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# AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

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The views expressed in the articles in this Journal are the author's own and do not necessarily represent General Staff opinion or policy.




Photo: Australian War Memorial, Canberra.

### PORT MORESBY

When Japan entered World War II in December 1941 and advanced rapidly through Malaya, Indonesia and New Britain, there was only a very small and ill-equipped militia garrison at Port Moresby in New Guinea. Port facilities were quite inadequate for military purposes.

During 1942 Port Moresby was gradually developed into a great military base with an impressive complex of airfields. The picture shows an Australian Heavy Anti-Aircraft Battery preparing for action against an impending Japanese air raid.

# A PROPOSED REORGANISATION OF ARMY HEADQUARTERS

Major N. M. Turner  
Royal Australian Army Service Corps

THE fighting potential of an army is directly related to its leadership, training and organisation, supported by its intelligence and logistic systems. This concept is reflected in the army's organisation for higher command. Traditionally, and based on the British Army pattern, Army Headquarters has been developed about a structure involving General Staff "A", "Q" and "MGO" Branches to fulfil the requirements of this concept.

However, although this structure is basically sound and adequate, the emphasis on certain aspects of the concept has changed with the development of modern warfare, and, generally, the change in emphasis has not resulted in any major reorganisation of our higher command structure.

It may be pertinent then, to examine our higher command structure with a view to increasing its efficiency to meet the diverse complications of modern war.

Perhaps the major developments in recent years have been centred about the urgency of

preparedness for war and the complications of logistic support. In the first case, planning and training in peace for immediate reaction to a call for assistance in South East Asia have taxed the resources of the General Staff. In the second case, the complexity of modern arms and equipment, coupled with the particular logistic hazards foreseen in a South East Asian theatre, has occasioned an alarming increase in the administrative burden of supporting the fighting troops.

## Basis for Reorganisation

The present organisation of Army Headquarters is shown as Table 1. As a basis for proposing a reorganisation of this command structure, the following factors are considered relevant:—

- (a) The General Staff must be freed of all unnecessary responsibilities so that the maximum effort can be directed towards operations, planning and training.
- (b) The logistic resources must be co-ordinated at the highest level of management.

## Present Organisation of Army Headquarters




Table 1

- (c) Technical services involved in research, development and inspection must be centrally controlled.
- (d) Provisioning must be centralised.

In part, the necessity for some reorganisation is based on anticipated developments which will evolve in the next few years. These aspects are not conjecture, but fact. They include such items as the growth of army aviation and the introduction of electronic data processing.

It is interesting to note at this stage that the United States Department of the Army has found it necessary to reorganise its higher command structure to cover deficiencies in materiel organisation, personnel system, combat development and training. This was done without major disruption at installation level.

Similarly in this paper, it is intended to restrict the review to higher command structure, although it is felt that any reorganisation of logistic command could ultimately pave the way for the rationalisation of the logistic services.

### General Staff

In general, the proposed amendments to the General Staff are deletions from the present organisation. In this regard, an elementary fact can be introduced. This is that both Engineers, with Survey as a subordinate service, and Signals provide logistic support. Further, the main efforts of these corps are involved to the rear of

the divisional area. It seems logical then, to transfer the responsibility for the command and control of these arms to the Logistic Staff.

In addition, the Office of the Scientific Adviser could be a basis for the control of such services as the Australian Army Operational Research Group, Army Design Establishment and the Directorate of Inspection. These are all technical services fulfilling a logistic function and should be grouped under the management of the Logistic Staff.

The Directorate of Public Relations has a basic "A" Branch function and it is felt that the General Staff could be relieved of the responsibility for its activities without prejudice to the efficiency of the public relations service.

In effect, these deletions would prune the General Staff to functions of operations, planning and training. With the addition of a new directorate of Combat Development, to function under the direction of the Director of Staff Duties and charged with the role of research and development of new tactical doctrine, new organisation and new material, the General Staff would be better balanced and organised efficiently to carry out its present role. However, to cater for future developments resulting from the growth of army aviation and the increasing accent on the tactical use of helicopters and STOL aircraft, a Directorate of Tactical Air Support will become necessary in the very near future.



## Logistic Staff

### General

It is in this field that major reorganisation seems necessary. At present, there are three members of the Military Board charged with various logistic functions. There is no co-ordinating management other than the Military Board. Here, it is considered that a new appointment, a Chief of Logistic Staff, parallel to the Chief of the General Staff, should co-ordinate the functions of "A", "Q" and "MGO" Branches, together with other logistic services, and represent them on the Military Board.

Beneath the Chief of Logistic Staff, only relatively minor adjustments are necessary to produce a structure based on Logistics (A), Logistics (Q), Logistics (Provision) and Logistics (Technical). The first three branches would be based respectively on the present "A", "Q" and "MGO" Branches, suitably amended. The Logistics (Technical) Branch would be a new branch in which Australian Army Operational Research Group, Army Design Establishment and the Directorate of Inspection are grouped under the Scientific Adviser to the Military Board.

Provision should be made for the control and operation of Electronic Data Processing, for inclusion under the Chief of Logistic Staff when it is introduced into service in the near future.

### Logistics (A)

The present structure of "A" Branch staff needs no amendment to efficiently carry out its

role of manpower allocation and personnel administration. However, the functions of the Director-General Medical Services, which require the co-ordinated efforts of the General Staff, "Q" Staff and Engineer-in-Chief, to provide complete medical evacuation and hospitalisation systems, would indicate that the Director-General Medical Services should be a principal staff officer directly responsible to the Chief of Logistic Staff.


The functions of the Director-General Medical Services can be vested in a non-medical staff officer who should control the functions of the medical service together with the dental and psychology services.

The appointment of a non-medical officer is not a radical departure from current practice. The requirement is for a staff officer who is concerned principally with planning and allocation of resources. A precedent has been seen in the successful tour of duty of an infantryman as the Director of Supplies and Transport, in which post he was ably supported by the technical advice of his subordinate staff officers.

Similarly, the Provost Marshal, whose functions include the administration of discipline, control of prisoners of war and the provision of detention barracks and military prisons as "A" services, and traffic control as a service to both the General Staff and "Q" Branch, should also be considered as a principal staff officer directly responsible to the Chief of Logistic Staff.

An inclusion under the control of Logistics (A) would be

Proposed Organisation of Army Headquarters



(a) New appointments/directorates.

(b) Provision functions co-ordinated by Central Purchasing Office.

Table 2

that of the Directorate of Public Relations as a service responsible to the Adjutant General.

### Logistics (Q)

The principal staff officers, under the Quartermaster General, should be the Director of Maintenance and the Director of Movements. With this grouping, Logistics (Q) is responsible for all the aspects of planning and implementation of supply and movement. The Director of Transportation should be subordinate to the Director of Movements, so that, with the transport resources of the Director of Supplies and Transport, all forms of transportation are under the control of the Movements Directorate.

In this regard, provision should be made for the operational control of logistic air resources under the Director of Supplies and Transport.

As a function of supply, in its broad sense, the Directorate of Electrical and Mechanical Engineers should be included as a "Q" service under the staff control of the Director of Maintenance.

Finally, the Director of Quarters, at present a principal "Q" Staff officer, could be directed best by the Engineer-in-Chief who already has the Director of Fortifications and Works and the Director of Engineer Services as his subordinate staff officers.

### Logistics (Provision)

This Branch should be charged, principally, with the role of provisioning. It should co-ordinate the purchasing functions vested in the Engineer,

Medical and ST Directorates, under the control of a Central Purchasing Office.

With the introduction of Electronic Data Processing, this co-ordination can be expanded to include depot stock control.

Other recommended changes have already been mentioned. That is, the transfer of the control of the Directorate of Inspection to Logistics (Technical) and the Directorate of Electrical and Mechanical Engineers to Logistics (Q).

### Engineers and Signals

As logistic services, these corps should be controlled by the Logistic Staff with their directors responsible directly to the Chief of Logistic Staff.

As previously described, the Engineer-in-Chief would assume the control of the Quarters Directorate.


### Conclusion

The proposed outline organisation for Army Headquarters is shown as Table 2.

The proposed organisation would achieve the following:—

- (a) Limit the responsibilities of the General Staff to those functions directly concerned with operations, planning and training.
- (b) Co-ordinate the management of logistic support.
- (c) Rationalise the grouping of the logistic staff and services.

The proposal would increase the efficiency of our higher command structure, and thereby assist materially in raising the fighting potential of the Australian Army.



VICTORIA, by the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Queen, Defender of the Faith and so forth. . . .

We of Our special Grace have Granted and for Us Our Heirs and Successors Do Hereby Grant . . . All that piece or parcel of Land in Our said Territory containing by Admeasurement Twentynine Acres two Roods and seventeen Perches be the same more or less, situated in the County of Cumberland and Parish of Alexandria, on the Old South Head Road, near the City of Sydney . . . Being the site of the Victoria Barracks, being the land advertised as Number Forty in the Government Notice dated 28th June 1850, with all

the rights and appurtenances thereto belonging. To Hold unto the said Principal Officers of Our Ordnance in Great Britain for the time being and their Successors in Office for ever. . . .

Witness Our Trusty and Well beloved Sir Charles Augustus Fitzroy, Knight Companion of the Royal Hanoverian Guelphic Order, Our Captain-General and Governor-in-Chief of Our said Territory and its Dependencies at Government House, Sydney, in New South Wales aforesaid, this Thirty First day of July in the Fourteenth year of Our Reign; And in the year of Our Lord One thousand eight hundred and fifty.

(Extracts) from the Deed of Grant for the land occupied by the Victoria Barracks at Paddington, NSW. The original, and

complete, document is held at the Mitchell Library, Sydney.

If you want to feel close to the history of Australia, and especially to the history of the Australian Army, go to the Victoria Barracks at Paddington, a Sydney suburb.

There you can see and touch the long, grey stone wall and the stone buildings, which were erected more than a century ago; built by convicts with half the world separating them from their homeland.

The construction of these barracks was commenced at a time when almost one-third of the population of New South Wales was made up of transported convicts still undergoing sentence, and of the other two-thirds, many were formerly convicts.

These barracks are a tangible and lasting reminder of the early, struggling years in the life of our nation; they are part of our history, and especially significant in the history of the Army in Australia.

When you go to Paddington, enter the barracks by the North Gate from Oxford Street, under the stone arch and across the grassed parade ground. Along the southern side of this once dusty rectangle, stands the main barrack block built to house eight hundred British Redcoats.

Set above the centre archway of this massive (737 feet long) barrack block, fronted by a myriad of cast iron columns, is a clock that has marked the time for generations of soldiers, over more than a hundred years.

On this parade ground the young Australian soldier shares a common experience with at least one man who saw the final desperate charge of Napoleon's Grand Army at Waterloo. Lieutenant Colonel Henry Keane Bloomfield who marched at the head of the 11th (North Devonshire) Regiment of Foot<sup>1</sup>, when they passed through the North Gate into the Victoria Barracks on Saturday, 5th August, 1848, was an Ensign at the battle of Waterloo. The 11th Regiment was the first unit to be accommodated at the barracks.<sup>2</sup>

This historic ground has served as drill square for British Regiments whose battle honours and service records collectively read like the index to a history book — Jamaica (1773); North America (1773); Gibraltar (1784); Holland and Ireland (1763); Corsica (1793); Elba (1796); Portugal (1797); Minorca (1799); Egypt (1801); Copenhagen (1807); Spain (1808); New Zealand (1834); India (1841); Turkey, Gallipoli and the Crimea (1854); "Salamanca" — "Nivelle" — "Nive" — "Orthes" — "Toulouse" — "Peninsula" to quote just a few.<sup>3</sup>

For more than twenty-two years, succeeding British infantry regiments wheeled and formed on this dusty ground, no doubt watching the seemingly ageless clock and hoping for time to fly.

On this same level expanse, too, members of one of the first

1. Hart's Army List, 1849.
2. Sydney Morning Herald, 7 August, 1848.
3. The History of the 50th (The Queen's Own) Regiment by Colonel A. Fyler, Mitchell Library, and Battle Honours, 11th Regiment, Hart's Army List, 1849.

of our Volunteer Colonial Regiments (now the 1st Battalion, the City of Sydney's Own Regiment), in 1854, received their introduction to the drill sergeant. And from here the Colonials went to fight, and die, in Africa. They were followed by youth of the new race of Australians: from this ground to the Boxer Rebellion in China, the South African War, the First and Second World Wars. . . .

On all sides of this historic rectangle are stone buildings which represent what is probably the largest group of convict-built structures still standing, and in use, in Australia. Everyone of them is a classic example of 19th century military architecture.

This, then, is the story of why and when these barracks were built and of the events which led up to their construction; it is, in fact, a history because it is true.

### The Marine Barracks

Soon after the arrival of the First Fleet at Port Jackson in January, 1788, the need for properly constructed barracks for the Marine detachment was recognised by Governor Phillip.

Canvas quarters had been erected on the west bank of the Tank Stream, but days of incessant rain proved the necessity for more substantial quarters.<sup>4</sup> On 8th February, 1788, Phillip gave instructions for timber framed barracks to be erected.

The three companies of Marines were each responsible for the erection of their own accommodation and, due to the

lack of skilled labour, unsuitable materials and the differing attitudes of the company commanders, all three companies were not housed until February 1789.

The Marine Barracks were considered, by Phillip, to be likely to offer sub-standard accommodation for, at most, three years.

These barracks were sited adjacent to the Tank Stream and on the western side of George Street, near Circular Quay.

### The George Street Barracks

By 1792 the Marine Barracks were beyond repair and, in September of that year, new barracks — later to be referred to officially as the George Street Barracks and by more common custom today identified as the Wynyard Barracks — were commenced.

The George Street Barracks were the first military barracks of solid construction to be erected in Sydney. Additions were made in subsequent years, but by 1810, they had attained their final form.

In 1836 these barracks occupied a site of approximately 16½ acres with a frontage to George Street; originally the land extended from George Street back to Darling Harbour.<sup>5</sup>

A plan of Sydney, dated 1836, and attached to the Report of the Select Committee on Trans-

4. Short History of the Military Forces in NSW by Major K. Coleman, MC, and Lieutenant-Colonel J. T. Knight, Chap. IV.
5. Ordnance Committee Report 1840, NSW Legislative Council Votes and Proceedings, 1840, p. 237 et seq.

portation, 1837-1838, shows the George Street Barracks as bounded by George Street, Barrack Lane (now Street) and Watch Ho (now Clarence Street). In the plan Clarence Street is shown as terminating at the junction with Barrack Lane. The southern boundary is not named in the plan but it probably was where Margaret Street now runs.

A few brief but descriptive lines concerning George Street, in the 1820's is contained in "Settlers and Convicts" first published in London in 1847. The identity of the author is, apparently, not definitely known.

The year is probably 1825, the writer has just disembarked from England and is describing his first glimpse of Sydney.

"At this period Sydney was ill-lighted; only a few lamps were scattered throughout the whole length of George Street (the main thoroughfare), which from the King's Wharf to the end of the houses at the foot of Brickfield Hill, can scarcely be less than a mile and three-quarters.

"As we walked down George Street we found Sydney, according to the custom on the first hour of a summer's night, all alive, enjoying the cool air. The street was clear of vehicles, and parties of the inhabitants, escaped from desk and shop, were passing briskly to and fro, in full merriment and converse. At the main barrack-gate the drums and fifes of the garrison were sounding out the last notes of the tattoo. In Sydney the

barracks occupy a noble sweep of ground in the very centre of the town. Leaving the long line of barrack-wall behind us. . . ."

### The Need for New Barracks

By 1836, only 44 years after the erection of the George Street Barracks had commenced, the Governor, Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Bourke, appointed a Board of Officers to select a site for new barracks. Included among the officers instructed to select the new site was Captain George Barney, RE, the Commanding Royal Engineer in the Colony.<sup>6</sup>

The George Street Barracks had, by 1836, reached such a state of deterioration, and were in need of such extensive repairs, that Barney recommended to the Governor that new barracks should be built, rather than much money be spent on restoring the old.

It was not, however, merely a question of the cost of repairs for restoration which influenced Bourke and his capable subordinate. The commercial centre of Sydney had by now expanded to the extent that the barracks were interfering with the formation of streets.

The site selected by the Board was on the Old South Head Road to the south of the town of Sydney (the area is now the suburb of Paddington), and was part of a Common set aside by Governor Macquarie under a Grant dated 5th October 1811. The Common contained between 800 and 1000 acres, and the actual site pro-

6. Ordnance Committee Report, 1840, Evidence by Major George Barney.

posed for the new barracks was a "new market" in 1810. The ground was mainly rough, with rocky outcrops and sand dunes interrupting the surface. The principal attractions offered by the area appear to have been comparative remoteness from the town, unsuitability of the soil for agriculture, the availability of stone for building, and the absence of any existing landholders who would have to be dispossessed.

### The Commanding Royal Engineer

In 1833 the Governor, Sir Richard Bourke, asked the War Office for an engineer to be sent out as there were many works of a military nature to be performed, and no suitably qualified officer was available in the Colony.

Later it was decided to establish a branch of the Ordnance Department in NSW, and in 1835, Captain George Barney of the Royal Engineers was despatched to Sydney.<sup>7</sup>

In 1836 Bourke obtained approval for Barney to be employed as Colonial Engineer, in addition to his duties as the Commanding Royal Engineer.<sup>8</sup>

Barney was born in London on 19 May, 1792. He was commissioned Second Lieutenant on 11 July, 1808, promoted Lieutenant 24 June, 1809, Captain 1 September, 1813, Major 10 January, 1837, and Lieutenant-Colonel on 15 August, 1840. He sold his commission in about 1846. He served at the defence of Tariffa in 1811-12 and at the capture of Guadaloupe and the Saintes in 1815.<sup>9</sup>

A capable engineer, Barney played a prominent role in the affairs of the Colony during his lifetime. He is credited with having been responsible for the first works on Circular Quay, the design of Fort Denison and, of course, for the design of the Victoria Barracks, Paddington. He was, variously, Surveyor General, Commissioner of Crown Lands and Chief Inspector of Distilleries. He died at North Sydney on 16 April, 1862, in his seventieth year.

### The Battle For Land

Up to the time of the proposal to remove the George Street Barracks all of the lands in NSW used for military purposes had been set aside for such use by the Vice Regal representative, exercising the gubernatorial powers. They were, therefore, Crown Lands in the widest sense, i.e., the Army had no needs of grant for these lands.

Because of this situation the Board of Ordnance was in the anomalous position of owning improvements such as barracks and defence works, on land for which the Board had no legal tenure. As a result of representations made by the Board in London, and to correct this anomaly — which existed in several Colonies — the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in 1836, sent out a Bill, under cover of a Circular Despatch dated 11 November, 1836. The purpose of the Bill was to vest "in the principal officers of Her Majesty's

7. The Australian Encyclopaedia, Vol. VI, p. 75.
8. The Sydney Sun Newspaper, 4 May, 1935.
9. The New Annual Army List, 1841.



Ordnance all Lands occupied for Military purposes in the Colony.<sup>10</sup>

Since a Legislative Council had been established in NSW in 1824, it thus became necessary for the Bill to be passed into law through the local legislature. However, when the Governor, Sir George Gipps, laid the Ordinance Vesting Bill before the NSW Legislative Council in 1838, he met with a storm of opposition.

In his Despatch No 150 of 26 September, 1838, the Governor had to report that:

"The Bill, I regret to say, met with such a decided opposition both in the Council and out of doors, that after passing it through a second reading . . . I judged it to be for the advantage of Her Majesty's service, and for the peace of the Colony, that I should carry it no further, and I accordingly withdrew it".

The nature of the opposition to the Bill can be judged from the fact that the Governor withdrew it when he could have forced the measure through by the power of the votes of nominated members of the Council.

His Excellency went on to explain the exact nature of the objections to the Bill, and to say that at length:

"All sorts of imaginary dangers were pictured as likely to occur from the establishment of a great Military Corporation, that might ultimately get possession of a great portion of the Lands of the Colony".

The relevance of the Land Battle to the unborn barracks at

Paddington was simple yet critical.

The Colony had need of the George Street site to satisfy commercial interests and, in that process, to swell the revenue from the sale of Crown Lands. Amounts received from that source had risen from £943-5-10 in 1830, to £152,962-16-4 in 1839. This last figure represented more than £1 a head of population.<sup>11</sup>

The troops were in need of new barracks, but the Board of Ordnance had no intention of surrendering the George Street site unless they could be put into legal possession of any other site on which new barracks were to be built. The Board also considered that, as the barracks were to be removed only to serve the interests of the Colony, the Colony should meet the cost of the new barracks.

In earlier years there would have been no obstacle to the Governor's wishes. Until 1824 no local legislative body existed, but in that year the Legislative Council of New South Wales was established. Initially it consisted only of the Governor, the Lieutenant-Governor, the Colonial Secretary, the Chief Justice, the Principal Surgeon and the Surveyor General. However, by 1829 the number was increased to 15, including the Governor.<sup>12</sup>

By 1838, therefore, any Bill introduced by H.E. would come

10. Governor Gipps' Despatch No. 150 dated 26 September, 1838, to Lord Glenelg.

11. Votes and Proceedings of NSW Legislative Council, Vol. 5, 1840, p. 322.

12. The Parliament of New South Wales. Booklet produced by officers of the NSW Legislature, 2 Apr, 56.

under the strong "property" views of such non-government men as John Blaxland, Robert Campbell, Richard Jones, H. H. MacArthur, James MacArthur and Sir Maurice O'Connell (who was commanding the 73rd Regiment when it arrived with Macquarie and, later, became a landowner of considerable worth, as well as the husband of William Bligh's daughter).

And so the matter rested until 28 May, 1840. On that date Governor Gipps, feeling, no doubt, that an additional nearly two years of the irritating sight of the George Street Barracks, and also time for saner reflection, would make the Council more receptive, once again introduced the Bill.

In a Minute, His Excellency, on again presenting to the Council "The Ordnance Property Bill", had this to say:

"In again laying before Council the Ordnance Vesting Bill I have to request attention to the correspondence which I have had with Her Majesty's Government on the subject of it, and which I now place on the table. By this correspondence the Council will perceive that the Board of Ordnance is willing to give up the present Barracks, and the ground on which they stand in Sydney, to the Colony, on condition of being put into legal possession of new buildings on an equivalent scale of accommodation, at a short distance from the town.

"Considerable opposition having been excited against the Ordnance Vesting Bill when it

was before the Council in 1838, I think it right in re-introducing the measure, to make some few observations on the nature of it in order to remove any misapprehensions respecting it, which may yet exist in the Colony".<sup>13</sup>

He went on to explain that the Bill was closely modelled upon an Act which, in Great Britain and Ireland, had been in force nearly twenty years, without being in any way complained of. It did not propose to give the Board of Ordnance any power which it did not already possess at home and in most other Colonies.

He explained that if the funds for military works were being provided by the Colony the Board of Ordnance might be willing to allow existing arrangements to continue whereby the military works were on land set aside for military purposes by the Governor.

However, those funds were supplied entirely by the British Parliament, "a fact of which opponents of the Ordnance Bill in 1838 appeared to be ignorant". The Board of Ordnance was alone responsible to Parliament for the proper expenditure of these military funds; the Board therefore, should have entire possession of ground on which works were to be erected or expenditure made. The Board of Ordnance might very reasonably refuse to expend money on land of which they are not in legal possession.

13. Votes and Proceedings, NSW Legislative Council, Vol. 5, 1840, p. 199.

"And consequently the withholding from them of the means of acquiring legal possession, may, and in all probability will, have the effect of preventing the erection of Works of Defence, for the protection of any Harbour or Town in New South Wales, or of throwing the expense of erecting them on the funds of the Colony".

". . . The rejection of the Bill, will probably have the effect of keeping the Military Barracks where they are now, to the great inconvenience of the inhabitants of Sydney. . . ."

On the second attempt the Governor had better luck. The Council resolved to investigate the proposal, and on 2 June, 1840 the Ordnance Committee of the Legislative Council of NSW was appointed:

". . . to take into consideration the correspondence on the subject of the Ordnance Bill . . . and to report to the Council on the expediency of entering into an arrangement for the removal of the Military Barracks, and the surrender to the Colony of the ground on which they stand in George Street, Sydney".<sup>14</sup>

The Committee wasted no time, and by 11 June, 1840 they were receiving evidence, and opinions, from such experts as Major George Barney, Commanding Royal Engineer, Mortimer William Lewis, Colonial Architect, and Messrs. John Blackman and Isaac Simmons, Auctioneers. By questioning these gentlemen, the Committee sought to resolve the following matters:

(a) The value of the George

Street site, and the buildings thereon.

(b) The value of the intended site.

(c) The cost for the proposed new barracks.

The Committee quickly agreed that the George Street Barracks occupied a site of about 16½ acres in extent and that the value of the land was approximately £75,000. There were differences of opinion expressed by the witnesses as to the value of the proposed site for the new barracks at Paddington. The report of the Committee makes this clear.

"Major Barney describes the site in question as lying on the southern extremity of the town (Sydney); the proposed area is about the same as that of the existing Barracks or rather less. (In the event more than 29 acres were set aside). Land in that neighbourhood realises about £500 an acre, but it will no doubt rise considerably after the erection of the new Barracks.

"Mr. Lewis considers the value of the new site to be worth £500 an acre, and as the town extends in that direction it will certainly increase. . . ."

"Mr. Blackman estimates the land there to be worth £1500 an acre at least. He does not think that the value of the land would be enhanced by the erection of the new Barracks, except in so far as accommodation might be required for trades of a low description".

There is no record to show that Major Barney took offence

14. Votes and Proceedings, NSW Legislative Council, Vol. 5, 1840, p. 237 et seq.

at Mr. Blackman's slighting imputation.

Some of the answers given by Major Barney are of interest. The Committee asked the Commanding Royal Engineer 32 questions concerning the old barracks in George Street and the proposed new ones.

Question 18: "In a military point of view do you consider the present barracks in a convenient situation, or do you think it desirable that they should be removed from so crowded a part of the town?"

"It is generally considered advisable that the barracks should be outside of the town — I am not, however, aware of sickness having been the consequence of their present situation; but on account of the discipline of the troops I think a position outside the town would be more desirable".

Question 20: "Is the plan you now produce that of the site for the proposed new barracks?"

"Yes".

Question 21: "Have the goodness to describe its situation and area".

"It is situated on the southern extremity of the town, but immediately within its limits; the proposed area is about the same as that of the existing barracks or rather less".

Question 22: "Do you consider that site as altogether unexceptionable, bearing in mind the rapid extension of the town in that direction?"

"I think it is a good site in every respect, it was approved

by the late Governor, Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Bourke, and by a Board of Officers appointed to report upon it". (This was in 1836 — R.V.).

Question 24: "Have you prepared a plan of the new barracks?"

"Yes".

Question 25: "Has that plan received the approval of the Board of Ordnance?"

"The plan was submitted to the Master-General of the Ordnance in 1836, but I have not yet received an official approval of it. I have no doubt, however, that it will be approved. . . ."

Question 29: "Is it proposed to construct the whole of the buildings, including the original walls of brick (sic)?"

"It is".

(The answer to question 29 is surprising because the whole of the construction was in stone. Unless the Committee meant stone "bricks" and Barney was aware of the meaning of their question). (R.V.).

Question 30: On the matter of cost, Barney had no doubt that £60,000 would be sufficient.

Question 32: He thought the new barracks could be completed in about 2½ to 3 years. (He must have assumed a constant supply of funds and labour because the task actually occupied 7½ years).

In their conclusion the Committee considered that:

- (a) The value of the intended site could be taken as from £750 to £1000 an acre;
- (b) The cost, including the value of a new Commissariat

Office, could not be taken as under £60,000.

The Committee thought that when the site was selected in 1836, "none more eligible could be found, but now considered whether it was not desirable to consider an alternative site, eg, Grose Farm just beyond the limits of the town (where Sydney University now stands), or on the reserve on the South Head Road". (This has not been identified).

In spite of the implied doubts as to the suitability of the site at Paddington, the Committee concluded its report with these words:

"Under all the circumstances of the case, as above detailed, your Committee are disposed to recommend to your Excellency and Council the acceptance of the proposal of the Board of Ordnance, as sanctioned by the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury,

'by which the expense of the new barracks will be charged on the Land Revenue, in consideration of the old barracks, and the land belonging to them, being given up by the Ordnance Department to the Local Government to be disposed of in Town allotments'

Provided, however, that a sum not exceeding £60,000 be required from the Colonial Funds, and that any saving on that sum to be effected by the employment of convict labour or otherwise, be deducted from the amount so required".

His Excellency, Sir George Gipps, Knight, Captain General

and Governor-in-Chief of New South Wales, and the Council, did accept the report of the Committee. The Bill, however, suffered a change in title and passed into Law on 2 July, 1840 as the "Military Landholders Act No. 2" — An Act for enabling the Principal Officers of Her Majesty's Ordnance to hold Estates and Property in the Colony of New South Wales for Military purposes etc. etc.<sup>15</sup>

This Act is a significant one in the history of the Army in Australia, and as portions of the preamble to the Act give a clear exposition of intent they are worth repeating here:

"Whereas Divers Lands belonging to the Crown in the Colony of New South Wales had long been reserved and used for Military purposes and were then actually in the custody and under the charge of the Respective Officers of Her Majesty's Ordnance resident in the said Colony . . . and whereas it is expedient that the said Principal Officers etc. should have certain powers to acquire land and alienate lands etc. which they do not now possess.

. . . Immediately from and after the passing of this Act the said Principal Officers etc. shall have power to have and to hold all such messuages lands tenements etc. heretofore used for Military purposes . . . may be conveyed to them by deed of grant from the Crown".

Thus for the first time on this Continent the Army was entitled to the legal tenure and posses-

15. Public Statutes of NSW. 1 Vict to 10 Vict, 1838-1846, page 1015.

sion of land for Military purposes.

The Military Landholders Act made possible two important consequential steps:—

- (a) All the lands at that time occupied for military purposes, without the Army having a legal tenure, could be conveyed by formal Deed of Grant. This included such long used sites as the ground on which stands Lancer Barracks, Parramatta, and the sites then in use for military barracks at Windsor, Liverpool, Newcastle etc.
- (b) The land for new barracks at Paddington could be placed in the legal possession of the Board of Ordnance. This at once removed a major obstacle to the acceptance by the Board of the proposal that they should vacate the George Street site.

The second and third significant features arising from all these proceedings are just as important in the history of political and military developments in Australia.

For the first time on this continent a military installation was to be erected as the result of the vote of a local legislature. These matters had, up to then, always been resolved by simple use of the gubernatorial power.

Finally, note these words which are contained in the Ordnance Committee's recommendation:

“ . . . by which the expense of the new barrack will be charged

on the (Local) Land Revenue” and again

“ . . . Provided, however, that a sum not exceeding £60,000 be required from the *Colonial Funds*. . . .” (Author's italics).

Thus, for the first time in our history, military expenditure was to be borne from local revenue. The Local Government had no responsibility for the cost of Defence installations — that charge remained at this time, with the United Kingdom Government. How, then, would this expenditure be shown in the Estimates? As will be seen later, the appropriations were listed under “Public Works”.

The Victoria Barracks, Paddington are, therefore, the first military barracks to have been erected in Australia as a result of the decision of a local legislature and also the first to be charged to local revenue. It might reasonably be claimed that they were the first military barracks erected by the Australian people, and as a prerequisite to their erection the Army first gained the right to Deeds of Grant for land in this country.

#### Approval at Last

It had taken four years (from the time the site was selected) to gain an approval to build the new barracks at Paddington but, having gained that approval on 2 July, 1840, Gipps was not slow to act.

In his Despatch, No. 112, dated at Sydney on 17 August, 1840 and addressed to Lord J. Rufsele (Secretary for the Colon-

ies), Gipps informed His Lordship of the Committee's approval, and went on to say:

"I beg to report to your Lordship that I have signified to Major Barney, the Commanding Royal Engineer, that I am ready to make advances from the funds of the Colony, for the erection of the new Barracks, on the condition contained in the Report, whenever he may think fit to commence them.<sup>16</sup> The sum of £60,000 will I believe be sufficient to erect the Barracks, provided the work be undertaken whilst some assistance in the shape of convict labour can be given to it; but if it be deferred until there shall no longer be any convict labour at the disposal of this government, the sum to which it is proposed to limit the expenditure may possibly be found insufficient. . . ."

### A Start is Made

Monday, 8 February, 1841 was a typically hot summer day in Sydney. The morning was fine and bright, with a clear blue sky. The Sydney Morning Herald of the next day reported that on Monday the sun was "very powerful".

At the Hyde Park Barracks, the prisoners were, no doubt, roused early. Six hundred and thirty-six of them had only recently arrived in the ship "Kelso", and were being transhipped at Sydney for onward movement to Norfolk Island. However, the Governor had decided that it would be expedient to prolong their stay at Sydney — where there were

urgent works of a military nature to be completed, and the local supply of convict labour was scarce. Harbour fortifications were being built and improved; then there were the new barracks to be erected.<sup>17</sup>

Soon after breakfast on that day, a working party of convicts set out along the Old South Head Road and on arrival at the site for the new barracks, the overseer reported to Mr. Owen McHugh, Clerk of Works.

The first task at the new site was to level off some of the sandhills, to excavate for foundations, and to remove the overburden of soil from the localities where stone was to be quarried.

Royal Engineers were on the job to supervise the work of the convicts and to complete surveys.

Some idea of the difficulties associated with the site preparation in constructing the barracks can be gained by a study of the photograph which follows. The rocky outcrops where Green's Road is today are clearly seen. At the time of construction in 1841-1848 the sandhills extended over most of the site, and these posed special problems as, when whipped up by wind, the flying sand made working conditions extremely difficult. Excavations for foundations had to be sunk very deeply at the western end and, as can be imagined, diggings frequently collapsed.

16. The Governor had actually given his approval to Barney on 3 August, 1840 by a letter from the Colonial Secretary. That letter has not been located.

17. Governor Gipps' Despatch No. 43 of February, 1841 to Lord J. Russell.

### Finance

With the barracks under way, it is interesting to examine the unusual procedure adopted by the NSW Legislative Council in the matter of funds for the work.

As stated earlier, the local government had no responsibility for Defence expenditure, and the cost of the barracks was to be financed from local revenue, which would in turn be reimbursed by the sale of the site of the George Street Barracks.

The Votes and Proceedings of the NSW Legislative Council, covering the years during which the barracks were erected do not clearly show all the expenditure involved. Amounts set aside under "Public Works", for the new barracks, to a total of £39,500 have been traced. *An-nua!* allocations appear to have been as follows:


1841	—	£1,500
1842	—	£2,000
1844	—	£12,000
1845	—	£12,000
1846	—	£12,000

The appropriations represent a large expenditure when the value of convict labour used, which is not included, is taken into account.

As time passed the Ordnance Department appeared to lose

#### THE 1871 PHOTOGRAPH

Note the toll house and gate in the Old South Head Road (now Oxford Street) which is shown running up the rise towards the Church on the crestline. The Paddington Town Hall stands today at the north-east corner of the barracks wall. The splendid Moreton Bay Fig trees inside the wall are alive and healthy today, 90 years after the picture was taken.



VICTORIA BARRACKS, PADDINGTON, IN 1871.



sight of the original financial stipulation "... provided, however, that a sum not exceeding £60,000 be required from the Colonial Funds. . . .", and any savings effected by the employment of convict labour to be deducted from the amount so required.

By 1843 the Ordnance Officers then in NSW were firmly of the opinion that the Colony had to meet the bill regardless of final cost. They were sufficiently positive in this view to move the Governor to send a Despatch off to the Secretary for the Colonies (Lord Stanley) on 8 May, 1843 for the purpose of soliciting "Your Lordship's interference, to protect the Colony against any larger charge than that specified in the conditions".

In spite of the arrangements whereby funds would be provided by the Colony, it appears that some financial contribution towards the cost of the barracks — in the final stages — was made by the United Kingdom Government. On 19 May, 1848 the then Commanding Royal Engineer in NSW (Lt.-Col. Gordon) wrote to the Assistant Military Secretary of the Major-General Commanding in NSW (Major-General E. B. Wynyard) seeking an amount of £485-0-4, to provide for certain work at the barracks. Gordon alleged that the increase in costs was mainly caused by the withdrawal of convict labour during the period of construction.

### **The Succeeding Years**

The progress of the actual construction of the barracks, the details of the British Regiments

which occupied them and the story of their final departure from Australia will be told in another part of this record.

### **The Search for Facts**

The search for authentic data to put together the story of the building of the Victoria Barracks at Paddington has extended to the following sources:

The Mitchell Library, Sydney.  
The NSW Parliamentary Library.

The Public Library of NSW (for Newspaper files).

The Melbourne Public Library.

The Metropolitan Water Sewerage and Drainage Board, Sydney (for details of the water supply to the barracks. This is a story worth telling on its own).

Old papers found at Victoria Barracks.

The Ordnance Board, London; and

The Royal Australian Historical Society, NSW.

The search for George Barney's original plans of the barracks has, up to date, failed. It is possible that they are included in the archives of the Ordnance Board in London. Official details of progressive construction have also eluded the search. These were probably taken back to the United Kingdom by the Ordnance Board officers when they finally left this country. For these reasons it has been necessary to omit aspects of the story which remain incomplete or which cannot be authenticated.

### Transfer of Land to New South Wales

So much has been devoted to the problems associated with the acquisition of land for the barracks, that there may be some merit in taking this particular matter one step further.

At the time of the passing of the Constitution Act (which established NSW as a self-governing Colony) on 16 July, 1855 the Ordnance Lands (including the site of Victoria Barracks) were excluded from the Crown Lands which became the property of the Colony of NSW. Under the Act the Imperial Government retained possession of those lands which were vested in the Ordnance Board in London.

For many years the Colonial Government negotiated with the British Government for the surrender of these lands to the Colony. However, the matter was not settled until the issue of a Privy Council Order-in-Council dated 26 October, 1899 which surrendered the lands in question to the Colonial Government in NSW.<sup>18</sup>

### Conclusion

This is only a part of the history of the Army's priceless barracks at Paddington, but it is

possible this record of the beginnings that could have been increasingly difficult to unearth in future years. For this reason the story has been printed in spite of the fact that it is incomplete.

It may be, too, that these facts will increase interest in the barracks and help to emphasise the importance of those stone buildings.

The visitor who goes to Paddington, with expectations of seeing a crumbling ruin will be disappointed. The barracks are in better condition than many solid construction buildings less than half the same age. They provide essential accommodation for a major military headquarters and a number of other important facilities for the Army. In this respect it is fortunate that their continued survival does not depend solely on their great historical significance, but on the simple facts that they are as necessary today as any other great public buildings, and that the cost of their replacement in the foreseeable future, could not be justified as a concession to "progress" or on any other reasonable grounds.

18. H. W. H. Huntington, Sydney Morning Herald, 27 January, 1904.

# Strategic Review

## AN EMERGING EUROPE

Captain J. J. Kelly, Irish Army

(Reprinted from the March 1963 issue of "An Cosantoir", Eire)

EVERYONE now knows that in October last, America's New Frontiersmen were in consultation for many days and nights, before and after John F. Kennedy, in his memorable message to the world on Sunday, 22nd October, threw down the gauntlet to Mr. Khrushchev. For days, we seemed to be very close to nuclear war, while the more liberal-minded equated Turkey with Cuba and the ever-ready demonstrators rag - tagged through the various capitals of the world. Eventually, Russia beat a retreat in the face of superior arms. Russia was the only true peace-loving nation, we were then told, but, apparently, this was not a tune that appealed to its obstreperous bed-fellow, Red China, and since we have been treated to the violent bickerings of the Communist partners.

### Berlin Histrionics

Towards the end of January, Khrushchev arrived in East Berlin for the East German Communist Party Congress and declared: "As Marxist-Leninists, we cannot conceive the creation of a Communist civilisation on the ruins of the world's cultural

centres, upon an earth deserted and poisoned by thermonuclear fallout. . . ."

Krushchev, of course, was talking to the Chinese whipping-boy, Albania.

"Blessed is he who chatters about war and does not understand what he is chattering about", he said in an obvious reference to Peking's lack of nuclear arms.

In reply, General Wu Hsiuchuan, the Chinese representative, took Yugoslavia as his nominal target. He declared that the Yugoslav Communist Party had surrendered to the imperialists and was usurping the title of Communists. But to the 2,500 delegates at the Congress, Wu's assertions were unacceptable and were greeted by frenzied cat-calling, booing and foot-stamping. In the long Chinese-Russian wrangle, this was the first time the Chinese had been so blatantly humiliated in public by their ideological comrades. Probably carefully engineered, the demonstration seems to indicate a widening in the rift between the two major powers. Basically, however, the Communist ideal is still world

domination and that it is a matter for dispute how best to implement this ideal does not alter the fact that Peking-Moscow are still partners. To quote China's Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, in November, 1960: "Soviet Communism has bloomed a Soviet flower and Chinese Communism a Chinese one. Both are equally Communism, but their flowers are of different hues". Whether the hues are sufficiently different to cause complete disruption is, to say the least, doubtful. China and Russia still form one of the two great power blocs and opposed by the democratic West. The stalemate of the Cold War continues to exist after seventeen years.

### The American Budget

America, the powerhouse of the West, recognises this and in proposing to Congress, the 1964 U.S. budget — the biggest in the nation's history — President Kennedy seeks the colossal figure of 59.6 billion dollars for warlike purposes, 55.4 billion under the heading, National Defence and 4.2 billion for Space Research. It is worthy of note that a further 10.1 billion is charged up to interest on the Public Debt. As the Public Debt itself may be attributed to previous defence spending, the military might of the Western Bloc is going to cost America 69.7 billion dollars, or over 70 per cent. of the total expenditure of 98.8 billions envisaged in the budget during fiscal year 1964, which begins on 1st July next. Some items listed for procurement in 1964 are:—

1. Six Polaris missile-firing nuclear submarines.
2. Thirty warships, including six nuclear submarines (non-Polaris).
3. 150 improved Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missiles.
4. Development of a 1,650 m.p.h. tactical fighter plane for the Air Force and the Navy — the F-111, formerly TFX.
5. The forming of an Army experimental air assault division, specially designed for mobility.
6. Redesigning of the Nike-Zeus anti-missile missile and development of the highly secret Nike X.

An interesting aspect of the 1964 budget, is that in catering for an expenditure of 98.8 billion dollars, President Kennedy budgeted for a deficit of 11.9 billion and further let it be known that the government deliberately plans to run in the red until 1967. The U.S. economy is still lagging and this is one of Kennedy's ways of getting it moving and possibly getting it closer to the 5 per cent. growth rate promised in the 1960 Presidential campaign. One cannot help but think that less defence expenditure would help to solve America's economic problems, but coupled with that, one must admire the thinking that puts the freedom of the world before selfish housekeeping. That the freedom of the world may be only incidental to American freedom, does not matter. The US remains the bulwark of the West. Is her contribution in this regard appreciated?

### President De Gaulle

President De Gaulle has been quoted as saying: "The United States, delighting in her resources, feeling that she no longer had within herself sufficient scope for her energies, wishing to help those who were in misery or bondage the world over, yielded in her turn to that taste for intervention in which the instinct for domination cloaked itself". He has also said: "The Anglo-American powers never consented to deal with us as genuine allies", and on Europe, "Europe can only find peace . . . in an association between Slavs, Germans, Gauls and Latins". In recent weeks, he has lent emphasis to these statements by his actions and at the now famous press conference in the Elysee Palace, he made it clear that he does not appreciate interference in France's (and Europe's) affairs, whether intentions be noble or otherwise. "France intends to have its own national defence", he declared. "It is an absolute necessity for a great people to be master of its destiny and to have the means to fight to protect it. Alliances are not a virtue in themselves, whatever may be the sentiments on which they are based".

It is accepted that General De Gaulle is not interested in helping to build a multilateral NATO nuclear force that would be under American control. When he stated that he preferred "to construct and, if necessary, to employ our atomic force ourselves", he made the point clear. In furtherance of this policy, he showed no

interest in Kennedy's offer of Polaris and in coldly rejecting Britain's bid for entry into the European Common Market, he appears to have been having another tilt at American leadership and dependence thereon. He does not want any part in an Atlantic partnership dominated by America. He wants Europe, it seems, led by France, to go it alone: a Europe minus Britain, unless the British become "Europeans", which, in effect, means cutting links with the U.S. and the Commonwealth. Various reasons have been put forward for this attitude, among them, that De Gaulle sees himself as a man of destiny and that he now sees the opportunity to "tear the gag from her (France's) mouth and the chains from her limbs, so that she can make her voice heard and resume her march towards her destiny".

### "The Atlantic to the Urals"

Some commentators would have us believe that the French President is overconcerned with destiny and that, consequently, he is more of a visionary than a realist. It has been mooted that his vision of a Europe united from "the Atlantic to the Urals", may be only a mirage. This, however, is only one side of the story and it is probably pertinent that the sage of American columnists, Walter Lippman, has written: "We shall delude ourselves if we think his (De Gaulle's) action is a mere episode which will be washed away by the stream of history. . . . He is confronting this country (U.S.) with the need to make a

difficult and momentous reappraisal of our postwar foreign policy". This does not concur with the obtuse view that General De Gaulle's vision of the New Europe is a mere "delusion of grandeur" and, conversely, it hints — significant, perhaps, coming from an American — that the man who has brought France to its present eminence may have more foresight than many of his contemporaries on the world political scene. Still, one is left wondering whether it is opportune for Europe to turn its back on America at this particular stage.

The withdrawal in Cuba and the subsequent promise by Khrushchev to meet the West "halfway" in his exchange of letters with Kennedy towards the end of last year, lends credence to Russia's anxiety to avoid nuclear war, but it scarcely means that Russia is ready for peace with the West. Eventually, it is hoped, the day will come when Russia, possibly pressured by Red China, may seek agreement with the West, but that day has not yet arrived. In the meantime, General De Gaulle seems to be intent on making sure that when people are willing to live in peace from "the Atlantic to the Urals", it will be France who will have the credit for making such an event possible, and not the U.S.A. It is understandable that De Gaulle should make such a move, but it is hard to appreciate why he should do so at this stage and why he should take a step which places the strength of the Western Alliance in jeopardy.

### Franco-German Entente

Despite the Sino-Soviet split, the Communist bloc still presents a solid front and world domination, whether it is achieved by full-scale nuclear war, limited conventional war, internal revolution and disruption in emerging countries or peaceful infiltration, still remains as the ultimate aim. A united West should be better able to counteract this and it is reasonable to assume that it would be more likely to influence Russia and encourage any inclinations the Soviet Union might have towards seeking a peaceful solution to the Cold War. To quote the father-figure of the European Economic Market, Jean Monnet: "We must understand clearly that for the peace of the world it is imperative that Britain join the European Economic Community and that an equal relationship of partners be built between a united Europe, including Britain, and the U.S. . . . it is only in consolidating the West, that one can establish the conditions for a firm peace with the Soviet Union". France's European allies and co-members of the Common Market are not in agreement with the French President either and, at Brussels, the signs are that it was only a fear of breaking up the Common Market that avoided a disastrous rift on continental Europe. Adenauer appears to be De Gaulle's only convinced supporter and even his support is not totally unreserved, probably because opinion in West Germany is so sharply divided. The French and German leaders may

see the Franco-German entente as the foundation stone of a resurgent Europe, but in the final analysis, the fate of Europe still hinges on the powerful support of the U.S.

### **America's Role**

America possesses 97 per cent. of the Western nuclear striking force and in this context, not alone feels responsible for preserving freedom from Russian aggression, but, and this is more important, it is the only country in the West capable of doing so. As America insists on sitting on her nuclear secrets this position is likely to continue and President De Gaulle's contention that secrets cannot be even partially exclusive if there is to be a proper alliance, is nothing more than a desirable refinement at the moment. The hard reality is that America has developed and is developing her nuclear strength at considerable sacrifice, as witness the 1964 budget, and that she is willing to put her powerful military machine, both nuclear and conventional, on the line in defence of the free world. The fact that the U.S. Government is prohibited by law from sharing information on nuclear weapons is, of course, inconvenient in a closely-knit alliance, but the other countries concerned must accept this inconvenience, since America is indispensable to the Western defence. Her reasons for withholding secrets are logical, too. America's policy in this respect is to prevent a leakage of nuclear secrets and, in this way, to have another lever that may help to persuade Russia to conclude a nuclear pact.

U.S. motives are not altogether altruistic in contributing to Western defence. In the event of war, Europe would be her forward defence and from the U.S.'s point of view, it would be desirable to contain and defeat an aggressor there. Aided by her NATO allies, the probability of doing so is distinct, but if the US withdrew from Europe, the indigenous troops would be capable of offering little resistance and the Continent would be overrun, to the advantage of neither Europe nor America. Therefore, for the benefit of both it is imperative that American forces remain in Europe and remain in sufficient strength to deter any aggressive move by Russia. In common with everyone else, De Gaulle must accept this, but what makes the pill distasteful is that America, by virtue of her strength and the stalemate of the Cold War, is the dominating power in the Western world and that this situation will remain as long as the two great power blocs, constantly increasing in military strength, confront each other. Does General De Gaulle hold the key to the breaking of this deadlock?

### **Russian Reaction**

Already the Soviet Union has reacted to the signing of the Franco - German co-operation treaty, and in simultaneous Notes to France and West Germany on 5 February, protested strongly. The Note to France declared that, if the French Government wanted to build a real bridge of friendship between France and Germany, it should

recognise the existence of two German States and should cooperate with the Soviet Union in its efforts to finalise a German peace treaty. Objections were also raised to West Germany having access to nuclear weapons and it was stated that Russia would consider such accession as an urgent threat to its interests and that it would be obliged "to take the immediate measures necessary which would be dictated by such a situation". It was further stated that "No one should have the slightest doubt about the determination of the Soviet Union to use the rights she derives from her victory over Germany, a victory which cost her millions of lives, and her solemn undertaking not to allow any renewed German aggression".

It may be construed that Soviet protestations are a sure sign that De Gaulle is on the right road and that a reorganised and revitalised Europe would be a powerful stumbling-block to Soviet ambitions. If this is so, one must wonder how far Russia would go in backing its threat of "immediate measures". Indeed, one wonders if it would take the trouble to threaten at all, if America did not loom so largely on the horizon.

### Conclusion

Russia and China are quarrelling, but how deep their differences go is a matter for conjecture. Certainly, Mao tse-Tung's hundred flowers are beginning to blossom in dif-

ferent colours, but whether that means that the seeds he planted were different from those of his Russian neighbours, it is too early to say. The split in the Western camp seems to be based on whether Europe is to be American - dominated from Hampstead to the Brandenburg Gate, or whether it is to be an independent entity from "the Atlantic to the Urals". The first means that China-Russian differences are of little consequence, while acceptance of the second would imply that the differences are fundamental and of sufficient magnitude to force Russia into an integrated Europe.

At the moment, the indications seem to be that Russia, while willing to keep the Cold War cold, is not prepared to come to acceptable terms with the West at the expense of her ally, China, and it would certainly be dangerous to assume otherwise. Therefore, America, dominant or not, because of her material strength, must remain for some time to come as the chief guardian of Western interests.

Europe is steeped in tradition on a spiritual, intellectual and cultural level and this heritage must influence President De Gaulle's actions greatly, in seeking her salvation as an independent, powerful unit. But as the "Grand Old Lady" recovers from her *malaise* and sets about consolidating her position, it must be reassuring to have a strong young friend, however brash, standing guard not too far in the background.



# THE BATTLE GROUP ORGANISATION

Colonel F. W. Speed, OBE, ED  
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THE AMF Gold Medal and ASCO Prize Essay 1962 is a first class piece of work — good writing and good military thinking. It is to be hoped that it will receive the attention it deserves from general staff officers and planners.

There are four points which might be made — to aid in clarifying thought.

The use of the word "independent" in connection with the companies of the light infantry battalion is, perhaps, unfortunate. It brings to mind the very different Australian independent companies of the 1939-45 War; and could lead to thoughts of "penny-packets" and the disastrous "Jock Columns" of the Western Desert. There is no doubt that ability to create small, compact, self-sufficient forces for anti-insurgency and anti-guerilla operations will be necessary. But we should avoid anything which might lead, in operations, to the idea that the infantry company is normally the nucleus around which such a force should be formed. Let us keep our minds open by avoiding the word "independent" in the title of the com-

pany — or any other unit/sub-unit of infantry.

Much additional value will be gained if the Essay is read, and re-read, in conjunction with the article in the Australian Army Journal for March 1963 entitled "Man — The Key Weapon". That article made a strong case for special service units for anti-insurgency, anti-guerilla warfare, and more conventional operations. Special service troops are expensive to produce and their wastage is more difficult to replace. Since the Australian infantryman is being trained for operations in the particular type of warfare expected in South East Asia, there is a strong case for teaching him some of the special service tactics. Not only will he thus be a more versatile fighter, but the special service soldier will be conserved for longer range tasks outside the ambit of the infantry.

An outstanding feature of the organisation proposed in the Essay is the idea of a maintenance element in the infantry platoon. The proposition that the platoon, with an in-built capacity to maintain itself for a

longish period, backed by aerial re-supply, could be more flexible than insurgent forces tied for maintenance to caches and fortified villages, is most attractive and worthy of early trial.

It is regrettable that the writer of the essay did not make more use of the indigenous troops than to include them only as interpreters. One of our major problems is the difference in physical appearance of Australians compared with the local

inhabitants of South East Asian countries. There is a need for the gradual integration of indigenes into the framework of our organisation. A start was made in Korea and the idea was re-applied, albeit for a different purpose, in Malaya. The process would need to be a gradual one. But the idea, in due course, of a patrol comprising a mixture of Australian and Asian soldiers, trained as a team, would be a substantial contribution to the problem.

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The increasing use of the adjective sophisticated impelled us to look it up in the dictionary. The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines *sophisticate* thus: *To involve (subject) in sophistry; mislead; deprive (person or thing) of simplicity; tamper with (text & co) for purpose of argument; adulterate.* Webster has this to say: *To use quibbling arguments about; to make involved; to make artificial; to delude; to mislead; to amend or alter (text); to adulterate.*

At the risk of being thought unfashionable, it would, in the interests of clarity and grace, be better to use a word which really does mean what the writer thinks he is saying.

# THE ARMY'S AIR DEFENCE ROLE

Major B. R. Topfer,  
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How deeply do you think the Army should be committed in contributing to active air defence? Are you firmly convinced that AA units are of such vital importance to our Order of Battle that they should be re-equipped with modern weapons as a matter of the highest priority? Or perhaps you believe that such units are only second-class contributors to the Army's main task, and even an embarrassment for most of the time? Whether your views tend to the extreme in either direction, or lie somewhere in between, I hope that this article will give you some food for thought on the matter.

There can be little doubt that missiles have replaced guns as the most effective modern surface-to-air weapons. Our Army has recognised this by retiring HAA units from the active scene, and retaining only LAA units, equipped with a gun which can claim only a limited effectiveness — far from ideal — at low level. The future of our LAA units must therefore be a matter for serious consideration in the very near future, and

some form of costly re-equipment programme, probably including guided missiles, must become part of any such consideration.

But before we re-equip in any form, will we really be satisfied that we are doing so to undertake a role that is right and proper for the Army, or will we be thinking no further than finding new weapons to carry on the old AA artillery role? For that matter, are we convinced that the old AA artillery role was a necessary one for the Army in any case? Perhaps we have doubts about it, or it may even be that we just have not stopped to consider it.

## The Army's Main Task

Any Army claim for a role, which must involve money, equipment and manpower to carry it out, should be based on the Army's proper task in national defence. Surely this task is to do those things — and only those things — which a suitably organised, properly trained and skilled military land force can do, conduct sustained military operations on land. This

is the military role which only the Army can claim, no other Service can perform it.

If the Army gets at all clearly outside the area of requirements to meet its main task, then it is creating both internal and external difficulties for itself, and probably wasting national resources. I, for one, believe that both past and present Army commitments in active air defence can be criticised on just these grounds.

### Logical Responsibility for the Air Defence Role

I am sure everyone agrees that overall control of air defence measures must rest with the Air Force; attack and defence from the air must be in the Air Force's province, just as attack and defence on the ground is the Army's responsibility. Areas of mutual interest and activity must exist, and the most efficient and effective method of dealing with these is for one Service to own and control the equipment and units involved, catering for the other Service's interests by joint planning and mutual agreement. Can we really say that present, or even past, Army air defence policy measures up to this standard, remembering that the major interested party in air defence is the Air Force?

We have become accustomed to the Army contributing to active air defence with its AA artillery closely integrated with Air Force measures. We thus provide units commanded by the Army, but under Air Force operational control. After some little experience with such units, I

have come to believe that there is far more conflict, difficulty and disappointment in providing, training and using them than there should be. All of it stems from command and control being exercised by two different Services. You may well ask: why then did such a system come into use in the first place? I can only answer that it seems, when the aeroplane first appeared on the scene as a weapon of war, that the new Service formed to operate in the air — the Air Force — was interested only in flying aeroplanes. Gunfire from the ground was an obvious form of defence against air attack, and the Army through its Gunners was experienced in operating guns on the ground; the AA role came to the Army by default and through force of circumstances. But I believe this solution begged the question; it gave an answer based on a type of equipment (and equipments change!) rather than an area of major interest. The result has been a role out of step with every other task in the Army.

For AA Gunners, of necessity, must think and operate in an environment closely related to everything that is happening in the air, and in which ground operations must become of secondary importance. On the other hand, everyone else in the Army is concerned with operations on the ground, with some assistance or hindrance from the air as just another factor to be considered.

There is no gainsaying the fact that, right from its incep-

tion, the Air Force has had to keep its feet, literally, on the ground. Aircraft need ground airfields from which to operate, and these days an effective Air Force must operate surface-to-air missiles as well as aircraft. The RAAF has already made a start in this direction. So there can no longer be any claim that the Air Force has no interest or experience in operating active air defence measures from ground to air. To follow my line of reasoning, this was a rather tenuous argument in any case.

To me the logical conclusion is irresistible, even if it is revolutionary, and no doubt unpopular both in certain Army circles and perhaps in the great majority of the Air Force. The entire air defence role — except the Army's all arms weapons for close AA protection of ground troops — logically should be transferred to one Service, which can only be the Air Force. I believe that this policy should have been followed in the first place, and hasten to add that such a situation is not without precedent, for I note that the German 88mm AA guns used at the siege of Tobruk in 1941 were manned by the Luftwaffe.

A policy such as I advocate would leave the Army free to concentrate its efforts in research and development, equipment and manpower on the means to accomplish its basic role, and would leave to the Air Force all the essentially air-related problems of active air defence. I feel the Army would benefit by:—

- (a) Being spared the problems and costs of equipping with

specialised surface-to-air weapons, which would involve wasteful and sometimes unsatisfactory integration with Air Force systems, and whose operation might even be claimed by the Air Force in the long term.

- (b) Losing a task that calls for a breed of soldier whose basic orientation is quite different from that of other soldiers in the Army.
- (c) The Artillery being freed from the necessity of either producing two different types of Gunner, or laboriously cross-training in two fields which are actually far more different than they are alike in their requirements of technology, temperament, and attitude of mind.

### The Artillery's Problem

As the importance and power of the aeroplane as a weapon of warfare increased, so did that of AA artillery, and there can be no doubt that two breeds of Gunner developed in all the major artilleries of the world — AA and Field. The two branches were worlds apart — in spheres of interest and activity, types of equipment, techniques — in short, in almost every way. The fact that each branch was uneasy in belonging to the same Regiment as the other was even less important than the fact that the AA Gunner could not help feeling uneasy at belonging to the same organisation as the rest of the Army! The motivation for AA Gunners to sit and wait for something to happen in

the sky was quite different from that of everyone else around them, actively engaged in something constructive on the ground. Further, it was with a sense of their own inadequate knowledge of the Army generally, and Field Branch artillery particularly, that AA Branch Officers approached promotion requirements or a posting outside the AA sphere; all their thoughts and training had been directed towards what was happening in the air.

In the later stages of World War II, when the Allies achieved major air superiority, it plainly became necessary to convert large numbers of AA units to Field Branch artillery, and for the remaining AA units there was always the possibility of using them in the ground role. The Australian Army has followed this trend to the point where it has very few air defence units, equipped only with an LAA gun that is very much obsolescent. No one could claim that the techniques of employing this weapon are a lifetime study, but they are a study quite divergent from the employment of other military weapons, even for a Gunner. This has meant that to man our Regular LAA commitment and maintain fair career prospects, the Artillery currently has to cross-train officers and senior NCOs. Like it or not, this represents an artificial and essentially unconsummated marriage of the two branches.

However, it seems that the honeymoon will be brief. Divorce of the two branches again will be the inevitable outcome if we re-

equip our air defence units with missiles, as seems more than likely. Missiles are more complex technologically than guns, their training requirements are long and demanding. But even more important, missiles need essentially and basically technically-minded people — far more technically-minded than are required for Field Branch artillery even with the advances that have been made in its technology. The Artillery would again be faced with the problem of two separate branches, one dealing in the highly complex and rather static air defence field, and the other concentrating on the main artillery task of dynamic support of infantry and armour. I cannot help but feel that people involved in air defence would benefit most by not having to maintain a ground (Army) proficiency, and by being able to develop an air (Air Force) proficiency.

This situation and a solution similar to my proposal is not without precedent for the Gunners. The problems of coast defence, and even more so, anti-tank defence, bear witness to this. The controversy surrounding the responsibility for anti-tank defence was resolved, quite properly to my mind, with the RAAC operating tanks and the units devoted solely to heavy anti-tank weapons, and all Arms and Services possessing their own integral weapons for close self-protection only.

I suggest that the problem of air defence calls for a similar solution, with the Air Force

operating all units devoted solely to active air defence, and the Army using only All Arms close self-protection weapons. After all, even a Divisional Administrative Area contains several major units who must protect it from ground attack in any case. With the right unit weapons they can protect it as well as themselves against low-level attack from the air. If there is a task in the Divisional area of sufficient importance to warrant protection by an air defence unit, then the normal continuous procedures of joint Army / Air Force operations would be capable of assessing the priorities involved and providing an Air Force unit for the task.

### Conclusion

Now is the critical time for the future of the few air defence units retained by the Army to be decided. It is vital that the right decision is taken, and conditions have never been more favourable for us to make quite certain whether or not we would be following the right course in retaining Army air defence units in any form at all.

On balance, I consider it would be in the interests of the Army as a whole, and the Artillery in particular, to give up immediately to the Air Force the entire air defence role, save for the very limited part essential to all Arms and Services for their close self-protection using unit weapons.

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### COMPETITION FOR AUTHORS

The Board of Review has awarded first places and prizes of £5 for the best original articles published in March, April and May as follows:—

- March — Man — The Key Weapon, by Major E. M. McCormick, Royal Australian Infantry.
- April — Wild Rice and Green Strangers, by Lieutenant Colonel A. E. G. Strong, Royal Australian Armoured Corps.
- May — AMF-CMF Integration, by Lieutenant Colonel C. J. Millar, CMF, and Lieutenant Colonel A. E. G. Strong, ARA.

# REPATRIATION BEFORE FEDERATION

Colonel, The Honourable R. W. Swartz, MBE, ED, MP, (RL).

AUSTRALIANS have long been proud of our Repatriation system which is generally accepted as being one of the finest in the world. Over the years many thousands of ex-servicemen and women and their dependants have benefited under the system, but how many know that repatriation was a familiar word in this country long before Federation.

If asked, most Australians would say that our Repatriation system began during the First World War; some may be more specific and say that it really began in 1917 when Senator Edward Millen was appointed as the first Minister for Repatriation.

In a way the advocates for the 1917 era are possibly correct, but there is almost as much to be said in support of people who claim that Repatriation began in Australia about 35 years before that date.

The principle that an ex-serviceman was entitled to compensation for himself and his dependants for physical injuries suffered by him in his service to his country was accepted in Australia long before Federation and many years before the Repatriation Department was established.

Before Federation each Australian State had Colonial status

only. The result of this was that our contribution to the Empire in times of war was rather a piecemeal affair. Men, money and materials were raised by individual States or by a number of States joining together.

In our history there are three examples of this type of contribution to the Empire's cause and each of them in their way helped in the development of our present Repatriation system.

The first example was the Sudan War, the second, the Boxer Rebellion and the third, the Boer War.

In 1885, New South Wales raised a contingent to go to the Sudan. It was probably the first force raised by a Colonial Government for Empire service overseas. The contingent left N.S.W. on March 3 of that year but did not arrive in the theatre of war in time to take part in any of the battles.

The men returned to their homeland without suffering any casualties, apart from the normal sicknesses expected among any group of men in every-day life, and as a result questions of compensation or rehabilitation did not arise.

It is of interest, however, that the Sudan contingent was the first group of Australians to see service of the type which today



would qualify members for benefits or pensions under Repatriation Legislation.

Fifteen years after the Sudan contingent had left these shores the British Government asked the States to raise forces to help in the Boxer Rebellion Campaign. Three States agreed to do so and in 1900 more than 600 officers and men sailed for China.

The men came from New South Wales (304), Victoria (198) and South Australia (103). As far as it is known the contingent's activities during the Rebellion were confined largely to police work in Tientsin. They were not involved in any of the actual fighting.

Early in 1901 the men returned to Australia and were discharged.

As the Boxer contingent had been raised at the request of the British Government, the Australian States were not liable for the payment of pension rights or benefits. One of the conditions of their service was that the British Government would be responsible for compensation for death or disability due to their service.

At present there is no State legislation under which benefits can be paid for service in the Rebellion although at the time N.S.W. did have a general provision that members of the forces who were killed or wounded on service would be entitled to such a pension or gratuity as Parliament may decide. Widows or families of the men involved were covered to the same degree.

In Victoria, the Government accepted some responsibility for the pay and maintenance of its contingent. Private funds were also raised for the same purpose but no legislation existed for any repatriation rights.

Before the Boer War began several of the colonies offered the troops to the Imperial Government; and in September, 1899, six of the colonies held a meeting in Melbourne and decided to raise a "United Australian Military Contingent".

The Imperial Government accepted the offers on the following conditions, "Troops to be disembarked at the point of landing in South Africa fully equipped at the cost of the Colonial Government or volunteers. Imperial Government will provide pay at Imperial rates, supplies and ammunition and will defray expenses of transport back to the colony and will pay wound pensions and compassionate allowances at Imperial rates".

The colonies sent about 12,000 men to South Africa. Once in that country they were, for the most part, paid by the Imperial Government and some were issued with equipment. In all cases, however, they were paid by the colonies or maintained themselves until they reached there.

Apart from any rights to pensions from the Imperial Government the Australians were eligible for assistance from funds donated in the various colonies.

In addition to the members who received disability pensions from the Imperial Government,

New South Wales and Victoria paid pensions to a number of members on the same lines as the Imperial pensions.

The two colonies paid these pensions under State legislation and have continued to do so up to the present time.

None of the States provided medical treatment for their members but the Imperial Government paid for treatment under certain limited circumstances.

After Federation in 1901 Commonwealth contingents were raised and equipped on the same basis as the State contingents, but when the 4000 men concerned reached South Africa the war was virtually over and the only casualties were due to illnesses.

The Commonwealth Government was not called upon to assist in the rehabilitation or compensation of the "Common-

wealth Enlistments" who, incidentally, were required to sign an acknowledgement that they had no claim on the Commonwealth Government in the event of death or disablement.

The Imperial Government did not extend to the Commonwealth contingent the pension rights it had applied to the State contingents.

Australia's Repatriation System has changed considerably since those early days. At present the Department employs more than 8,300 people, it has 4,300 hospital beds and the number of people receiving Repatriation pensions or benefits now exceeds 710,000.

The Department's expenditure this year will be about £107 million—a magnificent tribute to the Australian people's acceptance of their responsibility to the men and women who served their country in times of war.

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Remember tradition does not mean that you never do anything new, but that you will never fall below the standard of courage and conduct handed down to you. Then tradition, far from being handcuffs to cramp your action, will be a handrail to guide and steady you in rough places.

— Field Marshal Sir William Slim.



## THE WAR IN THE AIR 1939-1945

AWAY back in the dark days of 1916-17 it seemed to the armies locked in the mud and misery of the Western Front that the gallant airmen who fought their duels in their crazy little machines were the only combatants who had escaped the abyss of murderous brutality into which war appeared to have fallen. It seemed that they were the only elements of the embattled nations still able to fight in accordance with the ancient knightly code. The names of the great aces were known to all — Bishop and Robinson, Richtofen and Immelmann. To the men entrapped in the reeking stalemate, these great names represented a more chivalric way of fighting, a way which could relieve mankind of much of the dreadful suffering which war entails. How were they to know that other men would see a different vision and would develop a theory of war which in essence aimed at transferring the main impact from the battlefield to the civil population.

In the years between the wars the advocates of "strategic" bombing argued their case persistently and persuasively. The more extreme among them held

that in future war all that land-bound armies would have to do would be to march in and accept the surrender of the enemy people. Even the most moderate of them relegated armies and navies to a secondary role.

Two recently published books tell the story of the attempt to demonstrate the truth of these theories in World War II. One is the official British history of the RAF's bombing of Germany — *The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany 1939-45*, by Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland. (Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London). The other — "*The Bombing of Germany*" by Hans Rumpf (Muller, London) — tells the story of the bombing from the receiving end.

Unlike the other books in the British official history of the war, this one is completely documented, though no reason is given for the departure from practice. Told in great detail, the story reveals much new information. Not the least important relates to the casualties incurred by Bomber Command, the percentage of total war effort employed and the failure of the operations to achieve their declared aim. Scarcely less important is the fact, revealed starkly and dispassionately, that the advocates of strategic bomb-

ing had never really worked out their theories in detail, that all along they were relying on the effects of mass destruction and terror.

Bomber Command's fatal air-crew casualties numbered more than 55,000, which appears to be much higher in proportion to strength than the loss sustained by any other large command in any of the three services. These figures are a striking reply to the theory that air warfare was going to be much cheaper than any other form of international conflict.

Equally striking is the revelation that official communiques relating to strategic bombing, particularly during the first three-quarters of the war, were not overburdened with truth. In August 1941 a careful analysis of photographs taken during night bombing operations shows that only one in five of the engaged aircraft got within five miles of its target. Over the Ruhr the proportion was only one in ten. The authors of this official account make no bones about the fact that at this stage Bomber Command was doing Germany very little damage. Even in 1943, when techniques had greatly improved, analysis of one raid on Berlin showed that the bombing extended back for some thirty miles along the line of approach.

In the face of the evidence of their inability to hit any target smaller than a city, the Air Staff turned to the expedient of area bombing. In a directive issued on 9 July 1941, Bomber Command was instructed to direct

its main effort towards dislocating the German transportation system and to destroying the morale of the civil population as a whole and the industrial workers in particular. Railway centres lying in congested industrial areas were given as targets "suitable for obtaining incidental effects on the morale of the industrial population". In 1943 the Chief of the Air Staff went so far as to prescribe that Bomber Command's aiming points were to be "the built-up areas, not, for instance, the dockyards or aircraft factories".

We may pause to imagine what would have happened if we had lost the war and if the victorious enemy had elected to stage a few war-crimes trials. The most skilful counsel would have had some difficulty in demonstrating that those directives did not constitute direct violations of the Geneva Convention. In the face of the written evidence it could hardly have been argued that the civilians had been killed by bombs aimed at a factory or a railway yard. It would have been still harder to demonstrate that in order to impair the clearly-defined industrial area of Hamburg it was necessary to destroy the entire city in a frightful fire storm and kill some 55,000 people, mostly women and children.

Until the closing months of the war the British authorities appear to have seriously overestimated the effects of bombing and to have underestimated the strength and resilience of German industry. They believed, perhaps because they wanted to

believe, that German industry was being steadily destroyed when it was in fact steadily expanding. Actually, German aircraft production continued to increase until September 1944.

Nevertheless, the massive pre-invasion offensives mounted by the bomber forces of Great Britain and the United States did win the measure of air superiority necessary to enable the invasion of Europe to take place. However, the fact that the Luftwaffe never fully recovered and that the Allied air forces enjoyed an increasing degree of superiority by no means resulted entirely from operations in the air. As the Allied armies advanced the Germans lost their radar and early-warning systems in western France, Belgium and the Netherlands, together with their advanced fighter bases. The Allies now held these advantages, and it was this factor as much as any other which enabled them to drive the Luftwaffe from the skies.

During the war Hans Rumpf was Inspector General of Fire Prevention in Germany. He was, therefore, in a good position not only to see what went on but to assess the damage inflicted by the Allied bombings. He estimates that about 600,000 German civilians were killed in air raids and about 800,000 seriously wounded. (Some 60,000 were killed in the United Kingdom.) Nevertheless, the fighting spirit of the German people remained unimpaired until the very end, despite Lord Trenchard's comfortable conviction that their morale would break

before that of the British. From both these books the plain fact emerges that on neither side did the indiscriminate bombing of civilians succeed in breaking the morale of the people.

Hans Rumpf is at some pains to show that it was not the Luftwaffe that started the sorry business. Quoting British authorities, he shows that the first deliberate attack on a civilian area was the bombing of Munchen-Gladbach by the RAF on 11 May 1940. He produces other evidence to show that Berlin had been bombed eight times before the counter-attack was launched on London. While this may be true enough, Herr Rumpf conveniently overlooks the Luftwaffe's attacks on Warsaw and Rotterdam.

However, in his conclusions Herr Rumpf strikes a sure note. In World War II the bombs used were pretty puny missiles measured against today's nuclear standards. Once indiscriminate bombing started it got completely out of hand. He believes, and in the light of experience it is indeed difficult to refute his arguments, that if nuclear weapons are employed on a small scale the situation will get out of hand very rapidly. And if that happens it is all up for both sides.

Together these two books constitute a hard factual answer to those who told us, and would still tell us, that the quickest and cheapest way to win a war is to attack the will of the enemy people from the air.

— E.G.K.

**THE PROFESSION OF ARMS,** by Lieutenant General Sir John Winthrop Hackett, KCB, CBE, DSO, MC. (The Times Publishing Company Ltd., Printing House Square, London, E.C.4).

This slim little paperback of 67 pages contains the 1962 Lees Knowles lectures given by the author at Trinity College, Cambridge. In them the author traces the gradual development of the soldier's vocation into a true profession, from ancient Greece to the present day.

General Hackett defines the function of the profession of arms as the ordered application of force in the resolution of social problems, and shows that it resembles other professions, such as medicine and law, in that it has a distinguishable corpus of specific knowledge and doctrine, a more or less exclusive group coherence, a complex of institutions peculiar to itself, an education pattern adapted to its needs, a career structure of its own and a distinct place in society.

Using this definition, the general shows that in ancient Greece only Sparta possessed a truly professional army. Sparta, because of the peculiar social and economic organisation of the state, degenerated into rigid militarism which, after some initial success, was in the end overthrown by more versatile adversaries. Rome achieved much success with an army that was professional in the sense that its members followed no other occupation but that was not professional in the sense of an established educational system.

It is in fact surprising how slowly Western society developed military forces that were truly professional in the sense that the need for a comprehensive educational system was clearly seen and provided for. The ability to command and lead troops was generally held to be a natural attribute of aristocratic birth rather than the product of training. Even in the Napoleonic armies training in higher leadership and the management of war was totally absent.

As usual reform was generated by failure, not by success. After their defeat by Napoleon at Jena in 1806, the Prussians undertook the development of a military education system which bore sound fruit in a subsequent series of victories which established the modern Germany. France, after her defeat in 1870, set about the same task. The British did not really start until the first decade of the present century after the South African War had brought to light defects in leadership and administration.

General Hackett shows that neither the French nor the British succeeded in developing a thoroughly sound professional outlook before World War I engulfed them. The French evolved a theory of war which failed to take into account the effects of the modern magazine rifle, the machine gun and the spade. The British, still working on the idea of aristocratic leadership and "half a day's work for half a day's pay", clung to the notion that horsed cavalry had a place on the modern

battlefield. They both failed to read the lessons of the American Civil War and Russo-Japanese War. As a result their ill-conceived and badly-conducted offensives on the Western Front inflicted incalculable damage on the creative and productive capacity of a whole generation.

From this uncertain beginning, true professionalism has developed in the British Services, indeed in most modern nations. General Hackett draws attention to a distinction between professional education in the profession of arms and that in some others, such as medicine or law. In education for most of the other professions emphasis is placed on a single long concentrated dose, after which the practitioner is recognised as qualified. In armies the initial dose is only large enough for the early stages. Advancement usually depends on much post-graduate study. In schools and courses the military officer spends about one-fifth of his professional life on studies to prepare him for an extension of his experience and for greater responsibilities. This is much more than the time spent in the same way in law and rather more than in medicine.

General Hackett shows that the profession of arms offers to the man inclined towards an orderly way of life the opportunity to perform a public service while pursuing private excellence. "It gives much and it takes more, enriching anyone who is prepared to give more than he gets".

For the modest price of 2/- sterling this little booklet gives

a perceptive and scholarly view of the development of the profession of arms. It will be all to the good if the reader enlarges his horizons by further study of at least some of the reference works listed by General Hackett.

— E.G.K.

**A TIME TO RETREAT** by Brian Cooper. (William Heinemann Ltd., London, and 317 Collins Street, Melbourne).

During a retreat it is seldom easy to ensure that demolitions are blown at exactly the right moment. If the pursuit is being closely pressed there is always the possibility of blowing before the last of the rearguard has passed. At the same time it is often vital to the safety of the force that the obstacle does not fall intact into enemy hands.

The author has taken this situation for the theme of his story and has added to it a number of complicating factors. A division is fighting a long retreat somewhere in the Eastern theatre and it is of paramount importance that the bridge on which it is retiring does not fall to the enemy. There is only a single practicable line of withdrawal although the enemy in overwhelming strength is able to move wide on the flanks. Superior orders compel the commander to fight too far forward for too long. Many things go wrong, as many things often do in situations like that. In the end the commander is faced with the unenviable decision of whether or not to blow the bridge with two-thirds of his force on the wrong side of the

wide, swift river. He fires the demolition and superior authority saves its face by putting the blame for the disaster on him.

The story is told as the proceedings of a Court of Inquiry which the general has struggled for twenty years to obtain. This treatment is most effective, even if the author has played rather loosely with the rules of procedure. Examination and cross-examination bring out the division's ordeal, with all its unexpected twists and turns, with dramatic effect. The general's dilemma is clearly and sharply portrayed. Every time we get to wishing that the evidence would hurry up and pass over the obvious some new unforeseen element is introduced.

This method of telling a war story is unusual, and the author has used it skilfully to portray not only the events, but the characters of the general, the members of the court and the witnesses. One ignores the call of the dinner gong in one's anxiety to at least finish the evidence of the latest witness.

Basically the book portrays a situation which in varying degrees might confront any officer on active service. It is a good soldier's story.

— E.G.K.

**BARBARA**, by Wayne Robinson (Peter Davies, London, and William Heinemann Ltd., 317 Collins Street, Melbourne.)

This is the story of a tank, a tank called *Barbara* by her crew. This Sherman M-4 was one of a battalion of similar vehicles

which has been specially fitted to swim ashore to a Normandy beach in advance of the American infantry. *Barbara* did that all right, and when things went wrong on that particular beach, as they did in fact go wrong, she helped to clear the exits. Then came the gruelling in-fighting in the bocage country, an endless succession of little hedged fields with numberless banks and sunken roads, splendid defensive country from which the Germans extracted the last ounce of advantage.

When the Americans broke through at St. Lo, *Barbara*, like all other tanks of her battalion assigned to close infantry support, watched enviously as the Armoured Divisions rolled by. But after the hard, hit-for-hit slugging match at Mortain her turn came for a joyful pursuit through the liberated countryside — until her division ground to a stop for want of petrol. The Germans recovered and there was much more hard fighting before they finally capitulated. Then *Barbara*, battered, war-stained, still with her twin propellers protruding from her stern, was driven off by strangers, watched by her crew with the same sadness that sailors might feel watching the ship they had fought in many a battle making for the breaker's yard.

Although *Barbara* and her crew are the central figures, this is the story of a close support tank battalion from its formation to its disbandment at the close of hostilities in Europe. It is a story well and truly told, a story of normal ordinary men



and their reactions to war. There are no very brave men and no shirkers. They do their job as they have been trained to do it, the discipline and cohesion of a good unit enables them to overcome their own misgivings.

I have never served in a tank so I don't know whether the

author has got his technical details right. But it has the ring of authenticity about it, while his battle scenes and the reactions of the men engaged are handled with effective restraint. It is a rattling good story of the war in Europe as seen through the eyes of fighting soldiers.

— E.G.K.

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The military life is lived in order that an authority properly constituted over a significant group of men, such as a tribe, city, nation, state or federation, may be furnished with professional armed forces. If those bearing arms act in ways not consonant with the interests of the constituted authority, or if they usurp its powers or dominate it, or in important ways put their own interests first, we have militarism.

— Lieutenant General Sir John Hackett, UK.