AUSTRAL 6120001240 ARMY JOURNAL



No. 192

MAY.

1965

Number 192

May, 1965

AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

A Periodical Review of Military Literature

Distribution:

The Journal is issued through Base Ordnance Depots on the scale of One per Officer, Officer of Cadets, and Cadet Under Officer.

AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

Editor:

A. J. SWEETING

Staff Artist:

G. M. CAPPER


The AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL is printed and published for the Directorate of Military Training by Renown Press Pty. Ltd.

Contributions, which should be addressed to The Editor, Australian Army Journal, Directorate of Military Training, Army Headquarters, Canberra, are invited from all ranks of the Army, Cadet Corps and Reserve of Officers. £5 will be paid to the author of the best article published in each issue. In addition, annual prizes of £30 and £10 respectively will be awarded to the authors gaining first and second places for the year.

CONTENTS

P	age		
The Challenge Lieutenant-Colonel F. W. Cook	5		
Planning and Supervision of CMF Training Lieutenant-Colonel R. S. Garland	10		
The Queen's Medal Competition	19		
The French Canadian Problem	23		
The War in South Vietnam Captain R. Clark	27		
Communist China's Strategy in South East Asia Today Lieutenant-Colonel J. O. Langtry			
Goats Major A. J. C. Newton	40		
Book Reviews	45		

The views expressed in the articles in this Journal are the authors' own and do not necessarily represent General Staff opinion or policy.



German Parachute troops over Suda Bay, Crete, 20th May, 1941.

THE CHALLENGE

Lieutenant-Colonel F. W. Cook, DSO, MC, Royal Australian Infantry

"Difficulties are meant to rouse, not discourage."
— Channing.

A close examination of the history of Australia, from its turbulent pioneering past to the electronic era of today, shows clearly that the Australian Army has been challenged, on

The author enlisted in the ranks of the 2/10th Battalian in November, 1939. He was commissioned early in 1940 and served with the 2/10th throughout the siege of Tobruk, winning the MC in May 1941 when he led his platoon in a bayonet charge on enemy machinegun positions. He was promoted captain in September 1942, serving as a company commander at Milne Bay and in the severe fighting round Buna-Sananada where he won the DSO. At Balikpapan in July 1945 he commanded the leading company of the 2/10th in perhaps the most critical of the 18th Brigade's operations.

He joined the Interim Army from the Reserve of Officers in 1951, serving first as OC 1 Reinforcement Holding Unit, and later for two years with the Pacific Islands Regiment. He attended the Staff College in 1954 and was afterwards for three years GSO 1 3 Div. He became CO 47th Infantry Battalion in 1958 and AQMG 1 Div in 1960. After qualifying at the US Armed Forces Staff College course in 1961-62 he was appointed Assistant Australian Army Representative, Office of the Military Attache, Washington. Since April 1964 he has been GSO 1 HQ Northern Command.

major points or issues, many times.

The challenges, as I see them, have been:

- the raising and training of the First AIF and its subsequent battles;
- the raising, training and commitment of the Second AIF to the widespread battlefields of World War II.
- the adjustment from desert warfare to the "hunt and kill" tactics of the jungle;
- the introduction of a widespread National Service scheme;
- the introduction of the Pentropic scheme.

These challenges, together with others, were all met and conquered. Today the army is faced with a new series of challenges. These, in the last few months, have been thrown at us with bewildering speed, at a speed closely connected with the rapidly changing face of world

politics as related to our particular half of the hemisphere.

The major new challenges are:

- To reintroduce a National Service scheme and, more importantly, to make it work;
- to expand our army without adequate numbers of officers, non-commissioned officers and quarters for them, and at the same time keep the soldier interested, active and contented;
- to reorganize the ARA and the CMF into new types of units and formations;
- to bring the CMF up to strength and train it so that it can take its place in formations and units in the battlefield at short notice without additions to existing ARA cadres.

For many years now soldiers, in discussions in canteens, messes, barrack rooms and in the training field, have argued the nature of the requirements to make this army of ours better. Arising from these discussions was a cry for such additions as more soldiers and more "teeth" for them. Predominant amongst the cries was the longagonised one for a greater sense of national purpose.

At last the soldiers' "cry" has been met.

We have now been given our tasks and it is up to us to meet them, beat them and produce the result. We have been challenged again.

National Service

A large number of young men will enter the ranks of the army shortly and serve for two years under the recently introduced National Service scheme. Most of these young men, though not volunteers, will be quite happy to give two years to their country provided we make those years interesting, instructive and active. If we fall down on our task and do not give them what they expect, they will become dissatisfied.

These young men — the National Service trainees — will gain their first and most lasting impression of the army at the training battalion. Therefore we must ensure that:

- (a) All instructors know their lessons and have rehearsed them fully. There is no room for the lazy and inefficient instructor. There can be no "4.30 p.m. dash to the canteen" man here. He must be prepared to spend all available time "honing up" the next day's work and in the preparation of training aids.
- (b) Officers supervise their instructors by day and complete administrative paper work at night.
- (c) Officers know their men; it follows from this that men will get to know their officers. Remember, if your men take their personal problems to the padre first and not to you, you have fallen down on your obligations to them.
- (d) Discipline during recruit training is strict, fair and

impartial and consistent from top to bottom. Every man who enters the army expects strict discipline; if it is lacking he will be disappointed.

After recruit and corps training, the National Serviceman will be ready to join his unit and he will expect to find that all the regulars are efficient and up-to-date and that his new unit — a regular field force unit — is ready for battle. Many of the units to which the national serviceman will go after recruit training will be in process of being reorganized to a new establishment, or in the unsettled condition of being raised.

These conditions will pose a great challenge to officers and NCOs who will be required to produce the right atmosphere to imbue the new soldier with the will to make his unit the best in the army.

Expansion

In the next eighteen months the army will be expanded bevond present-day recognition. New units will be formed, old units divided on reorganization, training battalions established. The need to undertake all this within the existing strength of the ARA may at first glance appear to pose an insurmountable problem. The "weak sister" can already be heard saying that this is impossible with our present shortage of trained officers and NCOs. What hope have we coping with the burdens?

The answer is simple. We work harder, make better use of

the available talent and adopt the attitude that it can and will be done.

Let us not forget that nearly every soldier in the ARA today is capable of being trained for NCO rank and that most NCOs are capable of accepting the responsibilities of one or two ranks higher.

All officers with troops under command should and must, if not already started be conductting NCO courses for all ranks of NCOs. All ARA other ranks capable \mathbf{of} being promoted should immediately be given the opportunity of advancement. If they are not, there will be dissatisfaction when National Servicemen gain promotion and are in turn giving them orders.

Many officers will be reposted and will be required to change loyalties to new units. All of these must approach their new units with a determination to make them the best in the army. This is the only attitude that will produce the best unit and the best unified body of units in the army. Remember, a unit is only as good as its officers can make it.

Reorganization

Again we are to reorganize!

If time is taken to stop and think, it will be realised that changes in the army are normal and are to be expected. As the foreseeable threat changes, or develops, so must our groupings and organizations change to meet them. If we do not change our thinking and our posture to meet future problems, then,

quite rightly, we should be called inflexible.

The new organizations of the army of tomorrow have been evolved by people who have access to information on the threats: future foreseeable therefore we must believe that all factors have been taken into consideration and that the new organization is soundly sidered the best for the present situation. No doubt, threat alters or new and more sophisticated weapons become available, there will be further changes. But this in no way should alter our thinking that it is the task of every man in the army to accept the new organizations and make them work.

In addition, new methods of operating and the development of new tactical concepts will be the responsibility of every officer, NCO and man in tomorrow's army. Officers, by an enthusiastic approach to the new problems, will have to convince the men that the new organizations and groupings are better than those of yesterday.

CMF

The greatest and most significant change in the Australian Army of today and tomorrow is that which is now taking place in the CMF. For the first time in its history, the CMF has been given a fighting charter and every man in it has agreed to fight anywhere, anytime No more will they face, in time of war, disbandment of their units and the subsequent raising of expeditionary forces. They

themselves will form the expedi-Theirs are the tionary force. units that could be mobilised The sucand sent into battle. cess or failure of those units will be entirely dependent on the present and future efforts of every individual to reach and maintain the highest possible What an incentive standards. to every man in the CMF and to every man in the ARA cadre staffs to produce an effort!

In the citizen forces of today, there are dedicated men who have for years retained their belief in the need for a CMF despite an apparent neglect, a lack of public recognition and in some cases, antipathy from the ARA. These men have now been vindicated in their belief.

The CMF has been given the important goal of providing the follow-up formations and let no ARA man now consider the CMF a wasteful commodity. Remember, the CMF and the ARA man alike have voluntarily placed their lives in the balance should an emergency occur.

Every member of the ARA must do his best to assist CMF units to reach the highest possible training standards so that, if required, lives will not be lost through inefficiency and lack of training.

Conclusion

In the preceding paragraphs, an attempt has been made to outline the challenges that have been put to us and to show how they can be overcome. Much more could be said about solu-

tions to the problems presented but, in the writer's opinion, solutions will appear, provided the ingredients of willingness, determination and a capacity for work are used in the recipe.

Every officer and soldier in the army today, whether ARA or CMF — and there is no difference today — can help to meet and overcome the challenges presented by the changes in organization and the newly-

boosted strengths, and should start 1965 determined that he will not be the one to fail.

We are on the verge of creating in peacetime a large, efficient army committed for immediate service in any part of the globe. We have the resources to make this possible. Let us do it with a sense of purpose, without grumbling over details and with the full realisation that WE MUST NOT FAIL.

T. E. LAWRENCE

He will always have his detractors, those who sneer at the "Lawrence Legend"; who ascribe his successes with the Arabs to gold; who view the man as a charlatan in search of notoriety by seeming to seek obscurity; who regarded his descent from colonel to private as evidence of some morbid "nostalgie de la boue". They knew not the man. Those who did, even casually and sporadically, like myself, can answer for his greatness. The complexity of his character, the "mystery" of Lawrence, on which so much has been written, seems to me to lie mainly in the fact that he transcended the ordinary heights in so many qualities: in courage, in knowledge, in self-discipline, in skill with his hands, in artistry of words, in sympathy with the common working man and with the soldier, in demanding so little from life for his body and so much — too much perhaps — for his mind. But I am not competent to analyse the man: all I can say is that he was cast in heroic but very human mould, and that it was good to know him.

- A. P. Wavell, in a letter to his sister, quoted by John Connell in Wavell: Scholar and Soldier (London, 1964).

PLANNING AND SUPERVISION OF CMF TRAINING

Lieutenant-Colonel R. S. Garland, M.C., Royal Australian Infantry.

What is Wrong with C.M.F. Training?

IT must be obvious to all soldiers that a part-time CMF unit cannot participate favourably in any future war unless the unit is able to per-

The author served as a section commander with the 2/3 Indep Coy in the Wau-Salamaua campaign in 1943 where he took part in both the capture and defence of Ambush Knoll, among other notable actions. As OC "A" Company, 2 New Guinea Infantry Battalion in the Aitape-Wewak campaign in 1945, he led the advanced guard in the successful capture of Kiarivu airstrip.

He served with 66 Inf Bn in Japan as a company commander and adjutant between 1946-48. After two years training in the United Kingdom he became Senior Instructor at the Officer Cadet School. He attended the Australian Staff College in 1954 and then served as Brigade Major with 7 Inf Bde in Queensland. He had two years' service with 3 RAR during the Malayan emergency in 1959-60 and then joined the staff at the Jungle Training Centre.

More recently he has served as an Executive Officer with 1 RQR and 2 RNSWR as well as completing two years and a half as GSO 1 (Training) at Headquarters Eastern Command. He has now taken up the appointment of Commanding Officer of the Infantry Contre.

fect all internal training procedures so that the best possible use is made of the very limited for training. available After all, if a two-hour night parade, once a week, is to make a significant contribution to the defence of Australia, we must pack this parade with interesting and instructive training. Some CMF units seem to waste much valuable time in calling the roll, company commanders' inspections and reading routine orders. This is often backed up by a dreary dismissal parade after one or two ill-prepared training periods. Net result bored and untrained CMF soldiers!

The general cursory officer instruction which is given to CMF officers in home training merely brings them up to the professional standard of "two up, straight up the centre and give them a cut lunch". To be proficient a CMF officer must apply himself to a lengthy and detailed private study of the military arts, procedures and techniques which apply to the

military profession. One of the very important subjects which is being neglected is the "Principles and Practice of Good Instruction".

All CMF home training is carried out either at night or during the weekend. Because of the CMF soldier's employment in a during capacity civilian week, his mental fatigue highest during the periods available for CMF training. The task CMF instructor. the attempting to attract and hold the soldiers' interest, is therefore very difficult. The solution can only be found in efficient planning and good presentation of interesting training.

All recent surveys of CMF training have indicated that the most common reason for the high rate of turnover of newly enlisted CMF soldiers is their dissatisfaction with the training which they have received in their CMF units. This dissatisfaction is normally generated by the following weaknesses in the arrangements for training:

- (a) Poor instruction.
- (b) Inadequately prepared instruction.
- (c) Inefficient administrative arrangements to support the training programme.
- (d) Badly arranged training programmes.
- (e) Lack of supervision of training and correction of faults by company commanders and platoon commanders.

These weaknesses stem from inefficient or lazy regimental

officers! Some officers, who are conscious of the need to produce good and interesting training, are misled into adopting a "sensational" approach to training exercises schemes. Such normally wasteful in both training funds and training time. There is nothing dull about learning the basic arts of the infantryman, provided the instruction is well prepared and delivered by competent instructors. The infantryman, as envisaged in future operations in South-East Asia, must be the silent, undetectable, but undisputed king of the jungle. He must be a master of the arts of scouting, concealment, tracking, hunting, shooting and silent envelopment.

The infantryman must reach higher standards in these ancient arts of survival than man has ever reached before at any stage of his evolution from the pre-historic primitive era to the soft, sophisticated present-day civilisation.

The modern Australian young man will sit enthralled before a TV set watching the exploits of legendary "fast guns", "Indian fighters", or "war heroes" and will fight shoulder to shoulder with the "Vikings". When he joins the CMF he has an educated thirst to acquire the fighting skills of his TV heroes. Surely we can capitalise on this motivated interest when we plan our training programme! course we must do some drill, necessary administration and so on, but the real aim is to perfect the basic arts of the infantryman, not "bore" him out of the Army.

What to Teach?

Training of the CMF must be considered under the following headings:

- (a) Recruit training.
- (b) Home training.
- (c) Camp training.
- (d) Specialist training.
- (e) Coaching courses for CMF promotion examinations.
- (f) Unit courses.

In every case, thought must be given to the aim of each of the above phases of training, which must be related to the training directives issued by superior headquarters.

When the aim is defined the subjects that should be taught are then grouped under the following headings:

- (a) Must know.
- (b) Should know.
- (c) Could know.

The instructional time available will then dictate the subjects which must be included in the training programme.

Recruit Training

If a recruit is well received on enlistment and his reception followed up by a well-planned programme of progressive and interesting training, we will stem the present tide of the rapid turnover of recruits within the CMF. The handling and training of recruits is a matter of vital interest to each commander and should not be passed off as a duty to the nearest junior NCO.

It is very obvious that there is a limit in every depot as to

how many recruit squads can be organized. This limit is fixed by the availability of competent instructors and the training facilities at the depot in terms of lecture rooms, parade ground and such-like. It is also obvious that our periods of enlistment should be phased so that suitable recruit squads can be formed in the depot.

All recruit training should adhere to the following principles:

- (a) Once a recruit squad has been formed, no new enlistment should join this squad.
- (b) The recruit training syllabus should conform to the requirements of unit training directives.
- (c) Every new applicant for enlistment should be issued with a wellprepared brochure which should give joining instructions and a detailed training programme for the next recruit squad to be formed.
- (d) Enlistments, clothing issues, etc., should be coordinated with the formation of recruit squads.
- (e) In every major centre, a recruit platoon will be formed, and only the best instructors should be posted to the recruit platoon. In every platoon depot a recruit section should be formed.
- (f) All instruction delivered during recruit training should be pre-planned in detail at least one week in

advance, and checked by the officer commanding the company or platoon as appropriate.

(g) Well - conducted passing out parades should be held at the conclusion of the recruit training course.

When former members of School Cadet Corps join a CMF unit, it might only be necessary to "brush them up" on recruit training and thus retain their interest by avoiding dull repetition of subjects with which they are conversant.

Home Training

The home training entitlement for pay is 7 days' obligatory training and 12 days' voluntary normally training. This is lumped together to provide 19 days' home training. The breakup of this period into night parades (one-third of a day) one-day parades and bivouacs is very controversial subject. Beyond doubt, a more productive training programme can be conducted at a two-day bivouac than can be achieved in training at six night parades. Weekly night parades are essential, however, to ensure continuity of interest and a smooth flow of CMF administration. The following break-up is suggested:

- (a) One night parade each week from February to November each year. Say 42 parades making 14 days, of which 7 days are made up of voluntary unpaid parades 7 days.
- (b) Four two-day bivouacs 8 days

(c) Four paid one-day range practices other range practices to be voluntary, unpaid activities

4 days

19 days

Some subjects such as range practices are best covered in home training, while company collective exercises are best handled during an annual camp.

The cycle of home training should recommence on completion of the annual camp. The aim of home training must be to prepare the unit or sub-unit for collective training at the next annual camp.

With this in mind, a draft twelve months' programme must be prepared, which will form the basis for the unit bid for training funds. The programme must cover:

Recruit training requirements.

Individual training.

Range practices.

Platoon collective training.

Specialist training.

Courses.

Exercises (TEWTs, etc.).

Reconnaissance for bivouacs and exercises.

The emphasis in home training must be placed on developing the individual skills of riflemen and specialists. In other words, riflemen must be taught to shoot; signallers must be practised in operating their equipment and so on.

The next point that should be stressed is the preparation of a

training programme. detailed Most CMF units make out a quarterly or even a six-monthly training programme. outline This is good, but it is not sufficient. A detailed training programme must be made out for each month and must state: dates, timings, subjects, reference to text-books, instructors, locations, administrative (including stores. uirements meals and transport arrangements if anv).

This programme must be adhered to, but it must have an inbuilt flexibility to cater for reserve instructors (to meet the contingencies of CMF service) and provide alternative wet weather programmes.

conference co-ordination must be held at every parade to finalise the details of training for the next parade or bivouac. Where possible this conference will be chaired by the company commander. At this conference, instructors should produce their lesson plans for their allotted instruction. Alternative instructors will also attend this conthat to ensure company commander's directions are carried out.

On certain of my visits to CMF depots I have seen some very badly organized training which could have been avoided by proper co-ordination by the company or platoon commanders on the preceding parade.

The detailed programme for a bivouac must be issued at least two weeks in advance, together with written copies of the proposed exercises. This means that the bivouac site must be reconnoitred at least four weeks in advance, and the training programme worked out in detail at this reconnaissance so that detailed preparation of exercises can begin.

In the conduct of an exercise, all umpires and control staff must be given a detailed brief and run-through of the exercise before it commences. The training programme must provide for the conduct of this brief.

A detailed critique must follow every exercise — even simple section exercises — and time must be allowed for this in the training programme. Many mistakes are made in training, and the lessons from the exercise will not be consolidated and remembered unless they are emphasised at the critique.

I would also like to see company commanders conduct a "wash up" conference at the end of a bivouac to discuss the weaknesses that have been exposed and decide on measures to rectify them. A subsequent simple, factual, report on the bivouac to battalion headquarters would be of assistance to the CO and staff, and at the same time help the company commander to clear his mind on future measures that should be adopted.

In the preparation of a training programme, certain principles must be observed:

- (a) The training must be interesting.
- (b) Training must progress through the lessons given in the text-books.
- (c) Revision periods should be included to refresh soldiers on important points.

- (d) Time must be allowed for essential administration. (However, most depot maintenance duties can be completed by employing soldiers on additional duty as provided for in financial instructions.)
- (e) Reserve periods are not necessary in a CMF programme. This always indicates faulty planning.
- (f) All instructors must be given time to prepare their instructional setting. This is normally achieved by staggering periods into officer and NCO type periods.
- (g) Where possible, avoid lectures after lunch and late at night. Never have two consecutive lectures! The soldiers become tired and bored.
- (h) For both night parades and bivouacs, strive for a balance between periods that provide instruction and physical activity.
- (i) Make the most of bullring or conveyor-belt type training as this system will solve many CMF training problems in terms of shortage of competent instructors, lack of adequate training stores, and difficulties in the preparation of instruction.
- (k) Our soldiers must be made fit. Include 15 minutes' physical training at the end of each night parade.
- (l) Before preparing the training programme, decide what you must teach,

work out any limitations terms of training stores, instructors. etc.. then frame the outline training programme. (As a Regular company commander, I always devoted several hours every week to planning the detailed training programme following week the though Ι always even issued an outline monthly training programme well in advance.)

In conclusion, I must emphasise that our home training must be good if it is to compete in appeal with the many and varied pursuits and hobbies that are open to the young Australian male, including the appeal of attractive young women.

Camp Training

Camp training is normally broken up into:

Revision of individual training — 3 days

section

and platoon training — 3 days

Revision of

Company collective exercise — 5 days

Administration and movement — 3 days

14 days

The success of an annual camp hinges on thorough preparation before the camp. Every effort must be made beforehand to ensure that the most use will be made of every minute of the available training time. This means that every exercise, every

demonstration, and every period must be planned and written before the camp commences. Every company must have a training programme that is thoroughly known and understood by every member of the company.

A company co-ordination conference, chaired by the company commander, should be held in camp each day to finalise any minor details that affect next day's training. This includes checking on both administrative arrangements and any weather alternative programmes. All travelling time should be kept to a minimum to ensure that the maximum time is spent training. Any necessary travelling time must be allowed for in the timings.

The principles already enumerated for the preparation of a training programme during home training, equally apply to the preparation of a programme for camp. All instruction must be well prepared and well delivered.

Specialist Training

Every company commander must aim at producing a 100 per cent. reserve of specialists within the company. This includes cooks, drivers, signallers, medical orderlies, clerks and storemen.

Whenever the company commander anticipates a shortage occurring that will reduce his 10 per cent. reserve, he must either organize or request the conduct of a specialist course.

The company commander must arrange for the continua-

tion training of his specialists. In the metropolitan areas, this should be co-ordinated during home training by either OC Adm Coy or OC Sp Coy as appropriate.

Every company commander should specifically recruit to fill his requirement of specialists. Such appointments appeal to a large number of young men who want this type of training.

Coaching Courses

company commander Everv must organize his coaching courses for both first appointment and NCO promotion examinations. The success of these coaching courses depends on making the candidate study and understand the study referthe ences that are listed in A.M.F. Promotion Manual. The student should be given private study assignments and then attend a discussion on each of the study references as his study progresses.

Each course should be organized over at least six months. with a concentrated full-time revisionary course just before the examination. At the present moment, the general standard of military knowledge of CMF students who present themselves for military examination in this explosive age is both pitiable and frightening. Members of the examination boards who condone 50 per cent, or higher pass rate in the face of such low standards obvious merely contributing to a degeneration of Australian military standards at a time when the adequacy of military preparedness is under searching public scrutiny.

The solution to this problem rests in the hands of every company commander. With a little imagination, some energy and adequate organization, a firstclass coaching system based on directed private study can be introduced to meet all coaching requirements. The fact that batheadquarters might talion organize junior leaders' courses or first appointment coaching courses does not relieve company commander of the his requirement to organize long-term coaching course. The battalion course is a bonus!

Battalion headquarters should also introduce a coaching course for preparing officers for promotion to captain and major based on the private study-discussion technique of instruction.

Unit Courses

The aim of unit courses should be to correct weaknesses that are disclosed in annual camp, assist officers and NCOs to pass their promotion examinations, and train unit specialists to offset anticipated future wastage. The following courses should normally be run annually under unit arrangements:

Methods of instruction course. Junior leaders' course.

First appointment coaching course.

Officer's coaching course and company commander's course run concurrently.

Driving course.

Cooking course.

Signalling course.

AQ course.

ARA staff course.

It is a company responsibility to ensure that all personnel who attend unit courses are carefully selected and adequately coached before their attendance at the course. Unit courses are normally of only six days' duration, which does not give adequate time for basic instruction and private study of the reference material.

Supervision of Instruction

The primary duty of all officers in peace is to train their subordinate commands for war. All other considerations are secondary and must support the training aim. The officer trains his command by the following techniques:

- (a) Preparation of the training programme.
- (b) Co-ordination of all training matters.
- (c) Delegation of instructional duties.
- (d) Supervision of training and correction of faults.

The last technique is probably the weakest aspect of CMF training. Most company commanders and many platoon commanders become "office bound" on training nights and do not supervise their training. As a result the same training weaknesses and mistakes are repeated throughout the year because the instruction is not supervised and corrected.

The arts of instruction which were so well understood in our

army some years ago are now dying fast. I have seen lectures "cuffed" at the last moment, lessons read from the text-book, and instructors, who had no real knowledge of what they were teaching, both boring and confusing their soldiers. In every case these weaknesses could have been rectified by a company commander who was "on the ball"

Gentlemen, get out of your office, tell your officers NCOs what you want, and make certain they carry out orders to your satisfaction! This means supervision and correction of faults. Your administration must be completed at some other time than during training Why not arrange for periods. your "In Tray" to be delivered to your home on the night before the parade, so that you can then make the most of the parade night?

Are you making the best use of your ARA cadre? They are all experienced regimental NCOs and most happy when they are teaching or supervising instruc-They are not posted to tion. CMF units to merely count buckets. file papers. talk to cooks and drink in hotels. they do these things they are not being properly employed or adequately supervised. They are probably bored, frustrated and fed up with CMF! Petty crime and insubordination will normally follow. The solution lies in good man-management by the CMF officer.

Conclusion

Our country has emerged from a great democratic movement which has resulted in a general political awakening of all classes society. The officer today does not command respect by virtue of rank alone. He must earn the respect of his soldiers and his subordinate leaders. He will receive a greater degree of respect from his subordinates if he can plan and supervise a good training programme, and back this up with sound manmanagement.

An officer in the CMF must place the interests of his soldiers first and ensure that no soldier bored or allowed ever remain idle. He must be a man moderate habits, capable always of applying all his faculties to his training duties. must appear a leader to his men. and be able to inspire them with his ability, knowledge and high ideals. If you have a high rate of turnover of CMF soldiers. undoubtedly there is something wrong with you!

The art of being a good CMF company commander lies in the ability to plan in advance and then delegate duties wisely and equitably to both CMF and ARA subordinates. This must then be followed up by critical supervision of the allotted tasks.



Aim

AIM of this stimulate in article is to officers, both of the ARA and CMF, an interest in the Queen's Medal Competition, now almost one hundred years old, at a time when the Australian combat soldier as much as ever required to shoot before is quickly and accurately in order to survive, and at a time when the competition is sorely in need of a blood transfusion.

The author graduated from OCS in 1952. He served with the 1 Fd Regt and 14 Training Bn (1952-55), with 105 Fd Bty RAA and as Liaison Officer 28 Commonwealth Independent Inf Bde, Malaya (1955-57), as a troop commander with 1 Fd Regt (1957-58), as adjutant 23 Fd Regt (1958-61), as adjutant 24 Fd Regt for two years, and as GSO 3 Training, HQ Western Command (1964-65). He was recently promoted temporary major and posted as a company commander to 2 RTB Puckapunyal.

History of the Competition

A medal for the best shot in the British Army was authorized in 1869. It had on one side the head of Queen Victoria, with the usual inscription, and on the other side a figure of Fame standing on a dais. She has a horn in her left hand, and with her right is crowning a kneeling warrior with a wreath of laurel. The warrior is armed with a bow, and holds a shield pierced by three arrows. The medal was 1869 instituted in and awarded each year, gratuity of £20, to the best rifle shot in the British Army. It was issued in bronze until 1872, and then in silver, and was worn on right breast. It became obsolete in 1883 and, as only 16 of the medals were awarded. specimens are very rare indeed. A somewhat similar medal, with the same ribbon, was at one time presented to the best rifle shot in the Indian Army. The original ribbon had a centre of dark crimson, with black, white and black stripes at each edge.

A King's Medal for the champion shots in the military forces, the counterpart of the older medal, was re-instituted in 1923. Now known as the Queen's Medal, it is awarded each year to the champion rifle shots in regular and territorial armies in Great Britain, as well as in each dominion. A bar with the appropriate date is worn upon the ribbon. The medal, worn on the left breast, has the Royal effigy on the obverse with the usual legend, and on the reverse the same design as that of the older medal of 1869

The photograph at the head of this article is of the medal awarded in Australia in 1955 to Sgt. R. K. Beardman. It can be seen that the reverse side remains unchanged from that of the 1869 medal.

Current Conditions of the Award

Medals become the property of winners and may be worn by them during the remainder of their service.

A clasp only is issued for a second or further award.

Medals are competed for under battle firing conditions.

The ribbon may be worn immediately the results of the competition are promulgated

Previous Winners in Australia

Previous winners of the award in Australia up to the present date are shown in Table "A". Note that out of a possible score of 200, the winning scores since the introduction of the SLR have on the average been below the average for the .303 rifle.

Current Support for the Competition

Generally the competition in the Australian Military Forces today is poorly supported from a competitor point of view. The fault lies at unit level and stems from a general lack of knowledge of the competition. The best indication of the support given to the competition in a Command is obtained from a review of competitors presenting themselves for the Command Elimination Shoot. Here might expect to find at least one representative from each unit, including CMF units; this, however is not the case. The probable attendance is likely to consist of a small group of older soldiers, devoted riflemen, who turn up annually to try their skill, and who usually produce good results except in the fire and movement practice, and a small group of younger soldiers, who are newcomers to the competition.

How many units record the scores of the annual fication practice and nominate the highest scorer as their representative in the Command Elimination Shoot? How many units arrange a training scheme for their potential medal winners? Until there is encouragement at unit level the competition will not receive the transfusion that it sadly needs and deserves. After all, of the three Services. this applies only to the army.

 Year	Rank	Name	Score
 1924	H/Capt	Ruddock, W.C.G.	138
1925	WO2	Taylor, B.	152
1926	WO1 (H/Lt)		162
1927	WO1	Shearim, J.D.	176
1928	WO1 (H/Lt)	Hutchinson, J.	171
1929	WO1	Shearim, J.D.	171
1930	WO1	Hachfath, W.H., DCM	166
1931	WO1	Shearim, J.D.	162
1932	Lt	Potter, C.W.	167
1933	WO1	Shearim, J.D.	162
1934	Bdr	King, J.O.	171
1935	Cpl	Carson, A.F.	173
1936	Pte	Potter, E.W.	168
1937	Pte	Potter, E.W.	156
1938	Pte	Savage, N.W.	171
1939	Sgt	Hall, N.W.	156
1947	Lť	Preston, A.	139
1948	Capt	Green, A.E.	159
1949	Capt	Eagleson, L.A.J.	152
1950	WÔ2	Archer, R.D.	172
1951	Maj	Magenis, G.C.	172
1952	Maj	Magenis, G.C.	174
1953	Sgt	Loveband, G.L.	157
1954	Sgt	Jeffery, P.E.	180
1955	Sgt	Beardman, R.K.	160
1956	Maj	Green, E.A.	173
1957	WO2	Archer, R.D.	154
1958	WO1	Guymer, J.A.	160
1959	WO1	Archer, R.D.	159
1960	L/cpl	Dennis, G.A.	137 SLR
1961	WO2	Pini, P.	159 ,,
1962	WO2	Loveband, G.L.	137 ,,
1963	Capt	Pratt, G.S.	145 ,,
1964	Pte	French, R.	136 ,,

Table A

The Suggested Transfusion

This year of 1965, with the introduction of Selective National Service, is an appropriate year to administer the transfusion. Why not a winner from one of our National Service Battalions during 1965?

Why not revert to the original scheme of awarding a gratuity with the Medal? The gratuity in 1896 was £20; £200 would be an appropriate figure today.

There is a need to revise the conditions governing the competition, as the current method of elimination does not permit

the best of the competitors to take part in the final round. This revision has already commenced at Army Headquarters and will undoubtedly improve the competition when introduced.

The Annual Classification Practice should be the same practice as the Queen's Medal practice. This is only logical in the interest of administration and in keeping with the conditions that the Queen's Medal practice must be fired under battle conditions.

General knowledge of the competition must be improved. The place to effect this is at our officer training establishments and recruit training battalions.

Greater support from Army Headquarters to the Command called upon to conduct the competition than has been given in the past is needed in the form of:

(a) Early promulgation of the date of the competition.

- (b) Arranging invitations to the Governor - General and Minister for the Army.
- (c) Provision of funds to cover competition expenses including a suitable function for entertainment of guests and competitors.

Command planning should require unit representation at the Command Elimination Shoot where suitable recognition should be given to those selected to represent a Command.

Fame

For anyone in doubt as to who Fame is, she is the personification in classical mythology of rumour. The significance therefore of the design is that while once the successful warrior was crowned by Fame thereby spreading news of his success, the successful rifleman is now awarded a medal bearing this symbol.

May Fame crown a worthy warrior for 1965.

THE FRENCH CANADIAN PROBLEM*

Captain P. J. Mitchell,

Fort Garry Horse,
Royal Canadian Armoured Corps

THE OUTBREAK of terrorism in Montreal in 1962, as an expression of political and social discontent, was something entirely new to Canada, Arson and bombing in the Canadian mind are associated with places like Algeria, Cyprus and Viet-Their intrusion on the domestic scene came as a disshock, particularly tinct English Canadians. Clearly, the violence of eruption from a problem of serious proportions and of long standing in the French Canadian province of Quebec.

French Canadians are not satisfied with the status of their race and culture in Canada. They feel that they are being swallowed up economically by English Canadian control of their province's resources and industries; culturally by English Canadian plans for a single Anglo-American national culture using the English language;

politically by English Canadian control of the Federal Government. Discontent was and is widespread. A small, but articulate minority favours separatism and is demanding independence for Quebec.

This demand poses a serious problem to Canada as a nation. The aim of this essay is to consider the nature and causes of that problem. I will not presume to offer a solution, because solutions to this type of problem have evaded a communion of great minds in the United Nations for many years, but will present certain requirements for an effective solution.

Background

To a casual observer, the separatist movement in Quebec is rather surprising. We are recognized as a very conservative people, slow to anger or to change in our political and social habits. On the surface at least, there has been internal harmony in Canada since our nation was constituted by the

^{*} Submitted as an essay at the Staff College, Queenscliff in July, 1964.

Confederation Act of 1867. The only noticeable stirring of opinion in Quebec before separatism was the vociferous but non-violent reaction to national conscription in 1944.

There was considerable mingling and intermarriage among English and French Canadians in the years following Confederation. Most of it took place Quebec where a sizeable English element commenced the development and operation of the province's resources industries. People of British and European extraction pushed the frontiers westward, but not the French. With the exception of splinter groups totalling about half a million who settled in Alberta and New Brunswick, the French population concentrated in Quebec. There they carried on their traditional way of life. resisting assimilation into the Canadian whole and extremely jealous of the provincial rights granted by the constitution. They developed \mathbf{a} cultural. social, economic and political climate which made their province distinctly different from the rest of the country.

Nature

French Canadians constitute one-fourth of our population. They are violently opposed to the American "melting pot" type of national culture. They feel that even as it is natural for English Canadians to seek greater unity, so it is equally natural for French Canadians to seek greater autonomy to protect their special racial and cultural interests. The extrem-

ists among them insist that these interests can only find adequate expression in an independent Quebec "state".

Politically, they want amend the constitution to provide greater provincial autonomy and reduced federal control. They want a Quebec that is strong and free because it is the principal home of Frenchspeaking citizens. Ιt essential to them that province should be free to own and to use the political and fiscal instruments which. federal or English Canadian hands, would deny them political base for the preservation of their racial traditions.

Economically, after decades of isolationism, political corruption and fiscal backwardness, the people of Quebec have suddenly realized that they behind the times. More important, they are behind the rest of the country. While they looked to their racial traditions and provincial rights, the remainder of the country, under federal moved guidance, into modern technological and industrial era. French Canadians now recognize that their province must finally enter this era, if they are not to be left with the depressing task of preserving the traditions of a dying society.

Three things stir the antagonisms that exist between English and French Canadians. are at once the basic causes of the problem and the chief its solution. barriers to In ascending order of importance they are language, racial character and self-confidence.

Language

At once the most obvious. this barrier is also the least of problems. It vexes thoughtless, but in an age when thousands travel all over the world it is difficult to believe that a nation can collapse over language difficulties. English is taught in French schools: is taught in English French schools. This provides a unique opportunity for the Englishspeaking majority to learn to communicate with French fellow citizens and thus develop a better understanding of them. Western Canadians in particular have never made adequate use of this opportunity to understand and appreciate French Canadian language and culture.

Racial Character

This is a barrier that is harder to overcome, if indeed it should be overcome. French Canadians feel strongly about their duty to the family and follow the practice of giving jobs and contracts to their relatives. English Canadians do not work in this way and there is a conflict between French instincts and English business ethics.

The whole tradition of French Canadian life makes a French a different sort of Canadian person with different interests. attitudes and inner needs. two the in Eoualize races Canada and you will probably find you have lost the brisk of English business efficiency life or the sparkling vigour of French cultural life. Tt. English Canada's loss that the Canada's wealth of French

literature, theatre and broadcasting is virtually unknown to it.

Self-confidence

The third barrier is a serious one. Canadians as a whole lack self-confidence. We complain about the Americans patronizing us, and feel less successful than they are. However, if we directed all our attentions to mastering our environment and meeting the demands of the frontier areas our alleged domination would less seem important and would rapidly disappear.

The same theory can applied to French Canadians with respect to English Canada. If the French spent more time on practical effort to develop their province and less time fussing about the imagined threat federalism. they achieve far more. Confidence in French Canada can only achieved bv the efforts Ωf French Canadians to bring their province's commerce and facilities up to the level of the rest the country. This requires modernization of their educational system, political reform, and changes in their investment habits. These are the things on which their attention and effort should be focused.

Conclusion

French Canada has made it clear that "La Race", the history and accumulated personality of the French in North America, is something to be valued and an object of pride. English Canada is less conscious of its past. While the French are looking

for solutions in the direction of equality, the English are looking for assimilation, annihilation of cultural differences and, ultimately, one common language. The solution must be some form of compromise, and the sooner the better.

The cure will not be found in suppression of our differences, but by bringing them into harmony. A stronger Quebec and a stronger Canada should be our aim. The solution to the problem could lie with the next generation, if a completely integrated English-French educational system was established. This idea would be welcomed by the direct neighbours of Quebec, but would be difficult to justify to people

west of Ontario who favour multi-culturalism. Nevertheless, it would lessen existing tension and, viewed optimistically, this type of education coupled with generosity on both sides might solve the problem.

Whatever the ultimate solution, it must include the preservation of our French Canadian heritage. That heritage represents a unique facet of our national character. without which we might fade into the almost overpowering background of American influence. Should French Canada ever cease to be, we as Canadians would lose the richness of an admirable dual culture and the chief ingredient of distinctive Canadian a nationalism

Another thing — people are still persisting in stressing the difference between Regular and Territorial divisions. This, to my mind, is lamentable. If the Regulars are so much better than the Territorials (which is not generally true, in my opinion) then they should be used to leaven the Territorials and not be kept as a "corps d'elite in separate divisions. We shall not win this war so long as we cling to worm-out shibboleths and snobberies. I am sure of this. Cobwebs want removing at once.

- General Auchinleck, letter to the Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 29th June, 1940.

THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Captain R. Clark, Royal Australian Engineers

THESE REFLECTIONS are based on a limited experience in Vietnam and in many cases may be old stuff to more experienced soldiers.

In order to succeed in this type of war all soldiers must be:

- (a) Physically fit. This in my opinion is the most vital part of training the as terrain and climate are severe enough without the The Viet-Cong opposition. present standard of physical fitness in the ARVN is low; as a result exhausted soldiers quickly fall prey to the \mathbf{vc}
- (b) Able to shoot well. Soldiers must be able to hit the target with a quick reaction shot. Well-aimed shots over distances exceeding 100 metres will seldom be needed.

The author graduated from OCS in 1954. He has since served with the School of Military Engineering, with 11 NS Training Battalion, 23 Construction Squadron, 7 Independent Squadron and 7 and 11 Field Squadrons. He was with the Australian Army Training Team in Vietnam in 1963-64. He is at present posted as Operations Instructor at the School of Military Engineering, Liverpool.

(c) Well led. The junior leaders must be capable of leading small units for varying lengths of time. At present an operation below company level is rare; the normal operation is of battalion size.

In this war the holding large numbers of troops reserve has been proved useless such reserves cannot brought into action enough to be effective. Therefore reserves should be held at the lowest level where they can be brought immediately into action. Reserves above the regimental level will seldom, if ever, be employed.

Limited vision makes operations similar to moving by night. Thus the great emphasis in training should be on night operations. Limited visibility also greatly restricts the range and type of weapons which can be employed.

The infantry battalion, with air supply every seven days, can operate for up to 30 days without the use of vehicles. Battalion headquarters is usually kept small and normally works efficiently with members carrying all they need on their backs.

It is unsound to despatch ARVN units into unknown areas and expect immediate results because the VC knows the area in the finest detail. Therefore, when ARVN troops move into an area they should spend days -weeks if necessary - learning the area of operations in detail, as this will help overcome the VC's big advantage. The VC's knowledge of the country comparable to one's knowledge of one's own home town. If we were to fight an enemy at home the advantage, naturally, would lie with us.

It is wrong to believe that because the VC is believed to have a battalion capability in a particular area that we too must operate as a battalion. The VC needs time to organize its workers into a battalion and this involves loss of security. It is unlikely therefore that at the most more than platoon groups (normally section and less) would be encountered in an area with a VC battalion capability. This of course would be when hard-core battalions are operating in an area.

Battalions must set up Intelligence networks from within their own resources. This can often be achieved by using soldiers enlisted from the area in which operations are being conducted. The conversion and use of VC prisoners is also most effective.

The following technique for searching a village appeared to produce the best results: on

moving into a village where the possibility of booby traps was high, the senior members of each household were ordered to stand before their houses. The battalion commander then explained that the discovery of any booby traps in a house would result in a new senior member of the household. This produced the desired effect, and in five cases the head of the house had pointed out traps left behind by VC which might have led to loss of life. The battalion commander explained that this procedure had been adopted after routine kindness had led to casualties among his troops. The fear of reprisals was well understood by the villagers and brought results.

The staff, in laying down precise times for a unit to arrive at a certain feature, leaves the battalion commander no scope for flexibility or initiative. As a result, during its moves, the battalion fixes terrain features as objectives without worrying about the VC in between. Battalion and company commanders must be allowed a higher degree of flexibility in this type of warfare.

One method employed to warning obtain advance of ambushes was to have a converted VC (dressed as a VC) ahead move οf the column. This has resulted in the VC calling out to the convert scout or, at worst, firing, which of course provides the required warning.

The placing of flank protection on the ground in some areas is impossible. Heliborne reserve

forces are used to overcome this, and fire support of guns is also effective.

The VC tend to move according to the seasons. During the wet the VC will live on the high ground, as food and water are plentiful. In the dry season food and water shortages force the VC to move down to the streams. This in turn dictates the areas of operations.

The unorganized destruction and villages of crops achieved little: in fact it has gained VC sympathy. If crops are to be destroyed they must be completely destroyed to a plan laid down by higher headquarters. Food is so abundant in areas along the Laos border that partial destruction achieves nothing.

The standard of navigation throughout the ARVN is poor and the constant use of smoke and aircraft - twice daily or when called for - to pinpoint positions is obviously of great value to the VC as a means of keeping ARVN movement under surveillance. A map is never seen below platoon level, so the emphasis on navigation must be placed on those who need it. It time-wasting to train and teach navigation to private soldiers. Concentrated effort should be applied to officers and NCOs.

The ARVN army, for some unknown reason, has adopted the steel helmet for patrolling. This is a useless piece of equipment, of value only as a means of carrying spare water. It is suggested that spare water-bottles be issued and helmets be left in outposts as mortar fire is seldom encountered by patrols. The

climate and terrain make water vital to the soldier; to keep fighting fit he must carry two water-bottles. In addition, section water-bottles would be an advantage. At present units camp on streams regardless of the tactical situation.

All arms and services must be able to protect themselves; this involves service troops providing patrols to clear areas round their depots. Great emphasis is placed on the training of all the arms and services in self-protection.

The footwear at present in use in the ARVN is most unsuitable for patrolling in the wet season. After about eighteen days on patrol in wet conditions the soldiers suffer from a type of trench foot and many have had to have toes amputated. It is most important in this country that boots have drain holes to let water escape. Australian boots on user trial lacked such holes. In addition junior leaders must be taught to watch and treat any foot problems in their units.

The ARVN places little importance on the loss of ammunition, either in training or on operations. Ammunition is left lying on training centre ranges; on operations clips are hooked all over web equipment, which results in vines knocking the clips onto the ground.

It is a constant battle to persuade battalions to pass back Intelligence information. This of course means that maps are seldom up to date even though each unit has its own Intelligence section which could revise them.

At present the ARVN lacks good leadership, due to the selection of potential leaders on a system similar to that of the French. A man must first of all be politically loyal; second, he must have an education far above the level required in a junior officer. Little account is taken of his ability to lead a platoon in battle. National conscription should allow officers to be selected from soldiers who have proved themselves in combat, and the system of sending civilians direct to officer training should be limited to a few special cases only.

Few ARVN units are able to operate by night, and the laying of night ambushes is only halfheartedly carried out. Until the ARVN can operate at night as efficiently as the VC there is small hope of winning the war. emphasize Training should Training night operations. centres do in fact carry out night training, but limited presentation is poor as instructors regard it only as an added burden.

The policy of handing out sweets and other gifts upon moving into an area should cease. This creates the wrong impression on the locals: before long they expect continually to receive without giving anything in return. Gifts should be given only to those deserving reward and senior officers should bear this in mind when visiting an area in which a batadviser has probably spent months creating a policy.

In keeping with all other socalled experts on this war, one has to come up with a solution on how to win it. The solution must be simple as it has to be implemented by simple soldiers at the battalion level. Here is mine: when a battalion moves into an area and gets to know it well, patrols of down to three men should constantly operate to harass the VC. This will cause the VC to concentrate for safety: in so doing they will give away security. The battalion can then bring the concentrated VC to battle destroy them.

Strategic Keview

COMMUNIST CHINA'S STRATEGY IN SOUTH EAST ASIA TODAY

Lieutenant-Colonel J. O. Langtry, DCM, Royal Australian Infantry

COMMUNIST CHINA'S goal Asia and strategic in South-East Asia is, clearly, to achieve domination of South-East Asia and probably whole of Asia. Her approach to this objective is unquestionably militant militant because strangulation by peaceful coexistence is not forced upon China as a strategy as it is upon the USSR.

The situation from China's point of view is vastly different to that confronting the USSR. The USSR and her satellites for

established countries, the majority of which are comanti-Communist mitted to alliances. Although the USSR's prospects of "peaceful" domination of these countries are slim. the alternative (overt military action) would almost certainly lead to global war. The outcome of attempted military pressure through Cuba has probably forced the Soviet heirarchy to accept that the only weapons available are those of the "cold war" - propaganda, subversion, economic and political pressures, and the disavowable encouragement of insurgency in places where the risks are small.

the most part adjoin prosperous

has Communist China these weapons in her armoury and more. China and her associate, North Vietnam, have the opportunities to be militant. for every non-Communist country bordering China is newly independent or still a colony Most are politically vulnerable and economically backward, and constitute classic

The author saw service during World War II in the South-West Pacific Area from 1941. He was commissioned in the 24th Battalion on Bougainville on 27th June, 1945.

After the war he returned to civil studies at Melbourne University, where he gained the degree of Bachelor of Science. He was appointed to the ARA as a captain in May, 1951. Subsequently he served in Korea and in FARELF. He attended the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, USA, in 1963-64. His current appointment is Assistant Military Secretary at Army Headquarters.

targets for subversion, insurgency and "wars of national liberation". The exploitation of this situation must appear irresistibly attractive to China and certainly offers a more rational explanation than any ideological consideration of her advocacy of militant revolution rather than peaceful co-existence.

It is irresistibly attractive for several additional reasons:

- (a) China, unlike the USSR, simply does not have the capacity to wage an intensive cold war.
- (b) China correctly assesses that, in this area, she can get away with militancy up to the limited war scale provided such wars are close to her borders and do not contain the risk of military confrontation with the West, until such time as she is prepared for it.
- (c) China needs South-East Asia and its vast resources if she is to emerge as a world power and the principal power in the international Communist movement. South-East Asia and Indian sub-continent provide attractive an medium in which China can effectively challenge Soviet leadership of the Communist bloc.

There is irony in the situation. The threat to South-East Asia stems basically from a country whose pretensions to great military power status, at this point in history, are patently untenable. Communist China has two of the fundamentals of power — the will to use it and,

to a lesser extent, the necessary ground forces. On the other hand she lacks the economic and heavy industrial capacity to support anything other than very limited wars close to her boundaries. It is unlikely that Communist China can attain major power status, in the conventional sense, until she is able to control the vast resources of South-East Asia. The principal obstacle to this is the supremely powerful but somewhat hamstrung United States and her Western Allies

What prevents China and North Vietnam marching south? Fundamentally, it is a matter of logistics. While large-scale insurgency can be supported without undue difficulty, China and North Vietnam could support only a fraction of their millions of troops if they were to attack across their southern borders. Thus, for the present, neither can afford an outright limited war with the West

It is true of course that there is no point in China attempting a limited war type of offensive against overwhelming when insurgency, terrorism and the current political offensive are achieving her ends. South-East Asia at this stage is not faced so much with an immediate credible threat of overt invasion as with the real danger internal collapse through Communist subversion and insurgency, coupled with a lack of confidence in the West by the Asian and South-East States.

Nevertheless the Communist Chinese politico-military strategists must surely appreciate that in the long run the possibility exists that continued success in South-East Asia could lead to limited war with the West. This especially relevant in the current climate of United States retaliation against North Vietnam. The risks of a limited war for China and North Vietnam now than greater before, but it is safe to assume that the current contingency was anticipated long ago. Since the end of the Indo-China war both countries have been assiduously acquiring every piece key terrain which would add to their military capability to resist an upward trend towards limited war. If they have not been able to gain control of the key terrain they have contrived to place themselves in a position to deny it to their antagonists. The current drive by the Viet Cong to gain control of the interior highlands and their repeated attempts to sever the communications north-south along the coastal fringe are to force the South destined thus Vietnamese to react. their conventional weakening defence against the overt threat across the 17th Parallel. This is accident: it is carefully designed to meet the contingency of the escalation of the current war into limited war.

Furthermore, it is not by chance that Hue is now particularly vulnerable. It is an old saying that he who holds Hue holds the key to control of Annam. Hue, the ancient capital, is the Buddhist stronghold and, traditionally, the spiritual centre of the country. It is likely to become the rallying point for a

Viet Cong inspired dissident Buddhist movement, influential enough to take over the country. It would be naive to think that the Buddhist "uprising" in Hue occurred by chance. The Buddhists have been a target for Viet Cong subversion for years, and with good reason, Buddhism, unlike Roman Catholicism, is incompatible with Comnot munism. South Vietnam is a Buddhist country controlled by a Roman Catholic minority or, these days, a psuedo-Buddhist minority - a factor not widely enough appreciated by the West.

The danger to Hue has been recognised, and has been partially countered by the introduction of US Marines into the area, which also makes the severing of the north-south communications along the coastal plain much more difficult for the Viet Cong.

Despite the introduction of Western troops, however, the Viet Cong now have effective control over much of the north, which, in effect, extends the border with Communism and thus improves their capability to sustain an increased level of insurgency in the central highlands and the delta.

Are there precedents to the above example of long-range Communist strategy in South-East Asia? Yes! Several years ago Laos was regarded as "the key to South-East Asia". The West was not prepared to see it taken over by the Communists under any circumstances. It was said at the time: "If the plug is pulled in Laos, the rest of South-East Asia will go down

the drain." The facts now are that, to all intents and purposes, the West is out of Laos and, short of war under much greater handicaps, will probably remain out. Western Laos ac-China's complished part of principal objective: it achieved a measure of discreditation of the West; it enabled China and North Vietnam to gain control of the strategically vital passes through the Annamite chain and gave them access to a virtually unassailable corridor for logistic support of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam, Some may ask: "Why don't the Communists take over the whole of Laos?" Why should they? The West can probably be relied upon to honour the Geneva Agreement, thereby securing the western flank of the Viet Cong without need to deploy large forces and without provoking the West.

China's parochial and special strategic interest in Laos, however, appears to be control over the north-west corner and the development of strategic roads through Burma and Thailand, deep into South-East Asia. Here, one can reasonably conjecture, is the start of a development of a more significant outflanking capability.

In fact, wherever a strategic route or key pass exists and provides opportunity for development — from Pakistan to along China's southern border — the Chinese are active. One reason for this littleadvertised pre-occupation has been mentioned: China has had sufficient foresight to appreciate that continued Communist success in South-East Asia could lead at least to a limited war with the West. Access strategic routes then becomes critical It should not be overlooked that the third stage of "revolutionary warfare" for a transition from insurgency to a conventional type of war; e.g., China and Indo-China. Again, routes are vital. Furthermore, contrary to popular belief. good lines of communication are essential also for large-scale insurgency. Communist insurgency on a large scale against strong opposition within any one of the South-East Asian States cannot be supported from local resources alone. The present level of insurgency in South Vietnam is dependent upon logistic support from Vietnam, Even the operational range of irregular, light-scale, porter-supported units is strictly limited by the capacity of the lines of communication.

is suggested that army advisers should be constantly on guard against becoming so preoccupied with the training of South Vietnamese troops, civic action programmes, "winning the hearts and minds of the people" and the political situation in South-East Asia that we forget our military responsibility to retain at all times, in all areas, under all circumstances whatever conventional military advantage we possess. We should specially concerned this aspect of our endeavours within South Vietnam today, for there the Communists are closing the gap in terms of conventional capability for limited war on the ground.

In stressing conventional military capability it is not intended to belittle in any way the significance of political, sociological and economic aspects of the war in South-East Asia. There are some areas in which the Viet Cong have gained the advantage, but it would be fatal to let them gain also the military advantage while our guard is down.

The non-military aspects of the situation in South Vietnam require re-appraisal. Some comments are pertinent:

- (a) In the sociological field. for example, it is too seldom stressed that the people of Vietnam are pre-South dominantly Buddhist -- the Roman Catholic content is miniscule. Is it too late to make a constructive proach to the genuine Buddhists? Continuance of Roman Catholic dominance in any field is likely to be "religious interpreted as imperialism".
- (b) Culturally the veneer of French sophistication very thin, and certainly imperceptible in the country-Warner Denis side. observed correctly that the Vietnamese are believers in "the spirits" and practise ancestor worship; and that astrology İS a governing factor in their lives, even among the more advanced. Here indeed is a starting point for an effective propaganda programme and a oriented properly civic action programme. Warner also makes the point that any civic action programme

- should, as a first priority, provide the means for restoration, maintenance and the guarding of places of Buddhist worship especially the village shrines.
- (c) Propaganda, psychological warfare, call it what you will, is a much under-rated weapon. A study of the Malayan Emergency has revealed that every £1 spent on psychological warfare reaped dividends out of all proportion.

South Vietnam provides excellent opportunity for studying Communist strategems. South Vietnam is the principal immediate target, mainly because, since the United States has committed herself China cannot afford to ignore the challenge. South Vietnam is an example of the lengths to which the Communists will go in order to "prepare the battlefield". Before the Indo-China war was over, plans had been put into effect for the Vietminh to remain behind, underground. in South Vietnam. About the same time the subversion of the Montagnards and the tribesmen of southern Laos was commenced Some useful points emerge:

- (a) Communist strategy in this part of the world is not one of opportunism, although inherent is the flexibility quickly to make the most of such opportunities as arise.
- (b) As the Communists were able to think far enough ahead to pre-plan for insurgency in South Vietnam they can think far enough

ahead to plan for a limited war should it be forced upon them.

- (c) Their strategy in South East Asia has been and still is all-embracing. While preparing for victory against the French in the north they were preparing for the resumption of insurgency in the south. Thus it is not surprising that today the Viet Cong can draw South Vietnamese forces from the 17th Parallel preparatory to an attempt to seize control of the key terrain in the north. Nor is it surprising that while the West's attention is focused on South Vietnam they quietly initiate Communist-Chinese supported "front" in north-east Thailand.
- (d) Perhaps the least appreciated Communist strategem in South Vietnam has been that of "keeping the pot from boiling too hard". In South Vietnam as elsewhere the Communists have tried to keep the magnitude of the threat below the level which might provoke spontaneous and whole-hearted support from the West for an immediate all-out offensive in all fields, aimed at the destruction of the Viet Cong military potential and removal of the causative agents of widespread discontent. Western democratic governments are hampered in their reactions to Communist advances by their need to govern their actions according to the extent of

popular support existing at the time. There is a very definite need to condition or educate the Western home front, as well as the peoples of South-East Asia, if the West is to be free to react promptly to every new Communist initiative.

What is the prognosis for South Vietnam? It is suggested that the immediate Viet Cong aim - as in Laos - is merely employ enough force military, political, economic and sociological — to weary defenders and bring about a political conference in order to obtain a "neutral" regime. In the military sense, and of immediate concern to the armies of the West, it should be recognized that as well as the undermining of the defences of the 17th Parallel control of the northern states is vital to the overall strategy of the Communists. Therefore the northern states must be secured by South Vietnam, even if Western conventional forces have to be committed to offensive operations to do so. The delta area should rate second priority as long as the main towns and villages can be held securely. Once the military situation is restored, a new approach to other aspects of the struggle can be attemp-To secure the northern states, consideration should be given to sealing off southern Laos from the Mekong River in the Savanakhat area east to the 17th Parallel in South Vietnam, not only to cut the Viet Cong lines of supply to the delta, but also to isolate the mounting insurgency in north-east Thailand. This analysis is not intended to suggest that China and North Vietnam plan on marching across the 17th Parallel tomorrow, but that their plan is to make its effective defence difficult, if not impracticable, It must always be borne in mind that the struggle for South-East Asia is a power struggle; demonsupremacy of overall conventional military capability will always remain a significant deciding the outwhether in diplomatic come. manoeuvring or in the purely military/para-military arena. United States bombing of North Vietnam bears witness to this.

North Vietnam's greatest vulnerability is the same as that stated earlier for China - an inadequate logistic capacity to support large-scale limited war coupled with lack of economic and industrial capacity to in any way match US resources. The fact that the revolution in North Vietnam is only now, after ten years, showing progress in the agricultural and industrial fields makes her particularly sensitive to the current US highly pattern αf selective bombing raids. There can be little doubt that the Communists realize that the United States capacity to destroy the everything that North Vietnam (and China) has striven so hard to build up in the name of the revolution. The significance of the US bombing raids cannot be ignored by them for too long.

Although the risk of escalation is there, so is the strong possibility that the raids will act as a deterrent and gain time for South Vietnam and the

West. The bombing cannot be an end in itself; it will not defeat the insurgents in South Vietnam, but there is the chance that it will limit their military potential and thus lessen the possibility of the mlitary overthrow of South Vietnam. From what has been said here it should be no surprise that the Communist bloc's response to the raids has so far been that of a "paper tiger".

So much for the Chinese politico-military left hook, through Laos and South Vietnam. To keep Communist Chinese strategy in perspective, we should now switch to the right flank and examine the politico-economic right hook through Burma.

Strategically, control of Burma would provide China with an easy means of entry to India and Pakistan, and enable her to dominate Thailand, particularly when communications through Kengtung (north-east Burma)a current Chinese project - are improved. Burma itself is underpopulated, yet rich in potential It is likely that a powerful influence on Burmese diplomacy in recent years has been the vast population and growing military strength of China and the belief that China will overrun South-East Asia. diplomatic skill on the part of Burmese is required maintain Burma's policy of neutrality, for to be neutral any country must be economically independent and have the will and strength to defend herself militarily.

Burma lacks most of these qualifications and probably sees

ultimate accommodation with China as her only recourse, perhaps hoping not to have to accept the Communist ideology as part and parcel of the deal. China's attitude to Burma is one of "peaceful co-existence" - after all there is no need for haste while the general trend in Burma towards closer ties with China continues Western approaches in almost every field are being rebuffed.

Thailand viewed with dismay the debacle in Laos, is openly concerned with developments in South Vietnam, and very recently was acquainted with China's intention to support subversion and insurgency in the northeast of Thailand. If the latter move is successful this would be the Communists' first significant strategic foothold across the Mekong River outside the delta.

From the outset, Thailand has been dubious of the outcome of the struggle for South-East Asia. Should Laos, South Vietnam and Cambodia fall under Communist domination, and pressure be exerted on Thailand through Burma, Thailand would be in a strategically untenable position.

From the military point of view, a key and vulnerable area in Thailand, in addition to the north-east, is north-west along the Burma-Laos borders — a remote wilderness with a sparse but unruly population and tenuous civil administrative control. It is ideal terrain for insurgency and lies astride the existing strategic only route from China into Thailand which by-passes the Mekong River.

Cambodia is being subjected to much the same treatment as China's tactics designed not to cause the over-Sihanouk of government, but to destroy completely what little remains of Western influence, to subvert the economy of the country, to encourage Sihanouk even faraway from neutrality" towards China and Vietnamese minorities. If South Vietnam should fall. Cambodia would tumble into the Communist camp like a ripe plum. Timing could be important, to the extent that China might not wish to apply pressure until she is in a position to follow up with a maximum effort against Thai-

Malaysia is a complex problem and perhaps sufficiently removed from the Communist Chinese threat at this stage for discussion to be out of context. It is worthwhile, however, to examine the situation in the long term as probably seen also by Indonesia. Imagine that the "redtide" has spread down through each country until it reached the nortern border of Malaya, United States' influence would have been eradicated: there could be diversions in India, Korea, Taiwan and perhaps Japan; China would have access to the Indian Ocean through Burma, Picture too the need for a realistic reappraisal which. would confront United Kingdom, France would be out of the area; Pakistan could be preoccupied with the Kashmir problem and perhaps a threat from China through Tibet. The whole balance of

world power in South-East Asia the Pacific would have changed; Indonesia and Australia would be particularly vulnerable. What could Malaysia do? Her position would appear in that event to be hopeless. Bear in mind also the huge and slightly predominant "overseas Chinese" population Malaysia in Malaya over 40 per cent.; in Singapore over 90 per cent, and numbers in verv large Borneo territories).

If Indonesia today lacks confidence in the ability of the United States to contain Communism in South-East Asia, an appreciation of the situation along the lines of the picture painted above points up clearly Indonesia's dilemma. Perhaps in part it explains why Indonesia is seeking more friendly ties with Communist China and why she may be suspicious of the long-term viability of an "overseas Chinese" dominated Malay-

sia as an anti-Communist state.

This analysis leads to the conclusion that the struggle in Asia is merely one of old-fashioned imperialistic expansion being conducted under an ideological frosting and that all available means must be marshalled to combat it.

The Chinese are fortunate in that many in the West still believe that military measures to halt Communism are useless and that all that is needed is increased economic aid, social reform and good civil administration. We must remain alert to the fact that we can be outmanoeuvred militarily by the Communists. Our own military power correctly applied can buy us time - and it would seem that the time to apply it is now. But we must be clear that there is a definite military objective and this should be in consonance with our political aims in the area.

SOLDIERS TALKING

I spoke to the Emperor of the moral effect which the resistance of the Spanish nation was having on people in general, suggesting to him that he was mistaken in attaching no importance to the example they were setting. I reminded him of the remark of the Tsar Alexander, which had struck me and which I had repeated to him on my return: "You have beaten the Spanish armies but you have not subdued the nation. The nation will raise other armies. The Spaniards, without any government, are setting a noble example to other nations. They are teaching the sovereigns what can be accomplished by perseverance in a just cause."... The Emperor said: "It is easy to pronounce judgment upon what is past; and easy to exalt as heroism what depends upon causes that are in truth hardly honourable. The heroism with which, in their hatred of France, they now credit the Spaniards arises simply out of the superstitions to which the mistakes of our Generals have given new vigour. It is out of laziness, not out of heroism, that the Spanish peasants have seized the opportunity of taking up this nomadic, smuggler's existence which is so suited to their taste and so much to the advantage of their poverty-stricken condition. There is nothing patriotic about that."

— Memoirs of General de Caulaincourt, The Retreat from Moscow.

GOATS

Major A. J. C. Newton, MBE, Royal Australian Infantry

"I answer quicker to the name of Bill."

- C. J. Dennis

In the November 1964 issue of the Australian Army Journal Major P. J. Norton

headed his article with the following statement:

The author joined the Australian Army as a senior cadet in 1927, served until January 1936 in the CMF as a field artilleryman and reached the rank of sergeant. He joined the PMF in 1936 and served as a warrant officer in the Australian Instructional Corps with CMF battalions and at RMC until May, 1940 when he was appointed RSM of the 2/17th Battalion AIF. He was commissioned in September 1940 and served subsequently with the 2/17th during the siege of Tobruk and at Alamein.

"It is possible for an officer to serve for many years in the army and to reach high rank without producing a single original thought."

After his return to Australia in 1943 he was for about a year Staff Captain (Admin) Advanced LHQ and then joined the 24th Brigade as Staff Captain, taking part in the operations at Labuan and in British North Borneo in the final year of the war. He served as Staff Captain on HQ Eastern Command and HQ 2nd Division and was appointed to the Quartermaster List in 1949. After promotion to Major in July 1951 he was appointed DAAGQMG HQ 2 NS Training Brigade (1951-54) and DAAGEST Command (1954-57). His present appointment is SO2 Directorate of Infantry, AHQ.

I have served many years in the army and although I have not reached high rank I believe I should not make my exit before hatching an original thought. Hence my reason for placing on paper the results of my thought.

My original contribution relates to "Goats." To avoid any quick rebuttals I shall first define my subject. Dictionaries which I have consulted define a goat as:

- (a) "A ruminating animal, seemingly between a deer and a sheep."
- (b) "A horned ruminant quadruped."

- (c) "A hollow horned ruminant of nearly the size of a sheep."
- (d) "A lecherous man."

 I believe that definition (a) should be accepted for the purpose of this paper.

As I have spent most of my adult life in the army, naturally enough I have had little to do with goats during that period. In fact, I can only recall two goats. One was the mascot of a ship in which I travelled during World War II. It was the pet of the Captain and had the run of the ship. It chewed up at least fifty hats, khaki, fur on the voyage between Bombay and Port Said, much to the delight of the ship's captain and the chagrin of the unit's quartermaster. The other was a fierce old Billy which had evidently been left by the Gunners as caretaker of the Old Hols-New South worthy Camp in Wales and resisted most violently the efforts of the officers and other ranks of the 19th National Service Training Battalion (which did not include any gunners) to occupy this camp in 1951.

However, as a boy in Western Australia, I did see a lot of goats because "nannies" in those faroff days were kept for their milk yield and the "billy" goats were often used in harness to draw light carts. These latter even took part in races known as "Billy Goat Derbies." They appeared to require little care and seemingly ate anything and everything.

Despite what may appear to be limited experience of these

animals, I believe that there is a strong case for the introduction of goats into the army to fill a variety of purposes. For example:

41


- (a) Pack animals.
- (b) Providers of fresh milk.
- (c) A change in diet.
- (d) Producers of clothing.
- (e) Hygiene purposes.
- (f) Guards.
- (a) Containers.

Pack Animals

A goat is of sufficient size to carry about forty pounds. Therefore, depending upon the number finally accepted into a battalion, it is logical to assume they would assist in taking quite a load off the soldier's back.

Fresh Milk

This is a commodity that is rarely available to soldiers on service. I understand that goats'



milk is particularly nutritious. Therefore, apart from providing an important addition to the soldiers' diet, it would also indirectly assist in the general health of soldiers. The number of milch goats required would need careful assessment.

Change in Diet

Once a herd of goats is allotted to a unit naturally the goats would breed and multiply keep the number of goats to an acceptable level, killing would be necessary. Goat flesh provide fresh meat rations, again undoubtedly helping to maintain the health and well-being of the troops. One can hear the exclamations of delight as the cry goes up "Roast goat

tonight, chaps" and the odd doubter saying "No kidding?"

Clothing

When goats are killed for rations the skins could be used to manufacture articles of clothing. How delighted the shivering troops on exercise "Longshot" would have been if, after a feast of fricaseed goat, they were then issued with a goatskin smock apiece. I am sure that goatskins could be converted into jerkins or smocks much quicker than the various committees etc. will design acceptable cold. wet-weather smock.

Hygiene Purposes


Earlier I made the statement that goats eat anything and



everything. Readers of the comic strip "Uncle Joe's Horse Radish" in the Sun-Herald will confirm this statement. Once goats are introduced the old hygiene slogan "Burn, bash and bury" will become redundant. All that will remain will be a herd of contented goats.

Guards

Based on my experience with the Gunner Billy-goat referred to earlier, it should be practicable to train a percentage of old Billy-goats as guards to protect stores, vehicles and suchlike. In view of their previous experience the Gunners would no doubt be prepared to undertake this training at the School of Artillery, perhaps as an offshoot to their Guided Weapons Wing.



Containers

Surplus goat-skins not for clothing purposes could be used as water containers. Remember Gunga Din waterbag." "An goatskin Goatskins are still used for this purpose in Middle East countries. Water containers in sufficient quantity have always been a requirement for units on service. Empty skins could also be filled with air and used for flotation purposes.

Apart from the primary uses for goats which are contained in the preceding paragraphs, naturally enough studies would be necessary to decide suitable of utilising by-promethods ducts. Several suggestions come to mind immediately. For instance the horns may be converted into musical instruments - horn pipes. The butts perhaps could be used on ranges. Bones could be converted into arrows - the opinion of several studious infantrymen is that we will be back to the bow-andarrow era before long. Although "Bull" is fast disappearing from the army it may be desirable to introduce a substitute and with herds of goats in the Service, a ready-made equivalent would be quickly available.

I recommend that a G.W.C. (Goat Working Committee) be formed with the aim of studying the introduction of goats into the army.

We are now required to make our bids

For Billys, Nannies and little kids.

Goats to milk and goats to eat,

Goats to save the soldiers' feet. Goats to guard the unit stores, Goats whose skins can be used for drawers.

Goats who'll eat the cans and trash.

Goats who'll save the army cash. Goats who will be happy to breed

And eat the normal unpalatable screed.

Goats quite small and goats quite strong,

Goats who'll be happy to tag along.

Goats who'll pay no DFRB,

(That is for "goats" like you and me).

And if you think my cause isn't right

Then I think it's time you really ought

To try and produce some original thought

On how you would help the soldiers' plight.





THE LAST CONFUCIAN, by Denis Warner. (Angus & Robertson Ltd., Sydney, 1964.)

Reviewed by Lieutenant-Colonel J. R. Salmon, GSO1, Directorate of Military Training, AHQ.

Denis Warner is of that old school of conscientious and able correspondents. unfortunately now too few in number, who disdain the superficial reporting of a variety of subjects and seek to confine their research and writing to a chosen field, Mr. Warner's specialty is South East Asia: his grasp of this vast and complex subject would be the envy of most diplomats. Thus it is hardly remarkable that he should be one of the very few Westerners with a deep understanding of Communist revolutionary techniques. It is this deep understanding which compels me to recommend The Last Confucian to all potential counter-insurgents.

Mr. Warner's "last Confucian" is Ngo Dinh Diem. In tracing Communist advance South East Asia the and numerous ill-fated Western attempts to stem it, Ngo Dinh Diem probably emerges as the dominant figures of the past decade. Certainly the author is convinced that Diem's personality, his family connections. and his failure to reach to the heart of the problem, were largely responsible for today's unhappy situation in South Vietnam, just as those same causes led inevitably to his death.

Mr. Warner's account, however, reaches farther into the past. He describes the develop-Vietnamese nationalism ing which, under the Communist control of Ho Chi Minh and his general Vo Nguyen Giap, led to the defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu. These events and the account of the political background which led to the control of South Vietnam by the Diem and Nhu families has already been described by the author in Out of the Gun and by Bernard B. Fall in Street Without Joy and Two Vietnams.

The Last Confucian however show plainly the way in which a Communist revolutionary war may develop unrecognized, even under governments more efficient than As David Galula ex-Diem's. Counterin plained clearly Insurgency Warfare—Its Theory and Practice, this is the stage when the insurgent is most vulnerable. However, if he is to be defeated, he must first be recognized as an insurgent. This can only be achieved by good intelligence working

close co-operation with the people — and the people will only be co-operative when they are secure and well-governed. Diem's government was good, but was there any alternative government that would have proved better? The author does not commit himself. Probably the history of recent South Vietnamese government provides its own answer.

Warner shows clearly why the co-operation of the people (and probably the war also) will be lost if protection is lacking at this stage.

"Beginning on 15th February [1960] in the Cambodian border provinces," he writes, "the Viet Cong launched a major terrorist campaign against village elders and other supporters of the Diem regime. Forty village chiefs died in the first week, and the tally of guns captured by the Viet Cong went up by hundreds...

village "Many and district officials were extremely bad. The Viet Cong's list of their crimes against the villagers ran from rape to cannibalism, and included murder, extortion corruption, theft and brutality. The execution of such people won friends. On the reverse side, the execution of hard-working and honest officials was calculated to strike terror into the hearts of those who opposed the Viet Cong. In the next year or so hundreds of vilage headmen and others suspected of co-operating with the government or guilty or genuine 'crimes against the people' were disembowelled and decapitated, and their families with them.

"Viet Cong treatment of a hamlet chief and his friends at the village of Mv-Chanh-Hoa near Ben Tre on 22nd April 1960 was typical During the night about twenty Viet Cong surrounded the village to block the escape of their victims. The Can Bo (political commissars) then went in and seized Nguyen Van Cat. the hamlet chief. Nguyen Van Tran, a member of Republican Youth. and three others. All were beheaded.

"Schoolteachers who taught the curriculum laid down by the government encouraged and their pupils to take part in flagraising ceremonies and to sing the national anthem another primary target. Several hundreds were kidnapped, tortured, starved, and indoctrinated. Those who responded favourably were released. More than a hundred are still missing, and thirty are known to have been executed. Between 1959 and end of 1961. the 636 schools closed their doors either because of the intimidation of teachers or because the Communists were using schools to spread propaganda."

In the face of such ruthless behaviour, is it surprising that the people should aid the Viet Cong if the government is unable to protect them?

After describing the deteriorating situation in South Vietnam which resulted in the fall of Diem, Mr. Warner analyses Western failures in Laos and the situation in Thailand, including the all too little known incipient insurgency in the north-eastern provinces. Insurgency in northeast Thailand is at an early

stage and can be defeated now. Something is being done; but is sufficient? Will the social being taken measures prove effective before insurgency develops to the stage when the cost of counter insurgency effort becomes beyond the auite the capacity of threatened government? The dilemma of democracy is that by the time insurgency becomes sufficiently dramatic to arouse Western public opinion and produce a reaction it is generally too late. Will the West apply its hardlessons from South learned Vietnam and elsewhere. north-east Thailand or will it so engrossed in remain macabre drama in South Vietnam that it will subsequently need to restage that well-known theatrical calamity "Too Little. Too Late"? Time only will tell.

The Last Confucian is perhaps somewhat disappointing those in search of new ideas for Communist revoludefeating tionary warfare. The book stresses need for the good government, meeting genuine needs. effective Intelligence. security for the people by the Thompson Plan of expanding government - controlled areas. efficient mobile helicopter-borne civil armed forces, affairs. military civic action and psychological operations. The importance of recognizing defeating insurgency in its infancy is a valid point well made by drawing attention to the developments in Thailand. Perhaps it is an admission of failure to seek from a professional journalist those answers which so far have evaded the

professional soldier. However, there can be no doubt that in *The Last Confucian*, a sage observer has provided a lucid account of recent events in South East Asia that serving soldiers will find both interesting and invaluable.

SUEZ: THE SEVEN DAY WAR, by A. J. Barker. (Faber & Faber Ltd., London, 1964.)

Though the title might suggest it, this book is not really exclusively for soldiers, for though it deals with strategy that strategy is more of a political than a military nature. Tactics are not discussed as it was not allowed to become that sort of war.

It is, however, very much a book for soldiers, particularly these days when soldiering on the higher plane is more of a political activity than ever before.

In the opinion of many the operation will be likened to that of swatting a fly with a steam hammer. This perhaps is so, as before a steam hammer can be used, steam has to be raised to operate it. However, political considerations are in many cases the cause of what might be considered strange military actions.

Militarily the book gives an idea of what the corrosion of time can do to a military machine. The machine that planned and executed the landings in Sicily, Italy and Normandy is shown to have been badly rusted, and in a poor condition to carry out what should have been, for that machine, a simple exercise.

There was no lack of planning. The operation is perhaps a good example of overplanning. This overplanning, plus the political pressures, disrupted the most essential element — time.

Many lessons emerge: lessons of command, transport, civilian-military co-operation, use of equipment and arms, logistics, guerilla activities, military intelligence — all lessons that have to be heeded.

The book is eminently readable, although it is obvious that a prodigious amount of research has gone into its production. The author, a retired regular soldier, is a graduate of the Staff College and the Royal

Military College of Science, and obviously knows his subject. No punches are pulled in describing either the military or political aspects of the campaign. The Israeli Sinai Campaign covered in so far as it affected the Suez operation. It is readable as a study subject as the lessons brought out are many and to the point. It is readable in the light of present events, where it can be seen that some of the lessons that emerged have been heeded.

Altogether this is a book that is pleasant and instructive without being academic, excellently mapped and illustrated, and very much to the point.

- G.M.C.

BOBDUBI-SALAMAUA, AUGUST-SEPTEMBER, 1943

Normal infantry methods and principles were used throughout the campaign and all the teachings of our textbooks apply in the jungle as in any other theatre of war. The principles of economy of force and concentration were frequently applied and once the enemy intention in certain sectors was ascertained it was quite possible to economise and concentrate for offensive action in selected areas. Both moves could be done under cover, and with covered approaches and routes the principle of surprise is often attained. The knowledge of tracks, the construction of alternative lines of communication laterals and force and aft tracks, as well as early information enabling an intelligent anticipation, permitted active and mobile action to be taken.

Security of force or in the case of sub-units local protection needed more application. Frequently companies neglected this most necessary principle and were surprised by the enemy. A common fault was for companies and platoons to withdraw to a "tight perimeter" to provide security at night, frequently abandoning good ground to do so. "Tight perimeters" have all the attributes of a fear complex and are not sound as a general principle in the jungle. Locality defence with its attendant listening and standing patrols and a capability of all round defence is much more sound. A knowledge of time and space under jungle conditions can only be gained by commanders experiencing personally the country. A sweating brow, aching limbs, wading waist high in streams, knee deep in mud, climbing mountains on hands and knees, falling down the greasy ridges, assist considerably in the appreciation of time and space. It certainly helps a commander greatly in his expectation of result when he blithely draws a task on a map.

- Brigadier H. H. Hammer,
15 Aust Inf Bde Lessons from Operations.