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Australian Army History Unit  
16 July 2014

# AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

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JULY,

1963

Number 170

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July, 1963



**AUSTRALIAN  
ARMY  
JOURNAL**

*A Periodical Review of Military Literature*

*Distribution:*

The Journal is issued through Base Ordnance Depots on the scale of One per Officer, Officer of Cadets, and Cadet Under Officer.

# AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

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The AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL is printed and published for the Directorate of Military Training by Renown Press Pty. Ltd.

Contributions, which should be addressed to The Editor, Australian Army Journal, Army Headquarters, Albert Park Barracks, Melbourne, are invited from all ranks of the Army, Cadet Corps and Reserve of Officers. £5 will be paid to the author of the best article published in each issue. In addition, annual prizes of £30 and £10 respectively to the authors gaining first and second places for the year.

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Photo: Australian War Memorial, Canberra.

### MONUMENT WOOD

Tanks were first developed for use in modern war by the British Army and made their debut at the Battle of Cambrai on the Western Front on 20 November, 1917. Although slow, cumbersome and lightly armoured, their success on this occasion showed their value in attacking the deep trench systems which covered the whole front.

The Germans were impressed by the performance of the British tanks and immediately undertook the development of similar equipments. It is not certain when and where the Germans first employed tanks in action, but the first one to be captured by the British Army was taken by 26 Australian Battalion in an attack near Monument Wood on 14 July, 1918. The picture shows men of the battalion inspecting the tank soon after its capture.

# AIR SUPPORT IN ANTI-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

Major L. G. Clark, MC,  
Royal Australian Infantry

(At present serving with the South Vietnam Training Team)

**G**UERILLAS gain much of their military success by extensive use of surprise. They are able to select targets at random, concentrate sufficient strength to ensure success of an attack, and withdraw before the opposite side can react with an adequate force. When on the defensive, they usually receive early warning of an operation mounted against them, and can slip away in small groups. The tactics and techniques of the employment of air in support of ground forces are being constantly developed and improved, and it is now possible to seize much of the initiative from the guerilla. The following outlines some of the methods by which the Ground Force Commander could employ the available air effort in South East Asian anti-insurgency operations.

## Parachuting

The paratrooper comes into his own again, particularly as the huge areas of paddy fields of South East Asia offer ideal Drop Zones, in both the dry and wet seasons. When a guerilla group has been located, either

in a carefully concealed hide or as a result of making an overt raid on a defended post, convoy or village, the most readily available force which can be committed to cut off the guerilla is an airborne unit. A proven system is to provide a paratroop company as an immediate ready strike force, alerted at an appropriate airfield with equipment packed, parachutes fitted, aircraft fuelled and air crew standing by. The company becomes airborne immediately the guerilla group is located. Detailed prior briefings are not required as it is not essential to have the Drop Zone (DZ) pre-selected. A short briefing can be made whilst in the air. To preserve surprise the troop-carrying aircraft should make only one pass over the DZ. The actual selection of the DZ is made by the Commander of the operation flying ahead in a separate, more versatile aircraft. Having made this selection, he can pass his plan over the radio net to the various aircraft commanders who can brief the paratroops in the air. The DZ can be marked either by

dropping flares, or the commander's aircraft actually landing and lighting smoke pots etc, or by a pathfinder team landing on the DZ by helicopter or by parachute. Whichever method is used the main body must drop within minutes, otherwise the guerillas will be alerted, and will escape in another direction. The identification of the objective or rallying point presents a problem to the individual parachutist who has been only hastily briefed in the air. Here, again, suitable flares, smoke signals, etc, will be required.

Whilst one company may be sufficient to engage a guerilla group, their escape can only be stopped if they are completely encircled. After the first company has dropped, the intentions of the guerillas will soon be apparent. If they are to withdraw away from the para force, then another company should be committed to jump across the new line of withdrawal. A second paratroop company is kitted as soon as the first is alerted, and emplanes on the returning aircraft. Preferably, if sufficient aircraft are available, the second company becomes airborne soon after the first, and orbits until such time as its DZ is selected. However, an experienced guerilla commander, knowing such tactics, may well stage diversionary activities to force a premature jump. The sealing off of the guerillas need not necessarily be solely an airborne operation, but can also be done in conjunction with heliborne and vehicle mounted troops.

Wind and weather are the main bugbears of all airborne operations. Some risks have to be taken once the elusive guerilla has been pinpointed. Jumps can be made in wind speeds up to 25 mph, but the greater the wind speed the greater will be the dispersal on the ground. Dragging will produce casualties, although the "Capewell release" now being extensively used, allows quick separation from the parachute. A low cloud base will often determine the jump height. Heights of 600 feet for the US T10 type parachute, and as low as 300 feet for the British "X" type, have been used. At these heights, however, there is little possibility of using the reserve parachute in the event of a malfunction, but the lower the jump height the shorter the period the parachutist is exposed to ground fire. On the other hand, by flying low the more vulnerable is the aircraft to the same ground fire. For fast reaction it is better to have all the troops jump in a continuous stick during the first pass over the DZ. Surprise will be lost if the unit must wait for the second echelon to jump before moving after the guerillas. This will result in more dispersion than desired, but practice will develop a system for quick reorganisation and onward move.

These airborne operations will, of course, require a fine degree of co-ordination. The airborne Command Post system will overcome many of the command problems whilst supporting fire can be provided by fighter aircraft. Both are described later.

The main difference to conventional airborne operations is that some troops must be landed as soon as possible so that the enemy is given no opportunity to escape. Security must take second place.

Once committed, the paratroopers must remain in operations until either the guerillas have been destroyed or they have irretrievably escaped and pursuit is not humanly possible. Accordingly resupply by air drop is a requirement; all forecastable supplies should be prepackaged and coded for identification so that scheduled and "on call" resupply can be guaranteed. Should the guerillas be cornered, and forced to fight it out, heavy drops of mortars, both 81 mm and 4.2 inch, 75 mm and 105 mm howitzers with their  $\frac{3}{4}$  ton towing vehicles, and their ammunition, may be necessary. Whilst the mortars are man portable across the paddy fields, the howitzers with towing vehicles might well prove an embarrassment due both to their very limited cross country performance and to the problem of their security. In guerilla territory, guns are prime targets for a raid or ambush. At night, when air support is not available, their range and fire power may make their use worthwhile.

Once the operation is completed, the extrication of the airborne force may present a problem. In the move back to base through guerilla infested territory, ambushes are always possible, either to the moving troop column or to the relieving vehicle column. The unit must have sufficient supplies, particu-

larly ammunition, to counteract ambushes and to assault opportunity targets on the return journey. Helicopters, of course, could be used for return, but this is not essential. However, the sooner the unit is returned to its base, the sooner it is available for other operations.

Whilst parachuting into the paddy fields is comparatively easy, parachuting into the jungle is hazardous. However, this may be the only method of approaching a guerilla camp in the jungle, and still retain surprise. Foot and vehicle columns will often be detected early by guerilla outposts, whilst helicopter operations will lapse for want of a landing zone near the objective. Success has been achieved in parachuting special groups directly into the jungle canopy. Each parachutist is equipped with a special equipment bag which, after his parachute has deployed, he is able to position under his feet, letting it act as a platform for his descent through the trees. Once his parachute has been firmly hung up in the branches, he lowers his equipment to the ground and then prepares his abseiling gear for use. This is basically a 200 feet long canvas web strap which is secured to the parachute harness. The parachutist wears a pair of canvas drawers through the edges of which the canvas web strap slides. Once out of the harness the parachutist slides down the canvas web strap to the ground, controlling his descent with his hands. The risk of casualties is greater than normal, but the surprise gained, in thick jungle,



is often worth it. Even if the party is not of sufficient strength to attack a large guerilla base it can ambush stray parties, direct artillery and air support fire into the base, and follow up when the guerillas withdraw. The problem of casualty evacuation, particularly of those injured in the descent, is immense, and may often force the abandonment of the mission. Rehearsals of such descents are, however, not popular!

Free falling, or Sky Diving, long an international sport, has a definite place in operations. Surprise is gained by the parachutist exiting from such great heights that the presence of the aircraft would not normally be suspicious to ground troops. Free fallers can also exit from suitable jet aircraft which are fast enough to avoid conventional ground fire, and not likely to be suspected as paratrooping aircraft. In operational free falling, the parachutist, after exiting, glides in the direction of the DZ, usually much smaller than normal, activates his parachute at a selected height (2,000 feet is a safe area) and, by means of his special highly steerable parachute, lands in the selected DZ. The remainder of his team would land simultaneously, or soon after. To maintain control of his body during descent the parachutist is not able to carry much equipment, and so his durability on the ground is limited. In a new development, both the main and reserve parachutes have explosive opening devices which are linked with barometric alti-

meters. At a set height the parachute will be automatically opened if the parachutist has by some omission not hand-operated the rip cord.

### Air Landings

Air landed operations are possible in some parts of S.E. Asia, particularly in the highland plateaux, where many open uncultivated areas exist, on the beaches and on the wider roads. Short take off and landing (STOL) aircraft, from the single-engined four-seat Cessna to the twin-engined Caribou, have an advantage over helicopters in that they can land and pick up troops over greater distances, particularly long range patrols. A pathfinder team may often be necessary to prepare the initial Landing Zone (LZ), but the patrol itself can prepare an LZ for take-offs. Secrecy and surprise, quick turn around and adequate security whilst on the ground are essential.

It is in the use of helicopters that spectacular improvements in techniques have been made. Heliborne operations have two main advantages over paratroop operations. Firstly, they do not require specially trained troops as with an infantry unit, some familiarisation training and a rehearsal prior to an operation will suffice. Secondly, as no special landing surface is needed, troops can be picked up and dropped where required, even using rope descents when the ground is difficult. The helicopters' greater flexibility often make their use preferable to airborne operations, although the

latter have the advantage of greater range and carrying capacity.

As with armour, helicopters are best employed in shock action, massing as many helicopters and troops as possible for the initial contact with the guerilla. When a guerilla concentration has been located, some friendly troops, known as a blocking force, are required to seal off the likely line of enemy withdrawal. A second, sweeping or netting, force is dropped on the other side of the concentration and clears through the guerilla area, forcing them up against the blocking force, for final destruction. Helicopters are ideal for providing these forces, particularly when the terrain would make foot movement slow, and vehicle movement almost impossible and highly subject to ambush. Surprise is paramount.

In mounting such an operation it is essential that reserve helicopters are available in the emplaning area to be used in the event of breakdown or accident, for the infantry groups must arrive intact. Not all helicopters and troops should be committed to the blocking and netting forces. As the operation develops the guerillas may obtain some local success permitting them to escape the cordon, or they may escape through some unknown path or tunnel. A heli-borne reserve force, circling the objective until required, can observe any guerilla movement away from the cordon, and descend on them at an appropriate place. Once these troops are committed a further heli-

borne reserve must be organised. When more than one helicopter lift is required, and the first lift, on deplaning, has proceeded to the objective, the same LZ should not be used for the second lift. Both the deplaning troops and the helicopters are extremely vulnerable when on the ground, and present an ideal target for a stray guerilla group positioning itself near the original LZ. To reduce helicopter turn around time, the troops for the second lift should have commenced moving towards the objective, either by vehicle or STOL aircraft, as soon as the first lift was alerted.

When the operation is to be a large one, or when frequent heli-borne moves of the committed troops are required, refuelling of the helicopters becomes a problem. The time lost by the helicopters returning to their main base for normal refuelling could be vital to success. The establishment of a forward refuelling point reduces this turn around time. Such a refuelling point can be prepositioned, but this will not often be possible, and may prejudice surprise. Helicopters can be used to bring in drums of fuel with high powered pumps and hoses, together with operating personnel, to a secure forward area. However, the fuel and equipment are heavy and bulky, and tie up helicopters which could otherwise be used for troop lifting. An alternative refuelling method is to instal in the cargo compartment of a STOL aircraft, such as the Caribou, portable rubberised fuel tanks with associated pumps and hoses. The aircraft with these

rubber tanks full of fuel is able to land on limited surfaces to provide an ideal refuelling point, particularly as it can service more than one helicopter simultaneously.

Whilst the blocking and netting operation, described above, requires the helicopters to land on comparatively secure LZs there are occasions when it is possible for helicopters and their emplaned troops to land directly amongst the guerillas, despite their small arms fire capability. One such occasion is when a guerilla group is besieging a fort or outpost, and the defenders seem unable to last much longer. The sudden arrival of a relief force directly into the guerilla ranks, particularly when accompanied by air support, may well be sufficient to make them realise that their siege is broken and they soon disperse or receive more casualties than they can inflict. Such an operation does a lot to maintain morale of isolated military units and defended hamlets. The possible arrival by air of a relieving force, soon after the alarm is given, is a clear deterrent to guerillas to launch siege operations or attacks.

Other opportunities to land amongst the guerillas occur when they are on the move or escaping, when they have halted temporarily, or when intelligence has indicated a conference is in progress. In each case, when insufficient troops are available to completely encircle the guerilla, shock action amongst them is necessary to inflict casualties before they can

break into small groups and disappear into the surrounding countryside. Helicopters landing on safe LZs often give the guerilla group a chance to disappear.

Helicopters are invaluable for resupply on outpost lines, particularly along a border. Outposts of about company strength located in guerilla infested areas, or along guerilla supply lines, can prove a serious obstacle to freedom of guerilla movement. They help to establish or maintain government control over civilians who might otherwise be forced to serve the guerillas. Resupply by vehicle convoy or portage is so vulnerable to ambush that the drain on military resources to secure the supply line makes the maintenance of the outpost uneconomical. Complete logistical support of outposts by helicopter takes the initiative from the guerilla, and frees a number of troops from escort duties.

Helicopter operations by night are possible and most desirable. Obviously surprise, security and speed are greatly enhanced if the helicopters can arrive at the LZ unseen. There are a number of limitations to night flying by helicopters, of which weather is the biggest. The pilot must be able to see the horizon to retain stability of his craft, and must be able to identify navigational markers and aids along the route. Mountains or similar obstacles along the route make night flying hazardous. The pilot must be well rehearsed by night in such operations. The identification of the LZ may pre-

sent a problem. If there are no natural beacons (e.g. the lights of a village or reflection from a river), and if the LZ does not provide an area with gentle approaches and clear of all obstacles, some means of positive identification is necessary. The dropping of flares will light up the area, but surprise is prejudiced and the eyesight of the crew is affected. The helicopter landing lights may provide sufficient illumination. Radio directional beacons prepositioned by an infiltrated ground party, or dropped by aircraft at last light, will assist. Alternatively an all weather fixed wing aircraft could navigate and lead the whole formation to the LZ, and, if necessary, use its own landing light or drop smoke grenades for identification. Landing in wet paddy fields at night has an additional problem in that the water has both an excessive glare and a light refraction, each badly affecting the pilot's height judgment. Previous daylight reconnaissance of the LZ would obviously assist, but should be kept to a minimum. The presence of reconnaissance aircraft over an area will always create suspicion.

Protection of, and fire support for, helicopter operations is an essential part of the plan. For its personal protection each troop-carrying helicopter should be armed with swivel-mounted machine-guns (preferably M60 MGs) at each door, or, if only one door, then possibly on a side window. Although the two MG operators reduce the carrying capacity of the helicopter, they furnish very flexible fire power.

Surprisingly, helicopters are unusually difficult to shoot down and destroy, the pilot being the most vulnerable and critical part of the craft. Flying helicopters in pairs is a minimum requirement for mutual security and for recovery if one is forced down. Subsequent helicopter flights will require a portion of the troops from the first flight to provide LZ security. On the trip to and from the LZ the helicopters should fly at a height that is out of small arms range (2,500 ft) or so low that the craft is over the defended area before the guerilla can react. Subsequent flights must take a different route.

#### Supporting Fire

Much greater support for the helicopter operation can be provided by ground support fighter aircraft or by armed helicopters. Artillery support is discounted as trajectory of the rounds restricts the flexibility of all the aircraft. The fighter's primary mission is to destroy strong points of anti-aircraft fire along the flight route. Generally a .50 MG will be the guerilla's largest anti-aircraft weapon, if they are to retain their mobility and flexibility, but larger weapons could always be concentrated for a particular task. Fighters are called on to "sterilise" the LZ and its approaches by MG fire, bombs and rockets. Naphalm is not favoured because the smoke may affect the helicopter pilot's visibility. This "sterilising" is a precautionary measure, designed to discourage resistance if the guerillas are in the vicinity. After the landing

the fighters provide cab-rank support on call, remaining in the area until all troops of all lifts have been successfully landed. The second lift often arouses more guerilla opposition than the first, as surprise has then been lost. For the second flight an alternative LZ and additional air strikes are desirable.

Opinions differ on the best type of aircraft to provide this support. The most modern fighter aircraft can certainly provide accurate ground support, but their high speed, large turning radius and restricted visibility of pin-point camouflaged targets, often prevent them providing the immediate close support helicopters require. The much slower but more versatile propeller-driven aircraft can provide more intimate support, often being able to escort the helicopters at their own speed.

The armed helicopter can provide the required support in another way. Gas turbine-powered cargo helicopters can provide a fairly stable platform from which rockets or fixed mounted machine-guns can be accurately fired by pointing the nose of the helicopter at the target. Another version allows flexible mounted groups of MGs, such as M60s with "endless" belts inside the cabin, to be fired by the co-pilot who, by means of power controls, can direct the machine-guns at a target as the helicopter flies past it. Armed helicopters can accompany the troop-carrying helicopters and, using their greater engine power and improved flight performances, detach themselves to deal with troublesome enemy strong-

points. Guerilla ground fire near the LZ can also be neutralised. During the landing, the armed helicopters can remain on call hovering over the LZ. As the operation continues they can also provide airborne fire support, particularly while medical evacuation helicopters go into the most forward area to collect casualties.

### **Airborne Command Post**

Excellent command and control of all air support operations is, of course, essential. Use of an airborne Command Post (CP) has proved effective. A cargo aircraft, such as a Caribou, is fitted up as a CP for the commander of the operation who is provided with staff, a variety of communication nets, and planning facilities. From the air he can actually observe the progress of the operation, and make immediate corrections if necessary. Being so close to the outstations his radio communications will usually be good. He can communicate direct with the leader of the helicopter or paratroop flight nearby, with the commander of troops in the air or on the ground, with his Forward Air Controller for fighter support, and with his reserve, whether airborne or waiting at an advanced base. Each of the groups involved may also use liaison aircraft of their own for final LZ, DZ, enemy, weather, etc, information and co-ordination. With so many wireless sets available in the aircraft, the many alternate nets thus provided further assist control. Due to the STOL characteristics of the Caribou, the commander can

land at a forward strip and transfer to a liaison helicopter for a personal ground visit to the committed troops. His CP can return to airborne status with command being retained by a radio link from the helicopter to the airborne CP.

### Aerial Photography

Guerillas will normally only make their presence known when they have achieved superiority for a particular mission. Accordingly every means must be used to seek intelligence. Aerial photography, long an established technique, should be used extensively as a means of detecting guerilla camps, movement and build-up for their activities. Long range reconnaissance aircraft and low flying short range more flexible aircraft, with a variety of photographic equipment, must be freely made available to field commanders at the lowest level. If the photos are readily forthcoming in the shortest possible time, this becomes an excellent intelligence source. However, the areas for photography must be specially selected to avoid overtaxing the limited Photo Interpretation Units.

### Defoliants

Guerillas rely on the local countryside for most of their food supplies. Rice and other crops cultivated in guerilla controlled territory should be destroyed. Done manually, it is a laborious task, often developing into quite a large operation. By spraying herbicides using the well known crop dusting techniques, from either helicopter or

fixed wing transport aircraft, large areas can be treated in a short time. The same technique is also effective as a defoliant. Heavily timbered or overgrown critical areas suspected of hiding guerillas can be rendered ineffective by killing the foliage and so denying cover. This is particularly valuable when the foliage in potential ambush positions along a road, track or canal is destroyed. Those countries in sympathy with the guerillas will probably claim this is "Germ" warfare, but this technique is accepted, generally, as being within the provisions of the Geneva Convention.

### Railroads

During an insurgency period one very successful method for a Government to demonstrate to the people that it is maintaining effective control over their country is to keep its railways running on schedule. Railway tracks are easy targets for guerilla activities, for it is impossible to guard the whole length continuously, and a simple demolition will derail a train. Once derailed, a train is a vulnerable target for looting. Low flying patrols, using aircraft with slow flying speeds for accurate observation, and high speeds to escape ground fire when necessary, and carrying armament for defensive ground attack, will be capable of detecting prepared demolitions and spiked tracks before a train is due. On the train itself radio operators have contact with the observation aircraft, and with the nearest airfield and military base. Fighter aircraft sum-

moned as soon as a train is ambushed, or the armed observation aircraft itself, will usually be sufficient to hold off the guerillas until the arrival of a relieving infantry force, often by helicopter.

### Artillery

Use of cargo-carrying helicopters to move artillery pieces in surprise operations deep into guerilla territory allows valuable artillery support, particularly at night or when weather prohibits fighter support. Heavy mortars can be carried fully mounted in slings under the helicopter. A 105 mm howitzer disassembled with crew and ammunition can be carried in the cabins of several helicopters. Before the guerilla can concentrate to attack the rather vulnerable artillery positions the same helicopters can airlift them to alternative positions, or withdraw them to a secure area. Thus no vehicular transport, which is road or track bound and easily ambushed, is required.

### Air Cargo

The extensive use of air cargo transport as a supplement to sea transport can do much to alleviate the vast manpower and material burden of keeping open roads for resupply activities. The guarding of bridges and intersections, securing of ambush

positions, clearing activities in suspect areas and the support of vehicle convoys, ties up huge numbers of troops who could better be employed in more active anti-insurgency operations. The complete abandonment of a road and the substitution of air transport restricts the guerilla's initiative, and may well be quite economical in the long run. Air cargo transport will always be at a premium, but its concentration in situations described above means that a forward base can be supported with the minimum of ground effort.

### Conclusion

Guerilla warfare is age-old, and guerilla techniques have changed little. Modern equipment and techniques have greatly improved the methods of countering the guerilla. The foregoing has shown how air support can provide the Government forces with a degree of initiative and surprise previously denied them. Although aircraft are costly, their extensive use can save both ground equipment and manpower which has been previously tied up in huge quantities out of all proportion to the guerilla force involved. Appropriate air support gives the ground commander an opportunity to meet the guerilla at times and places least suitable to the guerilla.

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# THE LAST POST

Major R. A. Newman, ARCM,  
Director of Music

As the sun sets on April 25 and as the rows of hard-won medals are returned to their moth balls for another year, the signal has been given for the resurrection of the annual spate of queries and arguments over certain aspects of the ceremonial for the occasion.

Amongst this year's crop there appears to be some divergence of opinion about the origin and significance of the LAST POST. In fact the view was expressed that its use for the occasion was incorrect, and that in British practice the RETREAT is the correct call, the LAST POST being an Australian innovation which crept in after World War I.

However, the fact that since the end of World War I in 1918, Belgian buglers have sounded the BRITISH LAST POST every night in the great cemetery of British soldiers at Menin Gate near Ypres, suggests that the statements do not justify consideration, and that there may be other claimants to the "innovation".

The origin of most of the routine bugle calls is clouded in a mass of historical and statis-

tical data, which is quoted at length in the various books of reference on the subject.

Whilst there is no suggestion that any of this is incorrect, I feel that the student using the most comprehensive books on the subject will find little continuity in tracing the evolution of the actual call with which we are so familiar today. In fact some of the statements made are contradicted in the same volume.

In attempting to assemble sufficient facts to assist in a better understanding of the subject, I feel that the derivation and implications of the title LAST POST are pertinent.

The first War Office publication of Army Calls (1798) includes the call "Setting the Watch", a title which requires little or no imagination to interpret as meaning the mounting or posting of sentries.

Although this was one call, it was divided into four "posts" or sections, each of which was sounded at its particular "post" or place of guard within the area of responsibility.

While the old notation is practically identical with that which



is sounded today, the modern version is divided into two calls or "posts", i.e. "Watch setting" (1st Post) which embraces what was sounded in the old first and second posts, and "Watch setting" (Last Post) which includes the old third and fourth posts. Thus the pristine significance of the word "posts" has been lost.

To further assist in a fuller understanding of the subject, it must be remembered that whilst the above refers to the Army as a whole, it does not signify that all calls were sounded on bugles only, or that one method was adopted by the various branches of the Army for the purpose.

Firstly it must be realised that, whilst the use of routine calls can be traced back in history at some length, such calls have been made by a variety of methods. In the long history of the British Army both the fife and drum have had periods as the official means of conveying the routine signals. In fact I still have amongst my works of reference a book, "Published by Authority", of the routine calls for drums and fifes.

Secondly, it must be remembered that whilst the Infantry used the bugle, the Cavalry and Artillery used the trumpet. These two instruments, though largely similar in appearance to the lay eye, are in fact in different pitches; the bugle in Bb and the trumpet in Eb. In addition they have a different range of notes within their compass; i.e. the bugle can produce up to its 8th harmonic, thus limiting its variety of notes to an extreme maximum of six, while the trum-

pet is capable of producing up to its 11th harmonic allowing for the use of ten notes.

Thus, though calls for the bugle and trumpet may be mensurally identical, they are more often than not harmonically different. Because of this, calls written solely for the trumpet are less limited, and of greater melodic interest than those for the bugle.

Despite this, and though not so grand in conception as the trumpet "posts" of the Cavalry and Artillery, it is the Infantry "Last Post" which is so readily recognised and accepted today, by servicemen and civilians alike, especially its use as an accompaniment to the impressive rites at a soldier's obsequies, where the closing bars wail out their sad farewell to the departing warrior.

The expressed opinion that, by British practice, the use of this call for such occasions is incorrect, can easily be refuted by reference to the British Army pamphlet *Ceremonial 1950* (amended to 1962), where the instruction is arbitrary and clear. While there is no need — or credit — to Australia to slavishly copy the customs of others, the use of this call by the British Army, and the Americans' application of their "Taps" to similar functions would indicate that our current usage is not inappropriate.

The linking of the funeral rites with the Commemoration ceremonial is surely an obvious and appropriate analogy, which is similarly applied in other countries of the world.

The statement of our critic that the sounding of RETREAT at military funerals and commemoration services would be correct is surely now refuted by consideration of the foregoing. It does, however, present me with the opportunity to similarly examine this call which, with the "posts" already mentioned and the Reveille, comprise the main time signals in the soldier's day.

In the military manuals and other reference books dealing with the subject can be found numerous references to and descriptions of different routine signals, which were sounded by a variety of instruments. It is unnecessary to quote these at length, but Ralph Smith, in his "Rules for Drummers and Fifers" (c.1557) refers to the RETREAT amongst other calls; and by the sequence in which it appears it seems obvious that the original belonged to the battle scene and conveyed the order to retire to some position in the rear.

By a study of the further evolution of this call it would appear to have developed into what can be termed a relic of the ceremonial past as, by an acceptable analogy, it came to represent the end of the soldier's working day, and was associated with a certain ceremonial designed to signify this fact. Thus, in Bland's "Military Discipline" (1727) we find that:

"Half an hour before the Gates are to be shut, which is generally at the Setting of the Sun, . . . the Drummers of the Post Guards are to go upon the Ramparts

and beat a Retreat, to give notice . . . that the Gates are going to be shut".

It was obviously this, especially after the re-introduction of the fifes into the British Army about 1745, that became the foundation of the modern ceremonial Retreat.

Although the foregoing may be considered sufficient to illustrate the subject, after a lifetime of Army Service I feel that an item from my own personal experience may not go amiss.

At one period of my service my regiment was quartered within a perimeter wall, beyond which was hostile country.

Half an hour before sunset the regimental band would commence marching and counter-marching over a chosen route to the accompaniment of suitable tunes; this was known as beating RETREAT.

During this period the inlying picquet were paraded and posted to their various areas of responsibility.

At the end of this half hour:

- (a) The perimeter gates were closed.
- (b) The Quarter Guard were "turned out".
- (c) The bugler or buglers sounded the Retreat, during which —
  - (i) The flag was lowered.
  - (ii) The Quarter Guard presented arms.
  - (iii) All troops within sound of the call, wherever and whatever their occupation, would stand to attention, officers saluting.

Even in friendly country, where the unit lines were enclosed within a perimeter wall with access through a gate, the ceremony was unaltered except that no inlying picquet was mounted; and when no perimeter or gate existed the ceremony was modified only in that this part of the ceremony was omitted. In addition it must be understood that while the sequence of the ceremony was a daily occurrence, the attendance of the band was limited to usually once a week.

The two "posts" referred to earlier, covered a similar period later at night, which can aptly be considered as marking the end of the soldier's day.

This period known as Tattoo proceeded somewhat similarly to the Retreat in that:—

- (a) The bugler sounded the First Post. Usually at 2130 hours.
- (b) All soldiers were required to be present at their beds as the company orderly sergeants checked for absences.
- (c) After this roll call the various company orderly sergeants reported to the Guard Room, parading outside.
- (d) At the end of the Tattoo period, usually 2000 hours, the Quarter Guard "turned out".
- (e) The bugler sounded the LAST POST.
- (f) The parading orderly sergeants were called to atten-

tion and the Guard presented Arms.

- (g) At the end of the call the orderly sergeants would report "present" or otherwise, and the parade dismissed.

Thus the soldier's day ended as, after the sounding of the LAST POST, fifteen minutes were allowed to elapse, presumably so that he might compose himself for his night's slumbers before the last call of the day, LIGHTS OUT, was sounded and silence reigned.

I must make it clear that whilst the foregoing ceremonies were general practice throughout the British Infantry, they varied in small details from regiment to regiment by virtue of the individual traditions and practices which were so jealously guarded.

Whilst it may not be pertinent to the original reason for this review, it is interesting to note that references to the Retreat, or a call by that title, can be found in the bugle calls of other armies, notably the American RETREAT, the Italian RIT-ERATA and the French LA RETRAITE. Many composers have borrowed soldiers' bugle calls to give colour to their music. Berlioz in his "Damnation of Faust", Bizet's "Carmen" and Auber's "Overture to Fra Diavolo" come to mind. Though most people are familiar with Von Suppes overture "Light Cavalry", few realise that its opening bars are the old Austrian Cavalry Retreat.

# CATALOGUE

## OF

# VIET CONG VIOLENCE

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(Reprinted from the December 1962 issue of **MILITARY REVIEW**, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, U.S.A.)

THE war in South Vietnam is full of contradictions. Both sides are on the offensive at the same time. The Viet Cong's (VC) ultra-simple tactics born of military poverty are working well against relatively modern forces. The Viet Cong are outgunned; they have no air force. Their guerilla forces are successfully carrying out a cheap war while forcing their opponents to spend millions.

Theoretically the Viet Cong should be defeated, if only because they are military lightweights fighting against heavyweights. The unparadoxical fact is that the Viet Cong irregulars in most cases thus far are fighting their war by their own special catalogue of violence. This well-worn catalogue is a rebuttal to machine age war. It provides master templates by which little men can be moulded into a military power capable of holding off the most modern armaments short of mass destruction weapons. The ABC's of this Communist-bloc exported war are more than Arms, Bullets, and Casualties inflicted.

The ABC's of Viet Cong success also lie in:

- Austerity of force and overhead.
- Balanced military-political growth.
- Cheap war techniques.

The Viet Cong are a scattered army of elusive and mobile units which present almost "no targets" to the opposing forces. VC combat units are either moving, attacking, or hiding. Headquarters of these units are austere, simple, and mobile — a small radio, a handcrank generator, an almost invisible piece of wire strung up in a tree for antenna. These, plus a few gun-toting men, comprise the tactical nerve centres which are so hard to find.

This is the enemy. Since he has no transport service except for coolie porters, he has no system — except people — that can be attacked. His only logistical installations worthy of being designated targets are small scattered bases shrouded under jungle canopies. His primary source of supply for weapons and ammunition is the

enemy he attacks. He offers no militarily significant logistical complex.

### Doorstep Warfare

Sometimes the Viet Cong are everywhere. Too often they are nowhere. They swarm over some canals in a fleet of sampans to overwhelm a lonely government fortress. Then they melt away carrying their own wounded. Planes search for them. Helicopters chase them. Patrols hunt them. Theirs is doorstep warfare of countless little battles at villages and armed forts. These militarily poverty-stricken platoons, companies, and battalions disappear like vaporous ghosts when their swift attacks are over.

Setting the science of warfare back a thousand years, some 15,000 to 20,000 Communist Viet Cong forces operate from a series of scattered bases which pockmark a little nation built up out of the wreckage of the Indo-China War.

### People versus Ground

In Viet Cong minds this is not a classic war, or a series of battles for Hill 209, but a war for millions of people. Thus the VC strategy is plainly one of "people gaining", not one of "ground gaining". The Red irregulars don't believe that they have to stay and hold communities everywhere in order to obtain popular support. But the VC are always marching back, however briefly, to villages and farmers and promising "the better life" — especially one which, if the people side with them, will be a life without war.

On the surface the VC's party line to the populace is not Communist. The Red propagandists' theme is political reunification of the Vietnams — the North and the South. The real Red motives are advanced under the guise of nationalism. At the same time, the Communists promise immediate individual or personal benefits to the peasants.

Along the primitive mountain people — the Montagnards — the VC have long been sowing unrest. Currently, however, the Montagnards are taking a second look at the intruding guerillas. The VC made a mistake: they kidnapped too many young males from the tribes. It is evident now that Viet Cong efforts among these tribesmen have backfired because there is a re-orientation of tribes towards the government.

Not on the highways, but on the byways, the Viet Cong work politically. By persuasion and coercion these gaunt little men work on the people in areas where communications are poor and government power is weak. There is a twist here; the VC have spent years in making certain regions weak. They have ousted, killed, or kidnapped landlords, district chiefs, government officials—any leader or person strongly anti-Red. Once these victims are out of the way, government machinery grinds into idleness. Then the Communists step in to reestablish community and social order, impose officialdom, collect taxes, and reopen schools. This is the strategy of turning the people away from the government.

### Twilight Zone Terrorism

Sometimes, plain, individual murder can win a group of Vietnamese people over to the VC cause. Take, for example, the case of a local government official who may — for a variety of reasons, some sound — be very unpopular with the local peasants. The Viet Cong formula is to murder him, take credit for the job, and then tell the people, "We have rid you of an oppressor". Some persons feeling oppressed by the ex-official have fallen into this trap very easily and sided with the Communists. The obvious point is that, if civil or military authorities in the provinces are not able and honest, they are the very persons whom the Viet Cong can exploit in the eyes of the people.

Between the extremes of singular murder and the more wholesale variety of open combat lies the twilight zone of Viet Cong terrorism and persuasion — little techniques like destroying peasant identity cards to confuse or disrupt civil administration and social welfare. There is the government insecticide team, ostensibly official, that enters a village and then turns out to be a VC goon squad out to confiscate farm machinery.

Along the jungle trails "tiger" pits are dug and the bottoms are floored with sharp pointed bamboo stakes to impale screaming victims. Young men and boys are kidnapped in wholesale lots from villages; marched off, they become porters and hostages. Indoctrinated, some of them become Communists, often

without knowing why. Foreigners are kidnapped and held for ransom.

Armed propaganda teams enter the village, assemble the adults, and give persuasive lectures to people tired of warfare amid their yards and rice paddies. Elsewhere, peasants are persuaded by the Red guerillas to store food supplies in caches. Government forces find these scattered and secretive "depots" hard to detect because the peasants don't talk — they fear reprisals if they don't obey the gaunt little men with guns.

Collecting taxes is not violence per se, but behind the pistol-packing collectors loom terrorism and reprisals if individuals — especially those better off — do not contribute.

Twilight zone terrorism is directed at selected targets, mainly government officials, systems and services, and foreigners. The VC make a studied effort otherwise to present a favourable image to the masses.

### Prime Military Targets

In this tormented nation the primary target of Viet Cong military attack is the Self-Defence Corps (SDC) organised from men in the villages for local defence. The SDC is a significant target for three reasons. First, the Viet Cong would perish without the support of the people, so they have concentrated on the SDC. Second, because the SDC is scattered throughout the nation in small bodies, it presents targets of opportunity — targets largely sedentary and militarily weaker

than army units, for example. Third, the VC seeks to capture weapons, and the SDC is a convenient source. Much smaller than the army, the SDC sustained not only the greatest number of casualties last year, but the greatest number in proportion to its size.

The Civil Guard (CG), a provincial level military organisation comparable to our National Guard and not much larger than the SDC, is likewise a prime VC target. It has had 1961 losses similar to those of the SDC.

When the VC guerillas attack a village outpost system or fortress, they usually have a way-laying force ready to attack army or Civil Guard reinforcement units which will be dispatched to rescue the point under attack. There is nothing new about this pattern, but the guerillas get away with it all too often.

#### Web of Intelligence

Find the enemy through the people; deny the enemy through the people.

A South Vietnamese military patrol slips out of a village at night. Suddenly, lights begin blinking from one hamlet to another. The Viet Cong are warned.

The patrol switches its route. A rooster crows, then another. As one US Army adviser put it: "You suspect the crowing rooster is a Viet Cong guard. When the rooster begins coughing, you are sure of it!"

The web of Red intelligence is woven through the populace. In the countryside people talk to

the VC, but often they won't talk to officials on the other side because the VC threaten to slit the throats of any informers. Often, government military forces in pursuit of the guerillas sweep into villages and find that women are the only persons remaining. Rather silent women, too.

This type of warfare puts a premium on the day-to-day knowledge of the whereabouts, strength, and movements of the opposing side.

#### Tactics

The calligraphy of the Viet Cong's strategy of violence is clear and concise — it was first written in Chinese. In fact, the Viet Cong strategy amounts simply to a re-run of an old film entitled, "The Early Stages of the Chinese Civil War". For example, logistically, the VC are simply adhering to the earlier Red Chinese Ninth Principle of War which reads:

*Replenish ourselves by the capture of all of the enemy's arms. . . . The source of the men and material of our army is mainly at the front.*

The Viet Cong are military parasites feeding on the enemy. They wage combat to destroy the enemy and capture arms, ammunition and material from him.

This is not a modern way to fight, one says. But the Red Chinese succeeded by it and the Viet Cong are not completely failing.

Note also the base selected for revolution. The revolt sparked by the Bolsheviks in Russia was

urban based. In contrast, Mao Tse-tung figures his revolution had to be based on a rural foundation. The Viet Cong approach is pattern after Mao's strategy.

At the hard core of Current VC operations is a simple principle — "no real estate per se". This principle contrasts with the conventional one wherein territory and ground gaining are regarded as inherent steps to victory. This is not so with the Viet Cong. Except for securing certain operational bases, they are letting government forces cope and grope over the issue of territory and territorial control. The obvious aim — the destruction of the enemy's fighting strength — is undeniably militarily sound.

### Mobility and Quick Battles

Few militarists bother to become poets, but Red Chinese Marshal Liu Po-cheng is an exception. Years back during the China Civil War he put a basic strategical concept into the following poem:

*When you keep men and lose  
land,*

*The land can be retaken.*

*If you keep land and lose sol-  
diers,*

*You lose both.*

During the latter half of the China Civil War, Liu was criticised for the loss of some towns he captured. His rebuttal was: "I traded 17 empty cities for 60,000 of Chiang Kai-shek's soldiers". Essentially, Liu had. He had concentrated on killing and capturing; his campaigns were militarily successful in that he destroyed enemy fighting

strength. However, he did not divert his own military strength and power by trying to hold onto real estate. The Chinese Nationalist Army was trying to hold territory and defeat the Reds at the same time. Liu — known as the "One-Eyed Dragon" — led one of the most mobile and elusive forces in that war. His command post and ultra-small staff were a classic model for simplicity and austerity. With about 200 men at his command post he controlled a field army of about 300,000 troops.

The Viet Cong today follow the same austere patterns of organisation, fighting according to Liu's poetic principles.

Foot mobility and manoeuvre make the VC units hard to hunt and pin down. Some guerilla companies never spend two days in the same place. By their mobility they multiply their tactical effect. This is their prime stock in trade — an old and famous trademark of the Red Chinese. The VC do not present good targets, and they try to fight battles only of their own choosing.

The VC reject positional warfare, and will for some time to come just as the Red Chinese and Vietminh did — and succeeded by it. They apply Mao's dictum, "Fight only when victory is certain, run away when (it) is impossible".

However, the VC are likely to defend their primary bases of operation by mobile and positional means, like "Zone D" — the jungle fortress the French never successfully penetrated.



Here, again, they are simply following a basic rule of Big Brother Mao.

At the marrow of the Viet Cong's strategy is the long and enduring war concept coupled with the tactics for winning individual battles by "quick decision".

Every week is witness to Viet Cong attacks on outposts and little fortresses wherein these Communists try to — and often do — achieve a "battle of quick decision". Then the VC melt away to live, and fight another day.

#### A Protracted War

We may expect this pattern to prevail. In Viet Cong minds this war — their fight — is plainly a protracted war. "Wear Diem's government, his people, and his troops down, then the propitious moment will arrive. People can endure only so long". These are concepts the VC are relying upon.

Some illusions of modern — or conventional — warfare techniques vanish in the jungles, the darkness, and in the monsoon rains of South Vietnam. For example, traditional rules of war leave the civil populace mainly out of the military struggle.

These rules are not in the Viet Cong catalogue; this war is a struggle centred for and on the people. The struggle is a political-military conflict.

One of the time-honoured rules of war is that soldiers wear uniforms. This was designed in part to save the civil populace from indiscriminate slaughter. But the Communists do not adhere to the rules of war. Every person on the Viet Cong side is a fighter—but without uniform. Many VC carry weapons while others carry and gather food, supplies, and military intelligence.

One of the prime Red strategists of this war is North Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap, the victor at Dien Bien Phu. Today, he is directing the Viet Cong by remote control. He is a practitioner as well as an advocate of what he terms "the strategy of long term resistance". As he states in respect to the Indo-China War:

*Only a long-term war could enable us to utilise to the maximum our political trump cards, to overcome our material handicap and to transform our weakness into strength.*

This axiom is being applied in South Vietnam today.

# Strategic Review

## FEDERATION OF MALAYSIA

THE proposed Federation of Malaysia which will come into being by 31 August, 1963, will consist of 15 States, namely the 11 States of the existing Federation of Malaya, the State of Singapore, Sarawak, Sabah (North Borneo) and the Sultanate of Brunei.

### Terms of Amalgamation

The legislatures of Sarawak and North Borneo have approved the report of the Inter-Governmental Committee set up by the British and Malayan Governments to work out the detailed terms on which the two territories will join the new Federation of Malaysia.

The Committee was set up following the acceptance by the British and Malayan Governments in July, 1962, of the report of the Cobbold Commission which, after exhaustive inquiry into Sarawak and North Borneo public opinion, concluded that a substantial majority of the population was in favour of Malaysia provided that satisfactory conditions and safeguards could be devised.

The enquiry of the Cobbold Commission and the submission

of the Inter - Governmental Committee report to the two Borneo legislatures were in accord with the agreement of the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and the Federation of Malaya in November, 1961, that whereas the creation of a Federation of Malaysia was a 'desirable aim' the views of the people of North Borneo and Sarawak should be ascertained before a final decision could be taken.

The reports of the Cobbold Commission and the Inter-Governmental Committee did not cover Singapore or Brunei. The views of the people of Singapore were sought on 1 September, 1962, in a referendum which resulted in a large majority in favour of the Singapore Government's proposals for the State's entry into Malaysia. The proposals were also approved by a decisive majority in the Singapore legislature. The question of Brunei's accession to the new federation is a matter for the Government of Brunei to decide.

Representatives of six major political parties from all five territories affirmed at a conference in February, 1963, their

determination to realise Malaysia by 31 August.

### **Development of the Malaysia Concept**

On 27 May, 1961, in a speech to the Foreign Press Association of Singapore, the Prime Minister of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman, proposed an understanding with Singapore, North Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak.

The Malayan Prime Minister's speech was received with great interest in the territories concerned. In Singapore on 3 June, the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, expressed his support of the Malaysia proposal, and on 23 July, at the end of a regional Commonwealth Parliamentary Association meeting in Singapore it was decided to form a Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee under the chairmanship of Mr. Donald Stephens, a prominent unofficial member of the North Borneo Legislative Council.

On 23 August the Prime Ministers of the Federation of Malaya and Singapore reached agreement in principle on a scheme of merger between their two territories. Under the scheme the Federal Government would become responsible for foreign affairs, defence and internal security while Singapore would, in addition to the powers possessed by the State governments of the present Federation of Malaya, retain control of labour and education matters.


The degree of support for the Malaysia concept in the Federation of Malaya was on 16 October indicated by the overwhelm-

ing majority given in the Malayan Parliament to a motion seeking agreement in principle to the proposed federation. Mounting support for the proposal in the Borneo territories was indicated by a resolution in its favour passed by the Annual Conference of North Borneo Chiefs and by the Sultan of Brunei in a speech to the Brunei Legislative Council.

In November, 1961, the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and Malaya agreed that the establishment of Malaysia was "a desirable aim". They noted with satisfaction the agreement for merger negotiated between Malaya and Singapore but decided that before a final decision could be made, the views of the people of Sarawak and North Borneo should be ascertained. To ascertain those views and to make recommendations, a Commission of Enquiry should be appointed by the two governments. The Prime Ministers also agreed that the views of the Sultan of Brunei should be sought and they decided that in the event of the formation of Malaysia, the existing defence agreement between Great Britain and Malaya should be extended to embrace the new territories.

### **The Cobbold Commission**

The appointment of a joint British and Malayan Commission to ascertain the views of the people of North Borneo and Sarawak was announced on 16 January, 1962. Before the Commission arrived in Borneo, the Sarawak and North Borneo Governments issued papers to



explain in simple terms the purpose of the Commission and the idea of Malaysia.

The Commission spent two months travelling widely throughout the two territories, interviewed over 4,000 persons and considered some 2,200 letters and memoranda from town boards, district councils, political parties, chambers of commerce, trade unions, religious leaders, members of executive and legislative councils, native chiefs and community leaders, as well as large numbers of individual members of the public. Public opinion was thus thoroughly consulted.

The Commission's Report, which was submitted in June, 1962, concluded that a substantial majority of the population in both territories was in favour of Malaysia in principle given suitable conditions and safeguards, that it was in the interests of both territories to join, and that an early decision to proceed with the plan was essential.

Following their acceptance of the Cobbold Report in July, 1962, agreement in principle was reached between the British and the Malayan Governments on the setting up of a Malaysian Federation by 31 August, 1963.

The detailed working out of arrangements under which North Borneo and Sarawak would become constituent States of the new federation, including safeguards on matters of special concern to the two territories, was remitted to an Inter-Governmental Committee (Britain, Malaya, North Borneo and Sarawak) under the chairmanship of Lord Lansdowne (British Minister of State for Colonial Affairs).

The Committee included official and unofficial representatives from North Borneo and Sarawak, thus continuing the process of full consultation with representatives of the local peoples which had been begun by the Cobbold Commission.

#### **Report of the Inter-Governmental Committee**

The Report of the Inter-Governmental Committee, published on 27 February, 1963, set forth detailed proposals for the accession of North Borneo and Sarawak to the new federation. The Committee recommended a federal constitution based on the existing Malayan Federal Constitution but with important amendments to meet the special needs of the two Borneo territories.

Constitutional guarantees would be provided for the two territories which would return 40 members to the Federal Parliament, 24 from Sarawak and 16 from North Borneo (i.e. 40 members representing 1½ million Borneans compared with a total membership of 159 for the whole of Malaysia representing some ten millions.

The Report envisaged that once its recommendations had been approved by the legislatures in North Borneo and Sarawak, a formal agreement to provide for the establishment of Malaysia by 31 August, 1963, would be drawn up and initialled by representatives of Great Britain, the Federation of Malaya, North Borneo and Sarawak.

#### **Consultation with Local Legislatures**

Following publication of the Cobbold Report, the general concept of Malaysia was debated by the Council Negri in Sarawak and by the Legislative Council in North Borneo in September, 1962, and both legislatures passed resolutions (unanimously in North Borneo and without dissenting vote in Sarawak) welcoming the decision to establish Malaysia by 31 August, 1963, provided adequate constitutional safeguards for the two territories' special interests could be devised.

As described above, these safeguards have since been worked out in detail by the Inter-Governmental Committee on which North Borneo and Sarawak were fully represented. The recommendations of the Inter-Governmental Committee were endorsed in both territories, where the legislatures were representative of local opinion, in March, 1963.

In Sarawak, the Council Negri adopted the Committee's recommendations without dissent and reiterated its earlier welcome for the creation of the proposed Federation of Malaysia by 31

August, 1963. Over half the unofficial members spoke; speakers generally were in favour of Malaysia although some had criticisms, particularly in regard to safeguards for religion and national language.

In North Borneo also, the Legislative Council unanimously adopted the Committee's Report, unofficial members from all parts of the country speaking in favour.

### Singapore

In December, 1961, the Singapore Legislative Assembly passed a motion to support in principle the Malaysia proposal. Subsequently a motion was passed in support of the agreement made in November, 1961, between the Malayan and Singapore Governments for a merger between the two territories.

On 1 September, 1962, a referendum was held and a large majority voted in favour of the Singapore Government's proposals for the State's entry into the Federation of Malaysia. These proposals provided for the retention by the Singapore Government of autonomy in labour and educational matters, for Singapore's representation in the Federal Parliament by 15 seats, for the retention of multilingualism and for the automatic gaining of Malaysian citizenship by all Singapore citizens.

The detailed constitutional and administrative provisions required to implement the merger agreement of November, 1961, are being negotiated by the two governments in a bilateral

Inter-Governmental Committee. Substantial progress has been made.

### Brunei

Indirect elections to the Brunei Legislative Council (the first under Brunei's Constitution) took place in September, 1962, and resulted in all the elected seats being secured by the Partai Ra'ayat, which advocated unification of the three Borneo territories under the Sultan of Brunei as constitutional ruler.

In December, 1962, Azahari and other leaders of the Partai Ra'ayat staged a revolt. The Sultan requested British assistance in restoring law and order, and the revolt was speedily put down by local forces and by British troops flown in from Singapore. The Legislative Council was dissolved temporarily by the Sultan who appointed an Emergency Council to carry on the government of the country. It has since been announced that representative institutions will be restored as soon as possible.

Leaders of all political parties in North Borneo and Sarawak condemned the revolt and vehemently rejected Azahari's claim to speak on behalf of them. The Secretary of State for the Colonies emphasised in a statement to the House of Commons that the action of the British Government in suppressing the revolt was undertaken because of its obligations under the 1959 Treaty with the Sultan. So far as Britain was concerned the attitude of Brunei toward the Malaysian Federation was a

matter for the Brunei Government to decide.

On 8 February, 1963, it was announced that the Brunei Government was in favour of the Malaysia proposal provided satisfactory terms and constitutional arrangements could be devised. Draft Heads of Agreement are being drawn up by the Malayan and Brunei Governments. After the initialling, the draft Agreement will be considered by the governments concerned, including the British Government.

### Benefits of Malaysia

Among the advantages seen in the Malaysian plan are that it offers the best hope for political stability to the ten million people who inhabit Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo territories. Separately independent, North Borneo and Sarawak would for a long time be comparatively weak units, and Brunei (population 83,000), despite its wealth, would politically scarcely be able to stand on its own.

As a Federation, these territories have a good prospect of developing in racial harmony, of which the present Federation of Malaya has already set an outstanding example.

The larger unit will be able to make the best use of resources of all kinds; for example, duplication can be avoided of all sorts of services and the best use made of trained manpower. It will make for greater prosperity through a larger home market.

The territories concerned would fit easily into the larger

unit, given their common tradition of British administration and the fact that Malay is the lingua franca in a large part of the area, to say nothing of English. They already have a common currency in the Malayan dollar. While there are bound to be difficulties in harmonising the economies of the region, when these have been overcome there will be obvious advantages to the people as a whole.

For the people in the Borneo territories one of the attractions of Malaysia is the hope that it offers of increased economic development and improved government services. Although development in the last few years has been rapid, standards in Borneo are still in many respects behind those in Malaya; the need to enhance development has been recognised in the Report of the Inter-Governmental Committee.

In the Report the Malayan Government agreed that the figure of 300 million Malay dollars (£35 million) should be accepted for planning purposes as the total of development expenditure required in Sarawak for the first five years after Malaysia Day, and to use its best endeavours to enable this amount of development expenditure to be achieved. This compares with a current programme of £22 million for 1959/63. Malaya also noted an estimate of desirable expenditure in North Borneo of 200 million Malay dollars (£23 million) for the same period and recognised that funds from outside the territory would be required.

# COMMUNISM VERSUS AUSTRALIA

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**DURING** the past year the Australian Army Journal has featured several most interesting articles dealing with Communism, in both a general sense, and as it affects various countries of the world. To date no article has dealt specifically with the danger of Communism to Australia, or the likely tactics of the Communists in bringing our nation within their orbit. This article, then, will attempt to remedy that omission.

Since some people would, perhaps, question whether the forces of Red imperialism have any desire to conquer our somewhat isolated continent, I will commence by showing that their admitted and clearly stated aim is nothing less than world conquest. The tactics which they use in accomplishing this aim may vary from time to time, and place to place; leaders such as Khrushchev and Mao may disagree as to whether the non-Communist world should be shot, or have its throat cut, but the ultimate goal remains constant. Over a century ago, in 1848, Karl Marx and Friederich Engels concluded their publication, the "Communist Manifesto", with these words: "The

Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social institutions. Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communist revolution; the proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains; they have the world to win".

A trifle melodramatic, perhaps, and possibly out of date? Let us, then, consider a more recent statement. At the Seventh Congress of the Comintern in 1938, the Comintern's Secretary-General, Dimitrov, in defending the tactics of the "Popular Front", said: "We are sometimes accused of departing from our Communist principles. What stupidity! What blindness! We should not be Marxist and Leninist revolutionaries, nor disciples of Marx, Lenin, Engels and Stalin if we were not capable of completely altering our tactics and our mode of action as circumstances may dictate; but all the deviations and all the ins and outs about tactics are directed to a single end — the world revolution".

Well, what of the present era? Has the leopard changed its



spots? Has Comrade Khrushchev a more mellow and "reasonable" outlook than his predecessors? There are those who would have us believe that this is so, but let Khrushchev speak for himself! Addressing the representatives of the Western powers in a party at the Polish Embassy in Moscow on 19 November, 1956, he said: "It doesn't depend on you whether we continue to exist. If you do not like us, do not accept our invitation and do not invite us in to you. History is on our side, and whether you like it or not, we will bury you". (Sydney Morning Herald, 20 November, 1956).

Eighteen months later the Soviet Chairman, whilst on a visit to Hungary, said: "The capitalists in the capitalist countries can live quietly in their own countries as long as the workers" (which in Communist jargon means the Communists) "let them. We advise them not to poke their noses — or as the Russians say—their pigs' snouts — into our socialist garden. That is how we interpret peaceful co-existence". (Melbourne Herald, 9 April, 1958).

These then are the stated aims of the Communists from their inception to the present day: the forcible overthrow of all existing social institutions; world revolution; the "Burial" of non-Communist nations. How, then, do they propose to perform their self-appointed undertaker's task? Quite simply, they propose to bring it about by warfare, a warfare of which Stalin wrote: "A war which is one hundred times more difficult, more pro-

longed, more complicated, than the most bloodthirsty of wars between states". (Foundations of Leninism). This will not necessarily be military warfare, for the Communists believe, with Bismarck, that "War is the extension of politics by other means". Thus the Communists in their attack use military warfare, political warfare, or a combination of the two. Political warfare is the use of political parties, trade unions, and "front" organisations to bring about the same result as military warfare. It is outwardly peaceful, except in its final phase, and, if successful, it can take over a country as a "going concern" instead of as a war-devastated wasteland. Perhaps the greatest advantage of this method is that, whilst in time of military conflict the citizens of a free nation will rally unitedly to its defence, political warfare is so insidious that the average person is not even aware of it. Former leading British Communist, Douglas Hyde, after leaving the party said of this "cold" war: "The Communists are at a great advantage since most people do not even know there is a war on".

But there is a war on, and we are in it. Where lies our most immediate danger then; from military or political warfare?

Geographically we fall within the sphere of influence of the Asian partner in the Communist "Big Two" — Red China. It is from Peking that the plans for the Communist subjugation of Asia and Australasia emanate. Despite, however, their standing

army of an estimated 4½ million, their reserve army of 5 million, and the third biggest air force in the world, immediate military attack seems unlikely. This picture could, of course, change overnight, particularly if: (a) Indonesia falls into Communist hands, thus giving Australia a common land frontier with the Communist empire; or if (b) The proposed healing of the rift between USSR and Red China results in the Asian partner receiving nuclear long-range missiles for its armed forces.

For the moment, however, it would appear that, despite the urgent need for Australia, in co-operation with our allies, to build up and strengthen our defences against the possibility of military attack, our immediate danger comes from political warfare, for this war is being waged now. The Communist political attack comes as a two-pronged thrust; external political pressure by the government of Red China, and internal subversion by Australian Communists and their fellow-travelers. As to their immediate aims, we have been given an insight into these by a speech made by Muo Mo Jo, Vice-President of the Chinese National Peoples Congress (the government of Red China) at Jakarta on 21 August, 1961, when he declared specifically that it was the wish of Communist China that Australia should eventually become a member of the neutralist Afro-Asian bloc". Doubtless if we were foolish enough to take this matter seriously; if we were to withdraw from the SEATO, ANZUS and ANZAM pacts, thus

leaving ourselves without allies and almost defenceless, we would quickly discover, as India, Tibet, Laos and other nations have already discovered, the truth of Mao Tse Tung's cynical admission: "Neutralism is a word for deceiving people". The apparent method to be used by the Chinese Reds to draw us into their trap is the bait of increased trade. To the dedicated Communist, every aspect of daily life and international relations is geared to the service of the Party. Trade in the hands of the Marxist is not merely a method of exchanging goods; it, too, is a weapon of war. Lenin gleefully anticipated the time when "capitalists will come to trade with us" for then, he said "they will begin to finance their own destruction". Red China has made at least two attempts to use trade as a weapon of the cold war; firstly, with some success, in Burma in 1954-57, and secondly (completely unsuccessful, since the Reds overplayed their hand) in Japan in 1958. If previous tactics are used, we may expect the Peking Government to offer us "increased trade for recognition". This is a seemingly innocent, almost one-sided bargain; Australia disposes of all its surplus wheat, and possibly other primary products, in return for the simple act of recognising an accomplished fact; that the Communists are the government of China. Many responsible people in Australia have already suggested the adoption of this policy. But the wily Reds do not give something for nothing; they are seeking not just the meaningless "cour-

tesy" of recognition, but the consequences of recognition, and these consequences would have a far reaching effect on the present Asian situation. Australia is a signatory nation of the Potsdam pact, which states that Formosa is part of the national territory of China and should be ruled by the legitimate government of China. Therefore if we recognise the Communists as the legitimate government of China, we recognise their full right to expel, by force if necessary, the "rebel" government of Chiang Kai Shek from Formosa, and subdue the inhabitants of this island by the same bloody butchery as they used in Tibet. This is why the Peking government will not accept the suggested "Two Chinas" compromise, by which the governments of Formosa and the Chinese mainland would both be recognised as the respective legitimate government of the territories which they control.

If, however we accepted this offer, and our national economy became partly dependent on trade with Red China, the next move would be an offer of even more trade. The Communists would repeat the words of Chou En Lai who, in an interview with Reuter's correspondent in 1956, said "You want more trade? Well, as our industrialisation progresses we can give you more trade... Through our industrialisation programme we can provide £50 million worth of trade annually. And what do we want in return? We want a simple thing. We want you to enter with us and all the nations of

South East Asia into a Pacific Peace Pact of the Locarno type".

What is a Locarno type pact? It is a pact under which all the nations of an area undertake to guarantee each other against external aggression but (and the sting is in the tail!) no nation in the area would be allowed to enter into or maintain, an agreement with any nation outside the area which could be considered as threatening a member nation of the pact. This simply means that if Australia entered into such a pact, we would be forced to withdraw from our defence agreements with USA and UK, we would be effectively neutralised, and a nation of barely 11 million people standing defenceless in the face of the Communist colossus, would quickly be reduced to the status of a "satellite", and ultimately absorbed into the Red Empire, ceasing to exist as an independent nation. This then is the current aim of Peking; to effect by political pressures, internal subversion and armed force, the "neutralisation" of South East Asia, including Australia.

As to the use of internal subversion, there is no dearth of material to show us the current tactics and aims of the Reds in this sphere. The agents of the international Communist conspiracy within Australia are, of course, the Australian Communist Party and their "front" organisations. Their immediate aims are to create an "atmosphere" amongst the Australian public which will be conducive to the growth of neutralism, and seize control of the Australian

Trade Unions. Lenin said, "Without the trade unions, revolution is impossible" and his local disciples have, since the mid-1930s, worked unceasingly to control the unions. This springs from two facts:

- (a) The economic power of the trade unions.
- (b) The influence of trade unions on other organisations.

Australian unions have a combined membership of almost 2 million, approximately 60 per cent. of all wage and salary earners in the country. This is the highest proportion of union membership of the free world. The unionists are organised in approximately 370 separate unions, ranging from large and powerful unions such as the Australian Workers Union, to small and insignificant unions with a few dozen members. Most, though not all, union state branches are affiliated to their appropriate State Trades and Labour Council, which may be termed the "state parliament" of trade unionism, and which exercises a loose overall control of trade union activities within the State. Their Federal organisation is the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), to which all unions of any importance, with the exception of the Australian Workers Union, are affiliated on a Federal basis. The authoritative and policy-forming body of the ACTU is the ACTU Congress, which meets every two years. Each union is represented at this Congress by a number of delegates in proportion to its membership, so that in fact a

group of large unions voting together, can out-vote the representatives of the remainder of the unions — this is one reason why the larger unions have been the main target for Communist penetration. ACTU affairs are conducted between Congresses by its interstate executive of 16 members, of which 6 are elected by the Congress, 6 are elected by the State Trades and Labour Councils (1 by each State), and 4 are full-time officials, elected initially by the ACTU Congress. The ACTU is a most powerful body; it treats direct with the Federal Government on industrial matters, and is represented on certain committees established by the government. Small wonder, then, that the Communists aim at control of this body.

The economic power of the unions is tremendous; a strike by four of five of the "key" unions, such as the transport or power unions, can bring Australia to a standstill. The Communists try to bring about such strikes, not to improve the conditions of unionists, but for purely political reasons. L. J. Sharkey, Secretary-General of the Australian Communist Party, says: "Political strikes are a higher form of struggle than economic strikes. Such strikes challenge the Government, the State, the rule of the capitalist class. One of our chief trade union tasks is the politicalisation of strikes". ("The Trade Unions", by L. J. Sharkey, page 35, 1959 edition). Because the Australian arbitration system is able to settle most industrial disputes in a peaceful

fashion, this system is hated by the Communists; on page 23 of the same publication, Sharkey says: "The Communists regard the State-controlled Arbitration system as a pernicious, anti-working class institution, whose objective is to keep the workers shackled to the capitalistic state, i.e. eternally wage slaves . . . we fight against this arbitration".

So two of the hallmarks of a Communist-controlled union are a contempt for the Arbitration Court, and political strikes, aimed at a State or Federal Government. Examples of the latter are the refusal of Melbourne watersiders to load a cargo of barbed wire for South Vietnam in May, 1962, the recent demand by the Seamen's Union for a "black ban" on the use of sea transport for the shipment of materials for the construction of the U.S. Naval base in North West Australia, and Communist instructions for industrial sabotage of scrap-metal shipments to Japan (Melbourne "Sun", 26 March, 1963). Thus the war goes on in the unions, with the Reds winning victory after victory, owing to the apathy of the majority of Australians towards the struggle in this vital field.

The use of a Trade Union to forward Communist policy is not their only gain when the Reds get control of a union; large donations are given from union funds to Communist "front" organisations, party members appointed as full-time union organisers devote the majority of their time to working as Communist Party organisers, the union journal becomes

a vehicle for Communist propaganda, union printing requirements are ordered from party-owned printeries (in Victoria the inappropriately named "Coronation Press")!

Additionally, besides their vast economic power, the trade unions have great influence on other organisations. Trade unions affiliate direct to two Australian political parties, thus sending delegates to the policy forming bodies of these parties. In Australia's main opposition party roughly 75 per cent. of the delegates to the State Conference represent trade unions; only approximately 25 per cent. of the delegates are from local branches of the party.

Unfortunately for Australia, the Communists have been extremely effective in their penetration of the larger "key" unions. Several powerful unions are, on a Federal basis, under Communist policy control; that is to say, although admitted and open Communists do not necessarily form a majority of the union's national executive, in fact all their political actions and resolutions faithfully conform to the current policy of the Australian Communist Party. The victories in these unions have been achieved by fraud, ballot-rigging and physical violence, and by the use of "popular front" teams of candidates. Even in the most "militant" union, a team consisting entirely of Communists would stand little chance of being elected, but when Communists are linked on a "How to Vote" card with members of other par-

ties they are given a veneer of respectability. In this event, key positions such as secretary are invariably taken by the Reds.

As a result of these victories, many policies which were originated by the Communists have spread, via Red - controlled unions and other "front" organisations to non-Communist groups and organisations who now, in most cases quite unwittingly, give these policies a cloak of respectability. Some of these policies are:

- (a) Recognition of Red China.
- (b) Admission of Red China to the UNO.
- (c) Withdrawal of Australia from SEATO.
- (d) No American bases in Australia.
- (e) No Australian troops for Malaya.
- (f) Nuclear-free zone in the Southern Hemisphere.
- (g) Repeal of the "clean union ballot" legislation.

Writing in the "Communist Review" in November, 1960, L. J. McPhillips said of these successes.

"The result is that whereas 40 years ago reformism was almost the sole ideology influencing the trade unions, today and for some time now, the concepts of the Communist Party have had wide and growing influence on the trade union movement. . . . This is evidenced not only by the large number of CP members occupying full time and honorary positions in the leadership of trade unions and workshop

organisations; but also in the extent to which many actions by workers reflect our concepts. . . . Party members also sit on the leading councils of the trade union movement, including Trades and Labour Councils — State and Provincial; Congresses and Conferences of the ACTU, and in latter years the ACTU executive".

It can be clearly seen from the above why the trade unions have been and are the main target for our Communist Fifth Column, but they also busy themselves with a multiplicity of "front" organisations, "Peace" Congresses, etc, and with penetrating and controlling other quite innocent groups such as local Progress Associations, School Committees, etc, working with a dedication and fanatical determination which puts to shame the average apathetic and lethargic believer in democracy.

What is to be done about the present situation then? In alliance with our allies, we can prepare for defence against the danger of military attack. But the danger of internal subversion and political attack can only be defeated by an informed public opinion, awake to the very real dangers which threaten us, able to recognise Communist policies from whichever quarter they are presented, dedicated to the protection of our hard-won democratic institutions against the white-anting attacks of the local agents of the Red Imperialists. Despite the small amount of support which was

received from outside their organisation, the educational campaign undertaken by the RSL was a step in the right direction. It is to be hoped that any similar campaign will meet with a greater degree of support,

especially from such organs of public opinion as the press, radio, etc.

In conclusion, a final quotation:—"All that is required for the triumph of evil is the inactivity of the good".

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### TEST FOR AIR ASSAULT UNITS

The US Army has started activation of new air assault and support units to test and develop further its air mobile concept for ground combat. Test units being gathered together at Fort Benning, Georgia, are designated the 11th Air Assault Division (Test). They will include an air assault infantry battalion (a lighter version of the conventional infantry battalion) and a composite artillery battalion including 105-millimeter howitzers, Little John missiles, and light aircraft armed with rockets.

An aviation group with a variety of aircraft and aircraft support equipment will be formed to provide surveillance, troop lift in the battle area, and air transport for supply and support functions. Other supporting elements to be activated are an air cavalry troop for reconnaissance, a support group for administrative and logistical needs, a signal company, and an engineer company. These test units will be grouped into a test model of an air assault division.

The division will be supported by a test version of an air transport brigade, using both helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. In addition to its capability for hauling combat echelons, the brigade also has the capability to "retail" to divisional units in the battle area the supplies brought to "wholesale" distribution points by the Air Force.

The air mobile concept calls for movement and support of combat units in the battle area by simple, rugged helicopters and aircraft capable of operating in the environment of the soldier with primitive base facilities. Further, the ground combat units are provided the capability to relocate by air immediately whenever it is tactically desirable to do so.

—*Military Review U.S.A.*

# NOTES ON

## SOME NEW AIDS TO INTELLIGENCE

Lieutenant Colonel J. T. Quinn  
Australian Intelligence Corps

THE aim of this paper is to indicate some of the more recent developments by Western Powers in equipments and techniques for reconnaissance, battlefield surveillance, etc.

Scientific and other advancements over the past two decades have vastly increased the destructive powers of nations waging war. Further, targets can be engaged over great distances with a speed not previously thought feasible. It is clear that the strength and tempo of the Intelligence effort must keep pace with other military developments, and much has already been achieved in this respect. Many of the new items of equipment affecting Intelligence are secret. A guide to some of the unclassified items follows.

### Helicopters

The helicopter potential requires little emphasis, and a convenient reference to one reconnaissance type will be found in the Australian Army Journal for July, 1960, which dealt with equipment for the Pentropic Division. The vulnerability of the helicopter is apparent. Other limiting factors

in its production and use are problems associated with maintenance, fuel supply and control. Note, too, that compared with its fixed-wing counterpart, a helicopter is expensive to produce, is costly to maintain, and is not easy to learn to fly.

### Armed Helicopters

The United States has experimented with a cavalry troop which uses armed helicopters instead of ground vehicles, although it has some ground vehicles for administration, etc. "... An element with real strike potential in its machine-gun armed scout helicopters, and the rockets of its weapons ships backed up with one or several rifle fire teams, it can move to an area 20-25 miles away, in about as many minutes. Further, on arrival it is ready to fight or to have a look-see immediately, depending on the circumstances. . . . On a reconnaissance mission they will move laterally many more miles than frontally. Movement by bounds (one or two machines covering the movement of another) will be practised frequently. . . ."

It is accepted that such a troop, with its complex equip-



ment and highly trained specialists, should not be engaged in other than reconnaissance and security missions unless there is absolutely no alternative in a critical situation.

Again, there is the problem of vulnerability, but this can be partly offset by the very low altitudes at which the helicopters can operate. Wherever practicable, they move at about five to ten feet off the ground.

A major problem is intercommunication. There is a need for equipment which is capable of meeting operational needs whilst being at the same time light and reliable. The requirement is for air-to-air, air-to-ground, and ground-to-ground voice contact!

Note that the actual flight of these armed helicopters should be restricted to friendly or neutral territory.

### Helicopter Types

Variations include a completely foldable helicopter that can be assembled and flown in the space of five minutes. A "drone copter" has also been produced, despite the technical difficulties of remote control of a craft required to fly in every direction, at varying speeds, and to hover in flight.

### Counting Devices

These may be regarded as small "boxes" capable of recording and transmitting vehicular traffic counts past the location in which a box is placed. It is not practicable to deal with technical or tactical aspects of the devices in these notes.

### Radar Detectors

One development is the Portable Radar, which provides forward units with the capability of detecting enemy at night. Some idea of the nature of the equipment can be gained from a photograph in the Australian Army Journal for July, 1960, of the AN/PPS4. "This equipment, because of its lightness and rugged construction is ideally suited to use in forward areas. It can detect men at a range of half a mile and vehicles up to three miles with an accuracy of 25 yards. Enemy movement is revealed by noise in the operator's earphones, rather than by the conventional usual display. The device is under consideration as an infantry surveillance radar".

### Infra Red Application

Searchlights can provide infra red illuminations for night operations. An infra red filter converts the searchlight beam to light which is invisible to the unaided eye, but which permits good observation by a viewer equipped with a metascope.

### Thermograph

This is a photographic device which uses heat or infra red radiation emitted by the subject to produce an image in total darkness. "Radiation produces ghost-like but easily identifiable figures even in total darkness by use of the thermograph. . . . A portable and highly mobile scanning apparatus, the thermograph will even register personnel or equipment under cover of dense fog or other conceal-

ment. It has a long range and can pick up objects as small as a mouse".

### **Airborne Radar System**

The equipment used is said to out-perform the human eye in separating objects at great distances, and can make photographs of what it sees. The technique is described as a day and night all-weather system which can probe enemy territory without flying over a hostile area. The system gathers fine radar map detail by "synthesizing" side-looking antennas

many times longer than the aircraft. The aircraft may fly at right angles to the area to be scanned, and the equipment (operating from the side of the aircraft) will produce map-like photographs for Intelligence study. The complete system includes the airborne radar equipment and a mobile ground unit which converts and processes the intelligence.

### **The Drone Family**

There are various types of remotely controlled flying devices, apart from the "drone copter". They may be regarded as miniature aircraft, needing no human pilot and capable of carrying photographic, infra red, radar or television equipment to observe terrain or enemy troop movements, etc., and transmit or bring back data. Speeds, distances and altitudes are being improved, and a high-speed jet surveillance drone has been tested.

In a typical mission the (ordinary) drone is launched

from a mobile trailer by two rocket motors. Once in the air the reciprocating engine takes over. Landing is accomplished by an automatic parachute device which floats the drone back to earth. Special inflatable rubber mats contained within the drone cushion the fall. Operational capabilities are at varying altitudes, although most missions are accomplished at low level where the drone's tiny size and speed aid in dodging enemy radar and guns.

### **Intercommunication**

Some idea of expected developments may be gained from the following extract from a US "Army" Journal.

"... Since there is more movement and less reaction time, more information must be collected and evaluated rapidly so that the Commander can make a timely decision. The enemy will undoubtedly be maintaining the same sort of pace and we must be able to trace his movements and locate profitable targets which will be fleeting in nature compared to past conflicts.

"To speed up the flow of information from the lowest units, a telephone type dialling system will make contact with any other unit or HQ. Contact is made through a combination of telephone and radio relays. Essential information is converted into digital form and processing system which eventually feeds the bits and pieces to electronic computers for display to operations personnel and the Commander.

"Thus the flow of combat information is accelerated by eliminating cumbersome processing by hand, and important information is available for recall from punched card and memory equipment.

"Recent advances in electronics have made this system possible as well as reducing the combat load of communications equipment, increasing reliability and lowering maintenance requirements. Radios are deceptively small yet have longer ranges with increased channel coverage from 80 to 800 usable frequencies.

"Miniaturisation and micro-miniaturisation of electronic parts allow 70,000 parts to be placed into a cubic foot of space. . . ."

### Conclusion

Most of the foregoing information has been extracted from

general literature, and is presented in this form for the convenience of interested readers.

It will be clear that even if many new devices are fully developed and produced in quantity, some will remain very costly and highly specialised. Further, there will be the problem of enemy interference by counter-devices, and in certain theatres of war the use of some of the new equipments may be impracticable or uneconomic because of the particular type of operations.

We must therefore concentrate on our immediate tasks, and improve our skill in the use of equipment and techniques already at our disposal. At the same time, we should devote due thought and discussion to trends in electronic and other developments, and their effect on Intelligence. These notes are intended as a simple aid in this direction.

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Only from comprehensive, up-to-date knowledge can come professional competence. Only from professional competence can come self-confidence. And only from soundly-based self-confidence can come willpower . . . which is essential to successful leadership.

—General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA.

# BUNDLES OF TEN

Captain H. B. Chamberlain,  
Royal Australian Infantry

THE essential components which maintain a unit's equilibrium are more of a domestic than an operational nature. The rigours of an exercise or the noise and dust of field firing are merely the outward signs of an intention to train rather than an attempt to progress. Armies of the past frequently marched off to expeditions vaguely wondering where the next wagon load of powder was coming from. It was not the expectation of glory which propelled them on most occasions, but somewhere deep in the dark little cells of their minds there was a sense that all this was right. The sound of marching feet, often booted as not, the creak of harness and the stench of their comrades were part of an inevitable act of the universe. A segment of stellar design reaching for fulfilment, or at very least a portion of a master plan arrived at by a panel of emperors. Impalement on an enemy's pike or the prospect of being the recipient of a few ounces of lead fired at short range was not of any great consequence.

Throughout armies today there is a vulgar inference that certain elements of administration are not all that they should

be. In the Australian Army for instance, the colourful emperors who guided the sweaty warriors of the past, with their salt-beef appetites and pipe - clayed gaiters, have been replaced by a cold-hearted, calculating Board. A body which leaves nothing to chance, robs administration of all its romantic doubt, so to speak. It is submitted that this unfortunate tendency could well undermine some of the traditions of our service. The result will inevitably be to deprive the soldier of taking a calculated risk in the control of his affairs, even, perhaps, to the extent of obliging him to conform. It is proposed to criticise some of the more drastic features of the current trend but at the same time reveal certain by-products which possess an element of good. Training matters will be avoided or perhaps briefly mentioned with the true and abiding respect which this awesome function deserves. Those of us who deal in facts, in other words, have difficulty in comprehending fantasy.

In a score of units on almost any day a party of an NCO and several soldiers may arrive at the Quartermaster's door for fatigue duty. Take the folding of blankets for example. In all

probability the party will be greeted by an arrogant storeman whose eyes reflect the activity in the canteen of the night before. Directing the NCO to fold a disordered pile of blankets in bundles of ten, he adjourns meanwhile with his collaborators in a cup of tea. Emerging an hour later he observes that the blankets are indeed folded and also tied. Most meticulous, in fact. He did however intend them to be rolled. This is remedied after a further hour of toil but there remains an odd number of nine in a total of forty-nine bundles where there should in fact be fifty bundles of ten. A painstaking examination reveals five bundles of eleven, four bundles of nine and at least three bundles of twelve. The essential feature of the operation demonstrates the inevitability of chance. A precise study of the procedure would be tiresome indeed and the party would have been deprived of the wholesome experience of obtaining a result by trial and error.

The vigorous and enervating debates which occur between Treasury officials and Army spokesmen on the matter of allowances absorb a great deal of attention. It appears that the act of travelling from one country town to another, although one may pass through two capital cities, involves less expense than travelling between two capital cities. This curious and enlightening fact may be gathered from a study of financial regulations. Many attempts have been made to prove this, but without success.

Of very special interest is the allowance which may be claimed for excess rental. Many a land agent has been known to slam the door and pull down the shutters on seeing a uniform approach. His typist may obtain practice by means other than fabricating documents describing fruitless searches for premises. To pursue this matter too far would perhaps be a trifle unfair. It is perhaps better to leave a surprise or two for those not yet initiated. On the other hand, however, the information could probably be employed to advantage as an aid to recruiting.

Certain instructions, although drafted with exquisite impartiality, at times drift into studied humour. Until recently a student proceeding to Staff College may not, it appears, take with him animals or servants. As no mention has been made of this in the latest publication it may be assumed that he may. Doubtless the instruction originated from the days when students of Oriental origin arrived with a concourse of elephants and a train of mixed individuals some of whom were present for other than utilitarian purposes. The vast array of edicts concerning rations are no less precise. Considerable thought must have been given to the division of eggs. Two-sevenths of an egg per day is not an easy quantity to place on a plate. The vicious arguments which may well ensue from an inequitable distribution compel one to doubt the wisdom of such an order.

As higher authority discusses the facts of military conformity, the muffled tones which guide our course may seem to waver. Among the piles of cigar ash and screwed-up notepaper there is surely an occasional hush. Here a comma is inserted or a semicolon appears. "Shall" becomes "will" and "to" is wisely transformed into "until". Indeed it is a great comfort to know that a member of AHBS may inspect the books of the Society on giving to the Committee one week's notice in writing of his intention to do so, or that expenses due to dislocation of a Metacarpo-phalangeal joint of a dependant's thumb may be reimbursed to the extent of £3-2-6. Interspersed between discussions of this and that there may possibly be heard the characteristic sound of a cork being extracted from a bottle; inkwells being so scarce. Be it an egg or a dependant's thumb, the members have painstakingly thought of every contingency and one and all are to be admired for their industry.

The compilation of the Board's Instructions into a single comprehensive manuscript is possibly a retrograde step. Clerical staffs, in particular, have been deprived of the exercise of inserting the numerous amendments occurring at least tri-annually. The printers, no doubt, are disappointed in that they are unable to reprint an instruction in its original form. In time this will be recognised for what it is, a mere wart on the face of progress.

The fundamental system of re-posting which hurls some

members headlong across the continent and leaves others carefully emplaced for a lifetime of tethered security is a marvel of inconsistency. By its very elusiveness it defies understanding and assuredly this is primarily the intention. Be it known that even now there are the faint beatings of a distant drum. The surgeons who so skilfully remove some of the more stubborn soldiers from their attachments are on the lookout for fresh patients. The grapes on the vine are literally vibrating with sympathetic activity.

Work is for working men. It is only just possible that Newton had soldiers in mind when he said that work is performed when a body moves. Or was it Joule? The most illuminating research on this aspect, strangely enough, was done by an earnest young Oberlieutenant on Bismarck's staff during the 'eighties. He discovered that the more capable a soldier was in performing his duties and the more carefully he carried them out, the more duties he tended to be given. The most interesting period of the research came when the Oberlieutenant revealed that the soldier's superiors were unable to judge the critical point at which the subject might break under the strain. In consequence the many who subsided under the application of continued and increasing pressure were often treated as malingerers. Thrown aside like a worn-out lieberwurst container, you might say. His fellows benefited from the process, however, as they were able to

win recognition and promotion, having been relieved of their more onerous tasks. Oberlieutenant Schwartz subsequently gave his name to a law which described the cause and effect of this phenomenon. It has received wide application in many armies, including our own. It is understood that an instruction is at present being drafted to counter some of the more unpleasant effects. In the natural course of events some serious opposition is anticipated.

In Marlborough's day any soldier would have been flogged if he'd asked about his dependant's thumb. As yet no one has written to the newspapers about the rental system. Most soldiers have passively accepted the

present form of the Instructions and indeed there are some soldiers who do not even raise an objection when a posting order arrives in the mail. Schwartz's Law has been given universal acceptance; in fact most soldiers expect its application. Two-sevenths of an egg a day is scarcely an equitable way of nourishing our warriors, but who raises a voice in protest? The implication that it is more satisfactory to have blankets tied up in bundles of ten lacks substance. If matters had been considered objectively it would have been better to have had them done up in dozens, bundles of twelve. All factors considered though, there's not a great deal of margin for complaint.

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### UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTIONS


The object of United Service Institutions is to promote the study of Naval, Military and Air art, science and literature by officers of the services.

There are United Service Institutions in each capital city in Australia, all of which maintain comprehensive technical and general libraries and conduct regular lectures on matters of Service interest.

Membership is open to commissioned officers of the Navy, Army and Air Force, either active, reserve or retired, and to women officers of the three Services. The Institutions are sponsored by the Government, which enables subscription rates to be retained at nominal levels.

This movement provides a venue for officers of the three Services to meet on common ground and consider subjects of mutual interest. Younger officers, in particular, are urged to join and support the U.S.I. in the State in which they are serving.

An enquiry addressed to the Secretary, United Service Institution, care of your Command or Area Headquarters, will be forwarded on to the responsible officer, who will be pleased to give further information.



**DIARY OF A GERMAN SOLDIER, by Wilhelm Pruller. (Faber and Faber, 24 Russell Square, London, W.C.1).**

There are plenty of books describing World War II as seen through the eyes of the German generals, books which have discussed the strategy of the campaigns and the influence of Hitler upon the conduct of military operations. And there are plenty of books describing the sufferings inflicted on humanity by the Nazis. In all this, however, there was a missing link. There was very little, if any, sound factual writing which would give us an insight into the mentality of the ordinary German soldier, which would explain why he fought so magnificently, not only in the intoxication of victory but in face of certain defeat.

To a very considerable extent, this book fills the gap in our understanding of the German view of the war. It is the war diary of a young German who crossed the Polish frontier as a private soldier on the first day of the war. Subsequently he served on the Eastern and Western fronts. He was twice decorated for bravery, promoted to commissioned rank, sustained two severe wounds, and was still fighting right up to the moment of general capitulation.

Pruller was a good soldier by any standards. If we make due allowance for the different ways in which the peoples of other countries commonly express themselves, this diary could have been written by a soldier of any army. The difference is one of emphasis. From first to last Pruller bubbles over with, to us, extravagant expressions of devotion to his Fuhrer and faith in the destiny of Nazi Germany.

Wilhelm Pruller was born in Vienna in 1916, in the middle of World War I. The end of that conflict saw the great Austro-Hungarian Empire dismembered, and Vienna the capital of a state too small and too poor to support the splendid city. Pruller grew up in poverty in the midst of the generally hopeless Austrian situation. Unable to join the Boy Scouts because his parents could not afford the small sum for the uniform, he turned for the companionship he sought to the Hitler-Jugend, the youth organisation of the Nazi Party. There, presumably, his indoctrination in the Nazi ideology began.

After eking out a miserable existence for several years, Pruller emigrated to Germany where he got a job with the Nazi SS organisation. When Hitler took over Austria in 1938, he returned



to Vienna where, through his Party affiliations, he secured satisfactory employment, married and settled down to become a devoted husband and father. A little later he was drafted into the army, and in August, 1939, crossed the Polish frontier with his unit. That is the point at which his diary begins.

The earlier entries are heavily loaded with the intoxication of victory. And here, too, the first evidence of thorough indoctrination becomes apparent. He is more than a little surprised at the appearance and conduct of the Poles—"Some of them really are human". He is astonished by the courteous and considerate treatment accorded him when he is taken prisoner. Nevertheless, he is sure that the Poles are very lucky indeed to be taken over by the superior Nazi Germany, even if they do suffer some inconvenience in the process.

Some of his intoxication wears off in the first terrible Russian winter. He is astonished by the first German retreats. He is even more astonished by the second winter, the retreats and

the long series of defeats. Astonished but not shaken, his faith in Hitler never wavers. At the very end, with Germany in ruins and the Allies closing in on Berlin, physically unfit for field service, he is still fighting on and still expressing his unbreakable conviction that Hitler is about to snatch victory from defeat. By then, however, his faith was tinged with bitterness against those of his countrymen who could see the reality of the situation better than he could.

Pruller never lost his faith. Fourteen years after the final debacle, poor and sick, he still believed in it all.

In Pruller's diary there are no concentration camps, no massacres, no brutalities, no harrowing scenes at all. Its horror lies in the spectacle of what political indoctrination and scientifically applied propaganda can do to an intelligent, kind and honourable man, and in the knowledge that it could happen again. All that is required is the kind of statesmanship that created the conditions in which Nazism took root and flourished.

— E.G.K.

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