the recommendation was never received by the higher echelons, as it was torn up by the Brigade Commander, along with a number of others. The officer who made the recommendation did not realise that this had occurred until much later, when he remarked to a friend, 'It was hard luck that Captain Harnett missed out on the Victoria Cross for which I had recommended him'. He added that he had thought Harnett would at least receive the Distinguished Service Order, but it was not to be so. Harnett was however, mentioned in Sir Douglas Haig's dispatch of 16 March 1919.

In many ways, Edward Harnett epitomised the Australian soldier of the time. Cocooned in the fog and chaos of a massive assault, separated from the remainder of his battalion, Harnett doggedly maintained the punishing momentum he knew was required to achieve his battalion's objectives. He gathered the remnants of his headquarters around him like a little brood, collecting stragglers along the way. He was confident in the abilities of his soldiers, but displayed an almost casual disregard for his own personal safety. His courage under fire is matched only by the complete detachment with which he describes acts of extraordinary bravery. He exhibited an almost pathological unwillingness to be pinned down or prevented from achieving his objective. While those around him were obviously disappointed that his bravery went largely unrecognised, Harnett himself was more eager to reward the courage of his subordinates. His is a story that further gilds the ANZAC image, that adds depth and dimension to the portrait of the Australian soldier. His is also a story that should be told. It is a lasting and fitting tribute to Captain Edward Harnett that he be remembered for what he did that day on the road to Warfusée.



Group of 17th Battalion Officers⁸

(Back) - Lieutenants R.R.F. Willard, MC, V.J. Sullivan, MC, C.W. Warburton, R.E. Massey, MM.
 (Front) - Lieutenant C.R. Maynard, Captains E.T. Harnett, C.C. Finlay.

ENDNOTES

1. Keegan, J., *The First World War*, Random House, Sydney, 1998, p. 440.
2. Downing, W.H., *To The Last Ridge*, Duffy and Snellgrove, Sydney, 1998, p. 138.
3. Laffin, J., *Australians at War: Western Front 1917-1918 The Cost of Victory*, Time-Life Books Australia, Sydney, 1988, p. 126.
4. Bean, *The Official History of Australia in the Great War of 1914 - 1918*, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1921. Bean wrote that the German official monograph notes that no member of this battery (the 2/151st Foot Artillery) escaped.
5. 'Artillery formation' was a formation commonly employed by units in the advance. The unit assembled in four waves, each consisting of a double line of dots. Each dot comprised a little group or section of men in single file. Each group was placed as if on the forward angles of the teeth of an imaginary saw, in a slanting, zigzag pattern. There was a space of 30 yards laterally between the sections, and of 200 yards between each successive section. This formation was known as 'artillery formation' as, to do serious damage, a shell had to fall very close to the advancing troops and no single shrapnel burst could damage more than one section. In this way, it provided maximum protection against shelling. If machine-gun fire were encountered, this formation allowed the rapid movement of troops into a single line. (Downing, *op.cit.*, p. 142.)
6. Bean, *op. cit.*, Bean notes that he personally informed Captain Harnett of the identity of this airman – later known as Field Marshal Herman Goering.
7. *ibid.*, p. 637.
8. Photo from MacKenzie, Lieutenant Colonel K.W., MC, *The Story of the Seventeenth Battalion AIF in the Great War 1914-1918*, shipping Newspapers, Sydney, 1946.

BIOGRAPHY

Major Catherine McCullagh joined the Army in 1983 as an officer in the Royal Australian Army Educational Corps. She has served in a variety of locations both within Australia and overseas in Singapore and Malaysia. In 1998, she was posted to the Doctrine Centre as Staff Officer Grade Two Publishing, ascending to the lofty heights of editor of the then *Combat Arms Journal* and the *Combat Services Support Journal*. These publications were amalgamated into the *Army Journal* in 2000. Major McCullagh is currently posted to the Land Warfare Studies Centre as a Research Fellow.



BY MAJOR CATHERINE MCCULLAGH

*My stretcher is one scarlet stain,
And as I tries to scrape it clean,
I tell you wot - I'm sick with pain
For all I've 'eard, for all I've seen;
Around me is the 'ellish night,
And as the war's red rim I trace,
I wonder if in 'Eaven's height,
Our God don't turn away 'Is face.*

Robert W. Service¹

The hellish experiences of stretcher-bearers in World War I are but the signature of the total battlefield experiences of those who volunteered to endure the nightmarish conditions in order to minister to the wounded. At Gallipoli, on the Western Front and on any other battlefield at that time, the movement of the wounded to safety was a complex, multi-stage process. Delays were very often fatal. Doctors, nurses and medical orderlies worked in primitive conditions with little in the way of anaesthetics and often rudimentary instruments. There was a high rate of infection and the wounded often died of septicaemia and gangrene due to the conditions, particularly those in the casualty clearing stations. Nonetheless, thousands of lives were saved by these heroic volunteers and many of those who were beyond saving were comforted in their final moments. Medicine itself was the only winner, as the body of knowledge acquired during those arduous times laid the foundations for those medical techniques and practices that the people of many nations take for granted today.

THE ORIGINS OF MILITARY FIRST AID IN AUSTRALIA

The Prussian military surgeon von Esmarch first introduced bandaging and splinting techniques as part of battlefield first aid, and these skills were later taught to British military stretcher-bearers.² The colonies of New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland and South Australia developed their own colonial defence establishments, essentially militia troops, in 1870, when Imperial troops were withdrawn from Australia. Volunteer forces had also been formed from 1803 on in response to perceived threats, including the possibility of a Napoleonic invasion.³ The origins of military first aid in Australia lie within the embryo ambulance sections of these units.⁴ At this early stage, volunteer or militia service was a new phenomenon and those who joined to provide medical assistance were not always regarded as essential. The British in particular, espoused this ideal:

The War Office ridiculed the idea that strong, intelligent and healthy young men should spend their time in tending the sick and wounded, and instead collected together some 300 decrepit old pensioners to form an Ambulance Corps.⁵

The murder of General Gordon at Khartoum provided the impetus for the formation of the first Australian military ambulance corps. This was a unit recruited and sent to the Sudan in 1885 with a contingent of New South Wales volunteers to support British troops fighting in the Sudan at the time.⁶ The Queensland Defence Force established an Ambulance Corps in 1884, while Victoria followed suit in 1886 and Tasmania in 1892. 'Active service' for some (such as the Brisbane Volunteer Ambulance Corps and the Wide Bay Ambulance Corps) comprised 'aid to the civil power' during the shearers' strike of 1891.⁷ The Brisbane Ambulance Corps, on the other hand, attended the weekly race meetings in Brisbane.

MILITARY FIRST AID IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR

The first World War saw an influx of medical personnel into the Australian Army Medical Corps and the Australian Army Nursing Service. At this stage, the Australian Army Medical Service was a small part-time specialised addition to the British Royal Army Medical Corps. By 1918, it had become an independent force in its own right. These dedicated Australians worked tirelessly in a variety of settings, including casualty clearing stations close to the front line and large general hospitals in both England and France. During the first World War, all field ambulances belonging to the Australian Imperial Forces (AIF) included stretcher-bearers, members of the Australian Army Medical Corps. They were supplemented by the battalions, which utilised band members as

bearers. Given the strong tradition of mateship that characterised the Australian soldier, it was also common to see soldiers who had survived a battle appear in droves to help search the battlefield for fallen comrades. Wounded men who were able to walk or even crawl, would often struggle from one shell hole to another in a desperate attempt to find the safety of their own lines. Stretcher-bearers would venture out once the heat of the battle had lessened in intensity, equipped with bandages, morphine and iodine. Many times the order was given to bring back only those with a chance of recovery. Those who could not be rescued often bled to death or were captured or killed by the enemy.⁸ In the conditions that marked the Western battlefields, it was often demanding and exhausting work extricating the wounded from craters of mud and carrying them, at times under sniper fire, back to the Regimental Aid Post. Although stretcher-bearers were clearly marked by the Red Cross armband that they wore and were known to be unarmed, they were often fired upon by a mistrustful enemy. Given the nature of their work, they were far more exposed than other soldiers who could dive for cover when under fire. Stretcher-bearers were forced to maintain an upright position when carrying the wounded, which afforded them no protection and exposed them often as the only visible elements on the battlefield. The use of German prisoners-of-war as stretcher-bearers was often the best way to avoid sniping by the enemy as they were reluctant to fire on their own comrades.



Australian Army Medical Corps stretcher-bearers with casualty on stretcher preparing to leave the battlefield. Septimus Power, oil on canvas, 1922.

*Photo Courtesy of the Australian War Memorial
Negative Number: ART03645*

 STRETCHER-BEARERS

Stretcher-bearers! Stretcher-bearers!
Seeking in the rain
Out among the flying death
For those who lie in pain
Bringing in the wounded men -
Then out to seek again.

Out amongst the tangled wire
(Where they thickest fell)
Snatching back the threads of life
From out the jaws of Hell;
Out amongst the machine-gun sweep
And blasts of shatt'ring shell.

For you no mad, exciting charge,
No swift, exultant fight,
But just an endless plodding on
Through the shuddering night;
Making ('neath a star-shell's gleam)
Where ere a face shines white.

Stretcher-Bearers! Stretcher-Bearers!
To you all praise be due,
Who ne'er shirked the issue yet
When there was work to do;
We who've seen and know your worth
All touch our hats to you.

An anonymous tribute to stretcher-bearers
 written by an Australian soldier in 1918
 which appeared in the AIF magazine, *Aussie*

The ultimate image of a stretcher-bearer is that of Private John Simpson and his donkey who toiled doggedly through murderous Turkish gunfire to rescue wounded digger mates and bring them to safety. Legend has it that Simpson went to war with his pet possum tucked in his slouch hat. His particular route was through one of the most dangerous traverses, known as Shrapnel Gully. Such was his love of animals that he would often leave his donkey behind cover while he would dash up steep cliffs and traverses and carry a wounded mate back on his shoulders. He would dress wounds as necessary and then whisper in the ear of his donkey, 'Okay animal, let's go'. Simpson was killed only 25 days after he landed,⁹ and, as news of his death spread, a hush fell over the Australian camp. His loss was greeted with extraordinary sadness by all. He was buried with the simple epitaph, 'He gave his life that others may live'.



Gallipoli 1915. Private John Simpson Kirkpatrick, 3rd Australian Field Ambulance, helping a soldier wounded in the leg by carrying him on his donkey.

*Photo Courtesy of the Australian War Memorial
Negative Number: J06392*

CASUALTY CLEARING STATIONS

The wounded were carried by stretcher-bearers to the first stage on the route back from no man's land, the casualty clearing station. While each casualty clearing station was identified by number, they were often nicknamed by soldiers with such appropriate names as 'Mending'em' or 'Bandage'em'. The nurses at these stations were often from the Voluntary Aid Detachments or British nurses from the First Aid Nursing Yeomanry.

The conditions in the casualty clearing stations themselves were primitive and dirty. Septicaemia and gangrene were common, with one third of all casualties dying. Doctors often worked on several patients at once, leaving the routine tasks of closing wounds, dressing and even anaesthetising to medical assistants. Even the chaplain could be called in to assist. One such chaplain, the Reverend Leonard Pearson of No. 44 Casualty Clearing Station wrote:

'I spent most of my time giving anaesthetics. I had no right to be doing this, of course, but we were simply so rushed. We couldn't get the wounded into hospital quickly enough, and the journey from the battlefields was terrible for these poor lads. It was a question of operating as quickly as possible. If they had had to wait their turn in the normal way...it would have been too late for many of them. As it was, many died...I did a lot of stretcher carrying and helped to strip the men of their filthy uniforms. We had to cut them off with scissors, and there were some nights that we cut until our fingers were raw. We had over a thousand beds and that simply wasn't enough. We had to keep the worst cases and send anyone who could possibly travel down to the base'.¹⁰



Sydney, 1917. Group photograph of Australian Red Cross Voluntary Aid Detachment Members.

*Photo Courtesy of the Australian War Memorial
Negative Number: P01102.019*



Palestine, c. 1917. A casualty on a wheeled stretcher being assessed prior to admission to 69 General Hospital at Belah after arrival by train in a military convoy.


*Photo Courtesy of the Australian War Memorial
Negative Number: H00878*

Transporting wounded soldiers to a military hospital was also an arduous and hazardous business. Australian soldiers, in particular one Sergeant Worsfold of the 9th Australian Field Ambulance, were adept at designing ingenious devices to transport their wounded mates over a terrain cratered and muddied by unremitting conflict. Of note were his aerial stretcher and a wheeled stretcher built for towing by a motorcycle. In the Western Desert, stretcher cacolets, which were designed to sit atop the twin humps of the camel, were often used. In Palestine, wheeled stretchers were cobbled together from a variety of spare parts often requisitioned from other vehicles.




A portable stretcher and carriage, designed by Sergeant Worsfold, 9th Australian Field Ambulance, with special attachment for hauling along aerial line.

*Lent by Sergeant A. Worsfold
Australian War Memorial Negative Number: C04779*



France, C. 1918. A portable stretcher and carriage designed by Sergeant Worsfold, 9th Australian Field Ambulance, which can be towed behind a motor cyclist.

*Lent by Sergeant A. Worsfold
Australian War Memorial Negative Number: C04780*



Western Desert, 1916. Stretcher Sitting Cacolets.

*Photo Courtesy of the Australian War Memorial
Negative Number: H00935*



Heilly, 1916. A wounded Australian soldier being lifted down from an ambulance by three soldiers at number 38 Casualty Clearing Station.

*Photo Courtesy of the Australian War Memorial
Negative Number: E00003*

Patients would be transferred from the casualty clearing stations to a field hospital by ambulance, many of which were horse-drawn. The field hospitals were often 10-15 miles back from the front and usually near a railway line. Men who could be transported further were moved by train to hospitals in England. These trains were typically converted to makeshift wards so that medical treatment could continue throughout the journey.



France, c. 1918. Three horse drawn British Army Ambulances waiting to evacuate wounded stretcher cases on the Maricourt to Montauban Road.

*Photo Courtesy of the Australian War Memorial
Negative Number: H08901, Donor British Official Photograph D234*

DENTAL SERVICES IN WORLD WAR I


While medical services at this time can best be described as rudimentary, dental services were almost non-existent. Despite this, the AIF did have a standard of dental fitness required of all who enlisted. Civilian dentists provided assessment and treatment in an honorary capacity in capital cities. Field ambulances and hospitals run by the Royal Australian

Medical Corps were established with the outbreak of World War I. There was no place however, for the inclusion of dental services within these establishments. Regimental Medical Officers were issued with a leather pouch of extracting forceps, the only instrument for use in a dental emergency.

The first dental services were established on 6 January 1915 with the raising of an Australian Army Medical Corps Reserve (Dental) which comprised six captains and 50 lieutenants. These officers were granted honorary rank within the Commonwealth Forces but were not utilised until late 1915. This was despite evidence from Boer War experiences that concluded that a large number of men were rendered unfit for active service due to dental problems. It was not until May 1915 that dentists were to be appointed for service in Australia and Egypt.

In June 1916, the Army lowered its dental standard for enlistment to admit recruits whom, while deemed dentally unfit, were classified as capable of being made fit for service. On 6 July 1915, 14 dental officers (honorary lieutenants), 12 dental mechanics and 13 privates were appointed for service with the AIF overseas to be attached to general hospitals. In February 1916, dental officers were first authorised to call up soldiers for dental examination and treatment. Prior to this, only medical officers had been granted this authority. Dental sections were allocated to medical units of all variety, including field ambulances and general hospitals.

On the Western Front, the first dental sections to be authorised to take the field comprised components of the field ambulances. By November 1917, the total number of dental units overseas in England, France and Egypt was 118 and, by 1918 there were 130 dental officers serving overseas with the AIF.¹¹



Aitape, New Guinea, 1945. Dental Posts were a more common sight in World War II than in previous conflicts involving Australian troops.

*Photo Courtesy of the Australian War Memorial
Negative Number: 018109*

THE INFLUENCE OF MILITARY FIRST AID

There is no doubt that military first aid, rudimentary though it was, had a fundamental effect on the development of medical practices in general. Even in the early stages of the First World War, it was clear to medical personnel working in the conditions on the front that this war would present unfamiliar injuries and illnesses on a scale previously unimaginable. From the cliffs of Gallipoli to the sands of Palestine and the cratered mud pits of the Western Front, a legion of doctors, nurses, dentists, stretcher-bearers, Voluntary Aid Detachment workers, Red Cross volunteers and even veterinarians, risked life and limb to save those caught up in the bloody morass. The body of knowledge that resulted from the desperate efforts of these heroic volunteers laid the foundations for medical developments in many countries, including Australia. From the muddy trenches, rugged traverses and stinging

sands of the First World War arose the medical techniques and practices that Australians take for granted today. Lest we forget where it all began:

*I kneel behind the soldier's trench,
I walk 'mid shambles' smear and stench,
The dead I mourn;
I bear the stretcher and I bend
O'er Fritz and Pierre and Jack to mend
What shells have torn.*

John Finley¹²

ENDNOTES

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BIOGRAPHY

Major Catherine McCullagh joined the Army in 1983 as an officer in the Royal Australian Army Educational Corps. She has served in a variety of locations both within Australia and overseas in Singapore and Malaysia. In 1998, she was posted to the Doctrine Centre as Staff Officer Grade Two Publishing, ascending to the lofty heights of editor of the then *Combat Arms Journal* and the *Combat Services Support Journal*. These publications were amalgamated into the *Army Journal* in 2000. Major McCullagh is currently posted to the Land Warfare Studies Centre as a Research Fellow.



BY CAPTAIN JUDITH SPENCE

Fifty-one years after one of the most tragic events in the history of Australian Army nursing, a group of women stand huddled on the shores of a lonely beach on a small island in the Indonesian archipelago. These women, grim memories etched on their faces, are former Australian Army nurses who served in World War II. They have gathered to remember, to relive and to revere the courage and sacrifice of all Army nurses and to dedicate a memorial as a lasting tribute. This is their story.



The Memorial on the beach at Mentok in which a stone from one of the prisoner-of-war camps is embedded.

With the entry of Japan into World War II following the bombing of Pearl Harbour in 1941, conditions in military hospitals in South-East Asia changed dramatically. Already stretched beyond capacity, the now torrential flow of casualties threatened to become overwhelming. As Japanese soldiers advanced into Singapore in February 1942, the casualty rate increased to desperate levels.

At this time, there were over 100 Australian military nurses from three military medical units, 2/4 Casualty Clearing Station, 2/10 and 2/13 Australian General Hospitals, which formed part of the 8th Australian Division, stationed in Singapore at the time. On the 6th of February 1942, the order came for all nurses to evacuate. For the nurses it was a heartbreaking decision as only a handful of soldiers were fit for the trauma of evacuation. In the face of the duty they held so dear, rose the agonising reality of abandoning the vast majority of wounded to an unknown and possibly merciless enemy.

Three ships were used in the evacuation, all hastily refitted as hospital ships, yet ill-designed for the purpose. As fate would decree, the destiny of the nurses on each of the three ships was wildly different. The first ship to leave, the *Wah Sui*, sailed on the 10th of February. Although bombed during the embarkation process in Singapore Harbour, the vessel escaped serious damage and reached Batavia (now Jakarta) relatively unscathed. Within a few weeks, the nurses were safely home in Australia.

The second ship, the *Empire Star*, left on the 11th of February. The *Empire Star* was a cargo ship designed to carry 24 passengers. Dire necessity dictated that over 2 000 people were crammed into its holds, berths and massed across its decks. Among the evacuees were Australian, British and Indian nurses, British troops and civilian women and children. During its passage, the ship was heavily bombarded by 92 Japanese bombers. Despite massive damage and huge loss of life, the *Empire Star* somehow limped to safety in Batavia. Massive repairs were carried out and the ship, incredibly, eventually reached its destination in Australia without further incident.

The last ship to leave Singapore Harbour was the *Vyner Brook*. She sailed on the 12th of February, vastly overcrowded and with little in the way of effective defences. She carried 65 Australian nurses led by the redoubtable matrons Paschke and Drummond. The nurses were organised into teams with responsibility for the various areas of the ship. Should the ship come under fire, the nurses were instructed that their priority would rest with tending the wounded. Should the order be given to abandon ship, the nurses knew they would be the last to leave.

The *Vyner Brooke* was attacked on the 14th of February in the Bangka Strait and sank within half an hour. While all the nurses survived the bombing, many drowned or were killed by the returning Japanese planes which raked those survivors struggling in the water with deadly machine-gun fire. The 53 remaining nurses staggered ashore in various stages of exhaustion, having spent anywhere from eight to 65 hours in the water.



At sea off Singapore, 1942. Troops on the deck of the cargo vessel *Empire Star*, which evacuated 2 514 people from Singapore to Batavia and was damaged by Japanese bombing.

*Photo Courtesy of the Australian War Memorial
Negative Number: P01117.008, Donor R. Sayers*

One group of survivors was washed ashore on Bangka Island. It was a motley group, comprising nurses, soldiers and civilian men and women. Finding themselves in a desperate situation, they surrendered to Japanese soldiers on the 16th of February. The men in the group were immediately led to a beach behind a bluff. The Japanese soldiers returned alone, cleaning their rifles and bayonets in front of the horrified women. The nurses were then ordered to walk into the sea, where they were machine-gunned. Only one nurse survived, Sister Vivian Bullwinkel. Although wounded, she feigned death until she felt certain the Japanese had left the beach. As she wandered ashore, dazed, the full enormity of the horror she had witnessed dawned on her. She was alone, in pain, desperately afraid, but she was alive.

Driven by a desperate need to survive, Vivian hid in the undergrowth, staying out of sight of the Japanese. She soon discovered that she was not alone, happening upon a wounded British soldier, helpless and in great pain. She nursed him as best she could, but soon faced the gnawing realisation that he would not survive without urgent medical attention that she, alone, could not provide. The decision was a dreadful one. She

knew she risked certain death for both of them, but felt that the slim chance of survival that surrender to the Japanese presented was infinitely preferable to the agony of watching the soldier die a lingering and painful death.

Carefully concealing evidence of the wound in her side that she carried from the massacre on the beach, Vivian and the soldier surrendered to the Japanese on the 28th of February. For her, it proved to be the right decision as, although incarcerated in Japanese prisoner-of-war camps on Bangka Island and Java over the next three and a half years, she lived to tell the tale. She joined the ranks of other nurses who had survived bombings and sinkings and now faced a gruelling and uncertain future. Eight of these nurses died in the camps during the final seven months of the war. All died of beriberi and some were also suffering from malaria. Of the original 65 dedicated and courageous women who volunteered their lives to save those of others, only 25 survived to return to Australia.



Singapore, 1945. Nurses from the 2/10th and 2/13th Australian General Hospital and one survivor from the 4th Casualty Clearing Station who were aboard the *Vyner Brooke* when it sank. After 3 ½ years as prisoners-of-war of the Japanese they arrive for repatriation. They wear their original uniforms, incomplete and oil-stained.

*Photo Courtesy of the Australian War Memorial
Negative Number: 044480, Sydney Morning Herald photograph*

On the 2nd of March 1993, 51 years after the nurses faced that agonising evacuation from Singapore, a memorial was dedicated in honour of those 65 nurses who were aboard the *Vyner Brooke* on that fateful voyage. A stone from one of the prisoner-of-war camps is embedded in the memorial, which is erected away from the camps themselves, on the massacre site at Radji Beach.



A group of the surviving nurses at the memorial:

Back (l-r): Jean Ashton, Flo Sayer (Trotter), Pat Gunther (Darling).

Front (l-r) Mavis Allgrove, Vivian Statham (Bullwinkel), Wilma Oram (Young), Joyce Tweedle.

The return to Bangka Island was a defining experience for the seven nurse survivors in the party. Among their number was Vivian Bullwinkel, for whom the emotion must have been indescribable. It was a quiet, dignified ceremony, marked by the individual contributions of each of these women, some reading from the Bible, others offering prayers from the heart. Accompanying the survivors from the *Vyner Brooke* were nurses from the *Empire Star*, reliving their own experience of fear and wartime trauma. As a fitting tribute to wartime nursing and an empathetic salute to their comrades in uniform, seven currently serving Royal Australian Army Nursing Corps members accompanied the survivors on what, for many, may have been their last journey to a place of tragedy. Many relatives of those who perished also made the pilgrimage as a means of at last farewelling their loved ones. For one woman, a girl of nine at the time of the fall of Singapore, it was a particularly cathartic experience. One of the nurses shot on the beach was a favourite aunt, still remembered with enormous affection and great sadness.

From the windswept reaches of Radji Beach, the party travelled to Jakarta to pay tribute to the eight nurses who died in the prisoner-of-war camps and now lie in the Commonwealth War Graves Commission Cemetery. Those nurses who were lost at sea and those massacred at Bangka Island, commemorated by name at Kranji War Cemetery in Singapore, were likewise honoured and remembered by the survivors and relatives who visited the cemetery.



Commemorative cross at the Commonwealth War Graves Commission Cemetery. The Australian Defence Attaché Colonel (now Major General) Jim Molan at Menteng with Mavis Allgrove and Jean Ashton.

I was deeply honoured to be selected to accompany the nurses and relatives on this their pilgrimage. I listened, inspired, profoundly moved and in a sense, horrified, at the pure veracity of what they described. These nurses had forged deep and abiding bonds, strengthened in adversity, the true depth of which I could only surmise. I felt them to be immensely generous in sharing their stories with us. The agony of reliving such experiences is something we will never truly understand.

They described in particular the dire conditions they experienced in Singapore when they attempted to nurse over 1 000 wounded soldiers in a facility designed for 200. They evoked images of nursing at night with no light, but vast numbers of critical patients whose needs remained desperate regardless of the time of day. They described nursing dying and severely wounded men with almost no supplies, lacking even the barest of basics. They described also the terrible trauma of having to leave the wounded behind in the face of the oncoming enemy. This they saw as the ultimate neglect of their deepest duty, their duty of care for the

patient. This sense of betrayal lasts to this day and will probably accompany them to their graves.

With little bitterness, they described their experiences in the camps. It was with commensurate horror, but little surprise that we heard of the now-infamous deprivations of the camps. Their will to live, their incredible ability to survive through wit and imagination was completely overwhelming. When I asked one of the nurses where this incredible ability to survive came from, she shrugged her shoulders and simply replied, 'You just do it'.

Many of their recollections were characterised by humour and joy. Some of the nurses joined the camp choir and brought relief from the daily grind through rehearsals and concerts. The same tremendous feeling of comradeship pervaded these stories that characterised the horrendous recollections of survivors of the Burma-Thai Railway: 'If you didn't have a mate, you were gone'. They were desperate to survive, but to survive together, and the death of any of their number was such a devastating blow that morale would be low for weeks.



A water well at the prisoner-of-war campsite, Mentok.

Sadly, the ranks of these indomitable women are thinning, with only a few left alive as the years take their toll. The stories of their incredible courage reinforce in me the belief that my service as a military nurse should embody my tribute to their tremendous dedication and sacrifice. They went to war in such uncertain times, the only certainty lay in doing their duty. This is so vastly different to the operational experiences of

nurses in today's Australian Army. Yet our common bond, undiminished by the years, lies in the utter strength of their commitment and is a value dearly cherished by nurses today.



BIOGRAPHY

Captain Judith Spence is currently working as a Military Support Officer with the Defence Community Organisation in the Australian Capital Territory. She initially qualified as a Registered Nurse from the Princess Alexandra Hospital, Brisbane in 1980, then as a midwife from the Mater Mothers' Hospital in 1984. She has a Masters Degree in Nursing from Flinders University, awarded in 1996. Captain Spence has nursed in various locations throughout Australia and the United Kingdom, and joined the Army as a nursing officer in 1989. She has enjoyed a number of postings to Canberra and Wagga Wagga, and was also deployed for six months with the first rotation to Rwanda in 1994. In 1993 she had the opportunity to accompany ex-prisoner-of-war nurses on a memorial trip to Bangka Island, Indonesia. That trip, the focus of her article, will live on as a career highlight.



BY CAPTAIN LORNA TODD

'The heartbreak in the heart of things'.

William Gibsen 1878-1962

The story that follows is cocooned and coloured by my own observations and emotions. It is an immensely personal account which does not pretend to conform to the views of policy shapers and arbiters. Rigid adherence to policy regardless of circumstance may have deprived me of the opportunity to save precious lives; my rigid adherence was to the spirit rather than the letter. Working within this spirit allowed me privileges such as being regarded by the Rwandan people as an equal rather than always as a benefactor, of helping them to help themselves. In particular, I acknowledge that, without the teamwork of my 'lost boys' who were constantly with me 'over the wire' and in the displaced persons camps, many things would not have been possible. I salute them.

I was born in Kwa-Zulu Natal, South Africa, and as a child travelled extensively with my parents in Sub-Saharan Africa. When the opportunity presented itself to go to Rwanda as part of the United Nations Missions Assistance In Rwanda (UNIMIR II), it was a dream come true. I speak fluent Zulu and Kiswahili (Swahili) the trading language of Central Africa, so it was not a great step to understanding most words in Kinyarwanda, the language of the Rwandan people. Alas the realisation of this dream was not always all that pleasant, but as time heals old wounds, I now recall with humility the lessons learned from a disparate people and their suffering. When we first arrived in Kigali there were no birds, nor did the people sing in the charming time-honoured tradition of the Africa I knew and loved. It was much later that they would sing, first in payment for treatment then when we all joined in for the sheer joy of shared music.

Set virtually in Africa's centre of gravity, Rwanda is also known as the 'Land of a Thousand Hills'. For centuries the Rwandans have patiently cleared the land for livestock and cultivation. For some time it has been almost impossible for them to continue in their traditional ways due to the menace of constant civil war between the Hutu and Tutsi nations and the ever-present threat of land mines. Yet as we drove into the countryside, *shambas* (plots of tilled land) would appear with bananas and a few heads of corn. The will to live is fundamental in us all.



A farm (*shamba*) on the way to Kibeu.

The primary task of my team was to render humanitarian aid in the Kigali Central Hospital, an area separated from the UN hospital, and also in the displaced persons camp at Kibeu. I was frightened, dirty, dusty or wet depending on the season, constantly tired and often had head lice from crawling into humpies to check on mothers and babies.




Jihadi

The hospital 'over the wire' as the non-UN hospital became known, presented a challenge, to say the least. It became clear early on that we could only render 'band-aid' medicine, which is very difficult, when all my senses screamed to 'do something worthwhile'. What is worthwhile? Many years ago a prophet said that 'a cup of cold water given with love was sufficient unto the day'. We went to the hospital to teach the nurses a semblance of sterile techniques, and succeeded in having them use at least two forceps when they applied dressings. One clean pair of forceps removed all the dressings and the other clean pair applied the clean dressings. Remarkably, the rate of sepsis dropped. Imana the local god also works in strange ways. Perhaps, like so many gods, he pities nurses

and those who strive to do their best, albeit in ignorance, but with good intent. The Rwandan nurses taught me patience and an acceptance of 'interference' in their hospital and wards that I am sure I would not have welcomed with such humour and equanimity had our positions been reversed. Nurse Ancilla was the first to trust me and we learnt together. I found an old 'MIMS' (a pharmacopoeia) where she looked up the action of electrolytes. This empowered her and we became equals in our battle against pus and disease, 'over the wire'.

At times it was difficult to maintain a logical perspective, especially in the displaced persons camps. We were in a land ravaged by war, yet were isolated within the UN compound when not at work. Most often it was the children with their large soft brown eyes who made contact with the people possible. Like children everywhere, they responded to kindness and lollies.



The child of light always smiled whenever she saw us.
(Displaced Persons Camp, Kibeu)

Nothing in my own African heritage had prepared me for the displaced persons camps. Here I found a spectrum of human emotions that will live with me forever. The Rwandans in these camps were people in a vacuum. Their only chance of survival was to take everything available. There were the pathetically grateful ones who would beg me on their knees to use my 'powers' to heal them or their loved ones. Mostly these people were moribund by the time they reached us. All that I could do was touch a withered hand or feel for a feeble pulse before passing on to another who had a better chance of survival. Conversely there were the 'difficult' ones who demanded all we had to give and then more. I pondered on these people to whom, with our wealth and medicines, however limited in supply, we seemed inordinately rich and I could not help a rueful smile. On many occasions I wondered how I would react in their circumstances.

I met many delightful characters, but my particular favourite was an old lady who was inordinately fond of banana beer. She arrived at the displaced persons 'clinic', claiming to have five ears, which had become her primary organs of respiration. As she talked, I felt myself drifting like a lotus-eater on the fumes. I set about her very gingerly with a stethoscope in order to gain time and breathed through my own ears so as not to inhale too many of her beer fumes. Being a mere *muzungu* (white person), and a fairly woozy one at that, I could only see two ears on her head, but by then I was breathing through my own ears so I could not judge too sensibly. I then told her I could cure her, but only with her co-operation and my magic pink pills. I proceeded to give her two pink-coloured Vitamin B tablets, and a cake of soap which, as I watched with some irritation, she immediately flogged for more beer. She was to return daily for the vitamin pills, and that she did so still remains a mystery to me. On day three she ceased to breathe from her ears and was quite rational. Alas! I am not a *sangoma* (witch doctor) and the banana beer ran out until the next time. But for a while we were both cured.

Monotheistic religions worship a god who is a supreme being: the creator of heaven and earth. The gods of Africa are many. They are wild, untameable and unfathomable. They don't reside in man's reason, but move perpetually in passion. The people are a breath in the sphere of the gods. They are the leaves in the gods' forest to rest or be blown at will. Ancestors of the living are revered and called upon in times of sadness and joy that they may join with the living in sharing these emotions and offer their wisdom. The joys and sorrows of the living are the work of these restless gods. The winds that blow represent the moods of the gods. In this belief lies the very essence of Africa in all her savagery and beauty.

I wish I could comprehend it. Like the Rwandan people, we in UNIMIR II also felt tossed upon the gods' winds of fear and change.

Images of people dying in the filth of a war-polluted earth, covered in their own excrement are difficult to forget. The squalor and stench of the displaced persons camp was dreadful, but somehow the fear, avarice and hatred of these unfortunate people was more difficult to bear. It is only now that I vaguely comprehend just how terribly their souls hurt. I suffered with those I saw suffer, but I can't grasp the dread reality of being forcibly removed from my home, watching my loved ones as they were murdered and having to scavenge for my very existence.



Daylight and reality – Displaced Persons Camp at Kibeu.

There was a nameless woman who will remain a part of me forever, who, but for a quirk of birth could have been me. She had AIDS and had been given a blanket by the British Hospital but, as she was incurable, there was no bed for her. Her condition was further exacerbated by dysentery. Her family members were all dead so there was no-one to care for her or bury her when the time came. The people in the displaced persons camp were so traumatised that I could not shame or cajole them into giving her shelter, not even the treasure of a blanket once she died. We couldn't bury

her as we did not know where the land mines were, and if we had, there were so many others like her that we would have become a permanent burial party instead of doctors, nurses and medical assistants. Although this poor woman looked eighty she was closer to my age. All I had to give her was my water bottle and hope that the next day she would be dead. The gods were cruel until the last. She did not die for three days. It was another two days before someone buried her. All the while as she lay beside the dirt road near our 'clinic' for three days, I gave her water. That was all she asked. I railed against heaven and our inadequate facilities. We could only stay in the displaced persons camp during the day. She was alone at night.

She would smile and say, 'thank you my sister' as she wiped the tears from my eyes with her dusty trembling hand. As she touched my cheek, my tears made furrows in her parched skin. She was cold and dry as parchment. This dying woman comforted me as I lived. I never knew her name, she could not speak much to anyone, but I will always remember the 'woman with the blanket' who had a dignity far greater than I will ever have. She will live in my memory as one of the most remarkable people I have ever met. We are forever linked in the common bond of humanity. She need have no fear of being forgotten as an ancestor for she is my sister as surely as if we were born of the same woman.


I volunteered to go to Rwanda as an Australian Army nurse, keen to share my practical nursing knowledge. But the local people filled the hands I held outstretched with their love, humour and the sadness that only the people of Africa know, accept, and so generously share with all who are willing to feel. The lure of Africa is forever her eternal beauty and challenge.

The Rwanda experience was perhaps more stressful for me than for the other members of UNAMIR II. I could communicate with the people in a common language and was aware of their fears, suspicions and taboos. I was once more the Child of Africa listening to *Mama Tomloh* (my nanny) exploring the wonders of this our great, but sorry land.



A wonderful way to warm children and give them biscuits.
The goat shed which also doubled as the treatment centre, Kibeu.


Was Australia's time and effort in Rwanda dispensing 'band-aid' medicine a waste of time? Let history be the judge. For me the answer will always be a resounding NO. You can't look into the face of human suffering and not see its alter ego – pity. For a very short time we were able to try to make a difference to the lives and deaths of the people entrusted to our care. At the end of the day we can only say we each did what we could in the way we knew best.



A new life is celebrated, no matter the circumstances.

BIOGRAPHY

Captain Lorna Todd joined the Army in 1983 as a Nursing Officer. She was initially posted to the 1st Military Hospital in Yeronga in Brisbane and then served in a variety of postings including Puckapunyal, Bonegilla, Canungra and Ingleburn. Captain Todd has also served overseas, on Exercise LONG LOOK, when she was posted to Aldershot in England and later, as a member of the United Nations Missions Assistance In Rwanda, the experience on which this article is based. She plans to leave the Army in 2002 and retire to the beautiful Gold Coast hinterland.



BY MAJOR MICK RYAN

It may appear obvious that every individual, group and nation engaged in any conflict should always apply the policy of Paris in the Trojan War and strike only at the Achilles' heel [sic]. Yet the history of human relations, as well as of war, shows conclusively that human beings more frequently ignore or do not see the opportunities for getting around an enemy or opponent and instead strike straight at the most obvious target they see.¹

Manoeuvre theory is a concept that is broader and more conceptual than the term manoeuvre... Manoeuvre theory offers a fundamentally different approach to warfighting.²

Manoeuvre theory has, in recent times, become the 'in vogue' term for all aspects of warfare which embrace the concept of indirect struggle against an opponent. The vast majority of Army officers have at least a basic understanding of concepts such as surfaces and gaps, pre-emption, surprise, disruption, dislocation, combined arms and risk. Far from being a modern concept however, the theory of manoeuvre has been understood and applied by the great military commanders from Alexander of Macedon to Guderian. From antiquity, military commanders have sought to neutralise their enemies' superiority in numbers or technological prowess through the clever use of tactics both on and off the field.

This article will examine manoeuvre theory through two military campaigns. It seeks to demonstrate that the briefest examination of military history is sufficient to show that manoeuvre theory is, ironically, not a 'fundamentally different approach to warfighting'. While the term itself may be a modern invention, the concepts that underlie manoeuvre theory have been well understood for more than two millennia.

History is replete with examples of innovative military commanders who have eschewed traditional forms of battlefield tactics and campaign strategy. Often at great risk, they have dared to put aside conventional military thinking and undertaken unconventional operations, both physical and psychological, to defeat their opponents. As Liddell Hart has asserted, 'effective results in war have rarely been attained unless the approach has had such indirectness as to ensure the opponent's unreadiness to meet it'.³ Two masters of utilising indirectness were Hannibal Barca and Thomas 'Stonewall' Jackson. While separated in time by nearly 2 000 years, their unconventional conduct of military operations confounded their enemies and produced spectacular victories.

Hannibal's victory in the Battle of Lake Trasimene in 217 BC provides the first illustration of the successful employment of manoeuvre theory. His crossing of the Alps and subsequent defeat of Consul Gaius Terentius Varro at Cannae in 216 BC⁴, are brilliant examples of Hannibal's employment of the basic concepts of manoeuvre warfare. His thorough preparation of the battlefield well prior to the first clashes and his tactical genius on the battlefield itself culminating in his defeat of the consular army on the shores of Lake Trasimene, provide an excellent study of manoeuvre theory at the tactical level.

The same maxims used by Hannibal to defeat his opponent at Lake Trasimene were put to use 2 000 years later and an ocean away, in the American Shenandoah Valley. Thomas J. 'Stonewall' Jackson's brilliant flanking movement at Chancellorsville in May 1863 is often cited as evidence of his tactical genius. However it was his earlier campaign, in the Shenandoah Valley during 1862, that resulted in the Confederate capital of Richmond being saved from advancing Union forces. In a campaign led by Jackson and loosely directed by General Robert E. Lee from Richmond, the Union forces were continually out-maneuvred and out-thought by the Confederates and forced to redirect divisions from their main effort to what was essentially a distraction and side event.

HANNIBAL – ENEMY OF ROME

Hannibal's genius in warfare has often and justifiably been acclaimed, for he had all the attributes of a great captain. When it comes to strategy, the movement of great armies and their tactical deployment upon the battlefield, he is almost impossible to fault. Hannibal had been bred for war and the world of the soldier was as natural to him as the sea to a shark or the air to an eagle.⁵

Undoubtedly one of the great commanders of the ancient world, Hannibal Barca was the eldest son of Hamilcar Barca, head of one of Carthage's leading families and great third century BC general. From an early age, Hannibal had been exposed to life on campaign with his father. According to the historian Livy, before leaving Carthage at the age of nine, he swore that he would be 'the declared enemy of the Roman people'.⁶ At the age of 29, he led an army of 12 000 horsemen, 90 000 infantry and 37 elephants⁷ across the Ebro River and into direct conflict with the Roman Empire.

While historians such as Bradford have claimed that Hannibal chose this indirect assault on Italy because of Roman domination of the sea⁸, this is open to debate. As Liddell Hart has pointed out, the Carthaginians always retained some freedom of movement at sea, even towards the end of the war when the Romans had established themselves in Africa.⁹ It is more likely that he chose this indirect route into Italy in order to acquire allies along the way, given his inability to quickly call upon fresh recruits from either Spain or Carthage.

Regardless, his crossing of the Rhone River and the Alps, the victory at Cannae in 216 BC and his 15 years of campaigning in Italy are well known and widely studied by historians. Hannibal's approach to Italy and the years spent fighting there provide the modern student of manoeuvre theory with an exemplary model of the indirect approach. His crushing victory over Consul Flaminius' army at Lake Trasimene is typical of Hannibal's oblique approach to warfare.

Hannibal had invaded Italy with the aim of destroying Rome's centre of gravity, the real basis of its naval and military strength: its network of Latin and Italian alliances. Hannibal was not equipped with siege trains, which would enable his capture of Italy's walled cities. He thus had to rely on his ability to subvert allied loyalty and that of his armies to defeat the Roman legions in battle.¹⁰

THE BATTLE OF LAKE TRASIMENE

Victory in the battles of Ticinus and the Trebia gave Hannibal effective control of northern Italy. He then commenced his advance on Rome. Two Roman consular armies deployed to halt this advance. The consular army under the command of Consul Gnaeus Servilius deployed astride the roads and passes on the Adriatic coast of Italy. Barring the road to Rome was a second consular army, that of Consul Gaius Flaminius. Ignoring the Romans barring the main routes to Rome, Hannibal instead chose to take his army on a gruelling march through the Etrurian marshes, in the lower Arno Valley. In so doing, he chose to expose his army to the most perilous of environmental conditions instead of meeting the Roman legions at a time and location of their choosing. By successfully crossing these marshes, Hannibal bypassed the Roman forces, which had sought to refuse his advance further south.


Hannibal surmised that, if he were able to bypass the Romans deployed to check his march south, they 'would be unable to endure watching passively the devastation of the country, but would spontaneously follow him...and give him opportunities for attack'.¹¹ He was right. The commander of the consular army barring the road to Rome, Consul Gaius Flaminius, was furious at being ignored by the Carthaginian invader. Sensing also political danger from Rome over Hannibal's uncontested march south, he set off in pursuit of Hannibal's army 'utterly regardless of time or place, but bent only on falling in with the enemy'.¹²

His opponent, now physically and psychologically dislocated, had taken Hannibal's bait. All that remained was for Hannibal to choose the place and time that he would strike the Roman forces. On the shores of Lake Trasimene, Hannibal found what he sought. On the northern shore of the lake existed a natural chamber, into which forces would have to enter through a defile. The lake provided the bottom of this chamber, and the northern, eastern and western hills provided the enclosing sides.

On the eastern hills of this natural basin, Hannibal sited his best troops, the Spanish and Africans, ensuring that they were visible from the western entrance, through which the Romans were expected to march. Hannibal intended that this large force would deceive the Romans into believing that he had deployed for a setpiece battle. On the western slopes, Hannibal arrayed his Gauls and Carthaginian heavy cavalry. Between these forces, on the high ground, he deployed his light infantry and pikemen. All that remained was for Flaminius' Romans to march through the western defile. After waiting until the Romans had entered this natural killing ground, Hannibal would close the door behind them.

Flaminius was eager to confront the Carthaginian before he could further threaten Rome. He ordered his forces to advance in column of march, not battle formation, towards Hannibal's army deployed on the eastern hills. Once the Roman troops were in contact with the Spanish and African troops, trumpets blared and the Gauls and heavy cavalry thundered down from the hills taking the legions on their left flank before they could form their battle formations and closing off their escape.

Through his skilful reading of his opponent's reactions, clever use of ground and refusal to fight on any terms but his own, Hannibal had successfully shaped the battlefield to ensure the destruction of the consular army. The brilliant tactical deployment and commitment of his forces during the battle served only to reinforce his successful 'preparation of the battlefield'. The battle resulted in the slaughter of 15 000 Romans and their allies. It is estimated that only 1 500 of Hannibal's men perished.¹³ The battle left Rome unshielded to Hannibal's approach.



The Battle of Lake Trasimene.¹⁴

His skilful utilisation of terrain and ability to materialise where the enemy least expected him were hallmarks of Hannibal's generalship. Two thousand years later on a different continent, an American general fighting for his newly formed nation would do exactly the same to bewilder and defeat his more powerful opponents.

GENERAL THOMAS J. 'STONEWALL' JACKSON AND HIS CAMPAIGNS

Jackson's tactical operations in the Valley Campaign are far less worthy studies in battle management, but masterpieces from operational and strategic perspectives. That said, Jackson's campaign in the Shenandoah Valley paid much greater dividends for the Confederacy than Robert E. Lee's 'greatest battle' a year later.¹⁵

In early 1862, the new Confederate States of America appeared to be on the brink of collapse.¹⁶ July 1861 heralded a confident beginning in which Confederate forces defeated Federal forces at the First Battle of Manassas. By early 1862 however, the Confederacy faced deepening threats in both Tennessee and Louisiana. Added to this was a massive army on the Virginia peninsula commanded by General George B. McClellan. McClellan was inching his way towards Richmond, the Confederate capital. Richmond was also a railway hub and major munitions-manufacturing centre, the loss of which would threaten the very existence of the fledgling nation. The forces under McClellan threatened to link up with the Union forces of Brigadier General Irvin McDowell, which were massing on the Rappahannock River opposite Fredricksburg, just 100 kilometres north of Richmond.

General Lee, then Commanding General of Confederate Armies, sought to relieve the pressure on the Confederate capital. The Confederacy could not prevail against the might of the Union forces moving towards Richmond. Lee therefore formulated a basic strategy to eliminate this threat.

In the spring of 1862, Lee wrote to General 'Stonewall' Jackson, who had assumed command of the Virginia Valley district in the previous November.¹⁷ Lee briefed him on the concentration of Union forces near Fredricksburg. In order to eliminate this threat and allow Confederate forces near Richmond to focus solely on McClellan, Lee proposed that Jackson's objective be the defeat of the Union forces in the Shenandoah Valley, which would draw additional Union troops into this theatre.¹⁸ This would both deprive McDowell of troops to support him in his crossing of the Rappahannock, and expose the Federal forces' flank.

Jackson was given two tasks. The first was to protect the Shenandoah Valley, a rich farming region used to feed the rebel army. The valley also constituted a natural, protected route to the Potomac River – an obvious

springboard for any invasion of the north. Jackson's second task was to prevent Union troops already in the valley from being detached and supporting the effort to march on Richmond. From these two (specified) tasks, Jackson derived another (implied) task: to prevent the marry-up of the Corps threatening Fredricksburg (and subsequently Richmond) from the north, and halt the advance of McClellan's Corps up the Virginia peninsula.¹⁹

VALLEY CAMPAIGN OF 1862

January 1862 saw Jackson's army marching on the town of Romney, an expedition almost defeated by bitter winter weather and poor coordination. Despite having lost the element of surprise, Jackson's men occupied Romney without firing a shot. The Union forces (which numbered about 7 000 men) had over-estimated the size of Jackson's force and had withdrawn north of the Potomac River.

Despite his success in forcing the Union forces from areas of the northern Shenandoah Valley earlier in the year, Jackson was driven out of the key city of Winchester in March 1862 by the Union army commanded by Major General Nathaniel Banks. Jackson's defeat was followed by a 65-kilometre forced-march retreat to the south.

Following this Union success, Banks departed the valley with the majority of his force to assist in the advance on Richmond. A detachment of just 9 000 men were left in the Valley under the command of Brigadier General James Shields. On learning of this, Jackson immediately commenced an advance back up the valley. His army strength at that time was just 3 000 men.²⁰

On 23 March 1862, Jackson attacked Union forces at the town of Kernstown, just south of Winchester. In bitter fighting, Jackson's force was defeated with the loss of almost a quarter of its strength.²¹ While this was a severe tactical setback for Jackson, it was the reaction of the Union forces after the battle that astounded him. Fearing for the safety of the Shenandoah Valley, Abraham Lincoln directed Banks' army to turn back to the valley immediately, and transferred another 7 000-man division into the theatre. Further, troops identified in the Washington DC area to join General McDowell's march on Richmond were ordered to remain in place to pre-empt any threat to the capital. While the Battle of Kernstown had been lost, the strategic consequences were propitious for Jackson and the Confederate cause. Almost 80 000 soldiers of the Union army were now immobilised because of the actions of Jackson's army of just over

3 000 men. As Tanner notes in his book, *Stonewall in the Valley*, 'though a tactical defeat, the battle of Kernstown was among the most productive battles the South ever waged'.²²

Following the battle at Kernstown, Jackson embarked on a series of countermarches which lasted the month of April and brought him back to the southern regions of the valley district. After successfully avoiding two Union armies attempting to isolate his forces in a pincer movement, Jackson marched his troops south and out of the Shenandoah Valley. Every engine and rail car that could be found had been assembled to evacuate the Valley army.

Upon embarking on the trains, the men were surprised to learn that they were headed back into the valley. In a masterful piece of subterfuge, Jackson turned in his tracks and deployed his forces back into the valley against the expectations of his opponents.²³ He successfully deceived the Union forces into believing that he had redeployed to assist in the defence of Richmond. His most dangerous opponent, General Banks, even claimed that 'Jackson is bound for Richmond. This is a fact, I have no doubt...'.²⁴

Returning to the valley, Jackson defeated the Union army marching from the west in a battle at McDowell on 8 May 1862. As a consequence, these Union forces under the command of General Fremont marched to the west and would play no further military role in the Shenandoah Valley for some considerable time. Jackson then turned his attention north, to Banks' Union army in the northern part of the valley.

Jackson used his cavalry with great skill to screen the movements of his infantry and to lead his opponent to believe in a direct assault by the Confederates on Union positions (now concentrated at Strasburg). The Valley army however, turned east, traversed the Massanutten Mountain and destroyed the Union garrison at Front Royal on 23 May 1862. This garrison was the Union rearguard, and sat astride the only rail link between Banks' army and Washington. Having deceived his opponent about his intentions and dislocated his forces by cutting off his rear links, Jackson achieved a major victory over the Union forces. Not only was the Union commander stunned and incapable of making rational decisions for 24 hours, the Union positions at Strasburg were now in great peril.

As Lee had foreseen, this action also resulted in Lincoln's order to General McDowall of 24 May 1862, in which he was instructed to forego his movement on Richmond and return with at least half of his force to the Shenandoah Valley. As Tanner wrote in *Stonewall in the Valley*:

'At that moment...May 24, the Valley Army won its Valley Campaign.'²⁵

After Front Royal, the Union army retreated north to Winchester, where on 25 May 1862, Jackson once again attacked and defeated the Federal forces. This resulted in the withdrawal of Union forces north across the Potomac River.

In less than three months, Jackson had marched over 400 miles, fought five major battles, winning four, defeated three Union armies and neutralised 100 000 Union troops, with a force that never exceeded 17 000.²⁶

MANOEUVRE THEORY – LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

*...throughout the ages, effective results in war have rarely been attained unless the approach has had such indirectness as to ensure the opponent's unreadiness to meet it. The indirectness has usually been physical, and always psychological. In strategy, the longest way round is often the shortest way home.*²⁷

Since the fundamentals of war were first enunciated by Sun Tzu some time between 400 BC and 320 BC, a vast body of military theorists have written about the principles of manoeuvre theory, or what Liddell Hart called the 'indirect' approach. Within the ebb and flow of this debate, there are four key points that remain salient: the psychology of the opponent; the mathematics of superiority; the decision to manoeuvre and/or fight; and the influence of terrain.

THE BATTLE FOR THE OPPONENT'S MIND

*Always mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy; if possible and when you strike and overcome him, never let up the pursuit so long as your men have strength to follow; for an army routed, if hotly pursued, becomes panic-stricken and can be destroyed by half their number.*²⁸

*Whatever the form, the effect to be sought is the dislocation of the opponent's mind and dispositions – such an effect is the true gauge of an indirect approach.*²⁹

The value of surprise over an opponent is well understood. Hannibal achieved surprise through careful study of his opponent's mind and calculated anticipation of his possible courses of action. Insight into the mind of his enemy gave Hannibal what he wanted most: his opponent's expectation of Hannibal's own course of action. Secure in this knowledge, he sought to do what his opponent least expected - with spectacular results. Hannibal placed great value on understanding the character of his opponents. He continuously sought information on his adversaries - who they were, their fighting qualities and their idiosyncrasies. His analysis of this information was one of his greatest strengths.

By marching through the Etrurian marshes, not only did Hannibal physically dislocate his Roman opponent, he profoundly affected his psychological state. Flaminius was furious at being bypassed by this 'barbarian', but he was also distressed by the effect of Hannibal's operations in the lands to the south. So great was this psychological dislocation that Flaminius refused to heed wise counsel to the contrary and set off in pursuit of his quarry. In doing so, he fell into the trap set for him by the Carthaginian.

During the 1862 Valley Campaign, Jackson consistently deceived his opponents as to the true nature of his movements and intentions. Very early in the campaign, in April 1862, his Union opponent, Major General Nathaniel Banks, wrote to the US War Secretary stating, 'I believe Jackson left the Valley yesterday'.³⁰ Three days later, Banks wrote that, 'Jackson has abandoned the valley of Virginia permanently...'.³¹ While Jackson's Valley Army had been pushed well south, Banks' assertions were based on assumption and not solid intelligence. Not only had Jackson not left the valley, he had absolutely no intention of doing so. In truth, Banks had no idea where he was or any inkling of Jackson's true intent.

Jackson took operational security to its extreme. He normally told no-one of his battle plans until the last moment. While this often confused and angered his subordinates, news of his intentions rarely leaked to his opponents. The last word on the success of Jackson's campaign must go to the then President of the United States, Abraham Lincoln:

I think Jackson's game—his assigned work—now is to magnify the accounts of his numbers and reports of his movements, and thus by constant alarms keep three or four times as many of our troops away from Richmond as his own force amounts to. Thus he helps his friends at Richmond three or four times as much as if he were there.³²

AT THE RIGHT PLACE AND TIME, DAVID WILL ALWAYS GIVE GOLIATH A FLOGGING!

...never fight against heavy odds, if by any possible manoeuvring you can hurl your own force on only a part, and that the weakest part, of your enemy and crush it. Such tactics will win every time and a small army can thus destroy a large one in detail and repeated victory will make it invincible.³³

During Hannibal's 15-year campaign in Italy, his army rarely numbered more than 60 000 men.³⁴ His original force continuously declined and he was forced to recruit locally to man his army. At the same time, the Romans, in coalition with their allies, were able to field over 750 000 men.³⁵ Despite this, using the ground to his advantage and carefully shaping the minds of his opponents, he was able to gain local superiority and defeat forces that were theoretically superior. Not without good reason did the cry 'Hannibal is at the gates!' still terrify disobedient children for generations after Hannibal's death.

Like Hannibal, Jackson used forces inferior in number to achieve spectacular results. His ability to outmanoeuvre his opponents allowed him to 'appear' at will with forces that were able to gain local superiority and win battles against, or at least dislocate, larger forces.

THE WORST MARCH IS PREFERABLE TO THE BEST BATTLE³⁶

...when the report spread in his army that the commander (Hannibal) was going to lead them through the marshes, every soldier felt alarmed...³⁷

In setting the scene for his confrontation with the Roman consular army, Hannibal marched his forces through incredibly hostile terrain to avoid battle at a time and place not of his choosing. In doing so, he not only surprised his opponent, but also set about shaping how he would eventually confront Flaminius.

Jackson kept his forces highly mobile. Not only did this allow him to manoeuvre his forces to achieve local superiority, but it kept his opponents constantly off-guard. Using back roads and lesser routes, he out-marched and out-manoeuved opposing Union forces throughout the campaign. Despite the immense strain on his men, he used this mobility to great effect in his destruction of the Union rearguard at Front Royal in May 1862. In a single stroke he dislocated the Union forces entrenched just to the west and rendered the Union commander incapable of rational decision making for more than a day. Jackson would 'rather lose one man in forced marching than five in fighting'.³⁸

TERRAIN CAN BE A BEST FRIEND AND A WORST ENEMY

*Configuration of terrain is an aid to the army.*³⁹

In the words of Sun Tzu, 'Know your enemy, know yourself, and your victory will not be threatened. Know the terrain, know the weather, and your victory will be complete'.⁴⁰ This ancient dictum is just as applicable now as it was two millennia ago. Hannibal would only fight on ground of his choosing. He was meticulous in his selection of ground that would conform precisely to his battle plan. He conducted detailed reconnaissance and analysis prior to deciding where he would fight. The Battle of Lake Trasimene illustrates vividly his use of terrain to maximise the effectiveness of his forces.

Like Hannibal, Jackson was well aware of the advantages of clever use of terrain. Indeed, Jackson 'used geography as a weapon of war just as potent as the rifles of his men'.⁴¹ Employing the topographic engineer Jedediah Hotchkiss as one of his most trusted confidants, Jackson used Hotchkiss' detailed reconnaissance and ground briefs to plan his battles. From his first interview with Jackson, when he was ordered to 'make me a map of the Valley from Harper's Ferry to Lexington, showing all the points of defence and offence between these points',⁴² Hotchkiss provided invaluable terrain analysis to Jackson.

CONCLUSION

Antoine Jomini defined manoeuvre theory as the requirement to '... use the mass of one's forces successively against parts of the enemy at their most vulnerable/strategic points, at the right time without compromising one's own'. Richard Simpkin further interpreted it as drawing 'its power from opportunism, the calculated risk, and the exploitation both of chance circumstances...still more on winning the battle of wills by surprise, or failing this, by speed and aptness of response'.⁴³

Such is the enduring nature of manoeuvre theory that it has survived the test of time and the quantum leap in military art that stands between the modern strategist and the brash Carthaginian who defied the might of the Roman Empire. Jackson and Hannibal were not endowed with the modern weapon systems, instantaneous communications and situational awareness of today's commanders. They almost always fought against numerically, and quite often technologically, superior forces.

Setpiece battles, fought using the conventional tactics of their time, would have destroyed their respective forces. Their application of what is now termed 'manoeuvre theory' was unorthodox, incredibly risky and caused fear and bewilderment in the ranks of their enemies and even their own soldiers. Yet it paid handsome dividends in a situation which, given almost any other course of action would have been deemed hopeless. As Jackson declared,

*Such tactics will win every time and a small army can thus destroy a large one in detail and repeated victory will make him invincible.*⁴⁴

ENDNOTES

1. Alexander, B., *How Great Generals Win*, W.W. Norton and Company, New York, 1993, p. 29.
2. LWC Operations Notebook, January 1999, Chapter 1, p. 1-1.
3. Liddell Hart, B.H., *Strategy: The Indirect Approach*, revised edition, Faber and Faber Limited, London, 1967, p. 25.
4. The defeat of the Roman armies, and slaughter of an estimated 50 000-70 000 Roman soldiers was a grave shock for Rome. Those killed on the Roman side included 80 senators, two state treasurers and 29 military tribunes. Bradford quotes the historian 'Livy' who wrote many years after the battle, 'No other nation could have suffered such a tremendous disaster and not been destroyed'. Bradford, E., *Hannibal*, Wordsworth Editions, Hertfordshire, 1981, p. 116.
5. Bradford, *op.cit.*, p. 211.
6. *ibid*, p. 29.
7. *ibid*, pp. 47-48.
8. *ibid*, p. 210.
9. Hannibal's eventual return to Carthage, prior to his defeat at the Battle of Zama, was by sea. Liddell Hart, *op.cit.*, p. 44.
10. Murray, W., (ed), *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States and War*, Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 77.
11. Liddell Hart, *op.cit.*, p. 46.
12. Bradford, *op.cit.*, p. 89.

13. A similar number were taken prisoner. Peddie, J., *Hannibal's War*, Sutton Publishing, Gloucestershire, 1997, p. 70.
14. Based on a map in Bradford, *op.cit.*, p. 107.
15. Goulding, V., 'From Chancellorsville to Kosovo: Forgetting the Art of War', *Parameters*, Summer 2000, p. 4.
16. Krick, R., *Conquering the Valley: Stonewall Jackson at Port Republic*, William Morrow and Company, New York, 1996, p. 2.
17. The Virginia Valley District was defined as the region between the Alleghenies Mountains to the west and Blue Ridge Mountains to the east, the Potomac River to the north and the city of Staunton to the south. Martin, M., *Jackson's Valley Campaign*, Combined Books, Conshohocken, 1994, p. 13.
18. Tanner, R., *Stonewall in the Valley : Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson's Shenandoah Valley Campaign Spring 1862*, Doubleday & Company Inc., New York, 1976, p. 156.
19. Alexander, *op.cit.*, p. 127.
20. Alexander, *op.cit.*, p. 129.
21. Alexander, *loc.cit.*
22. Tanner, *op.cit.*, p. 132.
23. *ibid.*, p. 163.
24. *ibid.*, p. 160.
25. Tanner, *op.cit.*, p. 239.
26. Martin, *op.cit.*, p. 194.
27. Liddell Hart, *op.cit.*, p. 25.
28. Jackson, T., quoted in Alexander, *op.cit.*, p. 133.
29. Liddell Hart, *op.cit.*, p. 164.
30. Tanner, *op.cit.*, p. 160.
31. Tanner, *loc.cit.*
32. President Abraham Lincoln in June 1862, quoted in Tanner, *op.cit.*, p. 327.
33. Jackson, T., quoted in Alexander, *op.cit.*, p. 133.
34. Peddie, *op.cit.*, p. 102.
35. This figure is based on Roman and Allied forces deployed in 218 BC. These forces were composed of 148 000 in the field (including four legions), a strategic reserve (located in Rome) of 53 000, reserves in Sicily and Tarentum of 8 800, 285 000 on the tribal lists as well as another 273 000 Romans and Campanians (including 23 000 cavalry), Peddie, *op.cit.*, p. 47.
36. This is a distillation of the concept of 'the hazards of difficult terrain are always preferable to the hazards of combat' stated by Jomini, Mahan and Liddell Hart and employed to great effect by Guderian during the blitzkrieg through Belgium and France in World War II. Simpkin, R., *Race to the Swift*, Brassey's Defence Publishers, London, 1985, p. 28.
37. The historian Polybius, discussing Hannibal's crossing of the Etrurian marshes, quoted in Liddell Hart, *op.cit.*, p. 45.
38. Jackson quoted in Lykke, A., (ed.), *Military Strategists: Past and Present*, US Army War College, Carlisle, 1984, p. 108.
39. Sun Tzu quoted in Sawyer, R., (trans.), *The Art of War*, Westview Press, Colorado, 1994.

40. Wee Chow Hou et.al., *Sun Tzu: War and Management*; Addison-Wesley, Singapore, 1991, p. 3.
41. Davis, C., *The American Civil War*, Salamander Books, London, 1996, p. 309.
42. Tanner, *op.cit.*, p. 113.
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BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL DAVID COGLAN

INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Cold War, an ever-widening rift has become apparent between those who believe that there has been a paradigm shift in the theory and conduct of international relations and those who do not. To those who believe such a shift has taken place, the post-Cold War environment has been characterised by rapid and in some areas, profound changes that challenge the traditional realist approach to the conduct of international relations. To others, claims of a paradigm shift are overstated and the realist approach remains the dominant paradigm. This same difference of opinion exists in the theory and practice of Australian defence policy. Those responsible for the policy and their supporters, downplay the possibility that such a paradigm shift has taken place, while those critical of the policy believe it has. The aim of this article is to explore and discuss these contrasting views as a means of assessing how well the architects of Australian defence policy have responded, and are likely to respond, to the security challenges and opportunities of the post-Cold War world.

A DIFFERENT WORLD

Those who believe that a paradigm shift has taken place, do so because of a growing belief that a traditional approach, in isolation, is inadequate for a rapidly changing world in which geoeconomics, rather than geopolitics, may become the dominant paradigm of international relations. Within this globalised world, increasing economic interdependence, the emergence of transnational corporations, international crime, mass population migrations, terrorism and environmental issues—most of which transcend national borders—are contributing to the decline in the relevance of the traditional, Westphalian-based state structure. Although opinions vary, there is increasing acceptance of the view that sovereign states are of decreasing relevance in an increasingly bifurcated world. There is little doubt that these factors are undermining established concepts of state sovereignty and autonomy. However, forecasts of the demise of the state ('the

absolutes of the Westphalian system...are all dissolving¹⁾ are premature. In the medium term the realist, state-centred approach will remain the model for international relations.

Coincident with the decline of state sovereignty is recognition, albeit not universally accepted, of the apparent decline in inter-state war, and from this, the notion that mature democracies, by their nature, will no longer fight one another. This 'warless society' thesis, advanced by Charles Moskos, suggests that 'war – at least between the superpowers and major European powers – is no longer the principal, much less inevitable, mode of conflict resolution'.² However, Moskos is not utopian – he accepts that war and conflict will continue but, rather than between advanced democracies, he and many others believe that war will be between the 'core' and the 'periphery' and within the periphery itself.³ These 'new', 'uncivil' or 'internal wars' will be principally based on the differences between those who are part of the globalised world and those who have been excluded from it.⁴ Within the periphery, these conflicts will usually be conducted in failed states and frequently based on ethnic nationalist grounds with little sense of political coherence.⁵ Although the role of humanitarian intervention in these types of conflicts is in hiatus,⁶ there appears to be conditional acceptance of the principle of international intervention, or peace enforcement, that seeks to restore order in a failed state or region.⁷

The decline in interstate war and the emergence of new types of conflict are changing the nature and conduct of war and the type of force structures required in the future. However, militaries have been slow to recognise this. The United States (US) is pursuing, at great expense, Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) solutions to primarily prepare itself for large-scale, high-intensity conventional operations in the quest for decisive victory. Ironically, the dominance that the US will achieve through this will be such that potential competitors, state-based or not, will be forced to adopt (and use) asymmetric strategies which have not been adequately addressed by the RMA. As such, the consequences of the RMA may outweigh the potential benefits.

The attitude of the US towards the RMA is symptomatic of an approach to security to which Australia subscribes, predicated on co-operative arrangements among the great powers. This approach fails to take into account that there is also a Revolution in Security Affairs in progress⁸ and that 'state-centred militarised definitions of security not only fail to recognise individual and community security, but also often fail to grasp the interdependence of security with others beyond the national boundary'.⁹ Barry Buzan observes that this state-based approach to

security is persistent but inherently inadequate in that it does not address the apparent decline in the sovereign state, the increasing bifurcation of the world and the resulting change in the nature of war and conflict. He advances that the concept of security can be encapsulated in five major areas: military, political, economic, societal and environmental and that a full understanding of the concept (and world affairs) can only be achieved through an understanding of the elements and how they relate to one another.¹⁰ This multidimensional approach lies at the heart of common security thinking and can help to identify what the referent object of security should be. As such, this broad concept provides the best tool with which to address the post-Cold War policy environment.

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE POLICY

Current Australian defence policy can be traced back to the *Australian Defence Policy* of 1972 that established its fundamental objective as the independence and security of Australia, rather than forward defence in Asia as a subordinate ally of the US.¹¹ The 1976 White Paper *Australian Defence* developed this theme further with its principal message being the need for increased defence self-reliance by exploiting Australia's geographical position.¹² Implementing the White Paper was not easy, as civilian and military planners could not reach agreement on an overall set of force structure priorities. In response to the deadlock, the Minister for Defence, Kim Beazley, appointed Paul Dibb to 'forge a consensus'¹³ within Defence. Dibb's *Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities* established a number of key themes including the principle that Australia should plan up to the level of regional military capabilities and embark upon an acquisition program to realise this objective.¹⁴ The 1987 White Paper, *Defence of Australia (DOA87)* was the government response to Dibb's review. It introduced a strategy of 'defence in depth'¹⁵ within an environment of 'self-reliance (that) must be firmly within the framework of our alliance and regional associations'.¹⁶

As the first White Paper in the post-Cold War era, *Defending Australia (DA94)* carried over most of the themes already established in Australian defence policy. It did however inject a harder edge treatment of the long-range strategic outlook for Australia on the basis that the constraints of the Cold War were 'being loosened' and that the stability of the region imposed by the Cold War: '...will be replaced by a more fluid and complex environment...(that) could produce an unstable and potentially dangerous strategic situation in Asia and the Pacific over the next fifteen years...at some time in the future armed force could be used against us and that we need to be prepared to meet it.'¹⁷ At the same time, *DA94* acknowledged Australia's growing interdependence with Asia

and sought active engagement in the region by flagging an increase in cooperation through bilateral and multilateral initiatives.¹⁸

The Coalition's defence policy was articulated in December 1997 with the release of *Australia's Strategic Policy (ASP97)* and was written to cover 'those elements of the Government's overall security policy which relate to the role of armed force in international affairs'.¹⁹ The Minister for Defence, Ian McLachlan, had already accepted that 'DA94 adequately described the shape of the early post-Cold War era'²⁰ and therefore ASP97 continued the strategic assessment established by DA94: 'Long-term trends are changing our strategic environment in ways which pose major new challenges to Australian governments...circumstances could arise in future which would reduce our security from armed attack, threaten our vital interests, or directly imperil our peace and safety'.²¹ The White Paper acknowledges the continuing importance of regional engagement, but emphasises that bilateral relationships remain 'at the heart of our regional security diplomacy' and are only complemented by multilateral initiatives.²²

The focus of regional engagement and strategic attention has been widened to include a greater Asia-Pacific area.²³ While the Defence of Australia (DOA) remains the central theme, there is a new emphasis on meeting an enemy well forward in 'proactive operations that offer the opportunity to seize the initiative...The arguments for Australia to have capabilities to support more proactive operations are likely to strengthen in future years'. This includes the commitment of forces to regional contingencies, particularly if this may avert a 'potentially hostile power gaining access to bases close to Australia'.²⁴

To ensure Australia maintains its technological and operational advantage in the region, ASP97 commits the ADF to exploiting the RMA to develop a knowledge edge²⁵ advantage over any potential adversary. The knowledge edge will achieve this by delivering superior intelligence and command support systems and a more effective surveillance capability.²⁶ However, by ensuring that the knowledge edge has the highest priority in the force development process, the White Paper further compounds the looming block obsolescence problem by placing new demands on an already overcommitted budget.

ASSUMPTIONS, CONTRADICTIONS AND PERSPECTIVES

While some adjustment was made to Australian defence policy in response to the end of the Cold War, the approach used to formulate these changes remains firmly underpinned by a number of Cold War era assumptions. Foremost of these is that policy makers have continued to view and respond to the world in liberal realist terms. They have followed a traditional, narrow interpretation of security that equates with military strength and, in doing so, downplay other sources of (in) security, which then allows the concentration on external 'threats' and regional hotspots. Policy makers have maintained a traditional, Clausewitzian approach to the nature of conflict and, because of this, the role of military force within Australia remains unchanged as does the general thrust of acquisition and force structure priorities. Yet these assumptions do not necessarily suit the post-Cold War environment. As a result, a number of contradictions, dilemmas and tensions have emerged within Australian defence policy.

The most obvious contradiction lies in the fact that, while Australian defence policy acknowledges that it faces no threat from the region, 'it continues to build a military force designed to deter and, if necessary, combat military attacks that could only originate from within the territory of neighbouring states'.²⁷

This policy not only provokes tensions within Asia,²⁸ but also has the potential to fuel a regional arms race²⁹ and, most importantly, has force structure implications that present another dilemma to defence policy makers. Australia cannot, given the current level of defence funding, afford a force structure designed to keep pace with regional capabilities. The block obsolescence problem looming towards the end of the next decade further exacerbates this.³⁰ Successive White Papers have warned that, without increased funding, Australia will be unable to maintain its technological superiority in the region or to fund the replacement of key capabilities.³¹ Yet the trend in defence funding over the last 30 years is clearly downwards, with the current level of funding, in GDP terms, at its lowest level since 1938/39.³² Defence planners have failed to adequately address this issue. Even if the DER/DRP process delivers the promised annual savings ranging from \$770 million to \$1 billion, such is the depth of the funding shortfall, that this amount will only provide bridging finance to address immediate capability deficiencies. About \$40 billion in new spending is required to address the issue – 'this money doesn't exist', says Desmond Ball. 'The crux is not just block obsolescence and not just

incoherent planning – it's the fact of the two of them coming together. I see no grounds for optimism that they are going to make the right decisions'.³³ The onset of the Asian financial crisis has had little impact on this dilemma. While it has delayed, perhaps by up to a decade, the growth of regional capabilities, there are no indications that defence planners will use this opportunity, as they also could have with the DER/DRP,³⁴ to fundamentally rethink force structure priorities. (Hugh White argues that the Asian financial crisis 'makes little difference to our strategic plan'³⁵).

A second major contradiction in Australian defence policy is the tension between the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and Defence over the most appropriate mechanisms to achieve regional security. The DFAT White Paper, *In the National Interest*, establishes the importance of multilateral strategies for advancing Australia's interests.³⁶ These strategies, based on co-operative security measures, seek to build habits of co-operation and dialogue throughout the region by placing greater emphasis on confidence and security building mechanisms rather than increasing military interoperability.³⁷ Yet, as previously indicated, ASP97 continues to emphasise that multilateral approaches to regional security merely 'complement' extant bilateral arrangements that 'remain at the heart of our regional security building diplomacy'.³⁸ Some commentators believe that Defence further undermines multilateral security measures by relegating such discussion to the informal 'track-two' level.³⁹ To Mohan Malik the difference in approach represents the transition from the old to the new: Defence remains in a Cold War, 'threat-oriented' stance (which may be anachronistic) while DFAT is pursuing 'order-oriented' arrangements more suited to the security challenges of the next century.⁴⁰ Regardless of motivation, the contradictions between DFAT and Defence in their regional engagement policies remain. At best the contradiction demonstrates a lack of coordination. At worst, the policies can be counter-productive and detract from the common goal of enhancing Australia's security.

How then, based on the policies and contradictions discussed, does one judge the performance of Australian defence policy in the 'different' world outlined at the beginning of this paper? It depends on perspective. Critics contend that defence planners have not adequately responded, if at all, to the challenges and opportunities of the post-Cold War era. This has occurred because they have continued, despite the changing nature of international relations, to see and interpret the world in purely realist terms. As a result, the two key defence planning documents issued since

the end of the Cold War, *DA94* and *ASP97*, pay no more than lip service to the changing nature of the world. They have largely ignored the impact of globalisation, the relative decline in the power of the state, and the effect that this is having on the future nature of war, where conflict is less likely between states and more likely to be between the core and the periphery or within the periphery itself. By ignoring this trend, Australian defence planners have been able to perpetuate their current acquisition priorities without having to pay attention to the structural implications imposed by a recognition of the changing nature of war. In turn, this allows a selective interpretation of the RMA and, despite a trend to the contrary, the maintenance of a culture of defence planning 'whereby the security of Australia and its region is equated with military defence'⁴¹ that eschews a 'common', multilateral approach to security.

'Dissident' critics contend that defence policy makers have 'continued to view the world through the simplistic and increasingly discredited lens of power politics realism'.⁴² The purpose is clear: to 'advance and legitimise, in the name of 'national security' quite specific frameworks and agendas which serve to protect and enhance the interests of their authors and supporters in the defence and security community'.⁴³ Regardless of motivation, clinging to a realist view while living in a postmodern world is a contradiction in itself and serves to further compound the dilemma faced by Australian defence planners. The biggest challenge to these policy makers (assuming they maintain their current approach), how to address the block obsolescence problem within the ADF, was not inevitable. If the reality of the changing world had been embraced, then the approaching crisis could have been averted, or at the least, ameliorated.

Those Australian defence policy makers who espouse the opposite view contend that their realist approach, regardless of the changing world (or in spite of it), remains prudent and practical. They reject the notion that globalisation is causing a reduction in the sovereignty of the state⁴⁴ and do not 'accept the kind of overly optimistic view of the future...that there has been a paradigm shift in international affairs which foresees that low level conflict and terrorism has replaced major war as the defence planning tool of the future'.⁴⁵ As such, Australian defence planning revolves around 'permanent interests'⁴⁶ and has adjusted to the post-Cold War environment by embracing regionalism.⁴⁷ Rather than embrace the concept of common security, defence planners emphasise the need for a more narrow discussion of the security dimension which is 'justified not just because historically it has been the dominant dimension, but also the government itself continues to emphasise national security in relatively narrow terms'.⁴⁸ This approach then allows 'the focus on a narrowly

defined concept of the defence of Australia as the (central) determinant of capability needs'.⁴⁹ The contradictions discussed earlier in defence policy are not necessarily accepted. Rather, this 'ambivalence in policy is a necessary tool to prudently maintain defence self-reliance as an ultimate military safeguard, whilst using defence engagement to attempt to build a regional security arrangement'.⁵⁰ The response to those who suggest that self-reliance and regional engagement are contradictory is that the 'reality is more complex but less contradictory, and more manageable, than these arguments suggest'.⁵¹ All in all, supporters agree that defence policy has made 'remarkable' progress⁵² over the past ten years and that *ASP97*, according to its author, is a 'bold policy solution' to Australia's defence needs.⁵³

These sentiments however, come as no surprise to the 'dissident' critics who are often ignored by established academic and policy makers as 'unrealistic' or overly 'theoretical'. But these charges are often based on the very assumptions about politics, security, identity and what counts as appropriate knowledge that the critics challenge.⁵⁴ They contend that this type of response is 'symptomatic of the trend towards 'professionalism' in Australian security studies, where academics increasingly market themselves to the official security community as presentable, uncontroversial, unpolitical and objective'.⁵⁵

EAST TIMOR

So how has the 'bold policy' of Australian defence planners prepared the ADF for its biggest deployment of troops in over a generation? Not particularly well. *ASP97* acknowledged that the ADF might have to deploy in support of Australia's regional interests and details how crisis warning is designed to give adequate notice to allow forces to be readied and, once deployed, sustained.⁵⁶ It worked to some extent. When operations in East Timor appeared likely, the government increased the readiness of the Army's 1st Brigade and chartered the fast catamaran *HMAS Jervis Bay*. However, as the scope of forces required became clearer, it became obvious that the Army would be seriously challenged to deploy and sustain the number of troops required. This was a result of the low priority accorded to the maintenance and development of land forces within Australian defence policy for at least a decade. *ASP97*, despite acknowledging the possibility of having to deploy forces into the region, made land forces its lowest priority for development in an already overcommitted budget. With the continual trade-off of personnel for technology, and the search for a DRP dividend to finance high priority

force structure initiatives, the Army was constrained to 23 000 full-time personnel of whom about 15 000 were to be in the combat force. This meant that the Army could only maintain (and sustain) one battalion group for short-notice operational deployments. With East Timor requiring the deployment of well over a brigade on peace enforcement operations, the 'hollowness' of the Army has become obvious.

The East Timor mission does not match the profile of the decisive, high-technology conflict favoured by Australian defence policy. The nature of the deployment matches the new style of conflict discussed earlier – a peace enforcement operation that seeks to restore order in a failed region – far better than the realist model underpinning *ASP97*. The operation is personnel intensive, with a land-based warfighting structure, of unknown duration, and is making little use of the high-end technological platforms that receive the highest priority in current defence policy. Further, the coalition building of the international force was firmly based on multilateral grounds in what Fred Brenchley has described as 'peacekeeping globalisation'.⁵⁷ But the operation cannot be sustained by the Army's force-in-being – which is virtually all committed. As a result, the Army must raise at least an infantry battalion group for operations in East Timor and will be dependent on filling these units, and other vacancies, with new recruits and part-time soldiers who wish to deploy.

So the 'bold policy' of *ASP97* has not met the reality of deployment particularly well. Although there is no doubt that defence restructures, especially in the operational and support areas, have positively contributed to the successful deployment into East Timor, *ASP97*'s realist approach has resulted in an ADF, and especially an Army, that is inadequately prepared for the scale, tempo and likely length of operations in East Timor.



16 Nov 1999; Suai, East Timor. INTERFET patrol of an area between Suai and Matai.

*Photo Courtesy of the Australian War Memorial
Negative Number P03184.263*

THE FUTURE

As this article goes to print, a new White Paper is due to hit the streets. The inevitable question for policy makers concerns the shape of the future. Initial indications show some promise. The then Chief of the Defence Force, Admiral Chris Barrie, noted that the debate on defence issues had been difficult to generate in the past because of the assumption that security was Defence business alone, when it was in fact the business of all Australians. As such, he hoped that the White Paper would 'step out into new territory'.⁵⁸ His submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Inquiry into the Suitability of the Army for Peacetime, Peacekeeping and War indicates that this 'new territory' may include a recognition of the changing nature of war in the post-Cold War environment:

There are many possible operations that could be undertaken (by land forces) in circumstances other than war that require military capabilities to undertake activities such as countering sophisticated international and domestic criminals possessing military-style capabilities. As well we must be ready to respond to asymmetric threats...in which conflict between nation states is not often a feature.⁵⁹

As the Army continues to recruit and train troops for service in East Timor, there appears to be recognition within government, the media and the wider community, that the Army is too small.⁶⁰ As a result, regardless of the fate of the so-called 'Howard Doctrine'⁶¹ at least two full-time brigades are likely to remain on the Army's order of battle. This should allow the maintenance of a mechanised 1st Brigade in Darwin for mid-intensity conventional coalition operations and the 3rd Brigade in Townsville as an airmobile, amphibious capable, rapid deployment force. The integrated 7th Brigade in Brisbane also has potential for development as a constabulary force structured and equipped, in the first instance, for peacekeeping and for 'operations other than war' roles that could include some capability to respond to asymmetric threats.

With East Timor delivering a 'wake-up call'⁶² over Australia's future military needs, the Prime Minister, with bipartisan support, has flagged the possibility that defence spending will 'significantly increase'.⁶³ The new White Paper will inform Australians of how this money is to be spent. As the writing team assembles, it has three broad options. First, as the CDF hinted, it could adopt a 'postmodern' approach and truly explore 'new territory' by using East Timor as the catalyst for a fundamental rethink of Australian defence policy. Such a rethink could be aimed at considering the changing nature of the post-Cold War environment, and, in doing so, seriously address the looming block obsolescence problem. The second option could involve a 'middle approach' that adjusts current policy to take into account an increased role and heightened priority for land forces and the naval and air assets to support them, and to seek a rise in the defence budget to pay for this. The third is a 'realist' option that argues that East Timor validates current defence policy. This would indicate that Cold War constraints have indeed been 'loosened' and that, as predicted, Australia faces a less stable and potentially more dangerous situation than it did in the past. Given this situation, while the requirement for more land forces should be acknowledged, acquisition priorities should remain as they are, and

increased defence spending should be used to solve the funding shortfall created, ironically enough, by the current policy.

CONCLUSION

The world has changed markedly since the end of the Cold War. Through the processes of globalisation and interdependence, the sovereignty and autonomy of the state have been eroded in an increasingly bifurcated world. In parallel, the decline in inter-state and therefore conventional war, and the emergence of 'new' wars have already changed the nature of conflict. Similarly, the concept of security has broadened to embody a multi-dimensional approach that lies at the heart of common security thinking. These changes should have provided the opportunity for a fundamental reassessment of Australian defence policy to ensure its relevance in the face of the challenges of the postmodern world. Yet the opportunity has not been taken, and because of this, a number of contradictions and tensions have emerged within Australian defence policy. These contradictions expose the fundamental disjoint created by attempting, in a changing world, to implement a defence policy firmly underpinned by Cold War assumptions that have lost, or are losing, their relevance.

The deployment of the ADF to East Timor, to a 'new' style of conflict, illustrates the folly of pursuing a defence policy locked into a one-dimensional, realist approach. As the new White Paper is prepared, Australian defence planners must accept that a changing world requires a new conceptual approach to the challenges of Australia's security planning and that a realist approach in isolation, as demonstrated by current defence policy, is inadequate. Such an approach will not be easy for those with ownership of the current policy. If they do not accept that a fundamental reassessment is required, and attempt to continue to push the reality of a changing world into an increasingly isolated traditional framework, the disjoints within Australia defence policy will be further, and perhaps irretrievably, compounded and Australia may be unable to respond adequately to the security challenges that lie ahead of it.

ENDNOTES

1. J. Mathews quoted in Walt, S., 'Waiting for Mr X', *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1998, p. 12. (Searchbank Electronic version).
2. C. Moskos quoted in Dandeker, C., 'A Farewell to Arms? The Military and the Nation-State in a Changing World', in Burk, J., (ed.), *The Military in New Times: Adapting Armed Forces to a Turbulent World*, Westfield Press, Boulder, 1994, p. 119.

3. Generally speaking, the 'first tier', 'zone of peace' or 'core' comprises the globally dominant group of democratic countries. The 'second tier', 'zone of turmoil' or 'periphery' comprises the remainder of the world and can be further subdivided into 'sub-tiers' to reflect the differences within this group. Cheeseman, G., 'Alternative Futures', in Clarke, S., (ed.), *Testing the Limits: The Proceedings of a Conference held by the Royal Australian Air Force in Canberra, March 1998*, Air Power Studies Centre, Canberra, 1998, p. 59.
4. Kaldor, M., *New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era*, Polity Press, Oxford, 1999, pp. 69-70.
5. Snow, D., *Uncivil Wars: International Security and the New Internal Conflicts*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder Co, 1996, pp. 98-9.
6. Primarily as a result of the United States experience in Somalia and the failure of the United Nations to raise a humanitarian force for Zaire in 1995. Houston, W., *Developing Army Doctrine in the Post-Cold War Era*, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Working Paper 302, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 1996, p. 7.
7. Acceptability of such enforcement is usually predicated on a clear mandate, endstate and withdrawal time being agreed upon. Connaughton, R.M., *Peacekeeping and Military Intervention*, Occasional Paper No. 3, Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, Camberley, 1992, pp. 17-8.
8. Rattray, G., and Rothenberg, L., 'A Framework for Discussing War in the Information Age', in Pfaltzgraff, R., and Schultz, R., (eds.), *War in the Information Age: New Challenges for US Security Policy*, Brassey's, Washington DC, 1997, pp. 331-2. Bracken, P., 'Future Directions for the Army', in Bracken, P., and Alcalá, R., *Whither the RMA: Two Perspectives on Tomorrow's Army*, US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle PA, 1995, p. 13.
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10. Buzan, B., *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, Second Edition, Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York, 1991, pp. 4-7 and 19-20.
11. Dibb, P., 'Australia's Defence Policies in the Post-Cold War Era', in Cotton and, J., Ravenhill, J., (eds.), *Seeking Asian Engagement: Australia in World Affairs 1991-95*, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1997, p. 62.
12. In order to exploit Australia's geography the paper saw the need for 'comprehensive intelligence and surveillance, maritime patrol and strike operations, air defence, mobile ground forces, the protection of shipping and a capability for sustained operations.' S. Woodman, 'Strategies and Concepts', in Malik, M., (ed.), *Australia's Security in the 21st Century*, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1999, pp. 34-5.
13. Woodman, S., *Australian Security Planning at the Crossroads: The Challenge of the Nineties*, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Working Paper 271, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 1993, p. 5.
14. Department of Defence, *Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities*, Australian Government Printing Service, Canberra, March 1986, Parts 1 and 2.
15. Department of Defence, *The Defence of Australia 1987 (DOA87)*, Australian Government Printing Service, Canberra, March 1987, pp. 31-2.
16. Beazley, K., Preface to *DOA87*, *ibid.*, p. vii.
17. Department of Defence, *DA94*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, November 1994, pp. 7-8 and p. 4.

18. *ibid.*, p. 16. To Paul Dibb, *DA94's* approach of analysing the 'strategic environment free from the ideological constraints of the Cold War...marks the maturing of Australia's Defence Policy.' Dibb, *op. cit.*, p. 70.
19. Department of Defence, ASP97, Defence Publishing, Canberra, December 1997, p. 3.
20. McLachlan, I., 'Australian Defence Policy after the Year 2000', in Hookey, H., and Roy, D., (eds.), *Australian Defence Planning: Five Views from Policy Makers*, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 1997, p. 2.
21. ASP97, *op. cit.*, p. 4.
22. *ibid.*, p. 25.
23. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s Australia defined its region of primary strategic interest as South-East Asia and the South Pacific. ASP97 widens this area to include 'the countries of East Asia, South-East Asia, the South Pacific, the United States, and, perhaps increasingly in the future, South Asia.' *ibid.*, p. 9.
24. *ibid.*, p. 46 and p. 32.
25. *ibid.*, p. 56.
26. Thomas, T., 'Attaining the Knowledge Edge', *Australian Defence Business Review*, 14 February 1999, p. 16.
27. Snyder, C., 'Australia's Regional Security Planning', in Malik, M., (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 94.
28. Snyder, C., 'Australia's Pursuit of Regional Security into the 21st Century', *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 21, no. 4, December 1998, pp. 7-9.
29. 'While the fundamental purpose of our defence posture should be to protect...Australia from external aggression or by attacks from armed individuals and groups, we need to recognise that other states and communities have the same rights and expectations.' Cheeseman, G., 'An Effective and Affordable Defence for Australia', in Smith, G., and Kettle, S., *op. cit.*, p. 293. With this sentiment in mind, given the different political (and economic) conditions within our region, the possession by Australia of overtly offensive weapons system could contribute to a regional arms race.
30. A number of key ADF capabilities will be nearing the end of their serviceable life by around 2010. These include the FA18, F111, C130H and the guided missile frigates.
31. *DOA87, op. cit.*, pp. 105-9. *DA94, op. cit.*, pp. 146-50. *ASP97, op. cit.*, pp. 50-51.
32. Woolner, D., *op. cit.*, p. 152. White, H., 'Australia's Strategic Outlook', *Journal of the Society of Military Engineering*, vol. 2, no. 1, February 1998, p. 11.
33. Quoted in Lyons, J., 'Operation Backflip', *The Bulletin*, 3 August 1999, p. 25.
34. The DER/DRP was used to source money to fund an already overstretched program rather than as an opportunity to reassess the budget itself – '(we) did not need a strategic review to tell us that the budget was being spent inefficiently...(or) to tell us that we must invest more in capability simply to equip our forces with the latest technology.' McLachlan, I., quoted in Cheeseman, G., *A Tale of Three Documents: The Coalition's 'Blueprint' for Facing an Uncertain Future*, Australian Defence Study Centre, Canberra, 1999, p. 5.
35. White, H., 'The Strategic Review - What's New?', *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute of Australia*, December 1998, p. 61.
36. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *In the National Interest: Australia's Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, August 1997, pp. 47-8.
37. Snyder, *op. cit.*, p. 13.
38. *ASP97, op. cit.*, p. 25.

39. Cheeseman, G., 'Back to 'Forward Defence' and the Australian National Style', in Cheeseman, G. and Bruce, R., (eds.), *Discourses of Danger & Dread Frontiers: Australian Defence and Security Thinking After the Cold War*, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1996, p. 252.
40. Malik, M., 'Securing Australia: from Alliances to Agreements', in Malik, M., (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 68-92.
41. Dalby, S., and Sullivan, D., 'Alternative Security Strategies: Dissident Arguments and Australian Geopolitics', in Malik, *ibid.*, p. 232.
42. Cheeseman, 'A Tale of Three Documents', *op. cit.*, p. 16.
43. Cheeseman, G., 'Back to 'Forward Defence' and the Australian National Style', *op. cit.*, p. 271.
44. Houston, *op. cit.*, p. 4.
45. Dibb, P., 'The Relevance of the Knowledge Edge', *Australian Defence Force Journal*, no. 134, January 1999, p. 42.
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
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BIOGRAPHY

Upon graduation from the Royal Military College, Duntroon, in 1984, Lieutenant Colonel David Coghlan was allocated to the Royal Regiment of Australian Artillery and posted to 16 Air Defence Regiment. After a series of regimental appointments, he was posted as Staff Officer Grade Three, Operations, at Headquarters 3rd Brigade and then to the United States as a ground-based air defence instructor. Upon his return to Australia, he was posted as Operations Officer at 16 Air Defence Regiment. Following his attendance at Army Command and Staff College, he was posted to Deployable Joint Force Headquarters as the Staff Officer Grade Two, Joint Operations 1. From there he was posted to Army Headquarters in Canberra, where he is currently the Staff Officer Grade One, Organisational Structure. Lieutenant Colonel Coghlan has recently completed a Master of Defence Studies at the University of New South Wales where he was awarded the Pedro Fedorzenko prize as the most outstanding graduate of his year in Defence Studies. His article, 'Australian Defence Policy in the Post-Cold War World' was awarded second prize in the Chief of Army's Essay competition for 1999.



BY JIM TRUSCOTT¹

The political reality is that conflicts will usually be a matter of choice, multinational operations the norm, and domestic factors will increasingly influence national commitment. These all serve to complicate the Commander's task. Carefully structured preparations become more difficult, short notice contingency planning more likely, and sometimes there may be no opportunity to produce a campaign plan. This underlines the need to keep a close watch on developing crises, and for rapid reaction forces it is even more important to avoid collateral damage and unnecessary casualties. This will probably govern the way the operation is conducted, and will certainly dictate which targets are attacked. Politics will drive the speed at which the Commander can react, and may determine his priorities even down to the tactical level. The scope for manoeuvre will be limited and it will be very difficult to get inside the decision cycle of some opponents.²

Australian SAS has been through a metamorphosis over the last five years. This change has resulted from the upgrading of counter-terrorist capabilities, unprecedented employment on global peace operations and human resource initiatives. Equally, much research has been invested in the preparation of the probable next SAS, and SAS-after-next. It seems appropriate at this stage to review what has been learnt from this reform, from study, and from field experience. While SAS still expects to be committed in the future to traditional rural patrolling tasks along regional boundaries, these are, after all, tactical operations. The SAS *raison d'être* remains one of strategic and operational employment against high value targets in the electronic jungle. With few exceptions, these targets are located in the urban and ether domains. This article specifically seeks to inform industry, Defence research institutions and military organisations of SAS requirements for warfighting in these

domains. Naturally, the views represented are those of the author, and the opinions expressed do not constitute either Defence policy or doctrine.

This article draws upon the lessons of modernisation programs and operational practices. In some cases, leading edge weapon and communications technologies have been fielded in operational areas at some risk to missions. These lessons are particularly valuable. The ensuing discussion identifies a range of technologies across critical battlespace operating systems which could be exploited to enhance intelligence gathering and small-scale offensive operations. Most technologies are described without definitive priority or an indication of their relative importance, but they offer a unique opportunity for the harnessing of innovative Private Financial Initiatives.

There is no doubt that decreasing tolerance for operational outcomes other than success will require the probable next SAS to be faster, quicker, lighter and smaller. Increased micro-management is anticipated in short wars, although it is expected that operators will still be required to make operational decisions that have strategic effect. Inter-departmental security activities are also expected to increase, although the primary SAS function will remain with Defence, whose SAS operators will perform a broad spectrum of tasks in a highly urbanised region. The contingency requirement to train for war and then prepare for peace missions is the expected sequence, not the reverse.

Establishing information superiority in the urban and ether domains is now the key mission determinant. This requirement applies particularly in the period just prior to a military lodgement, when SAS must collect, process and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information. The reason for this profile is that experience shows that Defence dependence on distributed electro-optic and electro-magnetic intelligence is myopic. Defence cannot rely on sensor technologies to provide real-time continuous situational awareness of an adversary. However, because of the absence of highly intrusive mobility, inadequate strategic reach remains the key SAS weakness in achieving this task at present. A related weakness is ineffective coordination of SAS as strategic troops with national information operations. Information operations equate to deep manoeuvre, and this is the domain of spatial SAS.

SAS places so much operational focus on winning ongoing employment, that there are now officers dedicated to the marketing and business management functions. Experience demonstrates that advertising ensures that SAS is used for more than just deterrence, and that the costed

SAS option absolutely dominates any market competition. SAS.com is ready to be floated with the advent of accrual accounting and Service Level Agreements. These practices are the only way to enshrine the inter-departmental integration and joint service cooperation required for special operations to be conducted in space and throughout built-up areas. For example, SAS must have the ability to offer direct contract employment to selected specialist personnel. Like any organisation that seeks to dominate its market share, SAS knows that salesmen ('liaison officers' in military parlance) are crucial to winning the contract. The SAS-after-next will see such SAS salesmen permanently located throughout the region within governments and in all key private sectors.

Research shows that, in many ways, asymmetric war is self-inflicted – imposed upon the ADF because of its conventional thinking. The challenge for SAS is to enable conventional Australian forces to regain the symmetric advantage through the application of unconventional concepts. Imaginative and effective handling of SAS is especially required if SAS troops are not committed until the last possible moment. Accordingly, a range of technologies has been identified in order to prepare the probable next SAS. These solutions focus on enhancing clandestine close-access technical intelligence gathering to aid recon-pull,³ the ADF, and the conduct of command-pushed highly intrusive offensive operations including discrete recovery. It should be noted that 'small-scale' in SAS parlance implies operating without external fire support, and not necessarily small in size. By the very nature of the urban and ether domains, full and half-urban camouflage of all solutions is absolutely critical for all technologies. Hence SAS requirements are now commonly characterised by qualifiers such as reachback, covert containers, low signature, discrete, less discrete, deep clandestine, and soft sabotage.⁴

FIREPOWER

Firepower may be a critical battlespace operating system, but it is too conventional a concept for SAS in the urban and ether environments. Cold or silent killing is far more consistent with the clandestine mission profile. Politically acceptable short wars typified by high technology and low risk are likely to have these same critical demands imposed upon conventional firepower solutions. This restraint particularly applies in the non-linear enclaves that have replaced the matrix of rear, close and deep battlespace. To operate in this domain, SAS has developed graduated force tactics, so that it can be employed in different enclaves with different conditions, and in areas where there are rules of

engagement about collateral damage. Graduated force is a major new SAS selling point. Cold killing does not preclude kinetic energy weapons, but SAS can no longer risk the carriage of non-ceramic destructive weapons. The only option at present is to conduct an urban task without weapons. Radio frequency immobilisation of a target is now the desired urban technology, be it the propulsion of large ships or any other high value target, including virtual strikes against information infrastructure.

It remains to be seen if there is a residual role for SAS in target designation for precision strike. This role may occur solely to satisfy the law of armed conflict with respect to confirming the target under rules of engagement constraints, or where 'once over the target only' weapons will not guarantee success when operated alone. To achieve this requirement, SAS requires the ability to upload digital imagery to inbound strike platforms in order to streamline man-in-loop targeting for long-range precision strike, and for post-strike damage assessment. In many respects, SAS simply regards target designation or terminal guidance offset equipment as throwaway ammunition to enable operators to survive in built-up areas. Nonetheless, a training laser attenuator would present a valuable means to practise this close-access target illumination in urban areas. Certainly SAS will still be required for sabotage when urban strikes, particularly virtual strikes, risk unforeseen collateral damage. To achieve such precision sabotage, the lightweight attack munition technology, which is derived from the construction industry and which SAS currently uses, will very much remain a benchmark for urban success. On a directly related issue, when the region crosses the tactical nuclear threshold by about 2010, there will be a need for concrete counter-force breaching charges should SAS be tasked with the capture and neutralisation of weapons of mass destruction.

SOLDIER MODERNISATION

Soldier modernisation is a critical survivability issue, vital to equip SAS to achieve close access in the urban and ether domains. It is necessary to improve the current capability which is based on hand-held sensors, high frequency radio communications, and regional languages other than English.

The language of war is ordnance; the language of peace is persuasion. It is a lot easier to shoot than talk, but language is the sine qua non of peacetime SOf⁵. In the absence of war, language is often what distinguishes us from other troops with whom we share many of our tactics, techniques and procedures. Regional orientation and cultural awareness cannot be mastered until target language has been mastered - and then practiced.⁶

For non-linguists, the singular critical technology in order to maintain operator survivability at the point of collection is the ability to automatically covertly translate oral languages, either directly or in conjunction with laser listening devices. This requirement is more important than any other signature reduction activities in support of the close-access *modus operandi*.

Regardless of the technology on the man, SAS has learned that cognitive testing of people and the use of mental agility doctrine to create a problem-solving and learning-organisation attitude, are the crucial issues for soldier modernisation. Hence SAS is interested in the current psychometric tests of mental agility used in industry and commercial tests of capability mapping through virtual reality and their applicability in assisting current selection and training regimes for urban environments. There is no doubt that relaxation in high-threat environments is equally vital to maintaining tempo for early effect and precursor operations by SAS. Technology used by Spetznaz to simulate sleep may well be worth employing operationally in comparison to drug equivalents.

MOBILITY AND COUNTER MOBILITY

Lack of stealth projection is a major limitation on SAS utility as strategic troops: specifically the lack of a capability for long-range covert insertion and extraction of teams. In terms of defence capability outputs, there is a strong argument for SAS to become a strategic partner with Air Force, as this is the only Service focussed on deep penetration. SAS has learnt that inter-archipelagic force projection cannot rely on third country operations, and the requirement for a long-range, multi-point to multi-point, threat-penetrating capability must be locked into a Service Level Agreement. Notwithstanding the need for continued development of clandestine long-range multi-point to multi-point platforms, ideally special operations-capable Chinook helicopters with electronic warfare threat-penetrating capabilities, SAS force projection solutions would benefit from research into all other platforms which satisfy as much of the

profile as possible. This includes commercial air applications, which are the only platforms with workable full-urban camouflage. The need to operate in and from a sea-land environment is equally crucial for SAS. Such platforms must be able to transport a small group of personnel quickly and in various conditions. Craft need to have excellent manoeuvring and handling characteristics, and they need to be capable of fast transits in extremes of weather and sea conditions. This capability must be combined with low noise and infrared signature in order to reduce the probability of detection.

In many ways, SAS simply needs to regain the capabilities that the Australian Service Reconnaissance Department possessed at the end of the Second World War to support clandestine force projection into and through the South-west Pacific Theatre. A suite of dedicated amphibious aircraft, country craft and submarines with float-on/float-off capabilities supported their mission profiles. Then, as now, a single platform did not suit all missions. In modern SAS doctrine these platforms are generically referred to as long-range insertion craft. The WWII Krait style snake boat remains the only viable and deep clandestine option at present, although regional benchmarking is required to test the ongoing veracity of such country craft. Future solutions to insert into the urban domain may include a combination of commercial wing-in-ground effect craft, floatplanes, high-speed vessels, and swimmer delivery vessels. Suitability in the majority of cases will be dictated by a capability to refuel at sea.

Signature management research would prove beneficial in improving multi-spectrum threat warning, which is portable in any long-range insertion craft. This could be used to distort an adversary's current radar picture without cueing a trained operator onto the radar hole, or to understand the effect of sea state in masking small craft. Radar deception through the ability to generate electronic black holes to mask aircraft movement would be particularly useful in achieving covert insertion. Platform research into small helicopter or surface stealth craft technology, which would provide options other than the overt use of high signature ADF platforms, would also be valuable. Research into fast craft that can minimise the approach profile between the electronic horizon and the beach-landing site would be equally worthwhile. Complementary research to enable radar to determine accurate wind strengths and wave heights would support the insertion of SAS from over and under the electronic horizon. Similarly the concept of a wind-sniffer operating from an aircraft would be worth investigating for its utility in providing confidence for parachute load following into the sea at P hour, particularly if aircraft racetracks are too risky. On land, SAS has no interest in light strike vehicles, as these do not provide concealable mobility in the urban and ether domains. SAS favours commercial low

signature mobility vehicles, particularly motor cycles, which are the only mobility assets compatible with Chinooks. At best, a disposable commercial high mobility vehicle may be considered. These vehicles should be seen as merely ancillaries to the insertion aircraft and procured as such through a singular Defence acquisition program.

SUSTAINABILITY

The extant logistic requirement for SAS on operations in the urban and ether domains is self-sustainment for extended periods. There is no magic solution to this requirement, with age-old area orientation and language remaining the operating benchmarks for self-resupply. However SAS has identified the need for quick action procurement to achieve 'now tech' or 'then tech', as opposed to just 'high-tech' equipment. This procurement is based on the rapid development and evaluation of prototypes to mate emerging advanced technologies with SAS-peculiar mission requirements. It also provides for SAS-specific advanced technology demonstrations. It addresses projects which are a result of unique joint, special mission or area-specific needs for which few-of-a-kind prototypes must be developed on a rapid response basis, or must be of sufficient time sensitivity to accelerate the prototyping effort of a normal acquisition program. SAS needs only one or two concept technology demonstrators, but these must be proven in design.

To this end, SAS.com requires a direct alliance with industry, as the current contractor is too slow. Commercial ruggedisation (involving the use of a commercial container with a small amount of hardening not necessarily to the full military specifications) is the issue rather than military specifications, as the latter is not necessary, and risks the loss of full urban camouflage. SAS welcomes Private Financial Initiatives that will facilitate such projects as the air delivery of fuel at sea. Implicit in quick action procurement is the need for SAS to hand off technological successes and lessons learnt from failures, to the ADF. SAS is acquiring a de-development culture to hand off skills that are no longer special. This is particularly important as SAS continues to acquire additional skills.

C⁴ISR

SAS has made considerable advances in C⁴ISR, but it is the one battlespace operating system in which substantial technological advancements are still required. These are necessary to equip SAS with the ability to watch and listen simultaneously. It is imperative to optimise live situational awareness from target (live feed from target to home base) in the urban and ether, without having to resort to human surrogates such as coastwatchers and air observers, or non-technical close access reconnaissance. The key challenge for enhancement is the exploitation of

tactical photographic, acoustic, signals and business intelligence to cue other strategic intelligence collection. The integration of business intelligence with what has traditionally been considered strategic intelligence has emerged, as national sovereignty has waned as a defence concept in a global economy. This merged collection requires a whole of government approach. In this new kind of combat, SAS operators are generally older than their predecessors. The task implies small numbers of extremely well educated soldiers, fluent in media as well as languages, and capable of four-dimensional (urban, sea-air, and ether) effects. Languages continue to be essential for any early-entry SAS, precursor SAS, and support and influence SAS employed in a close-access role, and the emphasis on language has been operationally validated.

C⁴ISR technological enhancements include the need for rapidly deployable lightweight array technology with remote data acquisition systems, which SAS can position in harbours or littoral choke points. Enhancements such as the automatic detection and localisation of jet aircraft through unattended ground sensors which form part of the larger multi-function unattended battlefield acoustic surveillance system, are essential to allow early warning out to 20 kilometres from airfields. Continued research into other unattended collection devices to complement extant information capture and transmission systems would be extremely beneficial. Research into spectral targets would be useful to provide the ability to cue satellite collection, and for non-electronic communications. Tactical unmanned aerial vehicles with the ability to carry a variety of target acquisition sensors may provide valuable close-access urban photography. Suffice to say, SAS remains interested in 'walk on,⁷ plug in' ground threat warning for commercial platforms, smaller signals intelligence manpack systems perhaps employing optic fibre and leave-behind jammers, close access tempest collection and tactical network mapping software.

The SAS experience dictates that the best possible edge is generated by command at the highest level and situational awareness based on nationally distributed information. However SAS has learnt not to rely on command support systems. A network-centric approach to situational awareness is not reliable, and in many cases the trend towards three-dimensional displays is a waste of resources until command support system databases are populated with information from denied areas, and with tools to both fuse and separate media. This population may never occur. Simplistically, Lotus Notes and Lonely Planet are all that is required, rather than systems which offer little more than senior officer fascination devices. Commanders and staff must be able to turn software and hardware off, and rely on wetware alone ('wetware' is the SAS term for mental agility). However reachback is a critical requirement for fielding national information systems in forward operating bases. These systems rely on split-based processing with narrow bandwidth for

information pull, and large bandwidth for information push. There is no doubt that SAS will be truly optimised as a high tempo organisation in the near future when information technology-educated reinforcements form the majority within SAS in about 2005. Information will always remain the primary SAS product. The greatest threat to the SAS capability to produce information of value will be the ability of an adversary to prevent its speedy delivery from the point of collection to clients in Australia.

Personnel recovery is a new feature of politically acceptable conflict where the survivor is the mission commander. In this area, research into cheap beacon technology or global positioning systems and electronic tracking is essential to achieving personnel recovery, particularly of those high-risk SAS operators who are evading and seeking recovery in the sea-air gaps. Equally, low probability of intercept and low probability of detection is the minimum acceptable standard for communication and information systems in the urban and ether domains. Hence SAS is interested in similar electronic tracking technology to allow one-way secure communications with operators in very high threat environments. Suffice to say, the acquisition of digital topographic data in denied areas is crucial to this technology.

SIMULATION, MODELLING AND TRAINING

Basic selection and training equips the SAS operator well for missions, enabling incredible tempo to be generated as a consequence. Ill-considered reorganisation is one of the greatest threats to SAS. To that end, the concept of a small, highly specialised team of mature soldiers has remained relevant, and it will continue to be so in the foreseeable future. The SAS experience is that multi-skilling is the key to this force packaging and task organisation, although it does have its restrictions. SAS is pushing its limits and is dangerously close to shedding some skills or even forming another SAS. To achieve multi-skilling, SAS has learnt that simulation is no substitute for practising the full mission profile. Consequently, SAS focuses on traditional face-to-face teaching with very little distributed learning. This training has a three-tiered approach based on realism to provide variety and flexibility, accurate shooting allowing for full bore ammunition,⁸ and high volume activity. The SAS experience is that tempo also flows from a non-standard approach to training, in which management packages are best seen as a record of current solutions only, and not an objective resource tool. However, SAS believes that there is some merit in modelling, and continues to experiment with a battle laboratory to prove the value of investing capital in SAS.com. Soft systems modelling is cheap and effective, and it may pave the way for

subsequent virtual reality mapping of close-access urban and ether full mission profiles.

CONCLUSION


Operations are conducted by SAS in exactly the same manner as large commercial enterprises. Warfighting in complex terrain requires SAS to be more competitive, more astute, more competent and more productive than the opponent. Utilisation of high payoff technologies; selective application of digitisation; exploitation of innovative ideas, growth paths, and systems integration; and innovations in doctrine and organisational concepts can potentially provide low-cost, high return capability enhancement and will be pursued vigorously. The challenge then is for industry to prepare innovative Private Financial Initiatives to modernise SAS.

ENDNOTES

1. Quote used in Article Title from Adams J., *The Next World War*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1998.
2. Garnett, Vice Admiral Sir Ian, KCB, 'The Heart of the United Kingdom Defence Capability' in *Defence and International Security*, RUSI Journal, April 2000, p. 11.
3. This involves reconnaissance forces finding gaps for manoeuvre forces to exploit. The opposite is recon-push.
4. Kills in the ether, for example, jamming.
5. SOF (Special Operations Forces) is the United States term for what the Australian Army refers to as Special Forces.
6. Captain Paul Shemella, U.S. Navy (Retd), 'Academic Preparation: Sharpening the Tip of the MOOTW Spear', in *Special Warfare*, Fall, 1998.
7. Walk on mainly refers to aircraft fits.
8. At odds with the ADF's use of simulation to train up to and including live firing.

BIOGRAPHY

Jim Truscott is an ex-SAS major who has recently moved to the boardroom to become what he styles a 'corporate commando in the second battlefield'. His was a 26-year career that reads like an excerpt from a 'Boys Own' annual. He participated in dozens of international expeditions, including the Bicentennial Everest Expedition in 1988 and, more recently, to Borneo to trace the legendary exploits of the Special Reconnaissance Department of World War II fame. His was an errant career in an unconventional setting, serving with a variety of headquarters, special operations and regional force units, Commonwealth and international forces where he continually pushed the boundaries. He was awarded the Order of Australia for services to mountaineering in 1988. He is now a Crisis Management Practitioner with a consulting firm in Australasia in what he describes as the 'cold, brutal civilian world' – the perfect forum for some 'cold killing' and 'soft sabotage'.



**BASED ON AN ARTICLE BY THE LATE
COLONEL EUSTACE G. KEOGH, MBE, ED (RETD)**

In early 1948, a chance meeting occurred at the old Naval and Military Club in Melbourne that bore all the hallmarks of 'Yes Minister' style backroom plotting. Less sinister in its intent, the meeting was to pave the way for the birth of the original *Army Journal*, which was to enjoy an almost 30-year, albeit somewhat chequered, history. The meeting resulted in the appointment of Colonel E. G. Keogh to the position of editor, and it was he who, by dint of foresight, massaged and manipulated the old wartime Army Training Memorandum into what eventually became known as the *Australian Army Journal*. This is his account of some of the trials and tribulations of those formative years.

'One day early in 1948, I met by chance Brigadier Ian Campbell (then Director of Military Training) in the old Naval and Military Club in Alfred Place, Melbourne. The Brigadier told me that it was proposed to continue publication of the wartime Army Training Memorandum and that the Vice Chief of the General Staff (General Rowell) had suggested that I might be interested in the position of editor. Since I was indeed interested, the machinery for establishing the necessary civilian position in the Department of Army was set in motion. Eventually I found myself installed in a small room in 'M' Block, Victoria Barracks, Melbourne, a CMF officer employed on the civil pay roll. I had the best - and the worst - of both worlds.

During World War II, the Army Training Memorandum was produced monthly by the Directorate of Military Training and circulated to formations, units and training establishments. It provided the latest information on enemy organisation, weapons and tactics gathered from many sources, including unit and observer team reports. It contained material on the latest developments in training aids, techniques and requirements. Generally, it was designed to keep all concerned up to date on all aspects of training activities.

It was clear however, that in peacetime there was not nearly enough material of this kind to produce a publication on a monthly or even a quarterly basis. Consequently, we attempted to convert the Memorandum into a magazine of general military interest. But it did not really fit. The title was uninspiring and the format dull. It looked like a half-hearted attempt to pursue some ill-defined object.

So we put up a paper recommending the establishment of an 'Australian Army Journal', having the following aims:

- to provide a medium through which to convey to the officers of the Army and the cadet corps, the trends in military thought and developments at home and abroad
- to provide information designed to assist officers with their personal studies and training problems
- to stimulate thought and to encourage the study of military art
- to provide the basis of an Australian military literature which, it is hoped, in the fullness of time, will equal in diversity and dignity the military literature of other countries

The Chief of the General Staff approved the production of a journal, initially on a two-monthly basis and eventually on a monthly basis, when sufficient material was forthcoming and when satisfactory printing and production arrangements could be made.

Until funds became available, the journal would have to be printed by the Army Headquarters Printing Press, a unit formed in the Middle East during the war and not really equipped for work of this kind. Although under pressure for the production of training manuals and other urgently needed publications, the printers cheerfully undertook the additional task. *AAJ No 1*, June-July 1948, was distributed to stationery depots during the last week in June.

While the *Journal* was generally well received, snipers soon began to take pot shots at the editor. These usually took the form of telephone calls questioning the inclusion of some of the material on various grounds. Finally a senior officer objected strongly to an article on railway unification on the grounds that it might encourage the Government to divert defence funds to railway construction. We took that one to the Vice Chief of the General Staff. General Rowell said, 'Ah, the old bellyaching problem. Tell him to put it up in writing and we'll consider it. Very few will, you know, because when they have to commit themselves to paper -

and the record – their argument seldom looks as good as it did over a couple of drinks in the Mess'.

Next day General Rowell followed up his advice with a paper which clearly and unequivocally established the editor's responsibility and authority. Word travelled fast.

During the first 18 months, pressure of work in the inadequately equipped Army Headquarters Printing Press caused an ever-widening gap between publication dates and actual delivery times. Eventually, on the insistence of General Rowell, funds were made available for an outside contract. Wilke and Company Limited was the successful tenderer. We took this opportunity to change from a two-monthly to a monthly basis. The first monthly journal – No 12 – was published in June 1950.

Another problem in those early days arose from the fact that higher authority, particularly on the civil side, seemed to be firmly of the belief that the editor was practically unemployed. At any rate, numerous odd jobs were constantly being thrust upon me. Perhaps the most frustrating was the presidency of a board set up to investigate the loss of books from the Defence Department Library in Melbourne and the apparent total loss of the small library established in Darwin just before the war.

We thought that Darwin was disposed of when we found that the Japanese had bombed the building housing the library to smithereens. Then some cad produced two miserable tattered and battered volumes that had turned up in Alice Springs. So we had to find an expert willing to testify that the marks and stains on the books were undoubtedly caused by an explosive substance.

The missing Defence Library books turned out to be flimsy paperbacks about tropical diseases hastily produced for urgent issue to medical units and detachments in New Guinea. For some extraordinary reason they had been taken on charge by the library and then sent on loan to the units. Now, after three years of war and five years of peace, we were supposed to find the books or produce evidence to justify a write-off. We compiled a list of convincing explanations and proceeded to fire them off one at a time. The file went back and forth for weeks and weeks and got fatter and fatter. But we never saw it again after we fired the round labelled 'white ants'. That exercise in futility must have cost the taxpayer quite a packet.

In 1952 the Shenandoah campaign was set as a subject for study in military history. At the time only a few regular officers were involved. In September of the following year when the number of students was much greater, it was discovered that there were not nearly enough suitable books available. The Military Board ordered the Director of Military Training (not the officer who set the campaign in the first place) to produce one for issue in January. Then the Director of Military Training found that there was not enough money in the printing and stationery vote, though he had a little to spare in the fund allotted to the *Journal*. This was our big chance. We offered to write the book and produce it as an enlarged January 1954 issue of the *Journal*, provided the editor was relieved permanently of all extraneous duties. We just made it.

Having rid ourselves of those time-consuming jobs, we found that we were more or less committed to producing a series of campaign studies to assist officers preparing for promotion examinations. Since this could be fairly regarded as a direct contribution to the aim of developing an Australian military literature and the program was spread over 10 years, we accepted it as a fair exchange for the distractions that always seemed to beset us at the worst possible moment.

From 1954 onwards, production of the *Journal* proceeded fairly smoothly, though we had occasional tussles with people who raised objections to some of the material included. Perhaps the most memorable was the occasion when we were attacked for according a seven-pointed star a prominent place in the cover design. It was claimed this was a Communist emblem and was in use as a distinguishing feature of the kit worn by the troops representing the enemy in training activities. We spun the discussion out for quite a while. Communist emblem or not, a deathly silence settled over the stricken field when we drew attention to the Australian coat of arms, our national flag and the coinage then in use¹.

POSTSCRIPT: THE JOURNAL – 1965-1976
AND ITS 1999 REVIVAL

Colonel Keogh retired in 1965 and was succeeded by Mr A.J. Sweeting, Senior Research Officer on the 1939-45 Australian Official History. Mr Sweeting, who was also co-editor of the RSL journal *Stand To*, approached the *Journal* with the confirmed attitude that the Australian Army comprised officers who had something to say and knew how to say it.

The first and greatest challenge of Mr Sweeting's tenure came in that same year, with increased Australian involvement in the Vietnam War. This commitment to the war was inevitably accompanied by censorship. Articles previously left to the judgement of the editor for clearance were closely scrutinised by senior officers both on the civil and military side. The *Journal* was placed in the restricted category, but its circulation, paradoxically, continued to increase. Despite the scrutiny to which articles were widely subjected and the occasional delays which resulted from inroads into the time of over-busy officers, it cannot be claimed that the functioning of the *Army Journal* was gravely handicapped or the quality of its contributions adversely affected. There was argument and discussion, and publication of an article might sometimes have been delayed, but only in the rarest circumstances was one ever suppressed.

Clem Coady became editor in 1967. To use his own words, he was 'instructed in the dos and don'ts of being an editor of an Army journal'. He goes on to say, 'I came away from that meeting bleakly conscious that the don'ts outweighed the dos'.

For eight years he fought for the right of the *Journal's* contributors to say what they wanted to say. It was a very difficult period. With the Vietnam War came the need for secrecy combined with high sensitivity, making the *Journal* a very bland mixture. The *Journal*, and the editor, suffered as a consequence. To quote Clem again, 'It became a handsome package containing a modicum of substance'.

Clem Coady himself, 'having enough of the Irish [in him] to keep banging [his] head even though the pain became more intense', eventually retired through ill health.


The last issue of the original *Army Journal* was published in 1976. It was replaced by the new *Defence Force Journal* which continues to this day. The needs of the Army readership were also met by the introduction of the *Combat Arms Journal* and the *Combat Service Support Journal*, both produced biannually. These journals are now also defunct, having ironically been replaced by the newly revived *Army Journal*, which reappeared in 1999.

The return of the *Army Journal* is testament to the essential role of ideas in the profession of arms. The *Journal*, like the Army of which it is reflective, is far more eclectic than ever; its contents span a broad range from the experiential to the conceptual to the historical. If anywhere within the Army itself, there is an indicator of the nature of its current mood, and state of health, it is the *Journal*. Long may it remain so. After all:

*A man's ability to write opens a window into his soul,
emblazoning his ideas for the greater good of all.*

BIOGRAPHY

Colonel Eustace Graham Keogh was editor of the first *Army Journal* from 1948 to 1965. During this period he also produced the military history series commencing with his publication on the Shenandoah campaign. Many of these publications were researched and written and by Keogh himself and many survive as authoritative campaign guides today, testament to the quality of his work. Colonel Keogh died in 1981.



LIEUTENANT COLONEL ANTHONY JOHN

The Australian Army is the first volume in a seven volume series published by the Oxford University Press – titled, *The Australian Centenary History of Defence*. This volume was published to coincide with the centenary of the Australian Army and it is therefore appropriate that it be reviewed in this edition of the *Army Journal*. It is a slim volume of somewhat unusual but undoubtedly attractive proportions not unlike a coffee table book.


The Army is the oldest of the three armed services and, as is noted, one of the oldest continuous national institutions in Australia. The author makes the point that when Australians think of defence they think of the Australian Army. As a consequence, the Army embodies the Digger, who in turn symbolises certain core Australian values. These core values of mateship and so forth, which as Australians we identify with, allow us to associate with the Army far more readily. Jeffrey Grey has demythologised the legend of the Australian soldier as 'the natural fighter, the undisciplined and unruly soldier, the larrikin with a cause' image. Rather, it is an Australian Army we can recognise and appreciate for all its strengths and weaknesses.

This book is the history of the Australian Army as an institution. It is not a history of the Army's battles, although by necessity this forms a backdrop to the account. It is not a study of the Australian soldier or his commanders, however thumbnail sketches and experiences are related. These elements complement the narrative but as part of a wider canvas. This is the story of the Army with its shortcomings and failures examined, and its triumphs and successes acknowledged.

The Australian Army is organised chronologically into eight chapters from Federation in 1901 to the East Timor commitment in 2000. Each chapter is dense with facts and figures and is able to stand alone or be read as part of a continuous record of events. While complex and detailed, the writing style is fluid and very readable. This reviewer noted two minor editorial

errors, however these are small blemishes in an otherwise richly detailed and well-researched volume.

This book is a worthy companion in the bookshelf to Jeffrey Grey's other standard text, *A Military History of Australia* and will no doubt become a standard in its own right. Who should read this book? In part the answer is in the dedication – those who served in the defence of Australia 1901-2001. Beyond this, however, the readership should include those who are interested in Australian national defence and security and the serious treatment the Australian Army gives this subject.



The author, Dr Jeffrey Grey, is Associate Professor at the School of History at the Australian Defence Force Academy. He is the author or editor of 15 books and currently holds the Horner Chair of Military Theory at the Marine Corps University in Quantico, Virginia.

BIOGRAPHY

Lieutenant Colonel Anthony John, CSC, graduated from the Officer Cadet School, Portsea, in 1985 and was commissioned into the Royal Australian Infantry Corps. His postings have included service with the 1st Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment, the Special Air Service Regiment and the British Special Boat Service. He was Staff Officer Grade One, Land Operations, at Strategic Command in 2001 and in 2002 undertook operational service in the War on Terror. In late 2002, he took an appointment as Chief of Army Visiting Fellow at the Land Warfare Studies Centre. Lieutenant Colonel John holds a Bachelor of Arts from Melbourne University, a Master of Defence Studies from the University of New South Wales and a Masters of Military Studies from the Marine Corps University. He is a distinguished graduate of the United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College and the School of Advanced Warfighting.

