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Editor:

COLONEL E. G. KEOGH, MBE, ED, (RL).

Assistant Editor:

MAJOR W. C. NEWMAN, ED

Staff Artist:

MR. G. M. CAPPER.

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Number 181 June, 1964

CONTENTS

Photo: Australian War Memorial, Canberra.

BAKRI 1941

On 7/8 December 1941 the Japanese, without a declaration of war, attacked the American Naval Base at Pearl Harbour and landed in northern Malaya, where 8 Australian Division formed part of the British garrison.

Attacked by vastly superior forces specially trained and equipped for jungle warfare, the British garrison was compelled to withdraw to Singapore island. During the long retreat down the Malay peninsula Australian units were constantly in action, and made the enemy pay heavily for every success he gained.

At Bakri on 18 January two 2-pounder guns of the 2/4 Anti-Tank Regiment fought a close action with nine Japanese tanks, destroyed all of them, and thus temporarily relieved the pressure on the infantry. The picture shows one of the guns firing during the engagement.

AIRBORNE ELEMENTS IN THE FIELD FORCE

Major L. A. Eyles
Royal Australian Infantry

THE MOST probable role for the Field Force is in operations against an enemy engaging in revolutionary warfare somewhere in South East Asia. Such operations are already familiar to us, and a wealth of experience and lessons has come from Malaya, former French Indo China, and South Vietnam. We have a good knowledge of many aspects of the potential enemy's characteristics and tactical doctrine. Those aspects which have a direct bearing on this article are stated briefly below.

His Intelligence System. Through agents, informers, a terrorised population and his own patrolling, the enemy usually has been forewarned of operations being mounted against him. Warning has usually been sufficient to permit evasion or ambush of dismounted or vehicle borne operations.

His Mobility. Largely unfettered by vehicles and a ponderous administrative tail, comprised of hardy peasant stock, he produces an amazing cross country mobility. He has shown an ability to disappear from one area and re-appear in another many miles away in an incredibly short time.

His Elusiveness. Given time to avoid contact, he will always do so when circumstances are not in his favour. His excellent and rigidly disciplined camouflage, and intelligent use of hides, make him most difficult to find, to observe, or to detect in ambush.

Concentration. When he does choose to fight he will do so with fanatical ardour, and with a concentration of combat power designed to give at least a reasonable chance of success, if not overwhelming superiority.

Ambush. Assisted by camouflage, limited surface communications and suitable terrain, he has developed the ambush technique to a fine art. As conducted in Indo China, his ambushes achieved decimation, if not complete destruction, of whole columns of dismounted, vehicle mounted or mixed forces.

Surprise. Much of his success has been won by complete tactical surprise. This has been achieved through mobility, elusiveness, good security and his ability to concentrate combat power without reliance on roads and vehicles.

To come to grips with such an enemy, except when he wants us to, obviously, will be our greatest problem. Assuming that we can find him and deny or mislead his intelligence sources, it remains for us to close with him in sufficient strength to defeat him, and quickly enough to forestall his evasion.

To do this we must achieve a degree of mobility far greater than his. We can never hope to achieve a degree of dismounted mobility with relatively large forces over an extended period superior to that of the enemy described. No degree of training, determination, or reduced weight in rations and equipment, will enable an Australian force operating in an enervating climate to outmanoeuvre on foot a vigorous indigenous force. Quite apart from the physical aspects, we rarely could hope to deny or mislead his intelligence sources for long enough to allow a lengthy dismounted approach.

Vehicle borne operations have even less chance of success. The enemy's avoidance of roads, his great skill in ambush, and the paucity of roads, all combine to deny this alternative.

The enemy's proven ability to achieve surprise when he does choose to attack in strength, and his ensurance of favourable combat power at that time and place, require great and quick flexibility in a commander's reserves. If they have to be committed over any distance on foot, or in vehicles along roads certain to be ambushed, they may not arrive at all. If they do, it will probably be in time to bury their dead and find the enemy gone.

The Solution

The solution to our problem can lie only in tactical air mobility. Intelligent use of all types of available transport aircraft will enable the fight to be carried quickly and securely to the enemy. It will permit almost immediate reaction by reserves, whose chances of arriving in time to be of use will be enhanced greatly. With proper security before mounting the operation, air mobile forces can achieve complete surprise and reduce tremendously the enemy's ability to evade.

Ability To Apply The Solution

Our present organisation and training limit our scope for employing air mobility in the field force to landing in helicopters and fixed wing aircraft. There is one exception. The Special Air Service Company has a capability to parachute. However, this unit will be available rarely, if ever, to join in large scale destruction of the enemy. It will be committed fully to its primary roles of medium and long range reconnaissance. From it and other reconnaissance elements will come the vital information on enemy strengths, movements, locations and resources, which will enable us to plan our targets and select the best method of approach.

We are limited in scope therefore to the carriage and landing of infantry and necessary supporting arms and services in available helicopters and fixed wing aircraft.

At this point, certain important questions arise.

How many helicopters or fixed wing aircraft will there be, available and suitable for employment in the combat area? In support of a task force we might have one or two sections from the Light Aircraft Squadron, offering a negligible troop lift capacity. We may have up to say ten aircraft from the Medium Transport Squadron. At best with these resources, we could hope to lift about a company in aircraft that can land in the combat area on suitable unprepared landing areas.

How many suitable landing areas will there be? Obviously, any attempt to prepare landing strips in advance would prejudice security. The enemy shows a distinct preference for areas most difficult of access, for hilly jungle clad terrain where there are fewest good surface approaches, and where suitable existing landing areas will be rare or non-existent.

To what extent can we rely on helicopters and suitable light and medium aircraft being available from other friendly forces? This is an imponderable. Probably the fairest answer is that such forces, faced with the same problems, will be making maximum use of their own aircraft, leaving little availability for us. Even if such resources were pooled under a theatre commander, it is unlikely that sufficient quantities would be available for continued support on the scale likely to be required.

What use can we hope to make of heavy transport aircraft likely to be available in the theatre? Probably very little, other than in air landed operations where suitable landing areas are available.

It is apparent, therefore, that the scope of tactical air mobility in South East Asia also has its limitations while our forces can do no more than ride and land in the available aircraft.

To gain maximum advantage from tactical air mobility, to make full use of all available transport aircraft, and to overcome the lack of suitable unprepared landing areas, we must seek airborne mobility. We must develop, as in the Special Air Service Company, an ability to use a parachute when necessary. Our normal infantry, with suitable elements of supporting arms and services, must be able to operate on foot, vehicle borne, air landed and air dropped. Only in this way will we achieve a degree of tactical mobility superior to the enemy's.

The French, in their war in Indo China, proved the advantages of deployment by parachute to achieve security and tactical surprise. Frequently also, the bulk of their reserves were airborne troops, giving quick flexibility and security in committal. In his afterthoughts on Burma, Sir William Slim stated: "I would, if I had had the aircraft available for practice, have made it (parachuting) an ordinary part of, at least every infantryman's training." However, in neither of those campaigns was the airborne technique carried beyond formed airborne units.

In our small army, faced with the problems described above, now is the time to break away from the traditional airborne force, which we have neither the manpower nor finance to support, and create a parachuting capability as part of a normal field force soldier's training.

Feasibility

Parachuting from both rotary and fixed wing aircraft are established techniques. A dropping zone in open or cultivated areas, wet or dry, on coastal sand dunes and many other areas where fixed wing aircraft could not land, presents no problems.

Parachuting into a thick jungle canopy is also an established technique. It does present a few problems. The technique depends on the entanglement of the parachute canopy and rigging lines in the upper branches of the trees, which may be up to two hundred feet from the ground. To continue to the ground, abseilling equipment is used. Thick vegetation presents some problems in rallying a large force. However, large forces up to battalion size should rarely be required on one dropping zone. More likely, platoon or company size groups will be required in a pattern, astride ridges or paths offering best approaches to a target. The technique does sometimes lead to an increase in landing casualties, perhaps as high as 25%. However, this gives better odds than up to 100% casualties from walking or driving into a prepared ambush laid by an enemy aware of a surface approach.

In Australia we already have a parachute school. Since 1950 it has been producing an average of one hundred parachutists each year. The twenty students on each course have been volunteers from most arms and services, mainly regular army. Allowing for wastage from the service and beyond a reasonable upper age limit for parachuting duties, there remains a considerable pool of trained parachutists.

Until 1955 this training could not be put to any useful purpose, except for the few officers and soldiers who became instructors at the parachute school, or served in the Airborne Platoon at Williamtown.

In 1955 the school's products were put to wider use when the two newly formed CMF Commando Companies brought with them a requirement for a partial parachuting capability.

Then in 1957, 1 SAS Coy was formed, requiring 100% parachuting capability.

Since 1957 the bulk of the school's effort has been absorbed in providing:—

(a) Basic training for recruits for 1 SAS Coy and the commando units.

(b) Refresher training for SAS and commando.

(c) Training of replacements for its instructional staff and the Airborne Platoon.

(d) Training army stick commanders and RAAF jump masters.

(e) A few basic courses for officers and soldiers not destined for SAS or commando duties.

Although original recruits for SAS were drawn from most arms and services, relatively few of the pool of trained parachutists were absorbed. During the ensuing five years there has been a turnover within 1 SAS Coy, returning parachutists to other duties.

So there remains today, both in the field force and elsewhere, a ready pool and source of trained parachutists. Similarly there is a pool of parachuting instructors who have completed a period of service at the school. Other instructors have been trained as a reserve but so far not employed.

What better starting point could we have for the formation of elements with a parachuting capability within the field force?

Formation of Airborne Elements

We can form them now, simply by concentrating all spare trained parachutists, by arms and services, into appropriate sub-units or sections within field force units. They must of course be fit and eligible for both field force and parachuting duties. Concentration should not include parachutists serving with 1 SAS Coy or ARA cadres of commando units, whose parachuting capability should continue.

It cannot be guaranteed that all vacancies against establishments would be filled, but original concentration should provide at least the bulk of:—

(a) A rifle company in each regular battalion.
(b) A pack artillery troop.
(c) An engineer troop.
(d) A section of a field ambulance.

To fill the gaps, officers and soldiers could be given priority vacancies at future basic courses at the school.

Possession of the elements suggested would do much to enhance the flexibility of a battle group or task force, even if the process went no further. However, real flexibility will be gained only by expansion with an ultimate goal of complete infantry units and selected supporting arms components, able to use a parachute as a means of transport.

Expansion and Support

Support of the elements formed by initial concentration of trained parachutists would not be a heavy commitment. Expansion would involve increased backing in proportion to the rate and degree of expansion required.

Initial Support

The most important commitments would be:—

(a) Provision of adequate stores.
(b) Provision of continuation training.
(c) Provision of facilities for storage, packing and maintenance of parachutes.
(d) Adequate aircraft support.
(e) Increased output from the school.

Stores

The major items required are:—

(a) Jump helmets.
(b) Main and reserve parachutes.
(c) Containers for weapons and personal equipment.

(d) Platforms and parachutes for heavy drop.

Continuation Training

To maintain operational readiness, parachutists require continuation ground training and at least four refresher jumps a year. Supervision can be provided by the pool of instructors already mentioned. Training aids and mock-ups can be improvised by unit or engineer labour.

Parachute Facilities

Existing facilities at Williamtown could not support parachute requirements for refresher jumps without expansion. Probably the best solution would be to create an Army Parachute Packing and Maintenance Unit. Such a unit could handle all of the Army's parachute requirements, for jumping, air supply and heavy drop.

Aircraft Support

Additional support would be necessary to cater for refresher jumping and an increased output from the school. Initial airborne elements could be supported by available aircraft, especially if the Hercules C 130 is used. The advent of the proposed Medium Transport Squadron should remove any problems of aircraft support.

Increased Output

Present intakes of twenty trainees could be increased to forty without over-taxing the facilities at Williamtown for ground training and parachute packing and maintenance. The instructional staff would require three more warrant officer instructors. About ten to twelve more flying hours per course would be necessary.

Expansion

Expansion can be achieved at whatever rate is considered necessary. Rapid expansion would involve considerable outlay for its support. Gradual expansion would be most economical, progressing company by company, troop by troop, over about a five year period.

Conclusion

We have a requirement for the highest possible degree of tactical mobility to defeat a revolutionary enemy in South East Asia. The degree required can be achieved only through air mobility.

We can expect limited availability of suitable aircraft, and the terrain denies full development of the potentials of air mobility. Full potential can be realised by introducing airborne techniques into normal units.

We have a functioning parachute school, a pool of trained parachutists and instructors, and could readily support wider parachuting activity without inordinate expenditure.

We should use available trained manpower to form airborne elements now on a company group basis. We should then expand those elements at the best possible rate until all regular battalions and an appropriate cross section of supporting arms and services can use a parachute when necessary.

With the mobility and flexibility so gained, a field force committed to revolutionary suppression in South East Asia will have far greater chances of early success.

COUNTER INSURGENCY

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SOME ANTECEDENTS FOR SUCCESS

Lieutenant Colonel William F. Long, Jr.,
United States Army

Reprinted from the October 1963 issue of *Military Review*, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, U.S.A.

ALTHOUGH the United States is motivated by a Western revolutionary spirit and democratic idealism, it may face many of the challenges and disabilities of European colonial powers when directly engaging in counter-insurgency in the coloured world of Asia and Africa. Lessons that can be learned from European experience may be valuable in the future for the United States.

In an attempt to discover common denominators of insurgency and antecedents for counter-insurgency success, four cases were investigated — deliberately selected to include direct Communist participation in some but not in others.

The south east Asian selections — Malaya and Indochina — involved European powers with Communist-directed insurgency: in Malaya, the Communists were defeated; in Indochina, the Vietminh won over France.

The African cases included two successes — Madagascar and Kenya — in which direct Communist participation has not been proved.

The Philippine anti-Huk experience, an attractive success model, was ruled out because of its limited value for studying outside — or third power — participation. Further, the

Lieutenant Colonel William F. Long, Jr., is assigned to the US Army Element, Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam. He served with the 3rd Infantry Division during the Korean War, was with Headquarters 7th Army in Germany, and was assigned to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. He attended the US Army Command and General Staff College, is a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College and the Naval War College, and received his Master's degree from George Washington University.

defeat of the Communist Huk movement was almost a personal triumph for Ramon Magsaysay. A disturbing observation arising from all of the case studies is that men of Magsaysay's calibre have also been on the other side.

Some Common Denominators

In all four cases, insurgent leaders took advantage of education and institutions, provided by the colonial power, to further and mature their schemes. In most cases, native leaders — Communist and non-Communist alike — had travelled, lived, and even been politically active in Europe. They knew the Western World and the attitudes, strengths, and weaknesses of their political masters. In addition, every insurgent movement had political support in the matropolitan country. This ranged from strong French Communist support for the Vietminh and the Madagascan revolutionaries down to moral support from English liberals for Kenyatta in Kenya and the impact of British recognition of Red China early in the Malayan emergency.

In every case, the revolutionary leadership judged the time propitious for revolt. There were immediate, real grievances to exploit — social discrimination, economic exploitation (especially with regard to alienation of land), social disintegration, and religious issues. During World War II (and to a lesser extent, World War I) European weaknesses had been exposed. Native troops had travelled extensively and valuable guerilla training had been provided to a hard core native group. In Madagascar, for example, some guerilla leaders had learned their trade in the French Resistance fighting Germans. Starting in the French Army in the Tirailleurs Malagaches, a few reached high rank in the maquis.

Other Factors

Other factors also favoured insurgency: the development of a colourful bureaucracy; the passing of the early face-to-face leader-administrator who worked closely with, and understood, the native people; and World War II administrative degradation. At the same time, settlers with vested interests complicated the social and administrative problems and frequently blocked ameliorating, pro-native reforms. On the international scene, anti-colonialism and socio-economic humanitarianism in the United Nations strengthened revolutionary expectations of support and success.

In every case, insurgent leaders "telegraphed" their intentions, but preoccupation with metropolitan problems and poor intelligence resulted in the government being surprised by the actual outbreak of hostilities. Fighting generally started with terrorist acts, and terror was used as a policy lever to control or neutralise the population in favour of the insurgents.

Direct Communist assistance was present in two cases — Malaya and Indochina — but only in the support of the Vietminh in Indochina was it massive and effective.

Trans-border sanctuary and support figures in Indochina, and, to a lesser extent, in Malaya. But the most significant fact is that the insurgents succeeded in bringing about an effective degree of independence, either directly or as a result of reform and concessions by the colonial powers, regardless of the outcome of military operations.

Antecedents for Success

In the paragraphs which follow, the major antecedent factors are delineated for the cases investigated. It is well to keep in mind that, while these factors are separately treated, they too, are inseparably related.

General Political Approach

Governments menaced by insurgency strive to achieve and maintain effective control of their populations and territories. No one aspect of control is more important than the continuation or rapid restoration of civil institutions and agencies.

In Malaya the British staffed danger points with administrative officers in depth to ensure continuity of governmental operations and control. Effective administration was also continued in Kenya. In both cases, stringent, even petty, control measures were used to discipline, and reward, selected villages or administrative units. A sense of responsibility, no matter how irksome, was impressed upon native political leaders and the populace.

In both cases, unity of organisation and effort was achieved with civil authority paramount at all levels. Even though a state of emergency was declared, the situation was never militarised. Taking into account the differences in type actions and the duration of operations, the same general approach obtained in Madagascar where martial control was established only for the duration of a relatively short military campaign.

In Indochina the political situation could not be managed and French military resources were insufficient for occupation of the land to control the people and, at the same time, to provide mobile troops in the numbers needed to gain the initiative. The French-supported, native civil administrative officers frequently appeared inept, even to their own sponsors.

Population Support Base

In Malaya and Kenya, British settlers constituted a broad but thin base for consolidating government control. Arming the planters was a necessary risk, but their restraint was generally commendable and there was little alienation of the native population through indiscriminate retaliatory violence.

In Malaya the Communists were almost exclusively Chinese. Therefore, the Malayan ethnic group furnished a broad base for developing effective popular control and support. In Kenya non-Kikuyu Africans, Christian Kikuyus, and "Old" Kikuyus, true to their traditions and religion, formed a similar structure. This was also true in Madagascar where the non-Merina tribes — well over half the population — feared the return of Merina dominance.

In Indochina the French had no initial chance to develop a native base of support. World War II developments forced French forces to return in the role of a reconquering army, plus the handicap of being denied the customary right of an invading army to treat the population as enemy people and to control them accordingly.

Political Aspects of Security

Security measures to protect the loyal and passive elements of the population were an initial part of the counter-insurgency concept in Malaya and Kenya. Arms control and stringent population control measures were effective in isolating the insurgents logistically and increasing the positive separation of the activists from the people.

In Madagascar military operations drove the rebels into remote regions and localised fighting. This permitted the restoration of civil administration, in most places, in relative safety within about a year after the beginning of the emergency. The final mop-up phase was not long in securing the entire island.

Domestic Unity

The quality of home government support was a major factor in the four counter-insurgency cases investigated. This support was generally good in Kenya and, with the exception of recognising Red China, in Malaya. The elimination of Communists from the French Cabinet was a decisive factor in the Madagascan revolt.

The length of the Indochina war and the multiplication of difficulties and differences between the major factions in France militated against a consistent policy or adequate support of the military effort. The lack of political leadership and decisiveness condemned the French Army to psychological wounds and frustrations that were to rend the entire political fabric of France during the Algerian war, and beyond.

Metropolitan colonial administration was sensitive to world opinion, as well as to domestic public opinion. The revolutionary nature of non-Western European world opinion tended to aggravate the difficulties facing colonial governments when vested interests and national pride ruled domestic opinion.

In each of the cases, successful counter-insurgency included political reforms. Even the failures included the recognition of the need for reforms. The differentiating factor is the timing of the reform measures and the effectiveness of implementation. This places a premium upon timely, enlightened, positive, and unified government reform policies and programmes.

Social and Economic Measures

It is unlikely that real counter-insurgency success could have been achieved without social and economic reforms. One universal element which has emerged from the study of revolutions is land reform.

The pervasiveness of the need for an enlightened land policy is remarkable. Writing in 1948, when his words were timely as well as important, Gerald F.

Winfield stated that the Red Chinese land policy was the major tool used to gain and hold power in the countryside.[1]

In Malaya there was a social and economic integration of the Chinese minority along with land reforms. The Africans in Kenya, having gained a greater political position, are now openly dedicated to social and economic reforms which will give them the equality — perhaps superiority — they desire. Similar changes in Madagascar were started by the French, and have accelerated as colonial status gave way to French-granted independence. Any meaningful reforms of this nature were beyond the French in Indochina.

An excellent example in microcosm of the effects of economic betterment and social welfare on political loyalty was furnished by the British campaign to win the jungle aborigines away from the control of Malayan Communists. Open-handed, sensitive, and humane treatment, combined with imaginative provision of light aircraft to haul native artifacts to a ready market, led to unprecedented native economic gains. This, in turn, had a salutary effect upon the character of these primitive people and upon the quality of the support their loyalty provided.

The integrating influence of successful counter-insurgency is seen in the development of trans-tribal political parties in Kenya and Madagascar. The importance of integrating the Chinese into Malayan political life is another case in point. The future of the white minority in all areas of coloured independence remains to be seen. However, this appears to be a problem in direct ratio to numbers and privileges, and the attitudes of the whites, themselves, may be decisive.

Psychological Phenomena

Psychological approaches were varied, and it was in this field that the French appeared to be defeated most decisively in Indochina. They found nothing to say or do that matched the Vietminh in developing a psychological or spiritual rapport with the people. That is not to say that they had no local successes, but it was the overall psychological bankruptcy that was deadly. This even eroded the morale of their own gallant men.

The Madagascan revolt had a complex psychological background. It is an over-simplification to say that it was merely an attempt by the Merina to re-establish their hegemony. In many respects, the Merina, as the clerical class, continued their position of superiority under the French. Their aspirations and activities, plus the past remembrance of Merina rule, alienated the other tribes who fared better under the French.

There were religious complications, but English Protestant missionaries supported the French. One reported that the French were generally restrained, and their treatment of captured rebels so generous that they received local criticism for being too lenient.

[1] Gerald F. Winfield, China: The Land and the People, William Sloane Associates, Inc., New York, 1948, p. 398.

Too, the isolation of the world's fourth largest island permitted the French to handle the rebellion with a minimum of outside influence. In contrast with Indochina and Algeria, the results tend to prove that the French have the capacity for successfully managing revolutions.

The British won a tremendous psychological victory over a diabolically designed psychological masterpiece — the Mau Mau. The success of the government-sponsored de-oathing programme prevented the Mau Mau from capturing or neutralising a sufficiently large Kikuyu population base to reach stage one in the Mao Tse-tung revolutionary pattern.

It would be impossible to overvalue the contributions of a few Englishmen in Kenya whose complete knowledge of the Kikuyu language and psychology made the victory possible. In situations where settlers with a surface acquaintance with the natives and selfish financial interests could be counter-productive and dangerous, the real specialists were indispensable. Their conversion of terrorists to pro-government operations is an example of psychological warfare at its peak.

The Malayan experience proves that Communist zealots can also be rehabilitated and converted to anti-Communist programmes, and the propriety and restraint of the British approach deserves more attention. Winning the loyalty of the jungle aborigines, rehabilitating terrorists, and resettlement have received wide operational emphasis. The psychology behind these operations and the charater of the responsible personnel need further appreciation.

Military Operations

Counter-insurgency experience in the investigated cases proves that people's wars requires military leadership of unusual imagination, dedication, and restraint. Unity of command is critical, and the complete integration of military operations into the over-all political scheme requires organisation and definition of objectives to an unprecedented degree.

It is in this respect that US counter-insurgency involvement faces the critical obstacle: military power resides with the United States, but it is, of necessity, tied to the political fortunes of indigenous leadership and has no legitimate means of either leadership or separate expression of goals.

The one admonition growing out of a study of people's wars is: *Don't fight the people.* When revolutionary activists are integrated with the populace, frustrations and loss of patience lead to the temptation to fight the entire population. The key to winning is separating the zealots from the population, destroying or converting the few, and controlling or protecting the many. This was done to a successful degree in Malaya, Kenya, and Madagascar.

Trans-border sanctuary and supply have a great influence upon insurgent strength and operations. But closing international borders to insurgents

has represented political, rather than military accomplishments.

Closing an extensive border is a military undertaking of enormous dimensions and may not be feasible in close country. Closing the Thai border to Malayan insurgents, as the result of a political agreement, was a major step toward victory — especially when joint Thai-British police actions destroyed trans-border Communist bases. The Red Chinese victory over the Kuomintang, which opened up Indochina for Communist logistical and training support, was a military catastrophe for the French. In reverse, the geographic isolation of Madagascar was a great military and political advantage for the French.

Trust and Control

In the final analysis, ordinary trust may be the *sine qua non* of successful counter-insurgency, especially where foreigners are involved. The over-all impact of British behaviour in Malaya and Kenya achieved a degree of trust that permitted British participation in, and channeling of, the revolution. The same is true of the French in Madagascar.

The French were not trusted by the masses in Indochina, and the behaviour of French administrators during the occupation, and the militarising of the French position after the war, were critical in this respect.

The Communists, who aim at terminal control of rather than continual dependence upon the majority, have a two-edged advantage. They have invested heavily in locating and training native revolutionary leaders, and they front their subversion with these native leaders operating inside native movements. They need to achieve a short period of trust, just long enough to gain power. Then, the Communists establish a control system in which the consent or trust of the people is not implicit as it is in the democratic system.

Critical Stage

The Communists have politicised war and militarised society. The West must understand the need to fight political revolution with timely political, social, and economic reforms, regardless of their role in the counter-insurgency situation.

Stage one, the winning of an effective degree of population support, is the critical stage. In Kenya, Malaya, and Madagascar, needed reforms and resolute political and military action stopped the insurgency before stage one was completed. It is doubtful that an outside power can be effective in a people's war once stage one consolidation is accomplished by the insurgents. We can only recall that a portion of Indochina went all the way.

THE NEW DEFENCE ORGANISATION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

Major H. E. D. Harris,

Reprinted from the February 1964 issue of *An Cosantoir*, Eire

THE CHANGES in the higher organisation of the Defence Forces of Great Britain as outlined in White Paper[1] clearly indicate a compromise. Many advocates of a centralised organisation have been disappointed, but it is hard to see what more could have been done with three such well established departments of state in time of peace. The only comparable case in history is the abolition of the 400-year-old Board of Ordnance in 1855 at the height of the British troubles in the Crimea. The changes leading up to the establishment of the Army Council in 1904 were much less far-reaching but took some 10 years to bring about in the face of bitter obstruction from within. The 1963 defence reorganisation is obviously what the British Government and its advisers feel will be accepted more or less cheerfully at present.

Constitutional and Parliamentary Control

The transformation begins in the autumn of 1963 with the introduction of legislation. When this is passed the powers of the Board of Admiralty, the Army Council and the Air Council will merge in a Defence Council. Authority and responsibility will be vested in a single Secretary of State for Defence.

The offices of the First Lord of the Admiralty, Secretary of State for War and Secretary of State for Air and the Board of Admiralty, the Army Council and the Air Council will be abolished. The former will be replaced by Ministers of State, third level appointments, and the latter by three Boards. The Defence Council will deal with major policy and the Boards with management matters. An interesting point to emerge is that the Secretary of State for Defence will be chairman not only of the Defence Council but of the three service boards as well.

The New Ministry will be responsible for a budget of nearly £2,000M. a year, some 400,000 servicemen and women and about 400,000 civilians.

The White Paper stresses that in such a large organisation although there must be a distinction between policy and

[1] Cmd. 2097, H.M.S.O. July 1963.

management, a much closer working partnership than existed under the old system must be achieved. The Secretary of State for Defence will coordinate all questions of policy and administration of concern to the fighting services, but major questions of defence policy involving foreign and economic issues will be dealt with by a Cabinet Committee on Defence and Overseas Policy, presided over by the Prime Minister and including Cabinet Ministers involved. The chief of the Defence Staff and the three Chiefs of Staff will attend as required, as will the Scientists and the Minister of State, and the Permanent Under Secretaries.

The Secretary of State for Defence will produce as at present an annual White Paper giving information about Defence as a whole. He will now also present a single set of Defence Estimates which will show Votes for each of three Services and a Central Vote; expenditure on defence by the Ministries of Aviation and of Public Works and Buldings will also be included. Accounting for expenditure will be done by the Defence Secretariat. "Strong central financial control" will be exercised in allocation of resources, but delegation to the Board Members of day to day financial affairs is visualised.

Defence Staffs

The Chiefs of Staff Committee is about the only part of the existing organisation which will remain in its present form. Disagreement between the Chiefs of Staff will be referred to the Secretary of State and if necessary to the Cabinet Defence and Overseas Committee. It is stated that the Chiefs of Staff will be responsible for the conduct of military operations.

The Naval, General[2] and Air Staffs will join with the present Ministry of Defence Staff to constitute the Defence Staff. Their principal corporate duty will be to find the "best Defence Solution" to the problems with which they are faced. They are to be accommodated in the same buildings and be split up, in addition to existing elements of Joint Planning and Joint Warfare, into Defence Operations Executive, Defence Operational Requirements, Defence Signals Staff and Defence Intelligence Staff.

Defence Secretariat

The Defence Secretariat will be established by bringing together civilian administrative staffs from the present Ministry and the three Service Departments. Its chief responsibility will be long term financial planning and control of defence programmes and budgets, allocation of resources to the three services, and consultancy with other government departments. It is to include a special Second P.U.S. of S. responsible for "identifying fields (for example stores, technical establishments and training) in which administration might with advantage be placed on a Defence rather than a single Service basis."

[2] The title is changed from Imperial General Staff to General Staff.

To enable management to be carried on on a Defence basis, wherever possible, branches which operate in similar fields will be grouped in the same building. A special appointment of a Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff for Personnel and Logistics, described by the Americanism of "three star rank", is to be made to further this objective. There is also to be a senior officer appointment of Defence Services Secretary "to act as the sole link between the Sovereign and the Secretary of State for Defence on matters at present dealt with by the Naval, Military and Air Secretaries.

The Defence Scientific Staff under the controversial leadership of Sir Solly Zuckerman is being strengthened and given increased powers and its influence permeates almost all the major committees.

Committees

One aspect of the new organisation calling for special notice is the proliferation of Committees. No less than twelve major standing committees are mentioned in the White Paper (apart from the Min. of Aviations and other extra-departmental ones). Anyone with experience will realise that there will be many more subordinate ones and it looks as if many officials will spend most of their lives on committees. The American defence administration went through a similar agony in the 1950s; there was great confusion, with innumerable committees and sub-committees, and it was impossible to determine who did what.

Weather, Aviation and CD

For some reason not made clear, the Meteorological Office is to come under the Ministry of Defence, but the military research and development done by the Ministry of Aviation is not. Instead, sections of the two Ministries concerned with this work will be stabled together and exchange representatives on panels and committees. Surprisingly, too, Civil Defence has not been raised to the status of a branch of the Defence Ministry. It does not even receive a mention.

Civilians and Traditions

A note of anxiety is sounded in the White Paper about the effects of the reorganisation on the large numbers of civil servants in the four departments when it declares "A positive effort of constructive thought and imagination and a broadening of loyalties (will be required) on the part of all members of the new Department." Free interchange of officials between the divisions of the new Ministry must be accepted. On the other hand the White Paper assured the three fighting services that their individual traditions and battle honours will be preserved.

Is It Too Big?

Doubts about what is described as a "monster organisation" have been raised, but seem unimportant beside other aspects. Measured in terms of total manpower the new Ministry is minute compared with the War Office in 1944-5 which had 2½ million soldiers and an unknown number of civilians



NEW BRITISH DEFENCE ORGANISATION — EFFECTIVE 1st APRIL, 1964

spread all over the world. The anxieties are really centred on if the proposed system of control by all those committees and all the "sit - by - me" adhoccery blistered on to old jealous departmental machinery can hold out until more radical changes come about.

Army Reforms

In the case of the Army, the new organisation has overtaken two reports on reorganisation. The NYE report on the War Office itself in which inter alia, the post of Deputy C.I.G.S. was seen as redundant and the BOWER report on supply and maintenance in which it is understood some reorganisation of the duties of the R.A.S.C., R.A.O.C., and R.E.M.E. was proposed. Whether these will now be implemented remains to be seen. One assumes that the title will be changed from War Office to Army Office in due course.

Streamlining

Informed opinion on service matters is fearful that, instead of increased efficiency, administration will become more ponderous than ever. For example, ". . . the streamlining of the three branches responsible for catering in their respective services should go a lot further than merely bringing the three together with a more senior officer plus his staff on top because the numbers justify a higher grade."[3]

This is more than likely to happen unless some completely new thinking is done about systems of supply. One type of organisation that could be worked is the "Command" type, already proved in the R.A.F. with such components as Transport Command.

American Example

Last year the Americans set out to improve their logistic system by welding the former Technical services into an Army Materials Command, the executive part of which is the Supply and Maintenance Command. This controls supply, maintenance and transportation, ranging over such aspects as direction of transportation agencies, depot maintenance, stock control, finance and overseas supply agencies. The Command budget for 1962/3 was £800 M. with some 71,000 personnel at 65 major installations. A high degree of automatic data processing, integrated stock control and standardisation of supply procedures and media is part of the reorganisation.

Integrated Commands

If efficiency is to be obtained the command concept is probably the most acceptable at present in the British defence system where each service will strive to avoid being submerged in another. In a command structure operating on objective lines, officers and men from the three services can serve together until the time comes for a further step in amalgamation.

Until integrated inter-service commands come about there is little hope of much real streamlining. These of course are not new to the services in overseas areas but a step might be taken

[3] R.U.S.I. Journal, August 1963.

by forming an experimental one at home. Reform of army geographical commands is overdue and the same is true of the navy. One might begin in Scotland and Northern Ireland.

Training

Most students of defence feel that although the single service concept may take a long time to evolve, ultimately it must be the pattern for British defence. Much depends on what the "3-star general" and the special second P.U.S. of S. can achieve in the first period. Among the more sensible comments of Field Marshal Montgomery are proposals for the reorganisation of Dartmouth, Sandhurst and Cranwell. If a single service outlook is inculcated at the very beginning of a service career it will be easier to accept sooner than later. More urgent in the training field is the reorganisation of curricula at the four staff colleges and the scientific training establishments.

With army recruiting again falling off, the running sore of B.A.O.R. needing radical surgery, complex overseas deployments, and the problems of M.L.F. to preoccupy it, the new Ministry of Defence has much to do. But making sure that the new house is in order and working properly must be top priority if British defence is to be taken seriously in the world of the future.

There is a vast difference between being a staff officer and being a commander. The staff officer is never totally responsible — the commander always is. For that reason, although a good commander usually will make a good staff officer, the opposite is not necessarily true.

General J. Lawton Collins, US Army.

THE VITAL FACTOR

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MOTIVATION

Major R. D. F. Lloyd, MC
Royal Australian Infantry

WHY do you want to make the Army your career? I'm sure you've been asked this question. No doubt it's been asked of practically every officer now serving in the Regular Army and will continue to be asked of those who wish to serve in the future. It seemed to me when I was first asked, and in fact for some years afterwards, that it was a rather unreasonable question. I believe now, however, that it is far from unreasonable. It is actually a most vital question, one which should represent the essence of the Army's publicity and selection policy. It is a question, the truthful answer to which should indicate whether the applicant for the Regular Army has or has not what I believe to be the essential requirement, proper initial motivation.

The Importance of Proper Motivation

For the other rank, proper initial motivation, although very desirable, is not necessarily vital. If he is well led and well instructed, he should perform his duties effectively in both peace and war. For the officers of our Army, however, I believe proper initial motivation to be absolutely essential.

It is not sufficient for an officer to look upon his Army career and training merely as a job which can provide him with certain material benefits — a higher education, an adequate salary, security of employment and guaranteed promotion. This type of officer doesn't need the Army and the Army certainly doesn't need him. The officer we do need is one who looks upon his career as a challenge — a basic challenge to his ability as a man to lead and organise men. This basic challenge presents itself to all officers, technical or otherwise, for the Army is essentially made up of men, despite the machines and equipment that go with it.

Above all, an officer must have a strong desire to serve. It is often forgotten that an Army exists for one main purpose, to fight, and under present conditions this will probably entail the regular component of our Army fighting while the rest of the community remains at peace. It doesn't necessarily make a

properly motivated officer to attend such a war and with a bit of luck to return alive. But to lead and organise men effectively and if necessary give his life in such a war, an officer must have the desire to serve his country and the desire to meet the extreme test of his leadership ability, despite the cost.

There are many, I know, who would not agree that proper motivation in one seeking a place in our Army is of such vital importance. I've no doubt there were many who voluntarily enlisted and fought in the wars in which this country has been involved, who did so because "it was the thing to do", or "everybody else was doing it", rather than for a real desire to serve their country. This is no discredit to them, but for the Regular Army and particularly its officers, this type of reasoning is neither applicable, nor good enough.

Even in peace the regular officer, especially the married one, suffers many disadvantages which his civilian equivalent does not. The frequent moving of his family and home, insufficient and inadequate housing, a working week normally far in excess of forty hours, an early average retiring age and many more that you know only too well. When a "small" war comes along, added to these of course are the discomforts and dangers of combat. This disparity between the Regular Army Officer and his civilian equivalent is balanced by two main factors:—

(a) Firstly by the material benefits the Army provides.

(b) Secondly by the opportunity it provides for leadership and service to his country.

Either one of these could provide the basis for motivating a young man to make the Army his career. In many cases it may be a combination of both. The danger for the Army lies in the fact that he has been influenced too much by the first of these factors and not enough by the second.

The need for properly motivated soldiers is not unique to the Australian Army. The United States Army for instance, as a result of an exhaustive inquiry into the conduct of its prisoners of war in Communist hands in Korea, has now placed far more emphasis on the requirement for proper motivation of its members. This emphasis appears quite justified considering the type of enemy our regular soldier is likely to be required to fight. A more strongly motivated enemy is unlikely to be met. His motivation is based on an ideology which threatens our very existence and in him it is in-bred. Unlike our selection boards, his have not the problem of assessing motivation!

I don't believe that we can defeat this enemy with superior equipment and tactics alone. It is becoming more and more obvious that we must be prepared to live and fight more in the way he does. To do this we will not only require a great deal of training, but it will require us to endure a greater degree of hardship than perhaps we have ever done before in training and in war. I wonder

whether these requirements are recognised and understood by those who apply for membership to our Regular Army? They should be. If they are, and the applicant still wants to apply, then everything else being equal, he is the young man we want!

Attracting the Right Applicant

One of the major methods used to attract applications to our officer training establishments is by newspaper advertisements and strategically placed posters. With few exceptions, the emphasis in these is on the material benefits the Army has to offer as a career, rather than the opportunity it offers for leadership and service. The latter are mentioned but are not given due emphasis.

There is no doubt of course, that the material benefits advertised by the Army are in fact available to the cadet during his training and subsequently as a Regular Officer. But does this type of advertising attract the applicant with the proper motives? I suggest most strongly that it does not. In fact, by endeavouring to out-do large business and industrial organisations by offering "soft bait" in this way, we tend more to attract the applicant whose desire to make the Army his career is based predominantly on what the Army can do for him materially.

Another method the Army uses is the employment of the Army Headquarters Team of Lecturers. These officers have the opportunity of getting right at the source of officer potential and to those who exercise the major influence on the potential applicant. To the young men they address they should emphasise the challenge, the opportunity to serve that the Army offers and the high moral standards required for acceptance. Undoubtedly they will be asked about the material benefits the Army offers, and of course these should be explained. The basic approach, however, should be not as sellers but as buyers. To the parents and others who exercise influence on the potential applicant, the approach must be somewhat different. To them, the career prospects the Army offers are of vital interest because of their natural desire to see that their son's future is secure. These prospects must be presented truthfully and without exaggeration, but always the opportunity the Army provides for service and leadership should be predominant.

The Army is so often in the position of being a supplicant, trying unsuccessfully to sell itself to its potential applicants on a material basis. What seems to have been forgotten is that the Army is a fine, proud organisation, that it offers a challenge to the best of our country's youth and that service in it is highly honourable and highly rewarding from the standpoint of moral values. If our youth wants security or a trade, these things are widely obtainable, but they are not necessarily the Army's business. Its appeal should rest on the opportunity it gives to serve our country, which depends on its armed services for security.

The way to attract the right applicant for the Army is to tell him not what he's going to get out of it, but what it requires of him. Only if he is of the right calibre will he be acceptable. There is nothing new in this type of approach — it is used for example, by the United States Marine Corps and many regiments of the British Army. Despite the belief by some that this approach won't work in today's world, I believe that although the number of applicants may be reduced temporarily as a result, what we get will be of better quality. Subsequently, quality will attract quality.

We have not yet succeeded in raising the standard of the Regular Army in the eyes of the public sufficiently to allow us to sit back and select what we want out of great numbers of eager applicants. What we must ensure is that we attract the best. By doing this we make the selection board's task easier.

Selection Problems

How does one know what really motivates a young man applying for entry into one of our officer training establishments? I'm sure there is no ready-made formula for assessing this and it is beyond the scope of this article to deal in detail with selection problems and procedures. However, having stated the importance of selecting only those who have the proper motives, it is essential that we be able to assess these with maximum accuracy. I do not agree with the many sceptics who believe that a truthful answer to the question — why do you want to make the Army your career? — is never given. It may take time to arrive at the truth, but a selection board consisting of experienced officers, given sufficient time with an applicant, I'm sure, can assess his motives quite accurately.

Inevitably some errors in selection will be made. It is important that these be discovered as soon as possible. This "weeding out" can and should be done quite early at our officer training establishments, if the motivation factor is given due emphasis.

Conclusion

With hard work and good instruction, an officer can gain professional knowledge, but the necessary initial motivation is something either he has or has not. This can only be fostered, not produced. It is vital, therefore, that we attract and select to our officer training establishments, only those applicants who have the basic quality to meet the test that they, as Regular Officers, will face in peace and war.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Captain H. V. Dobinson
Royal Australian Infantry

"The professional military mind is by necessity an inferior and unimaginative mind; no man of high intellectual quality would willingly imprison his gifts in such a calling."
— H. G. Wells.

INTELLIGENCE may be classified as animal, human or military. This paper is concerned with a combination of two of these — human and military. More specifically, it is an analysis of Wells's statement and is thus concerned primarily with officer intelligence. The subject is discussed under three headings:

(a) The Need for Intelligence.

(b) The Problems — Our Intellectual Deficiency.

(c) The Remedy.

Wells's assertion is certainly an arresting one which should incite in most officers a few moments of critical self-analysis. His criticism of the military mind was prompted by the catastrophic casualties of World War I — the product of inept generalship. Fortunately, history abounds in examples of military genius, so perhaps Wells was a little too severe. Criticism of World War I leadership was fashionable at the time, and although the disparagement of the military mind may have had a great deal of validity for that period, history before and since belies it to a degree. Nevertheless, it is obvious that few officers rate the title "genius", and perhaps there is some element of truth in the assertion that soldiers generally are not gifted with high intellectual capacity.

The Need for Intelligence

In their book "Men In Arms", co-authors Preston, Wise and Werner note that: "The Byzantines surveyed war with the subtle and mature intelligence of an ancient civilisation, and applied to its study the same careful scholarship which distinguished their convoluted theology and elaborate public finance. But if war was not, for them, a heroic game, neither was it an intellectual exercise. It was precisely because the existence of the state hung so completely upon the capabilities of its armed forces that the study of war, so often ignored in more complacent and less threatened societies, attracted the best Byzantine minds."

One might dispute the fact that Australia is threatened by political and military developments to our north. There can be no doubt that as a society we are complacent; and we do little, if anything, to attract the best Australian minds to the study of war.

It may be unfair to compare conditions of warfare in the tenth century with those of the twentieth century. Obviously, there are differences, but in most countries with a highly developed society, the bulk of a nation's intelligence has always been required to run the nation's economy and to produce weapons of war. Twentieth century warfare makes greater demands on a nation's intellectual resources. The production of war material requires the labour of numerous scientists and technicians; such vocations require a high degree of intelligence. Clearly, then, the armed services must compete for a fair share of this intellectual reservoir. The products of modern technology, and the necessity to understand their functions, put a premium on high intelligence in commanders.

The Problems — Our Intellectual Deficiency

The problems are these:

(a) An apathetic community and, stemming from this —

(b) Poor social status compared with other professions.

(c) The channelling to technical arms and services of a disproportionate number of our most intelligent officer cadets.

(d) The rank structure, which requires the young officer to spend much of his time learning the rudiments of soldiering, without at the same time requiring him to exercise his intellect.

(e) An inadequately trained citizen force.

The Public Attitude. In common with the people of other democracies, most Australians regard the army as a necessary peace-time evil — a drain on the Federal budget for which there is little tangible return. Few, of course, deny the need for an army in case the country is forced to go to war; but it is something which would be better if it cost nothing and made no call on the nation's young men. Against this background there is little incentive for bright young men to offer their services. Our military history lauds the spirit of the warrior, but gives little attention to the need for outwitting the enemy.

Our recruiting of officers reflects this attiture. There is the call to adventure, interesting new equipment and security of employment. The recruiting authorities can offer little else. The weakness in our recruitment of officers is the national attitude to the army. Our recruiting methods attract to the modern army above-average young men, bright but not brilliant. Thus the tendency is toward intellectual mediocrity. There are, of course, exceptions. Nevertheless, there is evidence to show that this criticism is generally true.

The Oxford University Press has published recently a series of

Great Australians — twenty-four of them. Only two were soldiers: Monash and Murray, and both achieved fame outside the military sphere — Monash in engineering and Murray for his work in New Guinea. Perhaps this merely shows that the nation spends comparatively little of its time at war, but our Anzac tradition might be cause for expecting more soldiers in such a list.

Social Status. Position in the social scale has a profound effect on the bureaucratic professions, particularly the police, teachers and service officers. All three need men (and women) of high calibre. Unfortunately, rates of pay, the requirement to perform many mundane duties, and, above all, their relatively low status in the community, deny to these professions the quality of human material they need to be fully effective.

Comparisons with other armies illustrate the point. The Wehrmacht was able to attract men of high quality because Germany chafed under the terms of the Versailles Treaty. The status of the army was high. The Russians adopt a course which can only be pursued in a totalitarian state; boys with outstanding qualities are placed in Suvarov schools and their education directed to soldiering. The role of the United States Army is different from our own and that of the British Army. For example, the corps of Engineers and Signals have a task in certain development schemes such as erosion control and the construction of strategic roads. The status of service officers in the United States is probably higher than that in Australia, and as a result a good proportion of men of high intelligence make the United States Army their career.

It may be of interest to note that a public opinion survey, made in the United States about 1950, gave the following rankings of occupational prestige:

Supreme Court Justice	—	1
Physician	—	2
Airline Pilot	—	24
Accountant	—	28
Army Captain	—	32
Public School Teacher	—	36
Policeman	—	55
Plumber	—	60

Allocation to Corps. A high proportion of Chiefs of the General Staff in both the British and Australian Armies have been gunners or sappers. These were once (and possibly still are) the technical arms to which the intellectually-inclined officer graduated. Today there is still a natural tendency for the hard-working, intelligent officer cadet to find his way to the technical arms — Signals, Engineers, etc. The aggressive outdoor cadet generally seeks and is given a place in Infantry. (This is by no means the universal rule, but the tendency is there, nevertheless). Our future leaders can thus be expected to be, in the main, technical men. The channelling of high intelligence into the technical arms, and the consequent lack of it in the purely "teeth" arms, could lead to a stagnation in battle procedures and techniques. For most of their careers, technical men are

not always directly concerned with tactics.

The Rank Structure. The army's rank structure, with its requirement to spend ten years in the junior grades, fails to exercise the full mental capacity of the young officer. After four years at the Royal Military College, some graduates attend a university for a further two years. In the two years, then, before becoming captains, the only period of mental stress is probably a short tactics course and a promotion examination. The stress, if any, is of a minor nature compared with that experienced by a professional man in civilian life. In the six years which elapse as a captain, the only strain on the intellect is probably another promotion examination. Eventually the course at the Staff College supervenes and some original thought and mental exercise may be necessary.

Citizen Military Force. Voltaire criticised the professional armies of his time on the grounds that soldiers were recruited from the poorest human material. (This is certainly not the case today.) To introduce better material into the army and thus produce a more effective defence force, Voltaire's contemporaries suggested the citizen army, wherein the manpower of the entire nation — and its talents — served the country in time of war. The Australian Army, with its large citizen component, fits this pattern to some extent, but with one significant shortcoming — training time. In future wars we may have too little time for our citizen forces to reach professional standards of efficiency before being committed in battle. It will avail us nought if we attempt to use intelligent but inadequately trained citizen force officers. Their talent, the nation's intellectual resources, will be wasted.

The Remedy

The fundamental problem is to attract men of high intellectual quality into the nation's armed forces in order to achieve a high degree of efficiency. The army should have a fair proportion of the nation's brain-power, yet two related factors which inhibit the acquisition of this commodity lie outside the army. The factors are, public opinion and social status. Since one leads inevitably to the other, they may be considered jointly.

The greatest need is a reorientation of public opinion. There is certainly a good deal of public sympathy for the army, particularly in business and professional circles. But greater prestige for the service officer is required. This, of course, is a two-way process. The officer must be worthy of prestige by virtue of his intellect and training. The way to obtain this prestige is to get the sympathy of the press, politicians from both party blocs and other people in public office. School headmasters and ultimately all parents must be favourably impressed. This is difficult and the main source of inspiration can only be an ultra-efficient army which advertises its altruistic

nature. The Army Team of Lecturers is a step in the right direction in promoting a favourable outlook on an army career. Parental consent is probably the chief stumbling block. The widespread knowledge which is characteristic of modern society means that all people are aware of the lethality of modern weapons. Small wonder that parents are reluctant to give permission for a son to embark on a military career.

An efficient army cannot be bought for the price Australia is currently prepared to pay. Unfortunately, a higher expenditure of the national income on the army will, initially anyway, tarnish the popular image we wish to create. Money will also be involved in any attempt to alter the position of officers on the social scale, for it is an unfortunate fact that, with few exceptions, an individual's status in our society is almost directly related to his income. Remuneration should be based on a logical scale of values and the professional officer should be rated higher than he is at present. However, it is a case of the dog chasing its tail. Quality in the officer must come first, higher pay and social prestige later.

Something can also be done within the army. Having enlisted the high-quality officer cadet, his intellectual growth must be assured. This can be done in several ways:

(a) Courses at army schools with the standard of examination pitched at a higher level than at present.

(b) Seminars of two or three weeks' duration on subjects such as tactics, philosophy of war, electronics and other technical fields.

(c) A requirement to produce certain essays and military papers in the officer's own time.

(d) Propect studies: for example, the adaptation of new inventions to army requirements.

(e) A short staff course to improve knowledge of standard procedures. ((A "potted" version of the standard staff college course would be suitable.)

This programme need take no more time than is currently allotted for attendance at courses, since much of it can be done "on the job". Finally, it would be a great advantage if the staff college course were given some civil recognition, say in the field of management. Officers too old for field appointments who have been passed over for promotion would then be able to seek a new career in middle age with some prospect of success. This would remove the major objection to a retiring age of 47.

All this seems a far cry from officer intelligence and it might be appropriate at this point to reiterate the need for intelligence, whilst at the same time keeping the services in correct perspective. They must acquire only a fair share of the nation's intelligence. This must not be done at the expense of other necessary fields such as national

development, scientific research, teaching, and the professions generally.

Conclusion

The public must be educated in the role of the army. This is not necessarily only the winning of battles. In the past, arms races have been followed almost inexorably by war. This need not be so in the future. The atomic age has brought with it, at least temporarily, peace through strength. The more efficient an army, then, the greater its value in peace.

The task of command necessitates a profound knowledge of human nature. There is only one way this can be acquired — by experience. An officer's life is of necessity often mundane. It savours (in peace, at any rate) of the public servant who, by becoming entrenched in a job, becomes something of an expert. All officers must be experts in handling men. The army needs lots of men of sound ability to be regimental officers and to perform routine technical duties. In this context, it is worth noting that in any profession, there are only a few outstanding intellects. The average man fills the type of posting mentioned above. The point at issue is whether or not the army has its fair share of outstanding intellects. There are some, of course; high intelligence is found in all walks of life, but in the army such men do not always reach the top level of command. They are often given employment in restrictive fields, especially in technological research.

For colonels and above, mediocrity is not good enough. We need good brains, not only in the various technical fields, but also in the realms of tactics and strategy. It probably matters little whether the commander of a force started his career in Artillery, Signals or Infantry. He must have the mental capacity to wield his force to the best advantage, to achieve victory at minimum cost in human life. With the weapons available today, we in the West, anyway, cannot afford the standard of generalship which inspired H. G. Wells to pen his indictment of the military mind.

ENGINEERS IN COUNTER INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

Lieutenant Colonel J. H. Templeman
Royal Australian Engineers

THE AIM of this paper is to describe the likely tasks of RAE units should the field force be committed to counter insurgency operations in an overseas theatre. It is based on the concept of current operational plans which envisage a force of one or two battle groups operating in South East Asia in conjunction with allies. Following on from the description of tasks it outlines the engineer training requirements to fit both RAE and other arms for this role.

Introduction

In order to gain an immediate appreciation of the engineer tasks in this type of situation we must think in terms of the way in which the campaign is to be conducted as a whole. We know that the operational area will fall into a number of broad categories in each of which the immediate tactical situations and aims are different. In the base area for our field force, which will be in a controlled area, the engineer tasks of construction are little different to those required in the base area for any operation. There will be more emphasis on the immediate protection of engineer working parties, and engineers will have to contribute

Lieutenant Colonel J. H. Templeman graduated from the Royal Military College, Duntroon, in 1940, and during Word War II served in Syria and Java with 2/2 Pioneer Battalion. He is a graduate of Civil Engineering, and is a member of the Institution of Engineers (Australia). Since World War II he has served in various appointments, including Technical Staff Officer, Department of Supply, Chief Engineer at Maralinga and CO, 6 Engineer Stores Regiment. He is at present Chief Instructor at the School of Military Engineering.

to the defence of the area. In controlled areas generally there will be many tasks associated with the defence and support of the friendly population against possible attack, e.g., assistance in the preparation of villages for defence. Outside of the controlled area, tasks will fall into two categories, firstly those directly concerned with the support of elements of our forces being used on operations against the guerillas, and secondly maintenance of existing facilities which will be required by us although in non-controlled areas, e.g. certain railway lines or roads.

There will be emphasis on speed and expediency in areas of operations where we are seeking to establish and extend control, which will only be achieved when mobile patrols can move quickly to deal with trouble, and when the local population is relatively safe from attack.

Air supply and movement of troops by air is basic to counter insurgency operations and therefore the construction of airfields, light strips, helipads, and dropping zones, is one of the most important engineer tasks in the base area, controlled areas, and throughout areas of operations.

The Base Area

Airfields

The AMF tactical doctrine for anti-guerilla operations makes the point that the base area will normally contain an MRT or SRT airfield, and the military and air force installations necessary for its operation. Thus, an early task for the engineers in the overseas theatre may be the construction of one or more airfields. Even if it is not necessary to build an airfield, it will most certainly be necessary for us to contribute to the maintenance of one.

In the construction of an MRT or SRT airfield we must consider the need to commence supply quickly to our forward elements. We must have the ability and equipment for rapid construction including the laying of prefabricated surfacing such as pierced aluminium plank or pierced steel plank.

Depot Installations

In order to make the base area function the principal requirements will be:—

(a) The maintenance, operation, and possible development of port facilities.

(b) The construction and improvement of the roads and tracks within our depot complex area.

(c) Construction of hard standings.

(d) Assistance to units in the construction of their installations, e.g. electrical reticulation, covered storage and refrigeration, POL, hospitals.

(e) Water supply.

(f) Assistance throughout the LSF area in the construction of strongpoints, obstacles and other field defences.

Defence

There will be a constant guerilla threat to the base area and therefore a far greater emphasis on defence than would

normally be the case. This in no way changes the nature of the engineer task, but it will certainly cause much engineer effort to be drawn off from installation construction. In the early critical stages there is certain to be a conflict between the urgent need for depot construction on the one hand, and defence tasks on the other.

The Controlled Area

Protected Villages

Throughout the controlled area, the local government will want to protect all villages. This means the provision of the strongest possible fences surrounding them, and patrolling at night to prevent infiltration. Engineers will be able to assist in this task in the cutting of timber, provision of barbed wire, and to advise on the construction of fences and other obstacles. Sappers will also be used to advise and assist in the making of booby traps, warning devices and strongpoints.

Road Maintenance and Construction

In South East Asian countries roads are at a premium. To disrupt our operations within a controlled area, the enemy will attack bridges and other critical points in the surface communication system. Weather will also cause roads to deteriorate and fail, thus creating a continuous maintenance task. There will be a requirement for the improvement of roads and tracks so that our forces can move quickly to deal with insurgency. Our logistic system in the base area will be dependent on a good road system.

Engineer Resources

Logistic and transport considerations highlight the importance of engineering materials such as timber and rock for the construction and maintenance of our own installations in the base area, and also for tasks to help control the area generally, e.g., protected villages. We will use local labour to the maximum extent possible. Protection of units detached to win materials will be of paramount importance.

Strongpoints

These will be required throughout controlled areas and be manned by patrols provided either by armed forces, local police, or friendly elements of the population. Combined with strongpoints there will be a requirement for observation towers. Engineers may advise and assist in the construction of these protective installations.

Patrols

When enemy infiltration occurs in the controlled area, and should pockets of insurgency develop, our forces will be called upon to send fighting patrols to deal with the trouble. Such patrols may have to move through very difficult country on foot, or where possible they would move by helicopter. Depending on the particular circumstances some engineer assistance will be required, in particular for the construction of expedients to cross water gaps, and in overcoming other obstacles to movement, e.g. mined or booby trapped areas and difficult terrain. Generally speaking it must be accepted

that our patrols will be very lightly equipped and operate without engineer assistance.

Uncontrolled Areas

Uncontrolled areas fall into two groups, those in which our forces are fighting to establish control, and those we are not seeking to control for the present.

It is in uncontrolled areas, and in support of operations to establish and maintain control, that the true skill of the sapper and his ability to provide expedients, is of prime importance. This is the area where the basic field engineering skill of both sappers and other arms is a vital requirement in order to give our patrols the necessary ability to move rapidly, and to assist in establishing firm patrol bases. Support to local friendly forces will be a task of great importance, as also will be the protection and fortification of villages. Engineer tasks in the uncontrolled area range from the construction of a strong forward airhead for a force of battle group size, to tasks in support of offensive patrols carried out by non-engineer labour.

Engineer tasks in areas which we decide to leave uncontrolled will be rare and of a hazardous nature; they could be repair and maintenance tasks to allow one time convoys to pass through, or the support for a force carrying out a special mission such as a raid on an enemy stronghold.

Engineer Tasks

Airfields

The requirement for airfields in the base area has already been mentioned. The emphasis on air supply and the need for patrols to move quickly makes it imperative that engineers construct light airfields and helipads rapidly throughout the area of operations. The important technical aspects to achieve this requirement are:—

(a) Selection of an economical and practical site.
(b) Rapid clearing of jungle using any available labour.
(c) Use of light plant which can be air dropped.
(d) Firm agreement as to minimum standards of construction.
(e) Solution of the special technical problems which would arise in this theatre, including drainage, and use of local materials.
(f) Use of prefabricated surfacing and matting.

Because of the emphasis on speed these aspects are discussed in more detail below.

Recognition of good light airfield sites in a terrain covered with thick jungle is a difficult task, and at the best will be trial and error based on commonsense engineering principles. An engineer officer will look for a level feature which can be drained and which requires minimum effort to clear. Experience is the best guide to selection, and training must bear in mind the need to develop skill in location from maps, air photographs, and air reconnaissance — these being usual methods in addition to ground reconnaissance and survey. The engineer must be skilled in

making a rapid ground reconnaissance of tentative sites selected from the air, so that a practical assessment of the task is made before work starts. He must be able to visualise the effort required for each major phase of construction, i.e. clearing, draining, and surfacing, and be able to see how the particular problems relating to the site are to be overcome. In site selection and final location the engineer must be aware of the pilot's requirements for a clear approach path, and he must know precisely the requirements for a clear approach path, and he must know precisely the requirements for our aircraft.

Clearing, preliminary levelling, and drainage form the basis of the light airfield because in dry weather these will probably suffice to enable limited if hazardous operation. Generally this work will be done by native labour using hand tools. The engineer task is to direct the available labour and get the job done at speed. Extensive wide clearing is essential to enable the sun to dry out the ground on either side of the strip. Drainage is a basic consideration for airfields and roads because of the high rainfall.

We have a scale of light plant which can be air dropped for this early airfield task, and used subsequently for roads, tracks, and in the construction of field defences.

One of the difficult problems in South East Asia is the frequent lack of local surfacing materials unless we are fortunate enough to be in an area containing abundant laterite deposits. In the counter-insurgency situation the task of transporting material even a mile or so may well be impossible in the early stages of gaining control and a light airfield cannot therefore be satisfactorily surfaced except for dry weather. On the other hand we must pursue every means to keep the surface drained and firm using local materials and labour. There may be parts of the surface where corduroy type construction will help, partial stabilisation of the soil may also be possible.

Roads

Considerable road development will be required in order to make our base area function effectively. This will include road maintenance from the port area to the depot complex area, jeep roads and tracks, and construction and maintenance forward from our depot complex into the controlled area to detached elements of our field force.

In forward areas of operations, where we are seeking to gain control, a programme of road maintenance and route construction is essential so that our patrols are mobile. The programme will follow quickly after initial clearing operations by our troops and other friendly forces. All construction will have to be done using the minimum of plant and maximum of local labour. What plant is available will almost certainly be in the very light range because of the transport problem, any heavy items will have to be air dropped in several separate loads and assembled on the job.

Throughout the South East Asian countries there is always a system of local tracks connecting native villages, which generally follow the best routes. As a first approach to the communication problem, the best solution may be to develop these tracks so that they are wide enough to take our vehicles.

Bridges

It is only in the base area that one can visualise the need for Class 30 bridges, here there will no doubt be a requirement for this heavier classification in order to make the depot complex area function. Bridging in the base area will often be constructed with local materials and labour, e.g., timber pile or trestle types. Planning should be based on equipment bridging for known commitments when transportation facilities permit.

In the forward areas we require bridges of about Class 3 in the early stages for the developed system of communications, while for actual operations with our patrols any bridges will be of a temporary or improvised nature, as control is established and the area developed heavier classification equipment bridges will follow. Bridges for the road and track system will always be required urgently, therefore in the case of small-gaps a simple timber beam bridge is likely to be the common answer. In the case of wide water gaps an improvised ferry may often be the best expedient. Suspension bridges of steel wire rope and local timbers, ARC mesh, timber cantilever type bridges, and native bamboo type construction, will all be used depending on availability of materials and the skill of the local people. Anti-insurgent operations will demand the basic field engineering techniques required for the construction of these expedient type bridges.

Flotation methods may have to be used for operations which lend themselves to the employment of vehicles and other mobile equipment. Assistance may also be required for the movement of vehicles and other equipment across difficult country. Both engineers and infantry must be trained in the basic techniques of using suspension cables, blocks and tackles, and flying foxes. The use of improvised captive ferries for swift flowing wide rivers is also most important. These small elementary tasks are simple in themselves but vital when considered in relation to the task and situation of a force operating from a forward airhead.

Field Defences

General

The first consideration when an element of our Task Force is sent forward to assist in gaining control of an area is to establish an airhead and patrol bases. These must be protected against attack.

The airhead is such an important link in the maintenance system as to demand a very strong system of field defences, wire, and warning devices. It will also be essential to clear fields of fire.

A patrol base will contain very limited stocks of ammunition,

supplies, medical stores, etc. It will have a helipad and may be adjacent to an airfield. It will often be a company group locality from which we will send out detachments of platoon and section strength against local insurgents. This locality should be adequately protected against attack, which means an immediate emphasis on the construction of strong section posts. It means also the extensive clearance of fields of fire. The locality may also be completely protected with a barbed wire fence, or by a strong fence made with bamboo or other local materials depending on availability. The degree to which development of defences will be carried out depends on the threat and the need for concealment in the particular situation.

The construction of field defences will have to be undertaken by troops occupying the airhead or patrol base with the assistance of local labour. Where very strong self contained localities are required the task should be carried out with engineer assistance.

Villages

Troops will have to give all possible assistance to the local population in the preparation of fortified and protected villages. Only when we are operating in a friendly environment in which we know that the local people feel free from enemy attack can we effectively control the area. Works for the protection of villages will be similar to those for any defended locality and consist of fences, fields of fire, weapon pits, warning devices, hideouts and man traps. Local materials and labour will be the rule because our logistic system will rarely be able to cope with the great quantity of stores needed for more sophisticated field works. Sappers will often control the work but all arms must be capable of supervising this task.

Demolitions

The principal uses for explosives will be to assist in the rapid construction of air fields, roads, and field defences.

Opportunities may occur to use demolitions in the offensive role in raids against the enemy supply system, but generally his line of communication is primitive and difficult to attack. When possible we will raid his installations, especially in areas where there is any build up of stocks along the covert supply routes from neighbouring Communist states. When it is profitable to do so we will also hit enemy controlled rail or road systems. In general, good targets will be rare and difficult to find.

Climatic conditions will have a most adverse effect on explosives making it imperative that every precaution be taken in storage. With the requirement for rapid construction, and with uncertain re-supply, the protection of explosives from wet becomes an even more important consideration.

Water Supplies

Due to the prevalence of disease and native ignorance and indifference there will be a continuous requirement to improve water supplies both for our own

consumption and in protected villages. At airheads and patrol bases strictly supervised water purification measures are essential. To avoid surface contamination it may often be advisable to drill or bore for water as soon as possible. In many areas the best supplies will be obtained from wells at depths of from 50 feet to 150 feet.

In forward areas it will often be impossible to rely on the conventional water supply equipment, e.g. the Paterson trailer. It will certainly not be feasible to provide equipment for all villages in which we are interested, or those in which we want to establish patrol bases. All troops will have to be able to purify water using field methods. Engineers must be skilled in the erection of primitive water points and in the methods of obtaining the best water available for the local conditions, e.g., surface, wells, or bore holes.

River Transport

Waterways are an important part of the transportation system in South East Asia, and there are river craft of all types in general use. Important engineer tasks may therefore be:—

(a) Operation of an inland water transport system.
(b) Selection of native craft for our use.
(c) Repair of river boats.
(d) Construction of wharves and other facilities for unloading.
(e) Destruction of enemy craft along his river L of C.
(f) Employment of equipment boats and barges.

Engineer Training

General

The following considerations give a guide to training in engineer tasks for the counter-insurgency campaign:—

(a) The need for base area installations which are complete and protected.
(b) Air supply, and the need for speed in implementing it.
(c) Limitation on engineer construction in forward areas due to air supply.
(d) Emphasis on expedients and field engineering methods in forward areas.
(e) Assistance to the local population.
(f) Provision of tracks to give mobility to patrols in controlled areas.
(g) The need for engineers to be able to defend themselves and take their part in the defence of an area.
(h) The need for all arms and services to be able to help themselves in basic engineering tasks.
(j) Greater emphasis on the need to move across country on foot.

The way in which these considerations should influence the training of the principal engineer units is discussed in the following paragraphs. Their effect on all arms is also discussed.

Field Engineer Units

Training will need to emphasise the independent and isolated situations in which sub-units and individual men will find themselves. At the airhead a field squadron is likely to work

as an entity, but in forward areas, patrol bases, and in support of operations, we will find troops and sections responsible for a variety of different types of small engineering tasks. The need for the field engineer to have a good grasp of all aspects of his job is obvious.

Particular tasks in which a high degree of individual skill should be developed are:—

(a) Supervision of native labour and planning their work.
(b) Field defences.
(c) Operation of light plant.
(d) Uses of hand tools and explosives for jungle clearing.
(e) Light bridges and flotation methods.
(f) Rapid location and supply of water.
(g) Map reading and navigation.
(h) Movement and work at night.

Tasks which the field squadron and troop should be capable of undertaking immediately and be thoroughly practised in are:—

(a) Light airfields.
(b) Helipads.
(c) Tracks.
(d) Field defences.
(e) Improvised light bridges.
(f) Winning local timbers and gravels.
(g) Watermanship.
(h) Movement by air.

The following tasks must be emphasised in the training of field park squadrons:—

(a) Control of engineer stores being delivered to widely dispersed elements of our forces.
(b) Assembly of plant delivered by air in several loads.
(c) Control of local resources.
(d) Field engineering.

Construction Units

Construction squadrons will generally be located in the base area and work with their normal plant and be responsible for the construction of installations including depots, roads, wharves, etc. In some circumstances construction elements in addition to field squadrons will have to be sent forward to the airhead to assist with its construction.

The following aspects of training will require particular emphasis:—

(a) Rapid road and airfield construction.
(b) Use of light plant to cope with otherwise inaccessible tasks.
(c) Winning of local materials.
(d) Employment of local labour to augment the squadron's effort.
(e) Field defences.
(f) Water supply.

Advanced Engineer Stores Squadron

This unit will be located in the base area possibly with detachments in the forward airhead, and as usual is responsible for the receipt of all engineer stores, local purchase, and forward despatch of stores.

Air supply and the probable dispersion of effort in forward areas give emphasis to the following training requirements:—

(a) Preparation of all types of engineer stores and plant for despatch by air.

(b) Control of local resources of engineer stores and materials.

(c) Employment and training of native labour for stores tasks.

RAE Units Generally

Anti-guerilla warfare influences all engineer units in two ways:—

(a) Every unit and sub-unit must be thoroughly capable of defending itself against guerilla attack. Therefore, units must be capable of taking their part in the defence of an area and all personnel must be competent with their weapons.

(b) Engineer units are likely to be used temporarily in engineer tasks other than the conventional type of task for their particular role. Construction squadrons are more likely to be required to undertake field engineering type work and be detached from their heavy items of plant. To a lesser extent the same could apply to stores units. All engineer personnel must be practised in the normal field engineering techniques with particular application to the South East Asian theatre.

All Arms

In forward areas the basic field engineering to construct and defend patrol bases and to give mobility to patrols is the business of all arms. Any unit could be called upon to assist in light airfield or road and track construction. Field force soldiers should all be trained in the following basic field engineering skills:—

(a) Field defences.
(b) Purification of water.
(c) Use of hand tools.
(d) Construction of elementary jeep and foot bridges.
(e) Flotation methods.
(f) Construction of tracks.
(g) Watermanship.
(h) Mine warfare.

Conclusion

Counter-insurgency operations require engineer units of the same types and trained basically in the same way as for conventional warfare, but an awareness of the particular problems to be encountered in the defence of the base area, and the need for a high degree of skill in basic field engineering in the forward area, must be emphasised. The all arms responsibility for minor tasks is most important, as is also the need for all engineer units and individual soldiers to be capable of protecting themselves against enemy attack.

THE BLUNTED SWORD, by David Divine. (Hutchinson and Co. Ltd., 178-202 Gt. Portland Street, London, W.1.)

On 23 April 1964 a new defence organisation came into being in the United Kingdom. Broadly the three services are now grouped in a single Ministry under a Secretary of State for Defence. The Admiralty, the Army Council and the Air Council are replaced by Navy, Army and Air Force Boards, each in charge of a junior Minister subordinate to the Secretary of State for Defence. Under the chairmanship of the Secretary of State there is a Defence Council made up of the junior Ministers, the Chief of the Defence Staff, the Chiefs of Staff of the three Services, the permanent Under Secretary of State for Defence and the Chief Scientific Adviser.

The declared aim of the new organisation is to secure a closer degree of co-ordination between the three Services, to ensure more economical and efficient administration, and to develop a balanced defence service which will be an effective instrument of national policy in peace and war.

Mr. Divine, who is Defence Correspondent of the *Sunday Times* and a commentator of some authority, shows that the revolutionary appearance of the new organisation is more apparent than real. Fundamentally, the only revolutionary thing that has happened is that a few traditional designations have been changed. The three Service Ministries, with all their ancient ways of thinking and acting, have simply been lumped together in a monolithic bureaucratic machine.

Mr. Divine examines the Services in turn to see if their records suggest that they will bring to the new organisation the intelligence and professional acumen necessary to make it a more efficient instrument than the ones it allegedly replaces. With ruthless logic he traces the failures of each of the Services over the last sixty years to develop doctrine, weapons or equipment appropriate to the conditions of modern warfare.

On the Army side at any rate his arguments are difficult to refute. The soldier, like the sailor, had wrapped himself up in a professional cocoon compounded of a stubborn conservatism, and blankly refused to see the changes that were taking place in the world around him. There was the failure to read the lessons of the American Civil War, which resulted in the Army entering the South African

War with a tactical doctrine outmoded by modern weapons. There was the mentality which took the Army into World War I with the idea that the machine-gun was a much over-rated weapon. There was the failure to discern the possibilities of the tank and, when those possibilities had been demonstrated in battle, the unforgivable failure to develop a really effective anti-tank missile.

Mr. Divine traces similar failures in the other Services, showing that in all three cases they were due partly to an almost pathological conservatism and partly to complicated and cumbersome departmental systems. Even when the Services evolved new ideas they failed to develop the equipment necessary to make them practicable. Most new equipment appears to have been developed by private enterprise and adopted by the Services only after a long fighting retreat.

In the development of equipment undertaken or sponsored by the Services over recent years, Mr. Divine gives some figures of astronomical cost for no return. In some cases development was begun at a stage when it ought to have been quite clear that by the time the equipment was available its employment would have been made virtually impossible by developments in other fields.

Mr. Divine is fair enough to lay a fair share of the blame on the bureaucratic web in which soldiers, sailors and airmen have become hopelessly entangled over the last half century. It is this as much as traditional habits of thought which in his view will defeat the objects of the new defence organisation. Nothing has been eliminated; the three webs have simply been welded into a bigger and stronger one.

Mr. Divine is not against the idea of an integrated defence service. In fact he is all for it. In this book he adduces some very strong reasons why the new organisation is unlikely to do better than the old, and might well do worse. He concludes by putting forward some ideas which, he suggests, might make the new structure a workable proposition.

It would be unwise to think that this book is not of direct interest to Australians. In the past we have slavishly followed British doctrine and organisation, often with unhappy results. Doubtless there are people at the present moment weaving up plans to have another go at unification with the United Kingdom example to support their arguments. While steps towards some measure of unification are desirable and inevitable, it would be wise to read this book and then think it out for ourselves before taking them.

— E.G.K.

THE BETRAYERS, by Jonathan Root. (Martin Secker and Warburg Ltd., London; and William Heinemann Ltd., 317 Collins Street, Melbourne.)

It is now ten years since the American Communists, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, were executed for espionage. At the time

the case aroused world-wide interest, for the penalty was unusually severe for peace time and there was widespread controversy as to whether or not the Rosenbergs were really guilty. In the four years immediately following the case ten books were written about it. Nine of them were devoted to the charge that the whole thing was a frame-up. The tenth attacked the other nine.

Now Mr. Jonathan Root, an experienced journalist and crime reporter, has attempted an objective reappraisal of the whole case. He certainly gives the impression of sincerity and impartiality for he has obviously succeeded in freeing himself of all considerations other than a search for truth.

Mr. Root has undertaken a great deal of research to present the background of the early lives of the Rosenbergs in the dreadful New York slums. The children of Jewish parents, they suffered the double disadvantage of belonging to a despised race set in the heart of an underprivileged sector of society. If Mr. Root has had to draw heavily on his imagination for his dialogue about this period, in his description of the grinding poverty of the Rosenbergs and their environment, particularly in the depression of 1929-35, he paints in glowing colours a picture of a breeding ground for Communism. In doing so he is neither appealing for the reader's sympathy nor peddling some creed of his own. He is merely creating the background against which the moral guilt, as distinct from the legal guilt, of the Rosenbergs should be assessed.

Mr. Root traces the childhood and adolescence of the two people who eventually became Mr. and Mrs. Rosenberg. Both declined to accept as a divine dispensation the world in which they found themselves. Both challenged the established order of their society, a society which in their view inevitably doomed many of its members to a life of bitter poverty. They both became obsessed with the notion that the only cure for this state of affairs lay through Communist revolution.

Having established his background, Mr. Root traces the lives of the Rosenbergs, their work, their marriage and their arrest. He does not describe the activities for which they were eventually condemned. He tells this part of the story by means of a detailed presentation of their trial from its first to its sixteenth day, followed by comments on the strength and weakness of case presented by either side. This may sound like tedious reading, but it is compulsive reading all the same.

Neither Ethel nor Julius Rosenberg made any attempt to defend themselves. They gave their lawyers no help at all. It would appear that they were so dedicated to their Communist faith, so utterly convinced of the corruptness of Western society, that they denied the right of that society to decide their guilt or innocence. To the end they saw themselves as martyrs to be numbered among the saints of the new order.

Mr. Root concludes that the Rosenbergs did in fact transmit highly secret information to Russia. While leaving much to the reader's own judgment, he gives the impression that he has presented the material justly and impartially. His book is an impressive piece of crime reporting.

— E.G.K.

THE TWO VIETNAMS, by Bernard B. Falls. (Frederick A. Praeger, New York, U.S.A., and London; and F. W. Cheshire Pty. Ltd., Garema Place, Canberra, A.C.T.)

Those who are familiar with Bernard B. Fall's excellent "Street Without Joy" are bound to be disappointed with "The Two Vietnams". Authors of works on contemporary political and military history must inevitably be torn between the desire to produce a carefully revised and well edited text, and anxiety that the volume will be overtaken by events before the ink is dry. "The Two Vietnams" although difficult to read because of its disjointed journalistic quality and because it has been somewhat outdated by two coups, should nevertheless be studied by all serious students of counter-revolutionary warfare.

The first half of the book surveys the origins and history of the "First Indochina War" from World War II and even earlier until the Geneva Agreement of 1954. The reader can afford to skim much of this section as it adds little to the military history of the bitter struggle that ended unhappily with the withdrawal of the French. Notwithstanding this criticism, the political events of the immediate post World War II period are extremely interesting. They do contribute to an understanding of contemporary national attitudes within SEATO towards the "Second Indochina War".

Despite the plain and salutary lesson meted out to the French it is both disturbing and surprising to read of how the "Second Indochina War" was allowed to develop unrecognised. Beginning as it did with the methodical establishment of bases, followed by the systematic murder of village officials and the disruption of communications by ambush, it is difficult to realise that the war had entered the Active Phase before its existence was recognised. Both the Government of South Vietnam led by Ngo Dinh Diem and its advisors seem to have lacked an understanding of revolutionary warfare and the political remedies needed to win it.

Two changes of Government have occurred since this book was written. Neither of the two post Diem governments have produced political and economic leadership which indicates an awareness of the true nature of the struggle or which are likely to fulfil the hopes and aspirations of the people. In these circumstances it is impossible to see an outcome to "The Second Indochina War" that is other than as unhappy as the outcome of the first.

Professor Fall enunciates very clearly the vast differences between the Malayan and Vietnamese emergencies. He explains lucidly why the "new villages" of Malaya succeeded while the "strategic hamlets" of South Vietnam failed. As the development of defended villages are part of the AMF doctrine for counter-insurgency the excellent chapter "Insurgency: Myths and Legends" which is the heart of the book should be read by those who lack the time to study it further.

— J.R.S.

The printing press is the greatest weapon in the armoury of the modern commander . . . a province was won when the civilians in it had been taught to die for the ideal of freedom: the presence of the enemy was of secondary importance.

— *T. E. Lawrence.*