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Photo: Australian War Memorial, Canberra.

IORIBAIWA RIDGE

In July 1942 a strong Japanese force landed in the Buna-Gona area on the north-east coast of New Guinea, and advanced by the Kokoda Trail over the Owen Stanley Mountains with the object of capturing Port Moresby. Initially Japanese superiority of force enabled them to push back the Australian opposition to the western side of the mountains.

The Japanese offensive was brought to a halt at Ioribaiwa Ridge, and the reinforced Australians seized the initiative and drove the enemy back to their beach head.

The picture shows a 25-pounder gun of the 14 Field Regiment being hauled into position for the preliminary bombardment of the Japanese positions at Ioribaiwa.

CONTROL

AT THE

TOP

Colonel F. W. Speed, OBE, ED,
Australian Staff Corps

CHANGES have been taking place in the higher defence machinery of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand, which are of interest to Australians.

The present organisation in the US came after years of struggle to establish an optimum defence organisation. Following World War II, the civilian leaders had encountered considerable trouble in their efforts to get agreement among the military men of the Army, Navy and the then Army Air Force, on the systems and techniques which might be needed for the maintenance of peace or the prosecution of another war, how and where another war might be fought, and who would attend to the various parts of it. And the problem was complicated by the existence of the US Marines, as a separate corps claiming precedence over the others.

The efforts, with some sincere military men supporting and others equally sincere opposing, led to the National Defence Act

of 1947. This "unification" measure separated out the Air Force as a third Service, and created the Defence Department to co-ordinate.

Two years later, Congress took away the cabinet rank of the

Colonel F. W. Speed was commissioned in 5 Battalion, CMF, on 27 July 1931, and in October 1939 transferred to 2/5 Battalion AIF. After regimental service with that unit in the Middle East he became Brigade Major of 26 Brigade, and later GSO 2 AIF HQ ME. On his return to Australia with 9 Division he served as GSO 1 on HQ Aust Army and in New Guinea with 1 Aust Corps, and was an instructor at the Staff School. Joining the Regular Army after the war, he held staff appointments at AHQ, and in 1955-58 he commanded the Australian Army Forces component in FARELF. He is at present Inspector of Administration at AHQ.

three service secretaries (Australian equivalent, Ministers) and strengthened the hand of the Secretary of Defence. But the troubles continued. Partisan tactics to oversell one role or technique, to gain a bigger slice of the defence vote, bred more confusion, uncertainty and some waste.

The troubles came to a head in 1958 and an unhappy Congress decided on a series of amendments to the Defence Act which put the responsibility for orderliness in national security affairs squarely on one man, the Secretary of Defence, and made him responsible only to the President as Commander-in-Chief.

The first Secretary with these plenary powers managed, in two years, to set up a single agency for defence communications and put in train other moves for consolidation of common activities. He said his greatest innovation — and it took him a year to do it — was the creation of a Joint Strategic Targeting Committee that, for the first time, really synthesised the war plans of the three services at the strategic level.

Then the Administration changed, and the new President Kennedy, with a fresh angle on security problems, cast about for the man to implement it. Unfettered by the British requirement to select a member of the Parliament, Kennedy chose Robert S. McNamara, 44, then President of the Ford Motor Company. To him he gave a simple directive: Provide the US with the armed forces necessary

for national security, and do the job at the lowest possible cost. He did not set any upper limit on either.

The way seemed to be clear for real progress. For the first time since Franklin D. Roosevelt's time, the US had a President who was able and ready to take a strong personal interest in defence. For the first time in its history, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had a chairman — General Maxwell D. Taylor — who was a confidant of, and personal adviser to, the President and who was to develop a firm and intimate working relationship with the new Secretary of Defence.

Kennedy has made national defence one of the main issues, if not the chief issue, of the 1960 presidential campaign. He did not knock the existing defence set-up, but said that it could be better. It seemed that he had grown away from the theory of massive retaliation and he was interested in General Taylor's ideas on the maintenance of balanced forces, with less emphasis on the nuclear offensive. Taylor had been brought back from retirement into which he had gone from Chief of Staff of the Army after being unable to sell his ideas to the then JCS, or to Congress, during the mid-1950s; and his first act on recall had been to recommend to the President the course of action which should be taken in South Vietnam.

For about three weeks after his appointment, McNamara studied the situation at the Pentagon. One of his chief con-

clusions seemed to be that the military heads of the three Services worked too much on innate beliefs and not enough on hard facts. A man of high intelligence and tremendous capacity, he called for a scientific approach to the solution of problems.

To aid him he set about hand picking three men to become assistant secretaries. He chose:—

Roswell Gilpatric, 56, a New York Lawyer, to be Deputy Secretary. He had been Under Secretary of the Air Force ten years before, and had had a hand in drafting the Rockefeller Studies Project Report on National Security in 1956-57. This had recommended large increases in defence expenditure and changes in defence organisation.

Paul Nitze, also 56, a New York investment banker and State Department planner.

Dr. Charles Hitch, 53, a Rhodes Scholar and an economist. He had been for more than ten years with the Rand Corporation — a non-profit civilian organisation of egg-heads which undertakes research for the Department of Defence and others on a wide range of classified subjects.

It was the economist who said "The application of quantitative analysis in relating weapons systems to national security objectives is a new problem grown in the last twenty years. And you don't become an expert in solving it by the conduct of military operations." This statement represents one aspect of the broader subject of operations research which had its origin in the best brains of Britain's

Universities when they were brought into the scientific problems of World War II, and was carried into commerce and industry in Britain, the United States and elsewhere after 1946.

In Western nations, at least in peace, the budget is the core of the problem, and it was in the defence budget that McNamara began his systems reorganisation. Hitherto the divisions of the defence budget had been by departments. The Secretary of Defence had annually given the Services budget ceilings and guidelines, the Services submitted their individual budgets, and the Bureau of the Budget trimmed them to size, after consultation with the White House. The Secretary of Defence then made decisions, within the approved figures, on any unresolved issues.

The McNamara - Hitch approach changed all that. In May 1961, the Services were told to submit details of the force structures they needed to carry out their roles and the finance necessary to support them — for the five years beginning 1 July, 1962.

Hitch and his staff then made a complete lay-out of the elements of the three services' programmes — combat units, weapon systems, development projects, and so on. Next they combined the corresponding elements of the three programmes into a single one divided into what they called "programme packages". Thus, for example, they produced a programme package on Research

and Development, for the three Services combined, for a five year period.

When the whole document was completed, Congress — and incidentally the Pentagon and the White House — for the first time had a reasonably firm idea what the three Services would look like for the foreseeable future and the likely total cost. Moreover, the total cost of a new weapons system could be seen, not just the portion to be paid for in the annual budget currently under consideration. Further, each successive year would be taken care of by a new five-year plan produced annually; and any new ideas or other changes necessitated during the current year would take the form of "proposed programme changes".

This was all reasonably straightforward and there were many who thought that this kind of action should have been started years before. However, the nub of the matter was still to emerge.

Hitch, the economist, and his men subjected the programme packages to cost-effectiveness studies and other forms of examination. One such economist, a 33-year-old former Rhodes Scholar and instructor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, had been put in charge of the review of "proposed programme changes" for eight of 24 major items. This list included items of such significance at the level of the Minuteman missile force, the Nike Zeus anti-aircraft missile, increased funds for the Polaris system, and Navy and Marine tactical air-

craft. Questioned by a subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, McNamara explained that his economist had only been assigned responsibility for consolidating various papers on the projects and preparing briefs for the Secretary's personal consideration. Asked if he had any idea of the economist's age, military experience and background, McNamara said he did not know his age but had the highest opinion of his intelligence. On his military experience, the Secretary was unable to speak but pointed out that his man was not rendering a military judgment. What the economist was doing was to apply the quantitative analysis technique to the military proposals and to seek out alternative programmes for the Secretary's consideration.

Another such analyst, in examining the Strategic Air Command's bomber programme, studied the question (as one writer put it) "whether it would be preferable to have 1500 bombers vulnerably crowded on 60 air force bases, or to keep 800 bombers more safely dispersed on 200 bases, counting the cost, the political and economic impact of land acquisition and new construction; with the whole checked off against megatonnage of destruction delivered on target; plus the proposition of maintaining X proportion of the bombers on airborne alert, figuring in the problem of keeping crews available and not forgetting engine depreciation and metal fatigue in aircraft frames."

All this analysis has taken place, if not in an aura of

mystery, at least with a strong impression of centralisation in the Secretary of Defence himself. To this is added a feeling that the application of these scientific techniques is made too impersonally. There is a belief that McNamara and his civilians don't understand people, that the personal relations which are part of the foundations of military life and military operations are disregarded. As General Norstad, formerly Supreme Commander in NATO put it to a Senate Committee: "Too much attention tends to be paid to system and perhaps too little to men and their relationships."

The trouble is that, before McNamara, there were so many differences of opinion between the three Services that it was extremely difficult for clear policies on inter-service relationships to develop. McNamara's system has led to uproar in Washington the like of which has not been seen since the McCarthy-Army hearings of ten years ago. But there seems to be some hope that, when the dust settles, the concept of the functional across-the-board budget and the programme package may yet give a lead. It's a case of time alone will tell.

By contrast we can now see what the United Kingdom is doing about the same kind of problem.

Their situation was more complicated than that of the US. The three Service headquarters were not together in the one building; in fact they were, and are, quite widely separated. Tradition has kept the UK forces

more widely divergent in character and even the title of the headquarters — Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry — are different. Their three Ministers rated as Secretaries of State, and the degree of control exercised by the Minister of Defence was largely a function of his personality. The three chiefs of staff came together as necessary in a Chief of Staff Committee headed by a fourth, the Chairman; but they were autocrats each in his own sphere.

In 1958, following assumption by the Minister of Defence of increased authority to take decisions on matters of general defence policy, a Defence Board was set up to assist the Minister in formulating policy and for dealing with inter-Service problems. This Board included the three Service Ministers, The Minister of Supply, the Chairman Chiefs of Staff, and the three Service Chiefs. At the same time, the Chairman Chiefs of Staff became Chief of Defence Staff. These changes were "designed to emphasise the importance of the closest inter-service co-operation and to ensure that the fullest information and advice from the Service Departments is made available to the Minister of Defence".

Then, in March of last year, the Minister of Defence in the House of Commons announced decisions in principle to strengthen the central organisation for defence. A unified Ministry of Defence is to be set up. Authority and responsibility is to be vested in a single Secretary of State for Defence.

The White Paper on the subject states quite bluntly that the 1958 arrangements "have not in practice secured the degree of central control over defence policy which is necessary in the national interest". From this it can be inferred that the same sort of inter-service scrapping has gone on in London as in Washington, but the world has heard less about it. British reticence, no doubt.

Thereafter the White Paper goes on in words which are strikingly similar to views expressed in America:—

"A unified Ministry of Defence is essential if the defence budget (not far short of £2,000 million a year) is to strike a proper balance between commitments, resources, and the roles of the Services.

"Better arrangements are needed for formulating requirements for weapons and for controlling the defence research and development programme.

"The control of defence policy requires a greater knowledge of the background problems and currents of opinion within the Services than can be secured with four separate Defence Departments responsible to separate Ministers.

"The Secretary of State for Defence must have complete control both of defence policy and of the machinery for the administration of the three Services. The line of authority and responsibility from the Secretary of State will run unbroken through military, scientific and administrative staffs throughout the Ministry."

Behind the similarity of words, however, lies a very substantial difference in circumstance and outlook.

In the US the President is Commander-in-Chief of the Services and the Secretary of Defence is responsible direct to him. Robert S. McNamara, as President of the big Ford Motor Company was an industrial magnate to his finger tips. He was not a parliamentarian. The reforms stemmed directly from the President himself, and Congress had a hand in the legislation.

In the UK, the reforms were initiated by the Minister of Defence. Of course he had Cabinet approval for his action, and quite possibly Cabinet guidance in the formulation of his plan. But there was no question of an outsider coming in to implement the reforms and to set his own particular seal on them. The design was that of the man who will put it into action.

Then, too, there is the difference in background of the man himself. The Rt. Hon. G. E. P. Thorneycroft began as a regular army subaltern in 1930, resigned his commission three years later to read law, joined the Bar in 1935, and became a Member of Parliament in 1938. This is his fourth ministerial appointment.

Under the new scheme — which is to come into operation on 1st April, 1964 — the parliamentary heads of the three Services will cease to be called First Lord of The Admiralty, Secretary of State for War, and Secretary of State for Air. They

will become Ministers of State for Defence (RN, Army, RAF), will hand over to the Secretary of State for Defence their statutory powers for defence of the realm, and will thereafter discharge whatever responsibilities the Secretary of State may delegate to them from time to time.

It is the intention that the three Services will preserve their separate identities; and among the primary functions of the three Ministers will be execution of policy on behalf of the Secretary of State in respect of their designated Services.

The present Defence Board becomes the Defence Council; the Board of Admiralty, the Army Council and Air Control become Navy, Army and Air Force Boards of that Council. Management of each Service will be delegated to its Board.

There are odd quirks in the new set-up. Judicial and quasi-judicial powers for review of disciplinary awards, the redress of grievances and the like will be vested in the Service Boards. But all regulations, orders and instructions hitherto issued by the Board of Admiralty and by the Army and Air Councils will be issued under the authority of the Defence Council. The three Service Chiefs of Staff in the 1958 reorganisation retained a right of access at all times to the Minister of Defence, and when necessary to the Prime Minister. They have again retained this right in 1963.

The increasing importance of science is recognised by changing the Chief Scientist, Ministry of Defence, into a Chief Scientific

Adviser; and he becomes, with the Chief of Defence Staff and the Permanent Under Secretary of State (in Australian language, Secretary of the Department) one of the three principal advisers to the Secretary of State.

The problem of separation of the three Service headquarters is to be resolved by bringing the Naval, General (Army), and Air Staffs — as distinct from the administrative staffs of the three Services — together into one building, to constitute a Defence Staff.

The Defence Staff "must take into account the views of the individual Services and ensure that plans are based on a realistic assessment of their capabilities. But their principal corporate duty will be to find the best Defence solution to the problems with which they are faced." Since merely being brought together in the one building is unlikely to be enough, existing groupings such as the:—

Joint Planning Staff; and
Joint Warfare Staff

will be joined by four new organisations:—

A Defence Operations Executive;
A Defence Operational Requirements Staff;
A Defence Signals Staff; and
A Defence Intelligence Staff.

As the White Paper states, "A central problem of the new Ministry will be the defence programme and budget. The long-term financial planning and control of the defence programme and the allocation of resources to the three Services will be a primary responsibility

of the Permanent Under Secretary of State."

As the Permanent Under Secretary is to be one of the three principal advisers to the Secretary of State, it would seem, at first sight, that a civilian is to assume a position analogous to that of the civilians at the Pentagon.

However, here again no doubt will emerge the essential difference between the UK and US systems. The PUSS will be a senior career civilian — a trained and thoroughly indoctrinated member of the British civil service. He will be a man of substantial power and firm views, but he will also understand the place of his part of the organisation in the overall service-civilian machine.

Moreover the White Paper makes great play of matters of

leadership and morale, and this could be taken to mean that the UK has seen the difficulty of impersonal approach into which the US system has run. Unless the Secretary of State chooses himself to adopt a potentate's stance, it is unlikely that the civilian side in the UK will run away from the military as it did in the US.

Details of the New Zealand Scheme have not yet been disseminated. They too are adopting a unified Defence Ministry. No doubt it will be nearer in form to the UK than to the US. Moreover the size of their forces is such that a small, taut organisation will be possible. The progress of their scheme will be watched with considerable interest because there is little doubt that enthusiasts in Australia will think a change desirable here.

COMPETITION FOR AUTHORS

The Board of Review has made the following awards of £5 for the best original articles published in the December and January issues:—

December — "Training Army Divers", by Captain L. G. Halls, Royal Australian Engineers.

January — "Population Control Techniques of Communist Insurgents", by F. M. Osanka.

SERVE TO SURVIVE

Colonel D. A. Cormack, ED, (Retd.).

READERS of the article "Australia Alone" — AAJ Sept. '63 — by Captain H. L. Bell, could not fail to have been impressed by the author's clarity of expression and forceful approach to the national problem of adequate defence. Many readers must also have been surprised and gratified that the Journal should print anything critical of the status quo, however mild.

The simple fact is that something must be done and done quickly to restore the army. Captain Bell advocates a full-time regular division. Others favour a part-time CMF raised on a universal training basis. These are questions of economics and best value for money, and on both of these counts a CMF is by far the best proposition. A future CMF must certainly not be dismissed by a type of thinking — to quote Captain Bell — "... as if a computer expert or a cipher coder could be trained in a 14 day camp". The fact is that a CMF collects computer experts and cipher coders and just about everything else as it goes along. What they are trained to do in a 14 day camp is how to work within the

military machine and discover how best to use their civil background. We have had proof in two major wars that the CMF trained civilian expert in any kind of skilled work or profession is a resourceful and reliable soldier.

Next to a full-scale standing army, a large citizens' military reserve is the most valuable contribution towards the safety of this country. It involves personal service with very little sacrifice and also brings many side effect benefits to the community. At present beyond a scattered handful of volunteers and a high percentage of non-effectives on roll books it is fair to say we don't have a CMF of any worth.

Colonel D. A. Cormack, ED, was commissioned in Royal Australian Signals in 1930 and served with 6, 7 and 9 Divisions AIF before becoming CO of Signals, 1 Armoured Division in 1942. He was CO of the Central Signals Training Depot in 1944-45, and finished his war service as CSO NT Force. In 1948 he became CO of 2/21 Australian Horse.

In the event of any crisis our regular forces would not be of anything like the size required and a large intake would become necessary. As the nation's manpower (and womanpower) banked up within the new army, the element of leadership at all levels would soon spread out far too thin. Given time this could adjust itself, but how much time may we be guaranteed?

The need for a part-time civilian military reserve is so obvious as to require no argument at all. The need that this should be on a universal training basis is equally so, provided one is prepared to admit the truth that a voluntary CMF has never been a success.

If our future army is to take the field consisting mainly of former civilians, then it is essential that regular officers who would share the bulk of the leadership should have had "drill hall" experience. It is equally important that future CMF officers should reach a higher standard approaching that of the professional officer. This was possible and actually happened

under the long forgotten "compulsory training" scheme in spite of frustrations in those days due to lack of funds and the small number of available regular Staff Corps and Instructional Corps personnel.

Today we have the best regular army component this country has ever seen. There is every reason to suppose that we could also have a new and highly improved CMF. A large and universal service CMF would do much to restore confidence in the country both at home and abroad. It is a logical partner to a regular military force and each would find support and benefit from the other. If this is not established soon while some of the old leaders are still below the retiring age, then it will become increasingly difficult as each year is allowed to drift by.

On the score that universal training is not among our favourite things — the late President Kennedy struck the right note when he said — "Ask not what your country can do for you, but what you can do for your country."

THE AMPHIBIOUS TRACTOR

Captain A. A. Nolan, BE, AMIE (Aust.),
Royal Australian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers

TWO most interesting and outstanding units of the US Marine Corps are the Amphibious Tractor Battalion and the Amphibious Howitzer Company. These two units are part of Force Troops (Combat Support Group) and are allocated to divisions as required. Their main role is to provide support for the assault on enemy-held beaches. This support takes the form of transportation of men and materials and fire support during the landing.

The Amphibious Tractor Battalion

The organisation of the battalion is shown in Figure 1.

The LVT is a lightly armoured, fully enclosed, tracted amphibious vehicle available in several forms.

1. LVTP. An armoured personnel or cargo carrier. This vehicle can lift 34 combat equipped troops, lift six tons of cargo afloat and nine tons on land, lift a 105 mm. towed howitzer with its crew and 90 rounds




Figure 1




Figure 2

of ammunition. It is 29 ft. 8 ins. long, 11 ft. 8½ ins. wide and 9 ft. 7 ins. high and weighs 31 tons. It is manned by a crew of three. Ground clearance is 18 ins., ground pressure 9.2 p.s.i., maximum speed on land is 30 mph and in the water 6.8 mph. It can overcome a vertical 3 ft. step and a 12 ft wide ditch. Its range is 190 miles on land or 57 miles in the water.

2. LVTC. An armoured personnel carrier using the same hull as the LVTP set up as a command post for the command elements of the assaulting troops. It is fitted with radio sets for naval fire control and air support control purposes.
3. LVTE. An assault engineer type vehicle mounting a mine clearance rocket with line charge and mine clearance plough. The main roles of the LVTE are to breach mine-fields and destroy obstacles.

4. LVTR. A recovery vehicle containing limited repair tools used to tow or repair disabled vehicles.

The LVT is powered through a torque converter to planetary gear systems for high range, low range and reverse. Steering on land is achieved by shifting power from one track to the other through a steer differential. In the water, to provide better manoeuvrability steering is achieved by disengaging all power from one track.

The drive from the transmission goes to the final drive system and thence to the tracks. Propulsion in the water and on land is by means of the tracks.

Captain A. A. Nolan is a Bachelor of Mechanical Engineering and was commissioned in the Royal Australian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, ARA, in 1956. He is at present training in the USA.

Special shaped grousers on the tracks move the vehicle through the water.

In the water freeboard is only 18 ins. The vehicle thus shows a very low profile. The lightly armoured hull provides protection against most small arms fire and shell fragmentation. The embarked troops are thus well protected.

The LVT is remarkably good in the water. List to port or starboard must exceed 126 degrees from the vertical before the vehicle will capsize. It has safely negotiated 22 ft. of plunging surf and in an undamaged condition is practically unsinkable.

The Amphibious Howitzer Company

The organisation of the company is shown in Figure 2.

The LVTH mounts a 105 mm. howitzer on the same hull as is used in the LVTP. It is capable of firing afloat or ashore. The turret will allow 360 degrees traverse of the gun. The vehicle is lightly armoured.

During landings the LVTH provides direct fire support to assist in the landing, particularly after naval gun fire and air support has been lifted. The gun can also perform indirect fire tasks in support of an attack or during defensive operations.

A soldier rode into Albert Park Barracks on a motor scooter. He was in uniform and wearing a white civilian crash helmet with a peak. Army crash helmets are khaki without a peak.

According to the rules this soldier was as improperly dressed as he would be in uniform wearing a homburg.

What would happen if he met an officer? Would he salute?

The only army personnel who appear to be issued with crash helmets are D.R.s and Military Police. They only wear them on official duty — when riding a motor cycle. If army crash helmets were issued to serving owners of motor cycles, would this tend to make their riding official?

In Victoria at least, the riding of a motor cycle without a crash helmet is illegal.

What is the position?

TO GAIN THE REAR

William Paul Haiber

Reprinted from the November 1963 issue of **MILITARY REVIEW**,
Command and General Staff College,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, USA.

GUERILLA activity has always been regarded as a natural by-product of conventional warfare. The Old Testament tells of Samson releasing several hundred fire-touched foxes in the corn and wheatfields of his Philistine enemies in a self-proclaimed act of revenge and sabotage. Wherever there are conquerors and conquered, you are sure to find the bee stings of guerilla activity, a series of unrelated act of violence and sabotage, which to the occupying powers are rationalised as more inconvenience than threat to their continued occupation of a country. By counting the bee stings one is able to gauge the temperament of the hive, and so it has always been.

In recent years, however, the nature of this bee sting warfare has changed enough for us to consider it as an entity, rather than as a by-product of guerilla warfare.

We have witnessed the successful guerilla campaigns of Mao Tse-tung which netted him all of China; the campaign of Ho-Chi-Minh which gave him half of French Indochina, and a stranglehold on the other; the

winning campaign of Fidel Castro which put all of Cuba in the Communist bag; and the success of the Front of National Liberation (FLN) which terminated French rule in Algeria.

Until recently, the United States has never been involved in such guerilla wars deeply enough to employ American military forces or to give military supplies in sufficient quantities to prevent guerilla takeovers. Our aid has always been token. The prevailing United States political sentiment has been that the insurgents had some merit in their revolt, and that these insurgents were not — since they had denied the name — Communists. In one way or another we had been propagandised or talked into positions of non-intervention, or half-hearted assistance, when we did decide to do something.

William Paul Haiber, a technical writer with International Business Machines, has served in both the United States Navy and Air Force. A student of military history, Mr. Haiber received his B.A. degree from Brooklyn College.

The United States, long a spectator, has now been called upon to take part in the game, and much of what we finally do depends on a correct knowledge of the concepts and practices of guerilla warfare.

For the first time we are beginning to realise that guerilla warfare is the actual form of the war we are fighting in South Vietnam, and that it never sprang from conventional warfare.

Slowly and surely we are beginning to realise that guerilla warfare can be of and by itself both the tactics and strategies of conquest. Slowly and surely we are coming to realise that our enemies shun battle as formal, conventional confrontations, preferring, instead, to wage a far more subtle, economic, and less bloody (for them) conflict — a conflict they feel certain of winning.

First Guerilla Wars

That guerilla warfare goes much deeper than an annoying series of seemingly disconnected acts of violence and sabotage can best be seen if we go back in time to Lawrence of Arabia, whom Liddell Hart credits with winning the first of the modern guerilla wars. Lawrence's campaign, fought against the Turks between 1916 and 1918, was based on self-formulated principles of guerilla warfare. The validity of Lawrence's principles rested in their applicability to the time, terrain, and temperament of the combatants. The conventional forms employed slavishly by the Turks were valid if, and only if, their opponents chose to play



T. E. LAWRENCE

by the same rules; this was Lawrence's purpose — to play by rules his enemies could not follow.

Lawrence analysed, among others, the war philosophies of Clausewitz, Napoleon, and Foch, only to find them strangely inapplicable to the war problems facing the Hejaz Arabs then in revolt against Turkey. He went on to formulate his own theories of strategic guerilla warfare, which makes his book — *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* — a still usable manual of principles and techniques for non-conventional forms.

Liddell Hart, writing in 1936, cited Lawrence as a genius because he had created an entirely new form of warfare out of the elements of the old. Hart suggested that Lawrence's war was but the handwriting on the wall; that guerilla wars would eliminate most of the senseless vio-

lence and brute force usually engendered in the conventional; and that they would be fought with greater economy.

How did Lawrence wage his unconventional war against the Turks?

Gain the Rear

Simply stated, Lawrence felt that the aim of all military activity is to gain the rear behind one's enemies, since it represents all that is tender, vulnerable, and open to both exploitation and domination at minimum cost to the aggressor. Guerilla warfare begins and ends in an already occupied rear area. This activity is characterised by a subtle multiplication of force, by being, as Lawrence theorised, "an influence, a thing invisible, intangible, without front or back, drifting about like a gas". Guerilla warfare does away with the concept of fronts entirely.

The conditions Lawrence considered necessary for a guerilla campaign in the Middle East were:

- The Turks would operate on long, easily accessible lines of communication.
- The Turks would be bound by the rules of conventional warfare.
- The Turks would remain ignorant of the predictability of their own defeat.

Shortly before the beginning of World War I, the Turks threw in their lot with the Germans. The British, realising the threat to their Suez lifeline, tried to take them out by their ill-fated Gallipoli Campaign. The failure at Gallipoli permitted the

Turks to strengthen their hold and confirm their leadership over the Ottoman Empire, then in a state of collapse, administratively, but still the stronghold of Islam and all that implied.

Religious Strife


The great boil on the back of the Ankara Moslems embodied itself in the austere orthodox Hejaz Arabs who never ceased to sing the song of successorship to the Prophet and to proclaim spiritual leadership over Islam. The Ankara Government could not hold its loyalty by either persuasion or by force. And so it came about that, after the Turks hanged several sherifs and imprisoned others, the Arabs went into open revolt, rallying around the green banners of King Hussein. The time was June 1916.

With little effort the Arabs captured the twin holy cities of Islam, Mecca and Medina.

The Turks, true believers in the value of properly applied force, responded promptly by sending an army corps down the rails to Medina, which the Arabs relinquished almost as easily as they had acquired it. The second phase of Turkish operations was to push a corps out of Medina to capture Mecca which lay 250 miles beyond their reach, across a railless desert.

Taking that city was another story, and in it lies the story of Lawrence, the first of the modern guerilla campaigns, and the birth of communications warfare.

The English were not idle. They had high hopes of exploiting the Arab revolt, and they



eventually chose Lawrence as their agent to bring this about. Lawrence was at that time a rather unconventional young staff officer at general headquarters in Cairo, with a well-known background of travel among the Arabs and a deep understanding of their language and customs.

In 1916 Lawrence chose to spend his leave visiting Arabia, where his contacts quickly gained him access to Prince Faisal, who led the Arab Army. Much impressed with Faisal, he returned to Cairo to advise that the revolt could succeed without the aid of British troops, who could ill be spared.

The general staff, delighted with this economy, dispatched Lawrence as liaison officer to Faisal in order to put his ideas into practice. Within two years, Lawrence generated the legend and the facts that after 45 years are still subject to both controversy and admiration.

Situation

The situation Lawrence confronted had no pleasing orientations. The Turks were spread out along the Hejaz Railroad, 800 miles in length, which ran parallel to the Red Sea, across the high tableland of Arabia, connecting Damascus in the north with Medina in the south. The Hejaz line was a single track affair, having been built by German engineers from monies collected throughout Islam. Its construction was religious, in that it was built to make the pilgrimage to Mecca possible for much of the Islamic population. The line had been completed in 1908 as far as Medina; its con-

struction to Mecca had been halted by the advent of the war.

In the north, in what is called the Fertile Crescent, a British army faced a Turko-German force determined to fight for every yard of ground. Both sides used the "effusion of blood" principle developed by Foch; this led to a stalemate.

The Germans realised that the Turks were dissipating their forces along the length of the Hejaz line, forces that might well swing the balance of attrition their way. Medina had absolutely no military value, but the Turks insisted on holding the town for religious considerations, completely ignoring that a military victory in the north would give them Medina forever.

The defeat of German and Turkish arms lay in the rails between Damascus and Medina; Lawrence saw it there, and he made it happen.

Conventional thinking on the part of the Arabs was vague and nebulous, calling for some unspecified movement against the Medina Turks. The Turks, however, took the initiative and pushed a whole army corps out of that city on a broad front moving toward Mecca. One wing reached for Rabigh in the Red Sea, at which seaport the Arab regular army was in training.

Lawrence realised that the Arab irregulars could neither hold a line nor defend one. Their strength, he thought, lay in depth rather than in front, and that it had been the threat of an attack by Faisal's men against the northern Turkish flank that had actually inhibited for so

many precious weeks the latter's attempt against Mecca. Developing this flank threat, Lawrence and Faisal quit Rabigh, moved north to Wejh, another Red Sea port, occupied it in January 1917, and set up a new base.

Turning Point

The Arab movement northward threw the Turks into confusion. They cancelled their drive against Mecca, returned to Medina, and sprinkled half their strength along the railroad, reinforcing station garrisons. Although it was not apparent at the time, the movement to Wejh was the actual turning point in the war. It forced the Turks to create a front almost 800 miles in length. To the Turkish leaders the front gave the appearance of one solid black line, impenetrable and strong; but to the Arabs the front was composed of black dots representing rail garrisons, with the interstices more apparent and meaningful than the dots.

As Lawrence saw it:

For the rest of the war the Turks stood on the defensive and the Arab tribesmen won advantage after advantage till, when peace came, they had taken 35,000 prisoners, killed and wounded and wore out as many, and occupied more than 100 thousand square miles of enemy ground, at little loss to themselves.

By not fighting the Turks, the Hejaz Arabs had been able to gain the initiative and prevent movement against Mecca; the Turks, having little forage for their transport animals, were forced to eat them. Without

animals, a foot movement to Mecca was impossible.

Lawrence had seen the essence of Arabian aims as geographical, to occupy all Arabic-speaking lands. Killing Turks was not one of the aims. If the Turks would go quietly, the war would be over; if they refused, they would be driven out, but at the cheapest possible price.

Initially, Arab thinking had been along conventional lines — begin some sort of movement against the rails, preferably behind Medina, there to bring on a battle that would merely demonstrate the capacity of blood to flow without coming to any real decision. Lawrence was against it, and as persuasively as he could he presented his analysis of war and how that analysis meshed with Arab aims.

Three Elements

Lawrence saw all warfare as a three-element affair: one algebraical; one biological; and one psychological.

Algebraic

The algebraic element dealt with known variables like time, space, geography, climate, transportation, and men in type-masses. In this element Lawrence saw 140,000 square miles of Turkish-occupied ground. He estimated that it would require a minimum of 20 soldiers to hold four square miles, or a total of 600,000 men. The Turks had available 100,000 men. As Lawrence conceived it, this conspired to give the Arabs dominance.

Biological

The biological element dealt with wear and tear, with the one

element of unpredictable variability — men and the commanders of men. Lawrence observed that the greatest commander was:

... one whose intuitions most nearly happen. Nine-tenths of tactics are certain, and taught in books; but the irrational tenth is like a kingfisher flashing across the pool and that is the test of generals.

Lawrence extended his wear and tear theory to include materials. He knew that the Turks were not strong in them, so that the "death" of a Turkish rail, train, depot, gun, or cannon was more important than the death of a Turk. Depriving an enemy of his weapons and sustenance rendered him as useless as if he were, indeed, dead. The Arabs, who could not endure losses in men, were always able to arrange for material superiority in all of their attacks.

Lawrence's theory called for the negation of contact with the enemy. The Arabs were to fight a war of detachment, to contain the enemy by:

... the silent threat of a vast unknown, not disclosing ourselves until the moment of the attack. This attack need only be nominal, directed not against his men but against his materials: as it should not seek for his main strength or his weakness, but his most accessible material.

As a working tactic the enemy was to be denied his targets, and thousands of Turkish soldiers in the desert never fired a shot as a result. To avoid being targets, the Arabs developed and maintained a very effective intelli-

gence net. They were always able to disperse, to evaporate before the Turks arrived. Non-productive marches and counter-marches always subtracted from enemy morale.

Psychological

The psychological element dealt with the adjustment of the minds of the troops; of the minds of one's enemies; and, wherever possible of the minds of neutrals and non-combatant populations. Lawrence wrote:

The printing press is the greatest weapon in the armoury of the modern commander . . . a province was won when the civilians in it had been taught to die for the ideal of freedom: the presence of the enemy was of secondary importance.

According to Plan

And so it came about, quite intentionally and according to plan, that the Turks were allowed to maintain themselves in great numbers in every harmless place, including Medina. They felt disposed to concentrate in areas they could effectively dominate. Their confidence was restored by a reduction in Arab guerilla operations.

As it developed, the Arab strategy was not to destroy the Hejaz Railroad, but to keep it operating at a minimum, with maximum discomfort to the enemy. In short, the Arab attacks on the line were designed to fix the maximum number of Turkish soldiers all along the rails, making it possible for the Arabs to provide an overwhelming force at any single point on the line.

Arab strategy called for a distribution of attacks along the entire Turkish line to lend the appearance of Arab superiority and to force the Turks to build up their rail garrisons beyond a minimum number of men.

As Lawrence stated:

The ratio between area and number determined the character of the war. By having five times the mobility of the Turks, the Arabs could be on terms with them, with one fifth their number.

To Lawrence, battles were impositions on the side which considered itself to be the weaker.

The Arabs were to defend nothing, shoot nothing. Their cards were speed and time, not hitting power, and these gave them strategic rather than tactical strength. Range is more to strategy than force: the invention of bully beef did more to modify land warfare than the invention of gunpowder.

By putting these theories to work, Lawrence's guerilla forces captured 'Aquaba, Tafla, Azraq, Dera, and finally Damascus. By using the widest distribution of force with the maximum number of raids going at once, the Arabs achieved maximum disorder; it was this that supplied equilibrium to their campaign.

The accomplishments of Lawrence and his guerilla forces were masked by General Edmund Allenby's conventional breakthrough in the north. Yet for all of Allenby's closeness to the final objective — Damascus — it was Lawrence and his men who met him at the gates of the city, having come a much greater

distance and overcoming greater obstacles. As Allenby's mobile right wing, it was Lawrence who had made the conventional victory in the north possible by tying down thousands of Turks to the Hejaz rails.

The Thesis

Out of this protracted and gruelling warfare, Lawrence developed his thesis by which a successful guerilla war could be waged:

Rebellion must have an unassailable base, guarded not merely from attack, but from fear of it: such a base as the Arabs had in the Red Sea ports, the deserts, or in the minds of men converted to its creeds. It must have a sophisticated alien enemy, in the form of a disciplined army of occupation too few to fulfil the doctrine of acreage: too few to adjust number to space, in order to dominate the whole effectively from fortified posts. It must have a friendly population, not actively friendly, but sympathetic to the point of not betraying rebel movements to the enemy. Rebellions can be made by 2% active in a striking force, and 98% positively sympathetic. The few active rebels must have the qualities of speed and endurance, ubiquity and independence of arteries of supply. They must have the technical equipment to destroy or paralyse the enemies' organised communications, for irregular warfare is fairly Willisen's definition of strategy, "the study of communication" in its extreme degree of attack where the enemy is not.

In fifty words: granted mobility, security (in the form of denying the enemy targets), time and doctrine (the idea to convert every subject to friendliness), victory will rest with the insurgents, for the algebraical factors are in the end decisive, and against them perfection of means and spirit struggle quite in vain.

Even a brief inspection of the tactical and strategic theories and practices used in all of the guerilla campaigns fought since 1916 shows them to be duplicates of those developed by Lawrence. Where most of the guerilla wars have failed, namely in the Philippines, Malaya, Greece, and Kenya, the basic conditions for success, if initially present, were absent in the end as the result of aggressive counter-measure, some luck, and bad practice or misapplication.

To control, and then defeat, the Viet Cong in South Vietnam may be a long and costly proposition. That the struggle should be continued to its planned endings cannot be successfully disputed. On moral grounds alone we cannot simply turn over country after country to a handful of rebels whose will does not reflect the will of the people.

In South Vietnam the border between the rebels and North

Vietnam and Laos is their gateway to safety, their unassailable base. We can never hope with present policy what it is to penetrate that base. We must operate on the minds of the people in South Vietnam. We must ensure that they are 98 per cent. sympathetic to our aims. Then the rebels will be deprived of their supplies, mobility, and, lastly, their morale.

In handling future threats of guerilla wars in South America, a possible battleground of the future, it would stand us in good stead to adjust our thinking to this form of warfare to that we are as skillful and wary as our enemies. We have only to look at the start that has already been made in Cuba to know what might happen elsewhere in Latin America. Today, the rebels are in the hills preaching and propagandising, winning converts; tomorrow they will sit in the parliaments of man, where they do not belong, with a death grip on half the world, and with only half a world to go.

Our salvation lies in understanding the nature of these wars, fought on the cheap, by stealth, by terror, by intrigue, with skill and resolution. We must develop counter-techniques that will change the balance sheet of our failures into victories.

LOGISTICS

THE LOST CAUSE

Major N. M. Turner,
Royal Australian Army Service Corps

THE STUDY of military history is an important facet in the training of professional soldiers. From this study has developed the current tactical doctrine and military organisations. There is concrete evidence to support the view that we have learned valuable lessons from the successes and failures of our military predecessors on the field of battle. But the same development is not so evident in the field of logistics. Undoubtedly current logistic doctrine and organisations have been evolved from past experience and have been designed to cope with the latest tactical developments based on the modern family of weapons and equipment.

However, there is an obvious void in the planning phase and this discrepancy is indicative of an incomplete study of military history and a lack of credence about the importance of a sound, adequate logistic system to support the tactical plans.

We seem to have overlooked the wealth of evidence available from a study of even the more recent battles of World War II. We do not seem to have learned from the classical examples of New Guinea where first the Australian and later the Japanese operations hinged

almost entirely on the availability of logistic support. We have overlooked the consequences of inadequate logistic support as experienced by Rommel in the desert and the XIV Army in Burma.

All of this evidence indicates that although success in battle may be decided by guts and determination, the degree of success will be determined by the adequacy of the logistic support available. It is pertinent then to examine the current capacity for logistic support of our planned field force, and our attitude towards logistics as a study and as a job.

Attitude

Our attitude towards logistics is influenced by an unfortunate stigma which seems to surround the logistic services. This stigma arises within the military colleges and affects the selection of officers for the services. As a result, very few officer cadets voluntarily opt to be appointed to the services, and it is normal for the services to be allocated those who are left after the arms have had first choice. This does not mean in any way that the services are led by officers of low calibre, but it does reflect the general attitude towards such appointments.

Officer training pays little more than lip service towards logistic training. In general, logistics as a study is left to the experts and an aura of mystery surrounds the functions of logistic units to the unenlightened arms officers. Unfortunately, this state of affairs exists even at Staff College. Perhaps no-one could deny that it is far more interesting to throw tanks into battle, to unravel the mysteries of a fire plan and discuss the use of helicopters, than to concern oneself with the problems of how the tanks, ammunition and helicopters are to be provided and maintained.

It is not surprising, therefore, that many of the important logistic staff appointments are filled by arms officers whose background knowledge and interest is inadequate for their task. Service officers, by virtue of their employment and foremost interest in the problems associated with this aspect of military art, absorb a very sound appreciation of logistics. It is not astonishing then, that these officers become frustrated in their efforts to convince their staff masters of the importance of the various logistic problems and gain little success in their case for more understanding of their problems.

Present State of Affairs

The attitude towards logistics has influenced the growth of the field force. Our military might looks good on paper and would convince most politicians that they are getting top value for the tax-payers' money. But the regrettable fact is that we are

breeding a monster which would be incapable of worthwhile sustained military operation.

Whilst the teeth-arm units are well-equipped and well-trained, the logistic units, such as they are, are forced to operate on a shoe-string. The logistic field force units must rely upon shadow-posted men to bring them up to strength. In most cases, these units, with their permanently raised members, are loaned back to Commands for annual exercises. This is resulting in an imbalanced force at varied degrees of readiness for overseas service.

The type of warfare in which we are most likely to be engaged in the future will tax the logistic units to the utmost in their capacity to combine their normal tasks with the requirement to provide for their own defence. Logistic units require as much training as the arms which they are to support, and only a fraction of the training required can be gained by the practice of their various trade skills in the loan back role, and even less for the

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shadow-posted men. Fully raised units available for full time training is the only satisfactory way in which this short-coming can be corrected.

The efficiency of the basic structure of the Army in Australia must also be examined. The Command, Administrative and Training organisation provides the capacity for the peace-time Army to be recruited and maintained in their more static locations, and provides the framework for expansion in time of war. It provides the ability to train the CMF as potential reinforcements to the ARA field force and maintains a network of command structure, communications, depots and training establishments without which the field force could not exist. Yet the efficiency of this static organisation is continually undermined by the absence of shadow-posted men and loan back units. Techniques are being forgotten as supply depots and their like are scaled down or closed, and many essential postings are filled by civilians. The development of overseas operations could well involve a parallel development of overseas base depots which must be manned by personnel previously trained in peace-time. Reliance on civilian employees has been shown to create real problems in the availability of trained men who can be posted overseas. This was seen vividly in the Suez crisis.

Where Are We Going?

The future development of the Australian Military Forces has been announced as principally the expansion of the field force.

This growth has been made possible by an increase in defence expenditure which will support the additional manpower and equipment required. But in return for this increased expenditure our political masters will expect more infantry, more artillery, more power to kill the enemy — and more headaches for the logistician.

It seems that new battle groups will be given priority for manpower as it becomes available. Logistic field force units, already inadequate for the support of existing arms units, will be made even more inadequate as the field force is expanded. Logistic units will probably continue to rely upon shadow-postings and will continue to be unavailable for full-time training.

We will press for the purchase of new equipments, such as heavy-lift helicopters, without a full appreciation of the logistic implications. Yet these same problems may well influence the tactical employment of the new equipment and will certainly affect the logistic order of battle.

It is becoming evident that the study of logistics has far-reaching effects, and it may well be that the appointment of officers to logistic postings should be confined to those who have been selected and especially trained for such appointments. It is possible that in the future we should have officers who are trained exclusively for either general staff or logistic staff appointments. At the very least more emphasis must be placed on the logistic training of all officers.

Conclusion

The aim of providing Australia with a worthwhile mobile field force, available for overseas service at short notice, is the most significant peace-time achievement in Australian military history. It should not be prejudiced by the growth of an imbalanced force.

The fact that modern warfare is expensive in manpower and equipment for effective and adequate logistic support must be accepted, and the rate of growth of the field force must be governed by the parallel growth of arms units and the necessary logistic support units. The logistic units must be adequate to meet the needs of forecasted operational plans.

The state of readiness of all units, both arms and logistic, must be kept in line by raising the logistic units for full-time training. Provision must be made for the growth of the field force without prejudice to the efficient operation of Command, Administrative and Training

units and headquarters. Logistic techniques must be kept alive by the continued use of static depots manned by soldiers rather than civilians. Otherwise, the growth of the field force by raising new battle groups will be as futile as the development of a new machine without the provision of a source of power to operate it.

Logistic training must assume a more important role in the training of officers and consideration must be given to the separate progression of training and postings for officers destined for general staff or logistic staff appointments. Logistic training is completely inadequate at the moment, and the full import of logistic problems will continue to be underplayed until this state of affairs is rectified.

Logistics, so essential to eventual success in battle, will remain a lost cause and the lessons before us will stay unheeded unless remedial action is taken in time. Let us have the witch-hunt now — not afterwards when it is too late and has cost needless lives.

SOCIAL STUDIES

NECESSITY *or* HUMBUG?

Captain O. H. J. Wieser, BA,
Royal Australian Army Education Corps

SOCIAL STUDIES, like every other subject without tradition, has covered, and still covers, a multitude of sins. It has meant different things to different people and has included subjects ranging from "How to eat with a knife and fork" to violent anti-capitalist, anti-nazi, anti-democratic, anti-fascist and anti-communist tirades by frequently ill-informed people.

Social Studies as a subject was born in the war years, and after the war the experts of the various education departments were split into enthusiastically pro-Social Studies and equally keen anti-Social Studies camps. The subject was like an unwanted baby — nobody knew quite what to do with it, and the subject matter was left, more or less, up to a few enthusiasts who could see a glimmer of life in the early protozoic writhings of this embryo.

Soon the question arose: What exactly is it all about? Few could answer this and fewer still were prepared to lay their professional reputations on the block and actually give the answer. Today the answer is beginning to grow out of the chaos. Social Studies is the specialised teaching of a

specialised history, geography, economics and civics to either specialised classes in schools, or, what is more important, to specialised professions. The teaching of Social Studies, for instance, would differ in such fields as trade, foreign affairs, education, the armed forces or the social services. In this article I am concerned as to what Social Studies can offer to the armed services, especially to the Army.

Social Studies in the Army would be the specialised knowledge of the South-East Asian area. It is not only desirable to have this, but absolutely essential, because it is this service which will depend on its intimate knowledge of the area and its inhabitants not only to succeed in its objective, but to survive.

The reasons for this are obvious:

- (1) Nobody will deny that any Australian contingent in South-East Asia will be heavily out-numbered by the local inhabitants, which frequently are anti-western anyway.
- (2) Furthermore, nobody will deny that any Australian contingent will have to ensure the full co-operation of the inhabitants if it wants

to be successful in its objective, because the inhabitants know the area and its high-ways and by-ways much better than anyone from another country. But how can one get co-operation, if one knows nothing about the area or its inhabitants.

- (3) Therefore it is of extreme importance that the soldier who serves in this area does not only know his weapons and tactics, but also everything there is to know about the terrain and the people he comes into contact with.

For this purpose, Social Studies in the Army could be divided into the following sub-units, which can be covered to varying depths according to the ranks to whom it is taught.

- (1) Geography —
 - (a) Physical,
 - (b) Human,
 - (c) Social.
- (2) Economics of the area under discussion.
- (3) History.

1. Geography

(a) *Physical Geography*: One of the soldier's first principles is that he knows intimately the country he fights in. He must know its terrain and its topography. He must know the main forms of communications whether they be road, rail, track or canal. Furthermore, if he knows the vegetation, climate and rainfall of a country he will be further helped, because he should be able to draw various important conclusions from this.

How many of our soldiers are blithely happy in the knowledge

that Indonesia has a hot, wet climate and is covered in jungle and padi fields? Little do they realise, even up to officer level, that the climate in these islands changes with altitude and while they may be sweating in the steamy mangrove swamps of Sumatra, with a 150 ins. rainfall, they are frequently unaware that a few thousand feet above sea-level, where many villages are found, rainfall drops to about 30 ins., the vegetation changes to savannah and temperatures as low as 39°F. have been recorded, while the shortage of water can be quite a problem.

In the same area, a look at the map reveals a number of short rivers. Short rivers coming from mountainous areas are normally unnavigable. How many soldiers do know that many of them are permanently navigable during the monsoon, which on the other hand, bars the entrance to ships on other rivers. Intimate knowledge of these facts can overcome delays, misunderstandings, shortage of supplies or a shorter, more direct route to an objective further inland.

(b) *Human Geography*: This subject covers the way and the manner in which human beings adapt themselves to their environment.

Again a map and the necessary background knowledge can tell the trained observer what sort of people he is likely to encounter in a given area. For instance, he is not likely to find many peasants in the jungle areas of Borneo, while in the hill country of the Sino-Thai border the inhabitants, being frequently

primitive and semi-nomadic, may meet him with distrust and doubt. If he wants their co-operation, he must know their likes and dislikes. Primitive people, even more so than civilised ones, are very touchy on laws, customs and taboos, and the soldier has to tread carefully lest he break any of them and end his days then and there.

The distribution of population also falls into this field as much as it falls into economics. The most fertile areas are frequently the ones with the densest population. Thus we find that 40% of the population of Indonesia lives on Java and 75% of this figure on the eastern half of the island. On the other hand, large tracts on South-east Asia are not only underpopulated, but have no population at all. Surely this is worth knowing from a soldier's point of view.

Furthermore, does it help if the soldier knows that 80% of the population of South-east Asia is suffering from malnutrition? Does this fact give any information about the stamina and fighting qualities of his potential adversary?

(c) *Social Geography*: This can be called the peoples' way of life. World War II and the Franco-Vietnamese affair have shown that while an army can fight another army, no army can fight a people and expect to get away with it.

Modern war is becoming as much a civilian affair as a soldier's business.

The Germans were forced to tie down dozens of divisions in France and other occupied

territories because they failed to handle the population correctly. Why was this the case? Because the attitude which the Nazi Party adopted interfered very strongly with the people's way of life.

We find that the French in Indo-China made a similar mistake only that in their case it was not an accepted party line, but could be laid down to sheer, plain ignorance on the part of the French. The French, despite their superiority of arms and training, failed to retain Indo-China, not only because they failed to accept the doctrine of guerilla tactics until it was too late, but also because they did not bother to revise their ideas about Indo-Chinese guerillas, who, ably led by communist trained agitators, rallied the peasantry around them, who co-operated with them, even if not actively, then by refusing to give information to the French, or by giving the wrong information or by keeping the guerillas informed of French movements.

We often tend to call all guerillas communists. Rarely do we realise that many of them are just good patriots who are misguided and have succumbed to communist propaganda.

2. Economics

The economics of an area should be of interest to a soldier. It is essential for him to know not only what products are found in a certain district, but also how important these products are to the economy of a real or potential enemy.

Seeing that South-east Asia is primarily an agricultural and

fishing area, any secondary industries are vital for anyone's war efforts. It is essential to know their centres, but also any coal and oilfields in the hands of an enemy.

3. History

This is often the most maligned branch of Social Studies, especially in the Army. Troops and often their commanders fail to see the significance of this subject. The reason for this is that as soon as history is mentioned, they see before them a jumble of more or less meaningless dates. While such history teaching was once fashionable, its faults have been recognised and have been remedied. History as studied in Army Social Studies should not be a collection of dates, but a tracing of cause and effect.

As every good company commander knows, the more he knows about the personal history of a man under his command, the easier the man will often be to handle. So it should be with the history branch of Social Studies. For example: Pte Bloggs of X Coy 5 RAR went on a bender on 1 Jul 63. The date in this case is not really important. What is important is why he did do it and what was the outcome.

Similarly, it is immaterial as to the exact date when Singapore fell, but it is highly important to know why this so-called impenetrable fortress was taken and what effect this had on the Allied War effort from 1942/45.

I think that I have made myself clear what type of history is needed. History can be the "Man Management" of districts, areas,

and even countries. By knowing the cause and effects of certain events in a certain country and by knowing the major traits which constitute national pride, one can play on people's emotions, flatter their pride and get them to co-operate much more easily than by force. This is specially so with certain Asian races who are known to become stoical in the face of force or terror. This principle has been recognised by the communists and is put to practice with a great deal of success.

What constitutes the principles of History as viewed from a Social Studies angle?

Firstly the economic history of the country. Secondly religion, because the way of life in Asia is invariably tied up with religion. This can be seen in the recent coup in South Vietnam. In this case we find, whatever the final outcome might be, that to the common man it was a fight of Bhuddism versus Christianity and the overthrow of an unpopular "Grey Eminence" in the person of Mme. Nhu.

Thirdly, it often helps to know something about the races living there, and of the contribution these races have made to the way of life. Races in Asia frequently coexist, but do not really mingle with one another. Thailand is an exception to this rule. Often we find tension existing between various races, which can be exploited to profit by any potential and active enemy.

Fourthly, it is of importance to know why communism is spreading so rapidly in various areas in Asia. Above all we must know

not only the major weapons used by communism, such as agitation and trade penetration, but also the lesser ones. Communism constantly finds new methods of subversion and the Research Services Office in SEATO is permanently employed to discover the latest and increasingly subtle methods used. Therefore, the threat is recognised and definitely real.

The question now arises: Does the soldier really have to know all this? The answer is invariably Yes. Once more, the higher his rank the more he must know about it. The reasons for this are obvious: (1) South-east Asia may become his theatre of war. (2) He is going into an area where he is outnumbered, where his enemy knows every inch of terrain, where his own supply lines are insecure and long, while on the other hand those of the enemy are short and within the country. (3) To survive he must know the country and get the co-operation of the inhabitants. (4) How can he get this if he doesn't know "what makes them tick"?

Obviously to become an expert in such matters would require

years of study. The soldier cannot afford this because:

- (1) He has other duties.
- (2) His main duty is to fight and win a war.

But this is precisely where the study of this area can help him.

A broad knowledge of the general physical geography and a smattering of local history and customs would benefit the OR. The NCO and WO must have a slightly more specialised knowledge of the area, to include the other geographies and economics, while the officer should have a thorough working knowledge of this area in which he may have to lead troops, secure local co-operation or administer already occupied territory.

In conclusion, we can say that Social Studies is a wide and varied field which gives opportunity to assimilate facts and information in a variety of specialised fields. One of those fields is necessary to the Army, because it is necessary to make yourself familiar with every facet of the terrain in which we may have to fight and with the people in whose territory we have to fight.

SERVICE DOGS

FOR

THE A.M.F.

Trooper K. Metius

8/13 Victorian Mounted Rifles

DOGS have been used for military purposes since men started fighting, even before the Roman armies. All over the world during World War II many services on both sides used dogs with great effect in action. Despite this proof the Australian Forces, with one exception, have not made real use of dogs. The exception is the use of German Shepherd dogs to guard the RAAF base at Tottenham, Victoria. This neglect may be due to a lack of highly qualified dog trainers or the attitude of some Farmers' Associations which have discriminated against the German Shepherd dog for personal reasons.

Although the army is being modernised, the dog is no more out-dated than the soldier. A properly trained dog can make a soldier more effective and provide him with senses that will never be duplicated by electronics. Service dogs would fit in well with the modern pentropic battle group fighting guerillas in the jungle. There are several tasks for which a dog can be trained, such as scouting, patrolling, guarding, mine warfare, and mine detecting to mention but a few.

Guard Dogs

Guard dogs are used to guard prisoners, military property and vital strategic points such as bridges, dams, communication centres, etc. They have natural courage and will attack on command or at will if their duty is a free-roaming job within an enclosed area. Guard dogs can also be trained as tracker dogs, but only on a long lead if they were trained for free-roaming guard duties.

Dogs are able to differentiate smells of our own and enemy troops due to their different diets, living habits, etc. They also will detect suspects who usually produce a different perspiration when excited or disturbed. Finally, it is impossible to surprise a listening post or guard provided with a well-trained dog.

Scout Dogs

This type of dog is trained for reconnaissance patrols. It is evasive and silent; it will not bark if its life depends on it. The scout dog patrols ahead of its handler (1st Scout) and will return at once when it makes contact. On return it will point in the direction of contact. Even

if the enemy does not move, the dog will scent them before they have seen the dog, or at least the patrol itself, except in wide-open country. If the enemy is moving, the dog will hear them far ahead, much earlier than the human ear. There is no hope of ambushing a reconnaissance patrol which is led by a well-trained dog. Scout dogs are also trained as mine-detecting and tracker dogs.

Infantry Patrol Dogs

This dog will also act as scout but at a shorter range ahead of the fighting patrol. It is not completely silent as the previously mentioned scout dog. The infantry patrol dog is a first class all-round dog and is also trained for mine detecting, mine warfare, tracking and guarding. It cannot be used as a silent scout dog. The training of the patrol dog is dependent on many factors and not all dogs will achieve the high standards mentioned under this heading.

Mine Warfare Dogs

Such dogs are trained to crawl under armoured vehicles while carrying a mine on its back. The mine detaches itself from the dog's harness when the magnets on the mine touch the steel of the armoured vehicle. The mine is set off by a timing mechanism after it is detached from the dog's harness. The dog is trained to use natural cover and return to the handler on the double. There are many ways to train such dogs for their own safety and there is absolutely no need for cruel butchery of dogs as they are too precious. Mine

warfare dogs make use of vibrations and sound caused by armoured vehicles and need not see the object (night, smoke screen, fog, vegetation). When ambushing enemy harbour areas, dogs will not give away the position of the fighting patrol as they will send the dogs to the object, and then move quickly to another position. The dogs will approach the object quickly without making a noise, they will be seen when it is too late, and return to the starting point and then follow the fighting patrol under cover to their new position. In fact, the mines will explode when the dogs are returning.

The Russians used such dogs in the 2nd World War but they ran out of trained dogs because there were no magnetic or timing devices. The dogs carried live mines.

Mine Detecting Dogs

These dogs are trained to detect hidden land mines. Our engineers have trained such dogs in Australia. To my knowledge, these dogs were only trained for mine detecting work which seems to be a luxury in war. Service dogs should be trained for several tasks and not for only one. This is the least important task since mine detectors are available.

Reconnaissance Dogs

Another but yet untested task would be for reconnaissance dogs working alone at night to patrol the gaps between battle groups. Electronic beams cannot be screened in timbered or mountainous country and must be

patrolled to detect enemy penetration. In this case a well-trained dog can do a better job. The dog is equipped with an electronic device on its back. It has been shown the patrol route during daytime and will follow this track on its own during night. As soon as the dog makes contact between the two battle groups it will give a signal (short growl) and return at once to its base. Two dog handlers on both sides of the battle group are always in radio contact with the dog and will be able to determine the location of the penetrating enemy because of the electronic equipment carried by the dog. The dog will be out of range when the first shells are fired.

It should be remembered that allied agents carried telemetric devices to the top secret harbour area of the armoured division "Das Reich" which was relocated during the invasion of France. The allied air force immobilised this elite division completely but only because of the help of tracking devices.

V.H.F. Location Systems which can be carried in the pocket have been developed, while in World War II the transmitters were installed in a car.

Swedish police also have made successful experiments, using waveguide instruments with police dogs. There are certainly more jobs for dogs in modern warfare, such as parachuting with commandos, detecting the wounded, giving the alarm for nuclear fallout, because dogs cannot stand radiation and will be affected well before humans.

It should be emphasised that dogs cannot be trained to a high standard in a short time. So much depends on service dogs that the army cannot afford to have half-trained dogs when they are needed. Service dog trainers must have first-class knowledge in animal psychology as this is the only basis for dog training. Such knowledge is also vital for the individual dog handler. Dog handlers cannot be ordered to train dogs but must volunteer. They must be trained in psychology, training methods, dog management, first aid and dog diseases before the practical dog training starts. The handlers must also be prepared from the beginning to make full use of their charges even if its life may be endangered. There is no place for sentimental emotion-alists, because these dogs are trained for a purpose. If the regular army has not enough suitable personnel available for dog handlers and trainers, it would be a good chance for CMF units to recruit privately-owned dogs and handlers to establish dog squads or to have some dogs trained for the units tasks. These dogs would be ready for action when required, which would save at least three months or even more, depending on the trainer, handler and dog.

Authorities should not be led astray by the opinion of dog fanciers, who will praise their own breeds. The German Shepherd is the only breed suitable for the multiple training of a Service dog. Other dogs can do a job too, but they will be out of the question when it comes to high performance and multiple train-

ing which is so important in war-time.

US forces in West Germany have over 1,000 German Shepherd dogs in service. They have been educated at their training centres at Wiesbaden and Lengries. The West German Bundeswehr also has its own training centres and employs a large number of Shepherds. The UK FARELF prefers German Shepherd dogs in most cases. The Burmese Army is establishing dog training centres consisting only of Shepherds imported from Australia. Indonesia imported German Shepherds from Germany some years ago. The US forces supplied Service dogs to South Vietnam. They are trained not far from Saigon for guerilla warfare and parachuting. Israel has well-trained German Shepherds. The RAF is well known for its service dog training and they too prefer the German Shepherd dogs. The Police dog training centres in some Australian States, however, unfortunately cannot be taken as a standard as these centres rarely produced outstanding Service dogs and, in fact, too many breed fanciers were involved in selecting type and breed of dogs.

I include a few extracts from information given by officers experienced in this subject.

Lieutenant-Colonel J. Y. Baldwin (UK) —

"I worked a German Shepherd in the first war and if it had not been for that I am sure I should not be here to write now. . . . In World War II I immediately rushed to the War Office and every other branch of the Services, but it took nearly two

years before the value and necessity of dogs was realised. By then thousands of good dogs unfortunately had been destroyed. When the Government really understood what it meant, there were not enough Shepherd dogs to go round. So other dogs had to be taken in as well. . . . During the war I was responsible for the training of about 9,000 dogs with the RAF, which included training about 60 American dog handlers on each course. . . ."

Major W. J. Martin (US Army) —

Major Martin's command in Tokyo from 1953-55 went to the dogs, quite literally and to the Army's great satisfaction. The dogs involved were German Shepherd dogs, beribboned veterans of the Korean hostilities. The command involved was the physical security of the Tokyo Ordnance Depot, at the time the largest ordnance rebuilding depot in the world. Tokyo Depot is located in the Kita Ku (North Ward) of Tokyo, a politically unstable section of Japan's capital. Martin, the new provost marshal at Baltimore's Fort Holabird, said the depot presented "a terrific security problem" when he was reassigned from duties in Korea. In his job as depot provost marshal and security officer, Martin decided that sentry dogs were the answer to his problem. "There were many good reasons for requesting dogs to work with human guards," Martin said. "For one thing, a dog can better hear and smell at night, when the breaking and entering was taking place, than a human. An experienced man can sneak up behind a human sentry and the sentry will never

know until it's too late. That cannot happen to a dog. Another reason is the respect people in foreign lands have for dogs. In the US almost every dog is a pet, a pal. That's not true in other countries. There dogs and animals are kept for their ability to do a job and everyone realises it. They know that a sentry dog is an animal you don't fool with."

At the cessation of fighting in Korea 163 scout dogs were turned over to Martin. He put them on perimeter guard duty. The introduction of the dogs proved a tremendous success. Breaking and entering stopped completely. But it wasn't quite as easy as it might sound. About three months of training were required before the dogs could be used. "We received scout dogs," Martin explained. "They are trained to be evasive and silent, exactly the opposite qualities you want in a sentry dog. The training was laid out in four phases. First the dog was made familiar with his assigned handler. Sentry dogs are trained to be loyal to one man, and one man only. A well-trained dog, no matter how hungry he is, will ignore food unless it's given him by his handler. Once the dogs and handlers got to know each other, obedience training began. First the dogs were taught to obey a variety of voice commands, then hand signals. In the third phase, dogs were put through an obstacle course and taught to scale 10 feet walls, climb monkey bars and remain calm while weapons were fired, sometimes right in their faces. In the final stage the dogs were taught to attack. This is one of the big

reasons for using German Shepherd dogs. They have absolutely no regard for their own safety once they are ordered to attack. A Shepherd will hurl himself at a man or a car if ordered to — and continue to attack until the object stops moving or the handler calls him off. They are very agile. That, combined with their weight, is the big part of the dog's attack. Contrary to popular belief, it is not only the dog's bite that is dangerous. If a man is running away the dog will hurl himself at the man's back, knocking him down. If the man is facing the dog, the dog will hurl himself on the man's chest, again knocking him down. It is like being hit with a 100 pound sack of potatoes, traveling at 30 mph. (N.B. — The dog's attack work does depend on the training, they can be trained to hold the object only without causing injury, K.F.) . . . If the man has anything in his hands the dog will attack that arm. To a dog, everything, even a briefcase is a weapon."

Brigadier General J. T. Honeycutt—US Army—

Brigadier General J. T. Honeycutt, US Army, commanding the 47th Artillery Brigade, reports: Army sentry dogs in the programme to guard atomic Nike-Hercules missile units are on duty at Chatsworth (Oat Mountain) site. Dogs are also assigned to the Hercules sites at Malibu, Palos Verdes, Garden Grove and Mt. Gleason. A specially trained handler works guard duty with each dog on patrols, scheduled 24 hours a day around the perimeter of each missile launching

site. Dogs and handlers at Chatsworth site were trained together for their aggressiveness — were taught obedience and guard duty with its armed handler patrolling between inner and outer fences that surround the launching site area.

Brigadier General Honeycutt said that sentry dogs, such as those assigned to Battery C, 4th Missile Battalion, are able to detect movement several hundred yards away in darkness and fog. Their sense of smell is so acute, he said, that they can detect, unseen, an intruder 200 yards distant. (N.B.—This depends on the direction of the wind, K.M.). Twelve handlers and their dogs were assigned originally to a test programme conducted by the Army and this programme was followed by the assignment of 28 handlers and an equal number of four-footed sentries to the programme. General Honeycutt said 500 dogs and a comparable number of men will be required to place the programme in effect nationally.

The Army, he added, trained during World War II some 2000 dogs for guard duty alone.

The US Marine Corps also had a large number of dogs in service. They were of course not only used as sentries but also in the battlefields, and for special assignments. The German Shepherd dog, "Major von Luckner," served with the 2nd Marine Regiment on Guadalcanal and is credited with saving many lives of US soldiers. The plucky dog was wounded twice during the war in the Pacific and in 1959 still had a special plate made from an army mess kit, which was put in his head in an emergency operation performed by an army surgeon.

This should be sufficient evidence to show that service dogs are essential in a modern army. This applies especially to Australia which is short of manpower and has battle groups that will be engaged in jungle and guerilla warfare where trained dogs are highly effective.

THREWARD

ON

KANGA

Major D. A. Chinn,
2nd Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment

"Four into three won't go" — Primary School Arithmetic.

THE Australian Military Mission in the Commonwealth of Dig, a continent state in the temperate latitudes of the planet Kanga, had conducted many useful studies on the organisation, principles of war, tactics and logistics of the Dig army, since it was accredited to that country in 1997. One such study dealt with the tactical use of the horse (and later the mule) together with the subsequent development of the Dig Horse Corps, the Royal Dig Horse Force and the Dig Light Horse Squadron.

The study of the Dig Army's new divisional organisation was of major importance, due to its similarity with the Pentropic organisation adopted by the Australian Army in 1960, and Colonel A. R. Able, DSO, leading the Mission, himself headed the study group on the new organisation.

The Dig re-organisation had proceeded smoothly with the exception of the Hovantry element, which was in fact "infantry" as the Australian Military Mission knew it, except that all individuals had their own personal hovercraft, due to

the problems of foot movement in the long tendril-like grasses of the planet Kanga.

The problem posed by Dig Hovantry leaders related to tactical organisation, and was simply that the new Digmatic organisation put rifle platoons into four sections for operations (and, naturally, training) whilst the Manuals of Hoverceremonial and Hover Drill (All Arms) laid down three ranks or sections, based on the previous organisation, of three sections per platoon.

The argument put forward by the Hovantry Corps was based on the first paragraph of the introduction to the Manual of Hoverceremonial, which stated:

"The objects of ceremonial are to promote esprit-de-corps and, by attaining a high standard of steadiness and cohesion on the

Major D. A. Chinn was commissioned in the Regular Army in 1954 and served with 2 RAR until 1957. He was Adjutant 11/57 Battalion from 1957 to 1961, and later commanded 20 Cadet Battalion.

parade ground, to assist in the development of the moral qualities which are essential to success in war."

Following this, it was argued, as the Hovantry section was the basic tactical organisation for war, ceremonial hover drill, and indeed, all drill, should support the promotion of esprit-de-corps and attainment of a high standard of team steadiness and cohesion in just that organisation. Through experience in recent wars and campaigns as well as a devoted study of leadership, on which subject many famous Kanga generals had written, the Hovantry leaders believed that the establishment of team spirit commenced at section level; that section leaders could not effectively train their commands for war unless each section retained its leader and identity in all aspects of preparation for war — in training, in administration and in, of equal importance, drill. As it was the Dig Hovantry continued to hover and move in three ranks on all occasions other than actually engaged on tactical training.

The principal effects seen by Colonel Able and his study group in Hovantry units were, firstly, the loss of section "team" identity and with it the weakening of the authority of the section leader; secondly, the resulting increased command and administrative burden on the platoon headquarters due to the weakening of the internal command structure.

Formal submissions were made to the Dig Army HQ to change

the offending manuals of Hover-ceremonial and Hoverdrill (All Arms) to allow units to parade and drill in their tactical organisation. A precedent was claimed, for, more than two decades earlier, the Dig Hovantry had been organised in four section platoons, with hoverdrill manuals to suit, when a re-organisation into "threes" had resulted in the production of the prototypes of the manuals currently in use.

A survey was made of training establishments, some of the older cadet units and second hand bookshops, but none of the original "fours" drill manuals could be located.

The strength and logic of the argument was admitted, but the submissions were refused because of the time and the cost involved in rewriting the relevant manuals which had only in recent years reached their ultimate form after much amendment and review.

It was not at this point, however, that the argument ended, as the Dig Army was imbued with belief in the importance of team identity and morale and their relationship to training for and success in battle. A committee was formed at Army HQ level to consider this aspect of the re-organisation, as a result of which its report, entitled "Identity and Morale of the Hovantry Section" offered the following courses of action:—

- (a) Hovantry should remain on the present organisation of four sections per platoon and not participate in any drill whatsoever.

(b) Hovantry platoon organisation should be changed back to three sections.

The first course was hardly acceptable in view of the importance placed on ceremonial and drill generally. The second course was most undesirable because of the outstanding tactical advantages of the four section platoon over the old "three". After much soul searching and deliberation, the Dig Army HQ reluctantly decided to change the platoon organisation back to threes because of the importance of team identity and because the hover drill manuals could not be changed.


Colonel Able, who had been asked to give evidence to the Dig Army HQ Committee, had been unable to assist in drawing on his experience of any similar prob-

lem in the Australian Army, as he was forced to admit, his Army didn't realise that this problem existed. However, he asked the committee if copies of its report could be made available for issue to Officer Training Establishments in Australia where leadership was an important subject of study and where the Dig Army's attitude to team identity and morale might be of interest.

Philosophers in the Dig Hovantry, and there were many, comforted themselves with the thought that the figure three was a lucky number anyway — it was of great significance in their religion, the popular social attitude was "three's company, four's a crowd", and of course there was the motto on the National Coat of Arms — "Three-ward".

Initiative is the agent which translates imagination into action. It must be used intelligently lest it become irresponsible or even in-subordinate. Also, it must be used courageously when the situation warrants. Military history provides innumerable examples of commanders who — confronted with unforeseen circumstances — have adhered slavishly to instructions, which at best, have lost an opportunity; at worst, have brought on defeat.

— *Kommando, South Africa.*



**THE MARCH ON DELHI, by
Lieutenant Colonel A. J. Barker.
(Faber and Faber, 24 Russell
Square, London, W.C.1.)**

In March 1944 the Japanese 15th Army in Burma suddenly crossed the Chindwin and invaded the Indian State of Manipur with the ambitious object of reaching Delhi. This campaign, a particularly rewarding one for students of warfare in Asia, has hitherto not received the attention it deserves of military historians. Now Lieutenant Colonel Barker has produced a first-class detailed account of the long series of battles which culminated in the Japanese defeat and withdrawal.

Lieutenant Colonel Barker is well-qualified to write of these events. A regular British officer until his retirement in 1958, he is a graduate of the Staff College and the Royal Military College of Science, and served as an army air liaison officer during the campaign. In writing this account, Colonel Barker has been at great pains to present both sides of the picture at all levels. To do this he sought and received information and advice from the former commander of the Japanese 15th Army, Lieutenant General Renya Mutaguchi, and his surviving divisional commanders. While this

approach must have required much patience, it has resulted in the production of a fair and balanced account of the operations as seen from both sides.

In writing the Foreword to the book, Lieutenant General Mutaguchi has this to say: "I have always believed that the operations which this book describes came very close to success. Now I am convinced that victory was within my grasp. Failure was due partly to our command structure and partly to the differences which existed between myself and the Army Group Commander as to how the operation should be conducted. British success was due to the ability of the British commanders to select a promising course of action and then pursue it with resolute intent."

Even if this statement does over-simplify events and leave several extremely important factors out of account, it is true enough that Mutaguchi came within a hair's breadth of opening the way to India, though whether he could ever have reached Delhi is another matter. But he would certainly have created a situation of very great difficulty for the Allies. He would have cut the overland communications with China, and he would have secured the bases from

which air communications were being maintained.

From the beginning Muta-guchi's offensive was a logistic gamble. With virtually no air transport capability, with no roads suitable for motor vehicles, entirely dependent on pack transport over mountainous jungle tracks, he planned to live off supplies captured from the enemy. The stubborn fighting qualities of the British, Indian and Gurkha troops prevented him from capturing enough supplies, and in the end proved more than a match for the military virtues of his own troops. But that he was able to maintain his offensive for so many weeks, literally on a logistic shoe-string, says much for the tenacity and resolution of the Japanese soldier.

On the other side of the hill the British reacted by quickly improvising the largest air supply operation in the history of war. Their command of the air enabled them to bring in the troops and supplies to halt the Japanese assaults in some of the costliest fighting of the war, and eventually to throw the enemy back across the Chindwin.

The part played by Ord Wingate's Chindits is fully described and evaluated, and there are some interesting vignettes of General "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell, Lord Mountbatten's American Deputy Commander.

In contrast to so many books of this kind, Colonel Barker's account of the operations on the Imphal plain is very well mapped indeed. No less than nineteen maps enable the reader to follow the text with ease. Altogether,

this is a highly informative study of an interesting and important campaign. — E.G.K.

BULLER'S CAMPAIGN, by Julian Symons. (Cresset Press, London, and William Heinemann Ltd., 317 Collins Street, Melbourne.)

The South African War is a long way behind us now, and there are many who would say that in this age of intercontinental missiles it holds little professional interest for the soldier. But it does in fact hold a great deal of interest for it confirmed the indications already given in the American Civil War of the influences on tactics of the magazine rifle and the spade. It confirmed them in blood for in the early stages at any rate, British commanders in general showed little sign that they had ever heard of the American conflict or, if they had, that they had made any serious attempt to draw useful lessons from it. In addition the South African War illustrates the difficulties that beset regular forces which attempt to cope with guerilla operations by conventional means. Over and above all that it demonstrates that military means must be matched to political ends, and that mere personal courage in commanders is no substitute for professional competence.

Mr. Symons first set out to write a history of the South African War but before he had finished two books on the same subject appeared, so he switched his efforts to producing a biography of Sir Redvers Buller, the first British Commander-in-Chief in South Africa.

To provide a proper background to his study of General Buller, Mr. Symons has written at some length about the political intrigues and Imperialistic urge of certain British statesmen which led to the outbreak of the war. Intrigue was by no means confined to the politicians for, as Mr. Symons shows, senior officers spent much of their time in the years before the war jockeying for position and shamelessly cutting each others' throats. In fact the senior ranks of the army contained two contending factions, one headed by Wolsey, the other by Roberts. Naturally enough, this sort of thing hardly made for military efficiency. Worse still, the politicians who were so busily promoting the war, or simply drifting into it, declined to make the necessary financial provision to enable the army to follow up their policy. The result was that the army was deficient in arms, clothing, transport and other equipment to an extent that in the circumstances seems positively incredible.

Buller commanded the British forces in the first campaign in Natal, and lost in succession the battles of Colenso, Spion Kop and Vaal Krantz. If these reverses finally led to his recall, they never in any way impaired the faith of his troops in his leadership. At a time when the soldier enjoyed few amenities, Buller's care of his men was remarkable. If his solicitude for others had been matched by tactical ability, he would have been a successful general.

Buller was not the only professional dunderhead. For instance,

there was the brigade commander who insisted that the massed column was still the way to deliver an assault against machine-guns and magazine rifles concealed in rocky, broken ground.

Mr. Symons has the ability to be interesting even when discussing the political intrigues in the higher echelons of the army. His book is well worth attention if only for the negative lessons it demonstrates at all levels of command.

— E.G.K.

PATROL INTO YESTERDAY,
by J. K. McCarthy. (F. W. Cheshire, Melbourne, Canberra and Sydney.)

J. K. McCarthy joined the New Guinea Administration as a Patrol Officer in 1927 and is at present Director of the Department of Native Affairs and a member of the Papua-New Guinea Legislative Council. Except for a brief period during World War II, when he was seconded to GHQ South West Pacific Area, he has spent the whole of the intervening 37 years in the public service of the island. This vast experience qualifies him to write with unimpeachable authority about a people and a territory of vital interest to Australia in general and the Australian Army in particular. During the earlier part of his service, Mr. McCarthy led patrol after patrol into the interior of the then almost totally unexplored island. These journeys included patrols into the formidable Sepik River country, across the central mountains of

New Guinea and into the interior of New Britain. Almost every mile of these long patrols was fraught with danger — from the terrain itself, from tropical disease and, by no means least, from the arrows and spears of natives who resented the intrusion of strangers into their hereditary tribal grounds. But, even when the arrows rained down upon his party from ambush, McCarthy never forgot the purpose of his mission and the object of the Administration he served — the pacification and civilisation of the primitive people.

McCarthy was obviously more interested in the people than in anything else. He was, and is, not only interested in their strange and sometimes revolting customs and beliefs, but he was interested in them as human beings and he devoted himself wholeheartedly to protecting them against the ravages of unscrupulous white men, and to leading them to a better and more satisfactory way of life. Perhaps no other official of the Administration did more to win the confidence of the native peoples in the justice and sincerity of the Governments efforts.

Shortly before Japan entered World War II, preparations were made by the Royal Australian Navy to inaugurate a radio reporting service, later known as the Coast Watching Service, should the Japanese invade the islands. While this service was being organised, the Commissioner of Police, Colonel John Walstab, produced a plan for forming planter and other Aus-

tralian residents into guerilla bands which, operating from food dumps in the jungle, would be able to tie down a good many Japanese troops in a game of hide and seek. Although the plan was apparently approved by Army Headquarters, it was never put into effect. Instead an isolated battalion group, with no prepared withdrawal routes behind it, was placed in position at Rabaul to oppose what in the prevailing circumstances would almost certainly be a massive Japanese blow. The result was a foregone conclusion, but McCarthy's forethought and knowledge of the country enabled him and his associates to rescue many of the survivors of the battle.

After this episode, McCarthy joined the Australian and New Guinea Administrative Unit, a unit which did much to assist the allied forces as well as protecting the natives from the worst effects of the war. At the conclusion of hostilities he returned to his old service. His closing chapters describe the progress towards economic and political independence that has been made since the war, and suggest that there is still a long, long way to go.

This story of New Guinea is told by a man who has been part of its history for nearly forty years. It presents a fascinating panorama of life in the island, of its primitive people and their slow transition from savagery to civilisation. In my opinion it should be required reading for all officers of the Australian Army.

— E.G.K.