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# AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

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The views expressed in the articles in this Journal are the author's own and do not necessarily represent General Staff opinion or policy.



Photo: Australian War Memorial, Canberra.

#### LIGHT CAR PATROL

In World War I armoured fighting vehicles were in their infancy. The only armoured cars available for deep reconnaissance in Egypt and Palestine were heavy converted civil vehicles unsuitable for operations on the rough desert country. To meet the need the British organised a unit of unarmoured T-model Fords, each carrying a crew of three men and mounting a Lewis light machine-gun. Handled with great dash and vigour, this improvised equipment rendered valuable service throughout the campaign. The picture shows a patrol of these cars manned by Australian troops.

# MILITARY APPRECIATIONS

Lieutenant Colonel R. S. Garland, MC,  
Royal Australian Infantry

## RECENT EXERCISES

I have attended indicate that a large number of officers do not know how to produce a reasonable appreciation. This paper has been prepared to assist officers who may need some guidance in this subject.

Officers must interpret this paper to meet the particular problem with which they are confronted. In exercises, for example, students are often asked such questions as; give your

- (a) Outline plan supported by reasons.
- (b) Outline appreciation.
- (c) Appreciation in note form, etc.

In deciding on the method of approach to such problems, students must be guided by the time allotted to the question and proportion their time accordingly, including time for reconnaissance. The next step is to read the question carefully and to frame the answer to meet the requirement. In most problems there is insufficient

time for the development of a full appreciation. Consequently the answer should normally be prepared in a note or tabulated form.

However, on courses conducted for promotion to Major and Lieutenant Colonel under DA 21A, a full written appreciation may be requested.

## General

The term "Appreciation of the Situation" means nothing more than an orderly sequence of reasoning, leading logically to the best solution to a problem. Military appreciations may deal with tactical, strategical, administrative or other problems.

The technique of high level planning is not covered in this

*This article has been condensed from a paper prepared by the author to assist officers studying for examinations and participating in tactical exercises.—Editor.*

precis, which is concerned only with appreciations in forward areas.

Appreciations may be produced for one of two reasons:—

- (a) By a commander who wishes to clear his brain of conflicting detail and come to a balanced conclusion.
- (b) By a junior officer as a brief for his commander.

Although appreciations are made instinctively in everyday life, a military appreciation should first always be recorded briefly in note form. The effort to write out an appreciation in full at the first attempt tends to slow down the process of thought. But unless thoughts are noted down, it is not possible to review all the factors involved in a complicated situation with complete impartiality. (In promotion examinations, this paragraph must be related to the time value of the question.)

#### Sequence and Heading

All appreciations should be in the following accepted logical sequence:—

- (a) The aim which is to be attained.
- (b) Factors which affect the attainment of the aim.
- (c) The courses open to our own side and to the enemy.
- (d) The plan.

Normally the name of the officer making the appreciation will appear in the heading. However, if a commander tells an officer to make an appreciation, and gives guidance by stating the aim, the appreciation is

being written from the commander's point of view and his name or appointment should appear in the heading.

An appreciation produced for a superior officer should be signed by the officer originating it.

#### The Aim

The value of an appreciation depends primarily upon the correct definition of the aim.

#### Selection of the Aim

The aim must be within the bounds of immediate planning. There can be only one aim and a good deal of preliminary thought will usually be necessary before it can be determined. In practice, a most important preliminary study is usually necessary in order to establish the aim beyond doubt. The value of an appreciation largely depends on the correct definition of the aim, which should give in simple terms a full picture of the desired result.

If the aim is wrong the consequences may be disastrous. Therefore in this preliminary study it is the object of the author to sift carefully the various data or premises before him, and to divide them into the following categories:—

- (a) Those which are fixed, and which it is beyond his power to alter. These are part of the aim.
- (b) Those to which practical alternatives can clearly be found. These are Factors and must be fully debated in the body of the appreciation.

From the data he has collected, the author now selects his aim, and this must be the one event which is indispensable to the fulfilment of all others; that is, the one fixed concept which, if removed from the list, makes all the others incapable of practical fulfilment. Let us imagine that the author, a Divisional Commander, has received the following orders from the Corps Commander:—

"To capture a bridge head over the River Thames."

"To do so by 0600 hrs 11 Jul."

"Not to use more than one Battle Group."

"The bridge head to permit the construction of a Cl 80 bridge."

All these are fixed concepts beyond the Divisional Commander's power to alter — being orders. Which one is his aim? It is that one event without the achievement of which the others are clearly impossible — "To capture a bridge head over the River Thames". This must be expressed with great clarity and simplicity, and this must not be open to the accusation that it is a double, or a confused aim. Simplicity is the keynote;

"AIM. To capture a bridge head over the River Thames."

It would have been a double aim had it been expressed:—

"AIM. To capture a bridge head over the River Thames and permit the construction of a Cl 80 bridge."

### Limitation of the Aim

Inevitably there will be, as we have seen, other conditions affecting the aim, such as the time by which it is to be achieved, the choice of ground, the forces available, and the method of operation. The question is whether to express these as limitations to the aim, or discuss them as factors in the main part of the appreciation.

The rule for deciding this issue is very simple and must be clearly understood. It is that only those limitations which are imposed by a higher commander can be written into the aim. These limitations are **ABSOLUTE** and, within the powers of the officer writing the appreciation, ones to which there are **NO PRACTICAL ALTERNATIVES WHATEVER**, being orders.

Any other considerations, to which there will obviously be practical alternatives, are clearly **FACTORS** and must be discussed as such.

In the example, the Corps Commander has ordered the Division to capture its bridge head "by 0600 hours on 11 July using only one Battle Group", so the Divisional Commander will add to the aim given above, the limitation "by 0600 hours on 11 July, using only one Battle Group".

Similarly as the Corps Commander has said that the bridge head must be such as to allow the construction of a Class 80 bridge, that too is a fixed limitation to which there is no alternative.



The AIM will therefore be expressed:—

"1. AIM. To capture a bridge head over the River Thames, with the following limitations:—

- (a) Bridge head to be taken by 0600 hours 11 July.
- (b) Bridge head must allow const. of Cl 80 bridge.
- (c) Bridge head to be taken using only one Battle Group."

The methods of carrying out this aim and its limitations will then be fully explored in "Factors", and the plan which finally emerges must fully satisfy the AIM and its limitations. Every limitation, whether stated in the Aim paragraph or elsewhere, is therefore considered in Factors. In effect, the limitations to the aim are also limitations to the factors "Time and Space", "Ground", and "Forces Available".

The final point about the aim plus its limitations is that together they constitute the bones of the military problem to which an answer must be given in the plan. If the aim has the limitation "By 0600 hours 11 July", the plan must satisfy it. If this limitation had NOT been added to the aim, it would have been possible in the plan to capture the bridge head at 0800 hours or next day. Thus, the limitations in fact set limits to the whole appreciation. This is why they must be absolute.

### Factors

Consideration of the factors which affect the attainment of the aim involves a general study

of all the information which can be obtained from all sources. Having decided what factors affect the plan, they should be placed in a logical sequence and deductions drawn from each one, each deduction having a direct bearing on the aim.

The factors to be considered will vary with every situation, but there are usually a few which dominate the others.

A factor is defined as "a circumstance, fact or influence, contributing to a result". Factors which lead to no conclusion should not normally be mentioned.

In a tactical appreciation the following are some of the factors which may be considered:—

- (a) Relative Strengths (normally considered separately under Enemy and Own Troop), including probable reinforcements, present disposition, mobility, armament and morale of the enemy in relation to our own troops.
- (b) Ground; including suitability for tanks, obstacles, dead ground, and facilities for observation, approaches and ground covering approaches, availability and condition of roads, air strips.
- (c) Time and space.
- (d) Administrative considerations.
- (e) Air situation.
- (f) Security.
- (g) Climatic considerations; weather, hours of daylight, state of the moon.

- (h) Inter-communication.  
 (j) Assessment of tasks.

Deduction: I must be very cautious.

The above list is intended to provide no more than a line of thought. Every situation must receive individual attention.

Unless consideration of a factor leads to a deduction which is some help in the formulation of a course of action discard it.

### Examples of Useless but Common Deductions

- (a) The enemy has 20 men, but I have 100.  
 Deduction: I am stronger.
- (b) I am much stronger than the enemy.  
 Deduction: I can afford to be bold.
- (c) The ground is undulating and timbered.  
 Deduction: There is ample cover.
- (d) The enemy is aware of my presence.

### Examples of Useful Deductions

- (a) The enemy positions overlook all possible approaches.  
 Deduction: I should either attack by night or under cover of smoke.
- (b) The country to the east is heavily timbered with rocks and gullies, whilst that to the west is undulating with scattered timber.  
 Deduction: Any approach on the east is unsuitable for tanks, whilst that on the west is suitable for both infantry and tanks.
- (c) There is a full moon rising at 2200 hours.  
 Deduction: I must be across the open ground and in the shadow of the valley by 2200 hours.
- Before you actually consider the factors and deductions, consider what you want from them, depending on your aim:—

## EXAMPLES

### In Attack

### In Defence

#### Ground

- (a) What is the ground of greatest tactical importance to the enemy?
- (b) What are the approaches to the enemy's important ground?  
 Consider each separately in detail.  
 Possible assembly areas.  
 Possible FUPs.  
 Possible Start Lines.

- (a) What is the ground of greatest tactical importance to me?
- (b) What are the enemy approaches to this ground?  
 Consider each separately in detail.  
 Likely enemy assembly areas, FUPs, Start Lines.

Going for tanks or infantry,  
by day or by night.  
Obstacles.

Features covering the  
approach.  
(= objectives)

Fire support required to  
neutralise enemy weapons  
which can bear on this  
approach.

Allotment of troops to  
objectives.

Going for tanks and infantry  
by day and by night.  
Natural obstacles and  
ground suitable for artificial  
obstacles.

Features dominating this  
approach to my important  
ground and troops required  
to hold them (thinking two  
down).

#### Own Troops

- |  |                              |
|--|------------------------------|
| (a) The best way of using the troops and fire power that you have available (e.g., fire plan) etc. | (a) Assessment of resources. |
|  | (b) Patrols.                 |
|  | (c) Work to be done, etc.    |

#### Enemy

- |   |                                 |
|---|---------------------------------|
| (a) How well is he dug in?                  | (a) What equipment he has.      |
| (b) What equipment he has.                  | (b) What is his strength?       |
| (c) What action he is likely to take.       | (c) What he is likely to do.    |
| (d) What reinforcements he has available.   | (d) His patrol activities, etc. |
| (e) What he expects you to do.              |                                 |
| (f) Enemy strength.                         |                                 |
| (g) Types and positions of minefields, etc. |                                 |

#### Met.

- |   |               |
|---|---------------|
| (a) The stage of the moon.  | As in attack. |
| (b) Rain and effect of cloud on noise and visibility.                   |               |
| (c) Wind and its effect on noise and sound (i.e., chances of surprise). |               |

**Time and Space**

(Considering each fact or combination of facts)

- |                                   |  |
|-----------------------------------|--|
| Time now.                         | (a) Where the enemy is and how long it will be before he arrives, etc., thus indicating time by which position should be occupied. |
| Time objective to be secured.     |  |
| Time for re-organisation.         |  |
| Time for fight through objective. | (b) Any timings given by higher authority. Perhaps indicating priority of works, etc.  |
| Time for assault.                 |  |

Therefore H hr NOT later than . . .

or

- Time now.
- Time first light/last light.
- Time moonrise/moonset.
- Time for orders, etc. (own and subordinate).
- Time for move to Start Line.
- Therefore H hr NOT before . . .

Assessment of Resources to Tasks.

As for attack.

**Ground**

The study of Ground often creates confusion to the young officer, because the factors of Enemy, Own Troops and Time and Space cannot be considered in isolation to the relevant ground factors. The following advice is offered:—

- (a) Under "Enemy" consider ground factors which relate to enemy considerations; e.g. — dispositions — likely intentions, etc.
- (b) Under "Own Troops" consider ground factors relating to such considerations as; Covering Troops — Supporting Localities, etc.

- (c) Under "Ground" confine the considerations to those ground factors which have a direct bearing on your chosen aim.
- (d) Those "Ground" considerations which affect time and space considerations must be considered under this factor.

**Priority of Factors**

Factors should normally be considered in the priority of their effect on the aim. However, in most appreciations it is wise to consider "Enemy" first as this enables a logical flow of thoughts.

Under certain circumstances, one factor may have a limiting effect on the consideration of other factors. In an advance, withdrawal, quick attack or pursuit operation, a Time and Space factor may be the dominant factor. If so, this factor must be considered first and the deductions will shape the remainder of the appreciation. Consequently, it may be best, in such a problem, to consider Time and Space in more detail later.

### Courses

Only practicable courses should be considered, together with the salient points for and against each one. The course it is intended to follow should normally be stated last. Discussion of courses open should lead logically to the recommended plan of action.

Sometimes the deductions from considerations of your factors suggest one course of action only, which enlarged becomes your plan. Sometimes more than one seems reasonable and it is therefore necessary to examine them to decide which is the better. One way of setting this out is as follows:—

“*Course A* — to attack from the right, support by a barrage with start line the railway.

- For*
- (i) Quick.
  - (ii) Can use APCs right up to objective.

- Against*
- (i) No chance of surprise.
  - (ii) Very little cover available.

- (iii) Little is known of exact enemy positions on this flank.

*Course B* — to attack from the left, support by concentrations with start line Blackwater River.

- For*
- (i) Good cover.
  - (ii) Fair chance of surprise.
  - (iii) Cuts off most likely line of enemy withdrawal.

*Against*

- (i) Distance means that the attack will take considerable time.

- (ii) Trees may restrict tanks giving close support to infantry.

I will adopt *Course A* because it offers me the greater chance of success.”

NOTE: Sometimes there may be various courses open to the enemy, but these may have been covered under the factor “Enemy” so don’t repeat them.

### The Plan

The plan should be set out in sufficient detail for a staff officer to be able to write orders from it. It should start with a statement of the mission and should contain the most important details of the execution. Routine matters of administration and inter - communication can usually be omitted.

The plan is an enlargement of the Course chosen; the problem is how much to put in it. It is better to put too much than too little, but make sure that who-

ever reads the plan (including your examiner) knows how, when and with how many troops you intend to do the job, but don't bore him with details, such as:—

Actual designation of companies etc. (i.e., say one company, rather than A Company).

Rates of advance.

Details of re-organisation stores.

Which section of mortars, MMGs, or battery of artillery is firing at what (e.g., first say "artillery concentrations on 123456 etc.). It is often advisable to place as much information as possible on a trace to illustrate the plan.


### Conclusion

First read the requirement and then read your narrative

carefully and underline each factor (different colours for different factors is a good idea).

Jot down what you want to get from your appreciation. Then jot down the factors which seem the most obvious ones for that particular problem.

Think over the problem carefully, jotting down deductions that "hit you". Then start to write, discarding useless information and deductions, being brief, neat and tidy, and most important of all, thinking out the exact words of each sentence before you write it down. Remember you are trying to sell your reasons for adopting your plan, at the same time explaining why you haven't done something else, which might also seem quite good.



# ROUND THE CLOCK

## A SHORT STUDY ON THE USE OF TANKS AT NIGHT

Captain J. D. S. Henderson  
3 Dragoon Guards, British Army

SINCE GIDEON MOVED against the Midianites at the beginning of the middle watch, and probably for a long time before that, commanders have gained great advantages by moving and fighting at night. However, until recent years, night fighting has not occupied a prominent place in warfare. Now military savants throughout the world are agreed on the increased importance of being able to fight effectively at night.

It is indeed strange that, in such a definite climate of opinion, there should be many officers who dismiss with little thought one of the greatest assets in the nocturnal battle; who believe that tanks cannot fight effectively at night. In this belief they are wrong. Although there are many situations where it would be impossible or inadvisable to use tanks at night — often their noise would pre-

judice an operation based on surprise through stealth — it is indeed folly not to consider the many ways in which they can be used. It is at night that the shock action of an armoured attack will have the greatest effect on the enemy's morale.

This paper is written to convince the doubters that tanks can be used effectively at night and to indicate the likely effects of current development.

### The Past

On the 26th of March 1943 the Allies launched an attack on the German positions in front of Gabes in North Africa. The New Zealand Division led by 8 Armoured Brigade assaulted in the late afternoon and quickly overran the enemy's defences. 1 Armoured Division passed through the breach and advanced nearly four miles before dark. In what Field Marshal Alexander des-

cribed as a daring but successful move, they continued the advance by moonlight and drove straight past the bulk of the enemy's armour. By daylight the 21 Panzer Division had been cut off and, in extricating itself, suffered heavy casualties. This bold action, which played an important part in the allied advance, is one of the many night tank operations carried out by both sides during the African Campaign.

In November of the same year 25 Panzer Division, operating in the Ukraine, was ordered to move to Fastov and hold it at all costs. During the advance this raw division was thrown into confusion by enemy armour and by nightfall it was widely scattered. During the night Russian T34 tanks swarmed around the area destroying transport and at one stage surrounding the divisional commander's party which was moving forward with a Panzer-grenadier battalion. This battalion only managed to break out of the encircling tanks after fierce fighting, and the division never succeeded in its task.

One of the best examples of the offensive use of armour at night is the first phase of Operation "Totalize" which started on the 7th of August 1944. The 2nd Canadian Infantry Division supported by the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade and the 51st (Highland) Division with 33 Armoured Brigade, advanced along the axis of the Falaise Road. The forward troops consisted of an infantry and armoured brigade on each side of the road, organised into tight columns of infantry in APCs covered by

tanks and AVREs. These armoured columns crossed the start line at 2330 hours and moved to their objectives some three miles behind the German lines. Although there were some errors in navigation and a fair amount of confusion during the move, these objectives were taken and this first phase of Operation "Totalize" was an unqualified success. There is no doubt that, had the objectives been taken by conventional attack, casualties would have been many times those actually suffered.

In the latter stages of the Korean War, when there was little movement, tanks were used from dug-in positions to support all types of night operations including infantry patrolling. As the tanks were able to remain in the same positions, this meant that very accurate direct HE and MG fire was available at extremely short notice even on the blackest of nights. Furthermore, the fact that tank crews knew the ground well allowed additional tanks to be moved into fire positions during an attack or to support a counter-attack.

These are but four of many examples. They illustrate various types of operations and show clearly that tanks have been used successfully at night.

### The Difficulties

That there are many difficulties associated with the use of armour in darkness, no one would attempt to deny. These difficulties are basically as follows:—

(a) Command and control



- (b) Navigation.
- (c) Slowness of movement across difficult going.
- (d) Target identification, indication and engagement.
- (e) Identification friend from foe.

Moonlight will reduce the significance of some of these but they will nonetheless always be present to some degree.

### Command and Control

The difficulties of command and control are often aggravated by the fact that wireless silence, at least initially, is sometimes advisable. Effective control is achieved through:—

- (a) Simplicity of plan.
- (b) Careful reconnaissance during daylight.
- (c) Rehearsal where possible.
- (d) Tight formations.

### Navigation

For anything other than a short move, navigation is a factor that can easily lead to disaster. There are, however, many ways of assisting the navigators. In Operation "Totalize" the armoured formations were assisted in keeping direction by radio directional beams and by Bofors tracer shells fired along their thrust lines. The objectives were marked with green target-indicator shells.

### Movement

Speed will vary greatly according to the ground, but it will usually be painfully slow and often tanks will have to move at walking pace. However, this will frequently be acceptable at night when the difficulties of the anti-tank gunner are magnified. In "Totalize" deep bomb craters, the dust of the bombardment and of the thousand vehicles



Night firing, Korea, 1953 — Centurion Tank.

and a smoke screen laid by the enemy added to the difficulties of moving at night, and resulted in officers on foot leading small groups of tanks.

### **Gunnery**

The difficulties of producing accurate tank fire in darkness are many. Although it is often possible to engage targets which are indicated by trace, this is not always satisfactory where great accuracy is required. The gunner may often be blinded by the normal flashes of the battlefield and, with his restricted view, it is difficult for the commander to guide him onto the target.

Although gunnery at night will normally be a much slower process than it is in daylight, it is often possible to pick up the flashes from enemy weapons and to engage them.

### **I.F.F.**

Any form of night fighting has the attendant problems of identifying friend from foe. In the confusion that often arises it is easy enough for fire to be brought down on the wrong target. In "Totalize" some vehicles which became separated from the columns were fired on by tanks in the columns. This is to be expected in such an operation, but it is well to remember that the casualties so caused were a fraction of the toll the German Panzerjager would have taken in a daylight assault.

### **Tank Light**

There seems to be some doubt about the true meaning of first and last tank light. The half hour which is sometimes given

as a guide is misleading. To begin with tank light will vary in different parts of the world and according to the time of year. In parts of South East Asia, for example, the transition from darkness to light is a very rapid process. On the other hand, a slight mist will greatly reduce gunnery results. Furthermore, the state of training of the tank crews is another variable which should be taken into account. Training and practice will certainly reduce the time between tank light and darkness.

One should not forget the commander's machine-gun mounted outside the tank and therefore without the difficulties attached to a periscope-sighted weapon in twilight. Moreover, when this gun is firing, it is possible for the gunner to thicken up the fire by using the other machine-gun.

It is wrong to think of last tank light as a time when tank weapons cease to be effective. Rather should one consider a period of time during which gunnery results will gradually deteriorate.

### **Training**

The most important single factor in negating these difficulties is training. Command and control improve with practice; navigation can certainly be taught; as the tank driver gains in experience he is better able to move his vehicle; there are many techniques for twilight and night shooting which require constant practice; even at night effective co-operation between infantry, armour and other arms can be achieved through training.

General Heinz Guderian, surely one of the leading armoured soldiers of our time, saw the importance of night operations when, as Inspector General of Armoured Troops to the German Army in 1943, he ordered that greater emphasis should be placed on training for night fighting and night and twilight shooting.

### Artificial Light

Artificial light can be used to great advantage in overcoming the difficulties of tanks fighting at night. This will include:—

- (a) Movement light. (Either direct or reflected from clouds).
- (b) Artillery illuminating shells.
- (c) Flares dropped from aircraft.
- (d) Searchlights. (Including those mounted on tanks).

With present day equipment of this nature it is possible to keep a battlefield well illuminated during an attack or other operation. In Korea aircraft-dropped flares and searchlights were often used, the light produced being sufficient to allow good results in Centurion gunnery. Carefully sited searchlights can give tanks the ability to move fairly well across country. At the same time they blind the enemy and are extremely difficult to destroy.

### The Future

The one development which will have a profound effect on the use of tanks at night is infra-red. Although it will probably be some time before the AMF has infra-red equipment for its tanks, it is wise to consider its

impact now. Equipment which is now in use or under trial in many parts of the world will give tanks a much improved ability to move across country and to destroy targets in darkness. Infra-red, despite the dangers attached to its use, is likely to so improve the performance of tanks at night that fighting with armour in darkness will become a normal, rather than an exceptional circumstance in future war.

Navigation aids, such as those currently under development in Canada and the USA, will further assist tanks at night.

It is not proposed to go into the details of the administrative consequences on tanks fighting round the clock. Suffice it to say that the commitment for petrol and ammunition will be greatly increased and that maintenance, servicing requirements and crew fatigue will become the limiting factors to their use.

### Conclusion

Tanks have been used successfully at night, and, provided crews are at a high standard of training, their bold use in darkness, at a time when their shock action can be at its maximum, can bring great dividends.

Infra-red driving and gunnery equipment will mean that many of the difficulties inherent to armour at night are greatly reduced and that night fighting will take a more prominent place in the future, than it has in the past.

One thing is quite certain — tanks can be used effectively at night!

# CANADIAN DEFENCE INTEGRATION

Captain P. T. F. Gowans,  
Royal Australian Artillery

IN Colonel F. W. Speed's article, "Control at the Top", Australian Army Journal's March edition drew the attention to the changes which have recently taken place in the higher defence structures of the United Kingdom, the United States and New Zealand.

Considerable re-organisation is also being effected in Canada, including a high degree of service integration. These changes could be of interest to the Australian Defence Establishment because of the obvious economies available in service integration, and also because of the similarities between Australian and Canadian defence forces.

Necessary background to any study of a national defence organisation is a knowledge of the commitments and resources of that country. Accordingly then, these capsule summaries are given.

## Defence Commitments

Canadian defence policy is based upon the following precepts:

- (a) Collective measures for the maintenance of peace, as

embodied in the United Nations Charter, and including the search for balanced and controlled disarmament.

- (b) Collective defence as embodied in the North Atlantic Treaty.
- (c) Partnership with the United States in the defence of North America.

*Captain P. T. F. Gowans was commissioned into the Royal Australian Artillery, on graduation from the Royal Military College, Duntroon, in December, 1954.*

*After service in Malaya with 105 Field Battery RAA, he was appointed an Instructor-in-Gunnery at the School of Artillery, North Head. Later, he was Adjutant, 4 Field Regiment in Queensland.*

*Captain Gowans attended the Long Gunnery Staff Course in Canada, and is currently Australian Exchange Officer at the Royal Canadian School of Artillery.*

(d) National measures for the security and protection of Canada.

When national policy is reduced to priorities, these become:

1. Forces in being for the direct protection of Canada.
2. Forces in being as part of a European theatre deterrent.
3. Maritime forces as part of deterrent contribution.
4. Forces for United Nations peacekeeping duties.
5. Reserve forces and mobilisation potential.

Although Canadian and Australian defence policies are similar, priorities must be geographically adjusted, and UN duties omitted before comparison is made.

In fulfilment of her responsibilities, Canadian forces are deployed as follows:

#### (a) NATO

Canada will contribute a division to NATO when circumstances demand. One brigade group is maintained in Germany, while the other two brigade groups are stationed at home. Canada also contributes an eight-squadron Air Division, in a strike reconnaissance role, equipped with nuclear armed CF 104 aircraft. This division is now regrouping in Germany. The RCAF; and the RCN also have an Atlantic anti-submarine responsibility under SAC-LANT.

#### (b) NORAD

Under the North American Air Defence Agreement, continental air defence is integrated with that of the United States. Five CF 101 interceptor, and two Bombarc B missile squadrons, plus a share in manning the radar and surveillance system are Canada's contribution.

#### (c) United Nations Peacekeeping Duties

Canada's foreign policy places a high reliance on the UN. She is a regular contributor to UN peacekeeping duties, with units currently in the Congo, the Gaza Strip, and Cyprus. With logistic support and membership of the various truce teams, over 2,500 regular servicemen are now so employed. This figure includes membership in the International Control Commission in Indo China, although this is not a UN task.

#### (d) Home Defence

Canada's defence forces have a national survival role, with the army as principal agent. Much of the training of reserve forces is spent in these civil defence, evacuation, local government and rescue operations, and an extensive communication network is maintained.

#### Defence Resources

Canadian regular forces totalled approximately 125,000 in

December, 1963, with reserve forces at 89,000. The Royal Canadian Navy had a strength of about 22,000, with an active fleet of one aircraft carrier, eleven destroyers, fifteen destroyer escorts, and eighteen frigates, plus supporting ships and a submarine. Thirty ships are earmarked for NATO naval forces.

Forces are split between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. The Canadian Army is organised into four commands and a number of military districts. Active strength was about 52,000 in December, 1963. Four infantry brigade groups, and various command and supporting units make up the regular force.

The Royal Canadian Air Force strength was about 53,000. Twenty-seven squadrons were in service, including the NATO Air Division, those committed to NORAD, and thirty maritime reconnaissance aircraft under SACLANT. One reconnaissance and four transport squadrons completed the force.

Reserve forces comprised 82,000 Army, 2,000 Navy and 3,000 Air Force, in round figures. These forces are of restricted *battleworthiness*, due in part to the national survival role.

Defence industry, although of considerable importance, will not be considered here. Force strengths should be equated against a population of 18.5 million. 1963 estimates of \$1.6 billion, related to gross national product, make Canada's defence expenditures slightly higher than Australia's for the corresponding period.

### Background to Reorganisation

Canadian defence policy places the Minister of National Defence as cabinet minister responsible for the collective services and defence research. This has been in effect for many years. A separate Minister of Defence Production works in close liaison with the Defence Minister. An associate minister assists the Defence Minister, with the Deputy Minister of National Defence being the Civil Service head.

Like most nations, Canada has been concerned by the inherent waste in service conflict of interest and method. Some attempt to avoid this was made with the establishment of a Chiefs of Staff Committee. Concrete results were the creation of common medical, dental, legal, and postal services, as well as uniform code of service discipline. Nevertheless, successive Canadian governments have become concerned at a lack of central policy direction and the danger of services proceeding their own ways, even to the extent of committing governments in foreign policy by equipment purchases. Colonel Speed's article, and United States defence direction under Secretary McNamara, certainly indicate that the problem is not peculiar to Canada. Feeling in Canada reached a head in the election of 1963, which was fought on the issue of nuclear arms for Canada. This point largely arose because of the Air Division's re-equipment with a nuclear delivery aircraft, and the earlier placing of Bombarc Squadrons in Canada. This lat-

ter weapon has no conventional warhead.

The newly elected Liberal Government assumed office with a resolve to improve civilian control over the military forces, and to re-analyse defence policy. As a result of these deliberations, these important steps were taken:

- (a) A decision gradually to phase the Air Division from its nuclear role, and to change the role of the Air Force to give a greater ground support potential. Like many countries, Canada found her air and ground forces pursuing different strategic paths.
- (b) A decision to cancel a major naval frigate procurement programme, while the RCN role was re-examined.
- (c) A decision to trim reserve forces.

The Government's resolve was still further strengthened by the release of the report of the Royal Commission into Government Administration in late 1963. The report noted the inefficiency of defence co-ordination by committee in the following words:

"Thus the effectiveness of the Chiefs of Staff Committee as an executive authority is largely dependent on the personal qualities of its members, each of whom has a virtual power of veto in any of its deliberations. The same pattern is followed throughout the co-ordinating organisation which has evolved under the committee, consisting

of more than 200 standing tri-service committees. Although the business of the Chiefs of Staff Committee appears to be conducted with reasonable dispatch, your Commissioners observe that, in general, the system permits procrastination, and the absence of a single commanding voice may spell the difference between success or failure in any matter of joint concern to the three services. When any attempt has been made to move beyond co-ordination into integration, the weakness of the committee basis of direction persists. When it was decided in 1953 to consolidate medical services outside the direct authority of any one Chief of Staff; the Surgeon General was made responsible to the Personnel Members Committee, consisting of the Chief of Naval Personnel, the Adjutant General, and the Air Member for Personnel. As an executive authority, this committee has all the defects of the Chief of Staff Committee in aggravated form. Procrastination and interservice disagreement, amounting to a virtual refusal to accept direction, have proved formidable obstacles to progress.

"A similar experience was noted by your Commissioners in the Report on Telecommunications, involving the unsuccessful attempt of 1950 to develop an integrated teletype relay system under tri-service committee direction; the lack of an effective executive authority in that case led to the abandonment of the attempt at consolidation, and the development of three increasingly wasteful,

and increasingly inadequate networks.

"It is the opinion of your Commissioners that the effective consolidation cannot be based on joint control by the three services with the object of preserving the traditional responsibilities of the three Chiefs of Staff for the control and administration of all the Armed Forces."

The Royal Commissioners recommended the gradual transfer of executive authority over common requirements to the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff. The Government, however, basing their decision on a wider spectrum of argument than just administrative efficiency, has legislated a much more revolutionary solution.

### Canadian Defence Reorganisation 1964

In the White Paper on Defence, issued in March 1964, the Government announced the integration of the Armed Forces of Canada under a single Chief of the Defence Staff, and the formation of a single Defence Staff, as a first step towards an ultimate unified defence force for Canada. It was hoped that this step would:—

- (a) Produce a more effective and co-ordinated defence posture.
- (b) Make considerable savings from the eventual reduction of headquarters manpower staffs, plus training, operating, and maintenance costs.
- (c) Divert a more satisfactory proportion of the defence budget from housekeeping

to new equipment. A target of 25% for new equipment was given.

Whether the Canadian proposals will achieve these aims is a matter for history to decide. However, any reader still perusing this article will realise the parallels between the Australian and Canadian problems, and will watch with interest the Canadian experience in this field.

The Defence White Paper left implementation responsibility with the Chief of the Defence Staff. Air Chief Marshal F. Miller was appointed first Chief. He had been Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee since April 1960, and had wide administrative experience as an earlier Deputy Minister, or Civil Service Head of the Defence Department.

The reorganisation of National Defence Headquarters takes effect on 1 July, 1965; this is the first stage of a three stage plan expected to cover about three years. It is not yet the Government's intention to produce a single service, but rather to integrate administration and training wherever possible.

### System Changes

The system change can best be illustrated at two levels, the Civilian Control and Advice Level, and the Service Command and Staff level.

On the civilian control level Figure 1 illustrates system changes. Note that under the old system, the office of the Defence Minister was a battlefield of competing interests. In






FIGURE 1

the new system, only one service officer has access to the Minister, while civilian control is strengthened by inserting a cabinet committee on external affairs and defence, and strengthening the management role of the Deputy Minister.

In showing service command and staff changes, no purpose is served by illustrating the existing Department of National Defence, as this is merely the convenient grouping of three service headquarters in one location, similar to the Administrative Buildings in Canberra. The new combined staff organisation is of interest, for it cuts across traditional lines, and is based on functional, rather than service responsibility.

Thus, as an example, all questions on forces readiness, regardless of service, will be handled by the Chief of Operational Readiness. This officer is

lieutenant general or equivalent, and is assisted by specialist service staff officers, where specialist knowledge is required.

In Phase 2 of the Defence Reorganisation, the system will be extended to field commands. Although no policy has been officially announced, it is envisaged that the service with predominant interests in an area will assume control of all other service elements. In certain areas, Naval, Army, and Air Force Headquarters exist performing roughly similar functions. It is fairly obvious, for example, that the problem of housing dependants does not alter with the colour of father's uniform, nor is the leave movement of a soldier any more difficult than that of an airman. Many administrative savings are possible in things of this type, and it is hoped to release personnel for field duty. Phase 2 is expected to take two years.




FIGURE 2. Canadian Defence Staff, 1964.

Phase 3 is the extension of the function system to individual units and bases. The depth of integration is again left to the Chief of the Defence Staff, based on his experience in Phases 1 and 2. Few details are yet available, but the general expected trend may be illustrated in these examples. Individual recruit training, at the general military level, is to be centralised, as is much common - to - all - services trade training, such as driver, and vehicle mechanic.

#### **Conclusion**

The Canadian re-organisation is a bold step, which could lead

to an entirely new approach to military planning and thought. Whether the plan will be completely successful remains to be seen, but it deserves every good wish and every success. In the words of the usual ubiquitous defence spokesman:

"Don't forget we have nowhere to look for experience. Canada is breaking new ground, and everyone is watching us. But if we can make this work, it is quite likely that we will have produced a blueprint for all but the biggest powers to follow in the future."

And Australia could be one of those powers.

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# THE ALTERNATIVE— OUTWARD BOUND

Captain M. Jeneid,  
Royal Australian Infantry

A PREVIOUS contributor, Major W. F. Burnard, has written an article entitled, "The Leader and the Led", in the April 1964 issue. As a follow-up to his article I want to promote the idea of one particular antidote to the lethargy and apathy apparent amongst the young men whose profession, in brief, is leadership.

We accept that in a long period of no-war, clear memory of the experience of hardship is dimmed, until there is left only idle talk of it without any reality. We accept the magical phrase, "It's different in a real war", because we all know, or are prepared to believe, that great maturing influences are induced by war through unrelieved privation, responsibility and fear. And yet, whilst talking about the immaturity of the young leader of today and recalling times of war, so little is done to introduce these people to any substitute for it that the responsibility for softness and slackness lies not so much with the young as with their superiors, who are, vicariously, their mentors.

There must be a substitute for these rigours of war, and of course there is. It is not enough to offer extra tough battle courses and commando courses. These are set demands of a soldier's curriculum which require only set-piece attitudes

and efforts from students in order to attain the required pass standard. The solution is available and can in fact be effectively implemented without the paraphernalia of war, by the introduction of all potential leaders to the experience of hardship and a sense of danger presented through expertly controlled situations of duress and hazard.

This brings to mind another magical phrase, "Adventure Training". Both the meaning of the phrase and its application are constantly misunderstood and consequently abused by

*Captain Jeneid served for seven years in the Royal Marines, three as a marine and NCO and four as an officer. After a year in civil life, he enlisted in the Parachute Regiment and served for six months as an NCO before attending OCS and receiving his commission in the same unit. For the next two years he was chief instructor of specialist training cadres, and captained the cross-country and athletic teams which won the British Army championships. On promotion to captain, he was posted as an instructor at the Army Outward Bound School. He was commissioned in the Australian Army in April 1964*

superiors who think in inspired terms of sending people from place "A" to point "B" to report back what they have seen there. The originators of such schemes, having imposed the demand, sit back well satisfied that they have done their job, happy in the thought that the adventurers are having a new and exciting experience. Analyse this sort of expedition, and there is only one phrase suited to summarise it: it is "Hitch Hiking". No! Adventurous expeditions are obviously desirable and likely to prove beneficial; but there has to be a reason involving a worthwhile sense of purpose for their exercise, and there have to be experts on expeditions which by the degree of their ambition become correspondingly worthwhile at their completion.

The substitute which I am promoting involves the development of character through the experience of hardship and adventure; not so that men are shown how to be tough for the sake of grading themselves physically "tough", but so that the emphasis is put upon mental development, a toughness involving the training of the mind. I am talking about a form of "Outward Bound" training and thinking particularly of the methods used to achieve this development of character at the Army Outward Bound School in the United Kingdom.

At this stage it is important to identify a positive advantage from the experience of war as it affects the men who participate in it. There is only one

truly satisfactory outcome, and it is of course the one which offers the greatest advantage, which can only be the final victory allowing the victors to draw up their terms of peace. And so it is with the idealised form of training which I am suggesting may fill in for the ultimate experience of war, because the development of courage and endurance allied to strength and knowledge will allow a man to enforce the demands of his mind rather than try to meet the standards pleaded by his own and everyone else's defective body.

"Outward Bound", another phrase, another nebula; but the effects of this one take on the proportions of towering cumuli. Now, to summarise rather than eulogise: it is a form of indoctrination which seeks to persuade a person that most things are worth trial and effort; it attempts to delineate right from wrong as it affects an individual; it strives to induce a man into a condition of strength through self-confidence. It does much more for some, but at its least it does a lot for anyone and this alone justifies it as a culture.

The system is perfectly suited for adaptation by the army. The greatest teething problem in any civilian school controlling a group of students who come and go is that of collective discipline amongst undisciplined strangers. The soldier arriving for a course by-passes this predicament and so the experience may proceed at once. The subjects which are going to be used,

teaching the students self-discipline and confidence, are outdoors and para-military and straightaway this means a high standard may be attempted.

Mountaineering, canoeing, swimming, cross-country running, navigation, survival and rock climbing are some of the main ingredients easily, but easily, laid on in such a course of training, which may be the can opener on a man's approach to life.

Every student competes against his own standard on arrival rather than against the next person's, at the same time he fits into a small team which requires harmony and collective effort, also a share of organisational responsibility. Leaders are not appointed, they emerge from within the student group and stand or fall with each new event the group faces.

Every event in the syllabus is aimed to inculcate through self-revelation; by recognition of inadequacy and by realisation of improvement and by the vision of own potential. Every lesson is taught in the first instance through leadership by example, and only by demonstration and example, so that this thesis is not propounded in conversation but through confrontation with hazard, fatigue, responsibility, despair and loneliness. But all these in the hands of experts who control, guide, encourage and finally watch and assess the student.

At the end of the course, when the student is confronted by his instructor, he is faced with a disturbing moment of

denouement. He is told exactly what the instructor feels about his efforts; his character, manners, habits, courage, endurance and his potential ability. It is disturbing because the instructor has talked, worked, lived, suffered and competed with the student throughout the course. The student knows that the person talking to him is telling the truth.

And what is the outcome of such training?

The result is a development of the mind so that a man comes away from his experience with a greater sense of awareness; a more acute sense of what is right and what is wrong. He will be more capable and more willing to identify his "place" in any situation.

And how does the army benefit?

From this degree of awareness will be derived a greater sense of purpose, which will encourage, or even compel, the junior leader to position himself in "that place" from which he can best exert his influence.

To finalise this issue, let's not forget that such vices as lethargy and apathy are latent in all human beings, of all ages, and it is only when such cardinal virtues as Strength, Courage and Endurance go undeveloped, unspecified and are not even encouraged, that these other vices easily fester. If fresh attitudes can be imbued there will not be much room left for concern by the junior leaders' superiors, who are, also, their mentors.

# THE PARTING

Warrant Officer P. G. Gittins,  
Royal Australian Army Education Corps

Nay, I have done; you get no more of me,  
And I am glad, yea, glad with all my heart,

... ..  
Shake hands for ever, cancel all our vows,  
And when we meet at any time again,  
Be it not seen in either of our brows  
That we one jot of former love retain.

— *Michael Drayton.*

IN THE STRUGGLE for mastery of the Communist world, the clash is over the rival ideologies. Both China and Russia agree that Communism eventually will conquer the world, but they disagree violently on how it is to be brought about. Mr. Khrushchev says that Communism can triumph through his policy of peaceful co-existence. He wants to avoid a nuclear war. Mao Tse-tung calculates that Communism has more to gain and less to lose from an aggressive policy. But it is considered that both sides have a major interest in avoiding a complete break. To expect this would be wishful thinking.

If he could return from that other world whose existence, as a good Marxist atheist, he of course denied, Lenin would be dismayed by the Sino-Soviet quarrel but hardly surprised. Contrary to its reputation, Communism has never been a "monolith". Communists live in a violent hate-love relationship, and have always reacted to one

another's heresies far more viciously than to any "class enemy".

In a sense, it is absurd to find Communists today fighting each other — and the rest of the world — over a tomb, with a mass of dated polemics used both as a sacred writ and a manual of strategy. But unlike monarchists, Communists cannot find legitimacy in a family tree or by divine right. Unlike democrats, they do not draw their mandate from the people they rule. Communist legitimacy, such as it is, derives from the writings of Karl Marx and from the words and deeds of Lenin, the first man to apply Marxism to a living nation.

*An up-to-date analysis of the Sino-Soviet rift. This article is a sequel to that appearing in the Australian Army Journal in January, 1962, entitled "When Friends Fall Out".—Editor.*

In the Communist arsenal, words are often more important than bullets. Marxist manifestos, Leninist decrees, Stalinist theses, and Central Committee resolutions have provided ideological ammunition against colonialists, Fascists, imperialists and capitalists, as well as against other Communists.

### **Lenin and his Philosophy/Doctrine**

Lenin, in scores of books, pamphlets and collected speeches, said enough to prove almost any side of any Communist ideological argument. Moreover, he naturally had different views as a frustrated exile, as a revolutionary organising street fights in Russia, and as the head of a government. Thus the battle of Lenin quotations could go on until the end of time. For example:—

#### *(a) Peaceful Co-existence*

Closely following Marx, Lenin was convinced that competition for markets among capitalist countries would inevitably lead to war, and moreover that "the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end. And before that end arrives, a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable." Lenin was sure that the general havoc caused by war was necessary for the spread of Communism. He vaguely referred to the idea of peaceful co-existence only a few times, and for special reasons—once whilst trying to get Russia out of World War I.

#### *(b) Revolution*

Like Marx, Lenin thought that violent revolution was both inevitable and necessary. "Those who are opposed to armed uprising," he wrote, "must be ruthlessly kicked out as enemies, traitors and cowards." He dismissed the notion of peaceful victory over capitalism as heresy, akin to the hated belief in mere social reform. This, as Lenin and Marx saw it, provides a palliative for the workers that, by lessening their misery a little, only delays revolution. On the other hand, Khrushchev can quote Lenin as saying that the time must always be right for revolution before it is tried, and also that "revolution cannot be exported," meaning that each country must reach it on its own.

#### *(c) Nationalism*

At least to begin with, Lenin put the cause of world-wide revolution ahead of any one nation's self-interest. "I don't care what becomes of Russia. To hell with it," he said after the October revolution of 1917. "All this is only the road to a World Revolution." On the other hand, when White Armies were storming towards Moscow and Petersburg, Lenin swiftly turned nationalist, calling on Russians to defend "the Socialist Fatherland"!

Thus from these three points alone it can be seen that Mao has the better of the argument. But Khrushchev argues effectively that Marxism is not a fixed dogma, but a method that must be applied to different conditions of each era — for



instance, to the nuclear age, which drastically changes the nature and concept of war.

It is not enough simply to "get out the book and look up what Vladimir Ilyich said. We must do our own thinking, study life diligently and analyse the contemporary setting."

In a way, Lenin did just that. He adapted Marx to totally different conditions than those known to the scholarly, misanthropic exile in 19th century London. Marx predicted that the revolution would happen in an advanced industrial society and shaped his theories to this prophecy; Lenin applied them to a backward peasant country. Marx was inclined to sit back and let the revolution come; Lenin taught that it had to be helped along with the aid of a corps of professional revolutionaries.

Lenin, therefore, owes nearly as much to Machiavelli and Von Clausewitz as to Marx. He passionately believed in Marxism — but he also believed in using any means to help it win. Thus what he did is at least as important as what he said. He remains pertinent not only because his successors keep invoking him, but because he epitomises in his career so much of later Communist history and so much of what is unchanging in Communism's nature.

What makes this Sino-Soviet rift so important is the difference between the two main Communist Parties over the philosophical cement that is supposed to hold them together. That cement is ideology — the

basic adhesive of all Communist societies.

The importance of ideology to the Communist is little understood by the Western World. Yet it is vastly more important than was Hitler's "Mein Kampf" to the Nazis. Ideology is the tap root of the Communist system; it inspires every Communist policy and commands every Communist action. Once let the Communist world split over its doctrines, and the consequences can be as bitter as were those that followed Martin Luther's breach with the Roman Catholic Church.

#### Origins of the Rift

The origins of these ideological differences are embedded in the facts of Communist history. China is the only country — outside Russia — where the local Communist Party seized power under its own steam. In Eastern Europe, Communist doctrine and revolution was carried forward on the tank treads of the Red Army, but, in China, the Communist victory was a uniquely Chinese affair. It was won by a Chinese peasant army under the command of a vigorous Chinese revolutionary who had never been to Moscow and who owed little, if anything, to Russia.

Mao is often described as a "Stalinist". In fact, he had little love for Stalin, who, during the '20s, advised the Chinese Communists to join forces with the Moscow-trained Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang took the opportunity to decimate the Communists and later drove them from their base in the south to

the northern province of Shensi. There, in the hillside caves of Yen-an, they built up the power which led to final victory.

Once Mao had won, the Russians welcomed him to Moscow and signed a treaty of friendship. But Stalin never accepted the upstart Chinese as an "equal." Right to the last, he thought of China as a satellite, not as a partner. While Stalin lived, Mao did not dispute the primacy of the Soviet Union, whose support he urgently needed during the Korean War. But when Stalin died, and the Soviet Government was incapacitated by the jarring struggle for power among Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin and Khrushchev, the Chinese pressed their claim that Mao is the "greatest contemporary theoretician of Marxist-Leninist doctrine".

The high point of Peking's ideological "ascendancy" came in 1956. Khrushchev had just made his first onslaught against Stalin and his attack set off a series of upheavals that shook the Communist world. Poland, under Gomulka, began moving away from Soviet control. The Hungarians revolted — and had to be suppressed by Soviet tanks. Immediately, the Chinese moved on to the European stage in the role of mediators — between the Russians and their restive satellites. After Chou En-lai toured the capitals of Eastern Europe early in 1957, no-one could mistake the fact that it was the Chinese who had helped Khrushchev to restore the tattered fabric of the Soviet Empire.

Thereafter, the two giants began to move apart. Determined to industrialise China in a single generation, the Chinese leaders imposed Draconian controls on their people. They adapted Stalinism because only through compulsion could Mao extort the sacrifices that would be needed to achieve his "great leap forward". The Soviet Union, simultaneously, was moving in the opposite direction. Having committed himself to "catch up with the USA", Khrushchev quickly recognised that the scientists and managers on whom he depended to run an increasingly sophisticated economy would no longer rest content with shabby homes, a workhouse diet, and a rigid obscure Stalinist bureaucracy. Khrushchev therefore, began to dismantle "Stalinism".

It was precisely this dismantling process that brought the rift between Khrushchev and Mao to the point of an open break. For Khrushchev's sweeping revisions of Communist orthodoxy conflicted with the basic necessities of Communist China's advance. Khrushchev gave orders that the transition to Communism must be gradual, must be achieved not merely through "idealistic fervour" but through better living standards and must permit each country in the socialist camp to "advance at its own pace". The Chinese were horrified.

Simultaneously, Khrushchev revised the standard Stalinist line in Soviet foreign policy. Having moved the Soviet Union into the era of nuclear missiles, he understood — as the Chinese

did not — the awesome facts of atomic war. Khrushchev's reaction was to seek a truce with the West — not out of any retreat from his belief that Communism will eventually rule the world, but because he was now convinced that the Soviet Union could win by "economic means".

To the Chinese, this was sheer heresy. For Khrushchev's brand of peaceful co-existence — dramatised by his trip to see President Eisenhower at Camp David — meant that Russia was more concerned with negotiating with the West than with helping the Chinese to "re-capture" Formosa and "liberate" South East Asia. China's fears were borne out when Russia refused to supply fuel for Chinese fighters that sought to master the Chinese Nationalist Air Force over Quemoy and Matsu. The Communist Air Force lost.

On the 90th anniversary of Lenin's birth, the Chinese brought their ideological anxieties into the open. In a series of five formal statements they condemned "peaceful co-existence" as "illusory" and proclaimed in its place Mao's doctrine of "rising in revolution and smashing the imperialist yoke". Khrushchev's sharpest reply — which finally set the seal on the Sino-Soviet split — was delivered at the 1961 22nd Congress of the Communist Party. As the delegates listened to his all-out attack on Stalin, Molotov and Hoxha (of Albania), it soon became apparent that in the twisted language of Communist disputation he was really attacking Communist

China. "They have become a brake and a ballast!"

When China's Chou En-lai rose in reply, any lingering pretense that the Communist bloc was still united was cast out of the window. For Chou split with Khrushchev all the way along the line. Where the Russian had denounced Stalin, the Chinese praised him — and went out of his way to lay a wreath on the old man's tomb. When Khrushchev had spoken openly of a possible reconciliation with the USA, Chou denounced America as "the most vicious enemy of peace". Chou reserved the bitterest part of his speech for Khrushchev's attack on Albania. "To bare a dispute between fraternal countries," he said, "can only gladden the hearts of our enemies." And with that the Chinese delegation flew home.

Since then, the ideological rift between Peking and Moscow has steadily grown wider, and it has been virtually impossible for Chinese and Russian Communists to meet without attacking each other's doctrines.

### The Rift Today

As only he can do it, Khrushchev last April once again defined the quarrel. He hit hard at what he presents as the two main issues:—

- (a) Peaceful co-existence v. war.
- (b) Peaceful evolution towards Communism v. violent revolution.

Returning to the defence of what the West has already taken to calling "goulash Communism", he said, in effect, that

it is easier to fight a revolution on a full belly than on an empty one. The Chinese, he sneered, want him to tell the Russian people: "The economy has been sufficiently developed. Let us produce less so as not to become fat and thereby grow like the bourgeoisie." China, he said, wants to tell the workers in the West: "Why the hell are you earning so much? Do you know what danger you are in? You have degenerated." To his audience, Khrushchev shouted: "Comrades, nothing but ridicule would come of this. Should we switch our industry to the production of belts, so that we may draw them tighter? Will this inspire the people to march ahead? To where? Into the grave? What do their own people want — war or rice? I think they want rice."

The Chinese, Khrushchev hinted, are merely envious of Russian prosperity — but this prosperity is necessary to the revolutionary cause, he added virtuously, for it inspires workers everywhere. Moreover, if the Chinese have economic problems, then they have only their own "reckless experiments" to blame.

All Communist splits, big or small, are essentially the result of failures — failure to meet a goal, failure to measure up to reality. One failure behind the present Sino-Soviet quarrel is Russia's recent inability to make headway in the "cold war", another is the glaring fact that more than four decades after the revolution, Communism is nowhere able to match the capitalist standard of living.

A more fundamental question is whether Khrushchev's current line denotes only a temporary, tactical change in Communism or a more profound one. All Communists, no matter of what type, still share the aim of defeating capitalism; but this statement, while as true as ever, is no longer a sufficient analysis of the situation. The results of Khrushchev's de-Stalinisation drive, which began in 1956, are still shaking the Communist world; "re-Stalinisation", a return to despotic control by Moscow, is not impossible, but could be accomplished only through violent upheaval.

### The Chinese Viewpoint

Mao Tse-tung's goal is to capture the world's Communist Parties. Already he is dividing them. The next step is to conquer them. His latest declaration urging all Communist Parties throughout the world to abandon the "Soviet revisionist quagmire" and adhere to the Chinese Communist Party Marxist-Leninist line, is seen as summoning them to follow the lead given by the Australian Communist Party's pro-Peking faction and establish separate organisations.

The Chinese have accused the Soviet of fracturing the Communist camp, breaking aid agreements, keeping the Chinese case from the people, timidity before the American "beancurd tiger", and a ramshackle assortment of peculiarly Marxist crimes, including "adventurism", "capitulationism", "parliamentary cretinism", "revisionism" and "reformism". In a separate

blast, Peking even raised the question of China's present frontier with the Soviet Union, referring to the century-old border settlement as "unequal". China's uncompromising challenge leaves the Soviet Union no choice but to respond.

The Chinese view, through Mao's eyes, may be summed up as follows:—

- (a) Khrushchev and his cronies have a completely erroneous understanding of the world situation. They fail to see that the conflict between capitalism and Communism is fundamental and implacable. They think the oppressors and the oppressed can work together. And most important, they think that imperialism, led by the USA, can evolve to such a degree that Communists and capitalists can even cooperate. This is utter nonsense! It only shows that Khrushchev has turned away from the guiding principles of Marxism-Leninism which China upholds and only China understands. Khrushchev obviously feels that the principles of Marx and Lenin are out of date and that only he knows how to rewrite them. But these principles are universal, scientific and immutable. They will always light the path to world Communism.
- (b) Khrushchev's betrayal of Marxism-Leninism had led him to negotiate with the US imperialists, begging for peace on his knees. He

should know that he can never rely on the assurances of capitalists, but he is ready to sacrifice the interests of Cuba, Vietnam, the Congo and other countries. This won't work. Comrade Castro knows this only too well.

- (c) Khrushchev is also ready to throttle the struggles of the oppressed peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America because he is afraid that these revolutionary battles could lead to a world war. China is not afraid of this. We will support these movements and wars because we think Communism should hit the imperialists everywhere, weaken them everywhere. Nor are we afraid of nuclear war, although we know that nuclear weapons have great destructive power. People are the main factor in peace and war, not hydrogen bombs. And we could survive such a nuclear war.
- (d) Khrushchev is talking rubbish when he says that the US paper tiger should be feared simply because it has a mouthful of nuclear teeth. American imperialism can be toppled. To achieve this, Communism should encourage revolution and unrest in all countries, be resolute and determined to eliminate all weaknesses. The people of China, Korea, Cuba, Vietnam and Algeria won their victories, even though the US had nuclear weapons. And other peoples

can win the same victories. Khrushchev has obviously lost his revolutionary fervour and become as timid and shortsighted as a mouse.

- (e) We willingly accept the principle of peaceful co-existence between, say, Indonesia and a Communist country, but we do not accept peaceful co-existence between oppressed and oppressor nations (e.g., between Cuba and the USA). The class struggle continues, and we will support it in every way, morally and materially. Nor should true revolutionaries ever lose sight of the main goal — smashing the capitalist system and seizing control of the State. Khrushchev's theory of peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism is completely erroneous.

- (f) Khrushchev and his supporters are splitting world Communism. They are betraying the principles of Marx and Lenin which produced tremendous victories for our cause. But this will not continue since it is becoming clear that Moscow is serving the imperialists. The workers of the world will not stand for Khrushchev's leadership and will toss him out. Then under the leadership of the Chinese Party, truly Marxist and faithfully Leninist, the great revolutionary tide of the working class will finally triumph.

### The Russian Viewpoint

Without doubt Khrushchev's major problem, perhaps as formidable as anything he has ever faced, is the Sino-Soviet quarrel. This is nothing less than an urgent and direct challenge to world Communist solidarity.

Khrushchev has said enough already to make it clear that he has passed the point of no return; either the Chinese will have to toe the line, or else there will be an open breach. But what does "toeing the line" mean? It does not mean, it cannot mean, the complete subordination of Peking to Moscow.

Were a complete break to come between Russia and China, it might well undermine Khrushchev's personal position in Russia and his standing in the world generally. For this reason perhaps, above all others, Mr. Khrushchev has sought to depict the dispute as ideological rather than fundamental. He has repeatedly taunted outside powers with trying to split Moscow and Peking, and told them not to gloat over the troubles or count on a rupture.

The differences, he has said, would be resolved ultimately. Thus in the face of attacks from Mao, that have become more virulent and venomous, Khrushchev, without entirely ignoring them, has shown amazing patience and restraint. Even his retorts to Mao during his (Khrushchev's) visit to Hungary were relatively mild. He told Hungarians: "If we could promise people nothing better than revolutions they would scratch their heads and

say, "Isn't it better to have good goulash?"

Khrushchev's ideas of cautious reform have been successfully applied and used as a demonstration to the world against the Chinese. Such benefits as have so far come the Western world's way are in Soviet liberalisation of trade, expanded cultural relations, and tourist exchange. Mr. Khrushchev sees in this the easiest way of softening relations with the west — especially as it does not involve Russia in giving much away. On disarmament, however, Khrushchev is conceding little or nothing.

Obviously it is going to be a long and difficult process, and in any event, with American and British elections near at hand, Khrushchev waits to see the shape of the new administrations he will have to confront.

When Khrushchev took over Russia, he could boast that Communism ruled one third of the earth's people and controlled one fourth of the earth's land surface. Beyond the iron and bamboo curtains were 6,000,000 Communists, more or less loyal to Soviet Russia. How badly that image has been shattered was illustrated by the very birthday greeters who came — or failed to come — to Moscow.

### **The Significance of the Sino-Soviet Split**

There is a very fundamental and profound cleavage between Russia and China; and it can only surprise people who were dogmatic or Marxists. Two great

powers are going to have divergencies of interest regardless of their ideological principles. China is a great nation and will not take dictation from the Soviet Union as a country like Hungary would. Russia and China are in different stages of development and the Chinese are absolutely right in saying they are not afraid of nuclear war. China has objectives that are not attainable by peaceful means — such as taking Formosa — so it must think of war. The Russians aim at world conquest by the attractiveness of Communism.

There is a definite polarisation going on within the bloc, but it would be difficult to make a balance sheet. It is clear the Chinese have picked up support in Asia. North Korea and Indonesia have been impelled to move toward the Chinese position.

The situation is difficult for the West to exploit. Any attempt to intervene might have a reverse effect, i.e., draw the bloc together. The dispute weakens the Communist camp, makes it difficult for them to co-ordinate policy. But the other side of the picture is that it is not beneficial for us to have the Chinese exerting pressure on the Soviets to be more militant.

What both sides have wanted was not to cause a split, but to convert the other side — to use the dialogue as a lever to force the other side to adapt. However, Chinese attempts to change Soviet policy have failed. One possible Chinese motive in the verbal attacks might be an

attempt to change the leadership in Moscow.

Cuba was viewed by the Chinese as a sellout; in the Sino-Indian border dispute the Russians not only did not help China, they actually inched closer to the Indian position. These two simultaneous developments pulled the alliance further apart. In fact, we now have a break of sorts, in that the Russians conduct their policy without taking account of Chinese objections, and the Chinese will not strike out independently where it is not to their obvious advantage.

#### The World Communist Parties

Aggregate membership of the world's eighty odd different Communist Parties is less than 43 million. China and a dozen Parties — chiefly Asian — which support the Mao line claim more than 20 million of this aggregate. The Soviet officially has the support of more than 60 Parties (including the Australian); China has less than a dozen (including New Zealand). But there are known to be sharp divisions in the Parties of Sweden, Belgium, Italy, India, Ceylon, Mexico and Brazil.

China specialists in Hong Kong, assessing the present Communist scoreboard, expect that Mao will eventually win over Communist Parties in Africa because of the Soviet colour handicap, and because African and Asian States are still confronted with the economic problems and hardships of under-development.

The Russians and the Chinese are both resolutely pushing

their opposed lines in Africa (7 established Parties) and Latin America (18). So far the Soviet predominates here — uneasily and perhaps only temporarily — because Russian aid smothers Chinese aid. Cuba is an outstanding example of their support by favour.

The struggle for leadership and initiative in world Communism will increasingly become a racial one — a prospect which can give little or no comfort to Australia.

#### The Australian Communist Party Attitude

Since 1962 the Australian Communist Party has supported Khrushchev's "soft" line, that of peaceful co-existence with the West. Khrushchev has argued that a drive for world Communism was not worth the risk of an atomic war which would devastate both sides. Given time, capitalism would crumble and die, leaving Communism supreme.

When the Australian Communist Party declared support for these views, all States fell into line, except Victoria. Here, a group led by a barrister, Ted Hill, supported Peking's doctrine of all-out revolutionary struggle against the West, even at the risk of world war. This group sees Khrushchev as a traitor who sold out Cuba when he agreed to the US demand to dismantle rocket bases on the island.

In June, 1963, Mr. Hill and four supporters — all Victorians — were sacked from the Party's Central Committee, the policy



making body for Australian Communism. The five were veterans of more than 20 years' standing in the Party. Some well known Communists then announced their resignation from the Party. Among them were:— Clarrie O'Shea, Victorian Secretary of the Tramways Union, and Paddy Malone, Secretary of the Builders' Labourers' Union. They issued a statement attacking the pro-Russian stand of the Australian Communist Party and declared support for Peking's ultra-militant line.

The Moscow group struck back by expelling Gordon Lewins, secretary of the Painters' Union — a Peking man. Possibly the pro-Peking union leaders may form a rival Communist Party, though it would have little support outside Victoria.

### The Nuclear Danger

Russia seems to understand correctly the nature and consequences of a nuclear war. In recent years the Soviet Union has pursued its ends by means which were unlikely to provoke a general conflict, with the one exception of Cuba.

Communist China, on the other hand, seems to not worry about a nuclear war and its consequences. Indeed, Mao has openly stated that China can afford to lose 300 million in the first battle, and then "still have enough people left to win". However, it is considered in some circles that China's nuclear attitude will change once she becomes a member of the "nuclear club".

### Conclusion

Superficially, the quarrel between the two Communist giants might appear comforting to the West. Perhaps it has brought Russia and the West closer together. But the Western Governments, watching the turn of events, can see little joy in them. The isolation of China can bring gains to nobody.

The West, which for many years underestimated the importance of the split, should not now overestimate it. At any rate, it should not be taken at face value in the terms Moscow and Peking themselves use to describe it. China is not quite so warlike as Moscow pretends nor Russia quite so peaceable.

The Chinese attack Moscow for cowardice in signing the test ban treaty with the imperialists, and they have spoken cynically about the possibility of surviving a nuclear war, but after all, Russia, not China, has the bomb. Russia, not China, risked nuclear war in Cuba, and came close to risking it in Berlin.

For a Communist, Khrushchev has given every evidence of sanity and of really believing in peaceful co-existence. And yet it is well to remember that Stalin too, practised a form of peaceful co-existence when he entered the popular fronts with the hated socialists abroad during the '30s and fought alongside the hated capitalists in World War II. The West paid a price for this at Teheran and Yalta. It is not impossible that some day Khrushchev will present his bill.

Obviously the West for the present has nothing to fear from the split, and perhaps something to gain. But just about the only sure thing is that the split, as such, will never solve the West's own problems, or preserve peace, or assure freedom. After all, no matter how Moscow and Peking interpret their Lenin, he is still

the man who said: "The existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end. And before that end arrives, a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable."

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"The lessons of the October, 1942, Battle of Alamein, taken together with the lessons of all other battles fought by the British in the desert, indicate therefore that the Eighth Army was not, and never became the equal in quality of training, tactics and leadership (at all levels) of Panzerarmee Afrika. Why was this? The answer would make a fascinating book!"

— C. E. Lucas-Phillips in "Alamein".

# THE PAPER WAR AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

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IN "Popski's Private Army" we read how scraps of paper recovered from the most unsavoury places were used to piece together the Intelligence picture of the situation in North Africa.

The clerks of the Roman Army have left sufficient evidence of their activity to enable modern scholars to piece together the order of battle of the Roman Army for most important units for most of the period of the Western Empire (1st Century B.C. to 4th Century A.D.).

Security, as we understand the term, was not known to ancient armies. There was of course a realisation of the need to keep plans secret, but probably few commanders went as far as Quintus Caecilius Metellus who was noted for acting swiftly on his own initiative, and is reported to have replied to a friend who asked what he was planning to do: "I would burn my shirt, if I thought it knew my plan!"<sup>1</sup>

It has also been suggested that the Spartan practice of varying the depth of different sections of their line of battle was due to a desire to prevent the enemy from working out their strength by multiplying the number of men in the front rank by the depth;<sup>2</sup> but it would seem just as likely to reflect variations in the strength of sub-units for a normal frontage (just as the AIF Battalions in 1918 managed battalion tasks with a third of their establishments), adaptation to terrain or local concentration of force. But security was even less of a concern for an ancient commander than it was for the Imperial Japanese Army twenty years ago.

It was only when the reforms of Marius (c. 100 B.C.) substituted a professional standing army for the old citizen army mobilised by levies as and when required that we find Roman

<sup>1</sup> De viris illustribus 61. 5-6.

<sup>2</sup> Thucydides V 68.

units with a continuing identity comparable with that of British Regiments.

Under the Early Empire there were about thirty legions and their feats of arms and movements — and lack of movement in the case of the Third Augustan Legion, which was stationed for three centuries in Africa — are quite well known from the historians and from their own inscriptions, official and unofficial. We think of the legionaries as infantry, which they were, but they also coped with the tasks of artillerymen, engineers, and a civil constructional corps. When a task was completed, the fact was recorded in an official inscription, dated by the year of the emperor's reign, giving the unit's title and commander. Indeed, the Roman wall in Scotland has provided so many "distance slabs" set up at each end of each detachment's task that it has been possible to work out how the building of the wall was organised and how the organisers coped with unforeseen difficulties encountered in the course of the construction.

But the legions formed only about half of a field army at this time. The other half consisted of "auxiliaries" and irregulars. The term "auxiliary" is misleading. These troops were armed and equipped just like the legionaries, but their cohorts (est. 600) were not brigaded into legions (est. 6000). The essential difference was that the legions were recruited from Roman citizens only, while the auxiliaries were recruited from those living within the boundaries of the Roman

Empire but not enjoying Roman citizenship. The irregulars were special forces raised to exploit a national characteristic or weapon not adopted by the Roman legions and auxiliaries; so the Balearic slingers were famous, and among the auxiliaries Batavians skilled at swimming into action with their horses had a part in the conquest of Britain.<sup>3</sup>

But neither auxiliaries nor irregulars receive much attention from the Roman historians who wrote for their own class and had little interest in what were technically foreigners in Roman constitutional thinking. It is true that we have inscriptions surviving from both classes of units. But we also have a special source of intelligence in the case of the auxiliaries, thanks to the Roman records offices.

The auxiliaries were not Roman citizens, but on completing an engagement of 25 years were granted full Roman citizenship. Such grants were recorded officially at Rome and published on bronze tablets on the walls of public buildings in Rome. Each discharged soldier received a certified extract from the original document, and many of these "military diplomas" have been found in different parts of the Roman Empire.

A typical diploma discovered as recently as 1960 in Roumania reads as follows:<sup>4</sup>

"The Emperor Caesar, son of the deified Trajan Parthicus, grandson of the deified Nerva,

<sup>3</sup> Tacitus, *Agricola* 18.5.

<sup>4</sup> C. Daicoviciu et D. Protase, *Un nouveau diplôme militaire de Dacia Porolissensis*, *JRS* li 1961 63-70.

Traianus Hadrian Augustus, Pontifex Maximus, in the 17th year of his tribunician power, Consul for the 3rd time, Father of his Country, has granted to the troopers and privates who served in the two (cavalry) regiments and six (infantry) cohorts which bear the titles, Silius' (Roman Citizens), 1st Tungrian (Fronto's Own), 1st Ulpian of Britons (Higher Establishment), 1st British (Higher Establishment), 1st Spanish, 1st Batavian (Higher Establishment), 1st Aelian of Javelin men, 2nd of Britons (Higher Establishment), and are stationed in Dacia Porolissensis under command of Flavius Italicus, given an honourable discharge after 25 or more years' service, whose names are recorded below, to them their children and their posterity the citizenship and the right of legal marriage with the wives they had at the time of the grant of the citizenship or in the case of bachelors with those they married later, but in respect of one wife only for each man, 2nd July in the consulship of Quintus Flavius Tertullus and Quintus Junius Rusticus:

Of the 1st British Cohort (Higher Establishment) under the command of Tiberius Claudius Fortis of Capua, Ex-Pte Sepenestus, son of Rivus, of Cornon.


Copied and checked from the bronze tablet which is affixed at Rome on the wall behind the

Temple of the Deified Augustus near Minerva's."

This document is dated 2nd July 133 in the reign of Hadrian. It gives the name of the commander of a military district and of all the auxiliary units under his command. From the many such diplomas found it has been possible to build up the order of battle of the Roman auxiliary units under the Roman Empire.

Egypt provides another source of information in the form of papyri. These show something of the routine clerical work of the Roman Army. One routine task was the rendering of an annual strength return on the 1st January, but the Egyptian official year began on the 29th August, so that a unit stationed in Egypt had to file two strength returns in the year. We have one interesting return<sup>5</sup> from a unit transferred from Egypt to Lower Moesia (modern Bulgaria) after the 1st September which to keep the records in Egypt straight sent to Egypt a return dated in September. This return has survived in a fragmentary condition. But even such fragmentary records have permitted scholars to piece together the order of battle of an army operating over 15 centuries ago, and warn us of the need for thorough security measures in dealing with the great volume of paper produced by modern Western Armies.

<sup>5</sup> R. O. Fink. Hunt's Pridianum: British Museum Papyrus 2851. JRS xlviii 1958 102-16.



**ON THEIR SHOULDERS**, by  
Brigadier C. H. Barclay. (Faber  
and Faber, 24 Russell Square,  
London, W.C.1.)

Most of us are familiar with the names of the generals who led the Allies to victory in the later stages of World War II. Those are the ones in whose careers we seek inspiration, whose methods we study and on whom falls most of the credit for success. But there are other generals whose careers are equally deserving of attention, whose actions contributed as much to final victory as those who stood at the head of the armies in the moment of triumph. These are the men who commanded the armies and thus shouldered immense responsibilities in the dark, early days of the war when, woefully unprepared, we faced the might war machine of the axis powers.

It is of these men that Brigadier Barclay writes. His aim is to show that although their names have been eclipsed by the fame of the later generals, the contribution they made to final victory was equally important. They were the men who held the fort in the lean years, who struggled with totally inadequate resources to hold off the assault,

to gain time for the Allies to build up their strength. If they had failed the war and subsequent events would have taken a very different course.

Brigadier Barclay begins with an outline of the development of the British Army from Waterloo to the outbreak of war in 1939, followed by a brief description of the general situation in which the Allies were placed at that time. He then goes on to consider in detail the actions of eight British generals who commanded at vital points during the early critical years. These generals are:— Lord Gort (France and Dunkirk), Wavell (Middle East), O'Connor (Libya), Wilson (Middle East), Auchinleck (Middle East), Cunningham (East Africa and Libya), Percival (Malaya) and Hutton (Burma).

The Brigadier sets out the evidence relating to the part played by each of these generals, and from it arrives at what seem to be well-balanced appreciations of their abilities and accomplishments. He has a flair for discarding irrelevant material, for setting out the essentials of the situation simply and clearly.

Australian interest will naturally be centred on those generals under whom our troops

served during the war. Of these, Wavell is the outstanding personality. Certainly in all history few commanders have accomplished so much with so little. Wavell was the British commander in the Middle East when war broke out, and when France capitulated he found himself with pitifully inadequate forces facing powerful Italian armies in Libya and Ethiopia. Wavell did much more than maintain his position. By brilliant manoeuvre, by the juggling of his slender resources, he tumbled the Italian East African Empire and drove their armies out of Libya and Cyrenaica. O'Connor and Cunningham were his principal subordinates in this grand design. O'Connor was captured in Rommel's first counter-offensive, and was succeeded by Cunningham, fresh from his masterly East African campaign. Cunningham failed in his new environment for the same reason that Auchinleck, who succeeded Wavell, failed. Both men were cast in the wrong role. Neither of them had had any experience of armour, or even any sound training in its characteristics and employment. Both were defeated by the superior techniques of an opponent highly skilled in the type of warfare prevailing in North Africa. Recast in roles more appropriate to their training and experience, both men rendered very valuable service.

Brigadier Barclay thinks that in the absence of adequate air and naval support, Percival had no hope of holding Malaya. He shows, rightly I think, that the Japanese won by superior

leadership, tactics and equipment. While the Brigadier suggests that Percival could have done more to prepare his army for the shock, he lays most of the blame for lack of preparation on the local government authorities. While there is no doubt that the local bureaucrats lived in a dream world (as bureaucrats often do, it can hardly be inferred that they would have interfered if Percival had introduced some real drive into training. To Dominion troops arriving in the Middle or Far East one of the most striking and surprising phenomena was the very slow tempo prevailing at pretty well all training establishments. There seemed to be all the time in the world, so much time that Dominion students, accustomed to a full day's work, were often bored. The fact that a commander's troops were not so well trained as those of his adversary cannot be put forward as an excuse for his failure until it is shown that he had driven them to make the utmost use of every available hour. After all, Montgomery pumped a lot of training into the Eighth Army in the short time that elapsed between his assumption of command and the battle of El Alamein.

With the exception of this blind spot, which seems to be characteristic of British military historians, Brigadier Barclay has written a book which deserves the attention of all thoughtful soldiers. It is a fine piece of military writing, lucid and terse. He had done more than set a just value on the ser-

vices of the generals who enabled the massive build-up of our military strength to proceed; he has given us a book with many valuable lessons.

— E.G.K.

**THE RED ARMY**, by Major Edgar O'Ballance. (Faber and Faber, 24 Russell Square, London, W.C.1.)

For the last fifteen years the military might of the Soviet Union has cast an ominous shadow over the Western World, and continues to be a powerful factor in the conduct of international affairs. The great NATO Alliance has been built up to counter its influence and to hold it at bay. Western Governments and their military advisers must take it into account at every point in the conduct and development of their international policies.

What is this war machine like? What are its strengths and weaknesses? How is it organised, how is it armed and equipped? What are its tactical and strategic doctrines? How well will it fight?

Major O'Ballance attempts to answer these and other important forces of Russia from Tzarist times to the present day. In doing so he clears away a good many misconceptions. For example, he shows that although the Tzarist army completely disintegrated in the 1917 Revolution, a very large number of officers remained in the service and played a notable part in the civil war which ended in Communist victory.

Major O'Ballance presents the development of the Red Army in five distinct but overlapping phases:— 1, birth and growth during the civil war; 2, re-organisation on conventional lines; 3, the great purge carried out by Stalin in 1937; 4, World War II; 5, development from 1950 to 1963.

When he first grasped the reins of power Stalin devoted much attention to modernising and building up the Red Army. But when he conceived the idea that some of the senior officers, particularly the old Tzarist officers, were conspiring against him, he struck ruthlessly. Before the purge of the armed services was over about 30,000 of the 75,000 senior and medium grade officers had been executed or imprisoned. About 90 per cent of the general officers and 80 per cent of the colonels disappeared. Three of the five Marshals of the Soviet Union were liquidated.

The Red Army was still reeling from this demoralising and physically damaging blow when war broke out in 1939. Consequently its performance when it invaded Poland, already hard pressed by Germany, was anything but impressive. Taking relative strengths into account, its war against little Finland was hardly a brilliant success. And in the first German onslaught it very nearly succumbed, so nearly in fact that this point in history will always be one of the big "ifs" for posterity to ponder over.

The onset of winter gave the Red Army a breathing space in



which to pull itself together and muster its reserves. From that point onwards it has never looked back, though there were times during the war when it was again hard pressed. Since the close of hostilities in 1945 it has developed steadily in the spheres of doctrine, training, organisation and equipment, its first line formations poised ready to roll westward at a moment's notice.

Major O'Ballance concludes with a penetrating appreciation of the strength and weakness of the Red Army and, after presenting the facts clearly and concisely, arrives at a conclusion with which few could quarrel. His competent professional assessment will be of interest to soldiers and statesmen.

— E.G.K.

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