AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

No. 179 APRIL, 1964

Number 179

April, 1964

AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

A Periodical Review of Military Literature

Distribution:

The Journal is issued through Base Ordnance Depots on the scale of One per Officer, Officer of Cadets, and Cadet Under Officer.

AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

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The AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL is printed and published for the Directorate of Military Training by Renown Press Pty. Ltd.

Contributions, which should be addressed to The Editor, Australian Army Journal, Army Headquarters, Albert Park Barracks, Melbourne, are invited from all ranks of the Army, Cadet Corps and Reserve of Officers. £5 will be paid to the author of the best article published in each issue. In addition, annual prizes of £30 and £10 respectively to the authors gaining first and second places for the year.

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

Photo: Australian War Memorial, Canberra.

ANZAC 1915

On 25 April, 1915 — forty-nine years ago — an Australian and New Zealand Army Corps landed on the Gallipoli Peninsula at a place which later became known as ANZAC, after the initial letters of the formation. This was the first amphibious operation undertaken by Australian troops.

The landing was made on a narrow beach at the foot of steep cliffs behind which lay a maze of tangled gullies and ridges. The initial impetus carried the main attack forward only a short distance and, after costly fighting, the corps found itself confined to a small beachhead from which it never succeeded in breaking out. Although there were many fierce attacks and counter-attacks, generally both sides remained facing each other in deep trenches which in many places were only a few feet apart.

The picture shows Trooper A. M. Maxwell, 3 Light Horse Regiment — afterwards Captain Maxwell, 52 Battalion — on sniper duty at Quinn's Post.

KING OF THE JUNGLE

OR

PAPER TIGER

The Directorate of Military Training,
Army Headquarters

IT is now more than four years since the Australian Army Journal of February 1960 published the first details of the reorganisation of the Australian Army to a "Pentropic" basis.

In these four years, the organisation has been tested in part by all the recognised techniques of testing such an organisation in peace. Four CGS exercises and three major field exercises—"Icebreaker" "Nutcracker" and "Sky High" — have been held, "Springtide," "Autumn Tide" have exercised the logistic elements, and the Australian Staff College is now in the third term of the second course to be run on the pentropic organisation. Corps conferences have studied particular aspects of the organisation, and two war games on logistic support have been done by the Australian Army Operational Group.

The organisation has been subjected to close scrutiny and constructive criticism by many, and less scrutiny and destructive criticism by others.

Basis of the Organisation

Before the decision to reorganise the army was made, a study group was formed to study the problem in detail. This study group comprised experienced senior officers who could draw on the experience of World War 2, Malaya, and the operations in French Indo-China. This was the first time that such a study, aimed specifically at operations in South East Asia, had been undertaken by the Australian Army. In fact we know of no other army that has made such a study and developed an organisation especially for operations in this theatre.

The study group faced the task of designing an organisation with the following characteristics:—

(a) As it would be used only in South East Asia, it would have to be organised for tropical warfare against a numerically superior army.

(b) The Regular Army must be able to provide a significant part of the Division at short

notice for "fire-brigade" duties, or an early contribution to an allied force, pending the mobilisation and further training of the Citizen Military Forces.

(c) It must be able to be deployed in small formations able to operate independently.

(d) It must have a high firepower ratio.

(e) It must be able to operate in all terrain likely to be met in South East Asia, in nuclear or non-nuclear war.

Viability

On the following points there can be little argument:—

(a) The Regular Army can supply a significant part of a division for "fire-brigade" duties, or for an early contribution to an Allied Force.

(b) The division can now be deployed in fifths instead of thirds — a fundamental improvement in flexibility.

(c) There is a significant increase in the firepower-to-manpower ratio.

The main arguments for or against the current divisional organisation devolve on whether the organisation is the best available for warfare in South East Asia and whether it will do the tasks for which it was designed. At divisional level the organisation has been tested only by TEWTS; the results of these indicate that the current organisation, used in the role for which it was designed — limited tropical warfare including insurgency — is better than the World War 2 "triangular" division.

The division can dominate more ground in defence and has greater offensive capacity. It can split off a task force or battle group for a particular operation and still retain a strong force under command of the divisional commander, and the response by battalions to the requirements of the divisional commander is much more rapid now that the intermediate headquarters has been removed.

At battalion level, the fifth company gives the battalion commander more flexibility in attack, and the means to provide protection for vital battalion installations and activities without weakening his basic position in defence.

Seven Dubious Arguments

Set out below are seven arguments used by the antagonists of the divisional organisation to support their claims that the concept should be abandoned and we should revert to the the World War 2 division with its triangular structure. These are dubious arguments.

"The Pentropic Division is based on the American Pentomic Division which has been discarded because it was too inflexible."

Apart from the basic figure of 5 and approximately the same strength, the resemblance between the pentropic and the pentomic division is superficial, as a study of the pentomic division will show. The study group used the pentomic division only as a starting point in its investigations into the new organisation. It also considered

four and six-sided organisations, but finally recommended the pentagonal structure.

It is imporant to realise why the United States Army found the pentomic division inflexible. A divisional organisation which is designed for operations anywhere in the world must allow for different "mixes" of arms, in different theatres. The ROAD divisions gives greater flexibility in this regard, hence it was adopted. But the structure of a ROAD division for a South East Asian theatre has not, as far as we know, been decided. The Australian organisation is designed for one theatre only: therefore the same criteria of flexibility cannot be applied to it.

"The Australian battalion cannot be part of any of the SEATO Allies' brigade organisations."

The Australian battalion in 28th Commonwealth Brigade is quoted to support this argument. This exposes the risks of attempting to draw general conclusions from particular cases. The 28th Commonwealth Brigade was formed for a special purpose and the Australian contribution to it was agreed long before the pentropic division was studied. This resulted in the scale of accommodation in Malaya being made on the basis of a "British" battalion, and also in a ceiling man-power figure and financial commitment being placed on our contribution.

Regarding the placing of Australian battalions under command of allied brigades, it would be unsound and undesirable from a national point of view to scatter Australian battalions piecemeal throughout allied formations. It may be necessary, temporarily, to place an Australian battalion under command of an allied formation. There is no operational reason why this could not be done.

"The Pentropic Division is not standard with Allied Divisions."

It would be an ideal situation if all divisions and formations in allied armies could have the same organisation, equipment, standards of accommodation and scales of supplies. For many reasons this is impossible. A most important factor is that allies should be compatible, tactically in concept and doctrine, and logistically in major items of equipment and ammunition. Already we are compatible with the United States and the United Kingdom in small arms, field artillery, mortar ammunition and any other items of equipment. Our entry into the Basic Standardisation Agreement (ABCA Agreement) ensures that in the future we will approach more closely standardisation with our major allies.

In tactical concept and doctrine, Australia has made a significant contribution to the ABCA Agreement, and this contribution will be even greater in the future. No suggestion of operational incompatability has been found in the studies already done.

"The 'triangular' divisional organisation has proved itself to be suited to all theatres of war, Europe, the deserts of the Middle

East, and the jungles of Burma and New Guinea. Why discard a proven organisation?"

No single organisation can meet all the requirements of world-wide operations. It would be odd indeed, if an organisation designed primarily for operations in Western Europe could be the optimum for the deserts of the Middle East or the tropics of South East Asia.

Both the United States and the United Kingdom have world-wide commitments, and their organisations must be, to a certain extent, a compromise. It is now well known that the triangular structure was not entirely suitable for tropical warfare in World War 2.

"The battle group is too unwieldy. The comanding officer cannot command both the infantry and the supporting arms."

Except in the early stages of operations, or when a battle group is formed for a small independent operation, we expect that the placing of supporting arms under command of the battalion commander will be the exception rather than the rule. Once a task force or divisional headquarters is deployed, command and control of supporting arms will normally be centralised at the highest level.

The problems of an infantry battalion commander commanding a group which includes supporting arms are much the same under either the pentagonal or the triangular structure. They are not new, and are not confined to pentagons. In any case, the commanding officer of the pentropic battalion has been provided with a larger staff to overcome many of these problems of command.

"Being a small army we cannot afford to be different from the armies of major allied powers."

If we accept this argument we are faced immediately with a dilemma. From which major allied army should we differ, because we must differ from at least one.

It is essential that any army, large or small, should have the most economical organisation and the one best suited to its particular requirements. The smaller the army, the more important these considerations become. The Australian divisional organisation is more economical in manpower than the triangular organisation. It has more firepower in the forward area, and the number of subordinate headquarters has been reduced from twelve to six.

It is true that by adopting a unique organisation we have introduced some problems. We have to produce our own publications, but this has forced us to examine critically our military doctrine to ensure that it is suitable to meet South East Asian conditions. Whether we had adopted a new organisation or not this would have become a necessity eventually.

"Within our small army we have three battalion organisations, Pentropic, 'Malayan' and PIR. Obviously, the pentropic battalion is suspect if we need three different organisations."

The reasons for a special organisation for the battalion of the 28th Commonwealth Brigade has been mentioned.

In the case of PIR, the role of the battalion and the problems peculiar to the command of Papuan soldiers, make the current organisation of PIR more suitable than the pentropic organisation. However, the section and platoon in each type of battalion has been made almost identical, so that changes to the company and battalion structure can be made easily if necessary.

Valid Arguments

It would be wrong to imply that the current divisional organisation is perfect. It has undergone some changes since it was introduced, and there are features of it which need further examination. Such examination and experience in future exercises or operations may lead to present doctrine and organisation.

Conclusion

Australia has in its current organisation a division which has approximately 2,000 troops less than our previous organisation, but with more rifle sections, more tanks, more field artillery, more mortars, an organic light aircraft unit and much better communications.

The triangular organisation was not discarded lightly. Traditionally we had always followed the United Kingdom organisation, but it is clear that an organisation designed and equipped for operations in South East Asia in a limited war role must differ from one designed to be "pan-world."

The changes that were made were essential and inevitable. We must accept the fact that there will be some problems brought about by our organisation being different from that of our allies. These are neither great nor insurmountable, and the advantages we gain greatly outweigh the disadvantages.

THE LEADER

AND

THE LED

Major W. F. Burnard,
Royal Australian Signals.

FOR the Army to be an efficient fighting machine it must be well organised, well equipped, well trained and well led. At the present time the field force component of the Australian Army is well organised. It is designed for operations in South East Asia and has the mobility, flexibilty and fire power to fight all types of battles from guerilla actions to full scale nuclear war. Within the financial limitations imposed by the Government, the Army is well equipped. There is a continual stream of new equipments being brought into service, and if the re-equipment programme continues all units will eventually have modern weapons and equipment with which to perform their many and varied tasks. The standard of training is improving following the introduction of annual training exercises. Therefore, in the fields of organisation, equipment and training the Australian Army is well advanced in its preparations for war. But comparable advances have not been made in the field of military leadership. This view is confirmed in the report on Exercise GRAND SLAM published in the October, 1959, edition of the Australian Army Journal. An extract from this report reads as follows:— ". . . the intensely personal, practical and operationally essential 'know how' of junior leadership which was second nature to officers and NCOs towards the end of World War 2 will die out unless commanding officers take very active steps to ensure its survival."

The aim of this article is to suggest ways of improving the standard of leadership in the Australian Army.

To simplify presentation, the subject will be discussed in two parts. The first part will be an attempt to isolate the factors which have caused the standard of leadership to fall. The second part will be an exposition of the qualities which make a man a good leader and which, if applied realistically, will improve the standard of leadership in the Army.

Reasons for the Decline

Leadership is one of the most challenging facets of army life and the most difficult to master.

It is a human problem and, therefore, the standard is conditioned by the circumstances of time. During a war it is high. After the war there is a steady decline as men with operational experience are replaced by a younger generation. Eventually the time comes, and the time has come so far as the Australian Army is concerned, when the younger generation outnumbers the older generation. At this point it is simple to conclude that the Army is not what it used to be. Certainly, a man with operational service is generally a better leader than one without it, but it is a fallacy to suggest that this is the only reason for the apparent lapse in the standard of leadership. The fact of the matter is that the present generation, because of its post-war environment, is apathetic to hard work and hostile to discipline. These are the human characteristics of today's generation and these are the characteristics which have depressed the standard of leadership. Many would like to think that only the junior leaders are culpable. Such criticism is not valid. The attitude is general throughout the Army; the difference between officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers is only a matter of degree.

To turn men into soldiers is an exacting task requiring resourcefulness. Many officers are not prepared to accept the challenge or the incursions into their own time that regimental service involves. They prefer to think of service with troops as an unfortunate interruption in a career of staff work where planning, supply and administration are the things to do. They like to retain all the niceties of being in the army while somebody else has the never-ending job of looking after human beings — human beings who if not properly trained, on the day of battle will make fatuous all the planning, supply and administration. They overlook the fact that when they turn hurriedly from the unpleasant implications of regimental service, they push aside the experience they need to become proficient leaders and efficient staff officers.

Leadership is very hard work. It is demanding, repetitive, and lacks glamour. It requires loyalty, an acceptance of high standards and an understanding of human nature; qualities which are all suspect in a materialistic age. The officer must face the facts squarely. It is not a matter of doing sufficient work but of doing the right kind of work. Two days spent in drafting a complicated exposition on a nice point of administration is not worth a half a day spent teaching soldiers how to use their weapons. Whatever the difficulties, however unpleasant repetitive training might be, the first task of the officer must be to teach the soldiers their jobs. It must be accurate, painstaking and never left entirely to non-commissioned officers.

Many officers do not lead by example. They are slovenly, unpunctual, lazy and apt to accept excuses from their subordinates because it is the easy way. The

result of all of this is the badly trained subaltern. Compared with his predecessors he has a difficult time. To start with he is brought up in a society where any attempt at clearly defined leadership is tantamount to revolution. Basically, of course, he is as good as ever he was and that is very good. But his training is poor. He is not being given the carefully supervised repetitive work which teaches method and mental toughness, nor is he being taught that his first task is detailed man-management. He is, to his detriment, receiving too much sympathy and in many cases is being allowed to avoid responsibility.

Warrant officers and non-commissioned officers are probably more inefficient today than they have ever been. No longer forced to learn the basic principles of soldiering, they blunder through drill movements and admit ignorance of their trades. Many have lost the respect of their subordinates and, therefore, as leaders they are inadequate.

The Qualities of a Good Leader

If the standard of military leadership is to be improved, the challenge must be accepted by every individual in the Army. First there must be a swing back to objective thinking. The senior officer must honestly align his conduct with the requirements of his task, and strive to achieve efficiency in his unit. He must be an example in all things. He must work hard. He must halt any tendency in himself and others to criticise his seniors because the value of loyalty is self-evident, and disloyalty is a buffer to incompetence. He must, not, however, prevent constructive criticism of himself. The other man is always jealous of his point of view and to ignore him is to lose the common touch. There must be enthusiasm, good turn out and punctuality, and an insistence that right be done in all things. This does not mean that an officer must be a model of perfection. After all, he does have a normal life to lead. But it does mean that he should take his proper place as a leader of those he commands.

Next, and of all things this is the most important, the junior officers must be well trained. Their training must be objective, planned and combined with the training of non-commissioned officers and men. Subalterns should be given tasks which, when begun, are a little beyond their capacity. They will learn quicker by their own errors. Throughout, they should be made to realise that their true function is the production and leading of hard, well-trained soldiers.

Warrant and non-commissioned officers must be more carefully chosen. The man of iron who is feared and respected by his subordinates must be found again. They must be driven to efficiency or broken and no attempt made to distort the matter by conscious or unconscious desire on the part of officers to be popular. Once

standards of leadership are insisted upon they will be accepted by the majority. Those who will not, or cannot, live up to them must be reduced to ranks nearer their ability, or at least not recommended for further promotions.

Provided these things are done there is no need to worry about the Australian soldier. Shrewd as he is, he will both follow and be pushed more easily by men he knows to be knowledgeable and determined and he will accept discipline. But above all, if leadership is to be effective, the trend towards easy thinking and evasion of responsibility must be eradicated. Discipline must be geared to the requirements of the Service and not to civilian thought.

Conclusion

In this article an attempt has been made to find ways of improving the standard of leadership in the Australian Army. However distasteful it might seem, there is little doubt that the economic and social influences of the civilian world have had a tremendous impact on the serviceman. The apathy to hard work and hostility to discipline have generated motives which are in direct violation to sound military leadership. They must be eradicated quickly and effectively if the peace-time Army of today is to be successful in a future war.

No matter how well organised, well equipped and well trained the Australian Army might be, it will not be an efficient fighting machine unless it is well led.

COMPETITION FOR AUTHORS

The Board of Review has awarded first place and the prize of £5 for the best original article published in the February issue to "A Nation's Approach to War," by Captain E. D. M. Cape, Royal Australian Artillery.

SUVLA BAY

Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall,
United States Army Reserve, Retired.

Reprinted from the November, 1963, issue of MILITARY REVIEW, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, USA.

THROUGH one of the quirks of history, Suvla Bay has become counted one of the great and decisive battles of the ages. To question whether it merits that evaluation is but one approach by which to view it in perspective.

We know why it is so identified. Prior to Suvla Bay, the Gallipoli Campaign, for all of its frustrations, remained a shining hope. Then came what was supposed to be the crowning effort, with the maximum call of troops available to energise an elaborate plan aimed, at last, to secure an ample and dominant beach-head. But when this mighty effort fell apart among the subridges just beyond Suvla Bay, the Gallipoli hope turned to ashes. The inevitable sequel was the liquidation of the campaign to end World War I by eliminating Turkey and giving a full-armed embrace to Russia.

Still, within this same thesis, there are reasons to queston whether Suvla Bay deserves its hallowed niche. Toward the Gallipoli adventure, soldiers and scholars may be of different mind as to its prospect and promise. But none is indifferent to the argument. Gallipoli has an irresistible allure. It commands the imagination and grips the emotions. More worthy books have been written of it than the Marne, Gettysburg, or Waterloo. Again we know why. We are hit by anguish when that which is so nobly tried, dismally fails.

Threshold of Success

But there is something else — the vain brooding over the thought that the Gallipoli Campaign was time and again at the threshold of momentous success. The feeling of being almost there

Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall, United States Army Reserve, Retired, is an editorial writer and military critic for The Detroit News. He was Theatre Historian in the European theatre of operations during World War II, and served with the 8th Army in Korea during the fighting there.

persisted from the dark hour when the fleet was turned back from the Narrows. Is there any way of knowing? Two fluke hits, killing two capital ships in the first five minutes, might have stopped the fleet again in a second try. The same is true of the land battle. We see mainly the glow of opportunity. We discount the vagaries, the slings and arrows, of misfortune. There is no way of knowing what might have happened had that which happened not happened.

To count Suvla Bay a decisive battle, one would have to assume that Gallipoli failed only by the narrowest of margins, that succeeding, it would have beached the Central Powers, and that the brightest and best chance was the last great effort. For reasons other than those already outlined, these are challengeable assumptions. The reasons are to be found in the enterprise at Suvla Bay and the joined fight at Sari Bair, how these operations were conceived, and some of the personalities responsible for their execution. What we know of the battle's consequence is that after Sulva Bay, the hearts of oak in England, who had been for Gallipoli to the bitter end, in the main said: "This is it!"

But if the operation was wrong at its taproots, destined only to be a wasting effort with no chance of winning through because of insuperable built-in handicaps, that changes the light wholly. That which is wishfully conceived or grotesquely mismanaged has no claim on Heaven's help or on redemption due to enemy stupidity.

Unique Distinction

Suvla Bay has one distinction. No other amphibious operation was ever floated from such an inordinately complex and unnecessarily ramified plan. Yet simplicity is a first requirement. Every landing by troops in the face of the enemy is chaotic by nature, rife with disorder, and plagued by unanticipated problems. Nothing but first-hand command management may restore balance and energise the flow of force toward the object.

Suvla Bay itself was the heart of this overelaborated undertaking. Troops had to succeed there. The commanding ridges inland had to be secured so that a perimeter with depth of position behind it could be maintained — or the explosion out of Anzac Cove and the demonstrations elsewhere would never deliver the expedition into the Promised Land.

But one would never guess that from the plan which, by its very diversification, thinned high command attention to the breakpoint. Why the staff thought that the landing at Suvla Bay, the breakout from Anzac Cove, and the attack from Cape Helles all had to be synchronized, or rather, timed to one another over several hours of one night, baffles common understanding. The motive for so doing was to get the Turk off balance.

But covering feints in war succeed more rarely than bluffs in draw poker. Further, when one attacks everywhere, the enemy resists everywhere, and his command is constrained to sit back


AEGEAN SEA
GULF OF SAROS
BULAIR
SEA OF MARMARA
GALLIPOLI
SUVLA BAY
CABA TEPE
DARDANELLES
KRITHIA
CAPE HELLES
KUM KALE
KIRETCH TEPE
SUVLA PLAIN
SUVLA POINT
TEKKE TEPE
SUVLA BAY
SALT LAKE
ANAFARTA SAGIR
SCIMITAR HILL
CHOCOLATE HILL
BIYUK ANAFARTA
AZMAK DERE
SARI BAIR
AEGEAN SEA
CHUNUK BAIR
ANZAC COVE
LONE PINE
THE SUVLA BAY AREA
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YARDS

and await positive information about where the real threat is developing.

One negative consequence of the plan's ramification was to overload the man at the top who by nature was unsuited to this terrible burden. General Sir Ian Hamilton's attention should have been rivetted on the ridge mass around Tekke Tepe and Anafarta Sagir inland from Suvla which, if not quickly won and held, doomed his whole enterprise. He might have sustained a defeat of the forces who strove so heroically to gain the high ridges dominating Anzac Cove and still have claimed a shining victory.

Other Leader

The plan, to succeed, would have needed some other general. The best and bravest of men have mortal limitations. Fortunate are the few whose weaknesses are never laid bare by the demands of a particular field. Sir Ian was a leader of vast courage, soldierly imagination, and scholarly depths. He is still revered; few other leaders came through the Gallipoli fire unsinged. At 62, greatly travelled, and a keen observer of armies over the world, he was a celebrated author. The great commander and the gifted writer are not necessarily two different fellows.

But Sir Ian had the habit of essaying faultless prose amid the conduct of operations, instead of paying single-minded attention to the battle. He was more interested in analysing and recording his own reactions than in writing faultless orders based upon fullest possible knowledge of the developing situaton. There is never time for both; no proper commander has that much genius, that much energy. Sir Ian used his staff too little; his personal interventions in the battle tended to come too late. But what is more striking is that throughout the Gallipoli Campaign, the plans of his headquarters were never based on a realistic appreciation of men's powers under stress. By aiming too high on paper, they sowed the seed of battle disarrangement.

Situation

So it was at Suvla Bay, and we come now to the situation on the Gallipoli Peninsula in August, 1915, the first anniversary of war's beginning. By then Sir Ian had either on base or in transit 13 divisions, approximately 125,000 men, to expand his holdings ashore. Although the expedition stayed chins up, it had now to break out or eventually perish. Its forces hardly more than finger-held the harsh edges of the shore, its entrenched perimeter enclosing less than 400 acres. The Turkish line was literally on top of these trenches, much of the way within easy grenade lob distance from above. Any bodily exposure drew instant fire.

Yet within this shallow crater-and - diggings - pocked warren, 17,000 Anzac soldiers survived by struggle, or died in fighting back the immediate Turkish enemy, threefold as numerous. At Cape Helles there were six divisions, of 35,000 soldiers, also just barely ashore. The beach-head on the snout-shaped end of the penin-

sula had more than double the area of Anzac Cove, but was little less desperately placed. Greater tenacity than was displayed by these men in clinging for months to graveyard ground is not to be found in the annals of war. Both positions were intrinsically hopeless and their succour depended on staging a major diversion which would lift the pressure.

Weaponry

Opposite these forces garrisoning the peninsula were 13 Turkish divisions, three containing Anzac Cove, five against Cape Helles, three at Kum Kale on the Asiatic shore, three at Bulair, and two south of Gaba Tepe. They were ably directed by German General Otto Liman von Sanders. Among the Turkish commanders, Colonel Mustapha Kemal Ataturk, a star slowly rising, was the catalyst of inspired action. At Suvla Bay vicinity was only a minor troop body, called the Anafarta Detachment, embodying three rifle battalions, a squadron of cavalry, a labor battalion and 19 artillery pieces. That is more than enough weapon power to instill the shock fear which paralyses unseasoned troops

The Choice

There were better reasons than the light manning which made Suvla Bay the chosen spot for landing. Besides affording secure anchorage for the invasion fleet it was to the eye the one fair target on the peninsula — steep ridges did not directly command the shore. A salt lake more than one mile wide lay straight inland from the Suvla beaches but it was known to be dry in summer. Sir Ian intended that the assault waves would swing round the edges of the parched flat. There was room to deplay at Suvla; the very spaciousness of the front promised to deny the enemy of any concentrated target.

Before June ended, planning was well along. On the appointed night the six divisions at Cape Helles were to make a limited attack against the near village of Krithia. The Anzac force, augmented by one and one half-divisions fresh from Britain, were to feint toward the knob called Lone Pine, then under cover of dark drive for the commanding ridge of Chunuk Bair. The landing at Suvla from small boats was scheduled for one hour later, or 2230, just in time to beat the rise of a waning moon. By midnight the Allied front would be in full eruption.

Wonders were accomplished in the safeguarding of this multiple-chambered surprise. The reinforcement at Anzac Cove — men, animals, and vehicles — had to be smuggled ashore at night by the navy in stealth and silence, then kept hidden by day so that the Turks would not become alert to the buildup. Somehow it was done, although the beautifully contrived deception deserved a better return by the army.

With hardly more trouble, the sea service, given Sir Ian's blessing, might have shifted places between the Anzac force and the 25,000 untried soldiers shipped from Britain. That would

have delivered dependable strength against the decisive target; the attack out of Anzac Cove could have been given more moderate limits, or restrained to await opportunity. These are not new suggestions.

Command Power

To command the corps going in at Suvla Bay, there was sent from England Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Stopford, old for his 61 years, kindly, complacent, and remote from troops. He had never commanded in combat. Kitchener picked him because he was senior; there couldn't have been a sorrier choice. By comparison, the men he would command had at least youth in their favour. They had never felt fire. Their junior leaders were equally ignorant of the very special tactical problems of the venture — shore organisation, preserving identity, and collection by night.

Where lies the plan's unique complexity? Even the tactical schools barely skim the surface and staff colleges ignore it. So to spell it out — command power derives only from recognition of authority. In daylight, the face, manner, gesture and spoken word convey it. Men see and know their chief; any good junior leader may memorise the faces and names of 200 men within 40 days. But in that same period he will not be able to identify more than 10 to 12 of them by voice. We all have this low ceiling and there is no help for it.

Yet in the dark all is dependent on voice recognition. Let troops become scrambled and authority evaporates. Leaders hesitate to give orders, not knowing whom they address. Men will not obey, not knowing who speaks. Worse swiftly ensues, for it is starlit truth that men endure battle and mature unity of action only out of inter-personal faith and confidence. Where there is no recognition, the current dies.

No more wretched scene may be imagined than such a breakdown by night on a strange beach under fire. Each man feels lost in the crowd and his personal panic is exacerbated by the bedlamic confusion of the milling mass. There is no brake against mounting terror and the physical depletion it superinduces. We can pass by the other excessive pressures earlier in the ordeal — the ennervating heat during the mountup, the churning approach by the small boats, the vomiting of frightened men, and the awful sweat of anticipating the unknown. Dropped to the nadir of demoralisation, the troop body loses its will, its energy, its legs.

Fundamentals Ignored

This is what Hamilton, Stopford, Hammersley, and others delivered 25,000 soldiers into at Suvla Bay shortly before midnight on 6 August, 1915. We have learned much about these motor forces since, which was not known at the time of Gallipoli. So in justice to them, it must be said that they probably did not understand what they were attempting (the impossible) or one commanding voice would have cried: "Stop it!" No,

I cannot agree with my great friend, J. F. C. Fuller, that it was "an ingenious plan." It was a nightmare. At the decisive point it ignored the fundamentals.

I am reminded of John Masfield's quote as he closed his powerful essay on this whole campaign: "So courage failed, so strength was chained." Tragic is the only word for it. In the end, all things failed. It need not have happened. At least inso far as the Suvla landing is concerned — as to its possibilities of giving the great effort a future — it was beaten before the start.

Inertia

There was relatively little Turkish fire against the landing melee, but it was enough. Such was the inertia that settled on the troops from their night of shock that a score or more of Freybergs and Unwins were needed next morning to spark the determining number and boot them along from the shingle and the flats to the not distant high ground. (It only took about 47 to generate action out of stagnation at Omaha Beach).

But at the working level there were too few of these stalwarts whose drive was as prodigious as their instinct for doing the right thing. A few brave parties struck out eastward; the mass stayed inert not far from blue water. They were still scrambled, still inert, worrying about getting properly assembled. And some were probably a little euphoric, what with the coming of day and the knowledge that they were safely ashore; but that condition also induces lassitude.

The tactical details pale into significance beside the apalling fact that, given two days as a gift, the Turks closed first in strength on the nearby ridges above Anafarta Sagir which all along beckoned to this stranded corps. Incredible? Not at all, when we get the picture of Stopford, dawdling on his command ship, distant from the wrought confusion, messaging Major General F. Hamersley congratulations for getting his division ashore, seemingly unconcerned about what he does with it after. Here is a general definitely not commanding. But when Hamilton belatedly gets up to him, he neither takes over this sector of the battle nor relieves the man who is toying with it. It's the old chain-of-command hesitation waltz, a gentleman's glide when the going is good, but a burlesque turn when the life of an army is at stake

Results

Out of Cape Helles the corps commander did not carry out the limited holding attack toward Krithia as ordered. Overreaching, he tried to capture both the village and Achi Baba. So doing, he paid for his failure with the loss of half of the force of 4,000.

There are no braver tales in war than that of the gallant try for breakout by the forces of Anzac Cove. Ashmead-Bartlett wrote: "It was launched against positions the like of which had never been attacked before under modern conditions of war-

fare." John Masefield, Alan Moorehead, and others have paid eloquent tribute to the superhuman valour attending this intricate, over-demanding operation. Deathless courage was abundant. But more so was death. And glorious failure is failure still. The strike for the commanding ridges missed, partly because men lost their way in the dark baffled by the twisted ridge folds.

There and at Suvla the fighting continued for about one week. When the fire sputtered and died, Anzac Cove was just a little roomier — extending eastward to enclose Lone Pine and northward to tie in, near Azmak Dere, with the Suvla beach-head which ringed the salt lake and anchored on Kiretch Tepe. The British clung to Chocolate Hill. The Turks had Scimitar Hill.

More than 40,000 Allied soldiers fell during the August battles, the greater number of them cut down in the fighting round Anzac Cove. It was the price paid, as one general put it, "for five hundred acres of bad grazing ground."

Stopford was sent home. Hamilton remained, not to muddle through, but to muck it up at least one more time. What followed for the Gallipoli expedition were months of misery and tedium, hard duty, and the grinding gamble to stay alive against odds. All of it was anticlimatic. It is infinitely trying on soldiers when the idea settles that although the game is not over, there are no longer prizes to be won.

Failure at Suvla made inevitable the ultimate evacuation. Pride postponed it for a little while. Fate, and good staff work, made possible the evacuation's astonishing success. But even that deliverance could not write a happy ending.

This brigade is now composed of soldiers. We didn't realise it until we saw the reinforcements behaving badly on leave and looking anyhow.

— An A.I.F. Sergeant in the Middle East in 1940.

AUSTRALIA'S SECURITY AND THE BALANCE OF POWER

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THIS topic raises several questions as to definition. For the purpose of this essay I have chosen to regard the definitions as follows: (1) essential security interests as those interests that are involved in the defence of the homeland and territories, (2) local balance of power as that pattern of political structure and power in South East Asia, (3) central balance as the pattern of political structure and power at the global level.

Naturally the question involves close attention to the central balance of power idea. Schwarzenbergen in his book "Power Politics" defines the balance of power in this way: "Alliances, counter-alliances and treaties of guarantee and neutralisation are held to produce in favourable conditions a certain amount of stability in international relations. This equilibrium is described as the balance of power."[1] This definition requires some qualifications.

At present there is a degree of stability in international relations. Certainly, on paper, the system of alliances portrays the concept of a balance of power between 'East' and 'West', with America as the leader of one group of nations, Russia as the leader of another and a growing neutralist group. Major political issues usually align these groups into a power structure.

Stability in this sense is a surface stability only. Russia and America are not engaged in open warfare, but this is due in the main to the fact that both countries have the potential to destroy the other (and the rest of the world). Fortunately this includes themselves and as such the nuclear deterrent contains its own safeguard.

However , this does not exclude the building up of independent deterrents as in France or England or China, but this potential does not materially affect the final outcome of a clash[2]. It may provide the spark whether by design or accident, for such a clash. The offensive capability of these two great nations (America and Russia) preserves the status quo, the uneasy peace and as such the balance of power.[3]

1. Schwarzenberger G. "Power Politics" page 179.
2. The Spectator, December 7th, 1962, page 884.
3. Current Affairs Bulletin Vol. 28 No. 12, page 184.

Unfortunately in the final analysis, the attitudes, the capablities and the political exertions of the other nations are of little importance or consesequence in a showdown between America and Russia. Certainly these powers must provide leadership to the smaller nations and be influenced by their desires, but the final policy is one of individual survival to either America or Russia.

It must be pointed out that should Russia and America come into open nuclear conflict then this must be a global conflict with all nations either directly or indirectly affected by a nuclear war.

However, the tremendous weapons complex possessed by both countres have forced them into a military and political cul-de-sac. They are committed on the ideological level to a life and death struggle, but to resolve this struggle alternative methods and policies (short of war) must be used. Nuclear warfare invites mutual destruction so on the military level this has resulted in the maintenance of the nuclear deterrent and also a build-up in the capability for limited warfare.

The Balance of Power arrangement must find its true resolution on the local balance of power level.

Rostow points out that "The Soviet leadership, after Stalin's death, was quick and vigorous in designing a strategy which accepted the central importance of the new weaponry and of the nationalist revolutions in the underdeveloped countries.[4] America is faced with the problem of maintaining her nuclear deterrent and resisting through local measures the Communst advances.

It is at this (the local) level that the question of Australia's security lies. In the light of the power struggle that exists between East and West, Australia has chosen to throw in her lot with America. This generally has been for historical reasons. Prior to 1939 Australia regarded herself as isolated and as such safeguarded by the British Navy.

This position was shattered by the withdrawal of the British Navy in the early stages of World War II and the British preoccupation with European matters. (This situation is to be expected to continue, i.e. British participation in N.A.-T.O.). The Australian Government was rudely awakened to the fact that her security was vitally concerned with the need for strong and powerful allies on the local scene.

Fortunately at this time (1941-2) America was searching for bases in the Pacific to prosecute the war against Japan. As Gratten points out[5] it was fortunate indeed for Australia that her security interests corresponded with those of America. This position has set the trend for the present approach to security matters — not so much that Australia can greatly influence the central balance of power, but that she align her-

4. Rostow W.W. "The United States in the World Arena" page 415.
5. Hartley Gratten C. "The United States and the South West Pacific" page 223.

self to the central balance through the local balance.

Foreign policy during the war took on a more independent stand (under American leadership) the *ANZAC Pact of 1944* was an illustration of this fact. This historical alliance set in motion by the necessity for security continued after the war and the recent statements by the leadership of both political parties in Australia have supported the need for closer Australian-American alignment.[6]

However, a further trend must be recognised. It was, and still is, the policy of Australia and the small nations to throw their support behind the United Nations for the maintenance of peace and order. At the end of World War II it appeared that the "Big Three" could maintain world peace but the eventual split occurred between Russia and America, and Britain lost her status as a world power.

The United Nations over a period of time failed in its stated aim of the preservaton of peace. Despite many successes in this field the blunt fact remains that the world peace depends upon the policies of Russia and America. A U.N. resolution finally means little more than a judicial rebuke, as is illustrated in attitudes of Russia and the Hungarian revolt in 1956, and the American blockade of Cuba in 1962. To both Russia and America the vital concern was one of security.

The apparent failure of collective security as a United Nations venture has seen the growth of the regional defence organisation as authorised under article 51 of the Charter. It is on this issue that we can see the further transition from the central balance to the local balance. At present there are forty-three members of the United Nations and two non-members associated in collective defence treaties such as NATO, SEATO, Warsaw Pacts.

This regional defence organisation is related to the overall policy of both the United States and Russia to avoid a direct confrontation. It is in this position that Australia has found herself due to historical links with America (already mentioned) and developments in the U.N. itself.

Finally there has come the realisation that despite her European heritage and associations[7], Australia must play an active and prominent role in South East Asia[8] and that her immediate security now depends upon the local balance in this area.

However, with this reorientation in foreign policy there is a new awareness of the problems that are involved. Asia contains approximately 56% of the world's population, a militant China,[9] a growing Indonesia, and a non-aligned India.

Unfortunately for Australia the effective spread of communism is taking place in South East Asia, *not in Europe*. The military successes of Korea, Indo-

6. Australian Labor Party News. March 25th; 1963, and Sydney, "Morning Herald", March 16th 1963.
7. Current Affairs Bulletin Vol. 14, No. 13. Page 201.
8. Current Affairs Bulletin Vol. 14, No. 13. Page 204.
9. Australian Army Journal, No. 28, page 9.

China, Laos, North Vietnam and the subversive activities in Malaya. Thailand, South Vietnam give an indication of events to come.

It is obvious that from the military standpoint Australia does not possess the capabilities to wage war against a substantial threat, let alone the power of Indonesia or more important, that of China. At present by policy and statement Australia is committed to the idea of a defensive war within the framework of an allied command. A review of Australia's present military equipment and organisation, the population availability and productive capacity, an acknowledgement of the origin of her rubber, tin and oil stocks, quickly illustrates her vulnerable position.

The need for co-operative defence and security becomes a pressing issue at the local level. From the utilitarian point of view this position requires an alliance of powerful friends in the South East Asia area, Australia must assist in the build-up of an alliance of countries in the area united in a common front against a common foe.

However, the situation does not finish there. The nations of South East Asia, of themselves, are no match for the communist influence that constitutes the threat to their security. Both Britain and France maintain only a waning interest despite Malaysia, and their power to act is concentrated elsewhere (NATO) so they do not finally affect the local situation. The recourse must be therefore to the regional defence pact — backed and supported by the United States.

Again the problem is complicated by the discussion as to the nature of the threat. Two main trends emerge, (a) the threat of Communist China and (b) the threat of Nationalism, i.e. Indonesia.

Fortunately, particularly since the Korean War, America has taken a most active part in the defence of Asia against communism. Her own security requirements and foreign policy have committed her deeply to the defence of Japan, Formosa, Hawaii, Korea, Philippines and other bulwarks against communist domination.

Allied to American participaton and a British and French decline in interest Australia has seen fit to extend her defence treaty arrangements. This is illustrated in the ANZUS treaty signed in 1941 between America, New Zealand and Australia. Even though ANZUS could be regarded as a sop to the Japanese peace treaty at least it was a step in the right direction and an indication that the wartime association was to continue. Again we see the coincidence of interests between Australia and

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America that can be used for Australian advantage.

The ANZUS treaty is a guarantee to the security of the Australian mainland and territories. This support has recently been reinstated in a speech by Mr A. Harriman — U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, "The U.S. would come to the aid of Australia in the event of any attack on Australian forces in New Guinea or elsewhere."[10] One must be careful to remember that this aid must be given after "due constitutional processes" of the various powers concerned.

However, faced with the communist methods of subversion and revolution it is often difficult to create an awareness of the threat that actually exists. This attitude naturally suits the communist and has enabled them to make very real gains in the area.

The ANZAM was signed in 1955 as a further step in this concept of strengthening the local balance of power. Again when one considers the small capabilities of the nations concerned, Australia, New Zealand and Malaya, it is realised that the Treaty is only a further step in a general pattern of American support reaction to communism. Without the American influence in the background the Treaty could invoke very small military reaction at all.

However, it does fall into line with the general trend of Australian foreign policy to build up a strong alliance, and in the words of Sir Robert Menzies: "If the battle against communism is to be an effective one, it must be won as far north of Australia as possible."[11] This is sound military strategy, provides Australia with training facilities and a base in the area, and supports the concept of regional defence. However, the effectiveness of this strategy must be judged in the light of the capabilities of the two major powers in this area, that of China and America.

Further expression for the strengthening of the local balance can be found in the SEATO Treaty signed in 1954. In April, 1953, America called for "United Action" to stem the flow of communism in this region. The result of this call was a Pact comprising Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, the United Kingdom and United States. Fortunately once again the security interests of America coincided with those of Australia, to Australia's advantage. It is unlikely that there was much astute management on the part of Australia when one considers that she is merely one of the many nations with which America has contact.

The United States is the nation which alone possesses the strength to meet a severe threat. The capability of Red China alone in 1959 was estimated as a standing force of 2.6 million, reserves of 15 million and militia of 130 million, so the contribution of the smaller nation in SEATO to meet such a threat would be small indeed.[12]

10. "Sydney Morning Herald" Tuesday, 11th June, 1963.
11. Australian Army Journal, No. 101, Page 10.
12. Australian Army Journal, No. 132, Page 6.

Further illustration of this point could be found by reference back to Korea where the spread of communism would have been comparatively unhampered apart from American intervention. Thus in the unlikely event of a major outbreak in this area, SEATO gives the assurance of American support and thus a guarantee of Australian security under the major aim of SEATO defence against armed aggression.

The problem, however, is that the threat of a major outbreak is unlikely and activity in SEATO is confined to a pursuance of the second and third aims, (a) prevent subversion (where a real threat does exist), and (b) economic and social build-up (where a real need does exist).

Even in the field of prevention of subversion the record is not very impressive, and yet it is here that the balance must be maintained. Neutrality in Laos, loss of North Vietnam, costly involvement in South Vietnam illustrate the fact that the allied powers are on the defensive.

This raises some important domestic questions in Australia. If Australia's essental interests lie in the practical maintenance of the local balance, then she must take more steps to assist. Press reports both in Australia and America often point out that Australian defence expenditure of approximately 2.5-3.5% of the budget compares unfavorably with that of America — 8-11%.

SEATO is primarily a self-help programme, but unfortunately with only a small Australian commitment. This fact becomes more pertinent when one considers SEATO as a vital link in Australian security, but it is a more perpipheral concern, in the final analysis, of American defence. The implication, therefore, is that Australia must do much more in her own defence.

It is therefore vital to Australian security that she build up her commitment with the framework of the regional alliance, i.e., ANZAS, ANZAM, and especially SEATO. Her military activity must be also related to the third aim of SEATO — the economic and social build-up of the area.

This activity is being undertaken to a limited degree through the Colombo Plan. One must be careful to point out that high proportion of the funds for this plan are provided by the United States. There is need for Australia to do more through the Export-Import Bank and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Certainly a proper manipulation and exploitation of the resources of an independent Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines would create a formidable deterrent against aggression in the area.

This assumption introduces the other immediate problem involved in Australia's security interest—the position of the non-SEATO countries, their attitude to communism, to Australia, to the United States.

The obvious example is that of Indonesia, 400 miles from Australian soil, committed to a

strong nationalist platform and with a military capability, in the immediate sense, greater than that of Australia. The position is made more precarious by the attitude of the United States towards Indonesia and by Indonesia's position in relation to Australia's defence in depth concept. This warrants a serious reappraisal of our defence policies.

Australia must now be vitally concerned with the cultivation of friendly relations and concrete ties with Indonesia, steering her towards participation in SEATO, against a common foe. A powerful neighbour could be a dangerous enemy and pose a real threat to the local balance.

In summary, therefore, the following conclusions must be made. Due to the so-called "Balance of Terror" the conflict between East and West may now be resolved at the local level, i.e., South East Asia. It is at this level that America and Russia still play the dominant role, but there is opportunity for the smaller nations, i.e., Australia, to make a significant contribution.

Australia must strive by practical effort to build up her regional defence commitments, to cultivate and reinforce friendly allies, to provide guidance and practical assistance to these allies and become increasingly aware and concerned that the balance of power struggle may find its resolution in her own back yard.

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TACTICS

In planning your manoeuvre, try to envision what the enemy is most likely to do. Then assume that since this is so logical he decides to do it. But the enemy figures you are smart and have anticipated what he is most likely to do. So, he decides that a less likely course of action would outsmart you. But you, in making your original estimate, now believe the enemy will not choose the best and most likely course of action, but will try to outsmart you. So you decide to outsmart him and be ready to meet his less likely manoeuvre. The enemy now figures that you have analysed his most obvious manoeuvre and have figured him not to choose that, but rather a less likely course of action. So he has decided you are disposed to meet his less likely manoeuvre. So he finally decides that he'll outsmart you by taking the most obvious course of action over the best ground. You make a further analysis. You now believe that after the enemy has envisioned his best manoeuvre and then decided to outsmart you, you will have some misgivings about his secondary course of action. He, you decide, will figure that you will not be lulled by the most obvious but will get ready for his less obvious. You now decide that he figures it is natural for you to be waiting for him at the less likely place. You now decide you'd be a fool to be caught here while he takes the most obvious course, so you dispose to meet him there. The result: a head-on clash between your main force and his main force on the best ground as he follows his best course of action which you had figured out all the time.

Brigadier General A. F. Irzyk, US Army.
From "Armor," USA.

POPULATION SECURITY
THE KEY TO COUNTER INSURGENCY

Lieutenant Colonel William J. Beck
and
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HISTORICALLY, governments threatened by "Wars of Liberation" have often been too preoccupied with the liberation army's action arm, the guerilla. This desire to react to an identifiable target missed the major issue and too often has allowed the people of a countryside time and occasion to become solidly aligned with the insurgent movement.

The elusive "will of the wisp" armed guerilla has been impossible to find and the concentration of a nation's treasure in an attempt to destroy his nebulous bands is particularly distressing when it is realised that this type of investment does not meet the major threat. The insurgent practising "Communist revolutionary warfare" focuses his effort on attaining the support of the population which he accomplishes by aggressive and clever applications of various formulas. His ideal is a people organised to provide him physical and moral support, while denying this support to their government. Mao Tse-tung's contribution to warfare was the creation' of his famous "sea.' We can do much worse than analyse his methodology.

Programmes to counter an insurgency fall generally within three headings. The first of these is devoted to eliminating the conditions and grievances which are the raison d'etre of

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the insurgency. This is a programme of environmental improvement which must come to grips with the basic elements which have caused discontent. A working "Alliance for Progress" could cause the new revolutions in Latin America, for example, to die a-borning. The second programme concentrates on the armed guerilla, who must be the target of a nation's military forces. Aggressive action, designed to keep the guerilla constantly under pressure to forestall his developing a secure "base" area, is the principle of this counter-guerilla action. These two programmes are complemented and made possible by the third (the subject of this article), a programme adopted to "secure the environment" of the people.

The population security programme is aimed at doing three things: one, sever the linkage, or support relationship, between the population and the guerilla; two: eliminate the insurgency control apparatus in the community and three: provide a secure physical and mental environment for the population.

Such a programme is a flexibility of motion, never stopping to gather capability, but constantly applying pressure on the enemy throughout the environment until these grinding, wearing effects isolate and reduce the insurgent, insuring his defeat.

A police system (if one exists or can be created) is the most practical basis for the establishment of the population security force. Reasons for this are the close relationships that exist between the police and the population, the intimate knowledge of the population possessed by the local policeman and the need to relieve the military so that they can concentrate on the armed guerilla.

The main target in the establishment of a secure environment is the insurgency "apparatus" in the community. In the Communist version of insurgency, this is the cadre which deeply imbeds itself in the population and, by various combinations of persuasion, terror and conversion, creates a fertile "forcing ground" for the insurgency movement. This support of the guerilla takes the form of an "embryonic cord," a two-way street, whereby the guerilla is supplied by the population with food, weapons and intelligence, receiving in turn, direction and guidance. The guerilla considers this linkage vital to his existence and takes measures to protect it. Thus, in order to absolutely defeat the guerilla, this linkage must be severed and the sources of sustenance destroyed.

A critical step in making contact with the hard-core insurgency apparatus is the employment of an aggressive, penetrating intelligence programme. This effort, under strongly centralised direction at the community level, must be programmed with infinite care to insure expediting the flow of information to action agencies. Conventional intelligence operations, sound enough in other more conventional battle environments, must be modified to meet the urgent and pressing

demands of counter-guerilla forces. These forces must do two things, one, react instantaneously to guerilla activities, and two, aggressively pursue, outmanoeuvre and defeat the guerilla on his home ground.

The intelligence programme must provide for a "re-seeding" of the intelligence environment, providing feed-back of information, thus insuring an automatic up-grading of intelligence requirements by the operators in the field.

Finally, to offset the effects of an intensive and efficient enemy intelligence, there must be a counter-intelligence effort in great depth, the philosophy of which should saturate the consciousness of all those opposing the insurgency.

The overwhelmingly penetrating and binding efforts of the insurgency hard-core apparatus eventually provide a community "ideal' which, although not necessarily true to the classical structure of the Communist doctrinaire, is highly effective for the purposes of the insurgency. This mobilisation of the populaton provides and supports the insurgency with a never-ending stream of personnel and material. Obviously, then a mere eradication of the physical apparatus is not enough; other ideals to motivate people must be substituted for the previous influence of the insurgency dogma embracing the minds and spirits of the population.

The establishment of a new ideological base entails a popular mobilisation to include a focusing of allegiance. These new dogmas, tailored to the needs of the community, must be sufficiently vital and aggressive to overcome probable inertia, apathy and hostility, and be at least as "moving as those the insurgent used to command the enthusiasm and support of the population. Perhaps personalistic and fundamental in concept, the new base must present an obvious appeal, and, through keen and delicate handling, insure a long-lasting effect.

A basic consideration in control of a population is the measure of restriction to be imposed on their activities. Of many successful examples, a model of strictures most admired is that of the British during the Malayan Emergency: As the British stated, "Food denial caused more deaths by starvation among the 'terrorists' than they were able to kill in combat operations." Guerilla elements must live off the land. Their acquiring of food should be made as difficult as possible. Centralised cooking coupled with warehousing of staples after harvest, will force the guerilla to establish a jungle garden, thus aiding in pinpointing his locations.

A census and registration system, backed by a suitable individual identification card, is at the core of all security programmes. Even though counterfeiting, altering and confiscation by the guerilla can be expected, the ID card is still a basic framework on which most other measures are based. It should be issued to all persons; (small children can be included with their mothers) and be de-

signed to include all significant personal data. It can be colour-coded to indicate area of origin, and the profession of its holder can be indicated. An urban worker in the rural area is an automatic object of suspicion. A "trail of paper" follows each person, even in the developing society, and can be used to detect and destroy the insurgent elements.

The curfew comes immediately to mind and to hand. An eminent British colonial police official, with service in Palestine, Malaya and Kenya during their emergencies, said that he "reached for a curfew as naturally as for coffee of a morning." The breakers of curfew are prime suspects and should be caused to rigorously account for this offence. The uncontrolled movement of people is also a serious threat to internal security. Exceptions made to any restriction are always held to a minimum. Exemption granted a doctor may allow him to practice politics as well as medicine.

Guerilla operations may be so extensive as to make round-the-clock protection impossible for families scattered about the countryside. They are at the mercy of the guerilla, especially during the hours of darkness, and cannot be expected to refuse him aid. Under these circumstances families or even entire villages may have to be relocated. Despite their fears of the guerilla, many of these people will resent and resist the moves. The attendant hardships should be reduced to a minimum while a realistic psychological programme ("protected" village in Malaya) has been found to be an expensive and arduous measure fraught with psychological implications, to be taken when less restrictive measures do not suffice.

The objective of the physical control measures imposed on a population should be the creation of a positive gulf between the people and the guerilla. A starving, ill-informed band harrassed by the incessant patrolling of the military and blocked by the police and military from access to supplies and information is the goal of these operations.

A great danger, however, in the matter of securing the population is that the urgency of the situation may make an arbitrary imposition of controls and restrictive measures more attractive. This cannot be successful. Measures must be well-planned and delicately applied, and wherever possible accompanied by a clear and simple explanation to the people of the need for these controls. A desirable objective in this regard is to gain popular support by allowing the people to "involve themselves in the imposition of their own controls."

The battle for the allegiance of man continues unceasingly in the population control programme. All actions, military, police, or civil, must be accompanied by a consideration of their psychological impact on the people subject to such action. Psychological operations (in the military/police sense) must be based on com-

mon understanding amongst all population control agencies. A multiple approach will lead to overlap and waste and, more importantly, a distortion of the psychological image, oft-times resulting in a vacuous effort. In most instances, due to the minimum time available, a theme of "community identity" should be aggressively pursued to provide for the enhancement of local traditions, personalities and outstanding characteristics of the local society. The ideal community psychological operations programme is one with a strong, centralised direction, systemised planning and expert timing to provide maximum impact.

In summary, it can be fairly stated that the governent which survives an insurgency will have done so because it gained the support of the people. Means taken to control, or "secure" the population will allow a governent to "strangle" the insurgency. Further, it is important that the time gained by this tactic be applied to removing the economic, political and sociological causes of the insurgency. Finally, a nation will not know peace until the peoples who occupy this environment are united behind their government and by personal involvement providing their own security.

Every landing by troops in the face of the enemy is chaotic by nature, rife with disorder, and plagued by unanticipated problems. Nothing but first-hand command management may restore balance and energise the flow of force towards the object.

Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall.
US Army.

SCIENCE

AND THE

OFFICER

Major R. A. Clark,
Royal Australian Signals.

AN examination in military science has recently been introduced as a requirement for entry to the Staff College. Your reaction to this change was certainly dependent upon your seniority. If your Staff College days were behind you, your reaction was probably "Thank God." If you were just about to take the examinations you probably paled a little and said "What more can they do to us"- On the other hand, if you were recently commissioned you were probably just a little puzzled at this intrusion of the scientific into the military world.

However, in my opinion, this is a realistic method of ensuring that officers have some technical background on which to evaluate the effects of modern science on the solution of military problems. It is my aim in this paper to convince you that it is essential, for the efficient operation of our army, that all officers have a sound knowledge of basic scientific facts.

When the military science paper was introduced into Staff College requirements, the aims of the Military Board were probably as follows:—

(a) To develop the ability of officers to understand the employment of new and complex equipment and techniques.

(b) To improve the system of procurement of new equipment for the army.

(c) To maintain the professional status of officers in the public eye.

(d) To further develop the qualities of leadership by improving the general level of education of officers.

We will now examine each of these aims and see how much they contribute to the efficiency of the whole army.

Equipment and Techniques

Since the end of World War 2 the development of new equipment has continued at a fantastic pace. Command and control has been improved and extended by vastly superior communications systems; intelligence collection is facilitated by surveillance devices; infantry and

armour can now see at night using infra-red equipment; and rockets and missiles mean more range and power to the artillery. The employment of these new weapons and techniques demands a thorough understanding of their characteristics if the maximum benefits are to be gained from them. An analogy will serve to further explain my argument. The CSIRO each year makes new discoveries in many fields of Australian industry and agriculture. Unfortunately, manufacturers and farmers are slow in taking advantage of these discoveries because they fail to appreciate their significance. A similar situation can develop in the army if the implications of the employment of new weapons and techniques are not readily appreciated. It is therefore essential that officers possess the technical background necessary to avoid this situation.

The dropping of the atomic bomb at Hiroshima opened a completely new chapter of military thought. Since then the development of tactical atomic weapons has placed in the hands of the soldier the double-edged tools of nuclear radiation and atomic fallout. If the army is to survive on the nuclear battlefield, it is not sufficient that a knowledge of these weapons be in the hands of one or two experts. Every officer must know and understand the effects of such weapons in order to safeguard the lives of his men and to exploit the advantages to be gained. Such understanding can only be based on a sound knowledge of scientific fact.

Procurement of New Equipment

Every year the army spends approximately £10 million on new equipment. The procurement of this equipment is a lengthy and difficult process. The user must first state his requirements. This is produced by the various arms and service directors in the form of a statement of military characteristics for a piece of equipment.

If the equipment is to be developed in Australia, the designer goes to work and after a considerable time produces a prototype equipment. User trials and troop trials are then carried out, and many modifications are made to improve the equipment. Eventually, when everybody is satisfied, the equipment goes to production. At all stages of development the designer is advised and helped by army officers. However, there are many pitfalls. A faulty user requirement can mean years of wasted effort. A lack of understanding between the designer and the army can lead to costly mistakes. An incorrect instruction for a user or troop trial can mean further delays.

Similarly, the purchase of equipment from overseas has many difficulties. Manufacturers' claims do not always come up to expectations. It is often difficult to obtain adequate information and great reliance is placed on our overseas staffs. Financial arrangements can cause delays and production delays can even mean cancellation of orders.

Throughout this whole lengthy process of procurement, officers of many ranks are responsible

for making decisions. Unless these officers have the ability and background to make wise decisions, mistakes will be made. Mistakes are costly in both time and money, and our army, with its limited budget, cannot afford either if the troops are to get the best possible equipment quickly. Although technical officers will generally be available to make specific recommendations, the final decision usually rests with a general staff officer. He must have the technical knowledge and ability to evaluate such technical advice correctly.

There is one other aspect in the procurement of new equipment or the modification of old equipment that should be stressed. The people responsible for solving the army's equipment problems are the scientists and engineers of industry. If we are to obtain the best results from these people, we must be able to present our problems in a manner readily understandable to them. For this reason officers should have sufficient technical background to be able to discuss their equipment problems with technically qualified people.

Professional Status

The army today is in the public view more than ever before. We are, in fact, dependent upon a sympathetic civilian population for the level of our activities. It is therefore essential that our officers are thoroughly trained and competent, and that this fact is obvious to the general public. This latter requirement can be achieved partly by good public relations, but to a large extent it will depend upon the impression made by officers in their contact with civilians.

During the course of their duties officers of all ranks have dealings with politicians, public servants, university men and people from all areas of industry and commerce. If the officer is to sell himself and the army, he must impress upon these people that the army is up-to-date in its thinking and that it is moving with the times. This is an era of great scientific discovery and technological advances, an era of computers and space travel. The army officer must keep up with the changing world and to do this he must have sufficient technical knowledge to appreciate the implications of these changes.

Each year the army must convince the government of its requirements of money and equipment. In order to obtain the best results, the officers concerned must employ some top level salesmanship. An argument involving technical equipment can hardly be convincing unless it is based on a sound understanding of the principles involved.

Leadership

Some officers may be able to convince themselves that the previous arguments are not really applicable to them. However, no officer can deny the requirement for leadership, and leadership, amongst other things, demands that officers posses a thorough knowledge.

A soldier's responsibility is to be able to efficiently operate his equipment, be it rifle, gun, wireless set, radar or vehicle. The officer, on the other hand, must understand the characteristics and employment of the equipment he controls. He is then responsible for co-ordinating its use in order to achieve his goal in the shortest time. Obviously, the more senior the officer the more equipment he is responsible for co-ordinating. In the modern army, the quantity and complexity of equipment demands that officers have a better technical understanding to fully appreciate its employment. Unless officers possess this knowledge the troops will not have confidence in their ability to lead.

The Australian soldier is generally reasonably well-educated and through radio and television has some understanding of basic scientific facts. It is therefore essential that officers receive adequate training in science if they are, in fact, to be the leaders.

The Correct Perspective

Before concluding, it is necessary to get this question of scientific training in correct perspective. I do not advocate that all officers should have a science degree in order to do their jobs, or anything like it. However, the level of scientific knowledge of all officers should be such that they can intelligently appreciate the scientific factor in their day-to-day military tasks. Obviously, the more senior the officer the better his knowledge should be, and this is the main reason for the introduction of military science as a requirement for Staff College. It should also be appreciated that, generally speaking, technical officers advise and recommend while general officers make the final decisions.

Conclusion

A high level of general scientific knowledge is essential if the army is to function in the most efficient manner in this modern age. Such knowledge will improve the understanding of new equipments and techniques. It will help to produce the best equipment for the army quickly. It will raise the professional status of officers in the public eye and it will enable officers to maintain the highest standards of leadership. Obviously the level of knowledge required will vary considerably, but it is essential that all officers are able to appreciate the significance of scientific advances and their applications to a modern and efficient army.

DRESS EMBELLISHMENTS AND OTHER CHANGES

Warrant Officer L. Thompson,
403 Signal Regiment.

AT LONG last something constructive has been done about a reasonable uniform for wear by all ranks of the AMF by the introduction of the new pattern winter and summer uniforms. However, when compared to members of some other Armies, in particular the Pakistan, Canadian and American Armies, our new uniform still leaves something to be desired in so far as dress embellishments are concerned.

I am not suggesting that we go all out and adopt somethig from 'Ruritanian Nights' but some additions and changes could be incorporated for the sake of pride, smartness and 'glamour'.

At present, the only signs of service for any member (other than officers that is) is the Long Service Medal after 18 years and the Meritorious Medal for 22 years .

What of the member (officers, too this time) with service less or more than these two periods? A suggestion is that service chevrons be re-introduced to the AMF. These could take the form of gold stripes, each 2 inches wide by ¼ inch deep to be worn on the left sleeve above the cuff of winter dress and 'blues'. Each chevron could represent a period of service of 3 years, a period suitable to all engagements and re-engagements. This idea is not new to the AMF as service chevrons in some shape or form were worn by the pre-war Army.

The present system of embroidered Corps titles has not proved much of a success. First of all the winter dress signs have been reduced to omit the embroidered border, and earlier the summer dress titles were withdrawn due to unserviceability. Prior to World War I, Corps wore abbreviated titles, in metal, on their shoulder straps, e.g. RAA, RAE, etc. During the war members of the AIF wore the metal AUSTRALIA on their shoulder straps.

I suggest that we combine the two and produce titles of metal with the Corps (as one word, e.g. SIGNALS, ARTILLERY, etc.) mounted above AUSTRALIA. This metal could be finished in either silver or gilt.

The advantage of this proposed system is that this badge or title could be worn on all orders of dress whether summer or winter and could be removed

quite easily from the various uniforms for cleaning purposes. With slip-on badges of rank worn on the shoulder, the titles could either be embroidered or the metal type retained.

With the new pattern summer dress, as with the old, no provision is made for Corps badges to be worn on the collar. The American Army wear these insignia quite successfully and I see no reason why we could not adopt a similar system. Our present collar badges could be quite suitable provided they were made of a lighter material and had the American type pin clips.

As a suggestion, we could wear the Corps badge on the left collar and the letters ARA or CMF on the right collar. It is not considered by the writer that this would in any way depart from the 'one Army' concept but instead give recognition where recognition is due. For example, a professional soldier is proud of the fact that he IS a professional, and also, the part time soldier should be extremely proud of the fact that he is fulfilling his full responsibilities for the defence of his country during peace time.

Formation Signs have recently gone the way of all unsuitable systems, as indeed the recent system was. However, it is considered that some symbol of Field Force organisations should be worn. This could take the form of a brooch, distinctive to the formation, to be worn above the right breast pocket. It could be of some light weight metal.

In the event of a transfer to another formation of Field Force or a posting out of Field Force the removal of this symbol would not cause the normal disfiguration to uniform of stitch marks, fading material or large holes caused by the oversized pinfixing methods of present collar badges, etc.

Both the Pakistan and American Armies (there could be many more), use the system of wearing name identification tags on their uniforms when on military installations. The Pakistanis wear a coloured name plate worn as a brooch above the right breast pocket while the Americans wear a cloth name tag sewn in the same place on their field uniforms.

The advantages of this system should be obvious to all members reading this article and the advantages of adapting this system to suit our own needs is also obvious.

After many years of nagging, the Army has finally decided to issue us all with a raincoat. While this is a thoroughly wonderful idea, many may remember the difficulty in distinguishing an officer from a Warrant Officer, and vice versa. Now, of course, that everyone will be wearing a raincoat (none of which show badges of rank), just imagine the fun we are all going to have deciding whether to salute or snarl loftily.

Does anyone really know why badges of rank are NOT worn on raincoats?

Whilst on the subject of change, I would like to discuss the array of varied head dress at present on issue to members of the AMF.

Stretching the imagination slightly, it could be possible to issue a member of the AMF with the following items:—

Helmet, soldier, steel, with liner	1
Tropical beret	1
Beret, Navy Blue, Light Blue, Khaki, Black, Green, Red	1
Hat, KFF	1
Hat, KFF, Bush	1
Cap, Forage, Blue	1
Cap, Forage, Khaki	1

I am sure you will agree that this is truly wonderful.

I would not venture to discuss even briefly the coloured berets applicable to Armoured, Command, Light Aircraft, as it is well understood that these berets have a strong sentimental value to those respective Corps. However, the general issue navy blue beret is a different matter.

It is worn in several positions on the head and, whilst occupying its approximate place, it also permits itself to be pulled, pushed and poked into a strange assortment of shapes and styles.

A common fad apparently taking hold is the one of inserting a piece of cardboard inside the front of the beret behind the badge, then tucking a portion of the crown down behind it and then rolling or folding the remainder of the crown to drape becomingly over the ear. Apart from this tendency to reshape, the beret appears to have an almost magnetic effect on all molecules of dust and grime and, when sent to the cleaners, returns just that shade too small. This reduced size, of course, lends itself very well to wearing on the back or front of the head.

Now for the good old slouch hat. No doubt when (if?) this article is published I will become the target of a tar and feather party from some of the 'old' diggers of the local RSL.

The Hat KFF has been with the Australian Army for some considerable time, in fact, since the day of inception of the Australian armed forces. Therefore it could be argued that tradition is involved. Well, let us look at it more closely.

The slouch hat has not been universal wear for all ranks of the AMF. For example, during the last war, drivers, sergeants, service Corps, etc., all wore the OR peaked cap.

The Light Horse, later the Armoured, wore the slouch hat, of course, but they stuck a feather in it! Then as quickly as possible threw it away and put on their black beret and have retained it ever since.

Officers and Warrant Officers prefer to wear their cap instead of the hat for fairly obvious reasons of practibility and serviceability, etc.

Of course all ranks must wear the hat on ceremonial parades and when attending courses at the School of Infantry, and all will remember parades spoiled by sailing hats in the wind or hats with brims sagging shapeless in the rain.

Let's face it though, the hat did keep the rain off the top of your head but it concentrated it onto your shoulders instead. Tilt

the head and cascade a gallon or so of accumulated rain from the 'bash'.

All parades finish, however, and now comes the problem of where to put the thing so that it will dry out. Hanging it in the hall is obviously 'out', this can ruin carpets, rugs or polished floors. "Take it off that table" — it ruins polish or cloths. The obvious place to hang it was the wood shed — it couldn't do any damage there.

The real beauty of this slouch hat lies in the fact that, like Houdini, it can assume a thousand disguises and can be worn in any one of a dozen poistions, angles, etc. Its value in tropical warfare is readily seen when it is a fact that the tropical beret or giggle hat is issued for patrol etc., work and the 'ever faithful' left home!

Time moves on and we come to the Caps, Forage, Blue. In my opinion this article was issued solely for the purpose of being carried about in motor vehicles in case of accident when the owner might be compelled to finish his trip by public transport, etc. Enough said about this horrible item of head wear.

The Caps, Forage, Khaki does not give the same feeling of revulsion. On the contrary, if you are lucky enough to possess a "Herbert Johnston" or other like make, you could be quite proud to wear it.

However, like the Blues cap, what an item to pack It also absorbs water like blotting paper and again the problem arises of how to dry it. And the weight when wet? This weight is also apparent during hot spells, but it has one consolation. During hot spells you have only to lift the cap slightly from the head and you are immediately bathed in beautiful, cool, sweat. The fact that it is impossible for any air whatsoever to circulate in the cap may have something to do with the slight hairless condition of some of our senior officers and warrant officers.

Comes cleaning time and everyone entitled to wear a cap immediately looks around for his second cap. As everyone knows it is impossible to get one of these caps cleaned under 7 days, if you are lucky. Of course, you could always wait until you are on ARL for the cleaning.

Now that I have 'shot down' all our issue items of head gear, you may say "what now?". Well, I suggest that we abolish all existing head dress (not Armour, Commando, etc., and introduce a Glengarry type of head dress without ribbons. This is nothing new to the AMF as we did wear a forage cap before and during the early stages of World War 2.

The advantages of this type of hat are many but mainly cover cost, ease of packing and smartness. Corps colours could be piped and inset with no great difficulty. This cap could be issued to both officers and other ranks.

In the past few months (years)? many artcles have appeared in "Army" and elsewhere about the desirability of wearing the Sam Browne Belt. Can

anyone honestly say that this belt is not smart?

That the wearing of the belt is considered desirable is proved daily by the fact that many Cos insist on their RSMs, Orderly Officers, etc., wearing this belt when on duty. This is a mild form of revolt but is indicative of feeling.

One answer provided by "Army" newspaper to a query on issue of the belt was to the effect that the issue to all members entitled to wear it would cost a lot of money. Well, the new pattern winter dress will be introduced shortly with members paying for it at the cost of one battle dress from accumulated clothing allowance. I am positive that only a small minority would object to paying for the belt from this same ever enlarging allowance provided that they were permitted to wear it.

During the last war, all officers and WO1s wore the belt and cross strap whilst WOs wore the belt alone. I am sure that this should be so now. After all, I am sure that almost everyone will agree that a WO2 is entitled to some little distinction?

The subject of ceremonial sashes now rears its head. So far the Infantry are the only Corps permitted to wear these sashes. Why can't all other Corps wear them too? Not red coloured, of course, but in the Corps colours?

The assumption that it could not have succeeded is based not on the circumstances, but on the fallacy that whatever has actually happened could not have taken any other course.

Sir David Kelly.

MILITARY COLLECTING IN AUSTRALIA

N. R. Grinyer

MILITARY collecting in Australia is a fascinating and absorbing hobby, and one in which you could participate. I would suggest that everyone has, at some time, been a collector, whether of match boxes, cigarette cards or stamps. No matter what the subject of collecting, it is a tangible means of acquiring information, and each piece of information is of real value to those of kindred interest.

To the average Officer and NCO, the need for some sort of collection of military knowledge is essential, whether it be a study of some campaign with an eye to the Principles of War, or some factor which contributed to the winning or losing of a battle.

There is in Australia a Society which aims at collecting, and researching into military history, and all forms of militaria. This Society, which consists of a group of people, some Service, some ex-Service, and some who are purely interested, who can, and have, produced information for Army authorities, as well as encyclopaedia of authors on aspects of military history, arms and dress.

It is probable that quite a number of you have a Military collection of some description. To you, particularly, I would like to point out that your information is the product of, perhaps, years of accumulation but it is confined to you and your immediate associates. As you well know, information is of limited value if it is not freely available to all who seek knowledge.

Collectors of any description working on their own find their world at length becomes limited, and it is refreshing to find others interested in the same field.

To the serious collector, the idea of destruction of any irreplaceable item of outdated military equipment, of any vintage, is of great concern, and the obvious action on this matter is a policy of preservation by the individual and by the group. Therefore by creating a Society, the aspects of preservation are lent greater weight by the promulgation of Society policy, and in larger contentious matters, by the Society as a body.

To any group or society prestige is of inestimable value, and even more so when a society is

dedicated to the preservation of militaria. We cannot afford to offend the law, nor to bring ridicule upon the Society. Therefore the emphasis is upon attracting persons with the utmost sincerity in the collecting and research of militaria, and who are interested in furthering their knowledge on the subject.

The world opened up to the Military collector is vast, because each item requires research to determine its age and its place in the scheme of things. The nett result is a large accumulation of knowledge in respect to the various national forces, their dress, equipment and method of wearing equipment, and the links which tie the various arms of their respective armies together. Like most hobbies, one gains more interest when interests are shared.

It is of interest to know that members of this Society are the only non-service persons in Australia permitted by an Army R.O. to own Military uniforms and insignia.

This article is not only aimed at increasing our membership, but to inform people of our interests and aspirations. If you feel you would like to take an active part in this project, I suggest that for further information you contact the Secretary of the Military Research and Collectors Society of Australia:

N.S.W. Branch, Mr. N. R. Grinyer, 144 Chetwynd Road, Guildford.

Victorian Branch, Mr. K. Lyons, 262 Tucker Road, Ormond East.

Canberra Branch, Mr. K. White, 20 Mort Street, Braddon.

To learn that Napoleon won the campaign of 1796 by manoeuvre on interior lines, or some such phrase, is of little value. But if you discover how a young unknown man inspired a ragged, mutinous, half-starved army and made it fight, how he gave it the energy and momentum to march and fight as it did, how he dominated and controlled generals older and more experienced than himself, then you will have learnt something.

— Field Marshall Lord Wavell.



THE BATTLE FOR BUNKER HILL, by Richard M. Ketchum. (The Cresset Press, London, and William Heinemann, Ltd., 317 Collins Street, Melbourne).

On June 17th, 1775 the die was cast in the dispute between the British colonists in America and the Government in London. A few weeks earlier the colonists had fired on the Government forces at Lexington and Concord and compelled them to withdraw to Boston. The rebellion was taking shape, but formal fighting had not yet occurred. Nevertheless, these two small incidents encouraged the colonists to attempt to besiege the regular garrison in the town. Their effort can hardly be called a military operation for they had no proper structure of command, their men were without uniforms, completely untrained, desperately short of arms and ammunition. In fact they were not an army at all.

Had the Government Commander-in-Chief, General Gage, acted with any degree of energy, he could no doubt have broken the siege without any difficulty. But, partly because he wished to avoid action which would precipitate a crisis partly because he did not relish the colonists' tactics of picking off his men from behind walls and trees while declining formal battle, he sat tight in Boston under the shelter of his forts and the guns of the fleet.

On 16th June the colonists decided to build a fort on Bunker Hill, an eminence on a peninsula jutting out from the mainland towards Boston town. Since the colonists expected Gage to make an immediate effort to throw them out, the work was to be completed in that night. No reconnaissance of the site was made, no guides provided. The units detailed for the task simply moved off in the darkness carrying the few tools they were able to collect. In the circumstances it was not surprising that they built the fort in the wrong place, on a smaller and more exposed eminence. When daylight came and the nearest Government warships promptly opened fire, the work was only half finished. The men were tired and hungry, and no arrangements had been made to send forward fresh troops to meet the expected attack.

Urged on by his senior officers, Gage accepted the challenge, but he went about mounting the amphibious operation so slowly that the colonists had time to strengthen their defences and

get up more men before the Government marine, grenadier and light infantry regiments had made their unopposed landing. The regiments advanced in formal order over the broken ground and were shot to pieces by the accurate colonial marksmen. Reforming, they returned to the charge and, when the colonists' ammunition ran out succeeded in carrying the position at very heavy cost.

If the colonists had failed in their immediate aim, they had accomplished something far more important. They had stood up to the finest infantry in the world, strongly supported by the guns of the fleet, and had held them off while their ammunition lasted. They had inflicted losses out of all proportion to their own, they had shown that there was a way of countering the formal line of battle. The thoughtful among them read these lessons correctly and took courage from them. And when George Washington arrived a few weeks later he repeated the tactic of seizing another dominating eminence during the night, but this time the job was properly done. The Government forces, still licking their wounds from their Phyrric victory at Bunker Hill, had no stomach for a repeat performance and soon afterwards evacuated the town by sea.

Mr. Ketchum has described these events, which shaped the subsequent course of history, in the 'documentary' style. His easily followed description of the action is spiced with vignettes of the leading personalities on both sides, together with numerous impressions of lesser fry. He recreates the atmosphere of the action and shows us the outlook and idiosyncrasies of the contestants. This treatment brings out the factors of morale, of leadership, to a marked degree without impairing his description of the action. And his maps are excellent.

THE CIVIL WAR IN SPAIN 1936-1939, by Robert Payne. (Martin Secker and Warburg, Ltd., London, and William Heinemann, Ltd., 317 Collins Street, Melbourne).

This book is one of the "History in the Making" series. Like the others already published, it does not attempt to give a coherent account of the episode in question. It is concerned rather with its human aspects, and consists mainly of excerpts from official documents and from the writings of persons who witnessed or participated in the events, all more or less disconnected and in no particular sequence. It will not give you much information about the politics of the civil war, and none at all about the strategy and tactics of the military operations. But it will enable you to see the conflict as it was experienced by the Spanish people.

The strongest impression emerging from these pages is the sheer savagery with which the war was conducted by both sides. Perhaps this was due, as some of the contributors suggest, to the Spanish character, to the Spanish view of life — and death. At any rate, brutality be-

gets brutality, and both sides, irrevocably committed to the struggle, went in for it in a big way. It is significant that at least a million people died in the conflict, though it would appear that battle casualties were not particularly heavy. The great majority were massacred by one side or the other, mostly in circumstances that had nothing to do with military operations.

CONFLICT IN THE SHADOWS —The Nature and Politics of Guerilla War, by James Eliot Cross. (Doubleday and Co., Inc., Garden City, New York, USA).

Reviewed in MILITARY REVIEW, USA, by Lieutenant Colonel W. N. Martasin.

While many studies have been written on techniques and tactics of guerilla war, especially by Communist writers, Mr. Cross has attempted to review modern unconventional warfare with all its implications. The purpose of Mr. Cross' book is: . . . to look at the circumstances under which restive and changing regions become particularly vulnerable to subversion, insurrection, and revolution, at the forms these upheavals are likely to take, and at some of the measures which have proved effective in easing the tensions that make for turmoil and political collapse.

Mr. Cross was with the Office of Strategic Services in Europe during World War II and has held positions which well qualify him to write on unconventional warfare. He is now an associate of the Institute for Defence Analysis and has been a lecturer and consultant to the United States Naval War College and to the United States Army War College.

"Conflict in the Shadows" is a comprehensive analysis of the critical problems facing the United States as she becomes involved in providing support to countries fighting off or exposed to Communist subversion. Containing many references to the writings of guerilla leaders such as Mao Te-tung, "Che" Guevara, and T. E. Lawrence, the book also cites historial examples of guerilla warfare and briefly analyses these conflicts.

The military reader will find this book a realistic approach to problems which will be with us for many years.