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# AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

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Photo: Australian War Memorial, Canberra.

#### WESTERN FRONT, 1914-18

In World War I, after a brief period of mobile warfare, the opposing armies on the Western Front dug-in facing each other in deep trench systems extending from Switzerland to the English Channel. For over two years the armies were locked in these trenches. Neither side could break the stalemate, though many great battles were fought in attempts to do so.

The garrisons of the forward trenches lived under conditions of extreme hardship, particularly in winter when the constant heavy artillery fire churned the whole area into a morass.

The picture shows Australian infantrymen resting in "shelters" in the side of a front line trench which has received the attention of enemy guns.

# THE INFLUENCE OF REVOLUTIONARY WAR ON MODERN MILITARY THOUGHT

Lieutenant Colonel R. S. Garland, MC,  
Royal Australian Infantry

## The Rising Sun

**R**ESULTING from the spectacular successes of Communist Revolutionary ventures since the end of World War II a new form of warfare has evolved that challenges the basic structure of Western military concepts.

The classic manoeuvres of European positional warfare are meaningless when applied to a revolutionary struggle in the vast undeveloped but well populated areas of South East Asia.

The continuance of revolutionary investments in South East Asian countries is very attractive to the Communist bloc. A steady growth of Communist expansion is assured without the economical and physical havoc that would accompany a future major war.

The major Communist power that promotes and supports a revolutionary struggle can enjoy a large number of advantages that are not conferred by direct

military intervention. Such revolutionary ventures are cheap to support, but victory ensures complete domination of the people. The promoting country can assume the role of a benevolent "Big Brother" and proceed to influence an economic policy that will feather its own nest. It is no wonder that China is embittered towards the USSR and is now playing a similar "Communist Confidence Trick", that she learned the hard way, on her neighbours in South East Asia.

Revolutionary warfare has come to stay and it would be fair to blame some of this on the atomic bomb. The bomb has outlawed massive positional warfare struggles and favours a strategy which achieves control of the people without exposing nuclear targets. The guerilla operations of revolutionary warfare provide such a strategy.

Those army officers who learned their trade well in World War II, but are unable to grasp

the essential but elusive facets of guerilla operations would be a menace in any future campaigns. A new day has dawned in the evolution of warfare. In Asia the enemy does not tremble at the sound of marching feet, the rumble of tanks or the drone of bombers. He welcomes such threats and proceeds to rip their administrative system to pieces by guerilla warfare until the machines grind to a stop. The isolated components can then be defeated in detail.

Many officers, who fondly dream of massive artillery barrages and brilliant penetration attacks by armoured divisions, are reluctant to abandon their ideals for the squalidness of anti-guerilla operations with the accompanying heartbreaking jungle and swamp patrols against a phantom enemy. These officers have my full sympathy, but time has moved on and War Museums must continue to expand.

Probably because we are of European extraction, we are notoriously slow in recognising the likely impact of impending events when the first shadows cross our doorstep. However, the decisive defeat of the French Army, backed fully by US support, in the guerilla war in Indo China was more than a shadow. The endless graves in Saigon and elsewhere bear testimony to the valour of the French soldier and the death of certain Western concepts for the conduct of similar campaigns in the future.

A new soldier has been born and his tools of trade consist of a rifle, sandshoes, some clothes

and a handful of rice. But his victories will have a bigger impact on world history than those of the hordes of Ghengis Khan.

### The Counter

In planning a strategy to achieve victory in a revolutionary war the major factor to be considered is that, irrespective of outside Communist influence and interests, the struggle has developed as an internal conflict within the country, and the only satisfactory victory that will have a lasting quality must be developed from within the country and based on a popular political platform. Armed intervention by European powers to seek a military solution would arouse the hostility of all Asia and would spell military and political disaster for the "invaders".

From this major factor applied to the country in question, will flow the deductions which lead to the joint military/political plan to defeat the revolutionary struggle.

The next essential point to be grasped is that the military and political plans are inseparably meshed. They cannot and must not be divorced from each other. The political plan must offer a better deal to the people than Communism can offer. The military plan must provide the protection for the political message to be put across and must encourage the subsequent consolidation and development of the new deal. The people must be convinced that the new deal is what they want and that it has

come to stay, because of satisfactory military protection. This is a war of ideas and pressures that ebb with the tide of military successes.

To be successful, the Army must expand the control zones efficiently and deliberately. The control zones must commence in the centres of population and expand outwards. The aim must be to achieve complete domination in the expanding zones and this tactic must be based on separating the guerillas from the local population. For any given military force to be able to dominate a large area in SE Asia, the tactics of domination must be based on the ingredients of Surprise, such as Secrecy, Concealment, Deception, Originality, Audacity and Rapidity. The deployment of offensive patrols within these concepts must be based on large numbers of small patrols with the ability to concentrate to achieve decisive results as required.

The guerillas must be destroyed by a fluid patrol battle or forced into the contracting areas between the expanding control zones so that their eventual destruction is inevitable.

When we talk glibly about dominating an area in SE Asia we must take into account the enormous advantages that the guerilla enjoys when hiding or moving in his own habitat. He can "fade away" into the countryside or merge with the local population. To dominate such areas we must be able to outpatrol the enemy and make him too afraid to move. We will never achieve this standard

unless we develop tracking techniques and also considerably improve our standards of scouting, fieldcraft and shooting. Our present standards in these skills are hopelessly inadequate.

### Political Measures

A military force that is being committed to anti-guerilla operations should have the necessary political cells organic to the command structure of the force. The following cells or cadres are needed and they must each have adequate language capacities to assume direct control of the people.

- (a) Local Government.
- (b) Police.
- (c) Public Health.
- (d) Information Service.
- (e) Banking.
- (f) Local Militia.

Wherever possible the above cadres must be raised from the indigenous population and given proper training and political indoctrination. In an advanced Stage 2 Revolutionary War, it may not be possible to recruit the required political cadres to meet our requirements. In this case we must provide European advisers, skilled in the appropriate professions, to commence the difficult task of building up a sound local authority to assume control as soon as possible from the military commander.

The "benevolent" distribution of money and food needs thought as it can often do more harm than good. We must retain control of the distribution of our "goodies" and issue them strictly on a reward system. The oriental mind spurns the patronising and

indiscriminate benefactor. ("The Ugly American" is a term that is used sarcastically throughout SE Asia — in spite of massive American aid programmes. It would seem that money does not talk all languages.)

A new principle of war has probably emerged as a result of the development of Revolutionary Warfare. I suggest that this is the "Selection and Maintenance of the Political Platform." Anti-guerilla operations can only be successfully sustained if the support of the local population is gained.

Our officers and soldiers can no longer turn a deaf ear to the relevant political issues. They must understand, believe in and emulate the ideals for which we are fighting. Democracy is an empty word, but it represents our home, our family and our way of life.

At all levels, in the theatre of operations, we must act towards the achievement of the stated political goals. The goodwill of the local population must be won and retained. This requires a real understanding of the complex issues that are at the root of the national problems.

### Military Requirements

It should now be evident that the tasks of the Army fall into three broad categories:—

- (a) Maintenance and protection of the administrative bases required to support the Army in the country.
- (b) Establishment and defence of operational bases deployed in the centres of

population to permit political conversion.

- (c) Offensive operations to destroy the guerilla forces.

### Base Areas

The administrative bases will consist of an appropriate grouping of administrative units to meet the needs of the Army in the country. Maintenance of the forward operational bases must be by air supply as the road network between these controlled areas will be vulnerable to guerilla ambush.

The big question is — how can the administrative base be defended? In conventional warfare these maintenance areas are defended against major threats by the dispositions of the forward divisions and each administrative unit is made responsible for local protection against small infiltrating parties. However, in an insurgency setting, this concept does not provide an effective defence for the vulnerable depot complexes that make up a maintenance area against possible attacks by guerilla forces of up to regimental strength. Adequate protection can only be assured by a perimeter defence provided by a force of all arms. The required forces will seldom be available but the military commander must make suitable dispositions and groupings to protect his administrative bases to ensure the maintenance of tactical balance and the flexibility of his offensive operations in the theatre. The defence problems involved can be minimised by placing the administrative bases in secure or reliable areas, if this

is practical. However, the possibility of further deterioration in the local political situation must always be borne in mind and appropriate plans must be prepared.

### Operational Bases

The tactical considerations of defending an operational base do not differ from the defence considerations of conventional warfare, except that greater emphasis is placed on all-round defence. This of course places a greater demand on the available infantry as they must hold wider frontages than are desirable in conventional warfare.

It is a simple matter of mathematics to deduce that it is easier for any given force to defend a section of a front against a likely enemy approach than to defend the perimeter of a circle against approaches from any direction. As the operational base must contain an airfield of some sort and this airfield must be secured from enemy ground observation and small arms fire, a considerable outer perimeter must be secured from enemy ground observation and small arms fire, a considerable outer perimeter must be defended or secured against a major guerilla threat. The size of the perimeter to be defended may be reduced by the clever use of natural and artificial obstacles but certain defence precautions are still necessary to prevent enemy penetration of these obstacles.

In the commander's design for battle, he must be prepared to fight defensive battles to hold each operational base and he

must consequently be able to re-group any threatened base. Reserves should be earmarked to meet any such requirement.

The military commander must not be tempted into fighting an abortive battle away from his operational bases. The operational base and the controlled area in its proximity is the defended area of conventional warfare. Any sally by a force of all arms into an uncontrolled area is a foolhardy operation and is only warranted when a new operational base must be established. Such a force will only dominate the ground it stands on and it is vulnerable to guerilla counter-measures.

The winning of control over an uncontrolled area is an infantry battle based on patrolling techniques. In a previous article I referred to such techniques as "Pepper Pot Tactics". Perhaps "Fishing Net Tactics" would be a better name.

The military concept for the conduct of anti-guerilla operations is not unlike a modern form of naval warfare. The administrative base and operational bases are of strategic value and their defence is vital. The ground between must be dominated by a combination of air and patrol (submarine) activity until the ascendancy over the enemy (or the freedom of the seas) is gained.

The controlled areas must expand outwards and gradually link up to that subsequent operations can strangle the capacity of the guerilla to wage insurgency warfare.



### Offensive Operations

In my previous paper I stated my views on Battalion Concepts for the Conduct of Offensive Operations (*AAJ 173*, Oct., '63). I consider that offensive operations to expand the control zone must be fought as a fluid infantry patrol battle. The aim of the battalion commander is to locate and destroy the guerilla forces in his operational area. This offensive operation is not an all arms battle and it would be disastrous to violate this basic concept. Armour and Artillery have no role in this game of hide and seek in the jungle, swamp and paddy field areas. The prime role of supporting arms is the defence of the operational base so that a reasonable proportion of infantry can be released to take the battle to the guerilla in a form that does not confer advantages to the guerilla.

A major weakness in our training for anti-guerilla operations is the lack of techniques for the location of enemy bases. In the Stage 2 phase of the French War in Indo China, the French were unable to locate and strike back at the Viet Minh bases. The Viet Minh were thus always able to fight under conditions of their own choosing. Such concepts for the conduct of guerilla warfare are, of course, now well established in Communist tactics.

It follows that the operational concepts for the conduct of offensive operations against guerillas must be based on:—

(a) Techniques for the location of enemy bases.

(b) Operations for the destruction of located enemy bases.

The development of tracking techniques will assist in the follow up of guerillas and facilitate the location of their base. Destruction of the base can then be effected by a combination of air and ground operations, provided tactical surprise can be achieved. The employment of Armour or Artillery would probably always be negative the gaining of tactical surprise against an enemy who will disperse when threatened by a superior force. It is suggested that the "Pepper Pot" or "Fishing Net" concept that I have previously propounded provides the most effective approach for the conduct of offensive operations against guerillas.

We will continue to improve our insurgency capacity by conducting two sided exercises with typical tactical settings as will be found in SE Asia. However, young officers should be careful not to deduce wrong lessons from exercises conducted in Australia. The difficulties of posing the factors presented by a local population, protracted operations, actual SE Asian terrain difficulties, a tropical climate plus the problem of training an exercise enemy that can function on lines comparable to that of, say, the Viet Cong, should be remembered.

### Conclusion

In this paper I have endeavoured to prove that the conduct of a Revolutionary War is more than just a sideshow affair. It has been developed by modern military thought and is based on

## INFLUENCE OF REVOLUTIONARY WAR ON MILITARY THOUGHT 11

centuries of experience in all types of warfare. The impacts of the range of modern military weapons and missiles, plus the implications of their employment, have been evaluated and countered. The startling record of successes since 1945, in all parts of the world, prove the effectiveness of this primitive but modern form of warfare.

It is fortunate for us that the major pattern of world events moves slowly, in spite of what our newspapers would have us believe. There is still time for us to take stock of the lessons that have been learned from the conduct of our past operations against Revolutionary ventures and so endeavour to perfect our anti-guerilla techniques.

The conditions to be met in any likely future theatre of anti-

guerilla operations will always produce new factors. However, this should not deter us from a critical study of those past techniques which have proved successful in such theatres as Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus and French Indo China.

In recent years I have read with growing revulsion the steady output of literature that highlights the difficulties of insurgency warfare and paints a picture of a guerilla who stands as high as "Big John". Let us put a stop to this negative form of military thinking. Let us not be afraid of such shadows. The concepts that I have outlined in this paper provide a basic formula for victory. I do not doubt that they can be improved upon, but I firmly believe in their validity.

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It is the great paradox in life that to employ oneself cheerfully and efficiently in the service of others is gradually to possess all that is satisfying in life itself. Only rarely do any of us achieve the ultimate in that; but we can all try to the limit of our capacity.

It is the solution of all trouble; it is the only key to real success. Any organisation or person actuated by that rule of life cannot help but achieve leadership and great deeds. It will write history as never before.

— H. P. Breen, CBE.

# IMPRESSIONS OF A CADET UNDER OFFICER

Cadet Under Officer V. J. Rae  
Birrong High School Cadet Unit

AFTER two and a half years' service in the Cadet Corps many things have both impressed and disillusioned me.

A few times I've been bored and contemplated leaving the Cadets, but because of an interest and a liking for the Cadet Corps as a hobby I remained. However, the majority of boys who joined with or before me have left.

The Cadet Corps has helped me greatly, as besides building up my physical strength it has helped my mental approach. With increased knowledge and status, responsibility increases till one becomes the leader, mother and brain-centre for 40 cadets. The Cadet Corps has taught me to accept and obey orders, use my initiative and be to a certain extent independent. Above all the Corps has given me an insight into the army, and instilled a desire to join the CMF to further my military training.

The biggest drawback to the High School Unit is the high turnover of trained personnel. Unfortunately the greater part of the turnover comes from the ranks of NCO's and trained second year cadets. This leaves a small nucleus of CUO's and NCO's to teach recruits and those senior cadets who stay. This represents a waste in training as CUO's have been taught to impart lessons on fieldcraft and tactics and should spend most of

their time with senior cadets, but because of high turnover have to teach recruits.

The majority of cadet training should, I feel, be used to teach movement and weapon lessons and those activities which will call upon endurance and natural exuberance. This means that drill should be kept to a minimum. However, I don't advocate the abolition of drill, because drill has a two-fold purpose — self-discipline and the development in the soldier a sense of unquestioning obedience which helps him to carry out orders. Hence drill is necessary, but should be kept to a minimum and should involve only the elementary drill that is required to move a squad between two points in an orderly manner. If any special drill is required, for funerals, etc., then only selected persons should be given the intensive drill.

The Cadet Corps helps to change a boy into a young man, while the CMF, if he joins — and the Cadet Corps should give him an incentive to do so — changes him and helps him through the next stage of life. If the Cadet Corps taught elementary drill and the mechanics of military warfare, then the CMF should perfect the soldier.

As a substitute for drill, the cadet should be taught the mechanics of as wide as possible field of knowledge of military

weapons of all branches of the services and he should be quite well acquainted with elementary movement.

The annual camp usually consists of a 24-hour "contact" exercise and a 24-hour bivouac, besides range firing with platoon weapons. My suggestions are that the contact exercise should be arranged on a 48-hour basis, and that an obstacle course similar to those used at the RMC and Canungra be set up. The bivouac should be held rain, hail or shine. The camps, as far as the second year cadets are concerned, should be treated as a 10 days' endurance test during which time a fast pace should be set so as to stop the cadet complaining.

However, the 10 days annual camp, I feel, is not enough for senior cadets. An extra 5 days camp should be available during which they will not enter camp as a school unit, but as a force inside a CMF organization, i.e., the CMF should take the cadets on a 5 days camp. This camp, however, would not be a large base camp as is experienced in the annual camp. It would be in the form of a 5 days patrol behind enemy lines. Food will be carried in packs and either air dropped to the patrol or hidden in special dumps. During this time the cadets would act as CMF personnel. This means they would be treated the same and expected to carry the same weapons and arms as a CMF infantry platoon carries. The exercise would not be in the form, however, of a hike. Either regulars or other CMF/cadet sections would act as enemy to the

group. Contact would be able to be made at any time during the 5 days, day or night, and at least one night should be a night patrol, and the next day should be used till the afternoon as a rest period, at which time the squad would have to find suitable cover in which to sleep during the daylight hours.

This should help to build healthy cadets as well as keep their interests. It is something of this nature that I would have welcomed during my service with the cadets. The main thing to stress is the toughness of the course as an endurance test and the semi-commando nature of the exercise.

In an exercise of this nature many of the specialist corps would find use for their knowledge. During the exercise the cadets should be expected to man and operate all CMF platoon weapons. Instruction regarding these weapons would have taken a period of one school term prior to the 5 days camp. This term should include at least three Saturdays at CMF depots learning from their instructors.

These are just a few of the main suggestions which I feel would benefit the Cadet Corps as a whole. The suggestions are really just basic ideas but could be easily elaborated upon and put into operation. To quote in concluding, Major K. S. Stanley (AAJ No. 150 Nov. 1961): "The cadet corps would do better to have more adventure training, plenty of shooting, and very basic infantry training as its core subjects. Leave it to the CMF to develop further military skills".

# HINTS TO GENERAL STAFF OFFICERS

Lieutenant Colonel C. H. A. East  
Royal Australian Infantry

I HAVE presumed to offer advice on this subject following a somewhat lengthy sequence of General Staff appointments over the last ten years. I would hasten at this early juncture to add that these are my personal views based on my own experience, and I realise that not everyone will necessarily agree with me.

I have taken the Division and the Brigade as a background to this paper, but the points I hope to make affect General Staff officers as a whole and not solely the GSO 1 or Brigade Major.

The sequence of the paper is really based on a list of "do's" and "don'ts" and is sub-divided under the following headings:—

- (a) Relations with Commander.
- (b) Relations with own staff.
- (c) Relations with Administrative staff.
- (d) Relations with Higher and Lower Formations.
- (e) Relations with clerical staff.

## **Relations with Commander**

The first and most obvious requirement is to study the personality of your commander. This falls into two parts — prior to his or your arrival at the headquarters, and subsequently when

you are working together. In the first case it is simply a matter of finding out his previous military background if you are not already aware of it. This knowledge will facilitate your getting on the relaxed terms that are essential to a commander and his senior staff officer.

The second part of knowing the personality of your commander depends a great deal on who he is and how easy he is to get on with. Make a point of finding out quickly what he likes or dislikes, e.g., some like "paper" and want to see everything — some don't. Some leave you alone whereas some don't. Some commanders like their staff officers to be in the office with them while they are going through papers. I suggest that a commander in this category should be discouraged as you will never have enough time to get on with your job.

However, by studying his methods you will soon find the right tactics to adopt in your dealings with him. Tactics are very important. You must get to know his moods and when is the best time to put suggestions to him. I found, for instance, that the worst time to suggest business was just prior to a golf match or a race meeting. (I

might quickly point out that these two examples apply to different commanders.) Conversely, I found that a profitable time and place to settle matters was while driving with the commander on visits to units in his car as opposed to the office.

My second point is the requirement to gain his confidence. I suggest the best way to do this is:—

- (a) Always be honest with him.
- (b) When asked your opinion give your own views and not those you think he wants. Don't be a "yes" man.
- (c) If you or your staff commit a nonsense let him know so that he is not caught un-awares by some irate senior General Officer.

I believe in dealing with the commander personally. In all matters and rarely allowing any of my staff direct access unless the commander sends for an individual. If you must have an expert in, ensure that you are there yourself.

Encourage your commander to avoid detail — that is what you are paid to look after. In this way, you spare him and reserve him for the important aspects of making policy decisions, commanding and visiting his units.

Finally, by example, ensure that the commander is treated as a god in his formation. Never permit criticism by anyone, make certain that any decision of his is carried out as quickly as possible, and that he is always put first and given the best of everything. Put him on a pedestal and keep him there.

### Relations with Own Staff

In this part I have tried to give some hints on what to do when you first arrive at the headquarters.

Irrespective of your rank, I suggest that when you first arrive, any temptation to be a "new broom" be resisted strongly. Go quietly until you understand the system and what goes on. If you try to seize the reins too strongly or obviously you may well get off to a bad start from which is may be very difficult to recover. This approach is one I recommend for a staff officer, NOT a commander, who must undoubtedly take charge and show that he is the commander, from the outset.

Be careful of making too many changes until you have been there some time. It takes a period to get to know your subordinates and first impressions are not always right. Also, remember that your predecessor was not necessarily a fool and had, no doubt, good reasons for the systems which you may decide to change.

One of your main tasks as Grade One and Two Staff Officers is to make sure that your staff works as a team. They must be capable fellows naturally, but I believe that the officer who is not quite so efficient but who works well in the team is preferable to the brilliant one who is difficult and rubs people up the wrong way. Individualism is fine for commanders, but has no place in the staff.

I am convinced that team work is the most important factor in the working of any staff. How



can you foster it? Firstly, it should begin from the senior staff officer and work downwards. Whether you are a C of S, GSO1, GSO2 or BM you must always be approachable to your junior staff officers — never aloof. A good spirit is attained by the personal contact in dealings with your staff and this personal atmosphere should be ever present.

There are a number of ways in which you can encourage this personal feeling:—

- (a) As a grade two staff officer you will always find that the grade threes or junior staff officers are often very hard worked. Although this is only right and proper, a little praise and encouragement at the right time by you or your GSO1 means a lot.
- (b) When discussing a certain subject with your GSO1 bring in the GSO 3, who is actually dealing with it — it all helps.
- (c) As a GSO 2, encourage the GSO 1 to walk around the offices of the GSOs and discuss various points. Let the Mountain go to Mahomet, and get rid of the impression that you can't be approached anywhere than in your office.
- (d) Finally, mix with your staff on the sports field and in the mess. Be prepared to discuss matters with them outside the headquarters. In other words, be human!

Another means of gaining the team spirit is to keep all the staff fully in the picture. This is best done and the personal atmos-

phere maintained, by holding conferences. In Malaya with the 28th Commonwealth Brigade we did this by holding a daily conference at 0900 hours. At this the events of the previous day were run through and then the work to be done that day. It ensured that everyone had an idea of the others' work. In 1st Division the requirement was less pressing and a weekly conference was held following the same principle.

Our Army has developed the very bad habit since 1945 of failing to allocate responsibility to the appropriate rank. Too often have we seen the major concerning himself with the work of lieutenants while the latter find themselves doing the work of corporals. To engender confidence in your junior staff officer, to train him for higher appointments, to spread the work load — give him responsibility. Tell him on what matters he has authority to make decisions and then see that he does. Don't have units and higher formations awaiting answers from your headquarters because a GSO 2 was not prepared to make a decision without referring it to you or your Chief of Staff.

Finally, on this aspect of staff relations try to be polite. There is no worse animal to encounter than the rude staff officer. Be as rude as you like when it is deserved, but rudeness as a habit to junior officers is the act of a coward and a bully. A cheerful "good morning" and a few words when you meet the first time during the day will pay a big dividend.

**Relations with Administrative Staff**

From the point of view of the GSO 1 and AQMG and AAG at the Division and the GSO 2 and the DAA and QMG at the Task Force, it is vital that they get on well together. If there is any permanent disagreement one must go.

It is the duty and responsibility of the General Staff to keep the Administrative Staff in the immediate, and more important, the future picture. Practically all General Staff decisions affect the Administrative Staff and this very close liaison is most necessary.

I have noticed that the system generally breaks down on the lower level — grade three and staff captain. Junior staff officers must be educated and trained in the requirement to keep their opposite numbers informed. Again the personal visit is generally the best way.

Be careful to watch for signs among your staff of the emergence of the "G snob" outlook. Nothing can be more detrimental to the team effort, and the "we are one staff with but one purpose" theme must be inculcated in all branches of the staff. Similarly, be careful that the Mess does not become a breeding ground for a G versus A/Q battle. Avoid the tendency for General Staff officers to drink together as a group — break up such gatherings.

**Relations with  
Higher and Lower Formations**

The most important aspect here is to get to know your opposite numbers at once. The more of these people you know

personally the easier your work will be.

If you have an aggressive nature, you will get better results from your opposite numbers if you restrain it and employ politeness and tact in any of your dealings. Try to be helpful at all times but be quite prepared to be firm if it is anything of importance such as the commander's decision or order. Never permit a subordinate unit to question or argue a decision by the commander — tell them to get on with it. If the commanding officer feels strongly about it, politely suggest that he discusses this with the commander.

You may be tempted many times to promise something. Never do this unless it can be done — this is the easiest way to get into trouble. Most decisions require action by another branch of your headquarters, generally Q. Ensure that you get their advice first. It is preferable to avoid the risk of giving a quick decision for the dubious pleasure of being considered a keen decisive fellow, than to have to go back on a ruling because of an emergence of other factors subsequently.

Never criticise any of your own staff or any other branch of your staff to a lower headquarters or unit, or higher headquarters. Nothing will more quickly destroy their confidence in themselves, their loyalty and faith in you, and the team spirit. Defend your own units or formations if they are criticised by higher headquarters. If they deserve it, you can always see that retribution descends on them later.

Visits are essential, although sometimes very difficult to keep going, especially if the pressure of work is great. Ensure that a roster is kept for all your staff officers and ensure that they all get out and visit all units regularly. When an officer is visiting a formation or unit make sure that he takes something of interest with him and is prepared to bring back information or requests not only affecting his own but other branches.

Study the personalities of the commanders and senior staff officers with whom you have to deal. For instance, some commanders like submissions in meticulous detail and some hate anything on paper. With some commanders, the more one panders to them the less trouble they are, and if you can give way on some minor point in a magnanimous manner, you may well find a more important subject from your own point of view is accepted readily.

#### Relations with Clerical Staff

In this field I would include telephonists, civilian typists, orderlies and clerks of all categories. They are all generally very hard worked and the very good ones are usually few and far between. The more you look after them and the more interest you take in them the better results you get.

I suggest when you first arrive that you walk around their offices and get to know them. This is equally as important as meeting your fellow staff officers. If you can make any improvement in their comfort such as better

lighting, more space etc., it will be a good start.

When you first arrive check various aspects of their staff work. Two good subjects are the BF file and the calling for a file on an involved subject and noting how long it takes to arrive.

There are many ways in which you can show interest and give help. Some of them are:—

- (a) Try to refrain from submitting typing just prior to their stopping work for the day.
- (b) Ensure that an efficient relief roster is kept and that they get their fair share of games, exercise and recreation.
- (c) Encourage a pride in their work — I personally believe in the inclusion of initials with typing.
- (d) Discourage a G, A, Q clerk battle. A healthy spirit of rivalry is a good thing, but don't let it go too far.

Establish a close association with your chief clerk. He is the pillar on whom you rely and he must be taken fully in to your confidence. Give him responsibility, tell him what you want and leave it to him to get on with it. You must have a good chief clerk and you must trust him.

Finally, a point which is sometimes overlooked is the need to keep your headquarters personnel at a high standard of turn out, smartness and discipline. There is nothing worse than a representative from one of your units or a higher formation coming to your headquarters and seeing scruffy soldiers.

### Conclusion

The good General Staff officer must bear in mind always that his function is to serve his commander and subordinate units wisely and well. His own personality must be attuned and directed towards this requirement. The personality cult is to be developed for the commander, NOT the staff officer. This argues a somewhat chameleon type flexibility for the average Australian Army Officer, who is expect-

ted to be at different intervals an efficient staff officer and commander. Field Marshal Montgomery acknowledges his debt to Major General de Guingand. How many outside a limited circle had heard of the Chief of Staff compared with the commander at the end of the war?

Finally, it is hoped that the experiences of the writer will in some small measure assist staff officers in general, and General Staff officers in particular, in the performance of their duties.

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### COMPETITION FOR AUTHORS

The Board of Review has made the undermentioned awards for articles published in the year 1962/63:

First place and the prize of £30 to "Revolutionary Warfare" by Colonel M. P. O'Hare.

Second place and the prize of £10 to "It's New" by Captain H. L. Bell.

# Strategic Review

## THE DOCTRINE OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE SOVIET INTERPRETATION

Reprinted from the July 1963 issue of  
"Current Notes on International Affairs,"  
Department of External Affairs, Canberra, ACT

THE DOCTRINE of peaceful coexistence has been a continuous element in Soviet policy since 1917, except for a brief period of uncertainty about the time of the Korean war. In essence the doctrine, as expounded by the Soviet Union today, is directed towards the avoidance of nuclear war, though it implies the use by the Communist bloc of all other means in the attaining of an unchanging ultimate goal, the triumph of world Communism. While the Soviet Union held its position as the fount of Communist ideology, the doctrine remained consistent and unchallenged within the bloc, although certain of its bases were tempered to accord with changing circumstances. With the development of the rift between China and the Soviet Union, however, doubts have recently been expressed by the Chinese as to the validity of the Soviet interpretation of the doctrine of peaceful coexistence in promoting the objectives of world Communism. In a letter addressed to the Soviet leadership on 14th June, 1963, the Chinese

suggested that if the general line of the international Communist movement "is one-sidedly reduced to peaceful coexistence, peaceful competition and peaceful transition, this is to violate the revolutionary principles of the 1957 Declaration and the 1960 Statement, to discard the historical mission of proletarian world revolution, and to depart from the revolutionary teachings of Marxism - Leninism". This statement makes more important a precise understanding of the current meaning of "peaceful coexistence" as expounded by the Soviet leadership. A brief summary of the doctrine's past connotations provides a background against which its present meaning may be better judged.

### **Theoretical Basis of Peaceful Coexistence: 1917 to Stalin's Death**

In formulating the principles which were to provide the basis for the eventual establishment of world Communism, Lenin originally advocated peaceful coexistence as one of a number of tactics subordinate to certain

general principles. Following the revolution in 1917, it was argued that the revolutionary government was being subjected to "capitalist encirclement" aimed at bringing down the new regime. In such circumstances a protracted period of peace was deemed essential for the new government to consolidate itself, and to establish the Soviet Union as a sound base for the future spread of Communism. According to both Lenin and Stalin, peaceful coexistence would remain tactically necessary until such time as the world balance of power might favour the Soviet Union and her future allies. In the meantime, the task of foreign policy was to ensure that peaceful conditions necessary for this internal development.

In his speech to the XVth Congress of the Communist Party in December, 1927, Stalin said —

"We cannot forget the saying of Lenin to the effect that a great deal in the matter of our construction depends on whether we succeed in delaying the war with the capitalist countries, which is inevitable, and which may be delayed either until the proletarian war ripens in Europe or until colonial revolutions come to a head and finally until the capitalists fight among themselves over the division of colonies. Therefore the maintenance of peaceful relations with capitalist countries is an obligatory task for us. The basis of our relations with capitalist countries consists of admitting of the coexistence of two opposed systems."

Also during this period when war between the Soviet Union and the West was theoretically regarded as "inevitable", it was at the same time official policy that such a conflict should be postponed for as long as possible.

The addition of a number of countries to the Communist bloc as a result of the Second World War brought about a new situation. The Soviet Union could no longer be described as an isolated socialist state surrounded by hostile forces. The belief became current among the Soviet and other Communist parties that the old basis for the tactic of peaceful coexistence — an economically backward, weak and politically isolated Soviet Union — had been swept away. The Soviet post-war recovery was well under way, and as a result of this recovery, as the theoretical writings of the time reveal, a group appeared, the members of which contended that the Soviet bloc now provided a sufficiently strong base for encouraging Communist expansion wherever possible, and that the best course would be to press ahead with the "world revolution". Stalin's attitude to this group remained ambivalent until the publication (a few months before his death) of his last major work "Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.", in which he formally acknowledged the new situation of the Soviet Union, but at the same time disavowed the "left-wing" faction of the party. He maintained that the solution of Soviet and bloc economic problems would take a considerable time and that the policy of peaceful coexistence continued



to be essential. He supported his position by arguing that, while wars between capitalist countries themselves remained inevitable, their joint crusade against the Soviet bloc was not. It seems likely, however, that Soviet policy during the period between about 1948 and Stalin's death in 1953 was based on an uneasy compromise between those in the party who supported these views and those who favoured a more active policy.

### **Khrushchev and Peaceful Coexistence**

Since Mr. Khrushchev came to power, the doctrine of peaceful coexistence has been cast in slightly different terms, largely as a result of the changing power balance brought about by increased Soviet nuclear strength. Mr. Khrushchev has stressed that as a result of this change, war between the two blocs is no longer inevitable and has made the important addition to the theory that the suicidal nature of nuclear war has outmoded some of Lenin's earlier thinking about the inevitability of war between the Communist and capitalist camps. According to Mr. Khrushchev, Soviet — and also United States — policies should be designed to avoid nuclear war which he has described as "unthinkable", and to minimise the risk of war. A theme that occurred during Mr. Khrushchev's visit to the United States in 1959, and was revived after the Cuban crisis, was that of the necessity of compromise and mutual concessions in the name of reason and peace. This theme was clearly stated by Mr.

A. N. Kosygin, a member of the Presidium in November, 1962, following the Cuban crisis, when he stated that "we consider that concessions had to be made by either side, for these were mutual concessions: a reasonable compromise. It was compromise in the interests of all people, for it helped remove the threat of a global thermonuclear war. The Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence means that the two antagonistic systems, socialist and capitalist, existing on our planet agree that they can live without war, i.e., coexist. This is compromise — a mutual concession. It presupposes that issues are resolved, not through war but through negotiation based on the principle of peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition."

Mr. Khrushchev in his speech to the Supreme Soviet in December, 1962, stated the position even more categorically when he said, "The only choice before mankind in our time is peaceful coexistence or devastating war. But no people in any country needs a military catastrophe. A new war, if it is permitted to start, would kill people by the million, regardless of nationality and property status. Consequently, there is only one alternative: peaceful coexistence. And this means renunciation of war among states as a means of settling international disputes and their solution through negotiation."

The following excerpt from the Chinese newspaper "People's Daily" of 17th June, 1963, reveals the difference between the

Chinese and Khrushchev's interpretation of the doctrine:

"Peaceful coexistence cannot replace the revolutionary struggles of the people. The transition from capitalism to socialism can be brought about only through the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat in that country . . . Can peaceful transition be made into a new worldwide strategic principle of the international Communist movement? Absolutely not . . . The proletarian party must never base its entire work on the assumption that the imperialists and reactionaries will accept peaceful transformation. The proletarian party must prepare itself for two eventualities — while preparing for a peaceful development of the revolution it must also prepare fully for a non-peaceful development."

Much attention has been focussed on that aspect of peaceful coexistence which reflects the Soviet belief that world war can be avoided, that international disputes must be dealt with by negotiation, that there are leaders and people in the West with a sober appreciation of the international situation and particularly that a *modus vivendi* must be reached between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is primarily to this aspect of the doctrine that the Chinese have taken exception.

Peaceful coexistence does not exclude the waging of the cold war. In this regard the statement issued after the meeting of 81 Communist parties in Moscow late in 1960 described peaceful

coexistence in the following terms:— "This policy (i.e. peaceful coexistence) strengthens the position of socialism, enhances the prestige and international influence of the Communist parties in the capitalist countries . . . Peaceful coexistence of states does not imply renunciation of the class struggle . . . Coexistence . . . is a form of class struggle. In conditions of peaceful coexistence favourable opportunities are provided for the development of the class struggle in the capitalist countries and the national liberation movement of the peoples of the colonial and dependent countries . . . it implies intensification of the struggle of the working class, of all Communist parties, for the triumph of socialist ideas." The doctrine does not, therefore, in any way exclude activities directed toward undermining Western positions and advancing the cause of Communism in the world: on the contrary, it is judged to offer the best means of pursuing these activities in the particular circumstances of the present. The doctrine implies the maintenance of ostensibly normal relations with the West while at the same time affording the Soviet Union the opportunity to interfere in the internal affairs of Western countries through indigenous Communist parties, front organisations, etc. It is stressed that the maintenance of normal relations with the West does not mean any form of coexistence between bourgeois and socialist ideologies. This point was repeated by Mr. Khrushchev in his address to representatives of the intelligentsia in March, 1963, in

a section entitled "We are against peaceful coexistence in the field of ideology." In this he asserted that "peaceful coexistence in the field of ideology is treason to Marxism-Leninism" and claimed that "Soviet society in all its sections has now reached the stage of complete monolithic unity" and that the people and the party will not tolerate any infringement of this unity. An example of such an infringement, according to Khrushchev, is the attempt to impose "upon us peaceful coexistence of ideologies which must be opposed."

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The reader of these three books will surely ask why an operation in which so many distinguished characters had a hand, and which was so meticulously planned, went so desperately awry. This question contains much of its answer in that the operation was planned too rigidly and there was no single commander with responsibility for both the plans and command, from the conference table to the beach. It is significant that the one part of it which was a brilliant success from beginning to end, No. 4 Commando's fight at Varengville, and the destruction of the heavy battery there, was planned and executed throughout by the commander concerned. It remains a microcosm of what a larger raid should be.

Then come the errors which seem so obvious in the light of hindsight; intelligence misappreciation leading to a serious underestimation of the defences; pitifully inadequate fire support; frontal attack when surprise was so uncertain and precluded in the main landing, which was timed to take place after the assaults on the flanks. How did all these creep in under the very noses of men who were to prove themselves in battle as great commanders of the century?

— *Times Literary Supplement* in a review of three books about the Dieppe Raid.

# THE SINO-INDIAN CONFLICT 1962

## SOME MILITARY LESSONS

IN OCTOBER, 1962, the Chinese suddenly attacked Indian forces at several points on the mountains and ill-defined frontier. In the course of the fighting the Indian Army sustained severe reverses. Subsequently the Indian Government ordered an investigation to determine to what extent the reverses could be attributed to:—

Training.

Equipment.

The system of command.

The physical fitness of the troops.

The capacity of the commanders at all levels.

On September 2, 1963, the Minister for Defence reported the result of the investigation to the Indian Parliament. Although the inquiry dealt specifically with operations in mountainous terrain, the lessons learned are, fundamentally, of universal application. Basically the same principles will apply when considering operations in any environment.

In the course of his report the Minister for Defence said —

“While conveying to the House the Terms of Reference of this

Enquiry, I had made it clear that the underlying idea in holding this enquiry is to derive military lessons. It was meant to bring out clearly what were the mistakes or deficiencies in the past, so as to ensure that in future such mistakes are not repeated and such deficiencies are quickly made up. Consequently, the Enquiring Officers had to study in great and intimate detail the extent of our preparedness at the time, the planning and strategic concepts behind it and the way those plans were adjusted in the course of operations. This also necessitated the examination of the development and events prior to hostilities as also the plans, posture and the strength of the Army at the outbreak of hostility. In the course of the enquiry a very detailed review of the actual operations in both the Sectors had to be carried out with reference to terrain, strategy, tactics and deployment of our troops.

“The conclusions drawn at the end of the Report flow from examination of all these matters in great detail. In these circumstances I am sure, the House would appreciate that by the very nature of the contents it

would not be in the public interest to lay the Report on the Table of the House. Nor is it possible to attempt even an abridged or edited version of it consistent with the consideration of security, that would not give an unbalanced or incomplete picture to the House.

"I have given deep thought to this matter and it is with great regret that I have to withhold this document from this august House. The publication of this Report which contains information about the strength and deployment of our Forces and their locations would be of invaluable use to our enemies. It would not only endanger our security but affect the morale of those entrusted with safeguarding the security of our borders.

"The first question in the Terms of Reference was whether our training was found wanting.

"The Enquiry has revealed that our basic training was sound and soldiers adapted themselves to the mountains adequately. It is admitted that the training of our troops did not have orientation towards operations vis-a-vis the particular terrain in which the troops had to operate. Our training of the troops did not have a slant for a war being launched by China. Thus our troops had no requisite knowledge of the Chinese tactics, and ways of war, their weapons, equipment and capabilities. Knowledge of the enemy helps to build up confidence and morale, so essential for the Jawan on the front.

"The Enquiry has revealed that there is certainly need for

toughening and battle inoculation. It is, therefore, essential that battle schools are opened at training centres and formations, so that gradual toughening and battle inoculation can be carried out.

It has also revealed that the main aspect of training as well as the higher Commanders' concept of mountain warfare requires to be put right.

"Training alone, however, without correct leadership will pay little dividends. Thus the need of the moment, above all else, is training in leadership.

"The second question was about our equipment. The Enquiry has confirmed that there was indeed an overall shortage of equipment both for training and during operations. But it was not always the case that particular equipment was not available at all with the Armed Forces anywhere in the country. The crucial difficulty in many cases was that, while the equipment could be reached to the last point in the plains or even beyond it, it was another matter to reach it in time, mostly by air or by animal or human transport to the forward formations, who took the brunt of fighting. This position of logistics was aggravated by two factors:

- (i) The fast rate at which troops had to be inducted, mostly from plains to high mountain areas; and
- (ii) Lack of properly built roads and other means of communications.

"This situation was aggravated and made worse because of overall shortage as far as

vehicles were concerned and as our fleet was too old and its efficiency not adequate for operating on steep gradients and mountain terrain.

"Thus in brief though the enquiry revealed overall shortage of equipment, it has also revealed that our weapons were adequate to fight the Chinese and compared favourably with theirs. The automatic rifle would have helped in the cold climate and is being introduced. The enquiry has pinpointed the need to make up deficiency in equipment, particularly suited for mountain warfare, but more so to provide means and modes of communication to make it available to the troops at the right place at the right time. Work on these lines has already been taken in hand and is progressing vigorously.

"The third question is regarding our system of command within the Armed Forces. The enquiry has revealed that there is basically nothing wrong with the system and chain of command, provided it is exercised in accepted manner at various levels. There is, however, need for realisation of responsibilities at various levels, which must work with trust and confidence in each other. It is also revealed that during the operations difficulties arose only when there was departure from the accepted chain of command. There again, such departures occurred mainly due to haste and lack of adequate prior planning.

"The enquiry has also revealed the practice that crept in in higher army formations of

interfering in tactical specified tasks. It is the duty of Commanders in the field to make on-the-spot decision, when so required, and details of operations ought to have been left to them.

"The fourth question is of physical fitness of our troops. It is axiomatic that an unacclimatised army cannot be as fit as one which is. The enquiry has revealed that despite this our troops both officers and men stood the rigours of the climate, although most of them were rushed at short notices from plains. Thus in brief, troops were physically fit in every way for their normal tasks, but they were not acclimatised to fight at the heights at which some of them were asked to make a stand. Where acclimatisation had taken place, such as in Ladakh, the height factor presented no difficulty. Among some middle-age-group officers there had been deterioration in standards of physical fitness. This is a matter which is being rectified. The physical fitness among junior officers was good and is now even better.

"The fifth point in the terms of reference was about the capacity of the Commanders at all levels during these operations to influence the men under their command. By and large, it has been found that general standard amongst the junior officers was fair. At Unit level there were good and mediocre Commanding Officers. The proportion of good Commanding Officers and not-so-good was perhaps the same as obtained in any army in the last World War. At Brigade level, but



for the odd exception, Commanders were able to adequately exercise their command. It was at higher levels that shortcomings became more apparent. It was also revealed that some of the higher commanders did not depend enough on the initiative of the lower commanders, who alone could have the requisite knowledge of the terrain and local conditions of troops under them.

"Apart from these terms of reference the enquiry went into some other important aspects pertaining to the operations, and I would like to inform the House about this also. This relates to following three aspects:

- (i) Our intelligence;
- (ii) Our Staff Work and Procedures; and
- (iii) Our "Higher Direction of Operations".

"The Enquiry has brought out that the collection of intelligence was slow and the reporting of it vague.

"The second important aspect of intelligence is its collection and evaluation. Admittedly, because of the vague nature of intelligence, evaluation may not have been accurate. Thus a clear picture of the Chinese build-up was not made available. No attempt was made to link up the new enemy build-up with the old deployment. Thus field formations had little guidance whether there were fresh troops or old ones moving to new locations.

"The third aspect is dissemination of intelligence. It has come out that much faster means must be employed to send out

processed and important information to field formations if it is to be of any use.

"Now about our staff work and procedures. There are clear procedures of staff work laid down at all levels. The enquiry has, however, revealed that much more attention will have to be given than was done in the past, in the work and procedures of the General Staff at the Services Headquarters, as well as in the Command Headquarters and below, to long term operational well as to the problems of co-planning, including logistics as ordination between various Service Headquarters. So one major lesson learned is that the quality of General Staff work and the depth of its prior planning in time is going to be one of the most crucial factors in our future preparedness.

"That brings me to the next point which is called the higher direction of operations. Even the largest and best equipped of armies need to be given proper policy guidance and major directives by the Government, whose instrument it is. These must bear a reasonable relation to the size of the army and state of its equipment from time to time. An increase in the size or improving the equipment of army costs not only money but also needs time.

"The reverses that our armed forces admittedly suffered were due to a variety of causes and weaknesses as stated above. While this Enquiry, has gone deeply into those causes it has also confirmed that the attack was so sudden and in such

remote and isolated sectors that the Indian Army as a whole was really not tested. In that period of less than two months last year only about 24,000 of our troops were actually involved in fighting. Of these, those in Ladakh did an excellent job even when overwhelmed and outnumbered. In the easternmost Sector though the troops had to withdraw in the face of vastly superior enemy strength from Walong, they withdrew in an orderly manner and took their toll. It was only in the Kameng Sector that the Army suffered a series of reverses. These battles were fought on our remotest borders and were at heights not known to the Army and at places which geographically had all the disadvantages for our troops and

many advantages for the enemy. But such initial reverses are a part of the tides of war, and what matters most is who wins the last battle.

“What happened at Sela and Bomdi-La were severe reverses for us, but we must remember that other countries with powerful defence forces have sometimes suffered in the initial stages of a war. The aggressor has a certain advantage, more especially when the aggression is sudden and well prepared. We are now on the alert and well on the way of preparedness and this Enquiry, while bringing home to us our various weaknesses and mistakes, would also help to strengthen our defence preparedness and our entire conduct of such operations.”

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#### COMPETITION FOR AUTHORS

The Board of Review has awarded first place and the prize of £5 for the best original article published in the September issue to “Australia Alone” by Captain H. L. Bell, Royal Australian Infantry.

# A VISIT TO BERLIN, POLAND AND THE SOVIET UNION

Lieutenant-Colonel D. S. Thomson, MC,  
Royal Australian Infantry

## Part II — The Soviet Union

I HESITATE to write about the Soviet Union after only ten days in such a vast country. However, I had two advantages; my wife speaks Russian and we were what the Russians call camping "auto-tourists". As a result we had considerably more freedom than is usual. Intourist, "USSR Company for Foreign Travel" books the average tourist into special tourist hotels at £12-12-0 per day. By organising cars, guide interpreters and special tours, Intourist generally manages to show visitors what it is intended that they should see.

"Auto tourists" need not come under the control of the ubiquitous Intourist. Driving through the country we were required to stick to pre-arranged routes. (On a previous trip the driver of our Minibus had upset Intourist and the police by an unscheduled drive to Leningrad.) Despite this restriction we were free to stop and talk to people along the way

and we were more or less free to go where we liked in the main cities. We visited Minsk, Smolensk, Moscow and Leningrad. Dotted along the main roads are police boxes manned by the "Militsonairi" the Militia as the police are called. We noticed that as we neared these boxes we were watched through binoculars, after which the Militiaman went to the telephone in the box — obviously to report our progress. Only once were we aware of being followed. The Australian Embassy told us that if the authorities had known that my wife spoke Russian our movements would probably have been checked. Apparently Russian speaking foreigners are suspect.

"Don't take cameras", "Don't wander around alone", "Don't travel on the Metro", "Be careful when you talk to people". Such was the advice we were given before leaving England. My wife and I took many photographs although we were very

careful not to photograph things forbidden. We wandered freely around Moscow and Leningrad and we talked to many people in both Russian and English.

In Minsk, Smolensk and Moscow we stayed in tourist camps used by both foreigners and Russians. Only a tiny percentage of Russians have private cars, so those we met in the camps were obviously of the "upper crust". The camps are comparatively cheap — about £1-0-0 stg. a day. For this we got small two-man tents with floorboards, comfortable beds and mattresses and clean bedding. There were showers and a restaurant where one could get simple meals. Each camp was surrounded by a high fence and the gates were unlocked by a guard to allow vehicles in and out.


### Moscow — Capital of Empire

The huge city of Moscow impresses as the centre of a great Empire. In this summer holiday season the city was thronged by the varied people of the Soviets — Kazakhs and Tartars, Mongolians and Ukrainians, Georgians and Armenians. Banners and slogans, big pictures of Lenin (there were none of Stalin), triumphal arches, huge ugly statues, and great buildings, were all there to impress visitors from the outer reaches of Empire with the might and power of the Soviet Union.

The Kremlin is the focal point of the city. It is not the secret, forbidding fortress which one imagined. Anyone can go freely through the many gates. The red walls and towers, the gold onion

domes of the four churches and the yellow and white palaces of the Kremlin give an impression of colour and light. One evening we were in Red Square at 9 o'clock when the flood lights were switched on — a most impressive moment. Inside the walls there are gardens and trees. We wandered through the churches and cathedrals which are now museums, and with an Intourist guide we visited the Armoury which houses the treasures of the Tsars. It is a huge and very well laid out museum, with gold and jewelled treasures, magnificent clothes, ikons and armour and State coaches (including one which was a present from the first Elizabeth of England). The pleasant English speaking woman guide gave us a description sprinkled with a good deal of propaganda, contrasting the wealth and splendour of the Tsars with the poverty of the people and the little spent on education. We had only one other guided tour here — a tour of Moscow. The Intourist guides are obviously well chosen and trained.

Members of our party visiting the Museum of the Revolution were amused when two young men from Zanzibar infuriated a guide by not swallowing her propaganda. They laughed at the wrong places. On seeing Lenin's coat with a fur collar one said: "Things were obviously better then." At a map showing Communist Parties throughout the world and their part in the anti-Colonial struggle, they said "We will make our own revolution without your help, thank



The fantastic St. Basil's Cathedral in Red Square, Moscow. It is now a State Museum.

you." Obviously the solid propaganda line does not always have the desired results.

The Red Square, flanked by the Kremlin Walls, the fantastic outline of St. Basil's Cathedral, and the great department store of GUM, is much smaller than I expected. It looked very big on TV watching the May Day Parade. Below the Kremlin Walls is the Mausoleum of Lenin and Stalin. A queue of thousands of patient people wait to see the "gods" of the Communist world. We took our Australian in a wheelchair to see the embalmed bodies. My wife had a talk to a police officer about "war heroes" and we were quickly ushered to the head of the queue. Inside, in

glass coffins with bright lights shining, lay Lenin and Stalin, like very lifelike wax models. There was an awed, religious silence as the crowd shuffled slowly through the tomb. This was the only time in Russia when we were helped with the wheelchair; two young Russian soldiers carried the chair up the steps.

### Housing the People

The whole of the centre of Moscow has been reconstructed since the Revolution — except for the historic buildings. The streets are very wide and very clean: they are washed and swept every night by water trucks and by women with hoses

and twig brooms. Even the street surface under parked cars is washed. Pedestrian crossings in the main streets are underground. The traffic is busy but light compared with Melbourne, Singapore or Delhi.

Tourists are shown with pride the huge blocks of apartments which surround the city. Despite an immense building programme accommodation is poor by Western standards. Many families live in communal flats with the use of one room and shared kitchen and washing facilities. It is only recently that self-contained family flats have been built. Few families have any privacy. As well as the vast new apartment houses, there are shabby pre-revolutionary tenements and many wooden houses and shacks. These are obviously very crowded, if the TV aerials bristling from the roof are any indication. We counted six aerials on the roof of one small tumble-down wooden house. There are still large slum areas in Moscow although very great efforts are being made to clear them. Visitors are not encouraged to visit the poorer areas. Driving through one of the old parts of the city in our van, we were stopped by a taxi which passed us and blocked the road. Out got a man in plain clothes, swinging a police baton, who ordered us to go back the way we came. Late one night, my wife and I got a taxi from one of the outer Metro stations to take us back to the camp. Driving through a poor area we noticed we were being followed by another taxi which drew up beside us. The man in the back peered into our taxi, and we were

followed until we turned off to the camp entrance. This is the only occasion on which we were obviously followed.

### Public Transport

Public transport is good. The Metro is magnificent and worthy of the praise it receives. For 5 kopecks (about fivepence) one can travel anywhere in clean, spacious, comfortable trains. The stations with their marble, chandeliers, paintings and mosaics are well worth a visit. Trolley buses run frequently throughout the city. The fare anywhere is 4 kopecks and in most buses the honour system of payment is used. Passengers put their money in a box and tear off a ticket. We found people very helpful in providing the right change and in giving directions. People talked readily, particularly one elderly woman to whom I offered my seat — she chatted with my wife about Moscow. The taxi drivers were not so helpful. They were curt and sometimes rude, and we were told that many of them were police informers.

### Moscow Crowds

The crowds in the street are drab and shabby. Clothes are generally of poor quality, badly made and ill fitting. Shoes are ugly and serviceable. Few men wear ties. When my wife wore high heeled shoes, she was stared at in the streets. There is dull and colourless uniformity although people say they are very much better off than they were a few years ago. One rarely sees a well dressed Russian woman. Few wear make-up or have attractive hair styles — a great contrast to Poland.

Russian crowds are serious and unsmiling and give an impression of strength and purpose. People in their forties are lined and careworn; they show signs of the hard times they have been through and look much older than they are.

Russian women tend to have square, strong, shapeless figures. Everywhere one can see women doing heavy manual labour in the streets and in the fields.

Outside GUM my wife acquired an admirer who had consumed a good deal of vodka. He was an engineer and although a Muscovite, he had just returned from several years working in Siberia. He was very talkative. In 1946 he had been to America, but did not like it much. "Everything was money." He added "But of course I like all people. We must be friends with everyone." We said goodbye to him, but a couple of hundred yards further on he touched my wife's elbow and said brightly "Here I am again". This happened twice before he eventually left us. Moscow is filled with museums and exhibitions. We visited a few including the Museum of the Revolution and the fine Tretyakov Gallery. The latter contains some priceless ikons which are a strange contrast to the "socialist realism" of modern Soviet painters which fills so much of the Museum. We tried not to spend too much time in the past so we travelled around Moscow in the Metro and by bus and walked and sat in the streets and parks, in order to talk to people and absorb the contemporary scene.

### Family Life

One evening, whilst watching children playing in a park, we talked for over an hour to a young mother about family life in Russia. She was a teacher, her husband was a technician and they had two children aged four and five. They both worked a forty hour week spread over six days. At 0830 hours each morning she took the children to a creche where they spent the day. Here they had their three meals and played under an adult supervisor — one supervisor for each twenty-five children. The children were collected in the late afternoon and during the summer they were taken to a nearby park to play for a couple of hours, before going home to a light supper and bed. The children's father was away on his fortnight's annual holiday at a House of Rest. Our new friend had just returned from her own holidays. The children had recently spent 2½ months of the summer at a children's holiday camp, where their mother could visit them only once a month. In reply to a question as to what work she did, my wife said that she stayed at home and looked after our children. "I sometimes wish I could do the same", our friend said wistfully. "The children are well looked after, but everyone's ideas are different and it would be nice to bring the children up as I wish."

It seemed to us that there was little basis for a sound family life in these circumstances. Both parents must work in Russia and sometimes they must take more than one job to make ends meet.

It appears that the recently introduced seven hour day is not as advanced as claimed. The working week consists of five days of seven hours, with five hours on Saturday, a total of forty hours a week. This leaves only one day for family life. Children certainly do not see much of their parents. As the children get older they will go to Young Pioneer Camps and later to Komsomol Camps. When one thinks of the cramped conditions in which most people live, these camps seem to be a good thing. Although children receive a certain amount of political indoctrination, they do get a good holiday in the country or by the sea. On the other hand, much of the children's upbringing is left to the State.

### The Classless Society

"All animals are equal, but some are more equal than others", said George Orwell in *Animal Farm*. This certainly seemed to be true in the Soviet Union, illustrated by our lunch and dinner one day in Moscow. We lunched at a "Stahlovaya" or Workers' Restaurant, in a poorer area not far from the centre of the city. Here we queued with poorly dressed men and women, and one or two young soldiers for a meal consisting of sliced tomatoes with sour cream, meat rissoles and potatoes, bread, butter and tea. This was a simple but satisfying meal, very much cheaper than we could get anywhere else. We noticed a card in the window "Cleaner Wanted". Beer was sold here, but a notice



Crowds coming away from the Lenin Mausoleum after watching the changing of the guard. The walls of the Kremlin are behind.



on the wall said "Spirits may not be brought into or consumed in this restaurant". This may have been part of a current campaign against heavy drinking, in which vodka has been made more expensive and harder to get. Despite this we saw a good many drunks singing in the streets.

That evening we dined in a smart modern restaurant on the 7th floor of the Hotel Moscow. Here we had caviar, Kiev chicken cutlet and a small glass of vodka. At the next table was a group of very well dressed young Russians who were drinking lots of champagne and ordering the most expensive dishes on the menu. These were representatives of the "young rich" whose parents held well paid positions and could afford to give their children good allowances. They invited us to join them at their table — four young men who had just finished engineering courses and two pretty, well dressed blonde girls who were studying English at a Language Institute. They had all met at a summer camp in the Crimea and were having a reunion. The girls were anxious to practice their English and we talked a lot, in both English and Russian. They were bright and pleasant company, but it soon became apparent that they were supporters of the Party line, at least on the surface.

A discussion of colonialism developed and interpreting was difficult as the argument became more serious. I would like to have pursued this subject, but I thought it best not to get involved in politics, so I closed the discussion and we got on with

the party. We danced to a very good band which played modern Western music.

When asked about the camp my wife jokingly said that the tents were rather small. One girl resented this criticism and said heatedly "Our camps are all very good".

Although this was an intelligent and well educated group they were appallingly ignorant of the West. The only English paper they could read was the Daily Worker. One man, hearing we had been in East Berlin, asked if we had seen any Russians. We described how Russian tanks were helping to close the border. This seemed to upset him and he looked concerned and serious. They had no knowledge of what was really happening in Berlin.

### Meeting the Students

After our discussion on family life and our dinner with the "young rich" we were most interested to meet and talk to other young people. A 20-year-old student of architecture was outspoken in his criticism of the Government. He said that the students must be given more freedom to think, read and travel. He made the surprising and revealing statement "What we need is a revolution of the mind, not a revolution of the streets". He asked us to send him a copy of "Dr. Zhivago", but we thought it too risky. Whilst having coffee in a restaurant we met another young Russian studying journalism who was teaching himself English. His favourite authors were Faulkner and Steinbeck!! He did admit that he found *Ulysses* by James

Joyce rather difficult to understand. We said we found it difficult too. The only English language newspapers he had read were *The Daily Worker* and one copy of *The Chicago Tribune*. An ill assorted pair. Like all Russians who read English he had also read the inevitable Dickens and Galsworthy: I wish I had asked him what he thought of *The Forsyte Saga*.

We visited the huge new Moscow University, its wedding cake architecture dominating the city. In the main building were dormitories for 6,000 students. Unfortunately it was vacation time and the students were not in residence. We were interested to hear that Friendship University, founded for Asian and African Students had been renamed "The Patrice Lumumba University". No opportunity is missed to score propaganda points.

### Propaganda and the Party Line

One can almost imagine the Orwellian World of "1984". Propaganda is everywhere and it is hard to forget the all pervading Communism of the country — slogans and statistics, huge posters and loud music continually remind us of the fact. The slogans, in white on a red background, are interesting.

"The plans of the party are the plans of the people."

"To you, our dear Party, we dedicate our inspired endeavour."

"Forward to Communism."

"Through toil to Communism."

"Peace and friendship amongst all nations."

"Let reason serve peace, not war."

"Peace to the world."

Statistics are everywhere to remind the people of the industrial might of the Soviets. They are always comparative and give no indication of the availability of goods.

"Last year our State Factories produced "X" thousand trucks. This year they will produce "X" plus "Y" thousand trucks. Congratulations to the State Factory Workers. They have done well."

"Let us give to the country 10 million tons of milk."

I quote from *Pravda (Truth)* of 24 August. On the front page is the editorial:—

"Fulfilment of your obligations is the best gift you can give to the 22nd Session of the Party. In the flowering of our mighty strength, our country goes to the Session with the creative activities of our Soviet people rising ever higher.

In the large and small factories, in the mines, on collective farms and State collectives, Socialist competition is flowering and growing in honour of the Party's Session. The competitors are directing their strength to the fulfilment of the people's economic plans of the third year of the Seven Year Plan, before the due date and the achievement of new quantitative indices in the work of industry and village agriculture" and so on and so on for two full length columns.

The rest of the front page is headlined:—

"118 Million Poods of Grain for the Country."

"The Stalingrad District has fulfilled the plan for the sale of grain to the State. With a feeling of great joy the toilers of village agriculture, the Party and the Soviet of the Stalingrad District report to the Lenin Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to the dear Soviet Government and personally to Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, of the new workers' victory gained in the struggle for grain production." And so on.

Underneath are congratulatory messages from other regions. Page 2 continues the praise in fulsome terms.

At last on page 5 is some news of Berlin, headlined "The orders of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the German Democratic Republic". "In connection with innumerable provocations, particularly in the last few days, at the instigation of West Berliners and Mayor Brandt, against the citizens and institutions of the capital, Berlin, the Minister of Internal Affairs issued orders for the protection of the Republic." In one of these orders the citizens of Berlin and West Berlin are ordered not to come within 100 metres of the border.

By comparison, *The Daily Worker*, read in Moscow seemed an objective and well written paper. It gave full coverage of the last Test!!

We stopped at a petrol station which had a typical propaganda display. Revolutionary music and political exhortations blared continually from several amplifiers. Around the station were ten or so slogans and half a

dozen posters of statistics. We asked the man at the pump what he thought of it all. "I don't mind the music", he said, "but the political talks are boring."

Lenin's face is everywhere, always dressed in his bourgeois collar and tie. We saw no posters of either Stalin or Khrushchev. Political disfavour apparently leads to extremes. In the ceiling of the Komsomolskaya Metro is a large mosaic depicting important men. Once Beria was amongst them. When he went out of favour his face was changed so that it became unrecognisable.

The attitude of the man at the petrol pump station appeared to be typical of the average Russian. They seemed about as politically interested as the average Australian. The young seemed more interested in passing their exams, getting a good job, marrying and finding somewhere to live — very average ambitions. One young girl of about twenty-two in answer to our questions told us there were about 70 million members of Komsomol, the Communist Youth organisation and only about 8 million members of the Party out of a population of 200 million. She said it was hard to get into the party; one had to attend courses and pass exams.

We met no one who admitted to membership of the party. The only obvious members were the "druzinniki", voluntary civil guards in plain clothes with a red armband, whom one sees in parks and public places. They are all party members and

because of this people are more frightened of them than they are of the uniformed police — the Militia. One woman said they were “busy bodies, always sticking their nose into other people’s affairs.”

### The Church

Amidst all this propaganda the position of the Church is interesting. Many of the main churches are museums, but a few are open for worship. In Lenin-grad, a large city, an Intourist guide told us there were only two Orthodox churches open for worship. In Moscow one Sunday morning, we searched for a church holding services. No one in the streets could or would direct us. In Smolensk we arrived at the Cathedral on one of the days of the Autumn Thanks-giving and found crowds of elderly people standing packed together listening to the service. One shabbily dressed woman asked my wife if she wore a cross. She seemed pleased when we said we were Christians and went to church, and told all her friends. Afterwards we stood outside talking to a large group who said how delighted they were to see us in their church. When asked, they said that their children went to church also, but it was evident that very few young people were there.

Around the entrance to a church in Minsk were half a dozen beggars — the only ones we saw in the country. Inside we listened for over an hour to a beautiful choral service. Amongst the devout crowd (they are called “Believers” in Russia today) we saw a sprinkling of young women

and one or two men in their thirties. Many paid for candles to be passed forward. Incense was waved by two “otets dyakon” or deacons and a great Bible was held high by two acolytes in yellow robes whilst the crowned Bishop of Minsk read in Church Slavonic. There was a wonderful choir, the priests had fine voices, and all the people joined in singing parts of the service. It was a stirring and moving sight. This was a week day evening and not a Sunday.

Later, when people clustered around and discovered that we were from England (Australia was a bit beyond the ken of these simple people) they said over and over again “No War”, “No War”. “We are praying to God that there will be no War.” This was obviously from the heart and not politically inspired. Minsk had suffered terribly in the last war. My wife said that we also prayed for peace in our countries. They seemed very pleased and rather surprised to hear this.

Some young people told us that if they wanted good jobs it was unwise for them to be known as “Believers”.

Very few married women wear wedding rings. We discussed this with the young mother in the park who had no ring. She said that this was a pre-revolutionary custom, but she did say that some of the old customs were coming back into favour..

### Shops and Shopping

To live in Russia one requires a great deal of patience. In one of the many Gastronoms — State Food Shops, we pushed through a

crowd to see the price of bread and cheese. Then we returned to another queue at the cash desk to pay for the items we wanted. Then to a final queue to collect our purchases — all this for a loaf of bread and half a pound of cheese!! Often calculations were done by shop girls using the abacus — much slower than mental arithmetic for simple addition. In some shops like GUM, the State Universal Store, cash registers are now installed. This is a huge store selling a vast range of goods. The shops are disappointing; most goods are shoddy and poorly displayed. There seems little pride of craftsmanship. However, people said that compared with post-war years, they can now buy most of the necessities of life but few of the luxuries. How different from the "affluent society" of the West!

It is almost impossible to compare the cost of living as the tourist rate of exchange is particularly disadvantageous. Except for bread, food seemed to be very expensive. Few people can afford meat regularly and butter and cheese were almost luxuries. Fruit in the shops was expensive and of very poor quality, although apparently more plentiful than in previous years.

### **The Black Market**

The scarcity of some items has encouraged a thriving black market. Because of this we met the "Stylyagi" the Russian "teddy boys". They come up to tourists and ask for chewing gum or Biro pens. If they receive any encouragement they

arrange a rendezvous where nylons, drip dry clothing, transistors or Western currency can be handed over at a large profit to the seller. Three "big shot" black marketeers have been executed recently, so we decided not to be tempted. This has not discouraged the Stylyagi and there is evidence of a highly organised business. One tourist we met had made quite a lot of money. The black market was the only evidence of private enterprise. Late one night a young man sidled up to us and said, "Do you want to buy an Ikon?".

### **Leningrad**

Moscow is not Russia, any more than London is England. We also drove through the countryside and flew to Leningrad. Although this was not on our itinerary my wife walked into an Aeroflot booking office and bought two tickets. Our passports were checked but no questions asked. This is an indication of our freedom of movement. The plane was interesting. It was a Tupolev TU 1045 — speed 850 kilometres an hour at a height of 8,000 metres. It had two jets and carried about 140 passengers. A very fast rate of climb was combined with inadequate pressurisation. The fittings were comfortable and serviceable — altogether an impressive plane.

Leningrad — the old capital St. Petersburg — is a lovely 18th century city. Although badly damaged in the war, little trace of damage remains. Peter the Great's city has been restored and around it there are the inevitable great blocks of apart-

ments. The city is much more European than Moscow and the people were very friendly. They are proud of their city and one woman said, "Don't you think our city is elegant?". We did. Again, I could write pages on Leningrad, but it is largely a city of history. The great Hermitage Museum, started by Catherine the Great, deserves a mention. It is a treasure house of art and history. A gallery of Rembrandts — many galleries devoted to the French Impressionists — a section on Peter the Great — the Pushkin Galleries — and some of the lovely rooms of the Winter Palace, are all memories we will value.

### Farms and the Countryside

It is difficult to generalise on the countryside of such a huge land. We drove from Brest-Litovsk, through Minsk and Smolensk, to Moscow. This was the route followed by both Napoleon and the Nazis; much of the timber and many of the villages were destroyed during "The Great Fatherland War 1941-45". It is flat farming country dotted with collective farm settlements.

The houses are small thatched or shingled wooden cottages of one or two rooms. Water is drawn from the village pump. Apparently the standard of living of the peasant has not changed much since the Revolution.

It was harvest time and tractors and combine harvesters were working in the field. Hay was being loaded on horse drawn carts. In contrast to the mechanised farming we were

surprised to see peasants threshing wheat by hand on the road — this was the main road to Moscow!! After threshing, the wheat was spread out to dry and then raked into heaps ready to be carted away. Apparently there is still not enough modern machinery. One peasant got very angry as we tried to photograph him loading wheat from the road onto a tractor drawn trailer. It seems we are not meant to notice the less advanced aspects of collective farming.

There are no fences and herds of cattle are watched by cowherds. We passed several large and quite modern looking dairies and pig farms. The cows seemed a mixed bunch although the In-tourist line is that this is an area famous for its pedigreed herds.

The collective farms were not nearly so well kept as the private farms of neighbouring Poland. We saw little evidence of pride in work. The whole area was depressing, untidy and backward by Western standards. It is evident that the Government has concentrated on raising living standards for the urban workers in the towns and cities. Although the majority of the population still live on the land, the living conditions of the peasants have probably not improved very much since the Revolution. The peasants do not qualify for pensions or free medicine — benefits of the Welfare State, although under the recently announced plan aiming at true Communism, they should have these benefits by 1980 — as well as free bread!



We gave a lift to a cheerful, middle aged woman who was visiting her sister in the country. She carried a bucket to pick berries from the woods to sell in the market on her return to her city. The previous day a militia man had stopped us from giving a lift to a peasant; it is against the law. However, she said she was not worried as one of her sons was the "Commissar" of a nearby collective farm and another was "doing well" in the army in Moscow. She had on her best clothes and took off her black velvet jacket to show us a dress. When she removed her smocked blouse and embroidered head scarf for a photograph, we were surprised to see her wearing imitation pearls and long earrings — finery we did not see in Moscow. She was one of the few nicely dressed people we saw.

At the roadside restaurants which had potted plants and draped Victorian velvet curtains we were able to get a good nourishing meal. In contrast to television in the restaurant, the detached cess pits were as primitive as anything I have seen in the remoter parts of Asia. Even in the cities the lavatories are dirty and smell.

There were very few private cars on the roads. The traffic consisted of horse drawn carts and very large numbers of efficient looking trucks — all of the same type.

### The Army

I noticed that the civilian trucks were exactly the same as Army trucks — and they were often painted the same khaki green colour. This standardisa-

tion should give the Soviet Army an immense reserve of transport. Except for a few convoys and some large barracks we did not see much evidence of the Army from the road. In the towns I was struck by the very large numbers of officers and soldiers in uniform. It was difficult to photograph crowd scenes as it is forbidden to photograph soldiers. They seemed to wear uniform all the time. The officers were very smart in well cut uniforms — they were certainly much better dressed than any civilians. Some officers have cars and we saw them in the expensive restaurants — obviously they were very well paid. Practically the only well dressed women we saw were officers' wives. The officers looked competent and confident and the officer corps seemed to be chosen from the best material available. For obvious reasons, I did not speak to any officers.

Discipline seemed very good and officers are always saluted in streets, both by their juniors and other ranks. The soldiers were also well turned out, apart from recruits, who wore baggy blouses.

### Summing Up the Soviet Union

Trite phrases about the "free world" have a new depth and meaning. I wish that the starry eyed idealists who talk glibly about "the freedom and equality of the Communist Utopia" could visit the Soviet Union, talk to the people and see for themselves — not through the rose tinted glasses provided by Intourist.

The Soviet people have made great advances, but at a tremendous cost. Rockets to the moon

are little compensation for the depressing living conditions of the mass of the people, and the denial of personal freedom. Conditions are improving, but it will take a long time before they approach those of the more prosperous countries of the West.

They are a nation under the iron discipline imposed by the Party. The ceaseless flow of propaganda tries to convince the

people of the greatness and prosperity of their country, and it keeps them appallingly ignorant of the aims and way of life of the West.

Whilst a few students may want "a revolution of the mind" I doubt if such a revolution is possible in the foreseeable future. A few hours in Berlin was convincing proof of this.


Concluded.

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When a man has climbed by hard effort to a ridge from which he gets a fresh vista — if only of further ridges beyond — he will usually find, when he tries to tell of it, that those who have remained contentedly in the valley insist that there is nothing beyond what they can see.

— Liddell Hart.





**THE SPY AND HIS MASTERS,**  
by Christopher Felix. (Secker and  
Warburg, London, and William  
Heinemann Ltd., 317 Collins  
Street, Melbourne.)

Many books have been written about the conduct of conventional warfare in all its aspects, and quite a few about the possible course of a nuclear conflict. But very little has been made public about the mechanics, or the operational principles, of the secret war that is being waged fiercely between the Communist bloc and the Western World. This is a pity for it is as necessary for the peoples of the democracies to be as well informed about the nature of these secret operations as it is for them to be informed about the operations of conventional warfare. In both cases ill-informed electorates usually react blindly and blunderingly to the failures that inevitably occur in the course of a long conflict. It is hardly possible to win every trick. Steady nerves, which are the product of knowledge, are as essential in one form of conflict as in the other.

Recent examples of the confusion that can be caused in the public mind by ignorance of the nature of the secret war are furnished by the U2 affair and the Cuban fiasco. In both cases the

American people were rendered highly suspicious and distrustful of their own government by the spate of rumours, hints and half-truths that followed these two incidents. Knowledge of the nature of the conflict would have at least mitigated this unfortunate result. The public might have questioned the competency of the American Government, but they would not have suspected their motives, and they would not have been thrown into a state of confusion and unease.

The sub-title of this book gives the key to its contents — "A Short Course in the Secret War". Writing under a pseudonym, the author claims to have been an American secret agent for many years. He does not reveal any secrets of the American Government or its agencies. In fact he does not tell us anything that has not been known and understood by a limited number of people for many centuries. The techniques of secret operations are as old as human conflict. They have always been employed in one form or another. However, in modern times they have never been employed on the scale and with the intensity that they have been over the past fifteen years or so. Over that period they have been, and still are, the principal means of conducting the conflict between the two great opposing

power blocs. Since this situation is likely to continue, the author considers that it is important for the general public to have some idea of the operational techniques involved.

There is nothing sensational in the book. On the contrary, the first part of it resembles a manual on tactics, though it is couched in rather more lively language. The established principles and techniques of conducting secret operations, from straight espionage to the overthrow of a government, are set out in detail. While this part of the book may or may not be a completely satisfactory manual for the instruction of secret operators, the author will have achieved his purpose if it enables the layman to discern something of what is going on behind the incident that occasionally makes the headlines. More importantly, it will enable him to judge whether his government and its agencies are handling the situation in a competent manner.

In the second part of the book the author illustrates the application of the principles and techniques by recounting his experiences as an American agent in secret political operations in eastern Europe soon after World War II. While this part of the book stands on its own feet as a "thriller" it derives much added interest from the fact that it is a practical demonstration of the instructions given in the first part.

Perusal of this book will repay anyone who seeks to understand the news behind the news.

— E.G.K.

**THE U-2 AFFAIR**, by David Wise and Thomas B. Ross. (The Cresset Press, London, and William Heinemann Ltd., 317 Collins Street, Melbourne.)

This book could well have been written as a complement to the one reviewed above for it illustrates in a very striking way much of the material set out in "The Spy and His Masters". In all probability it is pure coincidence that the two books appeared simultaneously, but, taken together, they give an illuminating account of modern espionage methods.

Most people will recall the bare facts of the U-2 incident. Towards the middle of 1960 high hopes were set for an easing of international tension and a reduction of armaments on the "Summit" meeting between the Heads of State of the four great powers due to begin in Paris on May 16. On May 5 the Russian Premier, Khrushchev, announced in a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR that an American aircraft equipped with elaborate photographic apparatus had been shot down deep in Soviet territory, and that the pilot had been captured unharmed. The United States Government first denied all knowledge of the aircraft, then somersaulted by acknowledging full responsibility and implying that the flights would be continued. When the Heads of Government assembled in Paris Khrushchev demanded from the President of the United States an apology for the violation of Soviet territory and an assurance that the flights would be discon-

tinued. When these were not forthcoming, the conference collapsed before it really got started. A little later the American pilot of the aircraft, Gary Powers, was placed on trial in Moscow and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment.

At the time military interest centred around the question whether the aeroplane had been shot down by anti-aircraft fire from the ground from a height of 65,000 - 70,000 feet, or whether it had first been forced down to known ranges by engine failure. If it had in fact been shot down from that height the future of the Strategic Air Command did not look particularly bright. However, when Powers was exchanged for a Russian spy in 1962, the question was not important for the "stand-off" bomb had been developed. Little publicity attended Powers' return home. The whole incident was allowed to drop as quietly and quickly as possible.

Those are the bare facts and they are pretty well all that the general public has known about the incident. In this book the authors have brought all those facts, and some others not so well known, into proper relationship. In doing so they have produced an engrossing story of one of the most celebrated international incidents of modern times.

The U-2s were built primarily for deep penetration reconnaissance flights over Russia, and were operated from bases in allied countries under the cover story of upper-atmosphere weather research. Most of the

flights were very successful and the photographic and other recording instruments carried by the aircraft brought back valuable military information. The possibility of engine failure had been considered and the aircraft contained a destructor unit to be actuated by the pilot before he bailed out. Apparently, however, the possibility that both pilot and plane would land practically intact was never taken into account.

When Powers was brought down Moscow cunningly said nothing. But the American authorities, assuming that the aircraft had been duly destroyed, put out the prepared cover story about a missing weather research aeroplane. Khrushchev waited until the Americans were deeply committed to this story before blowing it to bits by announcing that he had captured the plane, the pilot and the recording apparatus. But he stuck strictly to the traditional rules of the game. He threw all the blame on the Pentagon and absolved the US President from any complicity. Clearly he expected the American Government to observe the same rules. An investigation would show that some officer had exceeded his authority. He would be removed from his post with a great fanfare of trumpets, and quietly reinstated somewhere else.

The President, however, acknowledged that he had personally authorised the flights, and implied that he intended to continue them. Apart from its violation of the customary rules of procedure, the President's statement wrecked the Summit con-

ference. Neither Khrushchev nor any other Prime Minister could have gone on with the conference in the face of the position taken by the President.

The authors have skilfully woven all the facts into a coherent story. Point by point they show what was occurring at various places in the world at crucial moments. This treatment is at once dramatic and illuminating, for it enable us to see just how difficult it is to produce credible explanations when you don't know how much your opponent knows. And it shows, too, how easy it is for operations of this nature to become ends in themselves unless they are strictly controlled and related to broader issues.

Although the authors have stuck strictly to facts they have made their book so readable that it is not easy to put down. They have made the factual story of one of the most notable international incidents of our time as exciting as any piece of imaginative writing.

**LAVAL — A BIOGRAPHY**, by Hubert Cole. (William Heinemann Ltd., London, and 317 Collins Street, Melbourne.)

The entry of Japan into World War II concentrated Australian attention on the Pacific and European events faded into the background. We are, of course, all familiar with the main events in the European theatre — Dunkirk, the fall of France, Operation Overlord and the drive into the heart of Germany. But how many can recall details of the earlier episodes — the tense

days of Dunkirk, Churchill's vain appeals to France to fight on, or the bombardment of the French fleet at Mers-el-Kehir? And how many can recall the names of the Frenchmen associated with these events? Those who can will remember Marshal Petain and Pierre Laval and, almost without exception, will bracket their names with the great betrayers of history.

To most of us Petain remains the gallant, unsuccessful soldier who, recalled to service in his old age, found the task imposed upon him quite beyond his powers. Laval is a dark, sinister figure about whom we know very little. In this biography Mr. Cole has given us an account of Laval's life, and at the same time has shown that Petain was not altogether a silly old man.

Pierre Laval came of frugal, peasant stock and even as a child can hardly be described as a winning personality. But he was a tremendous worker and, without much assistance from his father, succeeded in taking his law degree. Moving to Paris, he soon built up a good practice. In 1914 he entered the French Assembly as the youngest Socialist deputy. He strenuously opposed French participation in World War I but, once committed, he insisted that the war should at least be conducted efficiently. Appalled by the useless slaughter on the Western Front, he became an active participant in unofficial peace negotiations.

In politics Laval played a lone and successful hand and in 1931 became Prime Minister of

France. In the middle 'thirties he was one of the few European statesmen to discern the dangers posed by the rising power of Hitler, and sought to secure French interests by keeping Germany and Italy apart. However, in the tangled in-fighting of French politics he steadily lost ground and retired for a while from parliamentary life.

Laval opposed France's participation in World War II even more strenuously than he had opposed her participation in the earlier conflict. When the Germans made their breakthrough on the Western Front he took the view that all was over, that a German victory was assured, and that the only course open to France was capitulation on best terms obtainable. While the Government hesitated and the deputies wandered about Bordeaux in confusion, Laval saw himself as the only man with a clear-cut purpose, as the only man who could save something from the ruins. Driven by this obsession, he schemed and worked. In the end he persuaded the Assembly to make Petain the Head of State and then dissolve itself.

The picture of the Vichy Government is not a pretty one. No-one trusted anyone else, they were all cutting each other's throats as hard as they could. Petain and Laval shared two things in common, their hatred of England and their conviction that Germany would win the war. Nevertheless, their relation-

ship was anything but harmonious. Petain could dig his heels in when he liked, particularly when his status or his inordinate vanity was at stake. Laval, driven by his conviction that he alone knew what was best for France, was prepared to go to almost any lengths to achieve his ends.

Once France had capitulated a certain amount of collaboration with the German military government was inevitable. But Petain and Laval overreached themselves, particularly Laval. His conscription of labour for despatch to German munitions factories and his attempts to suppress the Resistance movement made him the most hated of Frenchmen. After the German surrender he was brought to trial and executed by a firing squad.

Mr. Cole has written a lively, readable story, not only of Laval's life, but of the intrigues and treacheries that riddled the Government of Vichy France. In these pages we see the war from a different angle — from the point of view of men who felt that the allied cause was lost. Some genuinely sought to do what was best for France, some merely sought to further their personal interests, all schemed against each other.

Mr. Cole delivers no judgment about Laval's character. He simply presents the man with impartiality and leaves the reader to form his own judgment.

— E.G.K.