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(Australian War Memorial.)

The 2/28th and 2/43rd Battalions landed on Labuan Island on 10th June 1945. Men of the 2/43rd Battalion are shown moving into a dispersal bay during the

BATTLEFIELD MOBILITY

Major E. C. Beacroft, MBE,
Royal Australian Infantry

"I consider that inter-service relations and the effective integration of the work of the Services are matters of paramount importance now and in the future, and should receive the constant and close attention of all military commanders and staffs."

— Field Marshal Montgomery.

PART I

Introduction

THE ADDITION of Short-Range Transport (SRT) aircraft to the RAAF order of battle and the employment of these aircraft on joint army-air exercises has resulted in an upsurge of interest in transport problems in forward battle areas. Unfortunately, however, it seems that in certain respects some interested parties are arriving at conclusions which are based on wishful thinking rather than on fact.

It is not uncommon to hear from Service sources, or read in the Press, statements which in effect claim:

"Battlefield aircraft will be operated by the RAAF for the exclusive use of the army in the field."

"The army's battlefield transport problems have been solved by SRT aircraft."

"Battlefield mobility will be assured by SRT aircraft."

An enthusiastic approach to this new concept of mobility is commendable, but failure to temper enthusiasm with realism is to court disaster.

While the SRT "twins" (Short Take-off and Landing) and VTOL (Vertical Take-off and

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He returned to civil life in January, 1946, but re-enlisted in September, 1950, from the Reserve of Officers for service with 3 RAR (Korea) and 1 RHU (Japan). In February, 1952, he returned to the PIR as adjutant and more briefly as a company commander. Service with 4 and 2 RAR followed until December, 1959, when he was appointed Admin. Officer, Air Support Unit. From September, 1961, he was for two years GSO2 (Air) HQ 17 Gurkha Div, Malaya, attached to HQ 224 Group RAF. In this appointment he saw active service with the joint land/air headquarters at the time of the Brunei rebellion and during subsequent operations in the Borneo territories. He also participated in a major SEATO exercise as a staff officer on combined headquarters.

He is currently serving as Army Instructor, Air Support Unit, Williamtown, N.S.W.

Landing) aircraft are destined to play an important role in future land operations, it would be prudent to draw attention to the fact that like all other aircraft and, indeed, all other forms of transport, they have definite limitations.

To consider that the SRT force is capable of "solving all battlefield transport problems" or "assuring mobility", or that SRT aircraft "will be used exclusively by the army" is to indicate a complete misunderstanding of the roles, characteristics, capabilities, limitations, Service requirements and proven methods for operating such a force in the combat zone.

SRT aircraft must be accepted as another — not the only — form of transport available to forward land force commanders. Roads, railways and waterways remain important lines of communication; pack animals and porters may often produce better results than aircraft and sad disillusionment awaits the infantryman who is so naive as to imagine that he will always be carried into battle by aircraft.

The foregoing comments are confirmed by a statement (attributed to a British helicopter squadron commander operating in Borneo) which appeared in the Sydney Press recently:

"We have insufficient helicopters to meet all demands."

British, French and American forces have operated SRT aircraft for many years and it is upon their experience that we, in view of our immaturity in this field, should perhaps base our initial techniques. The writer, having had considerable experience in the joint planning and control (joint agency aspects) of British-operated SRT aircraft in Malaya and Borneo, has selected the British concept as the basis for comments in this paper. Although the RAAF aircraft differ in certain characteristics and capabilities, their roles and the principles of employment in South-East Asian environment will be similar.

Requirements for SRT Support

In order to explode the myth that SRT aircraft are to be available for the sole use of the land force, some of the tasks for which they may be required by the air force are:

(*a*) Search and rescue operations (mainly helicopters).
(*b*) Maintenance of forward bases. A considerable degree of fixed-wing (Caribou) aircraft effort may be required to maintain Iroquois operating bases. Fuel, spare parts, servicing personnel, etc., may all have to be flown in.
(*c*) Reconnaissance for selection, or confirmation of suitability of forward landing fields, landing sites or dropping zones.
(*d*) Positioning of radar and/or wireless facilities for the control of air operations, and their maintenance.
(*e*) Deployment of forward control agencies, e.g., Mobile Air Operations Teams (MAOT).
(*f*) Communications flights for RAAF commanders and/or their staffs.

While it is true that many of the above tasks are indirectly concerned with the provision of support for the army in the field, they are normally accepted as air responsibilities and the effort required to meet them will, in most cases, be determined by the Air Component Commander on a single service basis. He will, of course, inform the Army Commander of the subsequent reduction in air effort available to support the land battle.

Despite the rather imposing list of possible air force requirements, the army will be the main user of SRT aircraft support. The tasks include:

(*a*) Deployment of forces by air-landing, air-dropping and roping down from helicopters.
(*b*) Deployment of fire support; e.g., guns and mortars.
(*c*) Positioning of equipment by air-landing or air-dropping; e.g., bridging, earth-moving equipment.
(*d*) The crossing of major obstacles, both natural and artificial.
(*e*) Logistic support.
(*f*) Casualty and prisoner-of war evacuation.
(*g*) Airborne cut-off and counter-ambush parties — both extremely valuable in counter-insurgency operations.
(*h*) Psychological warfare operations — voice broadcast and leaflet dropping.
(*j*) Movement of supply-dropping equipment recovered from forward areas.
(*k*) Positioning and maintaining communication facilities; e.g., radio relay stations.
(*l*) Communication flights and courier services, normally carried out by army light aircraft but may be allotted to SRT aircraft.

Availability of Support

The type and number of aircraft available and the support they are able to provide will depend upon a number of factors, the most important being:

(*a*) The overall national availability.
(*b*) Ability to move the force to the theatre of operations.
(*c*) The enemy air and ground threat.
(*d*) The concept of land operations.
(*e*) Aircrew availability.
(*f*) The location and suitability of operating bases and forward landing areas or the ability to construct them.
(*g*) The air force deployment capability, including control, communications and servicing facilities.
(*h*) Terrain and meteorological conditions.
(*j*) Availability of fuel and maintenance items.

The ideal SRT force would be one containing sufficient aircraft of the appropriate types to meet the needs of all Services at all times and under all conditions. This would call for an exceptionally large force with fixed and rotary wing elements, each with aircraft capable of carrying troops and all forms of vehicles, weapons and equipment likely to be employed. In addition, it would be necessary for

the SRT force to be able to operate throughout the hours of darkness in the worst conceivable conditions of weather and terrain. Only when such a force is readily available will such claims as "battlefield transport problems solved" and "battlefield mobility assured" be justified. It is extremely doubtful whether any nation can boast such a force; Australia certainly cannot.

Assuming that the land force commander will be afforded a balanced SRT force compatible with national availability and that the operating capability of the force may be affected by darkness and adverse weather, what actual support can he anticipate?

At this stage it should be obvious that he is not going to have SRT aircraft support to meet all his needs. It should be equally obvious that he is faced with the problems of integrating SRT aircraft support with all other forms of transport and establishing priorities for the employment of SRT aircraft. He must consider tactical and logistical requirements, particularly in relation to the rotary-wing element, and conservation of aircraft and aircrew effort to ensure continued support. "Waste not, want not" must be the guiding principle.

Detailed preplanning of exercises — necessary, but detrimental in many respects — has resulted in the misguided belief that the land forces will be allotted a fixed degree of SRT air support daily which must be used at all costs because the unexpended portion cannot be banked and added to the next day's quota. Adherence to this belief must inevitably result in a shortage of support at a time when it is most needed.

Aircraft serviceability is the critical factor in the provision of air support and the land commander can do much to ensure that it is maintained at a high level. It generally applies that the more frequently aircraft are flown under adverse conditions, the more maintenance they require and, of course, the sooner major servicing becomes necessary. In tropical areas the factors that militate against serviceability include the effect of climate on aircraft electrical systems, damage to airframes from buffeting in extreme weather conditions, damage to landing gear caused by rough landing fields, damage to aircraft skins and interior fittings caused by inexpert loading and unloading techniques, the conditions under which maintenance and servicing must be completed, and problems associated with obtaining major components and spare parts.

Land commanders can do nothing to overcome the technical problems, but by restricting aircraft usage to essential tasks and employing other means whenever possible, they can reduce the likelihood of unserviceability, lessen the workload on maintenance facilities and enhance the possibility of continued support. "Banking", therefore, can provide capital gains even though the dividends may not be immediately evident.

Principles of SRT Operations

In order to operate aircraft within tolerable safety limits, to ensure aircraft availability and to provide support when and where required, certain basic principles must be observed. Experience has shown that these principles assume greatest importance when applied to SRT operations. The intimate nature of this form of support calls for a complete understanding of all principles by commanders at all levels.

Joint Planning:

Operations involving land and air forces are joint operations and should be planned accordingly. Land operations must obviously be conceived by land commanders but, in the interests of efficiency and inter-service harmony, if air support appears necessary to achieve the aim, detailed planning must proceed jointly. Jointness may be achieved at various levels. At the top, the commanders themselves confer in the Joint Operations Centre (JOC); at formation or unit level air force officers will normally be available to advise and assist in planning, and within the joint control agencies army and air force staff officers work together continuously.

Conservation of Effort:

Air support should only be employed when the task cannot be effectively completed by other means.

Air Support Planned by Air Force:

Land commanders or their staffs state the requirement, the air commander or his staff allocates aircraft. Requests should not be made for numbers or particular types of aircraft.

One Soldier — One Airman:

One land commander will work with one air commander at any level of command. Any deviation from this principle must inevitably lead to confusion.

Commander of Air Forces:

Command is retained by the Air Component Commander.

Control:

Control is exercised at the highest level at which it can be effectively applied. Normally this will be through the Air Transport Operations Centre (ATOC) which is an executive agency of the JOC. When circumstances dictate greater flexibility, control may be delegated to a Forward ATOC, an Air Support Officer (ASO) at a formation or unit headquarters or a Mobile Air Operations Team (MAOT) operating with a forward unit or sub-unit. Under certain conditions operational control of SRT aircraft (usually helicopters) may be given to a land force commander for a particular operation.

Security:

When aircraft are deployed to forward bases or operating into forward landing fields or landing sites, the land commander is responsible for their overall protection against enemy ground attack.

Co-operation:

The intimate nature of SRT operations increases the inter-

dependence of the Services on one another and makes co-operation between them of vital importance. Goodwill and the desire to co-operate are essential at all levels.

Conclusion

Although incapable of "ensuring battlefield mobility" SRT air support certainly increases it and by so doing assures the land commander greater flexibility in the pursuit of his tactical aim.

A high standard of team work is essential for the effective employment of SRT support. This can only be achieved if the two Services realise that each has much to learn and that such learning must, of necessity, be done together. Unilateral exercise or operational planning, resulting in a request for support for a completed or near-completed plan, must be avoided. The time for jointness to begin in planning is when it has been decided that an exercise or operation should take place. Thenceforward planning should be based on the requirements of both Services, thus ensuring maximum efficiency and the avoidance of friction and ill-feeling. After all, goodwill is the most important prerequisite for successful joint operations.

PART II

Having examined some of the factors which are likely to limit SRT air support and having established the need to co-ordinate all forms of transport within the combat zone, attention will now be focused on the tactical employment of SRT aircraft in support of the land battle.

Historical Background

British SRT aircraft were first used in the Far East theatre during the Malayan Emergency. Despite the need to develop operating techniques under strange and exacting conditions and the unsuitability of the available helicopters, these aircraft afforded the land forces undreamed of benefits. Small tactical forces were moved in minutes where previously it had taken hours or even days to cover the same distance; troops, equipment and supplies were landed close to objectives; casualties were evacuated within minutes of their being wounded. "The greatest invention since gunpowder" was the opinion often expressed by infantrymen as the "sweat and tears" of moving over jungle terrain disappeared in the wash of propellors and rotor blades.

With the run down in emergency operations HQ No. 224 Group RAF and the 17th Gurkha Division turned their attention to the further development of procedures and techniques to exploit the potential of SRT aircraft in their tactical and logistic roles. As a consequence, by the time it became necessary to undertake joint land-air operations in Brunei, and later in North Borneo and Sarawak, a high standard of joint service operating efficiency and co-operation had been achieved.

Despite these achievements, there remained deficiencies and unsolved problems, the most important being:

(*a*) The difficulty of establishing, defending and maintaining airheads and aircraft operating bases in forward areas.

(*b*) The unreliability of air dropping for tactical resupply in adverse weather.

(*c*) The need for a system of logistic support capable of meeting land force requirements under all weather, terrain and operational conditions.

(*d*) Shortage of suitable aircraft.

In addition, all joint land-air operations to date have been conducted in comparative freedom from interference. "Seek and destroy" has been the general pattern of land activities with the enemy making no serious attempt to interfere with aircraft on the ground or in the air, or to conduct major land battles. As a result there has been little or no requirement for:

(*a*) The detailed defence of airheads or forward bases.

(*b*) Tactical flying and/or the provision of fighter-ground attack support for SRT aircraft operations.

(*c*) The speedy movement of large tactical forces.

(*d*) Large-scale air maintenance — in particular, ammunition resupply and casualty evacuation.

Unfortunately, similar conditions normally prevail during exercises, "enemy" forces being so limited in numbers, restricted in their activities and generally lacking in incentive and determination that the adequacy of defences and the ability of the friendly forces to react quickly to widely separate situations are rarely tested. Stockpiling and unrealistic logistic support arrangements also tend to create wrong impressions and mask the real problems.

With an escalation of the current situation in the Malaysian territories or outbreak of hostilities in neighbouring areas, it is unlikely that airfields, airstrips, helicopter bases, landing sites or low-flying aircraft will remain immune to attack — they certainly have not in South Vietnam.

In future limited war operations, the enemy can be expected to enjoy, initially at least, such advantages as superior numerical strength; freedom of movement; a wide choice of objectives; a detailed knowledge of the country, its people and their language; the ability to operate over difficult terrain under all weather conditions; a limited logistic support requirement and some assistance from the indigenous population, either voluntary or as the result of terrorist activity.

Army Requirements

Army requirements of tactical air transport support are all too often broadly stated as:

(*a*) The deployment of troops, firepower and equipment.

(*b*) The maintenance of forces deployed.

To tactical commanders charged with the tasks of prosecuting the land battle, the requirements are far more detailed. They require a means of overcoming terrain, vegetation and weather barriers to movement in order that they may achieve the degree of tactical flexibility necessary to offset the many advantages held by the enemy. To them speed and reliability are all important.

There can be little doubt that in future operations a sense of urgency will be a pre-requisite for success. The numerical superiority and inherent flexibility of the enemy must be countered with surprise through speed and concentration of effort at the right place at the right time. Firepower, rather than manpower, must provide the destructive force.

In this regard, although land forces may have to place considerable reliance in aerial fire support — due to the difficulty of positioning guns and ammunition — artillery, mortars and machine guns will still be required, particularly when weather conditions preclude the use of close air support, and for night operations.

Imperative though the rapid deployment of forces may be, their maintenance is of equal importance. Delays in the positioning of reinforcements, delivery of urgently required ammunition and other supplies and the evacuation of casualties must be eliminated or at the worst kept to a minimum.

It has been established that in the South-East Asian theatre the above requirements in most cases can only be met by tactical transport aircraft. It is also accepted that to ensure maximum effectiveness, the necessary air support should be available when and where required. To date this requirement has been difficult to meet. There are many who consider the provision of "on the spot" SRT air support a relatively easy matter; "base the helicopters forward with the fighting force and our troubles will be over," they claim. At the risk of being labelled a heretic, the writer refuses to accept this theory without considering all the factors. In practice, the provision of tactical air transport support can be a complex business and the overall plan must be based on:

(*a*) The task.
(*b*) Aircraft availability, characteristics and capabilities.
(c) Terrain and weather conditions.
(*d*) Airfield/airstrip availability.
(*e*) The air force deployment capability.
(*f*) Security.

The general task has already been established. The other factors are discussed below.

Aircraft Characteristics and Capabilities

The rotary and fixed-wing elements of the SRT force have individual characteristics which have a distinct bearing on the employment of the force as a whole. Briefly these are:

Helicopters:

The ability of the helicopter to climb and descend vertically and to hover offers many

advantages: independence of airfields; surprise through a high degree of manoeuvreability at all speeds; the ability to avoid enemy early warning radar by using terrain and/or weather; flexibility, which enables commanders to move troops and equipment quickly and to change destinations even when the force is airborne; a limited all-weather capability which may enable some air movement when other aircraft are grounded; economy, where the effort required to move over difficult terrain is less than by other means; the ability to carry awkward loads in the slung position.

The disadvantages and limitations of the helicopter include a very high initial cost; a large fuel bill — about two and a half times that of conventional aircraft of equivalent load-carrying capacity; a comparatively high maintenance requirement; relatively low speed, short range, brought about by the need to strike a balance between range (fuel weight) and pay load; performance affected by altitude, temperature and air density; when operating from dusty landing sites the downwash from rotors may make loading and unloading dangerous and jeopardise surprise; in daylight helicopters require the same air cover as conventional aircraft and they are extremely vulnerable to enemy ground fire, particularly when approaching or departing from landing sites.

Fixed Wing Aircraft:

Although they require larger take-off and landing areas, these aircraft cost less initially, require less maintenance, can carry larger loads over longer distances at higher speeds and have a far better payload/fuel consumption ratio.

Within a theatre of operations each type of aircraft has a definite role. The VTOL and critical range-payload characteristics of helicopters dictate the need to restrict their usage to areas lacking airstrips and where operations are likely to be conducted over limited ranges. The best results are achieved when they are employed as third dimensional front-line vehicles in direct support of forward land formations. In this role they should be operating over a radii of action not exceeding 50 miles to ensure a reasonable payload availability.

STOL aircraft may be employed in either the tactical or logistic support roles. These include the airlanding of troops, stores and equipment on unprepared or hastily prepared landing strips close to objectives; the carriage of casualties (personnel, vehicles and equipment) on return flights; the movement of parachute forces, supplies and equipment to dropping zones. After the initial deployment of the tactical force, fixed-wing aircraft activities will normally be confined to air maintenance tasks between the Medium Range Transport (MRT) airhead and army bases (maintenance-administrative areas) located at forward landing strips (STOL airheads) and airdropping of supplies to forward units and sub-units.

The pattern of operations most likely to ensure the maximum benefit from the characteristics peculiar to each type of aircraft is one which provides for helicopters intimately to support the tactical force while fixed-wing aircraft meet logistic requirements over the longer ranges.

Terrain

Throughout Malaya, Borneo and New Guinea the terrain follows a fairly standard pattern. Coastal regions are generally low-lying, with navigable waterways and limited road systems. The hinterland, however, is predominantly mountainous with high forests and thick undergrowth. The valleys vary from wide open expanses to precipitous gorges. Low-level air operations are hazardous to say the least, navigation is difficult and distances are often considerably increased by the need to avoid high ground. This applies particularly to rotary-wing aircraft if they are to carry a reasonable payload.

Meteorological Conditions

Weather conditions are influenced by monsoon periods. Generally the "dry" monsoon brings relatively fine weather during the mornings with thunderstorms building up over the higher ground and extending to the lower areas during the afternoons. The "wet" season produces prolonged periods of low cloud and heavy rain. Early morning fog and low stratus cloud may not clear in some of the lower areas before 10 a.m. during the "wet". While the weather does not normally prevent air operations for long periods — except at the height of the "wet" monsoon — it does dictate suitable flying times which may vary from day to day and hour to hour. Aircraft operating from bases far distant from the tactical area are affected most.

Conditions often deteriorate during the in-flight period and make airlanding or airdropping impracticable. SRT aircraft operating from forward bases do not suffer to the same extent. They are often able to complete tasks over short distances during breaks in the weather. On occasions in Borneo, helicopters "sat out" storms on temporary landing sites and completed their task when the storm had passed.

Airfields

In most cases the main military and civil airfields are located on or near the coast (the more densely populated areas). With few exceptions these are suitable for use by all types of MRT aircraft. The situation inland is far less favourable. Although airfields/airstrips do exist they are generally widely separated and many are unsuitable for sustained military operations. Sites suitable for the construction of new airstrips are few and construction is a difficult and lengthy process.

When considering possible operational areas, the distance between MRT airfields and SRT landing strips may vary from 20 to 200 miles. Unprepared surfaces suitable for use by STOL aircraft are rare and usually

restricted to hard patches of moist sand on the coast.

Aircraft Availability

Rarely will there be sufficient SRT effort available to meet all demands — a disturbing thought for those who consider that the "Army's battlefield problems have been solved by SRT aircraft" or that "battlefield mobility will be assured by SRT aircraft."

It must be appreciated that although the air effort available may appear adequate during the initial stages of an operation, this situation will change considerably as the campaign develops. Aircraft losses from enemy action and accident, unserviceability and delays in obtaining replacement items and an increasing requirement for support will inevitably result in an adverse balance.

In view of the probable shortage of aircraft and the number and variety of tasks, it is essential that the available resources be husbanded while at the same time ensuring the support necessary to achieve the overall aim.

Forms of Support

Having established the army requirements and considered environmental limitations and aircraft characteristics and availability, let us look briefly at the forms of air support which might be provided.

Initially there will be a need to deploy land forces and their equipment and to establish operating bases for the supporting aircraft. When these tasks have been completed, aircraft will be required to:

(*a*) Provide mobility for tactical forces.

(*b*) Maintain the tactical force in forward locations.

(*c*) Maintain forward army maintenance/administrative areas and aircraft operating bases.

Tactical Mobility:

This form of support will be frequently required in areas lacking airstrips or suitable landing areas for fixed-wing aircraft; consequently most tasks will fall to helicopters. There may be a limited requirement for fixed-wing aircraft to deliver parachute forces, but it is more likely that forces which cannot be airlanded will be "roped-down" from helicopters.

The ability to react quickly to requests and to complete operations under all weather conditions are perhaps the most important attributes tactical commanders will seek in this element of the air support force.

Tactical Maintenance:

Tasks will include the movement of reinforcements; resupply, particularly ammunition, rations, water, medical and engineer stores; aeromedical evacuation and the recovery of equipment.

Allowing for the fact that airlanding in forward tactical areas by fixed-wing aircraft will rarely be possible, the delivery of reinforcements and evacuation of casualties and equipment must be undertaken by helicopters.

Routine Maintenance:

Air maintenance tasks to forward bases, including aircraft operating bases, should be completed by fixed-wing aircraft. This may involve airlanding by MRT and/or STOL aircraft or airdropping by MRT and STOL aircraft when helicopter bases are established away from suitable landing areas. There may, of course, be occasions when helicopter bases may have to be maintained by portion of the helicopter force.

Aircraft Deployment

The deployment of the SRT force is the responsibility of the tactical air support force commander. His plan, however, must of necessity be determined jointly with the appropriate land force commander.

Normally transport aircraft deployment is related to the army logistic system. Consequently, we usually find maintenance or administrative areas located at or near airfields serving as the terminal for one type of aircraft and the base for another type.

During the initial stages of an operation we can expect the MRT terminal to be the base for both STOL and VTOL aircraft with the associated logistic organization being either the division or task force maintenance area (depending on the size of the force engaged). As land operations extend beyond the economic range of helicopters operating from this base, a new MRT airhead maintenance area is established further forward if a suitable airfield is available or, alternatively, a further link is inserted in the chain, i.e., a STOL terminal/VTOL base alongside which will be the task force administrative area. This latter base may, of course, be some distance from the forward troops — perhaps 20 to 60 miles.

This pattern of deployment provides for the re-supply of fighting units by airlanding, using helicopters, and airdropping by MRT and STOL aircraft. Other maintenance tasks, such as evacuation of casualties, prisoners of war and recovered supply-dropping equipment are completed by a combination of VTOL and STOL aircraft, i.e., VTOL back to their base, thence STOL to the MRT airhead maintenance area. Aircraft for tactical trooplift, movement of firepower and suchlike tasks are positioned forward as required. When operating in this manner the characteristics and capabilities of each aircraft type are fully exploited. Except during periods of adverse weather, when air operations may be temporarily suspended, delays in meeting requests for tactical support should be minimal.

Despite the favourable reaction time under this "classical" deployment system, there will be occasions when it is necessary to deploy rotary-wing aircraft to bases forward of the STOL terminal. These advanced bases may be temporary (for use by day only) or semi-permanent. This form of extended deployment will usually be for a limited period of time or for a particular operation and is designed to reduce reaction time. Although essential at times

to cope with special circumstances and certainly necessary if we subscribe to the theory that helicopters must be based on the "doorstep" of every unit likely to require their support, this extension can present many problems.

"Problems associated with aircraft deployment must be resolved by the air commander. We have plenty of our own. If he has to decentralize his forces to meet our requirements, that is his concern." So may the ground force commanders argue. Unfortunately, however, the solution is less simple. The entire cost of establishing, maintaining, operating and defending forward aircraft bases cannot be debited to the supporting air force. Land-air operations are joint ventures and the partners must each bear their share of the account if bankruptcy is to be avoided.

At this stage we shall forget the air commander's problems and concentrate on those which are likely to cause army commanders most thought.

Despite his anxiety to achieve maximum mobility and flexibility through SRT air support, the prudent commander will ensure the best deal possible before he advocates or agrees to the permanent or semi-permanent deployment of aircraft to his area of responsibility. He should satisfy himself that he is not confusing convenience with necessity when arriving at his support requirements; that he can afford the force necessary for the static defence of the additional base; that the air effort which must be diverted to the task of maintaining the base will not adversely affect the overall effort available to support his operations; he will heed the advice of air advisers on probable reductions in aircraft availability which may result from servicing difficulties, particularly those brought about by restrictions he himself must impose on the use of lights. From these considerations emerge the three main problems: defence, maintenance and aircraft serviceability.

Defence:

At the very least the division or task force will be responsible for the defence of two airhead maintenance areas / aircraft bases. Can we afford to accept further commitments? The answer to this question can probably be best found by looking at the actual task.

It is reasonable to assume that in further operations in the Far East theatre all airhead maintenance-administrative areas and permanent bases will have to be afforded absolute security against all forms of land attack. If we accept as a minimum requirement a "clean" area to a depth of 2,000 yards, the periphery of each area to be defended will be about 12,000 yards in ideal terrain conditions and much more in mountainous country.

In view of the attractiveness and vulnerability of targets within these areas, security measures must be much more stringent than might normally be required. A single saboteur can destroy parked aircraft,

aviation POL dumps, control installations, stores complexes and so on. Similar results may also be achieved by isolated mortars or artillery pieces from longer ranges. The task, therefore, calls for initial eradication of all threat from within the area and subsequent prevention of infiltration into the area. To be effective this degree of security must be maintained throughout the period of operations. It must be agreed that the responsible commander is presented with a formidable task, particularly when his aim is to attack, not defend.

Finding the forces to meet these defence commitments while at the same time retaining the ability to preserve the tactical aim will be no easy matter. Personnel concerned with the operation of aircraft and logistic support tasks may be able to provide a limited form of local defence in emergency but the very nature of their duties precludes active participation in the overall defence plan. It might be argued, and with some justification, that the employment of these personnel on guard or similar tasks may seriously interfere with their primary duties at which many will be required to work shifts throughout the 24-hour period.

It is obvious that the "teeth" arms must bear the burden. In this regard it is doubtful whether, even in the most favourable terrain, one battalion group will be capable of providing adequate security for one airhead maintenance area/aircraft base; two battalion groups may be required. This "bombshell" may well evoke the queries:

(*a*) Has the security requirement been overstated? How can any commander afford the force necessary to meet the static defence requirements and retain the ability to pursue offensive operations?

(*b*) What changes in tactical and logistic support concepts can be made to provide relief from what is obviously an intolerable situation?

There can be little doubt about the security requirement. Events in South Vietnam have proved the effectiveness of guerilla operations against aircraft bases.

No land formation or unit commander can afford to deploy 30 to 50 per cent. of his force on static defence tasks which are not directly connected with the tactical operations. There is a definite need, therefore, to either reduce the number of areas to be defended or to provide special forces for this task. A review of tactical and logistic concepts may also be warranted. This aspect is discussed later.

Maintenance:

Although there may be occasions (extremely rare) when secure surface means of communication are available, in most cases STOL airhead maintenance areas/VTOL bases will have to be activated and maintained by air. This will involve the fly-in of personnel, servicing and refuelling equipment, aviation POL, control and aeromedical evacuation facilities,

aircraft spares, etc. In addition, the appropriate army logistic support organization with its equipment, airfield teams and suchlike will have to be positioned by the same means. Delivery will be effected by air-landing from STOL aircraft supplemented where possible by airdropping from MRT. When a VTOL base is established away from an airstrip, airlanding by VTOL aircraft and airdropping are the only aerial delivery means available.

At this stage it should be noted that the major but by no means only air force logistic requirement will be aviation POL. Six Iroquois helicopters each flying four hours a day will consume 13,440 lbs. of fuel (70 gallons an hour). If we allow a very conservative 3,500 lbs. for all other items, including personnel changes etc., the total lift of about 17,000 lbs. does not seem large enough to cause alarm. (This total is the minimum theoretical one which the most rabid enthusiast could justify. Personal experience indicates that it is more likely to be doubled.) After all it amounts only to roughly half a C130 load or three Caribou loads — assuming of course that it can be delivered by these aircraft. Should delivery have to be made to an isolated helicopter base and airlanding and airdropping be impracticable, we find that three additional helicopters will be required to maintain the base.

Whatever form of aerial delivery is employed, the maintenance of forward bases is a costly business in terms of aircraft effort. One does not have to be a genius to arrive at the deduction that effort expended in maintaining other aircraft must inevitably reduce availability to the tactical force. At the same time it is also apparent that if rotary-wing aircraft are the most suitable for intimate tactical support tasks they must be used as little as possible in the logistic support role.

Helicopters cannot provide adequate support without having POL provided forward of their main base but they can operate quite effectively for limited periods when divorced from their main base facilities. The air effort required to position aviation POL will be far less than that needed to establish and maintain even a small base. On many occasions the aircraft will be able to carry sufficient additional fuel (internally or slung) for the particular operation.

This cursory examination of the maintenance factor confirms the need to limit the number of permanent aircraft bases, and the undesirability of establishing permanent VTOL bases away from airstrips.

Aircraft Servicing:

Availability, on a day-to-day and hour-to-hour basis, will depend largely on efficient servicing and maintenance systems. Although the air force is responsible for these tasks the land force commander is vitally interested in the net product — i.e., serviceable aircraft.

Keeping aircraft operational in the combat zone is a difficult

task but satisfactory results can be achieved providing technical staffs are given time, reasonable working conditions and adequate spares.

Time is also a critical factor to the land force. Although SRT aircraft may, in cases of emergency, operate at night, the main requirement will be for maximum availability during daylight hours. To ensure this, aircraft maintenance should be completed at night. This, of course, can only be done in areas where lights and noise are not likely to jeopardise the defences or alternatively where facilities exist or can be made available to blackout and soundproof working accommodation. Such conditions are not likely to exist in forward battle areas.

Aircraft technicians must be able to devote their undivided attention to their respective tasks and they should not be subjected to lengthy periods of inactivity which so often result from alerts in the main battle area. Trans-shipment of aircraft spares must be kept to a minimum to accelerate delivery and the "pipe-line" should provide for urgently required items to be delivered at any time. Both of these requirements can be more easily met when major servicing is carried out at rearward airstrips.

Two conflicting requirements have now been established:

(*a*) To have aircraft readily available to the supported force.

(*b*) To limit aircraft bases and restrict the siting of permanent VTOL bases to relatively "safe" fixed-wing airhead maintenance areas.

Present policy does not allow for each unit or formation to be allotted a proportion of the SRT effort commensurate with possible requirements. It follows, therefore, that support must be provided on a priority basis and this can only be done when aircraft are based centrally. Consequently, response time must be contingent upon the siting of bases. When these are located some distance from where the support is required there must be a delay in meeting requests initiated at short notice. On the other hand, it is apparent that in many cases it will be impractical, uneconomic and/or tactically undesirable to have bases forward.

Procedures developed to meet current tactical and logistic support concepts are sufficiently flexible to cope with most situations and, if properly implemented, should prove adequate insofar as the time and space factor is concerned. They are outlined below.

Normally air operations are conducted from bases in rear of the fighting force with support being provided on request. Tasking of aircraft is done on either a preplanned or emergency (immediate) basis:

(*a*) *Preplanned:* Aircraft may be positioned forward immediately before a particular operation or for a specified period of time to meet anticipated urgent tasks. In both cases aircraft operate from temporary bases where refuelling and limited con-

trol facilities are required. Except when weather may prevent timely repositioning, aircraft should return to their main base each night for routine maintenance and to relieve the land commander of added defence responsibility.

(b) *Emergency (Immediate):* Action to provide aircraft to meet emergency requests which are initiated during the course of operations can only be taken when the request is received at the appropriate tasking agency (ATOC, Fwd ATOC, etc.). Despite the simple and effective procedure for processing requests, the delay factor, inherent in this system, causes considerable concern to land commanders. Although it may be minimal, even minutes may be critical in certain circumstances.

It can be seen that while preplanned support approximates the ideal according to the views of many commanders (the "base the aircraft with the fighting force" concept) it restricts availability to other users for emergency tasks. Joint service planning staffs and tasking agencies must, therefore, adhere to the priorities established by the appropriate senior land force commander, particularly in regard to the degree of effort to be reserved for immediate tasks.

These deployment and tasking procedures have been thoroughly tested and found adequate for the form of operations for which they were developed, i.e., counter-insurgency. There can be little doubt, however, that they will need to be modified to meet future limited war requirements.

Land force tactical and logistic concepts may vary considerably in Malaya, Brunei and the Borneo territories. Concentration rather than dispersion of units and sub-units may be necessary to avoid defeat in detail, to provide defence for vital areas and to enable successful offensive operations to be mounted against widely separated objectives. Surprise will be essential and can best be achieved through speed — reaction time should be measured in minutes, not hours. We may well see a revival of a *modus operandi* as old as war itself — a series of self-contained fortified areas or bases from which offensives are launched and to which the forces return, after completing their task, to "lick their wounds" and prepare for further action. Each fortified area might be occupied by a task force of, say, three infantry battalion groups, the necessary service elements and sufficient SRT effort to provide mobility for at least one battalion group at any given time. Ideally, this area would be established around an airfield or airstrip (preferably one suitable for use by MRT, STOL and fighter/ground attack aircraft) and be located in relation to probable areas of operations.

Adoption of this concept would afford a number of advantages:

(a) Immediate availability of a composite strike force and its means of mobility.

(*b*) The ability to mount offensives quickly.
(*d*) Security of the force as a whole, including the base and SRT aircraft.
(*d*) The opportunity for continuous joint land-air training, rehearsals and so on.

On the other hand it calls for some reversals in air support policy. Decentralization of effort becomes a necessity — each task force must be provided with portion of the SRT force. MRT and STOL aircraft may have to operate over longer distances than hitherto but not to such an extent that they would not be able effectively to meet all requirements. There would be a need to "increase" national SRT aircraft availability — it is doubtful whether this can be avoided in any case.

Air maintenance would be simplified. Forts could receive stocks direct from the Rear Maintenance Area (RMA) either by airlanding or airdropping or a combination of both. Delivery farther forward would be by airdropping or airlanding from STOL aircraft or airlanding by VTOL. Evacuation of casualties, prisoners of war and recovered supply-dropping equipment (if applicable) would be effected by MRT and STOL aircraft. Should the latter have to be used, the payload availability, even over the longer distances, should be adequate. With each task force capable of holding its own reserves, there should be no need for a Divisional Maintenance Area (DMA). Although specialist assistance (AASO, etc.) would be required in each task force area, a considerable saving in manpower and equipment would result from the elimination of the DMA, to say nothing of the reduced defence commitments.

Conclusion

In this paper I have tried to highlight the value of SRT air support, the price the land commander must be prepared to pay for the support he requires and the probable need to review tactical and logistic concepts. Personal experience, current doctrine and a highly polished crystal ball have been used for reference.

I appreciate that many of the comments are highly contentious and there will be countless sound arguments against some of my proposals — I should be disappointed if there were not. The fact remains, however, that the potential of SRT air support will only be fully exploited when all users understand its capabilities and limitations and plan their activities accordingly.

INFORMATION DESK

Prepared by the Directorate of Military Training.

Introduction

THE DIRECTORATE of Military Training welcomes the topical observations made by Major A. H. Smith in his article "Information Please", published in the March issue of the *Australian Army Journal*. All of us sympathize with the student and are aware of his problems in preparing for TEWTS, exercises and examinations. The same frustrations, and lack of current information and doctrine have plagued us all. However, as these problems have been recognized for some time, the Director of Military Training has in hand plans for correcting the situation when re-writing training publications for the new divisional organization.

Over the past year or so, we have been studying what can be done to ensure that army films, training charts and publications do contain all the latest information and doctrine. The problems of distribution, printing and currency of information have all received very thorough consideration in the review of all GS publications which was completed in January, and we are happy to report from the Information Desk that shortly the regimental officer will see the fruits of our labours here in Canberra.

Form and Distribution

Proposed changes in the form of publications include:

(*a*) Standardization of sizes. These are:

- (i) Manuals, e.g. *Army Law Manual* (10 ins. × 8 ins.).
- (ii) Training pamphlets (8 ins. × 5 ins.).
- (iii) Pocketbooks, e.g., *Patrolling and Tracking* (6¼ ins. × 4 ins.).

(*b*) Other than the pocketbooks, all pamphlets will be issued in loose-leaf style to facilitate amendments.

(*c*) Plastic covers, with Chicago screws and waterproof spine will facilitate insertion of page amendments without tearing the holes — a common failing with that awkward *Staff Duties in the Field* binder.

With these innovations Major Smith will find that the new pamphlets are of a higher standard and he will probably agree that they compare most favourably with any other training publications in use throughout the world.

Now for the problem of distribution. We have always supplied pamphlets on a scale of issue based on the actual estab-

lishment of a unit — not its posted strength — together with a liberal reserve to Command pools. Pools can be drawn on for short-term loans to units running coaching courses and suchlike. Some examples of distribution scales are:

(*a*) Scale D to an infantry battalion:

(i) One copy to a lieutenant-colonel's command, plus one copy for each company 7

(ii) One copy for each officer's appointment on the establishment 36

(*b*) Scale E to a field regiment:

(i) One copy to a lieutenant-colonel's command, plus one copy for each battery and each officer 34

(ii) One copy to each warrant-officer and NCO of or above the ranks of sergeant 52

Naturally, there are many publications which are not issued on so generous a scale. Every officer does not want to know what type of grease to use in the dish washer, does he? The scale of distribution of each individual pamphlet must be assessed on the advice of all the Corps Directorates concerned. Then the requirements for Army schools, Command pools and Command and Army reserves must also be assessed before the final scale of issue is promulgated in AROs. Incidentally, does Major Smith realize that we now promulgate the issue of all new publications in Army Routine Orders? Every officer should read AROs so that he can see how a publication will be distributed and know whether or not he is entitled to receive a copy. If his copy is not to hand in a reasonable time, he can then raise the matter with the adjutant, or have him request an amendment to the Scales of Issue should it be inadequate. Scales of Issue are amended annually and should reach this Directorate by 30th November if of a routine nature. However, in urgent cases which cannot be met from Command pools or reserves, pending the routine amendment DMT will process an amendment forthwith.

Other Sources

As a result of Major Smith's plea, *Training Information Bulletins* (TIBs) are to be issued in future on a much wider scale of one per officer. For the time being the issues will be made twice yearly. If the need becomes evident, however, more frequent distributions will be arranged. TIBs will contain the latest training information and indicate recent or forthcoming amendments and so forth. They should include much of the information already promulgated in Corps liaison letters and bulletins, which should be regarded as an information source.

The *Australian Army Journal* is at present an Unclassified publication and is widely circulated not only in the AMF but to people outside the Service. If it were decided to publish training doctrine in the journal then

it would have to be classified RESTRICTED and issued only to members of the AMF. So let us leave the AAJ out of our calculations. It is a good medium for airing our views and should stay that way. Major Smith's article is a typical case in point.

A manual, *Army Training Instructions* (ATIs), which will replace *Instructions for Training, 1956,* is almost ready for the printer at long last. This publication should be of great value to all as it offers a consolidated source of training instructions and directives for the guidance of commanders and staff. Certain sections will be printed separately and issued on a far wider scale than the parent document, thus allowing for generous issues to units, command training pools and army schools of those portions of the text which concern them.

The New Approach

The more important pamphlets have been completely revised to reflect the reorganization of the army and considerable effort is being expended to ensure that all such publications are written to a common pattern and that needless repetition of information or doctrine is eliminated. This will be one step towards reducing their size. The present printing programme is the heaviest yet undertaken in the history of DMT — and all of it is progressing smoothly to achieve the tight timetable which has been laid down. Among the pamphlets under revision are:

(*a*) The Division in Battle series.

(*b*) The Infantry Training, Volume 4, series.

(*c*) Staff Duties (Australia).

These pamphlets should be in the hands of all concerned early in 1966. They will be issued at least on Scale D — one for each officer — with more generous reserves than in the past. The Division in Battle, Pamphlet No. 3; *The Staff Notebook* will be prepared later and should satisfy the demand for a "clue book". If it does not meet an individual's needs for any course or exercise, he should adjust it to suit himself by taking relevant pages or diagrams from other books in the series.

Important all arms and services subjects such as "Patrolling and Tracking" and "Ambush and Counter Ambush" have been given special consideration and will be issued shortly in pocket size on a very wide scale. Constant repetition of doctrine on these subjects which is an unfortunate feature of the current series will be avoided and pamphlet size thus further reduced.

Writing and Printing

The task of writing and printing the mass of material which pours through DMT is a formidable one. Since Australia has adopted organizations specifically designed for the South-East Asian theatre we have isolated ourselves from those excellent United Kingdom publications which formerly were purchased for the AMF. The writing task grew rapidly until it became quite beyond the capability of DMT with the

result that many books got out of date and stayed unamended.

When it is found that a particular aspect of training or doctrine needs to be changed, alternative ideas are first tested in search of the correct solution. The problem may be either the simple one of a brief amendment or the involved process of rewriting a whole series of pamphlets. When the answer emerges, then someone is given the task of converting practice into English in the form of a draft or an amendment to an existing pamphlet. (The drafting of pamphlets is often additional to an officer's normal duties and frequently can only be done at nights or weekends.) This draft must be vetted for accuracy by all the Directorates and Army schools concerned. The final draft is then given DMT blessing for consistency and compatibility with other doctrine before it is sent to the printer for setting.

Until recently DMT has lacked staff to handle amendments. A recent increase in establishment has provided two publications officers, one of whom will be given the task of ensuring that the new series is kept amended and up to date. Suggested amendments will be encouraged now that they can be handled. The draft or amendment must of course be fitted into the programme for printing already arranged by the printer — if the printer is to maintain his schedule and operate his business economically. We have managed to have the time for production of amendments reduced to a total of 21 days from time of receipt of the manucript by the printer to the date of issue to the COD for distribution to units. Prompt printing and distribution does not, however, overcome the practice adopted by some units of collecting their issues from the BODs only once a month or sometimes less frequently. Units should collect these issues as they become available and not leave them to gather dust in the Depot.

Finally the distribution and control of publications within the unit need to be examined closely. In the past a great deal of waste has occurred because of poor unit control. In some cases units have asked for copies of publications — unaware that they already held more copies in their unit library than they were requesting. One Command allowed its pool of a new publication to waste away in less than two years. The issue of *The Soldier's Handbook* to all private soldiers will provide them with a useful training manual which will impose on units further control and amendment problems. If these are solved they should reduce the private soldiers' demands for other pamphlets. ATIs will clearly state how these problems are to be overcome.

The problems of printing are still not entirely solved. Remember that Australia is changing to decimal currency in February 1966, and the army must take its turn along with all other government departments and business concerns in its bid to have matter printed. Most of our books are printed outside

the army by civilian firms who tender through the Department of Supply. As the contract system is rightfully an established part of Australian public administration we have sometimes to accept a lower standard than desirable or suffer delays which are beyond army control.

Conclusion

The Directorate of Military Training has in hand a number of measures to improve the system of production of training doctrine and information and expects that all major obstacles will be overcome before the end of 1966. Thenceforward we should be capable of making readily available all training information needed by officers and NCOs either engaged in the preparation of soldiers for battle or studying for promotion.

Well, Major Smith, we hope that we have provided you with the kind of information which you sought. Many thanks for your timely article which has encouraged us to brief you and the army as a whole on what we are doing to provide you with the training information to which all of you are entitled.

SOLDIERS TALKING

If on service you detect a soldier marauding, be sure to seize upon the plunder, whether pig, lamb, goose, or other poultry; but as it may be the first offence, and a reprimand may deter him from the like practices in future, you need not report him to the commanding officer; and if you eat the stolen goods, it is only to prevent the sin of waste.

In order to turn the penny, contrive, when in camp, to let your wife keep a hut in the rear, and sell ale and gin. The standing orders only say you shall not do it, but do not prohibit her. Here you may settle with your men; and if they spend the greater part of their pay in liquor, it is no more than they would do elsewhere, and you may as well have their money as another.

— *Advice to a Serjeant, 1782.*

BRITISH COUNTER-INSURGENCY EXPERIENCE

Lieutenant-General Sir Kenneth Darling, KCB, CBE, DSO,
British Army

Reprinted from the January 1965 issue of MILITARY REVIEW,
US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas, USA

THERE is little doubt that small wars, popular uprisings, and other types of commotions will occur in the future, and possibly with greater frequency than they have in the past. Both our nations have interests throughout the world and treaty obligations to our allies. And we British have a very special one of rendering assistance to any Commonwealth country which asks for it. It is, therefore, reasonable to suppose that the forces of both our nations are likely to have to meet the counter-insurgency type of operation.

This subject covers a wide field. At the lower end of the scale there can be riots and strife from which we can move to guerilla activity, rebellions, insurgency, and, finally, revolution. Whatever these definitions amount to, they all add up to trouble of one type or another which, if not properly and speedily handled, can quickly grow and lead to still greater trouble.

Frequently, I use the expression "soldier." I do not want this to be taken literally, since in counter-insurgency operations it is the combined effort of the civilian, the policeman, the soldier, sailor, and airman which makes for success. I use the word "soldier" only as a term of convenience.

Political-Military Operations

Sometimes in a counter-insurgency situation, particularly when things are difficult, we hear soldiers saying "if only we were given a free hand we would soon settle the business." To my mind this way of thinking discloses a complete failure to grasp the nature of the problem and how it must be tackled.

This article is based on a lecture given by General Darling on 4th May 1964 to US Army Command and General Staff College students at Fort Leavenworth. A Sandhurst graduate, General Darling was originally commissioned in the 7th Royal Fusiliers in 1929. He has served in India, with the 5th Parachute Brigade in Europe and the Far East; as Chief of Staff of the II British Corps during the Suez Canal crisis; as GOC Cyprus District and Director of Operations 1958-60; as Director of Infantry 1960-62; and as GOC I British Corps in Germany 1962-63. He is at present GOC-in-C Southern Command, England.

The contribution which military forces can make is limited both in time and scope. With regard to time, normally these forces are called in when the local government and police force can no longer contain the trouble. The contribution of military forces ends when the trouble has been reduced to such an extent that it is no longer a threat to the administration of the local government. As to scope, the task of the military forces is, in conjunction with the local government and police forces, so to reduce the power of the insurgent force that it is no longer an effective political weapon.

Principal Field

We all know that Communist methods of waging revolutionary wars are based on winning the active support — the minds — of the people. The government must counter this tactic by retaining the support of the people, and if that support has already been lost, by regaining it. The principal field for action must, therefore, be in the political field, and action in the military field must be designed to further the political aim and support it. While action in these two fields is inextricably mixed, military action taken on its own cannot achieve success. Moreover, it is wrong to think that military action can be applied to sterilize a situation, after which a political solution can be sought.

It must be obvious that what we soldiers can do is largely dependent on a clear political aim which is adhered to steadfastly. It is perfectly possible for us to put up with changes in the political aim, and in the military field to try and support what can best be described as a "stop-and-go" policy. Such a policy, however, makes life for us very difficult indeed, if only because inevitably it means that the initiative is lost, and holding the initiative is one of the prime requirements for successful military action. We must, therefore, never cease making it clear to our political masters that we shall pay a heavy price if we work in support of a stop-and-go political policy.

Personal Experience

Here, I would like to draw on a personal experience which I believe underlines the tremendous advantages to be gained once the political aim is settled and the soldiers know exactly how they stand in relation to it.

Just before I was sent to Cyprus, to my intense surprise I was sent for by the Prime Minister, Mr. Harold MacMillan. I must confess that I looked forward with much relish to my summons to 10 Downing Street — a place to which I had not been a habitual visitor in the past. The Prime Minister, in speaking to me, left me in no doubt whatsoever as to what was the political aim of Her Majesty's Government, the determination of Her Majesty's Government to attain it, and what part the military forces were to play. Finally, he added with a twinkle in his eye, "If you have any great difficulty or worry let me know direct. I daresay some of your requests

may impinge on the Chancellor of the Exchequer," and he added with a smile on his face, "but I can handle him."

You can imagine the effect this short talk had on me. Here I was going out as a new military commander to face a difficult situation, and I left 10 Downing Street that day well knowing that I had the whole power of my country behind me, and I lost no time in telling all my soldiers the form. This brief conversation greatly eased our task and enabled us to treat with contempt and disdain the small fry yapping at our heels, as always is the case in these situations.

Command

In a nutshell, the problem of command is one of welding together, from the highest to the lowest level in the territory concerned, the civil administration, the civil police, and the military forces involved, which could well comprise naval, army and air forces. Whatever organization is required, it must ensure intimate cooperation between the various government departments and the armed forces.

At each of the levels we have in mind there are three elements mainly concerned with conducting counter-insurgency operations:

- The civilian from the government or other authority.
- The soldier who is in charge of military operations in the widest sense. At the top level he might be called the Director of Operations.
- And, most importantly, Intelligence represented by the Chief of Intelligence.

At whatever level controlling bodies are formed — from the national level down to the district level — persons from these three elements will always be found working together. At each level the chairman will be the civilian, because it is the civilian administration which sets the pace and must remain in over-all control of policy in the territory concerned. You may be surprised that I have included in this triumvirate the Chief of Intelligence or his representative. I have done so deliberately to show the emphasis which I believe must be placed on the intelligence organization in handling the situation.

At the national level, the national security council, or whatever you may like to call it, will probably have a large number of people serving on it. In fact, executive action at this level will be in the hands of a much smaller body which must have efficient staff machinery to process its decisions. At the lower levels — the district level — the operations committee will be much smaller. I need hardly add that the areas for which military commanders are responsible must coincide with the areas which are the responsibility of their civilian counterparts.

This command organization sounds delightfully easy and clear cut. It would be foolish, however, not to recognize that there are considerable difficul-

ties in making it work smoothly. One difficulty stems from the fact that, if military forces have to be brought in to help the civil administration and the police, it is possible that the morale of some members of that administration will be low in some instances, and that there will be suspicion and jealousy of the military forces. Commanders of military forces, therefore, need to act with considerable tact to help re-establish normal civil administration where it is weak, to support the civil police, and finally, to lend all possible aid, both in brainpower and manpower, to the intelligence organization.

Winning People's Minds

The task of winning people's minds looms large in any counter-insurgency campaign, and three groups are involved in the contest:

- The insurgents.
- The forces of law and order.
- The man in the street, or, perhaps I should say, the paddy field, who is really the jam in the sandwich.

The contest is a triangular one, and its frontiers extend far beyond the confines of the country concerned.

No one understands better the importance of activity in this field than the leaders of insurgency movements, whether they be Communists or not. From our point of view, success in the battle for the allegiance of the man in the street can far outweigh that achieved by military action.

In considering how to conduct the campaign, the first thing we must attend to is its control and direction. I am quite certain that what is really important in this field is not the mechanics of running a propaganda campaign, but the policy and control. The latter should, I believe, be vested in a civilian. Here, the golden rule is that that person should, if possible, be of the same race as the target for the campaign. If this cannot be achieved, he should at least have an intimate knowledge of the habits and ways of the nationality concerned.

Since activity in the field of propaganda invariably involves matters of high policy, the head of the campaign should be responsible to the civilian head of government rather than to a military authority. By harnessing a high-grade intelligence organization to activity in the field of propaganda we have available to us a most powerful weapon. Action in these two fields is complementary.

In these situations we are bound to have hostile opinion of some kind to meet. It is probably a waste of time trying to win over that opinion which in any event is against us. We should not concentrate our effort on the extremes of opinion, but on the centre.

Communication

This leads me to ways and means of communicating with the minds of the people whom we are trying to influence — in other words, the problem of public relations and the use of the press, radio and television as a

means of conveying news, ideas, and information.

We all know the tremendous power in the modern world of these means of mass communication, and in recent years considerable strides have been made, particularly using the medium of radio and television.

What must be our attitude to the press, and I am using that phrase in the widest sense of the word? Too often the average soldier believes the right policy is either to muzzle or to ignore the press, but I am sure in this type of situation we can afford to do neither. The power of the press is far too great for such treatment, and I believe generally the following policy will pay:

- Whatever the risks may be, we must "play" with the press. The initiative must come from the top of the counter-insurgency forces, because the press is not interested in second or third strings. Senior commanders must make themselves accessible to the press within reason, and time spent in this way will be found to be well worthwhile. On the other hand, press conferences should not become too commonplace, otherwise they tend to lose their importance.

- It is a matter of judgment for the commander to decide to what extent he can take the members of the press into his confidence. He will have to be selective, and by doing so it enables him to gain their confidence and this is an important matter.

- It is generally better to use and harness existing means of disseminating information and news than to create some special medium which is clearly related to an organ of the government. I say this because the latter course immediately enables the man in the street to recognize it as being propaganda, and to regard it as being tainted and suspect. The trick is so to disguise what is propaganda that it appears to be perfectly ordinary news.

The upshot of tackling the problem in this way is that there is a good chance of getting the bulk of the press under control, and so providing a vehicle for the carriage of our ideas. This may seem far-fetched, but it is true because the press lives on news, and if it feels that it can come to us and seek our news easily, and we are prepared to let it have our news, then our news will be published. What we must never do, however, is to attempt to order the press to take a certain line of action. This the press will not do. We can obtain precisely the same effect by the indirect method I have described.

By adopting an open attitude with the press, then we can get this most powerful weapon for winning the mind of the man in the street on our side. This, incidentally, has a good effect on the morale of our soldiers — as conversely it has a bad effect on that of the trouble-makers.

And we must not overlook the handsome contribution to the task of winning the minds of the people which can be made by the

local police force; hence the need to build up an efficient police force founded on sound lines and properly led. Military forces, too, can help. A well-disciplined and well-behaved soldier is a magnificent means of communication with the man in the street. Conversely, if he is brutal or takes the law into his own hands, the results can be disastrous.

Tactical Problem

What are the problems of grappling with the forces of insurgency? Their tactics follow a well-known pattern. Their members are merged with the countryside. Often they wear no uniform and do not operate from a fixed base. They can live simply and largely off the country. The leader is responsible probably only to himself. He can be utterly ruthless, and is not bound to play by any rules. Their forces do not necessarily hold ground, nor will it suit them to stand and fight. They will operate with great patience, and surveillance is their watchword. They will use every means, fair and foul, to win public opinion.

Leadership is generally at a premium. Consequently, these leaders take exceptional measures regarding their own security. One feature of such measures is that, although there is a chain of command from the top to the bottom of the movement, it is only roughly organized and not known to all members of that movement in the way that we understand a chain of command in our regular forces. To all but a chosen few the whereabouts of the leader is not known, and the communications system is kept a closely guarded secret.

There is nothing new in these tactics, and we do not want to allow ourselves to be persuaded by upstarts such as Mao Tse-tung that he has produced some original thought in this field. In fact, we British in some degree or another have been promoting insurgency all around the world for centuries.

'Controlled Robustness'

If I were asked to sum up in a few words what general consideration should govern our tactics, I would say that this should be "controlled robustness."

In considering our own tactics, the first thing to do is to identify the precise problem posed to us. This is the starting point. In devising our tactics let us remember that military operations must be planned to regain control over the country without alienating the support of the people. It is important for military forces to gain and hold the initiative so that we force the insurgent to fight on our terms and not on his. The insurgent must not be presented with successes which are hailed as victories and which do much to bolster his morale.

We shall certainly have to take many leaves out of his book, and use underground means to attack him. We cannot entirely fight an underground movement by overground means. We must extract the maximum possible advantage from modern tech-

nical aids and equipment, which are probably denied to some extent to the insurgents. I am thinking particularly of air-power and communications. Targets will be hard to find, and when they are seen they must not be missed, which postulates a superlative standard of training.

The conduct of military forces must be above reproach. We are merely playing the insurgent's game if, as the result of being baited, we lose our tempers, lower our standards, and sink to his low level. To avoid alienating the support of the mass of the people in the territory concerned, the action we take must be as selective as possible. Bludgeon tactics generally do not pay.

Intelligence Organization

These are some of the points in the tactics we should use. But none of these are of any avail without a top-class intelligence organization, for it is this which enables us to act selectively, to hit where it hurts most, and to do so without alienating the mass of the people. It is this instrument alone that enables us to attack the leadership which, if eliminated, has an effect out of all proportion.

Intelligence is the key to the box of tricks; without it sound decisions in both the political and military fields cannot be taken. In fact, without a highly-tuned intelligence machine we are merely shadow-boxing.

Only by having a first-class intelligence organization can we seize the initiative and operate on our terms. Only by this means can we be selective in our action and avoid what I describe as bludgeon tactics, which play into the hands of the insurgents. It is the intelligence organization which will enable us to attack the leadership direct.

For all these reasons, and many others, those of us who become involved in counter-insurgency operations would be wise first to attend to the intelligence machine and to take steps to ensure that it is the best possible organization. An intelligence organization does cost money, but any expenditure in this field is a drop in the ocean compared to the cost of trying to operate without efficient intelligence.

Chief of Intelligence

Intelligence is largely a matter of organization and coordination, and it is often in these fields that we fail. Therefore, the first requirement is that there should be one — and only one — intelligence organization in the area of operations. This must be fully integrated from top to bottom, and must be headed by one man, whom I like to call the Chief of Intelligence, which gives point to his position of complete authority. This man must have the confidence of and work in the closest accord with the head of the civil administration and the Director of Operations. This is the triumvirate which, in effect, formulates policy for the conduct of the campaign.

What qualities should be required of a person holding the post of Chief of Intelligence?

Here, I must introduce you to a mythical British character called "Buggins." Buggins is a worthy person who has, according to his lights, done his job admirably for a number of years in the country concerned. His task has not been exacting because all has been quiet, and there has been little to disturb the normal rhythm of life. Suddenly, calm in the territory we have in mind is disturbed by the pressure of events. With the onset of trouble, Buggins finds himself hard put to compete with the new situation. In fact, he is very quickly out of his depth. But because he is an old retainer and has plenty of local knowledge, he is kept as head of the intelligence organization and gets promotion as it expands. He cannot rise to the heights now demanded of him, and in consequence, the intelligence organization suffers.

Buggins is very much in the position of a goldfish who has for some years lived a nice quiet life swimming about in a glass bowl in the house of his master. One day some unkind person comes along and tips the contents of the goldfish bowl into the Atlantic where there is a Force 9 gale blowing; somewhat naturally, Buggins, the goldfish, finds himself out of his depth.

The moral of this story is that we cannot afford to keep people like Buggins when the storm breaks. In short, Buggins must go and be replaced by a high-calibre man as Chief of Intelligence.

What are the qualities required of this man? First and foremost, he must be a high-grade organizer. Second, he must have relentless determination. Third, a strong personality and an iron constitution are both most desirable. The least important of the qualities required is that of local knowledge.

Find such a man and place him at the head of the intelligence organization, give him all the support and the trust he deserves and requires, and we shall discover that the business of engaging in counter-insurgency operations is simplified, which will be greatly to our advantage.

Summary

In this article I have outlined what I believe to be the main problems in the fields of political and military action, command, the tactical problem, and intelligence. What I have said may give the impression that these problems are easy and straightforward. In practice, the situation does not work out like that. A troublesome situation so often builds up quickly, and measures to deal with it lag behind and are tardily applied.

It may be that in the future the type of situations I have in mind will be handled more frequently by forces under the banner of the United Nations. In such an event, will the general principles I have described remain good? Will there then be new problems we shall have to face?

I can see no reason why the general principles should change in any way, but we can appre-

ciate the formidable additional problems which will have to be faced by a force drawn from a variety of nations and operating under United Nations command. I say this even making allowance for the undoubted fact that such a force may draw a good deal of strength from the moral backing of the United Nations.

So often speed in dealing with an emergency which suddenly arises is the secret of success. This means that the elements of such a force, together with its command system and communications, must be established and ready for action in advance of that emergency.

I fear we have some way to go before we reach such a situation.

WATERLOO, JUNE 1815

The last scene of the battle had been reached, and it was memorable enough; it redounded chiefly to the glory of the French Army, and it was fought out near de Coster's house. Here, waiting in squares, stood the two battalions of the 1st Grenadiers of the Guard, under General Petit — probably the finest troops in Europe. In the centre of the 1st Battalion was the Emperor himself. It was with these living ramparts that Napoleon designed to cover the disorganised flight of the Grand Army, and to save them from the horrors of close pursuit. A 12-pounder battery of the Guard Artillery was brought into action on the prolongation of the squares; but it possessed only one round per gun. As the pursuing cavalry closed, a last volley of grape-shot pealed from the mouths of the guns; and then the gunners, standing calmly beside their empty pieces, were sabred where they stood. But the squares standing firm withstood all charges. The attacks had no more effect on them than have handfuls of sand when they are blown against the granite pyramids of Egypt. The two squares of picked troops defied all efforts to break them, and they stood alone — two battalions confronting two armies!

For even Lobau's defences were down, and the Prussians had driven the defenders out from the ruins of the blazing village of Plancenoit, and pursuers and pursued debouched pell-mell on to the Charleroi highway. In self-defence the Grenadiers had to clear their faces with fire, lest foes should enter the two citadels with the friends who sought refuge therein. General Petit's Grenadiers stood firm despite the awful ruin around; but at length the Emperor ordered them to fall back, and slowly these war-worn veterans yielded ground. In perfect order they drew off, halting continually to rectify their fire and arrest the pursuit by effective enfilading fire. Thus the Old Guard showed that it was worthy of itself — and of France.

— Captain A. F. Becke,
Napoleon and Waterloo, Vol. II, (London, 1924).

THE QUALITIES OF A GOOD INSTRUCTOR

Warrant Officer R. R. Burns

"Give a wise man instruction and he will be wiser."
— Prov 9.9

COMMANDING OFFICERS sometimes say that good instructors are rare. They need not be rare. Anyone who is enthusiastic about his subject, knows it well and is able to talk about it in a clear and interesting fashion has it in his power to become a good instructor.

Instructing is an art, not an exact science. There exists a notion that the ability to instruct is a divine gift, bestowed on some, denied to others. This is far from the truth. The technique of instruction, like the technique of playing a musical instrument, can be, and has to be learnt. True, aptitude will vary; some will never achieve proficiency, few virtuosity, but all will improve with application and practice. Within these limits, instructors are made, not born.

Since the decision to close down the Central Instructors' School at Kapooka, New South Wales, very little has been done to ensure that junior NCOs are adequately fitted to carry out their jobs as instructors. Unit and sub-unit cadres have been and are being conducted, but these often fall short of acceptable standards.

The scope of this article is to help those responsible for instruction at all levels, especially where the training of the junior NCO is concerned, to appreciate the qualities needed in a good instructor. As the majority of the work of instruction in units is carried out by the junior NCO, perhaps these notes will

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The author enlisted in August 1945 and served with the 65 Inf Bn in Japan and with 3 RAR in Korea from the outbreak of hostilities until wounded in January 1951. Afterwards, he served with the 13 and 20 National Service Training Battalions, with 1 Reinforcement Training Battalion and at the FARELF Training Centre. He was attached to the Jungle Training Centre (1957-58) and posted to the RMC (1958-61). Thence he joined 3 RNSWR in May 1961 and a year later the 13 Cadet Bn.

While at RMC and 3 RNSWR Mr. Burns undertook a three-year course in his own time at the Australian National University in the faculty of Oriental Languages, and the qualifications so gained were instrumental in winning him a place in 1964 at the twelve-months' course at the RAAF School of Languages, Point Cook. He qualified at that course as a linguist/translator in Bahara Indonesia. He is now serving as an instructor with 1 Recruit Training Battalion, Kapooka.

be of some assistance in helping him to perform this task.

The Objects of Training

The objects of training are laid down in the various manuals for the different arms. Instructors should familiarize themselves with these objects and keep them in mind throughout their instruction. A clear idea of the aims and purposes of any instruction is essential if that instruction is to be really effective.

A successful instructor should know not only his job as a soldier, but sometimes the ways in which the minds and bodies of recruits work and of the most effective and economical way of learning and teaching.

Few things are so damaging to the morale of troops in training as poor instruction. If the work is given in a listless or monotonous manner by an instructor who is dull, half-hearted, or not well-informed, the men will become bored and discipline will suffer. Instructors must be masters of their subject matter, keen, resourceful and able to present their material in a realistic and challenging fashion. Hence the necessity to keep in mind the object of the training to be undertaken.

Qualities of a Good Instructor

It is impossible to learn how to teach by reading about it in a book. Constant practice is essential. You can, however, get ideas from a book, and you can learn to be self-critical. Set out below are some points which are definitely *not* the qualities of a good instructor.

(*a*) *The Non-Stop Talker:* This instructor subjects his passive class to forty minutes of oratory at a stretch. Sometimes he has even learnt the subject matter off, inclusive of jokes. He is veritably a human gramophone and expects his class to remember every word. Never talk too long or too much. Vary the procedure with questions, discussion and practical exercises. Try to give the class an active part in the lesson.

(*b*) *The Dictator of Notes:* The least line of resistance which an instructor can pursue is to dictate reams of notes carefully gathered and organized from various text-books. Notes are good in their place but only as an auxiliary, and should be produced as required, in precis form.

(*c*) *The Bore:* The dull instructor will never get results. The class, no matter how well-intentioned at the beginning, will become listless and inattentive. Whatever you do, avoid being dull. Work up an artificial storm sometimes, if necessary. Question briskly. Think out devices to give variety to your procedure. Try to look as though you are enjoying the period.

(*d*) *The Text-Book Reader:* One of the worst methods of commencing a period of instruction is to say, "Now open your text-books at page 5, and we'll go carefully through the chapter." On

occasions this may be permissible and even advisable, but as a constant method it is absolutely hopeless. The text-book is a powerful helper, but it is not meant to do your job for you. You have to give it life and meaning.

(*e*) *The Dealer in Sarcasm:* Sometimes there is a definite streak of cruelty in the instructor who uses sarcasm to impart his knowledge. It is unfair to make a student who is striving to learn the object of a cheap jibe. He cannot hit back. If you are sarcastic you will almost certainly earn the dislike of your class.

(*f*) *The Victim of Mannerisms:* Some instructors have unfortunate mannerisms. Students at first are amused, then they mock and eventually the effectiveness of the work is ruined. Mannerisms vary from a tendency to St. Vitus' Dance to the irritating habit of interspersing drawling "er-r-rs" through the sentences.

Having disposed of the bad qualities of an instructor, let me now proceed to the pleasanter task of making a list of the positive qualities which a good instructor should possess.

(*a*) *Knowledge:* He must know his subject matter thoroughly and be up-to-date. Anyone who has to instruct a squad when his knowledge is inadequate is in trouble. A group of soldiers will listen to and respect an instructor who obviously knows every point of his subject, but they are quick to detect and resent incompetence. The instructor who has had recent experience on active service has a great advantage in that he can speak realistically of what he has seen, but others can take pains to gather a store of good examples and illustrations. Make sure, however, that you know your work before trying your hand at instructing.

(*b*) *Clarity:* A good instructor must be clear-headed; that is, he should have a very clear mental picture himself of what he is going to describe. If he has, the chances are that he will be able to give his group an equally clear picture. Some instructors with an extensive knowledge of their subject lose effectiveness by giving the class a muddled account or a description drowned in small details. A clear-headed instructor is always appreciated by a class.

(*c*) *Keenness:* Nothing is so infectious as enthusiasm. The instructor must be interested in his subject. Then, if his instruction is good and clear, his class will catch his zeal. Practically every topic of army instruction can be made vivid and appealing. Moreover, an interested class will not become fatigued; it is astonishing to see the amount of work a keen instructor can get from an enthusiastic class without tiring them.

Boredom and fatigue have much to do with each other.

(*d*) *Personality:* To be really successful an instructor must have certain qualities of personality which ensure attention and the respect of his class. In his manner, be it ever so pleasant, there must be something a little *compelling. It is hard to* analyse the quality; perhaps to a certain extent the secret lies in the possession of a sense of the dramatic. It often reveals itself in the ability to tell a story well, and that is why a dull person will never make a good instructor. The quality of personality is born in people, but it is good to see how it can be developed in individuals by conscious effort on their own part.

(*e*) *Sense of Humour:* A sense of humour is a great asset in a teacher. The class will quicken up and respond immediately if, in the midst of a strenuous or difficult piece of work, they and their teacher can share a laugh. An instructor who said in a revision period, "Don't try to start from rest in one of the higher gears" made his point more effectively by adding, "It is bad for the transmission, and also for your NCO's complexion." On the other hand do not attempt to be humorous if it does not come naturally. Nothing is so painful as a would-be comedian who does not succeed. The response of your class will be an effective indicator.

(*f*) *Smart Appearance:* Smartness of appearance and demeanour is essential. Too much stress cannot be laid on this. Visits to many units and camps will give ample evidence. The instructor with the tired manner, drooping over a model or weapon with a hand in his *pocket, invariably has a* slack class. The reverse is equally as true; instructors who are neatly dressed and smart in their movements and manner always appear to have classes which reflect their own eagerness and smartness.

How the Recruit Learns

A recruit, on first joining a unit, has much to learn which may contrast strikingly with his ordinary civil life. He will learn a great deal of what is required indirectly without any special attention or instruction. Consciously and unconsciously, by imitation of those around him, he will pick up many of the customs and ideals of the Service which he has entered. The habit of cheerful, unhesitating obedience to authority is an example of one of the many things that are best learnt from actual participation in the life of an organization where this is the rule.

One of the most important functions of an instructor is to help the recruit by suggestion and example to fit into his new way of life. He should always remember his responsibility for this kind of indirect instruction and, at all times and in all circumstances, should endeavour

to reflect in himself and his attitude the very best traditions of the Service.

It should be stressed here that the views put forward in this article are not critical of the publications *Good Instruction, Parts 1 and 2* or *Successful Instruction,* but general observations on what qualities should be found in a good instructor.

Important though indirect learning may be as an aid in developing a recruit into an efficient soldier, a large part of the time available must be spent in direct instruction in the various details of a soldier's work. Among other things he must be trained to be confident and expert in the use of his weapons, and to co-operate with his fellows in the drill movements essential to enable him to take his proper place in a controlled and flexible unit. All these aspects of a soldier's life will need careful teaching, and the most valuable ally that an instructor can have in this work is the recruit's own "will to learn."

Organization

Not even the most gifted instructor can give a successful session without adequate preparation. He may be a good speaker and a good demonstrator, but unless his work is set down in clear and ordered sequence, with the main points emphasised, his class will be in danger of obtaining only a partial or confused impression of the material taught. How many instructors have had to "tidy up" the work of other lazy individuals who were too tired (perhaps after a heavy night in the arms of Bacchus) to prepare their lessons properly, and "cuffed" them?

Adequate time is essential for preparation and those instructors who constantly devote a fair amount of time to preparation before each session will never allow their procedure to become stereotyped. A versatile instructor with a gift of fluent speech may be able to hold his men's attention, but unless he backs up his natural talent by systematic preparation for his instruction periods he will not get results.

Conclusion

Throughout all instruction the instructor should keep in mind the general purposes of the whole of the recruits' training, together with the special purpose of each piece of instruction which he undertakes. He must remember how this fits into the whole scheme, what has preceded it and what is to follow. He should plan and conduct his work with these considerations in mind. For a junior NCO the lessons he should be required to teach initially, dependent upon his capabilities and experience, should be carefully supervised by a capable senior NCO or officer. This will ensure that he is headed in the right direction; once efficiency is achieved, he can then be left to the more difficult types of lessons.

Successful instruction is mainly a result of mastery over one's job, knowledge of the effective methods of teaching, under-

standing of the workings of the recruits' minds and of their abilities and limitations, and, perhaps what is most important of all, enthusiasm for the work. The more an instructor is able to communicate his enthusiasm the better. It is the individual recruit who is the ultimate teaching unit and who must be stimulated to make the required efforts on his own behalf which will lead him to become an efficient soldier. The instructor, by maintaining the qualities set out here, and by example, skill, knowledge and care, can guide the learner's efforts in the right direction most effectively when the will to learn is present.

THE AIR TASK FORCE

The employment of an air task force comprising transport and fighter squadrons in conjunction with a formation in the field is undoubtedly the solution to many problems which arise regarding transport by air in the forward areas. In the initial stages [of the Lae offensive] 2nd US Air Task Force was stationed at Tsili Tsili, some fifteen minutes flying from Nadzab; and later, when landing strip facilities permitted, moved to Nadzab. During the whole of the period from the commencement of operations until the Nadzab area was taken over by Corps, this air task force worked in conjunction with the division and maintained the closest liaison throughout.

The outstanding achievements of the transport squadrons were a real feature of the operation and contributed very appreciably towards its success. In one day one squadron of nine planes delivered 87 loads to Kaiapit — a round trip of approximately 100 miles — and on one occasion one plane made eleven trips in the day. The value of an aerial ferry service of this nature needs no further comment.

It is strongly recommended that, in operations of this kind, air task forces be employed with divisions in all cases where circumstances and conditions will permit.

— *Major-General G. A. Vasey,*

Report on Operations, 7 Aust. Div., New Guinea, 1-16 Sep., 1943.

REMINISCENCES: DOUGLAS MACARTHUR. (William Heinemann Ltd., Melbourne, 1964.)

"Publish and be damned!" If by some juxtaposition of time, place and purpose, Wellington's contemptuous remark to a young lady could have been proffered as advice to General MacArthur while he was writing his *Reminiscences*, the commander of the Allied forces in the South-West Pacific Area from 1942 to 1945 might perhaps have been permitted peacefully to pass into history as the "greatest general and best strategist" that World War II produced.

The assessment is Lord Alanbrooke's, quoted by MacArthur at p. 290 of his *Reminiscences*. General MacArthur lends weight to this assessment by remarking that Alanbrooke was England's "leading soldier . . . the finest strategic mind I had yet encountered . . . and . . . a professional soldier of the highest class" and adding the opinion of Liddell Hart — "the most distinguished of British military analysts" — that "MacArthur was supreme among the generals. His combination of strong personality, strategic grasp, tactical skill, operative mobility and vision put him in a class above other allied commanders in any theatre." Later General Spaatz's estimate that MacArthur was "the greatest general of all time" is added without comment.

Unfortunately for General MacArthur's reputation, not everyone has been content to accept these assessments, and the publication of his unusually revealing reminiscences has provided his critics, particularly in the United Kingdom, with material for attacks, largely of a personal nature, of quite damaging virulence. It seems odd that MacArthur's principal supporter among the English reviewers has turned out to be Field Marshal Montgomery. Montgomery, like Alanbrooke, Liddell Hart and Spaatz, may be no judge of what was proper so far as the Pacific theatre of operations is concerned, but he is, one would have thought, well-qualified to pass judgment on egotism.

Douglas MacArthur traces his ancestry back to a martial branch of the Scottish clan Campbell, and links the traditions of the family with "the heroic lore of King Arthur and the Knights of the Round Table." His grandfather had been brought to the United States by a widowed mother in 1825, was admitted to the bar and subsequently became an Associate

Justice of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. Douglas's father, Arthur, joined the Union Army as a first lieutenant and adjutant of the Wisconsin Volunteers at the tender age of 17, and by 19 was a colonel and in command of the regiment. Later he was for many years one of America's leading generals. He married in 1875 and fathered three sons: Arthur (born 1876, who died in 1923 after service in the navy in World War I, during which he won a Navy Cross and the DSM); Malcolm (born 1878, died 1883); and Douglas (born 26 January, 1880, at Arsenal Barracks, Little Rock, Arkansas of latter day fame). Douglas entered West Point in 1899, passing out as First Captain of the Corps with the "highest scholastic record in 25 years". He served in the Philippines and accompanied his father when General MacArthur was sent as an observer to the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. Later he served in France in 1918 as Chief of Staff of the 42nd (Rainbow) Division, became commander of the 84th Brigade in that division and commander of the division from 6th November until the armistice. In operations lasting about eleven weeks he won seven Silver Stars and two DSCs.

Afterwards the highest offices of the United States Army came quickly: he became Superintendent of West Point in 1919, served in the Philippines for an extended period, and in 1930 became Chief of Staff of the United States Army, a post he held for five years. During that period it fell to his lot to break up the Communist-inspired Bonus March of war veterans on Washington. (These actions "set me apart as a man to be destroyed, no matter how long the Communists had to wait," MacArthur somewhat grandiloquently remarks, "but it was to be 19 years before the bells of Moscow pealed out their glee at my eclipse.") He was then appointed Military Adviser to the Philippines Commonwealth Government and was later made a Field Marshal of the Philippines Army. At the end of 1937 he was retired from the United States Army at his own request, but remained with the Philippine Army to continue a ten-year plan of development. In July 1941 he was recalled to service in the United States Army with the rank of lieutenant-general and appointed commander of the United States Army Forces in the Far East, with headquarters in Manila. In March 1942 he left the Philippines to become Supreme Commander, South-West Pacific Area.

The General provides a colourful account of his departure from Corregidor to Mindanao by PT boat, and his subsequent flight to Australia by Flying Fortress on 17th March, 1942. Unfortunately, however, not all of it is in accordance with the facts.

"Over Timor we were spotted," he writes, "and they came up after us. But we changed course from Darwin, where they figured we would land and came in at Batchelor Field, 40 miles to the south, just as they hit the Dar-

win field. They discovered their mistake too late, and their dive bombers and fighters roared in at Batchelor ten minutes after I had left in another plane for Alice Spring (*sic*) to the South."

"It was close," MacArthur records his remarks to his chief of staff, Sutherland, as the aircraft landed, "but that's the way it is in war. You win or lose, live or die — and the difference is just an eyelash."

The account, though apparently circumstantial, sounds improbable in part. The implication is that the Japanese, like the Americans later with Yamamoto, regarded MacArthur as so important that they were out to get him at all costs. The General has a passion for drawing analogies, usually in his favour, between his own experiences and those of the other Great Captains — for example, Hannibal, Alexander, Napoleon. The death of Yamamoto, shot down by American aircraft, evidently affected him profoundly. He writes macabrely that "one could almost hear the rising crescendo of sound from the thousands of glistening white skeletons at the bottom of Pearl Harbour." But supposing the Japanese did regard MacArthur at this stage as so important, how were they to know that he was a passenger in the Flying Fortress? This section of the account is without foundation in fact, and should arouse speculation about other aspects of the accepted legend. Australian records confirm that there was no air raid on Darwin on 17th March — the day that MacArthur arrived there. A raid (the fourth recorded) had taken place on the previous day; the fifth raid did not occur until 19th March.

The General's statement of the background to his appointment as Supreme Commander, South-West Pacific Area does not agree with the accounts published in either the Australian or American histories.

He states that on 21st February, 1942, the Cabinet in Canberra requested his immediate transfer to Canberra as commander of the newly-formed South-West Pacific Area; eventually he was ordered to Australia by President Roosevelt. He found on arrival in Melbourne that "a sense of dangerous defeatism had seized upon a large segment of Australia's 7,000,000 people" and a "primary problem was to replace the pessimism of failure with the inspiration of success". As quickly as practicable he arranged a conference "with the man who had been instrumental in having me brought to Australia — Prime Minister John Curtin." Curtin, according to MacArthur, gripped him by both hands and said, "I knew I was not wrong in selecting you as Supreme Commander."

There is no evidence to support the passages relating to the Australian Government's early part in MacArthur's appointment to the SWPA Command. On 21st February, the ABDA Command, though crumbling, was still in existence. The SWPA Command had not been formed. Early in March the Australian Government proposed that General Brett, who had returned

to command the US forces in Australia after the dissolution of ABDA headquarters, should be appointed Supreme Commander of a new "Anzac" Area. According to the American and Australian official histories the first Mr. Curtin knew of MacArthur's coming to Australia was on 17th March, when General Brett telephoned the Australian Prime Minister and, in accordance with President Roosevelt's instructions, proposed that the Australian Government should nominate General MacArthur as Supreme Commander, South-West Pacific Area. The Australian Government complied. There is no way of checking whether Mr. Curtin's remarks are correctly reported, but it should be said of the "dangerous defeatism" that had apparently gripped a large segment of the Australian population, that there have been suggestions from American sources that at the outset General MacArthur himself was unduly pessimistic.

The General provides a new concept of the so-called Brisbane Line. He describes it as one traced by the Australian chiefs of staff "along the Darling River from Brisbane, midway up the eastern shoreline to Adelaide on the South Coast . . . The concept was one of passive defence [which] would only result in eventual defeat . . . I decided to abandon the plan completely, to move the thousand miles forward to eastern Papua and to stop the Japanese on the rough mountains of the Owen Stanley Range . . . This decision gave the Australians an exhilarating lift, and they prepared to support me with an almost fanatical zeal."

This legend was effectively disposed of by Dudley McCarthy, in *South-West Pacific Area — First Year*. McCarthy describes how Moresby was reinforced by General Sturdee with two battalions of militia soon after the outbreak of the Japanese war, quotes General MacArthur's "first directive" issued on 25th April, which prescribed "the entirely defensive role" for the Allied land forces of "preventing any landing on the north-east coast of Australia or on the south-western coast of New Guinea," and made no alteration in the existing dispositions of the forces. The arrival of reinforcements — A.I.F. and American — and the greatly improved training and equipment of the Australian Army — made it possible to extend the defence progressively northward. Even so no reinforcements were sent forward to Moresby until after the Coral Sea Battle, and no A.I.F. brigade reached New Guinea until after the Japanese had been established there for some four months.

General MacArthur's knowledge of the Papuan campaign is less precise than one might have expected, and bears some resemblance to the unclear communiques that he himself wrote during this period of the war. He describes a series of engagements in August, 1942, in the Owen Stanleys in which the enemy "passed over the peak of the trail and was descending the slopes towards Moresby" and by some flight of fancy places the

Japanese closer to that goal — "a mere 20 air miles" — than anyone else has succeeded in doing. Later he describes how his forces "compressed the enemy into the narrow coastal strip from Gona on the east (read west) through Buna village and Buna Mission in the centre and on to Salamaua on the west." Perhaps Sanananda, not "Salamaua" was intended, although Sanananda was the central (not western) keep of the Japanese defences. Salamaua, however, is plainly wrong, since the Japanese had not yet been pushed back to the coastal strip in that area and in fact were soon to begin an advance.

A deadlock followed, which MacArthur broke by sending in "General Eichelberger with my last reserve... the fresh troops made their presence felt immediately, capturing Gona on 9th December." Certainly Gona fell on 9th December — but to Australians who would be puzzled to learn that General Eichelberger was the inspiriting influence.

The General writes in so exaggerated a way of the influence of air power in this primarily infantryman's war — of "the calculated advance of bomber lines through the seizure of forward bases", each phase of the advance having "as its objective an airfield which could serve as a stepping-stone to the next advance" — that one is tempted to believe that he is confusing the Papuan with a later campaign. The truth surely is that the early conduct of the Papuan operations was dictated by the enemy with the Allied forces under General MacArthur responding, sometimes belatedly, to known enemy plans.

The Australian achievements in the subsequent campaigns receive scant notice. Lae (half a page); Finschhafen (six lines — the actual fighting described in a line and a half and then inaccurately); the mopping-up campaigns are not mentioned; Tarakan (seven words); Brunei (MacArthur "personally supervised the initial landing and with General Moorsehead and General Kenney went ashore with the assault waves"); Balikpapan ("resistance was only sporadic. I landed with the corps commander in the last wave of the assault troops" — plus 35 lines devoted to a minor incident — not recorded in the Australian official history — in which General MacArthur and the corps commander ran into "heavy machine-gun fire which caused some of our group 'to hit the dirt'."

The Australian commanders receive similar treatment. The commander of the Allied Land Forces, General Blamey, is briefly mentioned on 8 pages of this 426-page account; Generals Herring and Morshead on 2 pages; General Rowell, and Major-Generals Allen and Vasey and the other Australian divisional commanders are mentioned not at all.

Some readers may feel that General MacArthur's stated principles sometimes outshine his performance. For example, he states that Corregidor provided him with a perfect view of the whole panorama of the Bataan Peninsula. "As always,"

he writes, "I had to see the enemy or I could not fight him effectively."

Perhaps General MacArthur was correct in preferring the more distant view from Corregidor. His subordinate commander on Bataan where the fighting was ensuing may, however, have had other views. General Wainwright has recorded that MacArthur visited Bataan only once in the nine-weeks period after he withdrew to Corregidor. His failure to do so more frequently is not easy to reconcile with his account of the way he constantly exposed himself to danger during the air raids on Corregidor. This "was simply my duty. The gunners at the batteries, the men in the foxholes, they too were in the open. They liked to see me at such moments. The subtle corrosion of panic or fatigue, or the feeling of being fed up, can only be arrested by the intervention of the leader. Leadership is often crystallised in some form of public gesture . . . But in war, to be effective, it must take the form of a fraternity of danger welded between the commander and his troops by the common denominator of sharing the risk of sudden death."

If the need to share the risk was so apparent on Corregidor why not on more closely pressed Bataan? Why also was the need not felt earlier than October in Papua when for some time earlier the troops in the Owen Stanleys and at Milne Bay had appeared — to G.H.Q. — to be fighting a losing battle. When the General paid his first visit to New Guinea he had been in Australia for more than seven months; for the larger part of that period his headquarters had been in Melbourne, 2,000 miles distant from the front.

It would be wearisome to list all of the errors that mar General MacArthur's recollections. It perhaps suffices to say that his account of the SWPA campaigns is relatively brief and that the warning lights to the serious student flashed above occur within a few pages. It would be unfair, however, to decry his achievements, merely because of the evidence he provides of his own weaknesses. Where these existed they were blurred or obscured by a group of loyal officers and public relations men who skilfully and flatteringly built up the picture of MacArthur as a great commander — a brave, austere, remote, far-seeing strategical genius — at a time when such a legend was as badly needed in America as elsewhere. That campaign was persuasive, long-standing and brilliantly successful; the American officers who directed it have remained loyal to the concept; the chinks that have appeared in the public relations armour have been provided by the General himself.

— A.J.S.