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The views expressed in the articles in this Journal are the author's own and do not necessarily represent General Staff opinion or policy.



Photo: Australian War Memorial, Canberra.

KUMUSI RIVER

After their conquest of Malaya and Indonesia, the Japanese attempted to capture Port Moresby and Milne Bay in New Guinea. As part of this offensive they landed at Buna in July, 1942, and drove the Australian garrison back over the Kokoda Trail across the Owen Stanley Mountains. In October the Australians launched a counter-offensive, and in a series of bitter engagements fought their way back across the Trail. By early November they had driven the Japanese out of the mountains and had reached Wairopi on the banks of the turbulent Kumusi River. The picture shows troops crossing this stream on a hastily-built wire rope bridge.

BATTALION CONCEPTS FOR ANTI-GUERILLA OPERATIONS

Lieutenant-Colonel R. S. Garland, MC,
Royal Australian Infantry

AFTER World War II it became fashionable to forget the jungle and to discredit the employment of small packets such as commandos and guerillas. The activities of such parties were regarded as being a dissipation of strength to the detriment of the main effort. However, the Communist world has upset this theory by giving guerilla warfare a new look which confounded Western tactical concepts in the French War in Indo-China.

President Kennedy has stated that he is convinced that sub-limited, indirect Communist aggression involving the use of guerillas was the most likely form of warfare in this decade, and he would, he said, bet nine to one on this. Through the President's prompting the US Army has stepped up its counter-insurgency capabilities.

To shake up the generals and admirals and younger career officers with the new thinking, President Kennedy dropped a broad hint that future promotions of high-ranking officers would depend upon their demonstration of experience in the

counter-guerilla or sublimited war field. He noted that out of 22 officers being promoted in the Army to two star rank only two had first-hand experience with guerilla fighting in Vietnam and Laos.

In this article I have attempted to crystallise certain thoughts on battalion concepts for the conduct of anti-guerilla operations. I realise that many of the opinions expressed are

Lieutenant Colonel Garland had combat experience in World War II in guerilla type warfare as a Lieutenant with 2/3 Independent Company in the Wau-Salamaua Campaign and also as a Company Commander with 2 New Guinea Infantry Battalion in the Sepik District during the Aitape-Wawak Campaign. Between 1957 and 1959 he had two years' service as a Company Commander with 3 RAR during the Malayan Emergency. — Editor.

probably contentious and I hope that these opinions will be challenged so that they can be examined in greater detail.

As I drafted this paper, I realised that I would be accused of having a Malayan bias. However, after some years of reflecting on lessons learnt in Malaya, I am convinced that certain principles have evolved that can be applied to any other theatre in which a Communist revolutionary war is being waged.

Assumptions

To keep this paper brief I must assume that the reader:—

- (a) Has a good knowledge of the people, terrain and subsistence methods to be found in SE Asia.
- (b) Has studied and understands the stages employed by the Communists in the conduct of revolutionary warfare.
- (c) Does not confuse the term "Anti-Guerilla Operations" with such terms as "Jungle Warfare" or "Special Operations."

Phases of Revolutionary Warfare

The concepts for planning anti-guerilla operations must be related to the three broad phases for the conduct of revolutionary warfare. The techniques for the handling of Stage 1 and early Stage 2 of a revolutionary war have been developed, tested and perfected in the successful conduct of operations during the Malayan Emergency. It is regrettable that there are so many officers who are ignorant of or are unable to comprehend the

valuable lessons that the Malayan Campaign brought out. However, fortunately, our American Allies have the good sense to recognise the fundamental principles of the Briggs Plan and these principles are being translated into policy for the conduct of anti-guerilla operations in South Vietnam. We now talk of "Strategic Hamlet Defence Concepts."

Phase Three Operations

I would like to first consider the worst case which is the conduct of operations during Phase 3 of the revolutionary war. This will probably involve us in an opposed entry into the country to establish our operational bases. The principles of this stage do not differ from those of conventional warfare, except for the vulnerability of our lines of communication. Supply from the administrative bases to the operational bases must, therefore, be by air supply.

The occupation will be followed by a defensive battle in which the enemy will concentrate to gain a decision. This stage, of course, does not differ from defence in conventional warfare. The outcome of this battle will either mean victory for the revolutionary forces or a reversal to Phase 2 of the revolutionary war. This battle must be fought by centralised control and on classic lines.

Phase Two Operations

This is the phase where I consider that our Western military thinking is seriously at fault and which led to the decisive defeat of the French in Indo-China.

Many tacticians try to put conventional warfare on the ground and then endeavour to protect it from guerilla operations. This is sheer military lunacy. If the enemy ceases to fight conventional warfare — so must we. Anti-guerilla warfare is a very professional and highly skilled art.

An understanding of the social, cultural, political and revolutionary issues must be grasped before a successful plan can be formulated. The guerilla in Phase 2 is fighting from a political platform that ensures the support of the local population. He is aiming at the destruction of our army by controlling and arming the local population.

It follows therefore that the fundamental strategic principle is that the battle in Phase 2 of revolutionary warfare is won in the villages — not in the jungle.

Successful jungle operations are necessary for achieving final victory but they must be launched from firm bases established in the villages.

Village by village, district by district, the arteries of the Communist organisation must be cut, and kept severed. The campaign for the "hearts and minds of the villagers" is a political venture but it must be propped up initially by military operations. As the villages regain their strength and independence from Communist oppression, the local militia and police forces must assume a greater responsibility for village defence. This releases the Army for deeper jungle

operations to destroy the guerilla forces.

Whilst the enemy is fighting a guerilla war the size of his force and his capacity to strike back must not influence us to fight on conventional lines; except, of course, in the defence of the operational base. The capacity of the guerilla forces will influence the selection of the sizes of the initial areas for joint military-political operations, but it must not lead away from the aim of the anti-guerilla operations, which is to restore law and order.

I believe that the following principles must provide the basic structure for the formulation of a military plan for the conduct of anti-guerilla operations to combat Phase 2:—

- (a) Joint Military/Civil Planning to clear the area of immediate guerilla influence and to re-establish civil control. This plan must include measures for:—
 - (i) Village defence.
 - (ii) Food denial to the guerillas.
 - (iii) Control of population movement to facilitate military operations.
 - (iv) Creation of an intelligence organisation.
 - (v) Resettlement of outlying farmers.
 - (vi) Winning the goodwill of the people.
 - (vii) Army Administrative Arrangements.
- (b) Military Operations must initially be planned to permit the implementation of the above measures. In

Malaya such operations were known as "Framework Operations."

- (c) Subsequent offensive operations must be conducted as deliberate "Man Hunts" in which the enemy will normally enjoy advantages such as good intelligence, concealment, local terrain knowledge and wide experience at avoiding Army efforts to surround and destroy him. He will often have the capacity to strike back at battalion strength.

Military Operations

I do not intend to discuss "Framework Operations" as these are adequately covered in the publication "The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya 1958."

However, I would like to discuss the following subjects which are related to the conduct of offensive operations against guerillas at battalion level:—

- (a) Techniques for the location of guerilla camps and supply dumps.
- (b) Battalion planning to extend the control zone.
- (c) Company patrol concepts.
- (d) Attacking a guerilla base.
- (e) Deception planning.
- (f) Employment of air supply and helicopters.

The above subjects will be considered in an advanced Stage 2 setting where a task force operational base has been successfully established and the enemy has the capacity to strike back with battalion strength. The indigenous population are either hostile to us or are unreliable.

Location Techniques

The aim of military operations must be to destroy the guerilla forces. The capture of ground or the clearance of an area of jungle are only of importance if they contribute to a master plan which provides for the destruction of the enemy. As the guerilla is an elusive target and he fights on a concept which provides that no base is worth defending, our tactical ideas must be based on techniques for:—

- (a) The location of enemy camps and supply dumps.
- (b) Destruction of the located base by ground and/or air operations. These operations will not be successful unless tactical surprise can be achieved by either stealth or speed.

An enemy base may be located by the following means:—

- (a) Air photography and visual air reconnaissance. However, these techniques have definite limitations in jungle terrain.
- (b) Information from informers. Such information may be false or, if true, the guerillas may have become suspicious and moved their base.
- (c) Patrolling. In the setting as posed, the bulk of jungle intelligence will be provided by patrols. However, if the presence of a patrol has been detected by the guerillas, the base will be moved. This highlights the necessity for reconnaissance patrols to be highly skilled in fieldcraft and tracking.

The patrol plan must aim at locating the enemy base without compromising security. We will be better able to achieve this if:—

- (a) Our infantry are taught tracking to a stage where they can recognise recent enemy tracks in the jungle, even though these tracks have been obliterated or concealed by enemy actions.
- (b) Tracking teams, including tracking dogs, are on call so that located tracks leading to or from a guerilla base can be successfully followed. This will enable us to converge on the suspected area with a view to surrounding and destroying the camp as soon as it is found.

I believe that this tracking capacity is an urgent requirement for the AMF. It takes a long time to train an Australian soldier in this art and we should start now. It also takes six months to weld a tracking team, including dogs, into an efficient force. These measures cannot be implemented in the theatre of operation at the last moment.

With a tracking capacity we can follow up the guerillas after every engagement and so turn even an enemy ambush to our advantage.

Battalion Planning

The battalion plan to extend the control zone must be aimed at dominating the desired area. For convenience I will refer to this area as the "Operational Area."

The operational area can be dominated by either flooding the

area with our patrols or by systematic searching of the area backed up by offensive operations based on patrol information. The systematic construction of helicopter landing zones will also assist in the domination of an area.

The bulk of operational experience indicates that when an area is flooded with troops the guerillas move to another area until the operation has expended itself. The size of the operational area and the terrain difficulties found in SE Asia will seldom permit an area to be effectively cordoned and searched on the flood principle.

I favour a battalion plan which is based on systematic searching but which retains the capacity to concentrate against located targets.

Before finalising his plan for the conduct of operations to dominate the operational area, the battalion commander must consider:—

- (a) Measures to ensure the security of the battalion defended area.
- (b) Cover plan to conceal movement out of the defended area.
- (c) Location of likely enemy bases and the known pattern of enemy operations, including sources of supply and likely reactions to our operations.
- (d) Supply arrangements for the operation related to the requirement for tactical surprise.
- (e) Communication plan, which must ensure coverage of the operational area.

(f) Distribution and movements of local population and the resultant effects on our operations.

The Battalion Commander must decide whether the likely target will require a battalion operation or separate company operations. If he decides on a battalion operation the companies and platoons will move and search in conformity to a battalion plan. However, in the initial stages it is probably better to allot company areas and let companies develop separate company plans until sufficient battle information has been obtained to warrant a battalion or task force operation. The initial selection of areas to clear is interesting. It need not always be the one where the most enemy is. An easy victory has a big influence on the local population and on the morale of our troops.

Irrespective of the level, unless the exact location of a guerilla base is known, the following action is recommended:—

- (a) The area to be searched must be narrowed down as far as possible based on known information.
- (b) The most likely area for the guerilla base must be treated as the centre of the area to be searched.
- (c) Searching troops must converge from the perimeter of the area and search systematically towards the centre.
- (d) The allocation of areas, boundaries and timings must be so planned that all searching troops converge on the most likely area at the same time.

(e) All headquarters down to platoon headquarters must maintain wireless communications on a continuous or schedule basis so that the plan can be changed as required. Battalion and company command posts must occupy good wireless sites.

Great care should be given to the selection of boundaries. They must follow natural features and must be inclusive to a nominated force. If boundaries become known they can become an area of security for the enemy.

Great skill is required to move the search forces into the operational area without prejudicing surprise. Probably no other form of warfare has demanded such a high professional standard of tactical ability. The deception plan must be co-ordinated at the appropriate planning level and executed at all levels with extreme patience and care. Long approach marches by night will often be called for.

Company Patrol Concepts

The next important issues are the size of the patrol base and the size of the reconnaissance patrols. A strong enemy threat should not force us to establish company patrol bases and send out large reconnaissance patrols. This line of thinking will negate the aim of patrolling.

A company patrol base is noisy, difficult to move and difficult to hide. It will soon be located by the guerillas and will invite attack. To defend a company patrol base adequately will

seriously deplete the available patrol capacity. Patrols radiating from a company base will advertise the presence of the company and will restrict the range and frontages of patrols.

A larger area of jungle can be searched and dominated by patrolling from platoon bases as against patrolling from a company base. The platoon base is a flexible unit and it can move with the search. If the enemy attempts to concentrate against a platoon, he can, in turn, be surrounded by the remaining platoons of the operation.

All jungle experience has proved that the ideal size for a reconnaissance patrol is three—four men. This still applies to a reconnaissance patrol in anti-guerilla operations. During the search, each patrol is a reconnaissance patrol. It must move quietly and obtain battle information without being seen. Large reconnaissance patrols of fighting patrol strength will advertise their presence and compromise the operation. Also, the larger the size of each patrol, the fewer will be the patrols available, the smaller will be the size of the area dominated and the operation will take a proportionately longer time to complete.

A jungle search can be related to casting a net. The net must be cast over the suspected area and skilfully drawn in until all exists have been blocked. This is a sneaky operation and the well-trained guerilla will endeavour to either outwit or outrun us as soon as our operation is compromised. The deployment

of large numbers of small reconnaissance patrols moving from platoon patrol bases in accordance with a converging plan will ensure for us the best tactical advantages irrespective of any course the enemy may take if our operation is compromised. If we can then maintain contact and keep him on the move for extended periods he will outstrip his administrative resources and collapse. If he stays to fight he will be encircled. The guerilla must have a breathing space after every engagement to re-supply himself and plan his next move.

A principle is therefore established, and that is maintenance of contact with the guerilla forces. This principle is difficult to apply unless our forces include competent tracking teams.

In any event the battalion plan must aim at closing with the guerilla and being one jump ahead of him when he moves. Company and platoon plans must be arranged accordingly. When pressure is brought on the guerilla, the pressure must be maintained by extended operations, with rotation of platoons, as required, from the operational base.

Attacking a Guerilla Base

The plan for the search should ensure that when a guerilla base is located by patrolling, the battalion is favourably deployed for rapid encirclement of the area.

Orders for the establishment of a cordon must be issued by wireless (a company frontage in a cordon should not exceed 1,000 yards). This manoeuvre

calls for a high standard of map reading and jungle navigation. (This is a difficult operation in jungle and it should be practised in training for anti-guerilla operations).

The assault force should not move close to the objective until all companies in the cordon have reported that they are in position and have linked up with their flanking companies.

The assault force will then execute a silent attack onto the objective and break into the base on a narrow front. The enemy will generally disperse and be caught in the cordon. If the enemy stays to fight, the cordon can be tightened.

The use of air bombing must always be borne in mind, provided the target area can be accurately indicated to the air force. If an air strike is planned, the cordon must be arranged outside the danger area and close in on conclusion of the strike. Likely exits will be ambushed.

Personally I do not consider that artillery or mortar support should be taken into the jungle for this type of operation. Where possible artillery should support such operations from the defended area. If the jungle war of hide-and-seek develops into a fixed battle, the decision to fly in artillery and/or mortar support should not be made lightly. We should only fight such a battle when we are certain of being victorious. The enemy wishes to entice our vulnerable elements into the jungle so that he can employ his guerilla techniques to advantage. The jungle

war must be conducted in such a way that we retain mobility and never become roadbound, except in the controlled area.

Deception Planning

A great deal of thought, planning and care is needed to achieve surprise against the guerilla forces as they are operating in their own district and informed by the local population. As a planning basis it can be assumed that the guerillas will be informed of all movements by our troops unless we plan to deceive his sources of information which will be local agents, OPs, including tree OPs, patrols and wireless interception.

Consequently great skill is required to position an ambush secretly or to sneak large numbers of patrols, unobserved, into the jungle. Some techniques that will assist are:—

- (a) Use of closed armoured personnel carriers every night on all roads in the area. They may or may not carry troops. Stops should be frequent to confuse the guerillas.
- (b) Large numbers of small patrols to overcome his knowledge of our exact positions. One large patrol can be located, followed and ambushed. A large number of small patrols will upset guerilla techniques and throw him on the defensive.
- (c) A sudden change of boundaries to provide a unit access from an unexpected direction.

- (d) Long-term jungle patrols to maintain pressure on the guerillas.
- (e) Our guerillas dropped off in suspected areas — living off food dumps to maintain surveillance in those areas.
- (f) Small ambushes dropped off by platoons to discourage enemy follow-up action.
- (g) Use of air supply and helicopters for real and dummy purposes.

The above suggestions do not exhaust this field. This subject calls for low cunning and original thought. A really good trick will seldom work more than once.

Air Support

The principles of air support which are applicable to conventional warfare also apply to anti-guerilla operations, except that greater emphasis is placed on the gaining of surprise and deception planning.

It must be remembered that when helicopters are in the air, guerillas will man tree OPs to record numbers of aircraft, direction of movement and landing zones. He can then put the plan on the map, estimate time and space factors and react accordingly. Similar action will be taken when we use air supply to our ground troops. Therefore all plans for air support, in which the aim cannot be achieved by speed, must be supported by a cover plan which includes dummy air support to confuse the guerilla intelligence.

The helicopter gives us greater freedom of manoeuvre in the jungle and enables us to maintain continuous pressure against

the guerilla force. However, their use will seldom achieve tactical surprise. If blocking forces are positioned by helicopter they will seldom contribute tactical results except by diverting the guerillas in another direction.

To gain maximum surprise, air supply and helicopter movements should not be used in the operational area until this is enforced by supply requirements. Ground troops should carry in seven days' supplies to give greater scope for the gaining of surprise. (I would like to see a "Seven Day Patrol Ration" developed for the AMF).

Helicopter landing zones should be secured early by ground action to prevent enemy interference with the fly in.

Pepper Pot Tactics

The dissipation of a battalion (denuded of supporting arms and transport) into platoon packets, screened by small reconnaissance patrols, represents a radical departure from conventional tactics. However, the tactical advantages are enormous. I will refer to this concept as "Pepper Pot Tactics."

There is only one area for which we must be prepared to fight a decisive battle and that is for the defended area or operational base. When we leave this base we must not present a target for guerilla attack. A force of all arms moving out from this base will invite disaster. All movement into the operational area will be on a platoon basis either by helicopter or on foot, using devious and covered approaches. Motor

transport will not be taken outside the controlled area. All elements that enter the jungle must be on a man pack basis. All movement in the jungle will be through the jungle. We must never move along tracks, ridge lines or rivers — these routes are likely to be ambushed. It is easier, faster and safer to move by following the contours on the sides of ridges. With a little practice this art will become surprisingly simple.

With a few shakes of the pepper pot the battalion is positioned in the jungle in platoon packets but operating on a co-ordinated plan and controlled by wireless.

The guerilla is now placed in a difficult position. As he is living in dispersed bases he cannot move to concentrate without risking contact with one of our numerous small patrols. If he attacks one platoon we will encircle him. As our platoon bases are continually moved, he is denied time to make a satisfactory reconnaissance even if he wished to attack a platoon base. In fact the table has been turned — we own the jungle and our eyes are everywhere. He can no longer be certain of his security in the jungle.

In this Pepper Pot concept we are fighting the guerilla in his own fashion except that we have the tremendous advantages of superior wireless communications, ability to concentrate greater strength and air support. We are thus able to fight a favourable battle whenever we choose to do so. The guerilla cannot gain decisive military

results against the Pepper Pot concept. At best he can ambush or attack a platoon. We will then react by bringing in our tracking team and following him back to his base. All other platoons will converge on the suspected base area and the guerilla will be open to encirclement and destruction.

The Pepper Pot concept cannot be operated effectively until our soldiers are highly skilled in patrolling, fieldcraft, tracking, jungle navigation, ambushing, and have developed a high standard of accurate shooting at fleeting targets in jungle.

It can readily be appreciated that the jungle beyond the controlled area represents the No Man's Land of conventional warfare. In conventional warfare we only send out a fighting patrol when we have a specific mission. This also applies in anti-guerilla operations. We cannot throw a punch until we have found a target. It is the task of the reconnaissance patrols to find the targets and to set them up for destruction by our converging platoons.

Local Population

The presence of an indigenous population must be employed to our advantage for the purposes of gaining information and receiving the guerillas. A definite policy should be developed for all aspects of dealings with the local population. The effects of systems of punishment and reward for ensuring local co-operation must be carefully assessed.

It was found in Malaya that when an adequate payment is

made for information received, a steady flow of information would follow. However, adequate protection for informers and ex-guerillas must be arranged to ensure their continual co-operation.

Conclusion

Anti - guerilla operations require a patient and deliberate approach. The results of military operations are seldom spectacular, and in the end analysis victory is only possible if the long-term joint military/civil plan proves successful in winning over the villages to our cause. The Communists are very patient in building up their framework for the revolutionary war. We must be equally patient if we wish to dismantle this framework.

In the planning of major military operations we should stay out of populated areas until we are ready to take them over on a permanent basis. The take-over bid must be made in a manner that will promote the goodwill of the resident population. By expanding our control of the populated areas we will force the guerillas into the deep jungle. They can then be exhausted by military operations that keep them on the run.

In populated areas under enemy control we should first take the war to the enemy by waging a guerilla war against him and use his very excellent doctrine for this insidious form of warfare. These areas will be absorbed at a later date into the expanding controlled zone.

When war threatens the ambitious general should avoid the post of commander-in-chief for the opening campaign. Every war brings its surprises, and the general who must improvise to meet them will be blamed for not foreseeing what no one has foreseen, and for not providing what the Treasury has refused to provide in time of peace.

— *Times Literary Supplement.*

THE MASTER PLAN FOR CONQUEST IN VIETNAM

Colonel Edwin F. Black, United States Army

Reprinted from June 1963 issue of *MILITARY REVIEW*, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, U.S.A.

DURING October and November 1962, Communist radio broadcasts from Hanoi and Laos mentioned with increasing frequency a name which cast an ominous significance on what might otherwise have been routine reports of meetings of party officials. The name was that of General Vo Nguyen Giap, victor of Dien Bien Phu.

It would appear from the broadcast items and from other bits and pieces of information reaching Allied authorities that the Communist leaders, assessing their position in the fall of 1962, recognised that the tide of battle in South Vietnam had begun to turn against them.

As a consequence, they had decided to assign responsibility for the strategic conduct of the war to the man who had smashed the "Navarre Plan," who in one battle had put out of action 16,200 of France's finest troops, who had thereby broken the will of the French Government to continue the struggle for Indochina, and who had provided the military victory that was to gain the political triumph at Geneva in 1954. In so doing the Viet Cong would be returning to the strategic principles which had proved so sound in 1954: namely, "dynamism, initiative, mobility, and rapidity of deci-

sion in the face of new situations."

"Giap was no fool." This bitter masterpiece of understatement by the French journalist Bernard B. Fall, sums up, perhaps better than any other description, France's grudging tribute to the man who threw them out of South-east Asia. Only 50 years old in 1962, he has been an ardent Communist since his 'teens. Long before World War II had begun, he was already a veteran of French jails because of his illegal political activities. A French-trained history professor, he also holds a law degree from the University of Hanoi. However, he has looked on the French with an abiding hatred since the French police allegedly killed his wife and sister-in-law.

First Platoons Organised

Having studied guerilla tactics in China under Mao, he returned to Vietnam in time to take part in the Bac Son uprising and to organise in December, 1944, the first two platoons of the Vietnam National Liberation Army. On that historic occasion, deep in the mountain jungles of North Vietnam, he divided his tiny cadre into two parts. The first half became the initial platoon of what today is the well-trained People's Army of

Vietnam — 14 divisions strong. The second half became the first propaganda unit of what was 10 years later to become a victorious political movement.

How many Western military leaders, surveying their first batch of ragged conscripts, would have divided them as Giap did: half to fight, half to propagandise? While fully aware, as this early decision indicated, of the importance of supporting the political activities of the League for the Independence of Vietnam (called Vietminh for short), he never lost sight of his ultimate military objective — that of creating a modern, conventional fighting force, trained in the use of combined arms and capable of undertaking joint operations.

Contributions of Giap

Although he was a disciple of Mao Tse-tung and borrowed freely from his teachings on guerilla war, Giap made important contributions of his own. He adapted the principles of irregular combat developed by his fellow Marxists — Mao, Lenin, and Stalin — to the actual conditions as they existed in Vietnam, and worked unceasingly to convert his irregular forces into a well-disciplined, highly trained regular army.

How did Giap analyse the politico-military situation in his own country and how did he adapt the tactics of insurgency to meet the situation there? Having studied the “wars of national liberation” of Russia and China, he concluded that they had two characteristics in common with the struggle in Vietnam. To begin with, they

were both “people’s revolutions” — that is, they were broadly based uprisings having the support of the great mass of the common people. Furthermore, they were both “just wars” — that is, they were “anti-imperialist revolts.”

Despite these similarities, Giap realised that the war in Vietnam had its own character and this made it different from these earlier wars in Russia and China. As he saw it, the Russian Revolution was essentially a Socialist uprising. It was fought within an independent country — a country which, although backward by European standards, still possessed a fairly modern economy. In the case of China, Mao’s war was a peasants’ revolution. It took place in a country which, while unable to defend itself from foreign invasion, has nonetheless, never been fully conquered by a Western power. Moreover, China was a nation of tremendous geographic area, inhabited by a vast population of over 600 million people.

Peasants’ Revolt

To Giap, Vietnam presented a separate problem. Although the war in his country was being fought within the framework of a “national democratic revolution”—that is to say, a peasants’ revolt — there were clearly two major differences between it and the Chinese revolution. Vietnam was a colony completely under French control, and when compared to either Russia or China in terms of area or population, Vietnam was a small country.

Taking these fundamental differences into account, he adjusted his strategy to conform to the local conditions. To Giap, as to Mao and Clausewitz, the armed struggle was nothing more than the continuation of the political struggle by other means.

In Communist terminology, the key to the political struggle was the exploitation of two fundamental "contradictions" that existed in Indochina at the end of World War II. These were the conflict between the forces of colonialism and nationalism and the conflict between the landlords and the peasants. Since both of these motivating factors were strongest among the peasantry, it was clear to Giap that here was where he was going to find support and recruits for his guerilla campaigns.

An Appeal to the Peasantry

To win the loyalty of the peasants, to mobilise his efforts, to induce him to make the necessary sacrifices and to withstand the sufferings required to win a long, drawn-out war, the Communists devised a very simple slogan which served as the political rallying point for the Viet-minh movement. It was the same one used so successfully by Lenin in Russia and Mao in China. It read: "Land to the tiller!"

Having thus found a political chord which struck deep emotional and physical responses in the Vietnamese peasant, Giap turned his attention to developing a military strategy moulded around this humble matrix. He concluded that if he was going

to fight a war, the success of which depended upon the support of the rural population, it would have to meet three pre-conditions:

- It must not only appeal to the basic yearnings of the peasant, it must also provide him with some tangible evidence that measures were being taken to convert his hopes and aspirations into reality.

- It would have to be adjusted to fit the conditions which existed in an economically backward country like Vietnam.

- It would have to be prepared to deal with a long-standing colonial power, backed up by a powerful, modern, well-equipped army.

With these in mind, and particularly taking into account the vastly superior French armed forces, Giap adopted the strategy of the "long-term resistance war." His form of fighting was to be guerilla warfare; his main objective the destruction through continuous guerilla warfare of the military manpower of the French Army. As his irregular forces grew in strength, he planned, at the opportune moment, to shift from guerilla warfare to "mobile warfare."

From Guerilla to Mobile Warfare

Mobile warfare is the phase of conflict marking the transition between guerilla warfare and regular warfare. Tactically, it involves a series of widely dispersed attacks by separate guerilla units that have concentrated, in secret, sufficient forces

**THE ESSENTIALS OF THE MASTER PLAN, SUMMARISED FROM
GIAP'S BOOK, PEOPLE'S WAR, PEOPLE'S ARMY**

Phase I

POLITICAL TASKS

1. Destroy the communal administration.
2. Annihilate administrative personnel.

MILITARY TASKS

1. Establish Viet Cong military forces in each administrative district.
2. Activate additional military units — expand their area of activity.

*COMMUNIST FORCES
EMPLOYED*

Paramilitary forces (true guerillas).

Phase II

POLITICAL TASKS

1. Continue all political activities initiated in Phase I.

MILITARY TASKS

1. Initiate all-out guerilla warfare against government forces.
2. Reduce the government's control over the cities and routes of communication.
3. Compel the government forces to leave the countryside.

*COMMUNIST FORCES
EMPLOYED*

Units of battalion size or greater (regional troops).

Phase III

*POLITICAL AND MILITARY
TASKS*

1. Create dissatisfaction and a revolutionary situation in the armed forces that will bring about a *coup de etat* and a military-led government.
2. Take advantage of this situation to lead the people in a "popular" revolutionary movement against the new military-led government. Compel the military to form a coalition government.
3. Once this coalition government is infiltrated extensively by Communists, eliminate all other elements.
4. Take over government of South Vietnam.

to defeat isolated, outnumbered regular units in pitched battle. Strategically, mobile warfare is conducted on a nation-wide or theatre-wide basis, utilising a series of individual campaigns, widely separated geographically but closely co-ordinated from the standpoint of timing. It is designed to exploit a condition created by guerilla warfare in its more advanced stages — that is, a condition where “everywhere the enemy goes he is submerged in a sea of armed people who constantly strike back at him — who destroy his military manpower.”

Thus the mobility aspect of this type of warfare is achieved not by the physical movement of military forces as we commonly think of it — by airlift amphibious movement, rail or motor transportation, or even helicopters — but by concentrating and bringing into action local forces for attacks against fixed positions at dispersed locations throughout the country in accordance with an overall strategic plan.

A basic objective of Giap's mobile warfare is to create conditions under which guerilla warfare can be intensified and expanded. It achieves this by forcing the enemy to disperse; capturing enemy supplies; establishing new guerilla bases for the furtherance of the long-term liberation war; and, most important of all, by demonstrating to the people throughout the country the extensive organisation and widespread strength of the insurgent forces. The key to success is the ability of the

resistance forces to strike at will — where and when they wish.

In making the campaign of mobile war against the French a success, credit must be given not only to Giap, but to the tremendous sacrifices and almost super-human achievements of the millions of ordinary Vietnamese who contributed their labour and their lives in the final five months of the war.

During the winter 1953—spring 1954 campaign, there were Vietminh units that marched more than 3,000 kilometres. Others were shifted secretly from South Vietnam to the Dien Bien Phu battlefield over the “Ho-Chi-Minh Trail,” moving almost entirely at night along the rugged Truong Son mountain range for more than 1,000 kilometres. Incredible logistic problems were solved by thousands and thousands of civilian “volunteers” who carried the food and ammunition from depots, some 500 to 700 kilometres to the rear, up to the besieging units surrounding Dien Bien Phu.

Giap Builds Modern Army

With the end of the fighting in 1954, General Giap turned his full attention to the task of building a modern, well-disciplined army capable of conducting operations with combined arms. In carrying out this work, he placed great emphasis on both political and military discipline.

The former is achieved through a system of political commissars reaching down to the platoon level. These officials not only instruct the troops in the

basic principles of Marxism-Leninism and serve as the communication channel for the decisions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of North Vietnam, but they also emphasise the importance of the proper relationship between the army and the people. Guidelines for "strengthening the monolithic solidarity between the army and the people" are spelled out in a 10-point soldier's "Oath of Honour," supplemented by the "Twelve Points of Discipline" covering his relations with the people.

Military discipline is based upon a series of regulations which, to use General Giap's words, "befit a modern army." These include a code of military justice, a table of wages and allowances, a rigidly controlled system of awards and decorations, and a statute covering the relationship between officers and enlisted men in a "People's Army."

In addition to the regular forces, Giap has seen to it that a permanently organised militia and reserve have been created. The militia is composed of "village self-defence corps" units; the reserve consists of local territorial companies, battalions, and regiments. The purpose of the militia and reserve is to replenish the regular army; maintain local security and protect the sources of production and supply; and act as guerilla forces in time of war. As a further innovation, Giap persuaded the party that:

"... Since the return of peace in 1954 it has become necessary

to replace the voluntary people's service — that is their voluntary participation in guerilla warfare actions — with compulsory military service."

Plans for the Future

Finally, looking forward to the future, Giap has been studying the problem of the organisation of the "rear base" — that is, the problem of the revolutionary base for all subsequent operations against South Vietnam. This base is North Vietnam herself, now entirely "liberated." He expects North Vietnam to become the rear base for the People's Army as it moves southward to unify the country under the Communist flag. Reiterating the Communist line, he writes that the United States is striving to turn South Vietnam into a new type colony and a military base; that while conditions have changed with the French defeat, the struggle is far from over; and that the true enemy now is Ngo-dinh-Diem.

In assessing his enemy to the south, he concedes that Diem has built for his country a regular and modern army. But he postulates that this army's foundation is sure to be weak because it possesses three basic internal "contradictions." In the first place, it is an "anti-revolutionary" army. Second, it is "anti-popular" and lacks the support of the peasant. And, finally, it is in the hands of the "people's enemies."

Perhaps it is these contradictions which the Communists hope to exploit in the final phase of their master plan for the conquest of South Vietnam.

TRAINING THE C.M.F. UNIT COMMANDER

Major B. D. Clendinnen
2/19 Prince of Wales Light Horse

RECENT AAJ articles have referred to the fact that the number of CMF officers with war service is dwindling, and propose that this must result in having ARA or alternate ARA and CMF Commanders of CMF units.

While it does little good to cry over spilt milk and deplore the past lack of foresight which neglected the training of CMF officers to fit them specifically for unit command, we should be looking for a long-term solution to this problem which can only grow worse.

Short term the answer may well be to make use of ARA or ex-ARA officers but this only fills a gap without solving the basic problem.

A long-term solution could provide a worthwhile project for CSTU in each Command. In fact, I submit that experienced ARA and ex-ARA officers would be better employed conducting a coaching course for potential commanders than in actually commanding a unit themselves. At such a course they would pass the benefit of their experience to others outside their unit and even their corps.

Such a course would provide a pool of officers for final selection on the basis of regimental and staff experience, qualification at DA21A, and detailed study of the tactical, administrative and personal aspects of unit command. It would be a course with this specific aim, attended only by those officers considered likely to benefit and to have potential as commanders. It should not become just another CSTU wing.

By the time a CMF officer is eligible for selection as a unit commander even under the present system he has seen a few years CMF service in various postings and has qualified at the required tactical level. What he then requires is a broadening of outlook and an opportunity of studying objectively the methods of wartime commanders whose names fill the military history books. If he is left to study privately and at his own pace he will (should!!) be too involved in unit duties to prepare himself thoroughly for command appointments.

To my knowledge there is at present no serious effort made at providing a programme of study for potential commanders out-

side the subjects covered in a DA21A coaching course. We can therefore hardly compare the qualifications of a CMF major with those of an ARA major who has completed Staff College. Even placing a CMF officer as second-in-command to an ARA C.O. during the latter's term of office will not guarantee ipso facto the suitability of the CMF officer to later assume command. But attendance for one of two years at a properly constituted CSTU "CMF Staff College" could be expected to produce more satisfactory results in a greater number of individual officers and thus provide a larger pool to draw on when an appointment is being considered.

Such a scheme would not produce dramatic results overnight but must only help long-term in raising the general CMF standard particularly amongst senior officers, or potential senior officers.

The complaint is that a CMF officer cannot gain his necessary pre-command experience in the field. The answer is that he must be guided in his post-DA21A study and not allowed to fall into that state of mind which in effect says, "I've passed my 21A; now I'll be like de Gaulle and sit back to await the call."

If he does just sit and wait the call may never come.

COMPETITION FOR AUTHORS

The Board of Review has awarded first places and prizes of £5 for the best original article published in the July and August issues as follows:—

- July — "Communism Versus Australia" by Warrant Officer J. P. Sheddick, Royal Australian Infantry.
- August — "The Ethos of Patrolling" by Colonel M. P. O'Hare, Australian Staff Corps.

Strategic Review

THE GERMAN ARMY 1963

Captain S. O. Tiomain, Army HQ, Eire
Reprinted from the June 1963 issue of
An Cosantoir, Eire

IT could well be argued that the present dishevelled appearance of N.A.T.O. is a golden opportunity for the Soviet Union to let slip the dogs of war in Europe. Now that the balance of missiles between Moscow and Washington is equal — give or take a megaton — coupled with the internal dissensions between the N.A.T.O. members, what could be more natural than that Mr. Krushchev should decide that the time was ripe for Russia to exploit her considerable superiority in conventional forces. It may well be that the Russian leader has revised his conviction that Communism is best served by peace. After all, the man who permitted dozens of I.R.B.M.S. to be placed in Cuba last September can hardly be said to have mellowed.

N.A.T.O. is suffering from all the inherent drawbacks of an Alliance; and the bigger the Alliance the greater the drawbacks. But these are — in the main — difficulties of precedence, priorities and proportions. There is no disunity between

member nations on value of military co-operation, preparation and vigilance. The real disagreements revolve around the problem of the relationship between atomic and conventional defence potentialities. New proposals and plans are being tried for fit and quickly rejected but whatever the finally agreed solution will be it is certain that the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany will play an important role in "the new strategy."

They stand on the furthestmost boundary of the Atlantic Alliance, on the 800 miles long demarcation line bordering the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany. In the event of a conflict in Central Europe, the German Army, together with approximately five American divisions stationed in Germany, as well as with strong British and French units, would have to take the main impact. In the face of this consideration, details about the strength, arms and organisation of the German Army are of particular interest. At New Year the

Ministry for Defence in Bonn gave out information on these questions. It may be seen from the statement of accounts that at the end of 1962 approximately 415,000 soldiers in all were under arms. Of these approximately 236,000 are professional soldiers and approximately 180,000 soldiers doing military service. The latter are obliged to serve a period of 18 months of military service in West Germany. The Army now has at its disposal seven mechanised infantry divisions, two armoured divisions, one mountain division and one parachute division. Corresponding to the demands of modern warfare, the German Army is almost completely motorised. The modern German soldier no longer goes on foot. The heaviest weapon of the tank units is the American M48 tank with a combat weight of 46 tons. The largest gun in the German Army has a calibre of 203 millimetres. Apart from this the army's artillery is mainly equipped with rocket weapons. These extend from small anti-tank rockets which are guided to the target by means of an electric wire, to the largest tactical short range ballistic missile of the "Pershing" type, which can fly a distance of 500 miles and can carry atomic warheads.

The German Army does not, however, possess atomic ammunition which remains, now as previously, under the control of the American allies.

According to the official report of the Ministry of Defence the German airforce at the end of last year consisted of one recon-

naissance squadron, six bomber-fighter squadrons, one transport squadron as well as two anti-aircraft defence battalions. The German airforce does not have a bomber-fleet at its disposal since it is there principally for purposes of anti-aircraft defence and reconnaissance. In addition it must provide support from the air for ground-fighting. This duty is undertaken by jetfighters of the G91 type which are specially constructed for close ground support and are correspondingly armoured.

The bomber-fighter and reconnaissance squadrons have been up to now equipped with aeroplanes of types F 86 Sabre VI, F 86 K, as well as type F 84 F. For some time past these planes have been replaced by the Super-Star fighter F 104 G, which has broken world records for speed and climbing ability. The German aeronautics industry has the licence for manufacturing these jet-planes. The anti-aircraft defence relies on two types of rockets, "Nike Ajax," and "Nike Hercules." The latter of these two types is, with atomic ammunition, capable of reaching heights where the heaviest bombers fly.

The West German navy had at its disposal at the beginning of the year more than 15 squadrons with destroyers, speedboats, minesweepers and assault-boats with more than 182 warships and 30 auxiliary vessels. The main support of the naval airforce is the anti-submarine fighter plane Fairey Gannet. Because of the special tactical duty of the German navy to protect the coasts and reinforcements, it is

not planned to equip it with ships larger than destroyers.

Educating the Men to Become "Citizens in Uniform"

The most important difference between the German Army and the armies of most other nations lies in the fact that the German Army is subordinate, not to the operative commanding power of the German government, but to the superior authority of the 15 nations of the NATO pact in Paris. Not only in the turning away from old symbols like the steel-helmets and nailed-boots does one recognise the essential difference to the old German Army. But the spirit of the democratic constitutional state rules also in its internal structure. The famous "Prussian Drill" was recognised as being superfluous and senseless in military affairs and was replaced by the concept of educating the soldier to become a military expert, tough, brave and capable of independent thinking. The German taxpayers in 1962 paid more than 15 milliard German marks for the building-up and maintenance of the army. That is more than 30 per cent. of the German state budget.

The former enemies have accorded respect and recognition to the new German armed forces. England, France and the Netherlands proved this in a particularly striking way by placing training areas in their countries at the disposal of German troops, while there is constant interchange between German and U.S. units.

Communist propaganda never loses an opportunity to defame

the Bundeswehr as an instrument of Fascism and Revanchism. In order to justify the presence of Soviet troops in Eastern European satellite countries and the heavy burden of military expenditure, fresh arguments are constantly put forward to conjure up the danger of renewed German aggression. This constantly nourished fear of revenge is being used above all in Czechoslovakia and Poland to paralyse opposition and to force it to co-operate with the Communist rulers.

The following facts belie this propaganda:

- (1) Such aggressive and revanchist activities are specifically prohibited by the Basic Law of the Federal Republic.
- (2) Obligations under international law are enshrined in the Basic Law, which also make it compulsory for members of the Bundeswehr to be instructed in the rules of the Geneva and Hague Conventions.
- (3) The right of conscientious objection is fundamental. As a result many young men perform substitute service in the Red Cross or in hospitals.
- (4) A Personal Screening Committee set up in 1955 has the task of ensuring that no candidates with extreme right wing or "aggressive revanchist" views are accepted into the Bundeswehr as officer or N.C.O. corps. The members of this committee are drawn predominantly from the ranks of former resistance fighters

and those persecuted by the Nazi regime.

- (5) The subordination of military to political direction in the Federal Republic is guaranteed.
- (6) All units of the Bundeswehr are subordinated to N.A.T.O. National command is limited to troop welfare, training matters and to the appointment of personnel.

The young men of today who enter the Bundeswehr are cer-

tainly not enthusiastic about national service but they nevertheless accept it as an obligation. They know that a sacrifice is being demanded of them. They are prepared to make it, for they know the bitter necessity which has forced them to re-arm. Many of them, as children had experienced the horrors of war. They had grown up in the confusion of the immediate post-war years and at a time when many Germans quite sincerely had sworn never to take a gun in their hands again.

The feeling between the regimental officer and the staff officer is as old as the history of fighting. I have been a regimental officer in two minor wars and realised what a poor hand the staff made of things and what a safe, luxurious life they led; I was a staff officer in the first world war and realised that the staff were worked to the bone to try and keep the regimental officer on the rails; I have been a higher commander in one minor and one major war and have sympathised with the views of both staff and regimental officer.

— Field Marshal Lord Wavell.

THE RESUPPLY OF AN AUSTRALIAN FORCE BY AIR

Captain W. G. R. Fleming
Royal Australian Army Service Corps

FOR some years now the Australian Army has been restricted in its training to preparation for warfare in South East Asia. This has allowed its reorganisation and the tailoring of the new organisation to fit this very particular role. Our Army is very much more a specialist force than it was several years ago. Its basic divisional structure has been drastically changed, and the combat and logistical support for the division has changed also. Instead of the all-purpose, standard sort of force of old, designed to operate with only superficial change anywhere in the world, we now have a force designed specifically to operate in a very limited part of the globe and in particular types of operations.

The reorganisation of the Army was drastic and very thorough — there was not one part of the Field Force which was not looked at very closely and where necessary altered. This applied to organisations and to methods of employment. Also altered was the system of maintenance in the field, which

now had to cope with the new organisations and conditions. At first sight it appears to have been altered radically, whereas in actual fact the changes — particularly in the movement and carriage of supplies — are not so drastic as they seem. The organisations have changed but the system not greatly.

It is now three years since the new method of maintenance in the field was devised and there has been considerable opportunity to experiment with it in theory and to a limited extent in practice. From such consideration I am sure there has been insufficient weight placed on supply by air. This is the answer to our problem of maintaining a force anywhere in South East Asia. If we consider any of the places where the Australian Army may be committed we eventually come up against the enormous problem of the difficulty of maintaining the force over a land L of C. Under normal tropical conditions, with an active guerilla threat, the divisional column, as at present organised, is completely in-

capable of maintaining the division. Furthermore, with consideration of climate, terrain, known road conditions and capabilities, and the ever-present threat of guerilla attack, the problems of maintaining a land L of C — which could stretch several hundred miles from the port of entry to the fighting troops — are very formidable. Under these conditions — and they will be standard for our Army, specially organised to fight in this theatre — massive air supply is the answer. We have for years stated, and invariably placed in our preces a reminder that air supply is a normal means of supply. Now we must change our thinking somewhat. For the Australian Army at war, operating inland in any country, air supply must be the normal means of supply. This is in no way contrary to the standard principle that use must be made of all available transport and supply agencies. Rather it is a re-orientation of thought. Our present thinking is that air-supply is the stop-gap or fill-in. When all else fails we can always fall back on air-supply. I suggest that when thinking of maintenance of a force in South East Asia we must first think of Air, and then what other methods we can use to complement it.

Problems

To a country such as ours — rich, but only relatively so, and certainly not wealthy enough to wage unaided a protracted war, the major consideration in maintaining a force in the field must

be cost. Here again we must beware of false thinking, for cost is only relative. If the Government considers it necessary to place an effective force inland anywhere in this theatre it must accept the financial drain of supplying it by air. If the cost of supplying it by air is too great for the economy to bear, then very simply it must be withdrawn.

It follows then that with cost the dominant factor, it behoves us to keep down the cost of our aerial resupply so far as we are able. The aeroplanes, as a capital cost, need not be considered — it is the day by day operating costs that are cause for concern. Let us now look briefly at the problem of aerial resupply of a battle group. As a representative example I have chosen the Battle Group given in Appendix 1 to Annex RR of the "Pentropic Division in Battle — Part 2". Briefly this consists of an infantry battalion, a field regiment, a field squadron, a half squadron of armour, an RAASC element, a medical company, a RAEME element and a provost section with a total all ranks of 2,307. If we then assume that it is engaged in defence, the daily maintenance requirements work out at 90 tons, the breakdown being 5.5 tons of POL, 70 tons of ammunition, 6.8 tons of supplies, 2 tons of engineer stores, 4.6 tons of ordnance stores and 1.3 of medical, postal and canteen supplies. If we assume the supplies are to be air-dropped, this lot, over a normal range, can comfortably be handled by 6 Hercules or 33 Caribou sorties. The

| | |
|----------------------------------|---------|
| 95 x A22 1 ton containers at £45 | £4,275 |
| 95 x G12D parachutes at £280 | £26,600 |
| 95 x Pilot parachutes at £4 | £380 |
| 6 x Release parachutes at £50 | £300 |
| Release lines etc. — say £25 | £25 |
| Total | £31,580 |

TABLE I

bill for aerial delivery stores would be as shown on Table I.

If we keep this up for eight days we've gone through a quarter of a million pounds. And yet we've only been supplying one battle group.

Lessons

The main lessons to be drawn from this interesting balance sheet are I think two:

- (a) No effort must be spared to construct airfields as far forward as possible to take aircraft as large as possible.
- (b) when committed to air-dropping, no effort must be spared to return in good order as quickly as possible all aerial delivery equipments dropped.

There is nothing new about either of these lessons really. They are very sound principles which have been taught for years. The building of airfields as far forward as possible now assumes a new significance however. To drop a full stick of containers a C-130 requires an area of open ground 1,800 yards long by 800 yards wide. This seems an enormous area, but in practice (largely because of the dropping speed of 150 knots which is 220 feet per second) it

has been found necessary. The obvious question is "Where am I likely to find an area like that?". The answer of course is that very likely you will have to make one. And the follow-on from that is that if an area of this size has to be cleared to the extent where vehicles may be driven on it, it would probably require less engineer effort to produce a Caribou strip, and not a great deal more to produce one which may be used by the C-130. Air-landing of course has certain tremendous advantages in that payload is not wasted with cushioning material and aerial delivery equipment, reinforcements can be brought up as well, casualties and salvage returned, damage in transit, packing and handling time is greatly reduced, and of course we haven't got thirty thousand pounds worth of quite fragile equipment being subjected to very considerable abuse every day.

If, however, it is impractical for tactical or engineering reasons to construct or make use of airfields in the battle group maintenance area, then it will be necessary to fall back on air-dropping. It will be quite impracticable to free-drop the great bulk of these stores, and

we can plan, certainly for several years to come, on using platforms, containers and parachutes, all of which are relatively expensive but which, if necessary after being repaired and re-packed in the field, may be used again and again.

The use of re-usable aerial delivery equipment, particularly in view of its very considerable cost, necessitates its immediate recovery in the best possible order. This poses several problems, the first being that if we must resort to air-dropping, then air-landing would appear to be out of the question, and the land L of C would probably be non-existent or at best very slow. How then is the equipment to be evacuated? The second problem is that aerial delivery equipment is very attractive and can find numerous uses to the soldier in the field — webbing straps, canvas covers, plywood base-boards, not to mention parachutes — all can make his life much more pleasant, and so a rigid control must be kept on the ground to stop these items going off.

Besides being costly, aerial delivery equipment is also heavy; a G12D parachute (dry) weighing 128 lbs. while the 1 ton A22 container weighs about 60 lbs. We then find that to drop our 90 tons of supplies we actually needed 18,615 lbs. or 9 tons of aerial delivery equipment. And if we are to be able to maintain resupply by air-dropping, this 9 tons of equipment must be back-loaded very smartly, in fact we must plan on a daily back-loading of 9 tons. It may be possible to back-load by vehicle

from the DZ to an airstrip from which a Caribou could ferry the stores back to the base airfield. Failing this and in consideration of the urgency and necessity of the return of these stores to the maintenance of aerial resupply, this would appear to me to be a legitimate task for the helicopters of the RAAF Medium Transport Squadron. An Iriquois can carry 3,000 lbs. either internally or from its external cargo hook, and so in fact 7 Iriquois sorties would be required, either back to a trans-shipping airfield or right to the base aerodrome.

The Americans attempt to overcome the dissipation of their aerial delivery stores on the DZ by parachuting into the DZ soldiers of the Airborne Branch of the Quartermaster Corps who are responsible for the collection and return of all items of air-drop equipment, and who naturally discourage its abuse and removal by the fighting troops. This has definite advantages in that the packing agency keeps control of its own equipment and there is less chance of the stores being damaged through ignorant handling on the ground. However, the problem then arises that not only have the stores to be evacuated, but the personnel also, and there are several recorded cases from Korea where such troops were not withdrawn for weeks. To my mind it is essentially a matter of priorities — soldiers whose legitimate task is preparing loads for air despatch can not carry out this task if they are abandoned on a DZ, and in fact the return of aerial delivery

equipment should be the responsibility of the receiving formation through the DZ commander. Where, however, the return of air delivery stores is unsatisfactory, then it may be necessary for an RAASC detachment to parachute into the DZ to advise and instruct.

It then becomes essential for all ranks to be made fully conscious of the necessity of returning all air-drop equipment expeditiously and in good order, and the staff must ensure that certain officers and NCOs from all units are taught the correct methods of dismantling, roughly repacking where necessary and returning all such stores.

Conclusion

Briefly the purpose of this paper has been to stimulate some thought on new aspects of air-supply which up to now we have only been able to consider academically in the Australian Army. We now have the aircraft and we are getting more. We have the equipment — and we are getting more of that — we know where we are going. We have the experience of others to draw upon and it is now up to us to evolve in practice methods, organisations, systems and techniques that will stand the strain of active operations.

The bravest are surely those who have the clearest vision of what is before them — glory and danger alike — and yet, not withstanding, go out to meet it.

— *Pericles.*

A VISIT TO BERLIN, POLAND AND THE SOVIET UNION

Lieutenant-Colonel D. S. Thomson, MC
Royal Australian Infantry

Part 1 — Berlin and Poland

IT all started with an advertisement in the Personal Column of "The Times" — "Moscow by Minibus — £32." The people who answered this advertisement were an interesting "mixed bag." Apart from my wife and myself and a fellow DS at Camberley and his wife, there was an ageing Irish actor, a last year's debutante, a very gallant Australian who had served with the RAF, now partially paralysed and confined to a wheelchair, two charming lady schoolteachers, a young American archaeologist and an executive of a well-known publishing firm. In all there were twenty-two of us fitted into two minibuses, a Bedford and a Commer.

The organiser of the tour, an Old Etonian, Yorkshire farmer and ex-member of the Foreign Legion, had started this venture last year and was doing his seventh trip to Russia.

With this interesting and incongruous group we set off from London on 12 August, 1961, the beginning of a memorable and exciting trip.

These notes are a personal record of my main impressions of the journey. They will be divided into three parts, Berlin, Poland and the Soviet Union.

Berlin

Through the Iron Curtain

After driving through Belgium and spending a night at Venlo in Holland we arrived at Helmstadt, the beginning of the road corridor to Berlin on the border of East Germany at 1700 hours 13 August. We were waved quickly through the Allied Check Point and we then spent two hours outside the East German Check Point waiting for our visas. This was our first sight of the Communist world. Very young East German soldiers were armed with Czech machine carbines. Russian soldiers escorted cars through. The border was sealed with high barbed wire and wooden watch towers patrolled by East Germans, a foretaste of things to come in Berlin. There were red flags and huge propaganda pictures — Gagarin, the Cuban invasion, the joyous life

of the Communist worker and imperialism in Africa. Here we heard rumours of some trouble in Berlin.

At 1900 hours we received East German visas for Frankfurt-und-Oder, on the Polish frontier, and started down the autobahn. The collective farms of East Germany, with untidy fields and buildings in need of repair were a sad contrast to the thriving and prosperous farms of the West.

- Into a Beleaguered City

The two soldiers in the party had been asked by the War Office not to enter West Berlin, because of problems of implied recognition of the East German regime in the Russian sector. Although the rest of the party were to stay in the west, we were to be dropped in East Berlin where we planned to stay at the famous Adlon Hotel. On the road, just outside the city we passed a stationary convoy of 40 to 50 Russian trucks. We entered East Berlin through a check point where disinterested East German soldiers did not bother to check our papers but waved us through.

There were few people on the streets and no traffic. As we neared the centre of the city we noticed increasing numbers of soldiers, both East German and Russian. Soldiers guarded the entrance to the subways. Within a mile or so of the Brandenburg Gate we saw Russian trucks and tanks and larger groups of East German soldiers packed in the squares. Obviously all was not well. From desolate streets flanked by building destroyed

during the war, we entered the Stalinallee, the great Communist showpiece, a very wide street of huge rectangular blocks of apartments with meagre shops below. Then into the Unter den Linden to the Adlon Hotel near the Brandenburg Gate. Only the servants' quarters of this once great hotel are still standing.

We entered to ask for our rooms. The time — 2230 hours. Two large men in plain clothes closed in behind us. There were soldiers on the stairs. At the sound of our English voices the man at the reception desk looked horrified. "Nein, nein. No rooms." "Could he suggest another hotel — "Nein, nein." "Could we use the telephone" — "Nein, nein." He was frightened, we were obviously unwelcome. In this atmosphere we decided that it would be wiser to cross to the West, so we beat a hasty retreat.

There were many hundreds of soldiers on the east side of the Brandenburg Gate. The arches of the gate were filled with APCs — two deep. There were no civilians. We approached the Gate and at the word "Tourists" an astonished officer politely waved us through with no formalities.

On the West side there were police and some riot trucks, but no sign of soldiers. All seemed quiet. It was here that we discovered that the border between East and West had been closed. Shortly before we arrived there had been a big demonstration on the West side which had been broken up by "Wasserkannonen" (water cannons) and tear-gas. We were almost the last people to get through the gate. No

wonder there was no room at the Adlon! Later the British Consul told us that the hotel had almost certainly been used as a barracks and headquarters during the night.

View from the West

Across the border was another world. There were well-dressed crowds in the streets, traffic jams, neon signs and floodlit fountains playing in the squares. Except at the border itself there was no sign of crisis. We found rooms in a pleasant hotel which we later discovered was in the middle of the "Red Light District."

The next day we walked for miles around the Western sector. Everywhere there were signs of great prosperity — new buildings, well-filled shops and well-dressed crowds. The Brandenburg Gate was closed to traffic, but we could walk to within a few yards of the border. There were large crowds of sightseers and a picnic atmosphere on the West side. The police were good-humoured and handled the crowds very well. Across the border there were no crowds — only soldiers, police, tanks and APCs. We saw Russian soldiers changing the guard on the Russian War Memorial, just inside the gate on the West side. The crowd boomed and whistled. These were the only Russian soldiers we were able to photograph throughout the trip.

A Tour of East Berlin

At 1600 hours we got on a bus to do a tour of East Berlin. West Germans and tourists could still cross the border at this time,

only East Germans were barred. By now the police had cleared the crowds back to about 1,000 yards from the border because of further demonstrations during the afternoon. The bus was turned back at three border posts before we were allowed to cross in the French sector. East German police confiscated a camera belonging to a woman on the bus who tried to photograph soldiers at the border.

We toured through miles of devastated buildings. Except for Stalinallee and some blocks of flats, little reconstruction has been done. The people looked poor, shabby and very strained. There was little traffic. Soldiers were everywhere — Peoples' Police, Peoples' Army and "Factory Fighting Groups." The latter are trained to assist regular forces in event of an uprising. They wore ill-fitting uniforms; many of them were older men — reputedly all Communists. They were lined shoulder to shoulder across the Unter den Linden about 500 yards from the Brandenburg Gate. There were no curious crowds on the East side. The people looked thoroughly cowed. I counted 16 Russian tanks (T34s) lined up on Marx Engels Platz — near Ulbricht's Party HQ. Other Russian tanks were in many of the squares and gardens of the city — some surrounded by barbed wire. There was no attempt to disguise the naked threat of Russian force. Field kitchens, like baby Wiles Cookers were set up throughout the city to feed the troops. A vase of red carnations on one Russian cooker provided a bizarre note of colour.

During the tour of the city I sat next to a young German who had lived in East Berlin until 1954. He now lived in the West. He told me a lot about conditions in the East — food shortages, forced collectivisation, no private businesses. His grandparents lived in the East and he thought he would still be able to visit them; later events proved him wrong.

We visited the impressive Russian War Cemetery, where lie 7,000 Russians killed in the battle for Berlin, and drove past the grassy mound marking the site of Hitler's Bunker.

After seeing both parts of the city it was quite obvious why the Communists had been forced to close the border. No Communist Government could allow its people to see the contrast between the rich, confident and bustling West and the depressed and depressing East.

Dinner in the East

That evening a party of us decided to dine in East Berlin and we set off in one of the buses. We met a student demonstration near the border with banners — "There is Only One Germany" and "Free the Slaves." At first they thought we were Russians but became very friendly on discovering our identity.

A senior West German police officer in plain clothes offered us a police escort to the one open border crossing in the French sector. He said that the crowds were being kept back from the border because there were not enough West German police to

control the student demonstrators. Both sides were obviously very worried that the demonstrators might get out of control.

Our police escort left us at the border and we got through without any trouble. We tried to get a meal at the Adlon, but the restaurant was full of soldiers and there was no food left. In the lobby was a tired, dishevelled and worried-looking crowd. My wife spoke to them in Russian and they turned out to be a party of Bulgarian tourists on an "excursion."

We later had a good dinner at a Hungarian Restaurant in Stalinallee. The other diners were shabby and dull. The meal was cheap. Although the East Germans insist that their East mark is equivalent to a West German deutschmark, it is possible to buy five East marks for one deutschmark in West Berlin.

Next morning we left Berlin to drive through East Germany into Poland. On the way we saw a large sign proclaiming "Workers and Craftsmen of the German Democratic Republic. Your determination to keep peace and lessen international tension is a blow against the warmongers." Obviously such Orwellian exhortations were not sufficient to keep the workers content, hence the closing of the border.

The time we spent in Berlin was intensely interesting. We saw at first hand, Russian force being used to keep the restive people of a satellite under control. Throughout the rest of East Germany and in Poland, the

Russian Army was there in the background but was seldom obvious.

The twenty or so Russian Divisions in East Germany seem to make a successful uprising impossible.

Poland

The Polish Scene

On 15th August at Frankfurt-Oder we crossed the border from East Germany to Poland — the Oder-Neisse Line. There was a four-hour delay at the frontier whilst the details of our passports were laboriously transcribed by hand, both by the East Germans and the Poles. We had become accustomed to long delays at Communist frontiers and we normally ate our picnic meals during these delays.

Once into Poland the atmosphere seemed to change completely. Most of the farms in Poland are still privately owned. Prosperous-looking, well-cared-for fields and neat, small farmhouses were very different from the collective farms of Russia and East Germany. There were many new cottages, some painted white and blue, with bright gardens and small plots of vegetables. Although methods were somewhat primitive by our standards, they seemed to produce results. Strip farming is normal. Men and women were scything hay and raking it by hand. Few tractors were seen; instead there were many very fine, well-cared-for horses. These horses are a special feature of Poland. It is said that there are over 2½ million horses and that they eat as much food

as the whole of the urban population put together.

Ploughs were horse drawn and the main means of transport seemed to be long carts with rubber car tyres, drawn by matched pairs. There are no fences and the cows grazing in the fields were watched by cowherds. On the edges of the road, old women watched over a single, precious cow. Small boys herded flocks of foolish geese.

In spite of primitive methods there was a general air of contentment and fair prosperity.

The Church in Poland

As evening approached we noticed more and more families dressed in their best clothes going to church. It was the Feast of the Assumption, the great Feast Day of the Polish Church. Last year it had been a holiday but this year people had to go to church after work. The churches in the villages were packed, which was a somewhat surprising introduction to the strength of the Church in Poland.

After the rising in 1956, Cardinal Wyszynski and Mr. Gromulka reached an agreement whereby the Church would support the Government in return for certain rights for the Church. These included permission for religious instruction in schools and for holidays on the main Feast Days. However, early this year Gromulka withdrew these privileges. Despite this, the Church is obviously the most powerful unifying influence in Poland. Every church we visited was in constant use by the young as well as by the old.

New churches are being built, not only in Warsaw but in the small villages. Along the roads are many shrines and crosses, decorated with fresh flowers. It is difficult to see how a Communist country can allow the Church to wield such influence and power. One Pole we spoke to insisted that the people would not agree to any further restriction of worship. He said "Gromulka is having trouble with his masters, hence the recent decrees against the Church." In the face of Russian power, there seems little that the people of Poland can do to prevent a gradual whittling away of the influence of the Church.

Warsaw

Warsaw is a city of churches. We were shown around Warsaw by a 24-year-old Pole, intelligent, well-educated and very proud of his country, who told us much of the history of the city. In 1944, after the Polish uprising, the Nazis systematically set out to destroy Warsaw. They burned or blew up 85 per cent. of the buildings in the city. Even the churches were destroyed. With tremendous determination Poland set out to rebuild the city; money and labour came from all over Poland. It was decided that the old city — Staroye Mesto, should be rebuilt exactly as it was in 1939. With the aid of sketches, paintings and architectural records this old, medieval city has been rebuilt in perfect detail. Cathedrals, palaces, the wonderful old market square and the red brick walls of the old city were exactly

as they were centuries ago; it is difficult to believe that they have all been rebuilt in the last few years. The Poles are tremendously proud of what they have done. Around the old city are modern apartment houses and shops.

Towering over the new part of Warsaw is the Soviet-built Palace of Culture and Science with typical Stalinist wedding-cake architecture, not unlike the design of the Moscow University. It is despised by many Poles who resent this implied domination of their city.

The main shopping streets of Warsaw are thronged with lively people — very different from the dull crowds of East Berlin or Moscow. They are much better dressed—particularly the women with attractive hair styles and make-up. The shops seemed brighter and better stocked than those in Moscow. Some were still privately owned, which leads to competition and an attempt at window displays. We saw a number of antique and jewellery shops — unheard of in Moscow. The whole atmosphere was one of keeping up appearances under great difficulties. In the main streets baskets of flowers hung from the lamp-posts.

One evening we dined and danced at the Krodakil, a fine restaurant in an ancient cellar on one side of the Old Market Square. We were made very welcome. Our waiter had been in England during the war in the Polish Army and he gave us wonderful service. All the diners were Poles except ourselves — vodka flowed and life was gay.



15th Century Square in Krakow, Poland.

We danced to Viennese and Polish tunes, and everyone on the dance floor joined in singing. Suddenly the orchestra burst into "The Lambeth Walk" for our benefit. Shades of war-time London! We drove home in a horse-drawn Droszky, an old-world touch in a Communist city.

Talking to the People

My wife speaks Russian, as do many Poles, so she was able to have some very interesting conversations. The Poles dislike speaking Russian and we had to make it quite clear who we were. This established, people were surprisingly outspoken. Some, of course, spoke to us in English.

The young Pole who showed us around Warsaw dined with us

in a restaurant, where he talked quite freely, despite the fact that there were several uniformed army officers nearby. When we queried his outspoken comments in a public place he said that since the uprising in 1956 there was much more freedom. People were no longer frightened of the Secret Police. He did say that two of his friends had been imprisoned for passing on copies of "Dr. Zhivago" — this forbidden book seems to have a fascination for the young of the Communist world.

He told us of German atrocities during the war and I commented that he must prefer Russian domination to that of the Germans. He said, "No, we Poles hate the Russians just as

much as the Germans, but there is little we can do about it."

He was very anti-Communist and he said that not more than 5 per cent. of the people actively supported the Communists — many because it earned them better jobs and better living quarters. We had no way of checking the accuracy of his statements, except that his views were shared by several others to whom we spoke. A taxi driver told us that all the best flats went to the Communists.

A well-dressed technician, who with his wife hitched a ride in our van, was equally outspoken. He spoke some Russian and he and my wife talked for over an hour on his country and his life. To the comment that we had seen few Russian soldiers in Poland, he replied, "There are two Russians to every Pole in our country, but they are hidden away. They do not dare to appear alone amongst us. They say they are here to defend us from our enemies." The latter comment was said with a laugh, and when my wife cracked back, "From us?", he thought this a great joke. After translation we all laughed about it together. It is against the law to accept lifts from foreigners in Russia and when we asked if it was the same in Poland he said proudly, "They have their laws, we have ours."

He had been home to his village for the day and had a record player and some records. The villagers had been regaled with such tunes as "The Dark Town Strutters Ball" and "Alexanders Ragtime Band," which we all sang together. His wife was

well and simply dressed. He worked in a chemical factory and his wife in a shop. They lived in a one-room flat.

The Standard of Living

Accommodation is a terrible problem. We spoke to one couple — both of them in professions which would have made them very well off in England and Australia. With two children and another adult relative they lived in a flat of three small rooms. Until recently they had lived in one room.

The mother of one of the couples lived in a village near Warsaw. She had a State pension of 700 zlotys a month, 200 of which went in rent. Apparently her pension was sufficient for only about 10 days of each month. Her children helped to support her.

One Pole said that the wages of the average worker were sufficient for about half the month. When asked what happened during the other half of the month, he shrugged and did not reply.

It is very difficult to compare the cost of living. The official rate of exchange is 60 zlotys to £1 sterling, the black market or "free" rate is about 150 zlotys to the £1. A 2 oz. tin of Nescafe worth 2/9 in England is sold in the shops for 95 zlotys. A bed in the cheapest tourist hotel is 35 zlotys a night, whilst an 8 oz. bottle of vodka was 85 zlotys in a simple restaurant. Prices of course are fixed by the State. Although food and clothing seemed expensive, people were quite well dressed and able to

afford the staple foods — bread and potatoes. Rents are cheap although accommodation is very restricted.

There was a thriving second-hand clothes market and tourists are approached for Nescafe, nylons, woollen pullovers and drip-dry shirts, for which there is a ready sale. One couple told us that people were frightened that there was going to be a war and that many had been buying up scarce items such as sugar and tinned goods.

Krakow

From Warsaw we decided to visit Krakow, 200 miles to the south through pine forests and prosperous farmlands. This former capital, home of the old kings of Poland and one of the oldest universities in Europe, is unscarred by war. It is a lovely, dreaming, medieval city, full of Polish history and pride. I could write pages on Krakow but this would not add much to a description of contemporary Poland.

Signs of the Soviet Army

It was in the south that we saw most evidence of Russian troops. Previously the only Russians we had seen had been in Poznan — where the 1956 uprising began. Travelling on the highway from Wroclaw (formerly Breslau), through the former German territories, we saw several convoys of Russian Army vehicles. Just east of Trzebiel we passed what appeared to be a Russian training camp in the pine forests, with red flags flying. There were tank tracks on either side of the road — obviously a training area.

Although the road was marked as a Super Highway on our maps — the pre-war German-built autobahn to Berlin, it was not finished. One part ended without warning and we had to detour through small villages. Most of the bridges carrying the lateral roads over the highway had been destroyed during the war and not rebuilt. Apart from Army vehicles and a number of civilian cars with Russian number plates there was little traffic.

Finally we were stopped by two young Polish sentries with fixed bayonets who told us politely but firmly that the road — the main highway to Berlin was closed to civilian traffic. It is significant that the Polish Army wear the Double Eagle of Poland on their caps and not the Red Star of Communism. We were then forced to detour through the interesting villages of Zary and Zrelona Gora to the border with East Germany at Frankfurt-und-Oder.

Five days in Poland is little time in which to form firm opinions. However, we perhaps saw more of Poland and the Poles than many tourists and we left with some strong impressions.

The Poles are materially and spiritually better off than either the East Germans or the Russians. There is a strong feeling of national unity and pride. Many Poles were openly critical of the Gromulka Government but they saw that there was little alternative at present. They accept the fact that they must learn to live with Germany and Russia as neighbours. Des-

pite this, they are very European and have a strong feeling of identity with the West. Many would like to travel but it is difficult to get visas and they are very expensive.

Apparently there is more freedom here than in any other country behind the Iron Curtain. It is difficult to see how

conditions can improve, and if recent actions against the freedom of the Church are any indication, it seems likely that Poland will be gradually forced to give up the concessions it gained after the 1956 uprising. It seems that there is no chance of a successful revolt against Russian domination.

To be continued

It seems somehow criminal to some people to change their minds. There is nothing wrong with telling people one thing today and something else tomorrow: we change, and the world changes. Many things which were true yesterday are not so today.

It is a sign of our vitality to own that we have changed our opinion, indicating that we are wiser than we were. He is, indeed, a wise man who keeps his mind open so that he recognises important changes.

People with closed minds are prejudiced in favour of yesterday's thoughts. They resent having to question and re-examine their attitudes and ideas; still more do they resent it when others raise questions. Emerson dismissed such people in this way: "A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines."

— *The Royal Bank of Canada Monthly Letter.*



A NEW RUSSIA? by Harrison E. Salisbury (Martin Secker and Warburg, London, and William Heinemann Ltd., 317 Collins Street, Melbourne).

Harrison Salisbury has long been recognised as an authority on Russia. Speaking Russian fluently, he was head of the United Press Moscow Bureau from 1944 to 1949, when he joined the staff of the New York Times as its Moscow correspondent. In 1955, in consequence of some articles and a book about Russia, he was barred from the Soviet Union. The ban, however, was relaxed four years later when he was permitted to visit the country. In late 1961 and early 1962 he made a more extensive journey, travelling through Eastern Siberia, Outer Mongolia, Central Asia and the Ukraine, and staying for some time in Moscow. His book is a record of the impressions gathered on his last trip.

Generally, Mr. Harrison contrasts the conditions he encountered on his recent visit with those that obtained during his earlier sojourns in the USSR. There is a ring of authenticity about his comparisons; obviously they are the work of a shrewd, experienced observer moving in a familiar field.

Mr. Harrison found much evidence of a striking evolution in Russian thought and attitudes. The people generally were more relaxed, the dead hand of the Stalinist police State seemed to have vanished. There were definite signs of a new liberalism to be seen on all sides, particularly among the intellectual classes. Underlying these long-forbidden activities there seemed to be a definite trend towards the renewal of Russia's links with the West.

On the other hand there was strong opposition to the development of liberal ideas. Neo-Stalinism was evident both in the political arena, in the press and in the streets. While Khrushchev's position appears to be secure, the challenge to his policies is maintained by able and ruthless political adversaries who command sections of the press in which to express their opposition. In addition they appear to have the support of large groups of muscle-men who, on occasions, make things very uncomfortable indeed for those elements of Soviet society striving for a more enlightened way of life. Clearly the decision as to which way Russia will turn is not yet taken.

This little, very readable book of 136 pages throws much light

on current events. It has the great virtue of painlessness. Those who read it will reap the reward of being able to see current affairs with added interest and understanding and to place a better interpretation on events.

— E.G.K.

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY BIBLIOGRAPHY, Compiled by C. E. Dornbusch (Hope Farm Press, N.Y., U.S.A. Melbourne Agents, F. W. Cheshire, 338 Little Collins Street.)

This is by far the most comprehensive bibliography of Australian military literature in existence, and fills a need long-felt by people interested in the history and development of the military forces of this country. The author, who until his recent retirement was a member of the staff of the New York State Library, has specialised in this type of work, and produced authoritative bibliographies of Canadian and New Zealand military literature. When compiling the Australian bibliography he spent some months on research in this country.

Mr. Dornbusch divides his compilation into five main periods — Australian Colonies, Australian General Works, World War I, World War II, Occupation of Japan, and the war in Korea. In each section the available literature is listed under sub-headings — General, Campaigns, Art and Pictorial, Biographies, Regimental Histories and Personal Narratives.

Throughout the volume references are given to official and unofficial publications, army

orders, books and magazine articles. Extensive references are given to the literature covering extra-military activities such as war cemeteries and returned servicemen's organisations.

This volume deserves a place in every military reference library. It is to be hoped that when time has further enriched our military literature some equally competent scholar will carry on from the point where Mr. Dornbusch has left off.

— E.G.K.

THE LOVELY SERGEANT by Alan Burgess. (William Heinemann Ltd., London, and 317 Collins Street, Melbourne).

Even for the vanishing generation the thrill of the first moments of World War I is not easy to recall. So much has happened since then. It was a moment to have lived through, a moment which called to all that was good and adventurous to go forth to battle to redress the wrongs of little Belgium and Serbia, to make the world a safe place for decent people to live in. In that golden moment there was no cynicism, no doubt, no hesitation. There was no scarcity of volunteers. Their only fear was that it might all be over before they had a chance to participate.

Many people, impatient of the delay in getting into some normal establishment, formed themselves into unofficial groups or organisations. One such group of six women, some with nursing experience, some with nothing better than a sketchy course in first aid, gathered in

London under the leadership of the American wife of the Serbian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Their object was to join the Serbian field army as an ambulance unit. One of them was Flora Sandes, the daughter of a Scottish clergyman.

Apparently without any great travel difficulties, they did join the Serbian field army. The medical services were primitive to say the best of them. Doctors were scarce, and before long amputations of shattered and gangrenous limbs became routine practice for the women. The Serbians were tough; most of their patients survived the appalling conditions under which the operations were performed.

When Bulgaria joined the Central Powers and attacked the Serbians in the rear the band broke up and Flora Sandes accompanied a unit during its bitter retreat through the Albanian mountains in the depth of winter. Somewhere along the line of march she gave up nursing and became a combatant. If her initial contribution to the fighting was not very great, her presence and her passionate attachment to the Serbian cause helped to maintain morale at a time when an unusual stimulant was badly needed. The whole regiment very nearly died of starvation and exposure, many did die, but eventually they reached the coast and were rescued by Allied ships.

Promoted sergeant, Flora fought with her regiment until the end of the war. She does seem to have enjoyed a few privileges not usually accorded

to NCOs in any army, but she took her share of the rough spots all the same. She had enough fighting for anyone and was severely wounded in the forefront of an attack.

At the end of the war when Serbia was merged in the new nation of Yugoslavia, Flora was commissioned in the Frontier Troops, a formation composed almost entirely of White Russian refugees. Suppression of smuggling was pretty tame business, but Flora found compensation by falling in love with her sergeant, Yudenitch, an ex-colonel of the Imperial Russian Army. They left the army, married, and lived a successful and not uneventful life in Paris and Belgrade until World War II caught up with them. Yudenitch did not survive the hardships of the occupation. After the war Flora returned to England where she died a few years ago.

That is a bare outline of the life of the remarkable Flora Sandes. Mr. Burgess, of course, has made much more of it than that. In doing so he must have drawn heavily on his imagination for his dialogue and his descriptions of thought processes. Some readers will like it that way, some won't. It is a matter of taste. But in essence the story is authentic. Flora Sandes did do these things, even if she did not use the exact words Mr. Burgess puts into her mouth. His descriptions of Balkan warfare are vivid and accurate.

Those who like their recreational reading to have some foundation in fact will find this a good story.

— E.G.K.

BURGESS AND MACLEAN, by Anthony Purdy and Douglas Sutherland. (Martin Secker and Warburg Ltd., and William Heinemann Ltd., 317 Collins Street, Melbourne.)

Towards the end of May, 1951, our morning newspapers carried banner headlines announcing that Donald MacLean and Guy Burgess, two officials of the British Foreign Office, had suddenly left the United Kingdom in mysterious circumstances, and that it was presumed that they had defected to the Soviet.

This announcement was followed by an acrimonious debate in the House of Commons, in the course of which it was revealed that both officials had had access to highly secret documents and that the Security Service had been about to pounce on MacLean. Apparently someone had warned him and, in company with Burgess, he had fled the day before he was to be interrogated. It further transpired that both men had been members of the Communist Party in their University days, that Burgess was a confirmed homosexual and that MacLean was an alcoholic. Naturally there was much criticism of the Foreign Office and the Security Service.

No doubt the Security Service soon found out that the two missing officials were in Moscow, but some time elapsed before the Soviet admitted their presence. The affair died down and Mrs. MacLean and her children went to live with her mother in Switzerland. Then it all boiled up again when, on 11 September, 1953, Mrs. MacLean and her

children left their home and were eventually traced to a railway station in Austria where they disappeared. It later transpired that Soviet agents had arranged their secret, and voluntary, journey to Moscow.

This book sets out to tell the inside story of the official and private lives of the two diplomats. It is not a pretty story. Burgess emerges as an intellectually arrogant, flamboyant character who shamelessly flaunted his sexual aberrations. MacLean appears to have been less scholastically gifted and inclined to introversion. Both studied at Cambridge in the depth of the depression; both became attracted to Communism as a cure for the economic evils of the times.

On leaving the University both of them went through the motions of severing their connections with the Communist Party. Apparently both of them did so to cover their inner resolve to work for the triumph of Communism. MacLean entered the Foreign Office by competitive examination and appeared to settle down to the pursuit of a promising career. During a tour of duty in Paris he married an American girl with whom he returned to London soon after the outbreak of war in 1939.

His subsequent career was somewhat uneven. In London his private life was not of the sort which one expects a rising official of the Foreign Office to lead, while his frequent bouts of drunkenness must have been a sore trial to his wife. Trans-

ferred to Washington, he became, after the war, closely associated with the political aspects of the development of nuclear weapons. From Washington he went to Cairo where his drunkenness and general misconduct led to his recall to London.

Burgess seldom met MacLean after they left Cambridge. For a time he worked with the B.B.C. Despite his licentiousness, he seems to have been a clever and engaging character able to win the esteem of eminent men. With the support of some of them he managed to get an appointment in the Foreign Office News Department, and was sent to Washington soon after MacLean went to Cairo. His drunkenness and general misconduct soon led to his recall and discharge from the service.

Burgess is undoubtedly the man who warned MacLean that the Security Service was hot on his trail, and it was Burgess who arranged the getaway. But who warned Burgess? The authors attempt to answer the riddle. It was unfortunate for them that just as their book appeared the British Government announced that the "third man" was Kim Philby, a former Foreign Office official and later a journalist, who recently disappeared from his flat in Beirut and turned up in Moscow.

The authors appear to have gone to much trouble to get their facts right. No-one knows how much damage these two men did, how many secrets they passed to the Soviet. After reading the tale of their openly-

practised aberrations, one is left with a feeling of astonishment that such men could have been given access to State secrets. Altogether the authors present a readable account of this notorious episode, an account as complete as it is possible to make it.

— E.G.K.

PEOPLE'S WAR, PEOPLE'S ARMY — *The Viet Cong Insurrection Manual for Underdeveloped Countries*, by General Vo Nguyen Giap. Foreword by Roger Hilsan. (Frederick A. Praeger Inc., New York).

Reviewed in the **MILITARY REVIEW**, Command and General Staff College, U.S.A., by Colonel Eryan F. Kushner, U.S.A.R.

People's War, People's Army gives a revealing insight into the mind of an uncompromising military leader.

The author, General Vo Nguyen Giap is Minister of Defence and Commander-in-Chief of the North Vietnam Army. He has carefully detailed the main methods of operation for a combined political-military force operating in underdeveloped areas.

Giap stresses the need for initial indoctrination of the peasantry, reinforcing his ideologies with promises of immediate land reform. This initial process of political activity was performed by selected cadres of the local Communist organisations. The second stage, building the army, then commenced.

In Vietnam this task became quite simple since the local popu-

lation, ignorant of other political doctrines, had been thoroughly tutored in Communist dogma. With automation established in thought processes, Giap was able to develop a guerilla army which, because of its absolute adherence to Marxist-Leninist theories, was able to keep the French Army constantly engaged in massive mopping-up operations.

The fall of the French at Dien Bien Phu became a foregone conclusion. If the French concentrated at one strongpoint, Giap's guerillas would attack all along the rear. Correspondingly, dispersal in many strongpoints permitted Giap's troops to attack each point at a time of their own choosing and thus allowed piecemeal destruction.

The Viet Cong troops were constantly reminded that the French were invaders, and so were the Japanese, British, and even the Americans. By instilling a nationalism in the peasant forces, which formerly did not exist Giap like Colonel T. E. Lawrence, was able to create a fighting force peculiarly suited for the temper and terrain of the times.

People's War, People's Army is a key document in the ever-growing library of Communist guerilla warfare. The words "peace" and "agreement" are Orwellian in meaning. The military lessons to be gathered from this general outline are many. In particular, it appears that if the United States or any of her allies become committed to fight a local war in an underdeveloped country, it will not be sufficient merely to send troops to do the task.

Infusion of democratic ideals, contemporaneously, by dedicated adherents of real freedom, will be just as essential as the man with the gun.

General Giap's book is enhanced with an extremely provocative foreword written by Roger Hilsman, Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State. Mr. Hilsman sums it all up when he states:

To understand tomorrow, Americans must face up to the realities of the struggle for freedom in South-east Asia. This book, by an Asian Communist general, is therefore worthwhile reading for thoughtful Americans today.