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The views expressed in the articles in this Journal are the author's own and do not necessarily represent General Staff opinion or policy.



Anzac, 26th April, 1915.
Artillerymen and others dragging an 18-pounder field gun up Little Ari Burnu.

(Australian War Memorial.)

ANZAC:

SPARKS FROM AN OLD CONTROVERSY

Major H. V. Howe, Retd


THE initial landing at Anzac was made by two companies from each of the 9th, 10th and 11th Battalions of the A.I.F. — about 1,500 men in all who had travelled to the scene of the action in the battleships *London*, *Prince of Wales* and *Queen*. In support were the battleships *Triumph* and *Majestic*, the cruiser *Bacchante* and a number of destroyers.

The author is one of that gallant but diminishing band which took part in the first rush across the beach at Anzac at dawn on 25th April 1915. Then a lance-corporal in the 11th Battalion, he was commissioned in May 1917, serving with the battalion throughout the Passchendaele offensive and in the Hazebrouck-Merris sector from the time the German offensive opened in April 1918. In June he was appointed bombing officer, 3rd Infantry Brigade, serving thenceforward on brigade headquarters until the Armistice. Afterwards he accompanied the Australian Historical Mission which visited Gallipoli in 1919.

Hedley Vicars Howe has been many things in his time: peawler and well-sinker, private secretary to William Morris Hughes, and military secretary to the wartime Ministers for the Army, P. C. Spender and F. M. Forde. After World War II he was at first research officer at the Chamber of Manufactures, then orchardist, and later a planning officer with the Cumberland County Council. He is at present employed as a statistician in the NSW State Planning Authority.

On reaching the beach the men of the landing force jumped from their boats, waded ashore, dumped their packs, fixed bayonets and assembled in their respective platoons along a low bank 15 to 20 yards from the water's edge. The 10th Battalion in the centre of the line and one company of the 9th moved forward against light opposition across the lower spurs of the high plateau overlooking the landing place — Plugge's Plateau. This position was captured with relative ease by "A" and "C" Companies of the 11th Battalion, which together with a platoon of the 10th and Major S. B. Robertson's company of the 9th reached the summit with very few casualties: the enemy machine-guns could not depress their muzzles sufficiently to fire on the troops climbing the steep slope. On the plateau itself there was a brief but lively skirmish with 40-50 casualties to either side — the bayonet was not used and the men who tried to use it were promptly shot down.

The survivors of the Turkish outpost retired in good order over the inland edge of the plateau and vanished in the thick scrub of the valley below. Major Drake-Brockman, com-



manding "A" Company of the 11th, who was the senior officer present, assumed command of the position. A few minutes later he went into a brief conference with Brigadier-General MacLagan, commander of the 3rd Brigade, who had arrived on the hilltop. Brockman thereupon ordered the platoon of the 10th to rejoin its company in the valley, and directed "C" Company to occupy four prominent features on the "Second Ridge," about half a mile ahead — part of the brigade's first objective for the day. These features were later known as Pope's Hill, Bloody Angle, Courtney's Post and Steele's Post, and were immediately to the north of the 10th Battalion objective, which that unit's companies were rapidly approaching.

Brockman then led his own company and that of Major Robertson's down a zigzag track into the valley. At the foot of the track stood a pick-handle, stuck upright in the ground with a Turkish placard affixed to its top. Everyone believed it was a booby trap and left it severely alone — until some inquisitive soldier knocked it over with a bullet. Nothing happened. Turning left into a feature, later known as Rest Gully, the companies halted while the senior officers, with a few men as escort, climbed the adjacent height of Russell's Top to reconnoitre the terrain to the left which had been invisible from Plugge's Plateau. During their absence the first shell of the campaign burst over the waiting companies, scattering its shrapnel harmlessly on the hillside in

front. The heroes — or villains — of the landing also caught up with the advanced troops. They were the two men from each platoon who had been detailed to carry the reserve ammunition ashore from the boats — a box to each platoon. In cardboard packets of five rounds it had to be carried in cases — about the most awkward load possible in that country. Within the next hour everybody had a turn at carrying the stuff — cursing it and the carriers who had brought it forward.

After half an hour's absence the reconnaissance party returned and the companies moved into the main valley (Monash Valley) and made their way along it to the north. Brockman detached two platoons of his own company to occupy the crest of Pope's Hill about 500 yards from the flank of "C" Company, which was already in position on the southern edge of that ridge. With the one and a half companies remaining he pushed forward to the head of Monash Valley and led on to the crest at its northern end — Baby 700, the dominating feature of the whole Anzac position.

From the hilltop the whole theatre of operations was in plain view. Long lines of men moved up the valley toward the line — now firmly established on Second Ridge from Pope's Hill to the 400 Plateau (Lone Pine). Troops in the line were out of sight in the thick scrub — only a few could be seen moving about here and there. The retiring Turkish outposts had evidently reorganized and

gone to ground on Third Ridge — from 500 yards to half a mile across the valley in front of the Australians — whence they were maintaining brisk fire on anything which moved. On the left, out of sight of Baby 700, the 1st Brigade had occupied Walker's Ridge which ran down to the sea from the crest of Russell's Top. The 2nd Brigade, which should have followed the leading companies of the 11th and moved through to occupy Hill 971, unknown to the company of the 11th, had been diverted into the line on the extreme right flank — a departure from the plan of operation which, as it transpired, probably had little or no influence on the subsequent course of events.

As the men of the 11th and 9th Battalions paused on top of Baby 700 they saw about half a mile ahead of them the height of Battleship Hill, and behind it the crest of 971. On the lower spurs of Battleship Hill, on their right and left fronts, a company of Australians were heavily engaged and retiring by sections in good order, carrying their wounded with them.

They were Captain Tulloch's company of the 11th, which had landed in the second wave about half a mile to the north of the main landing, and, followed by Captain Lalor's company of the 12th, had made their way up Walker's Ridge to the northern end of Russell's Top, where Lalor's men, in accordance with orders, remained as a reserve and started to dig in with Turkish picks and shovels they found on the site.

Learning that the Australians were moving towards 971 Mustapha Kemal, the Turkish commander, immediately set the three battalions of his *27th Regiment*, which he considered one of the best in the Turkish Army, moving towards the area. The leading companies of its *1st Battalion*, commanded by Zeki Bey, were the first to engage the Australians. Zeki Bey later achieved distinction in command of the Turkish defence of Lone Pine and Hill 60 against Australian attacks, and on this occasion too he and his men justified Kemal's high opinion of them. Two companies checked Tulloch's advance from the front, and as the other two companies came forward they attacked him heavily from his right rear.

Finding himself without support and under rapidly increasing fire from his front and right rear, Tulloch had ordered a retirement and his men were falling back in good order carrying their wounded with them.

So much the men on Baby 700 had time to see before their admiration of the scenery was cut short by two shells right on their target. They burst about 20 feet above ground and about 50 yards ahead of the line, killing and wounding about 20 men.

Very smartly the line moved forward downhill — into more trouble. Machine guns, about 300-400 yards away, opened fire on either flank. In a clearly visible line right across the ridge, like grass thrown up by a lawnmower, leaves and twigs from the scrub flew into the air.

Before realising what it was the advancing troops walked right into the fire. Casualties were heavy, but the lesson was learned. The troops moved through the fire, but stopped before reaching a second line of fire about 100 yards ahead.

Four machine-guns were firing on them, all well sited. They swept the crest of the ridge, their firing perfectly coordinated. While the second pair barred any further advance, the first pair started to traverse the ground between their line of fire and the slope of Baby 700. In a few minutes Brockman's two platoons and Robertson's company had lost nearly half their strength.

The surviving officers thereupon ordered retirement to two slight depressions, 100 yards in the rear, which had been crossed in the advance. They were shallow extensions of the heads of Legge Valley on the east and Malone's Gully on the west, and each ran across the ridge to within about 25 yards of its crest. Only a foot or so deep at their highest points, they were four or five feet deep and 15 to 20 yards wide at the gully heads from whence they fell steeply away to the valleys below. Over their entire length they provided cover from rifle and machine-gun fire for about 400 men.

In twos and threes the men made their way back to this position, collecting ammunition from the dead before they left and dragging their wounded with them. Officers and men immediately began to organize for

the day's battle ahead — as calmly and efficiently as at any time later in the war, either on Gallipoli or in France, when they prepared to hold captured positions against expected counter-attack. At that stage the factor of paramount importance was not so much their military training and experience, but the solid matter-of-fact commonsense of officers and men alike, applied to the problems of the day as they developed.

Evacuation of the wounded was the first such problem. Walking cases were able to make their way to the rear unaided, but as no one had the faintest idea of the location of aid posts and as it was obviously impossible for the stretcher-bearers to carry the large number of wounded any distance over the country traversed earlier in the morning, they were collected at the head of Malone's Gully. Then, in slings improvised from web equipment straps, they were lowered down the precipitous slope from one pair of men to other pairs stationed at appropriate intervals, and finally left with a small party in attendance in a sheltered gully about 200 yards above the beach.

Walking wounded officers took with them their maps marked with the location of our troops in the position, the approximate location of the enemy, and the positions on which the ships were requested to direct their shellfire, together with signed reports from senior officers on the spot detailing the situation. Each and every one urgently requested artillery support and picks and shovels — but not one



(Australian War Memorial.)

Wounded coming down Monash and Shrapnel Gullies, 26th April.

shell of ours landed in front of Baby 700 and not one pick or shovel came forward throughout the day. Communication between the battleships and the shore had broken down immediately after the troops landed and was never satisfactorily restored throughout the campaign. Not until two or three days later did Divisional headquarters make any attempt to send digging tools forward to the front line; even then they sent very few although there were thousands on the beach — all being used to dig positions for the service units and headquarters.

About 9 a.m., Tulloch's company managed to filter its way back to the position around Baby 700 and, after Lalor's death, three platoons of his company joined the firing line,

leaving the other platoon to continue digging in the reserve position.

Some of the men, having discovered that the dead wood from the scrub burned without smoke, lit fires in the gully heads, boiled quart-pots and made tea, which was passed along the line — a pot to every five or six men. These proceedings were probably the origin of the contemporary reports in the Australian press that "a picnic atmosphere prevailed around Baby 700." It was a hot picnic! All day long the shrapnel came over — at first two shells every few minutes, then salvos of four at shorter intervals. About a mile to the rear Shrapnel Valley was beginning to earn its name.

The men in the line were engaged in a classic fire fight —

attempting to check the enemy advance and beat down his fire so they themselves could move forward.

Over the lower slopes of Battleship Hill, about 500 yards in front, there came a battalion of Turks in open order. As could be seen from the Australian line they were fairly heavily punished and withdrew into cover. Our men were shooting very deliberately. Every shot was aimed, and Zeki Bey later informed the writer the Turks were surprised at the effectiveness of the fire. Like ourselves they were not fully aware of the power of the modern rifle. Almost immediately after their first check the Turks commenced — and continued throughout the day — to dribble forward small parties of men to a position about 300 yards in front of the Australian line where there was evidently another slight depression affording cover. (Inspection in 1919 showed the position was an almost exact replica of that held by the Australians — two gully heads from which shallow dips extended nearly to the crest of the ridge and afforded cover from rifle fire for about two battalions.)

On the left flank about 50 yards up the slope above Malone's Gully was a straight trench 70 to 80 yards long, from each end of which a communication trench curved for a few yards and then ran straight back to the crest behind. This position was later known as the "U" trench. Early in the morning a party of Turks had established themselves there, and the

group around the gully head was ordered to capture the trench. Two officers and about 40 men rushed the position, shot down the garrison and jumped into the trench. Except for about a dozen who had jumped into the communication trenches they themselves were immediately shot down by enfilade fire from a machine-gun on the right flank — the trench was only about three feet deep, untraversed, and afforded no protection against such fire.

Some walking wounded clambered back over the parapet and began crawling back to the gully head. The Turks let them go. After a few minutes the unwounded men in the communication trenches started lifting the seriously wounded from the trench and carrying them back — they too were unmolested and the trench was cleared of wounded. The attacking party incidentally were not the first Australians to reach the trench — the bodies of several of Tulloch's men lay there already — evidently killed during their initial retirement. This was probably the first occasion on which the Turks permitted clearance of wounded. There were other similar incidents later in the campaign.

A few Turks later crept back into the trench, but no notice was taken of them; they were unable to raise their heads to fire without being shot themselves. A virtual armistice prevailed between the "U" trench and Malone's Gully until about 11 a.m. when a company of the Canterbury Battalion, commanded by a major, climbed up



Firing line of the 1st Australian Division, taken soon after the landing at Anzac.
(Australian War Memorial.)

the gully from the beach. Some Australian officers informed him of the situation. Evidently a believer in maintenance of the offensive he ordered an immediate attack by one of his platoons — about twice as many men as were needed for the task. He personally led the attack. Before they set out those who had previously been in the trench advised the New Zealanders that as many as possible should make for the communication trenches — and stay there. A number took this advice but the majority, including the major, jumped into the straight trench. It seemed as if the Turkish machine-gunners waited for them to get nicely lined up before opening fire, for they waited a few seconds and started in with long bursts. The major and every man in the trench was either killed or wounded — most of the latter seriously as the long bursts hit several times. The earlier experience was repeated. Four of the men from Malone's Gully ran forward and started lifting the wounded from the trench, helped by the New Zealanders already there. It was a somewhat longer job this time as there were about 25 men to be carried — but the Turks did not interfere. For the rest of the day the "U" trench remained unoccupied — of no value to either side.

Almost simultaneously with the Canterbury company two companies of the 1st Brigade under Majors Morshead and Kindon came forward. This brought the number of unwounded men around Baby 700 to

probably over 1,000 — many more than could comfortably fit into the 300-odd yards of the front line. Major Robertson had been killed. Brockman handed over command of the 11th Battalion remnants to Tulloch and made his way back to Pope's Hill. Morshead assumed command of the left sector from Malone's Gully to the crest of the ridge and Kindon of the right from Baby 700 across the northern end of the Chessboard. From around Baby 700 the whole line was plainly visible. Parties of Australians could be seen on Mortar Ridge and the Chessboard.

After an officers' conference at the top of Malone's Gully it was decided to organize a general advance to extend much wider on the right flank than formerly, and to connect up with parties of Australians visible on the far side of the Chessboard and on Mortar Ridge. The scheme was an ambitious one. Within 15 minutes the troops were moving — only to be halted as abruptly as in the earlier attack and with heavier casualties. A second Turkish battalion had come into the line and cut the right flank of the attack to pieces. For the next hour or so, liberally peppered with shrapnel, the line occupied itself with evacuating the wounded and attempting to check the Turkish build-up which, on the right and particularly on the right rear on the Chessboard, was becoming extremely dangerous.

At this stage another company of the Canterbury and two companies of the Auckland with three machine-guns arrived.

Colonel Stewart of the Aucklands took command of the whole position and disposed his own men on the right flank. He posted the machine-guns on Russell's Top where Lalor's men had been digging in. They commanded the Nek, a flat-topped ridge, nowhere more than 30 yards wide and about 100 yards in length, which connected Russell's Top with the lower spurs of Baby 700. Its northern edge fell precipitously away into Malone's Gully, the southern sloped more gently into Monash Valley.

Stewart lined up the newly-arrived New Zealanders in close support of Kindon's men on the right flank, and organized another advance across Legge Valley towards the nearest spur of Battleship Hill, about 300 yards distant. Part of the attacking line appeared to reach the edge of the valley, but from the outset it had been under heavy enfilade fire from both flanks, and very shortly afterwards was vigorously counter-attacked by the *III Battalion, 57th Regiment*, assembled behind Mortar Ridge. The line slowly withdrew to its original position.

Simultaneously Morshead's men on the left extended their flank along the spur above Malone's Gully and tried to move forward. They were stopped as promptly as earlier attempts to advance had been — by the same enfilade fire from machine-guns in increased strength and by frontal fire from larger numbers of Turks who had assembled behind the crest of the spur.

About 4 p.m. the four Turkish guns on 971 opened rapid fire

in which they were joined by a new battery firing from somewhere on Gun Ridge, away to the right rear. About 4.30 on an arc extending over half a mile from the Chessboard on the right rear to the crest above the "U" trench on the left, from positions about 300 yards in front of the Australians, the Turks came forward in open order in three lines, each about 30 yards behind the one in front. When the leading line was about half way to the Australian positions their artillery ceased fire. Almost simultaneously, all along the line, the Australians and New Zealanders rose from their prone positions and, kneeling or standing, fired into the advancing enemy. The Turks went to ground, and for some minutes it appeared that their attack had been halted. Very quickly, however, they again came forward — kneeling or standing to fire, and then crawling forward through the thick scrub. Slowly and steadily the Australians and New Zealanders fell back — fighting all the way. It took the Turks the best part of an hour to cover the 500 yards from their start-line to the head of Monash Gully. As an exercise in retirement the Australian movement would have won full marks. Within a few minutes of reaching the top of Monash Valley, they vanished from sight, disappearing into the thick scrub and broken ground of the valley slopes. The writer believes that the majority of the seriously wounded had previously been carried back to this haven of relative safety, and that during the night they were taken down

to the beach. Very few would have been left behind on the slopes of Baby 700.

As our men dropped into the valley, the three machine-guns on Russell's Top opened on the advancing enemy who promptly went to ground — those who had reached the southern slopes of Baby 700 moved back behind the crest.

Why the Turks did not continue their pursuit down Monash Valley is one of the unexplained mysteries of the Anzac campaign. They may have considered it too hazardous with our men concealed in the scrub in the excellent cover of the broken ground and supported by fire from the posts on Pope's Hill and Russell's Top overlooking the valley. Pursuit would have been a costly proposition in the circumstances.

The left of the Australian line on the north-western slopes of Baby 700 fell back in conformity with the movement of the right, but the 40 or 50 men around the head of Malone's Gully stood fast. They were in an excellent defensive position, and if compelled to retire could drop out of sight into the gully almost instantly. They had easily halted the Turkish attempts to cross the skyline about 150 yards ahead, shooting down any of the enemy who showed themselves.

Two corporals — one a New Zealander from the Canterbury and the other named Laing from the 12th Battalion, who was well known to all the West Australians in the group — had taken command. The men had

agreed among themselves that there would be "no nicking off" — that all would clear out together when the word was given, as it was soon after.

As the rest of the party slid down the sides of the gully, the Canterbury corporal, the writer, and three men of the 11th decided to make a run for it across the Nek instead of following the main body down the gully. All emptied their magazines into the oncoming Turks and bolted. This party was probably the last of the Anzac forces to cross the Nek alive during the campaign. Still in full flight and moving fast they fell into the rifle pits around the machine-guns on the Top, already occupied by about 40 or 50 men from Baby 700 and the half-dozen New Zealanders with the machine-guns. An Auckland machine-gun sergeant was in command. There was room for all in the rifle pits, each of which was about two feet deep; they seemed a home from home after the open ground further forward. The position was open to attack only across the Nek, or by troops climbing to the Top from Monash Valley; the slope from Malone's Gully was unscalable. Through the position a clearly defined track ran to the rear. The machine-gunners had arrived by this track and knew that it led back to the cliff above the beach and to divisional headquarters. The gunners had 16 belts of ammunition and most of the men still had almost full pouches — having replenished them continuously during the day from the dead and wounded.

All settled in comfortably, confident they could not be shifted and knowing that even if they were they had only to follow the track back to the heart of the Australian position. From the heavy firing they knew there were Australian troops to their left rear. They did not realise they were only about 300 yards away at the junction of Walker's Ridge and Russell's Top, the crest of which hid them from sight of the post, which itself overlooked Monash Valley.

Shortly before sunset a strong force of Turks attempted to cross the Nek, moving carelessly, bunched closely together. There was great excitement among the machine-guns. Men whispered to each other: "Let the bastards come." The sergeant ordered everyone to hold fire until the machine-guns opened, which they did when the leading Turks were less than 20 yards distant. The attack stopped dead, the relatively few unwounded enemy escaping by jumping into the valleys on either side.

Except for heavy rifle fire from Baby 700 everything was fairly peaceful in the rifle pits for the next hour or so. It had been ascertained that another party of New Zealanders were occupying a half-dug trench about 70-80 yards to the rear, which added to the general feeling of security. The moon was nearly full but obscured by cloud. The night, however, was not very dark, and visibility extended for about 30 yards — at which distance a man walking with head and shoulders above the scrub could easily be seen.

About 8 o'clock the Turks launched another attack. A few crossed the Nek while a larger party worked their way along Monash Valley and came up on the flank. They were easily beaten off, but in the scrimmage the machine-gun sergeant was wounded. In the pause after the attack he made his way to the rear, leaving the Canterbury corporal and the writer — the only NCOs present — in charge of the post. At this stage someone went back to find out how the New Zealanders in rear had fared. He returned saying "Hey Corp, the mob behind us has cleared out." It turned out later that they had made contact with the troops at the top of Walker's Ridge and joined them without informing the post in front.

Some time later the Turks moved a strong party along Monash Valley and attacked the post from flank and rear. The movement had been heard and the men were ready and waiting for them. Invisible in the rifle-pits, our men and machine-guns again kept silent, opening fire only at point-blank range. It was impossible to miss. The Turks fired a few rounds — mostly at each other — and the attack faded. The fact that they had virtually encircled the post caused concern, however, and after a brief discussion in which all participated, it was decided to fall back along the track.

About a dozen badly wounded men were picked up together with the machine-guns — still mounted on their tripods — and their ammunition boxes, and the party moved off. (Three very badly wounded men refused to

allow themselves to be moved and towards morning they were picked up by a counter-attack launched from the position at the top of Walker's Ridge.) After the party had gone about 200 yards they heard Turks coming behind and also moving along Monash Valley just below the edge of the plateau. Dropping the machine-guns ready for action and lying around them they again awaited attack and again blasted it at point-blank range. They then continued their retirement until, near the Sphinx, they dropped into a good trench overlooking the beach from which a Turkish machine-gun had fired at the approaching boats early that morning. Here they stayed, fighting off an enemy detachment which, unable to move along the cliffs flanking the position, had to content itself with lying in the scrub in front and harrassing the trench with rifle fire. Exposed as they were they got by far the worst of the fire exchanges which continued throughout the night.

At first light an officer climbed the cliff face to within about 20 feet below the trench and called to the party to get out of it as the fleet was going to shell the coast. The wounded were lowered over the edge to some men waiting below, the machine-gunners emptied their belts and the men their magazines; the guns and ammunition boxes were rolled over the cliff and then climbing out of the trench themselves the men slid on their backsides to the bottom of the slope. As they did so a 6-inch shell burst about five yards in

front of the trench — the first of their own the men had seen. It slightly wounded two or three but all reached the bottom of the slope in safety. All they needed was food and sleep. They had landed on the beach among Div HQ signallers, just in time for breakfast. The quart pots were already boiling and the sigs gave them as much tea, bully and biscuit as they wanted. All hands then found places for themselves, curled up and went to sleep for a couple of hours until a staff officer, rounding up "stragglers," roused them out, sorted them into their units and started them off towards the line again. At this stage, neither knowing the other's name, the writer parted company with the Canterbury corporal.

No definite information is available as to the number of Australians and New Zealanders who fought around Baby 700 that day — the writer's estimate is about 2,000 of whom 1,000 or more became casualties. It was some consolation to learn from Zeki Bey in 1919 that their opponents — the *57th Turkish Regiment* — also suffered 50 per cent casualties.

It has been shown above how well the front-line troops fought at Anzac during the first 24 hours. How well did the senior commanders at the two divisional headquarters perform during the same period?

Dr. Bean's account in the official history is based largely on his own observations, his private diaries and on interviews with the senior officers concerned. The following summarised ex-

tracts from the official history appear in chronological order.

"Colonel White (Chief of Staff, 1st Aust Div) realised the landing at Gabe Tepe had failed in its object. If withdrawn troops could be of use elsewhere."

"The first ideas of withdrawal came not from divisional headquarters, but from the brigadiers."

"Godley (NZ commander) had come ashore at noon and was convinced of the likelihood of disaster in the morning."

"The Kohat Mountain Bat-

tery which should have landed about 8.30 a.m. waited in its transport all day for lighters to arrive and land its guns."

"When two guns of the 4th Battery were brought to the beach they were temporarily ordered off again."

"Bridges to MacLagan (Brigadier 3rd Bde) shortly before sunset: 'Well old pessimist, what have you to say about it now?' 'I don't know sir, It's touch and go. If the Turks come on in mass formation on the left I don't think anything can stop them'."



General Bridges' first headquarters at Anzac, taken about 27th April. Fifth from left is Major Gellibrand, next to Colonel Howse, V.C. (facing camera), with Major Blamey standing at trestle table. General Bridges was inside the office on the left when the photograph was taken.

(Australian War Memorial.)

Carefully analysed the Official History reveals a build-up of tension at divisional headquarters which was not justified by events in the line. The failure to land guns despite the continued infantry appeals for artillery support are an indication of the state of mind prevailing at headquarters. The reasons given for the failure are those given by the officers of divisional headquarters to the Official Historian and are hardly convincing.

The statement that the first idea of withdrawal came from the brigadiers is one of the few absolute inaccuracies in the history. The nearest approach to such a suggestion is the conversation between Bridges and MacLagan, quoted above, which could not by any stretch of the imagination be construed as advocating evacuation. McCay of 2nd Brigade never knew the proposal was even under consideration. And, as the history records, when the question was raised, Walker, Birdwood's chief of staff then temporarily commanding the 1st NZ Brigade, fought the idea like a tiger.

At 10 p.m. on the night of 25th April, Bridges, then commanding all forces landed, signalled Birdwood, the corps commander aboard HMS *Queen*: "General Godley and I both consider you should come ashore at once."

Birdwood immediately complied with the request, and at 1st Division headquarters met Bridges, Godley, White, Walker and Colonel Howse. Proceedings at the conference were not revealed until publication of the

official history in 1921. The history records that Bridges, Godley and White urged immediate evacuation and that Walker hotly opposed the proposal. Bridges and Godley suggested that as time was short preliminary arrangements for re-embarkation should be made with Admiral Thursby at once, pending a final decision by the Commander-in-Chief. Birdwood at first refused to comply with their request but about midnight sent the following message to Sir Ian Hamilton through Admiral Thursby:

"Both my divisional generals and brigadiers have represented to me that they fear their men are thoroughly demoralised — even New Zealand troops only recently landed are to some extent demoralised . . . tomorrow morning there is likely to be a fiasco . . . if we are to re-embark it must be at once."

Birdwood was of course aware of Walker's bitter opposition to evacuation. He did not, however, know the views of MacLagan, who may have been, but probably was not, consulted by telephone. McCay knew nothing whatever of the conference — and in later years vigorously denied that he would have favoured evacuation.

Birdwood had either to submit his subordinates' recommendation to Hamilton or to relieve them of their commands and take over himself — which evidently he was unwilling to do on his slight knowledge of the facts. Hamilton, however, after consulting the naval com-

manders and learning that the ships were dispersed and that the proposed evacuation would not have been possible, rejected the proposal and ordered the troops to dig in and stick it out. His order saved the Anzac forces from catastrophe at the end of the first day of battle, and he is entitled to the credit for it.

The recommendation of Bridges, Godley and White to evacuate, made in ignorance of the state of affairs in the line and without consideration of the feasibility of the operation or the consequence of its failure, must surely have been the outcome of needless alarm, bordering on panic.

The briefest consideration of the position would have shown them that evacuation was a physical impossibility. The maximum carrying capacity of the boats available was under 2,000 men. There were 16,000 ashore clinging to toeholds on the hill-sides and closely engaged with an enemy who was vigorously attacking. The only evacuation routes to the beach ran down the valleys which would be completely commanded by the Turks if the line broke at any point.

The assumption of Bridges, Godley and White that the troops were demoralised was not justified — if there was any demoralisation at Anzac that night it was in their own headquarters. At the time of the conference morale in the line had risen to its highest point of the day — higher even than when the men first landed. Officers and men alike had

fought all day under heavy shell-fire without support from their own artillery. They had stood against all the enemy could bring against them. With the cessation of enemy shellfire at sunset the strain of battle eased tremendously. There being no longer any danger from snipers men could stand up and move freely about the line. Every enemy attack was being easily held. A wave of confidence swept through the troops.

The absurdity of the idea of evacuation is, however, only fully realised when it is known that opposing the Anzac line at midnight that night there were only six Turkish battalions — all first-class troops — two Arab battalions of lower quality and a third which went into voluntary liquidation when ordered to move into the line. By sunset, moreover, three of the Turkish battalions — those of the *57th Regiment* — had lost half their strength.

At any time prior to the conference either Bridges, Godley or White could have ascertained the condition of the troops by a 15-minute walk to the line at Steele's or Courtney's Posts — both pretty hot centres — where demoralisation of the troops was completely non-existent. None did so. They permitted themselves to be dominated by the fears generated during the day's tension in the relative security of headquarters by the reports of returning wounded.

On reading Birdwood's message to Hamilton, Admiral Thursby signalled all ships: "All tows and ships' boats to the

beach to re-embark troops." In recent correspondence with the writer, the midshipmen in charge of tows — now retired captains and vice-admirals — quote this order from their logs written at the time. They took their tows and the boats into the beach and reported to the naval beach officers who had received no orders about re-embarkation of troops, but interpreted the midshipmen's orders as an instruction to clear the beach of wounded, which they took the opportunity of doing.

A sequel — a very important part of the story — is omitted from the Official History. Notwithstanding the secrecy observed at headquarters, next day the story of the contemplated evacuation reached the troops and aroused intense indignation. Unit commanders were promptly instructed to deny the story and to threaten "rumour-mongers" with punishment for spreading it. The denials were readily accepted by the troops, the

majority of whom, after initial resentment, wrote off the story as a mere furphy.

Publication of the official history revived the matter, however, and aroused almost as much indignation in 1921 as it did when the story first circulated. The allegation of demoralisation was particularly resented. Like the public, the Governments of Australia and New Zealand first heard of the incident from the official history. Had they been aware of it earlier, perhaps a more critical view might have been taken of the later activities of some of the senior officers concerned.

As Commander - in - Chief Hamilton incurred most of the odium for the failure of the Gallipoli operations. In the interests of historical accuracy he should at least be credited with preventing the debacle which undoubtedly would have followed acceptance of the recommendation of the Australian and New Zealand commanders.

COMPETITION FOR AUTHORS

The Board of Review has awarded £5 prizes for the best original articles published in the November and December issues of the journal to:

November: Major P. J. Norton, "Workable, Acceptable and Safe".

December: Major J. W. Burns, "Mutual Support in the Jungle".

DEFENCE REVIEW

Prepared by an officer of the
Directorate of Military Training

INTRODUCTION

ON the 10th November 1964 the Prime Minister made a statement on Australia's defence requirements.¹ The major issues in the statement that involved the army were:

- (a) Selective National Service.
- (b) The expansion of the Citizen Military Forces and the School Cadet units.
- (c) The expansion of the Australian Regular Army in North Queensland and Papua-New Guinea.
- (d) The purchase of additional equipment.

The more important aspects of these defence measures, which will ensure that Australia has a fully manned and equipped army ready to meet any foreseeable commitments in the near future, are discussed in this article.

BACKGROUND

Since the Defence Review of 1963 there has been a deterioration in Australia's strategic position. This has been caused by the recent Indonesian policies

and actions and the growth of Communist influence and armed activity in Laos and South Vietnam.

However, Australia's defence cannot be considered in isolation; if it is to be successful it must be in depth and beyond our shores. Therefore our responsibilities to SEATO and ANZUS contribute to our national security. To fulfil these obligations the Government has decided that the Regular Army should be built up as rapidly as possible from the present 22,750 to an effective strength of 33,000 men, which means a total force of 37,500.

A peace-time army of this size would be adequate to meet our immediately foreseeable operational requirements and to form a basis for rapid expansion in war. The necessary units could not be provided with a lesser effective strength than 33,000. Because of national prosperity, full employment and the attractions of civilian employment the planned build-up of the army cannot be achieved by voluntary means.

¹ *Parliamentary Debates*, 10 Nov 1964.

NATIONAL SERVICE

General

The national service scheme is intended to produce an effective Regular Army of 33,000 by December 1966. The National Serviceman will serve in the Australian Regular Army for two years.

Present regulations prevent or prohibit soldiers under 18 years from serving outside Australia and those under 19 years from entering an operational area. Therefore the government decided that registration for call-up for national service training would be restricted to Australian youths who are 20 years of age or over.

Call-up

The first call-up of 2,100 is to take place in the middle of 1965; this will be followed by another call-up of 2,100 in late September and four call-ups of 1,725 during 1966.

The present provisions of the *National Service Act* will be maintained for:

- (a) Continued liability of call-up until 26 years of age and in particular cases until 30 years of age.
- (b) Exemptions.
- (c) Voluntary registrations in advance by those who have not reached 20 years of age. However, the question of voluntary direct enlistment for two years will not apply.

Deferments

The following are eligible for deferment of call-up:

- (a) Married men, except that those who marry after call-up action begins will not be discharged from the continuing five-year obligation, nor will such members be eligible for army married quarters.
- (b) Apprentices, until they complete their indentures, unless they wish to be called-up.
- (c) Students of universities and similar institutions, as a general rule, until they have passed their primary examination.
- (d) Members of the Citizen Military Forces with not less than one year's efficient service at the time of the ballot following their registration, subject to their continuing to serve efficiently for a total of five years. They will be liable for call-up for full-time service by ballot if they fail to render efficient service.
- (e) Persons joining the Citizen Military Forces after registration may be enlisted subject to the following conditions:
 - (i) There must be an existing vacancy in the relevant Citizen Military Forces unit and the circumstances must be such that the person can be truly trained in the unit.
- (f) Appropriate service in the Citizen Naval Forces and the Citizen Air Forces provides similar grounds for deferment.

Enlistment

The normal Regular Army enlistment standards will apply to all National Servicemen. These will include medical, dental and psychological tests.

At any stage, before or after ballot or while rendering compulsory full-time service, a person shall be free to join the permanent forces of the Commonwealth of Australia subject to parental consent while under the age of 21.

Service

The length of service will be two years' full-time service in the Regular Army Supplement — followed by three years in the Regular Army Reserve, or for selected volunteers, four years in the Regular Army Emergency Reserve. National Servicemen serving in the Regular Army Reserve will remain liable for annual call-up for training for a period not exceeding fourteen days each year.

All National Servicemen will be required to serve overseas as necessary. Because of this overseas obligation two years' service was required to provide for up to six months' recruit and corps training and also to allow for leave, movement and acclimatization, if necessary. This would allow the National Serviceman to contribute at least twelve months' effective service in a unit.

However, if a National Serviceman is absent from service for part of the time, his two-year engagement will be increased by a period equal to the

period of his absence. This is called non-effective service.

If a person fails to render service or comply with a call-up notice, then he may be committed by a civil court to the custody of a prescribed military authority for the term of his engagement.

Welfare

The Defence Bill recently before Parliament contains provisions for protecting the civil employment rights of ex-members of the forces. Similar provisions will be extended to National Servicemen.

The relevant military instructions, orders and regulations concerning dress, leave and discipline which apply to the Australian Regular Army will generally apply to National Servicemen.

National Servicemen are to receive the same rates of pay and allowances as the members of the Australian Regular Army appropriate to their rank and group. They are not eligible to contribute to the Defence Forces Retirement Benefits Fund or to receive gratuities in respect of their period of National Service.

National Servicemen will become eligible for benefits from the AMF Relief Trust Fund; the married National Serviceman is also eligible to become a member of the Army Health Benefits Society. Application for membership should be made within three months of becoming eligible, otherwise applicants may have to complete a waiting period. On completion of their full-time service National Servicemen will

not normally be eligible for continuation of membership of the Society.

The provision of the *Commonwealth Employees' Compensation Act* or the *Repatriation* (and associated) *Acts* will apply to National Servicemen during their full-time service and their annual fourteen days' training obligation.

A general information booklet, similar to the booklet produced in the 1950s for National Servicemen, is now being prepared and a copy will be sent to each National Serviceman some weeks before his call-up date.

Appointment of National Service Officers

National Servicemen who successfully complete a course conducted at the Officer Training Unit, Scheyville, New South Wales, are to be appointed to the probationary rank of second lieutenant on graduation. This rank may be confirmed after nine months' satisfactory service in that rank.

National Service officers will be eligible to apply for appointment to an Australian Regular Army Short Service Commission or Australian Regular Army Permanent Commission after nine months' satisfactory service.

Training

Initially the National Serviceman will receive ten weeks' basic training at a recruit training battalion; he will then undergo up to three months' corps training at corps centres in selected

corps units, or a combination of both. The length of corps training will vary by corps and by trades within each corps to meet the corps requirements. As a guide, corps training generally will not exceed ten weeks.

The training establishments will be organized as follows:

- (a) 1 Recruit Training Battalion at Kapooka, New South Wales, will be expanded to train about 350 National Servicemen from New South Wales and Queensland, in addition to training 750 Australian Regular Army recruits.
- (b) 2 Recruit Training Battalion is to be established at Puckapunyal, Victoria, to train 750 National Servicemen from all States except Queensland and some from New South Wales. In addition, the unit is established to hold 250 National Servicemen undergoing corps training in the Puckapunyal area.
- (c) 3 Recruit Training Battalion is to be established at Singleton, New South Wales, for the basic training of 500 National Servicemen from New South Wales and Queensland. (For the first two intakes these National Servicemen will train at 1 and 2 Recruit Training Battalions.) In addition the battalion will carry out Royal Australian Infantry Corps training for 500 National Servicemen.

After the National Serviceman completes his basic and corps training he will be posted to a

field force unit to complete his full-time service. As the scheme develops, new units of the Field Force will be progressively raised to absorb the National Servicemen.

CITIZEN MILITARY FORCES AND SCHOOL CADET UNITS

Citizen Military Forces

The role of the Citizen Military Forces — that is, to provide in war or defence emergency the follow-up forces and the expansion of our military effort — remains unchanged. From 8th December 1964 the Citizen Military Forces became eligible for overseas service in a defence emergency.

The target for the Citizen Military Forces is 35,000 soldiers and is to be achieved over the period of the new defence programme.

School Cadets

The decision to increase the ceiling of the School Cadet Corps by 5,000 to 45,000 cadets will allow new units to be raised and some existing units to be expanded.

THE AUSTRALIAN REGULAR ARMY

The Field Force of the Australian Regular Army will be expanded with particular emphasis on a substantial increase in the combat element and high priority logistic units.

A major army centre for a battle group of about 3,500 soldiers will be established in the

Townsville area of North Queensland. Tasmania was raised to the status of a separate Command early in January 1965.

The Special Air Service Regiment, already established at Perth in Western Australia, will be expanded to provide a headquarters squadron and four squadrons.


In Papua and New Guinea the Pacific Islands Regiment will be increased to three battalions by 1968. A second battalion is to be raised early in 1965. The Papua-New Guinea Command was raised to the status of a separate Military Command on the 19th January 1965 and became responsible direct to Army Headquarters.

Concurrently with this expansion in the army, major housing and accommodation projects to locate the new units and to house the staff and their families will be instituted.

Field Force Reorganization

Because of developments in the strategic situation and recent Government decisions to accelerate the rate of expansion of the army, the organization of the field force was again closely examined. This examination showed that modifications were required to meet the present requirements for both cold and limited war situations.

Strategic requirements are never static and periodic adjustments of organization are essential if the army is to respond quickly and effectively to the demands which may be made on it.



Outline Organization of the Battalion.

Alterations to the divisional organization will further improve the army's air mobility and will enable maximum value to be obtained from the increasing availability of air transport support in the form of additional Hercules and Caribou aircraft and helicopters. The division will thus be better suited to South-East Asian or similar conditions where roads are often few or non-existent.

The reorganized division will consist basically of nine infantry battalions, supported by an armoured reconnaissance regiment, three field artillery regiments, a field engineer regiment, a signal regiment and the necessary administrative units. These units can be grouped into three task forces, whose composition would be dictated by the particular operations.

Only essential combat and administrative units will be organic to the division; other additional elements, which may be required for specific operations, will form part of a combat support group. These elements will be allotted as necessary to the division to meet a particular situation.

The division will continue to have an army aviation unit of rotary and fixed wing light aircraft. This will be additional to the air transport support provided by helicopters, Caribou and Hercules aircraft of the R.A.A.F.

The main change in unit organization is in the size of the infantry battalion. The new battalion organization is outlined below:

SUMMARY

	Personnel	Attached
Officers:	34	2
Other ranks:	711	44
	—	—
Total:	745	46
	—	—

Transport

Trucks Utility $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton GS	26
with winch	
Trucks Utility $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton GS	
with winch FAS	2
Automotive repair shop,	
truck mounted $\frac{3}{4}$ -ton GS	
with winch, garage	1
Trailer, Cargo, $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton	27

Weapons

GPMG	53
MOR 81-mm	6
MAW	16

This organization is suited to both cold and limited war roles and is compatible with the organization recommended by the armies of our principal allies, as well as being more suitable for the training and administration of the CMF.

An article outlining the new divisional organization will appear in the *Australian Army Journal* as soon as possible after the examination is completed.

Purchase of Equipment

Over the next three years additional equipment valued at about £75,000,000 (Australian) will be purchased. This equipment will include the whole range of modern conventional weapons, ammunitions, vehicles, light aircraft, engineer and signal stores, earth-moving plant and cooking equipment.

Items of new equipment which the army is investigating include low-level anti-aircraft weapons, air-portable armoured fighting vehicles and new artillery weapons. Emphasis will continue to be placed on air-portable equipment and those items which will improve the army's mobility.

Conclusion

The Prime Minister, when he addressed the House on the Defence Review, said:

"We expect a continuing requirement to make forces available for cold war and

anti-insurgency tasks. We must have forces ready as an immediate contribution should wider hostilities occur. We must at all times retain adequate forces against any more direct threat which might develop to our own security. Because of our geographic position we have the most compelling reasons to take those steps which will put us in a position to meet these various demands."

From what you have already read you will see that the Australian Military Forces are now taking these steps.

TOBRUK 1941

In the early stages, especially, morale was a major consideration. We had just made a lengthy and hasty withdrawal and several units . . . suffered heavily. We were cut off by land, and had now to withstand a confident, numerically stronger and much more formidably equipped enemy, supported by an air force immeasurably stronger than ours. Our forward battalions were holding frontages of five miles. Where morale was in any way affected, it was soon restored and then grew.

Anything which might tend to cause apprehension or to shake the less stout-hearted was avoided. Thus sirens for air raid warnings were banned after having been used once. Cyrenaica Command withdrew their order to destroy ex-Italian ammunition dumps situated in the forward areas and not likely to be required. And everything possible was done to increase the morale. Senior officers made frequent visits by day and night to the forward posts, especially to the small and more isolated posts, and in fact to all positions; the offensive spirit was encouraged, patrolling and raiding were highly developed. Italian weapons and equipment lying in the open were quickly put into commission and even field guns were manned by infantry. In air attacks, instead of merely taking cover, the troops were required to hit back with everything they had.

The garrison was quickly welded into a team and the team spirit prevailed to a marked degree, manifested equally by British, Austrians, Indians, and later the Poles. It was a real brotherhood in arms.

— *L. J. Morshead, Report on Operations
9 Aust Div in Cyrenaica, March-October, 1941.*

ARMY JOURNAL TESTED BY READER OPINION

"What happened to that reader survey on the Australian Army Journal?" The question has been asked of me more times than I would care to count since taking up my present appointment.* It is a fair question, however, and one demanding an answer, since the survey, though now dated, shed light on readers' likes and dislikes and will shape future plans and policy.

The aims of the survey were to investigate whether changes should be made to the format and contents of the journal to enhance its value and interest and, more specifically, to discover whether the present system of monthly publication was satisfactory, whether the contents catered for the needs of the majority, and whether it was a suitable medium for the quick and wide dissemination of information.

The survey was conducted by means of a questionnaire prepared in conjunction with the Machine Data Processing Centre, Albert Park Barracks. Some 9,000 copies were distributed through Army Headquarters, Commands and FARELF to all officers, excluding staff cadets, school cadet officers and officers of cadets. Admittedly the fate of circulars has long been regarded as hazardous, but

even allowing a generous measure for the inevitable losses the response was disappointing and well below expectations. Nevertheless the 2847 replies received were processed by the Machine Data Processing Centre and forwarded to AAORG for analysis. They formed the basis of a 20-page report of which the following is only a summary.

The report sets out some reasons why statistical analysis of the replies was inappropriate.

- (a) It is probable that the sample of answers received was not random, i.e. only those officers interested in the journal replied.
- (b) There are doubts whether the journal was fully distributed to all officers.
- (c) Within some sub-groups of officers surveyed the sample obtained was small, and
- (d) The total population of some sub-groups is small and the statistical difficulties of sampling finite populations were encountered.

The analysis was carried out by breaking up the respondents into four groups — rank, corps, posting and age — to determine whether any particular group

* The writer succeeded Colonel Keogh as Editor in January.

showed preferences dissimilar to the overall result. It would be outside the scope of this article to reproduce each of the report's tabulated summaries, but at least one table is necessary to demonstrate the scope of the survey and the scale of its distribution.

The group analysis of the replies to the question "Do you find the *Australian Army Journal* generally an interesting publication?" was:

	No. in group	No % of group	Yes % of group
Total replies:	2847	7	92
Rank:			
2nd-Lt	212	4	95
Lt	682	5	93
Capt	913	8	91
Major	763	8	91
Lt-Col	216	12	86
Col	41	15	85
Brig	15	7	87
Maj-Gen	3	33	67
Corps:			
RAAC	181	4	96
RAA	362	10	90
RAE	241	7	92
RA Sig	166	8	91
RA Inf	795	7	92
RAASC	78	7	90
RAAMC	157	3	96
RAAOC	244	5	90
RAEME	175	7	93
RAANC,			
WRAAC	76	5	91
OTHER			
CORPS	256	11	88
Posting:			
Staff	752	9	91
Training Est	256	15	85
CMF unit	1056	4	96
CMF HQ	183	5	95
F.F. Arms	323	9	91
F.F. Services	160	6	94

Age:			
16-20	29	17	83
21-25	340	6	94
26-30	653	7	93
31-35	418	8	92
36-40	365	9	91
41-45	447	9	91
46-50	313	5	93
51-55	109	6	93
56-60	10	20	80

If a Nelsonian eye is cast on the poor overall response to the questionnaires, the *Australian Army Journal*, it seems, is entitled to bask in the warm air of reader approbation. The lack of response, on the other hand, could lead to the chastening conclusion that two-thirds of the officers approached are either not interested in the journal in its present form, or regard such a survey as time-wasting and unlikely to produce results.

The response to the question "Do you accept it as a literary work, a magazine or a professional journal?" was hardly illuminating: 3 per cent considered it a literary work, 34 per cent regarded it as a magazine; 66 per cent as a professional journal. In the lower (16-20) age group opinion was almost equally divided, while at the senior level the general officer who found to the journal's disfavour in answer to the preceding question evidently decided that to describe the AAJ as a "magazine" was the more damning of the alternatives. But what precisely is the difference between a magazine and a journal? The *Concise Oxford Dictionary* describes a magazine as a "periodical publication con-

taining articles by various writers" and a journal as a "daily newspaper" or "other periodical." Assuming that dictionaries are consulted, it becomes the harder to make up one's mind.

The next question was a useful and well-framed one, except that, perhaps unwittingly, it suggested its own order of preference. "Indicate each type of article which appeals to you: current affairs, military history, tactics, book reviews, strategy, administration, organization, special warfare techniques, leadership and morale, training, technical matters." Perhaps it should be remarked that to seek such preferences is to imply that an editor has unlimited choice of copy — which in this case, of course, he has not.

Each breakdown of answers revealed useful trends worthy of comment, but clearly the articles which provoke widest interest are those devoted to current affairs, military history, tactics and special warfare. The framer of the question guessed well except that book reviews (31 per cent) came a poor last — well below the real heavyweights such as "strategy (41 per cent), "admin" (46 per cent), "org" and "Tech" (each 49 per cent). "I never read reviews," remarked one armoured colonel emphatically. In the age break-up the percentage favouring reviews was least in the lowest age group (14 per cent) and most in the highest (50 per cent), perhaps bearing out the former editor's opinion that "higher authority has always

laid stress on the training value of . . . reviews." The lower ranks evidently prefer to disagree.

Articles on strategy were not widely popular, although at the rank of brigadier there was a decided and perhaps understandable preference (73 per cent). Articles on administration and organization tended to increase in popularity with age and rank, perhaps suggesting, as the survey report remarks, that such articles should be aimed at the senior rank levels, except that at the most senior level of the inquiry neither topic polled a vote.

Interest in articles on leadership, morale and training was general, but views on articles of a technical nature varied widely. It was clear, however, that the lower ranks (captain downwards) were more interested in technical matters than the higher ranks, and greater interest was shown by the RAAC, RAA, RAE and RAEME than by other corps.

The next question — "nominate any additional category of article which you consider should be introduced" — might have been expected to provide a field day for the light-hearted with suggestions for barrack-room pin-ups, space fiction and fishing notes. In fact it drew replies from only one-third of the respondents — largely serious in tone. The main requests were for articles on new weapons and equipment (157 requests) and on other armies (155). General administration coupled with corps news and inter-service

corps cooperation also represented a large field of interest. Requests were also received for personal narratives (56), for articles on South-East Asia (55), for humour (41), education (30), science, space (29), discussions (25), traditions (25), demobilisation (24), photographs (22).

A "letters to the editor" section, for long a diverting feature of daily newspapers and periodicals, was favoured by a majority of two to one. Second-lieutenants and the 16-20 age group very strongly favoured the proposal, but major-generals and brigadiers and the oldest age group were evenly divided in opinion about its value. "These two divergencies," remarks the report, "may perhaps be explained by the crusading zeal of the young and the conservatism which comes from experience."

One likes to think of "letters to the editor" as a useful barometer of reader opinion, but it should be remarked that comparable service journals overseas seem to be about equally divided as to their worth. On one side of the Atlantic the *Canadian Army Journal* and the *American Military Review* seem to prefer to keep their good-looking columns untarnished by such discussion; on the other side *The British Army Review*, the *Army Quarterly*, the *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute* all allow free rein to their readers' desire for lively debate.

"Do readers pick up any worthwhile information from the Australian Army Journal

not available from other sources?" Respondents were asked whether the information, if any, was (a) "considerable"; or (b) "little or none." A majority of 63 per cent plumped for (a), but officers of the rank of colonel and lieutenant-colonel were less definite. The report decided that this was probably because of the preponderance of staff appointments in these ranks and the consequent availability of a wider range of military information. The lower ranks (up to captain), the younger age groups (up to 35) and particularly CMF officers were emphatic in their belief that they derive considerable information not otherwise available from military sources.

The question "Does the AAJ provide any material which is beneficial to your present posting" seems somewhat synonymous with the preceding one, since any information which increases knowledge presumably would be beneficial regardless of posting. Once again, however, the journal seemed to be considered of more value in the ranks which contain the larger number of officers, and again of particular value to the CMF.

(One often-voiced criticism, not mentioned in the survey report, but which should be remarked upon here, is of the AAJ practice of reprinting important articles from overseas Service journals. It should be said at once that the traffic is not entirely one way. The best of the AAJ contributions are also to be found reprinted in overseas journals and for a pre-

cisely similar reason — to give them the wider circulation they deserve.)

Readers were next asked whether they favoured a monthly or quarterly publication. The present frequency of publication was judged satisfactory by 67 per cent, the lower ranks, the younger age groups and the CMF leaving no doubt about their wish that the present monthly rate of publication should be continued.

The scale of issue — one per officer, officer of cadets and cadet under-officer — was considered appropriate, and it was also generally agreed that the journal was "a suitable medium for the rapid and wide dissemination of information."

The reader survey next touched on questions that have some pertinence to the journal's value not only to regular and citizen soldiers, but as a channel of communication with the public at large. It may be appropriate at this stage to examine the origins of the journal and to recall some of the aims and ideals of its wise and learned progenitor, Lieutenant-General Sir Sydney Rowell.

When Gavin Long was writing *To Benghazi*, his pilot volume of the Australian official history, he was fortunate to have General Rowell to advise and comment on his draft chapter dealing with the Australian Army between the two world wars. In his draft Long had written:

There was in Australia no organised group to press for more effective military defence, nor any journal in which military and naval prob-

lems were discussed with authority. In his first report, in 1921, Chauvel had urged the re-establishment of the **Commonwealth Military Journal** which had been published from 1911 to 1915 and to which officers of the permanent and citizen forces had been "cordially invited" to contribute. Nothing came of the suggestion and, with one small exception, no military journal existed in Australia between the wars. To the extent that they thus failed to establish an adequate channel of communication with the people at large, the officer corps, both professional and amateur, must share, with the political leaders and the press, the responsibility for neglect of the army.

In the Staff Corps and militia were men who had something to say and knew how to say it, but their writings were to be seen in British journals, chiefly in the *Army Quarterly*, which was read in Australia almost solely by officers of their own Services. Criticism was discouraged by political leaders and their attitude affected the senior officers of the Services, and seeped downwards. As far as the Staff Corps was concerned the truth was that its members' otherwise outstanding education had included no instruction in what came later to be called "public relations" and their subsequent careers travelled in a narrow professional groove. The low pay helped to prevent them taking their proper place in social life outside the army and the corps became isolated to an extent that was exceedingly inappropriate in a group which was administering a citizen army.

General Rowell offered no comment on this part of the draft, but not long afterwards the *Australian Army Journal* made its debut. The first issue came to Gavin Long with a note in General Rowell's handwriting. (*To Benghazi* had not then been published.) Rowell wrote that "this was one occasion when the Australian Army was anticipating the lessons of history."

In his directive to Colonel Keogh, General Rowell laid down certain principles which form the editor's charter today:

The *Australian Army Journal* (he wrote) is a medium through which:

- (a) Officers can be kept informed on matters relating to Australian defence in all its aspects.
- (b) Officers can be kept informed of trends and developments in military thought at home and abroad.
- (c) Contributors may freely express their views on military and related subjects.

The only material subject to censorship are contributions which directly criticise the policy of the Military Board or the Government, which might cause dissension in the army or between the armed services, or which might have a security aspect.

It is probably fair to ask at this stage whether all the lofty aims of the charter are being realised. Certainly the editor has been untrammelled by censorship. But has he always been kept fully in touch with current military thinking? The publication of an article in the December issue supporting the Pentropic organization subsequent to the Prime Minister's announcement that it was to be discarded might suggest to some that he has not — if it was not appreciated that copy for an issue must be with the printer some six weeks beforehand.

The Service has been provided with a medium for freely expressing its opinions. Has full use been made of it?

The answer, it would seem, is no. The reader survey reveals that only 5 per cent of respondents had submitted an article for publication; 38 per cent had thought about it; 56 per cent

had never considered doing so. The report itself does not provide a full analysis by rank, corps, posting and age because such an analysis would reveal "only the obvious, i.e. that young officers, CMF and officers of the RAANC and WRAAC have not submitted papers or considered writing them." However, a survey of published articles conducted by the staff of the Director of Combat Development over two separate periods — 1948-52 and 1960-64 — revealed that most of the contributions were from the captain, major, lieutenant-colonel level, which perhaps serves to confirm a suggestion that insufficient officers at the senior level are using the journal to express their opinions.

The report went to pains to discover why the 38 per cent who considered writing articles (representing 1,092 respondents) had not done so, and arrived at the following analysis:

Lack of time	875	80%
Lack of interest	75	7%
Subject matter too controversial	302	28%
Subject matter not appropriate to current AAJ	249	23%

The report may be guilty of over-simplification in concluding that "at least 875 articles have been denied to the AAJ due to lack of time." (As most would agree it is one thing to consider writing an article, quite another to produce it.) However, it comes closer to fundamentals when it remarks that more articles might have been submitted if the encouragement were greater.

Probably some personal satisfaction is derived from a published article, and increased professional status is undoubtedly gained by a well-phrased and thoughtful contribution. "The encouragement need not be monetary," remarks the report; "lifting the status of the journal may be sufficient." On the other hand the present arrangement of awarding a £5 prize to the author of the best monthly contribution and nothing to the also-rans may seem inadequate when compared with the generous rates offered to contributors of articles to newspapers, or to the monetary rewards available to contributors in some Commonwealth publications. In one way too the existing arrangement seems more likely to inhibit than stimulate a free flow of contributions, particularly at the higher level. For example, a senior officer may well feel that *amour-propre* is involved if his contribution is to be weighed against that of an officer very much his junior. A monthly award to the best contributor also sometimes leads to injustice, particularly when two articles of outstanding merit appear by chance in the same journal. One contribution must be discarded in favour of the other; yet placed in separate issues of the journal both might have gained a monthly award and qualified for the larger annual prize distribution.

What of the future of the journal? A committee meeting, attended by Colonel Keogh, was held at AHQ last July to consider its charter and policy. The com-

mittee made certain recommendations which have subsequently been endorsed by the Deputy Chief of the General Staff.

Principally these were that the quality of the production, described by an outside authority "as well below the standard of overseas army journals," should be improved. The DCGS agreed that the AAJ should remain a professional journal and not become a classified document. The present monthly rate of publication will be maintained. The charter of the editor was confirmed without amendment, the committee in its recommendations emphasising that if the journal is to achieve its aims "the basis of its policy must be that free discussion is in fact free." Articles of a high professional standard, authoritative, and based on trends in military affairs, will continue to be eagerly welcomed. Directorates will be asked to supply unclassified but official commentary on new doctrines, weapons and equipment, and on other topics of professional interest for which readers have expressed a wish. A section will be opened to comment and discussion on previously published articles, and letters to the editor will be published. Outside contributions from people of standing in the community with a Defence or Service bias will be invited. But in the main the *Australian Army Journal* will continue to reflect the views, enthusiasms and researches of individual officers. From them must come the contributions which set the standard of the AAJ.

— A.J.S.

A VISIT TO GALLIPOLI

Robert Rhodes James

AS Sir Winston Churchill has commented in his biography of his father, the ill-fated Lord Randolph, a visitor to an old battlefield has considerable difficulty in realising that on the fate of some insignificant mound of earth the blood of many men has been shed and the destinies of empires distorted. This is particularly true of the old First World War battlefields in France. Kemmel Hill, Vimy Ridge and Hill 60 astonish only by reason of their relative insignificance; others, less famous, but equally crucial military features of the land-

scape, would easily escape the attention of all but the most knowledgeable visitor.

Gallipoli is rather different. For one thing, the years have dealt gently with the Peninsula. Apart from Krithia, none of the shattered towns and villages has really recovered from the campaign of 1915. Sedd-el-Bahr is still in ruins; only the grass and scrub in the litter of bricks and stones remind one that all this destruction occurred many years ago and not yesterday. The Peninsula, with the exception of the Turkish troops who garrison it, is less populated than it was fifty years ago. One can walk for miles without seeing a soul; what John North has called the shattering silence of Gallipoli is probably its most remarkable and chilling characteristic.

The author is Clerk of the House of Commons. At the age of 25 he published a well-received biography of Lord Randolph Churchill. In 1961 he was awarded the John Lewellyn Rhys Memorial Prize for the outstanding author under 30 years of age. In 1963 he published a definitive study of the British Prime Minister, Lord Rosebery, which received the award of the Royal Society of Literature. He was made a Fellow of the Royal Society and a Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford.

For the past ten years Robert Rhodes James has been working intermittently on a new study of the Gallipoli campaign. As well as gaining access to certain official archives hitherto closed to historians, he has used the papers of Lord Birdwood, Lord Kitchener and Sir Ian Hamilton, in addition to those of numerous other Gallipoli participants. The publication of his book "Gallipoli," in the Batsford Battle series, is planned to coincide with the 50th Anniversary of the landing.

His article, written after a visit to Gallipoli in 1962, is reprinted with acknowledgement to "Stand-To."

The sad little cemeteries marching across the Peninsula and a new coastguard station on "W" Beach are virtually the only changes which have occurred in the Helles landscape in the past fifty years. One has only to leave the one wretched road and plunge into the scrub to find reminders of the fighting everywhere. Turkish guns lie at clumsy angles in the yellow ground; a traction engine disintegrates with reluctance at "W" Beach; there is an entire light railway, trucks, track and all, piled into a dip near Sedd-

el-Bahr, with the Liverpool manufacturer's brass plates shining as brightly as ever; on Gully Spur, the scene of probably the most savage fighting on the Peninsula, one has only to kick the scrub to send a cloud of bones and skulls scuffling through the dust; in the Ravine, British unit markings can still be seen, and, at the head, the rows of Turkish skulls gleam grimly in the fierce light; a recent scrub fire on the Spur had revealed the opposing lines of trenches with startling clarity; at the old beaches, the remains of the British jetties are still clearly visible; the bank of sand under which the survivors of the "V" Beach landing sheltered throughout April 25th is now very eroded, and only a foot high in most places, but still clearly to be seen. The great Helles memorial, and an enormous new Turkish memorial on the site of De Tott's Battery dominate the scene less than the bald hump-back of Achi-Baba Ridge, to which one's eyes are compulsively drawn. An hour's walk from Helles brings one to the summit of this famous hill; so gentle is the climb that one is not prepared for the view back across the old battlefield. It reminded me very much of Vimy Ridge in this respect, although it is even less of an eminence.

At Anzac, the reminders of the fighting are everywhere. It is like walking through an ancient city devastated by earthquake, whose occupants were either killed or forced to leave in a hurry, and which has never been visited since the disaster. Axe-

heads, rum-jars, water-bottles, and bully-beef tins can be had for the asking; shoulder-flashes and cap-badges are less common, although I acquired a New Zealand shoulder-flash on Plugge's Plateau. An old man and a boy make a living by scooping up rifles, grenades, cartridges and even unexploded shells off the sea bottom a few yards off Anzac Cove. The water condensers erected before the Evacuation and put out of action almost at once by a Turk shell, have guarded the Cove for nearly fifty years like two gaunt sightless sentinels; they have now subsided into the sand, together with their concrete surround, which has crumpled rather absurdly against the cliff; one of the condensers is used by the old man and the boy as their shelter against the midday sun. At Ari Burnu, an old lighter is in the last stages of decomposition, and there is another off Brighton Beach.

This historic fragment of rock and scrub is now being turned into a forest. When I was there in August 1962 the old trenches were being filled with brushwood; terraces were appearing even on the sides of Plugge's Plateau and Russell's Top; by now the old battlefield will be fully planted, and virtually blotted out by trees. Owen's Gully, Wire Gully and Shrapnel Gully were already terraced with young conifers; the slopes of Baby 700 and Battleship Hill were fully planted. It is all rather sad and, one cannot help feeling, rather unnecessary.

Bodies are still being found; every winter the rains reveal

more human remains; if they are on the Allied side of the old front lines they are buried by the staff of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission; if they are on the Turkish side, they are left. "Turkish Quinn's" is a mass of bones; to this day, no one quite knows how many bodies lie in the tangle of ravines below Chunuk Bair.

It is perhaps this which gives Anzac and Suvla a cold hostile atmosphere all their own. If ghosts walk, they walk in Monash Valley, where the gully dug for the winter rains of 1915-16 is still deep, where one can easily see the remains of Malone's terraces behind Quinn's where Bridges' Road is still in excellent condition, and where the debris of war is everywhere. Near the old front lines there are sinister holes of old saps; one behind Johnson's Jolly is in perfect condition, and plunges deep into No-Man's Land; only caution and the absence of a torch prevented me following it to its end.

Suvla is desolate, empty and bleak. The sentinel hills which surround the Plain like an amphitheatre quiver in the August heat; the salt-carts crawl interminably over the glistening whiteness of the Salt Lake, like flies across a table-top; the trenches here have been washed away save on the higher ground. Australians, New Zealanders and others who grow bitter about the performance of IX Corps in the August offensive should explore the Suvla Plain for themselves; the view from Anzac or Kiretch Tepe is wholly deceptive. The

Plain is scored with deep fissures, washaways, unexpected ridges; the ground is coarse, thirsty and difficult. The heat, trapped by the sentinel hills, is worse than at Anzac; one finds oneself gasping in the apparently airless atmosphere. Even with a large modern army I would not care to traverse the Plain; it is made for defence, the innocence of the ground luring one into a maze of gullies, and a climb only possible by means of winding goat-tracks. It is, of course, far less spectacularly difficult ground to cross than that which confronted Godley's army in its assault on the Sari Bair crests, but anyone who thinks that it is easy ground to advance across should try walking from Lala Baba to Tekke Tepe. This, for me, was one of the major surprises of my visit and made me look far closer at the causes of the failure of the Suvla landing with a greater sympathy.

My visit was essentially a business trip in connection with my new study of the Gallipoli operations; I concerned myself primarily with distances, angles of fire and so on, comparing my notes with those of Dr. Bean and the Australian Historical Mission of 1919. Survivors of that mission would be astonished to find how little has changed; perhaps, too, they would be saddened by the lines of young conifers now covering the battlefield; but I know that they, and all survivors of the campaign, would be deeply touched by the devotion and skill of the British representative of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission.

His task is almost impossibly difficult. The water situation, particularly at Anzac, is now almost desperate, and plans are under way to build conserving tanks to save some of the winter rains; by August, the grass and the flowers have alike vanished, and the drab little cemeteries have a withered and forlorn look, resembling Indian parade grounds in their yellow harsh aridity, with rows of gleaming headstones, so few of which actually mark the grave of a soldier. The Commission's representative has to be engineer, horticulturist, water diviner, and diplomat.

The stars of Germany and France are high in modern Turkey; that of Britain is low, and this is sometimes reflected in the treatment given to visitors. Americans are tolerated and despised. But every now and then one penetrates the reserve of the Turks; my 1915 maps were a source of great interest, and the children of Canakkale still chant "Bouvet, Irresistible, Ocean" with glee. Poor Turkey! One has only to know some of the younger students to realise the yearning to be truly part of the western European civilisation so deeply admired and towards which Turkey has hardly moved a step for thirty years.

It is the real tragedy of Gallipoli that the mutual respect which it aroused was destroyed by the terrible misconceptions of the Lloyd George Coalition in the 1920s; an honourable peace in 1918, as proposed by the British soldiers and overruled by

their politicians, would have made the sacrifices of Gallipoli worthwhile. And it is ironic that, as it was the Dardanelles which threw Churchill down in 1915, so it was the "Chanak incident" of 1922 which moved him from office and the House of Commons, and which marked the beginning of a slow climb back into the political uplands which would surely have failed had not a second world war occurred. Within seven years, the true lesson of Gallipoli had not been learnt, and British influence has never recovered from the manner in which the Allied governments set about the dismemberment of Turkey when the war ended. The tragedy which began with a memorandum by Churchill to the War Office in August 1914 concerning the practicability of forcing the Dardanelles ran its full course when, ten years later, an independent Turkey resumed her control of that historic waterway. And, today, they are growing trees all over the Anzac battlefields, and the bones glitter eternally in the Aegean sun.

"No battlefield," John North has written of Gallipoli, "so lends itself to retrospective sentimentality." The best cure for the romantic haze which hangs over the campaign is to go to Gallipoli, in August, alone; for the intense heat, the blinding glare, and the spume of dust moving slowly across the Peninsula are not sufficient to obliterate the chilling coldness of the atmosphere. It was good to have gone there; it was better to leave. The Peninsula resents intruders.

AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1945

Major P. S. Codde,
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IN 1938, W. Macmahon Ball hypothesized three conditions necessary for the formulation of a considered Australian foreign policy:

- (1) Accurate information about other countries.
- (2) An atmosphere in which alternative policies can be freely and frankly examined.
- (3) An intelligent and civilised spirit of patriotism bent towards increasing the welfare of Australians.¹

This, at first glance, might provide a simple basis for an Australian foreign policy today, until one considers the peculiar compilation of factors which must influence her external commitments. For Australia is an island, depending for her economic prosperity and high standard of living on the value of her export trade, carried over long distances; she has a large and growing secondary industry; she is bound to the British Commonwealth by strong financial, commercial and cultural ties; her history and population are traditionally European; she boasts a liberal

democracy based on a capitalist economy; she is unable, due to her small population, to defend herself on her trading lanes adequately; geographically, she is tied to South East Asia, one of the most undeveloped regions of the world, with a high population density and a low standard of living.

Adding to the complexity are ubiquitous human factors. Sir Frederic W. Eggleston asserts:

"... Mr. Hughes was a great Nationalist. Dr. Evatt was an internationalist..."²

Evatt deliberately fostered an international awareness of Australia's relationship to world affairs. Through his personal endeavours, Australia took a leading part in the United Nations organisation and became the spokesman for the smaller powers of the world. Later, R. G. Casey was to criticise Australia's position in world affairs as one of "status without stature". He bent toward a policy of securing Australia's position by regional agreements

¹ W. G. K. Duncan, (ed), "Australia's Foreign Policy", (Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1938), p. vii.

² H. V. Evatt, "Australia in World Affairs", (Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1946), p. viii.

and a friendly attitude to our northern neighbours.

Although one may agree that an Australian foreign policy should desirably be directed along the lines Macmahon Ball suggests, the means of attaining these conditions, especially the second, seem remote today. For three factors, above all, have tended to dictate Australian post-war foreign policy. First, the final realisation that Australian security no longer is guaranteed by the presence of the British Navy in Pacific waters. Second, America's emergence from a position of voluntary isolation to one formulating global strategy for the Western bloc. Finally, the diminution of world distances in terms of time have ensured that Australia today is no longer isolated and remote, but shares the problems of nations at the furthest corners of the globe. Against a background of vacillating world conditions, Australian foreign policy has become one of expedience, striving to keep abreast, unable any longer, except in the strict legal sense, to claim many pretensions to independence.

If Australia had a chance of maintaining an independent point of view, it rested on the success of the United Nations Organisation. Although the preponderance of military strength in the immediate post-war years lay in the hands of the three great powers, Evatt emphasised that the smaller powers had a great, perhaps even decisive, part to play towards lasting peace in a world organisation. Upon the success of the

Organisation, not only depended Australian security, it was thought, but perhaps even her progress. For full employment and freedom from want, if an international obligation, clearly had advantages in maintaining Australian standards of living as well as her independence.

Australia's position on the Security Council and her representation on every committee possible, although attributable in no small measure to the convictions held by Evatt, provide a gauge of the importance attached, from an Australian viewpoint, to membership of U.N. Yet, by the nineteen-fifties it had become clear that the ineffectuality of U.N. in solving the more contentious international problems was likely to continue, especially where the interests of the two opposing power blocs were in conflict. The Government formed the opinion that U.N., at present, could not alone guarantee Australian security.

Recognition of U.N. inability to prevent aggression became expressed in the South East Asia Collective Defence Treaty. Until today, together with ANZUS, it forms the basis for Australian security policy. Restricted productive capacity, manpower and finance have determined a comparatively minor contribution by Australia to her treaty obligations. Nuclear weapons have been rejected as too costly, so Australia has been fortunate to profit by the nuclear deterrent and consequent assumption that future Communist expansion will be by limited war and sub-

version. Criticism of the in-substantial part being played by Australia is becoming, though, more trenchant. It has been pointed out that Australian defence expenditure is lagging seriously behind that of either the United Kingdom or the United States.³ Although Australia's stage of development may justly be cited as an excuse for this, it can hardly be expected that this will be casually accepted. Australia will be obliged to make a greater effort to ensure that her security remains underwritten by America.

For, if there is one aspect of Australian external policy since the war which has continued with unbroken and, indeed, increased emphasis, it is the importance attached to Australian-American relations. The success of Australian-American co-operation in the Pacific during the last world war; the realisation of Australia's dependence on American support in this sphere in the future; and the continuing suspicion of the Japanese menace of resurgence, guaranteed that the basis for Australia's postwar foreign policy would be a continuing and close collaboration with America.

"Why cannot the co-operation which won the war," Evatt asks, "maintain the peace and endure through the post-war period?"⁴

Later, Casey was to become "... the most eloquent Government exponent of the importance of Australian-American co-operation..."⁵, while the recent frequent visits of the

Prime Minister to the U.S.A., supply ample proof that there has been no official change of emphasis. The replacement of the Japanese threat in Asia by one of Communism, has determined that the focus of American global policy cannot exclude the Asian sphere. Even so, an outcome of Australian dependence on American support has been the subordination of her independence to ensure that collaboration vital for survival. American attitudes toward Indonesia, Communist China, Japan and Formosa have all influenced Australian official policy.

This is not to discount the valued friendship of Great Britain, but rather to supplement it in the region where the past war had shown Australia's influence and interests were greatest. Britain's decline since 1945 has encouraged independent foreign policies within the Commonwealth and a greater reliance on America. Commercial, economic and (certainly in the case of Australia) cultural ties provide strong bonds of adhesion, but Crowley believes that the continuing evolution of the members towards greater autonomy can hardly persist without the Commonwealth falling apart.⁶ So far as Australia is concerned, the ANZUS pact and Britain's abortive attempt to join the European

³ "Time", 29 May, 1964.

⁴ H. V. Evatt, "Australia in World Affairs", (Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1946).

⁵ G. Greenwood and N. Harper, (eds), "Australia in World Affairs, 1956-1960", (Cheshire, Melbourne, 1963), p. 233.

⁶ D. W. Crowley, "The Background to Current Affairs", (Macmillan, London, 1953), p. 25.

Common Market have contributed to the element of strain imposed on Commonwealth cohesion. In the face of the recently increased numbers of Commonwealth members with divergent interests and England's lowered status in international opinion, it is difficult to discard Crowley's view lightly.

Yet, if her destiny seems linked with that of America, Australia remains a small Pacific power with a large territory; a country with a small population and a provocative immigration policy; a nation with a high standard of living among Pacific nations with comparatively low standards. Shrinking distances and the creeping menace of Communism in South East Asia

have brought a developing awareness of the area in which we live.

"... Australia cannot afford to be insular in the Pacific."⁷ Collective security, it is recognised, must include provisions for trade expansion in the Pacific, leading to economic appeasement with higher standards of living and labour conditions. Good relations with our Asian neighbours must continue to be pursued through political, military and economic fields. How to reconcile this policy with the American view and our European heritage, is the fascinating problem contained in the development of Australian future external policy.

⁷ H. V. Evatt, "Australia in World Affairs". (Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1946).

SOLDIERS TALKING

It is needless to be afraid of overloading the infantry with arms; this will make them more steady. The arms of the Roman soldiers weighed over sixty pounds, and it was death to abandon them in action. It prevented any thoughts of flying and was a principle of military art with them. To these muskets I would add a bayonet with a handle, two and one-half feet long, which will serve as a sword, and oval shields or targets. These shields have many advantages; they not only cover the arms but, when fighting in position, the troops can form a kind of parapet with them in an instant by passing them from hand to hand to the front. Two of them, one on the other, are musket proof. My opinion in regard to this piece of armour is supported by that of Montecuculli, who says that it is absolutely necessary for the infantry.

Bayonets with handles to fix within the barrel of the musket are much preferable to the others because they enable the commander to reserve his fire as long as he thinks proper. This is a matter of the utmost importance, since one cannot hope to do two different things at once. That is to say, charge, or stand and fight. In one case they must fire, in the other not at all.

Marshal de Saxe, My Reveries on the Art of War (1732).



THE BATTLE OF THE V-WEAPONS 1944-45 by Basil Collier. (Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1964.)

At 11.20 a.m. on Sunday, 18th June 1944, a "flying bomb" — the FZG.76 or V-1, a mid-wing monoplane pilotless aircraft, with a warhead of rather less than one ton — struck the Royal Military Chapel at Wellington Barracks, London, barely a mile from Buckingham Palace and not much farther from the government offices sandwiched between Whitehall and St. James' Park. Seventy-eight civilians and 111 members of the fighting services attending morning service were killed or seriously injured.

The first flying bomb had puttered out harmlessly over the North Downs five days earlier. Before the end of the campaign roughly 10,500 were to be aimed at the United Kingdom, 8,892 from launching ramps and about 1,600 from aircraft. Until the Wellington Barracks' explosion, however, no flying bomb had inflicted anywhere near so many casualties. None had so closely missed killing so many people who, having survived, hastened to recount their experiences in places where the telling most mattered. Quickly the news circulated through governmental

and official circles. That morning's disaster brought home the menace of Hitler's new weapon as no scrutiny of casualty returns could ever have done.

That day General Eisenhower ruled that until further notice attacks on long-range weapon targets must take precedence over everything except the urgent requirements of the battle across the Channel which had begun only twelve days before. On the 20th the War Cabinet gave Duncan Sandys a watching brief over the counter-measures to long-range weapons as chairman of a new "Crossbow" committee. Neither of these events, however, were able to prevent Air Chief Marshal Portal from "grudging any large-scale diversion from attacks on the German oil industry" nor end the reluctance of Air Chief Marshal Harris and General Doolittle to "plug away at targets of such doubtful value as supply sites and 'large sites'."

The Allied use of their air striking power in this period, according to Collier, was "illogical and extravagant to an almost incredible degree." About 74,000 tons of bombs were devoted to offensive counter-measures between 13th June and 1st September, but a great part of this tonnage was aimed at targets of

doubtful relevance or of no relevance whatsoever. Thus the real job of countering the V-1 offensive was left to the air defences with some assistance after mid-August from the Allied armies sweeping on towards the launching areas.

It is pleasing to see for once an "official historian" producing a popular account based on his own deep research into an important period of history. Too many writers have jumped on the band-waggon of the official histories to produce books for popular consumption containing exaggeration and distortion or clouded by a superficial understanding of the facts.

Collier, a full-time professional writer, was serving as an Intelligence officer at Headquarters Fighter Command when the Germans first planned their V-1 and V-2 offensive and remained on the staff of the air defences throughout the early stages of the attack. Afterwards he went to SHAEF as one of a number of officers concerned with countering similar attacks on continental cities. At the end of the war he was appointed Air Historical Officer to Fighter Command and later joined the Cabinet Office as an independent but officially accredited historian. In 1957 his official history, *The Defence of the United Kingdom*, was published, unquestionably the most authoritative and learned study available, not only of the years when Britain stood with her back to the wall, but of that later period when the eerie flying bomb and the swifter yet less dreaded rocket struck at the heart of London.

Over the whole period of the offensive the number of people killed was less than one for every missile which crossed the coast or came within range of the defences, but the area of superficial damage was so wide, the whole business so alarming that the orderly retreat to the country of 100,000 Londoners a week for ten weeks on end — apart from the organised evacuation of a quarter of a million women and children — was hardly surprising.

One of the big problems of Air Defence of Great Britain Command was to devise a means whereby the fighters, guns, searchlights and balloons of ADGB could be used without causing mutual interference. In the early stages of the bombardment a good deal of confusion developed among the defenders. Aircraft pursued flying bombs into the gun belt and were themselves attacked by gunfire. It soon became necessary to define three separate lines of action according to the prevailing weather. One gave complete freedom to fighters and forbade guns to fire; another gave freedom of action to guns and restricted aircraft patrols to seaward areas only; the third laid down strict rules of procedure when both guns and aircraft could profitably be employed in the landward zone.

Collier, basing his account on a comparison of British and German records, shows how the plan devised enabled the air defences to get the better of the flying bomb even before the Allied invasion began to push

the German *Flakregiment 155 (W)* to more distant sites; he gives due credit to the ADGB commander, Air Marshal Roderic Hill — "tall, good-looking, un-faillingly polite, who stemmed from the Cambridge tradition of experimental philosophers for whom successful action is the correct application of sound principles"—and to Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Pile, who had headed Anti-Aircraft Command since the outbreak of the war, was well-known to the Prime Minister and other members of the Government and considerably more senior and experienced than Hill. Relations between the two men were uniformly good because Hill was tactful and Pile, an Irish baronet and a man mellowed by wide knowledge of the world, was more interested in helping the air defence commander to do a good job than in standing on his own dignity. This, of course, did not save Hill from being unjustly suspected of giving too much weight to Pile's views, particularly when Hill decided to re-site the guns along the coast to put them in the best position to exploit their ability to shoot down targets. Such a re-siting split the field of action of the fighters into two, but gave the gunners an unrestricted field of fire over the widest possible arc; it also placed them in an area where their radar sets were least influenced by neighbouring contours and where, incidentally, any round that failed to explode fell harmlessly into the sea.

Hill's momentous decision, which set in train within hours

arrangements to shift 23,000 men and women and the great mass of their accompanying guns, stores and communications network, was taken without prior consultation with the Air Staff — taken deliberately in order to avoid the several days' delay that would have occurred while the Air Staff referred it to the Chiefs of Staff or to the committee which usually considered proposals to move guns from one defended area to another.

It laid him open to the Air Staff's charge of sacrificing the fighter force for the benefit of the guns — if true, no doubt in air force eyes a Service heresy without parallel — and of yielding to the pressure of General Pile. But when these charges were disposed of and the decision proved to have been the right one, Hill found that he had bought himself a new measure of freedom. "The Air Staff might not have relished being by-passed but no one could fail to respect a commander who had the courage of his convictions and was willing to risk his career to get things done."

As Collier shows the campaign against the V-2 — a gyroscopically stabilised 46-foot long finned rocket, carrying a war-head of 1,650 lbs. of explosive, which travelled at a maximum speed of 3,600 miles an hour at a peak height of 50-60 miles — was far less successful. Armed reconnaissance and fighter-bomber attacks against V-2 targets were only "palliatives," according to Collier, although the latter achieved some good results. Two potential counter-

measures — attacks by medium and heavy bombers on such rocket stores as existed at The Hague and a plan to blow up approaching rockets by putting a curtain of shell-fragments in their path — were never tested. Collier believes that when the Chiefs of Staff turned down this latter proposal "they forfeited a unique chance of gaining valuable experience in technique at trifling cost. Even if no hits had been scored Britain would have won the moral advantage of being the first nation to experiment with anti-missile weapons in realistic conditions."

The last long-range rocket fell on England on 27th March 1945. Since September the launching troops in Holland had aimed

1,403 rockets at the United Kingdom, all but 44 of them at London. Of that total 517 had fallen in the London Civil Defence Region, 537 elsewhere on land, and 61 off shore. The remainder were wild or abortive shots. After launching their last V-2, the rocket troops at The Hague withdrew to Germany. About six weeks later the bulk of them and most of the rocket-launching organization surrendered to the American Ninth Army. So ended, writes Collier, "a bid which seemed to establish Nazi supremacy in the race for a novel means of indiscriminate destruction until the Allies capped it a few months later at Hiroshima and Nagasaki."

—AJS.

Much careful consideration, backed in time by the lessons of increasing experience, was devoted to deciding upon the essential qualities of a good junior officer. At first there was a tendency, induced perhaps by the fact that [in 1942] there was a desperate shortage of such officers and little time to test a young man's capabilities to the full, to attach more importance to technical aptitude and physical stamina than to character and leadership. Under the searching test of actual warfare, however, it was soon a case of "solvitur ambulando" and a definite change in official opinion resulted. If it was found impossible to obtain sufficient officers possessed of all four of the qualities just enumerated, then it was decided, inevitably and rightly, that the man of character, the man endowed with confidence in himself and ability to inspire confidence in others, must be preferred to the technical expert, however well-trained or efficient. In its way the decision was a minor triumph for an ancient tradition.

Ian Hay, Arms and the Men (London, 1950).