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# AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

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The views expressed in the articles in this Journal are the author's own and do not necessarily represent General Staff opinion or policy.



Photo: Australian War Memorial, Canberra.

## NEW GUINEA

Early in 1942 the Japanese followed their conquest of Indonesia and Rabaul by occupying Lae and Salamaua on the northeast coast of New Guinea. A little later they attempted to capture Port Moresby by an amphibious operation, but were temporarily checked by the battle of the Coral Sea. They then developed a plan for a two-pronged attack at Port Moresby — an amphibious operation via Milne Bay and an overland thrust from Buna across the Owen Stanley Range. These two attacks were to be supported by diversionary operations in the Bulolo Valley aimed at the capture of the important Wau airfield.

When the Japanese began their advance there was only a very small Australian garrison in the Bulolo Valley. The leading elements of 17 Brigade were flown into Wau by the United States Air Force barely in time to save the airfield. 17 Brigade immediately took the offensive, but their operations were continually retarded by supply difficulties in a climate which permitted at best only one or two hours of flying each day. After many weeks of strenuous exertion and hard fighting, the enemy was cleared from the valley.

The picture, which is taken from one of the rare open spurs, shows the typical rugged terrain over which much of the fighting took place.

# MAN

## THE KEY WEAPON

Major E. M. McCormick  
Royal Australian Infantry

MAO TSE TUNG, until a few years ago the relatively unknown leader of the Chinese Communist Party, is now the bogeyman of Western military interests. In conservative military circles ignorance has been replaced by adulation and his theory of revolutionary war hailed as a new type of warfare. Yet although immense effort has been put into the study of Mao's methods, his greatest lesson for the West is either ignored or unrealised. That lesson is FLEXIBILITY, flexibility of mind and of thought, a principle to which, all too often, only lip service is paid by soldiers of the West. Mao Tse Tung invented no new principles of war, he merely applied the existing ones to the situation at hand, a situation which would have appeared hopeless to conservative military theorists. Using the principles of war as a guide, he produced his theory of revolutionary war. A theory flexible in the extreme, catering for all conditions from a beginning of ragged bands armed with clubs and knives to the final victorious climax involving modern armies with sophisticated weapons systems.

Western military leaders are often accused of lack of flexi-

bility, and if we look at recent events in South East Asia there would indeed appear to be good grounds for such accusations. They appear to have learned little or nothing from the various military activities which have taken, and are still taking, place in that area since 1945. They still rely on superior weapon systems to deter aggression even whilst aggression succeeds, biting slowly piece by piece into the area of the free or uncommitted world. Nationalism is on the upsurge in South East Asia, and this itself will lead to conflict even without the collision of ideologies involved. The smaller nations in the area to a large extent depend on alliances with one or other of the great powers to preserve their freedom, but history has proved that powerful friends are no guarantee and often look after their own ends to the detriment of their smaller dependent friends. To exist, such small nations must have some deterrent of their own which will make their more envious neighbours think twice before taking aggressive action against them. Irrespective of their origins such nations must reorientate themselves with South East Asia and

they must have adequate, well-trained, well-equipped armed forces ready and capable of playing a decisive part in operations in that area. This will mean some changes in the traditional ideas of the organisation of armed forces and will involve the organisation of Special Forces as integral parts of the normal military establishments. It is with such forces that this paper deals with the aim of inspiring a more flexible attitude to them and their employment in the minds of conservative military men.

The theory of infiltration is not new and Special Forces are only an expansion of this theme, infiltration in depth. Such operations obviously need special organisation and practiced operators but before going farther it would perhaps be best to clear the mind of the various inaccuracies existing at present as to what Special Forces are. The idea of Special Forces in its modern form was born in World War II, but was never allowed to completely develop as it should. Nevertheless, many valuable lessons were learned and the future of such operations was apparent to skilled operatives like Stirling, Skorzeny and Peniakoff. According to popular ideas and the press, Special Forces were bands of latter day buccaneers gaily dicing with death in disorganised bodies dependent on luck for their continued existence. Nothing could be farther from the truth and Peniakoff underlined this when he said "Successful adventure in our line of business depends on vigorous attention to detail as

seamen know well enough but soldiers will not readily admit".

Nor were the men of Special Forces ignorant, unfeeling toughs. Discussing the work of the SAS, Stirling said, "All of it demands courage, fitness and determination of the highest degree; but also and just as important, disciplined skill, intelligence and training". The type of man required is perhaps put more succinctly by Captain Roger Courtney, of the first Folboat section, when he asked his men, "Are you tough? If so get out, I need men with intelligence". Such calibre of men demands strict methods of selection, and this is emphasised by Captain Park Yunnie, of PPA, when he states that out of every 100 volunteers for PPA about 15-20 would be considered suitable. This figure would be down to 12 at the base and after training perhaps half of the 12 would remain permanently. Such selection demanded a high degree of dedication from the aspirant, and he would really need to be keen to carry it through.

Contrary to popular opinion, far from being a gay, feckless adventurer, the special service soldier was a dedicated, intelligent, highly trained, well-disciplined soldier with a high degree of courage, fitness, skill and determination, carrying out operations demanding the greatest attention to detail. He still must have these attributes.

Special service units can be used under various conditions, where actual war has been declared, where no state of war exists but military action is

taking place, in conditions of war or insurrection and in conditions of what are commonly called peace. Let us therefore consider each situation beginning with the declared or normal state of war.

The first tasks that spring to mind are those used in World War II, raiding and reconnaissance. Raids were carried out by small bands to destroy communications, installations, headquarters, supply dumps and personnel. The more sophisticated the enemy weapon system the more targets are offered for the raider. The more successful the raids the more the enemy has to concentrate and divert troops for protection. The more he concentrates the more vulnerable he becomes to more sophisticated forms of attack — such as aircraft, yet the more he spreads out to avoid such attacks the more vulnerable he becomes to the raider. Man is still the key weapon of war and what one man can do another can undo. Installations protected from air or other attack, e.g., underground, can still be attacked and destroyed by men. Such operations offer vast returns for a small investment. It is interesting to note that the only allied serviceman to personally destroy over 100 aircraft in World War II was a special service soldier, Lieut.-Colonel Paddy Mayne, of the SAS, and many a small country's air force could be destroyed in one night by competent raiders.

The reconnaissance tasks of special service units spring easily to mind, and include such things as road watching, target acquisi-

tion, general reconnaissance and the collection of intelligence generally regarding units, routes, etc. It is a task in itself, familiar to the normal soldier but for which special force units should be used only in areas where conventional units cannot penetrate. It is a waste to use special force units on tasks within the capabilities of conventional units.

Another task suitable for special forces is area interdiction. In this an area is saturated with raiding parties working under centralised control on a task in support of conventional formations.

Such actions can completely paralyse an enemy rear area, remove it from his control, prevent the movement of reinforcements and supplies to the front and force him to divert troops to attempt to rectify the situation. In attack such operations could isolate the target, in defence it could do much to break up enemy preparations for attack, or prevent adequate support of the attacking forces. In withdrawal it would slow down the enemy advance and in pursuit could well turn an orderly retreat into a rout. Apart from this it could be used as a cover for operations, and it will do much to improve the morale of a beleaguered populace or destroy that of a hostile one.

Another task akin to raiding is the abduction or assassination of enemy military and political leaders. There is no reason why such people should be exempt from personal attack or denied their place of honour in



the face of the foe. If assassination is a dirty word then let us change to, say, neutralisation. The general is well paid and there is no reason why he should not be exposed to the same risks as the private rifleman. In many cases the killing of one general may have more effect than the annihilation of a complete division and even the threat of such attacks has a decided effect on the enemy war effort, as witness the effects of a rumoured attack on Eisenhower by Skorzeny. The security arrangements made practically smothered the General and prevented him from freely carrying out his duties. The senior officer who is under threat of personal attack is not the same cool, rested general capable of grappling with the daily problems. His rest and detachment are disturbed and so then is his concentration and his operational performance.

In the same manner political leaders should be considered fair game, and the effects of their removal can be far reaching apart from the encouragement such actions provide for the loyal opposition. Skorzeny's actions on Mussolini and Admiral Horthy spring readily to mind as examples of what can be gained by such operations. The deposing of Horthy saved over a million German soldiers and prolonged the war for at least six months. Apart from all this, the spectre of a bomb for breakfast or six inches of cold steel for lunch, would do much to curb the aggressive instincts of the most bombastic politician. War at close quarters is not the crusade it appears to the de-

tached impassioned orator safe in the midst of a legislative body.

Special Forces may also be usefully employed in the organisation of guerilla bands or in liaison with such bands. The accent should be on organisation with the special service soldier in an advisory capacity and command remaining in the hands of the indigenous leaders. Guerilla units can be of great use to special service units but because of training or other factors cannot replace them. Their best contributions is in support of specific special service operations and such units should, where possible, enlist the aid of guerillas, but, working with the guerillas rather than being involved with them.

The tasks outlined here give some idea of the variety and results that can be obtained from Special Force units. An example of the rewards is the activities of PPA in Italy where in a 78 day period a force of never more than 50 men cleared 1,600 square miles of mountain, enticed several thousand Germans to move back some 60 miles and killed over 300 of them for a casualty list of 1 killed and 3 wounded.

Even more pertinent is the Vietminh raid which destroyed 78 transport planes in two nights and did much to seal the fate of the defenders of Dien Bien Phu.

In conditions where no state of war exists, military action is often resorted to, to lend added weight to diplomatic presentations of a case in a dispute. A recent example of such an oper-

ation was the Indonesian infiltration of West New Guinea. Whilst there is insufficient evidence at present available to completely evaluate the activities of the infiltrators, they were obviously of great use at the conference table, they spread the defending forces, and in event of open hostilities would have proved to be a great embarrassment to the Dutch. This was a great reward when it is realised that they were not the high calibre troops which would have been employed by an organised special force unit.

Such types of action are becoming commonplace in South East Asia and may easily be resorted to again to start or stop a conflagration. They are in themselves only variations of the normal war tasks of special service units applied as the situation requires and need not be further discussed. Special Force units could well in such circumstances be the small nations' deterrent and as effective in their way as that of the nuclear deterrent of the great powers. The use of special forces in civil war or insurrection need not be enlarged on, but operations of this kind may often be linked with the use of such units in countries with which we are officially at peace. Such operations are of a clandestine nature and may be classed by some as terrorist activities. They are directed against equipment or persons living in neutral countries who are for example supplying arms to rebels or rebel functionaries themselves active in the neutral state. Such opera-

tions demand dedicated men aware that their parent country can offer little or no protection and may even disown them if they are caught. The abduction of war criminals such as Eichman may be another occasion where operations of this nature are required. In any case such operations have already taken place in Europe and other parts of the world, and no doubt will continue to be employed as required.

The foregoing gives some idea of the usefulness of special forces and a good mind will probably be able to provide many more equally useful activities suited to their employment. It is obvious that such tasks need precise planning which, in turn, demands an organisation and sound leadership.

The conservative soldier of World War II did not, or refused to see the possibilities of special forces, and as a result such units tended to appear as the personal ideas of various junior officers and to form private armies with no central control or direction. This lack of control did more to inhibit the full development of special forces than anything else. The unit had the leaders, but in the junior ranks and without an organisation or senior disciple to press their claims in the highest quarters.

A central control organisation is essential to the economical use of special forces, and this control organisation or directorate is probably the proper place to commence the organisation of special forces.

First create the brain and then the body. The directorate should be kept as small as possible and staffed by dedicated believers. The director himself must be of sufficient seniority to put forward the views of the organisation in the highest quarters. He will need to be a compelling personality dedicated in his belief, skilled in diplomacy and the other arts required in high level conferences. The directorate must be in close touch with military and political intelligence agencies and constantly appraising potential targets and operations in the light of the current situation, thus ensuring that the special force units can be brought into action as required with the minimum delay possible. It will be responsible for policy, organisation, supply and all questions relating to special forces and their use. Its staff must be composed of officers of flexible mind dedicated to their work. Without this controlling body the units will at the best degenerate into private armies, at the worst be misused and eventually disintegrate.

Leadership at all levels must be of the highest quality and the type of leader required was demonstrated by the various special force leaders of World War II. They must be men of decision, with plenty of initiative. They should be dedicated to the job at hand, divorced from careerism and prepared to sacrifice a brilliant future on the general staff for a worthwhile job. The best men deserve the best leaders, and they should be carefully selected. In addition

they should be required to pass the selection tests demanded of all members of the unit. There must be no privileged method of entry if a close bond is to be maintained between all ranks and, as will be required in action, they are to be capable of the same efforts as their men in addition to their duties as leaders.

The men themselves must be as carefully selected and the entrance tests rigorous to ensure that only the best and keenest eventually join the unit. Selection should be made by the special service organisation itself and the psychologist relegated to his proper sphere as an advisor.

The tasks outlined suggest the training required of such units. Obviously these must include high standards of weapon training, medical training, explosive training, unarmed combat, methods of entry and communication training, while the importance of minor tactics must not be forgotten. All this must be considered basic training. In addition instruction must be given in the attitudes, aspirations, etc., of the peoples in the areas where they can expect to serve. Initially this will be of a general nature providing a firm base on which an expert knowledge can rapidly be built. The success of most missions will depend on an intimate knowledge of both friends and enemies in foreign countries. Throughout the training, endurance and initiative must be constantly built up and the troops must be capable of operating on local

food supplies without the luxuries of the Western soldier.

Units should be organised, in groups of 6 as a maximum, on the brick principle so that they can combine as required. The actual organisation of a particular operation should be tailored to fit that operation, and control should be at the highest HQ in the theatre of operations to ensure that units are not frittered away or employed in pointless operations having no benefit to the war aims of the theatre or the country.

The potentialities of such units are prodigious and one deployed immediately in a threatened area would be of much greater help than a normal brigade. They can and will provide a deterrent for the smaller nation and add weight to its words in the council chamber. They have a variety of uses and will breed men and leaders of great value to the country in

many spheres. In South East Asia such units could be used with stunning effect but a flexible attitude about them must be created in the minds of all soldiers. They must cease to be special in the sense of being unconservative and must be accepted as having a place in a normal order of battle.

In conclusion it can be said that there is a definite place for special service units in the order of battle of the nations of South East Asia, and that the benefits for small countries are out of all proportion to the costs involved. Although not replacing normal military forces, they are an effective insurance and are just as useful to larger military powers. They must, however, be properly organised. The simple issue of special names and insigna does not create effective special forces. Any country ignoring their potential and not including them in its order of battle is doing itself a great disservice.

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#### COMPETITION FOR AUTHORS

The Board of Review has awarded first places and prizes of £5 for the best original articles as shown below:—

November — "The 106 mm Rifle M40 A1 Anti-Tank Weapon" by Lieutenant Colonel A. E. G. Strong.

December — "A Catechism of Communism" by Staff Sergeant P. G. Gittins.

January — "Revolutionary Warfare" by Colonel M. P. O'Hare.

# UNDERSTANDING ASIA

Major S. S. Chakravarti  
Artillery, Indian Army

IN spite of the rather pompous title this is not an essay into racial problems, but merely a plea for the need of the Australian soldier to understand Asia and Asians.

While perhaps not disagreeing with the necessity or desirability of such an understanding, the average service officer is inclined to think that this is the field of the diplomat, scholar and public relations man. An officer is already under the great strain of keeping abreast of technical and tactical developments, therefore at first sight it seems an unfair demand to expect him to have a knowledge of the complex history, politics and terrain of Asia. Further, it may be argued that day-to-day military activity does not require any great political understanding, at least on the part of comparatively junior officers, and in any case it is the function of the civil affairs department to deal with the indigenous population in any campaign.

These arguments sound plausible. It is the purpose of this essay to show that they are not, and that a necessity exists for the average service officer and NCO to have a good working knowledge of the people and terrain in which they are expected to fight.

## The Australian Sphere of Influence

The experiences of World War II and the facts of geography have convinced Australia that her sphere of political and military influence is in South East Asia, for South East Asia is virtually the defence perimeter of the Australian continent. Having accepted this fact Australia has taken the logical step of tailoring her military organisation and tactics to suit the possible needs of operations in this theatre. It would therefore be also logical for her to explore every other field which will make her fighting forces more effective in this region.

Australia has of necessity a small army, and the quality of a small army which hopes to make its military influence felt must be very high indeed. It would therefore be not quite correct for her to pattern its standards of training on the

*Major Chakravarti recently attended the Australian Staff College.*

comparatively large armies of the west; its standard must be higher. The Australian armed forces could certainly command military respect and influence if it became an army which was a "specialist" in operation in South East Asia. Then even the despatch of an infantry company could make an adversary feel quite uncomfortable. An important part of such a "specialisation" must be complete familiarity with the people and terrain in which they have to operate. To be able to achieve this they must take the trouble to know and understand Asia. If sympathy follows such an understanding, co-operation from the Asian in her sphere of influence cannot but also follow.

#### **"Nine Feet Tall" Soldiers**

In any future operation in South East Asia it is obvious that the Australian serviceman will have to function under the following grave disadvantages:

- (a) His enemy will invariably have an overwhelming superiority in numbers.
- (b) Unless remedial steps are taken the enemy will have the advantage of local terrain and acclimatisation to local conditions.
- (c) The enemy may have strong partisan support from the locals and also the advantage of knowledge of local languages.
- (d) The existence of a deep hatred of colonialism in this region can be very easily exploited to the disadvantage of any white troops.

(e) The regular forces of the enemy which he will have to face are not only well trained and adequately equipped, but are indoctrinated politically to play the role of a "liberator". Compared to such an enemy he has no training in dealing with people of whom he has scant knowledge.

These are very grave disadvantages indeed and to overcome them the Australian must really be "nine feet tall". Better training and superior equipment will undoubtedly add to his height, but a proper understanding of the terrain, the language and the people amongst whom he has to fight is also conducive to height building. At least let the "digger" be trained in the role of sympathetic and true friend so that in the long run he can outlast the dubious "liberator"!

#### **The People Now a Factor in War**

World War II was in many ways the watershed of military history. It was the first of "total wars", wars in which nations as a whole fought, and also the last of the wars in which nations were dragged in without a reference to their peoples. In World War II it was still possible to fight campaigns without any serious reference to the indigenous population, to wit the campaigns in Burma and Malaya, in which the Burman or Malayan played a very minor part. But it is also clear from the debacle in Burma and Malaya that a terrible price had to be paid for the neglect in en-

listing the support and co-operation of the people of these countries.

Since World War II conditions in Asia have changed rapidly. The fast pace of political development, economic pressures and the triumph of Communism in China have completely changed the tempo of life in South East Asia. Today anybody who seeks to fight in this region without understanding the local people and actively enlisting their support is courting military and political disaster. The French failure in Indo-China, in spite of superior weapons, mastery of the air and large well-trained armies is a standing example for all. The French failure was largely due to political ineptitude, a situation in which the army contributed in no small measure.

#### **Future Wars in South East Asia**

The terrible destructive power of nuclear weapons and its possession in abundance by both power blocs makes it virtually impossible for any side to launch a global war without risking self-annihilation. Therefore it is more than likely that future conflicts will take the form of limited war or guerilla war or a combination of both. This factor, combined with the generally unsettled conditions in South East Asia, has introduced certain new aspects in military operations.

So far military commanders have not had to cope with large scale enemy activity behind the Forward Defended Localities. He has fought wars in which the opposing forces were clear cut. In South East Asia this will sel-

dom be so. At every stage of operations from an infantry patrol to a divisional attack he will have to take into account the local population and its attitude. He will have to strengthen friends, win over some, neutralise others and be ruthless to known enemy sympathisers. This is no easy task and can easily escalate into savage butchery on the French pattern — a task which is made all the more difficult if the officer and NCO has no understanding of the people.

*Guerilla warfare has invariably an element of police work in which even NCO's have to deal with the locals. Anti-guerilla work also depends upon good intelligence which can never be had without local co-operation.*

While there will still be the necessity of a civil affairs department, there is no doubt that operations in this region will bring the officer and NCO and even the OR in daily contact with civilians. When these are known factors obviously it would be unwise not to take note of them and prepare the officer and NCO to deal with such situation rather than just hope for the best.

#### **Understanding a People**

An understanding of any people or country is based upon two main factors.

Firstly, there is a basic requirement for a correct mental attitude. An attitude which genuinely desires to understand somebody else's problems with sympathy, and is willing to ap-

proach them without any feeling of inferiority or superiority.

Secondly, a knowledge of the conditions in a country — geographic, economic and political. Vague sympathy which is not backed by knowledge does not serve any practical purpose.

It would therefore be worthwhile to discuss these factors in some detail, and also consider the means of acquiring knowledge.

### Mental Attitudes

"Australians had attitudes towards Asia and Asians before they developed a policy. They brought these along as a part of the European equipment and their original nature was greatly influenced by the usual 19th century concepts of Asia. Asians were considered either an inferior people with whom one did not associate on an equal footing or a people of such different culture that one could not associate with at all".<sup>1</sup>

World War II, in which . . . "not a few of us with little experience of Asians had to re-adjust many ideas, amongst them that of the inherent superiority of the white man as a soldier"<sup>2</sup>, was the turning point of Australian thinking on Asia. The revolutions in Asia and the compulsion of geopolitics have caused a change in attitudes. So that today we have come to the position in which Asians . . . "are neither inferior nor mysterious. They are just different".<sup>3</sup> But are they really? Argue it as you like. But unless Asia is approached with an attitude of equality the results even in the military sphere in spite of any

superiority in equipment will always be disappointing.

It must never be forgotten that colonialism has left very deep roots of hatred in Asia and nothing galls the Asian so much as a display of racial haughtiness. Tactless behaviour in Asia can turn a potential friend to an implacable enemy.

The class of people who can head free communities in South East Asia are under great stress and strain from the Communist camp. An attitude of racial superiority towards them by westerners they come in contact with can easily be the breaking point. For he may feel that at least the Communist treats him as an equal.

Since the soldier has to come in intimate contact with the people in this region he must be properly orientated and trained to deal with Asians. A neglect in this sphere will have to be paid by heavy forfeits in the political and military fields. In the short term it may mean the drying up of local sources of intelligence and co-operation, in the long term it may involve a whole region becoming so apathetic or even hostile that military operations will become seriously hindered. The correct mental attitude is therefore of prime importance.

### Language — A Key to Understanding

Perhaps the shortest cut to a people's heart and mind is to

- 1 "Australian Outlook on Asia", by Werner Levi.
- 2 "Defeat Into Victory", by Field Marshal Sir William Slim.
- 3 "Guerilla War", 1st Division publication.



know their language. A soldier who can speak the local language not only starts with a tremendous psychological advantage but is also much better equipped to gather vital local intelligence. While language experts will always be necessary, the presence of a large number of officers and men who have at least a working knowledge of local languages is an undoubted asset in South East Asia. Few will dispute the importance of language study, hence let us turn to see how much a study of languages can be promoted.

The learning of a new language is, except to the gifted few, always a painful process. Hence in order to promote language study some element of compulsion combined with incentives are necessary.

For the officer the correct place for a beginning in the study of a language is the Royal Military College. Some six Asian languages can be introduced into the curriculum and it should be made compulsory for the cadet to join in any one language class. The Indian Defence Academy for instance has a very similar scheme.

Having acquired a basic working knowledge of the language, officers should be encouraged to continue their interest by monetary incentives to the passing of proficiency examinations. Those who show a talent for languages can be sent either to the School of Languages or better still to a University of the country whose language it is. Foreign travel will then be an additional incentive and at the same time

give the officer an excellent finishing. Further, officers who pass the university grade in languages should be given a special language pay.

If the above suggestions are accepted it should be possible in the future to have a large number of officers who are familiar with Asian languages and a somewhat smaller core of experts in such languages.

Suitable schemes can be very easily drawn up for the NCO and OR.

The study of languages may involve hard work and some expense but compared to the dividends which it will pay the effort and expense will seem small.

### Study of Asia

Since very little if any Asian history is taught in the schools, the average Australian serviceman has very little idea of Asia. The little that he knows is based upon desultory reading and current press opinions. If the serviceman is to be properly oriented to the South East Asian theatre he must have a balanced idea of the geography, history and economics of this region. This is not to suggest that we attempt to make scholars of soldiers but merely that we fill in the gap in his education so that he can be a better soldier.

As far as the officer is concerned, once again the place to begin is the RMC which should include Asian history and geography in its syllabus. Cadets can be given "projects" on Asia similar to what is done in schools. At Duntroon and in later commissioned years it

should be possible, with the assistance of the universities, to give officers a list of suitable books which they should read. As a measure of compulsion one or two questions on this region should be a feature in the current affairs paper of promotion and Staff College examinations.

Surprisingly enough there is at the moment hardly any stress laid at the Staff College on a planned study of this region. The College library has a very good collection of books on Asia, most of which are left unread by students. Much can be done at this institution to promote South East Asian studies.

The other rank does not need to go so deeply into the subject, but requires a general re-orientation towards Asians and needs to be taught how to deal with the local population of the countries in which he has to fight. His education can start at the training centres by means of lectures, films and carefully written pamphlets. An attempt to rouse interest in reading books on Asia should also be made by the RAAEC staff.

### **Travelling in South East Asia**

It is really difficult to get the "feel" of a country, its people and its terrain from books alone. This can only be done by travelling in the country and freely mixing with its people — mixing is important. So many Australians return from a tour of duty in Malaya without having made a single Malayan friend. The British Army recognised the importance of travelling early in the century and encouraged officers to travel in areas like the

Middle East, in which Britain had a strategic interest.

If travel is not to degenerate into mere tourism it has to be carefully planned and controlled. Officers must be carefully briefed and de-briefed before such travelling.

If the principle that travel in South East Asia will help officers to have a better understanding of military problems in that region is accepted, the details of travel schemes can be quite easily worked out. Some suggestions and ideas are given below.

The first logical step in encouraging travel is to liberalise leave rules so that an officer can get adequate leave to travel. The Indian Army, for instance, gives an officer up to four months leave/furlough for the purpose of travel.

Officers going abroad should preferably have a working knowledge of the language and culture of the region. A prior study of geograph will also help terrain study.

Military "tourism" has an un-savoury past-history and unless care is taken such visits can arouse deep suspicion. Though officers may be given broad assignments, no attempt should be made at anything resembling espionage, or else the scheme can do great damage. In order to allay suspicion the Government can invite reciprocal visits.

In addition to those travelling as such, officers/NCOs should be allowed to study languages and customs at foreign universities.

In most Asian countries Australia has military attaches/staff. The junior staff of such

military missions can be enlarged and officers rotated in short term appointments so that a large number of officers have a chance to see and observe military activity in this region.

Travel is bound to broaden the military and political outlook of servicemen and thus can be a valuable means to the building of better understanding of Asia.

### Conclusion

As compared to the situation in two world wars in which the army had to fight in regions for which it was not trained or equipped, the Australian soldier today enjoys the undoubted ad-

vantage of being told that South East Asia is likely to be his theatre of future operations. The army is being trained and equipped to fight in such a theatre.

But unfortunately it is not being realised that in any operation in this region the soldier has a very important public relations function and consequently is being given little training in this aspect.

No army can fight without the co-operation of the people, let therefore the Australian soldier learn how to enlist the co-operation of the people of Asia. Let him understand Asia.

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### TANK DESIGN CONTEST

The results of the Tank Design Contest sponsored by the United States Armor Association and notified in AAJ 156, May 62, are given below:—

**First Prize:** Messrs. R. W. and J. P. Forsyth, California, USA, who operate a company engaged in independent research on combat vehicles.

**Second Prize:** Sergeant G. L. Eischen, Luxembourg Army.

**Third Prize:** Mr. E. Ridlon, Minnesota, USA.

268 entries were received. Of the 31 entries from foreign countries, four were from Australia and one from Papua.

## Strategic Review

# BRITAIN AND EUROPE

WHEN the United Kingdom announced her intention of applying for membership of the European Economic Community (EEC), popularly known as the "Common Market", the Australian press gave the proposal a hostile reception on the grounds that it was likely to result in very serious economic difficulties for this country. The general tone of political and press comment was to the effect that it would be a good thing for Australia if the United Kingdom failed to secure admittance to the Community, or at any rate to gain admittance on terms which would enable her to have the best of two worlds, to retain the Commonwealth trading system substantially intact and at the same time to obtain the benefits of the European system. Now that Britain's application has virtually failed, the press seems to have forgotten its original position, and appears to be entirely preoccupied with expressing rage at France's action in bringing the negotiations to an abrupt end.

This ill-balanced presentation of the news suggests that France

has taken up a selfish and wholly unjustifiable attitude. Usually, however, great nations do not take their stand on important issues from temporary pique or from inbred crankiness. As a rule their policies derive from a careful assessment of the probable effects upon national interests though, to be sure, emotionalism often does make itself felt. In the conduct of international affairs it is always necessary to see the issue from the other fellow's point of view, even if you do not like the prospect. In this case it is both interesting and instructive to forget about our British connections for the moment, and to look at the situation through European eyes.

During and immediately after World War II, Sir Winston Churchill had much to say about the necessity for European unity and painted a picture, attractive if somewhat vaguely drawn, of an effective federation embracing the entire continent, or as much of it as could be kept out of Soviet hands. As the basis of unity he exhorted the French and Germans to forget their

long-standing feud, to shake hands and be friends. Many eminent Europeans, seized with similar ideas, derived encouragement from Churchill's powerful rhetoric.

What actually happened? Europeans took the first practical steps towards economic integration with the formation of the Belgium-Luxembourg-Netherlands Economic Union in 1948. (Benelux). In 1951 these three countries, together with France, West Germany and Italy, formed the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) to promote orderly marketing, regularity of supplies, equal access to raw materials, efficient production and the general development of the associated industries. In order to achieve these objectives the signatories agreed to a measure of supra-national control of the industries.

Great Britain was invited to join the Community, but refused to accept the measure of supra-national control essential to the success of the scheme. When Sir Winston Churchill was returned to office he let this situation stand.

In 1957 the six members of the ECSC considerably broadened the scope of their economic integration, taking in practically all aspects of primary and secondary industry in a treaty which set up the European Economic Community (EEC). There are good grounds for assuming that had Great Britain applied at that stage for membership on the same terms as the foundation members she would have been readily accepted.

However, she elected to sponsor the formation of a rival organisation called the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and comprising the United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Portugal and Austria.

In the following years European economic integration was freely debated in British political circles and in journals interested in such subjects. The general tenor of these debates indicated a distinct coolness towards any idea of becoming entangled in continental affairs. Some of the opposition came from people who were unable, or unwilling, to see that the pattern of trade to which Britain had grown accustomed was undergoing profound and irreversible changes. Some of it came from people who were still submerged in dreams of an empire that was rapidly disintegrating; some of it from people who just didn't like continentals anyway. The debates were, of course, duly noted by European statesmen, and we must accord them the right to draw their own conclusions from them.

Eventually the failure of EFTA to act as an effective counter to the growing strength of the EEC, coupled with other shifts in the pattern of world trade, forced Britain to modify her policy. But the decision to apply for membership of the EEC was made with visible reluctance. From the political storm which followed, British Ministers emerged loudly protesting that they had no intention of joining unconditionally, that is to say, on the same terms on which other members had joined. Seen through

continental eyes, this looked remarkably like a man applying for membership of a club on condition that they changed their articles of association to suit his personal convenience. Further, in their explanations to their own electors and to other Commonwealth Governments British Ministers laid heavy emphasis on the argument that sheer economic necessity was the motivating factor. The point did not escape the notice of the continentals.

In the controversy which followed the decision, and which raged throughout the course of the negotiations, it became increasingly clear that British public opinion was sharply divided on the issue. The Parliamentary Opposition receded from its initial position of approval. Opposition generally grew rather than diminished, and much of it was expressed in terms not likely to be appreciated by the continentals. Finally, recent public opinion polls strongly suggest that British feeling is opposed to any notion of supra-national control, and that if an election takes place in the immediate future, the Government will be swept from office.

Taking these facts into consideration, and looking at the situation from the continental point of view, there does seem to be some substance in the French contention that British public opinion is not sufficiently attached to the concept of European integration to warrant her admission to the club.

Between the original invitation to Britain to join the ECSC in 1951 and her recent decision to apply for membership of the enlarged community, Charles de Gaulle pulled France up by her shoe-strings. Under his firm and able leadership she has moved from an inferior position of economic and political chaos to become the strongest nation in Western Europe. The material restoration he has wrought is matched by the restoration of the national spirit and dignity. France is no longer a supplicant; she stands square on her own feet.

From the beginning of the atomic era Great Britain has occupied a special position vis-a-vis the United States, partly because she contributed towards the development of the original bomb, partly because at a fairly early stage she acquired a bomb of her own and the means of delivering it to the target. There has been a fair amount of sharing of information between the two countries. But the sharing is strictly limited to these two. The USA has always declined to share her nuclear secrets with any third party, an attitude which has grown with her desire to lessen the chances of a nuclear exchange by restricting membership of this club to the present members.

There was a time when American military opinion held that NATO could repel a Russian attack on Western Europe only by the use of "tactical" nuclear weapons. In a famous address in London the Deputy Commander of NATO, Field Marshal Lord

Montgomery, declared categorically that the question whether or not nuclear weapons would be used simply did not arise. The NATO Command intended to use them. Naturally enough the Europeans, on whose territory the blows would fall, were not enamoured of this concept. They found the notion even less attractive when military exercises demonstrated the nature of the devastation that would occur. But there was little they could do about it, for at that time they could not defend themselves without American support. And the Americans, since they were putting up the men and the money, felt entitled to insist on their ideas.

Substantial changes have taken place. The operation of EEC has restored European economic strength to the point where it is well on the way to matching that of the USA. Economically, Western Europe is now far from being a dependent community, while practice in this sphere has encouraged them in the belief that they can achieve a similar degree of political integration.

De Gaulle of France and Adenauer of West Germany visualise a Europe economically and politically strong enough to constitute a third Great Power able to take its own untrammelled decisions on any issue that confronts it. De Gaulle in particular maintains that there is no room in the confederation or whatever it may become for anyone who is not whole-heartedly European in outlook and

sentiment. This means, of course, the termination of American authority in Europe.

De Gaulle is unable to believe that Britain will make a satisfactory member while she continues to look in three directions at once — over one shoulder towards her special American links, over the other towards Commonwealth trade, and in between times towards Europe. And, no doubt, he is not anxious to have a rival to French leadership of the new Europe.

Since the termination of the negotiations there has been some talk of Belgium, Holland and Italy bringing pressure to bear on France to compel a change of attitude. No doubt they would like to have Britain admitted if for no other reason than to act as a counter-weight to the Paris-Bonn axis. But they are not likely to do anything very effective. The EEC is working too much to their advantage for them to take any risks about breaking it up. The British Prime Minister's insistence that his Government was actuated by almost purely altruistic motives may perhaps comfort and influence his own electors, but they will carry no weight at all on the continent. Europeans simply don't believe it.

As things stand at the moment it looks as though Britain missed great political and economic opportunities, perhaps even the chance of securing any voice at all in European affairs, when she declined the original invitation to join ECSC.

*"There is a tide in the affairs of  
men,  
Which, taken at the flood, leads  
on to fortune;  
Omitted, all the voyage of their  
life  
Is bound in shallows and in  
miseries".*

The situation may not be as bad as that, though many authoritative British supporters of her application asserted that it would be. Certainly it requires of her leaders something more creative, something more substantial, than resounding denunciations of de Gaulle.

— E.G.K.

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#### AMF GOLD MEDAL AND ASCO PRIZE ESSAY 1962

The Board of Referees have judged the 1962 entries in this competition with the following results:—

- (a) The winning essay in the Senior Section was submitted by Lieutenant Colonel A. E. G. Strong, Royal Australian Armoured Corps, HQ Eastern Command, who is awarded the AMF Gold Medal, the £25 Sectional Prize and the special ASCO Prize of £50.
- (b) In the Junior Section no award was made because it was decided that no entry reached a sufficiently high literary standard.

The Referees wish to record their appreciation of the quality of the essays submitted in the Senior Section, and their regrets that no essay in the Junior Section merited an award. The Referees also wish to express regret at the small number of entries in both Sections.



# THE UNSEEN FOE

Captain J. J. Donohoe  
Australian Intelligence Corps

**A Communist is like a crocodile. When it opens its mouth you cannot tell whether it is trying to smile or preparing to eat you up.**

— Churchill

TODAY, many soldiers imagine that the only enemy with whom they should be concerned has a gun of some sort and will only show himself when war is declared. This view is very wrong and is due only to ignorance — ignorance which, if not corrected, can jeopardise not only the defence of the whole free world but the individual soldier's chances in actual combat.

The aim of this article is to show, in as brief and simple a form as possible, the nature of the Communist threat to the Australian nation, including the Army.

## Introduction

It will be recalled that, 22 years ago, the fall of Singapore to the Japanese, marked the greatest disaster in British military history. A large British force, including the Australian 8th Division, was hopelessly beaten and was forced to surrender to the Japanese. Within a matter of a few short months the whole of the area we know as South East Asia was in the

hands of the Japanese. The gateway to Australia lay open, and what appeared to be an enemy "eight feet tall" and invincible, was on our doorstep. As you know, this enemy was overcome after further years of bloody war and much sacrifice by the Australian people.

Today, we are faced with even a greater challenge than that posed by the Japanese; a challenge from a far greater enemy who threatens our way of life and who strives unceasingly and relentlessly to enslave the whole world. The enemy I refer to is international Communism.

## What is Communism?

Communism and Communist imperialism have captured the minds and bodies or enslaved 1,008,000,000 people. In other words one-third of the population of the entire world is under Communist rule and subjected to a form of government foreign to our ideals, and one which fails to recognise the worth, the rights and the dignity of mankind. Many of the countries at present under Communist control

did not choose this form of Government by the will of the people. Force has always played an important part in the Communist struggle for power. Force brought the Soviet Union, China and North Vietnam into being. In Tibet, Communist rule was forcibly imposed by the Chinese, and similar efforts have been made by the use of force in South Korea, the Philippines, Malaya and now South Vietnam.

The advance of Communism is really startling when it is realised that Communism as we know it today started 46 years ago, when V. I. Lenin, who was a disciple of Marx, the co-author of the Communist Manifesto, engineered the bloody overthrow of the Czarist government in Russia and formed the world's first Communist government.

It is not intended to delve deeply into the theory of Communism, but it is enough to say that Communism is many things. It is a doctrine, based on the theories of Marx and Engels. It is a revolutionary programme. It is relentless class war. It is a radical philosophy of history and society. It is a social system. It is an economic system. It is a political strategy. It is a world conspiracy.

Many men have been attracted by the ideals of Communism and those who are hungry, dispossessed, impatient for reform, or extremists, dogmatists, or theorists craving for certainty, fall easy prey to the Communists, because on face value, Communism offers the best solution to their problems.

The millions of people in forced labour camps and the bloodbaths of Poland and Hungary are evidence that, once in control, the Communists maintain power by the use of calculated terror, secret police, spies and enforced informers, with death (or worse), to those who do not submit to their suppression. Even to live "normally" under such regime would be a continual nightmare of dialectics. And remember that the Manifesto aims at the ultimate control of all mankind.

What many of us fail to grasp is that we are not only opposing Russian and Chinese Communism, but a gigantic world-wide "Army" masquerading as a political party, seeking to conquer the world with an entirely new approach to global warfare. This scientifically - applied concept, based on deception and deceit is known as revolutionary or psychological warfare. In application, every possible means is employed to weaken nations from within, to sap their strength, to pervert their morals, to sabotage their educational system, to wreck their social structure, to destroy their spiritual and religious life, to weaken their industrial and economic power, to demoralise their armed forces, and finally, after all this planned detailed infiltration, to overthrow their governments by force. In order to bring this diabolical plan to fruition the Communist Party disguises itself as a harmless political party.

### **The Communist Party**

To us a political party is a political group within the nat-

ional political set-up — loyal to, and part of, the nation — but differing in certain concepts and methods of operation. However, the Communist Party in any country, and this includes Australia, is interested only in the aspirations of International Communism.

Communist parties are not true political parties in the generally accepted sense of the term, but are ruthless totalitarian dictatorships, which, contrary to the claims of the Party, are run by a few men at the top. Many of these make frequent visits to the centre of International Communism in Moscow where they are kept up-to-date in the current interpretations of the Marxist philosophy. This is the manner in which all the Communists in the countries of the free world are controlled and directed.

The Communists use their privileges in a democracy to pose as an ordinary political party in order to build up a type of fifth column inside the nation concerned, and maintain an active organisation to further the World Communist aim of the destruction of democratic governments. Whether it uses subtle means or initiates a violent overthrow of a government, depends on the nature of the nation and the living standards of the people. Laos, Cuba and South Vietnam are good examples of the manner in which countries are attacked by Communism, through a sequence of subversion, infiltration, and eventually, armed aggression. This can happen in any nation if

the people remain indifferent to the threat of Communism.

The following statement made at the 1960 Moscow Conference of the Communist and Workers' Parties clearly shows the nature of the Communist movement.

"The interests of the Communist Movement demand that every Communist Party should display solidarity by observing assessments and conclusions, jointly worked out by fraternal parties at their conference, and dealing with common tasks of the struggle. . . .

"The interests of the struggle for the cause of the working class demand even greater cohesion among the ranks of every Communist Party and the great army of Communists of all countries".

Is this the way a national political party should function?

### Organisation

Briefly the Communist Party in Australia is organised as shown in Figure 1.

The National Congress meets every three years and is comprised of delegates from each State. The Congress elects a Central Committee which meets two or three times a year and this Committee, in turn, elects a Political Committee and a Disputes Committee. The Disputes Committee deals with party discipline, disputes between members and appeals by members. The Political Committee implements party policy through sub-committees and through the various State Executives.

The Secretariat is that part of the organisation which controls




Figure 1

and directs all party activities. It consists of the four top men of the Australian Communist Party who are dedicated, hard-working and experienced in all facets of political sabotage and corruption. Despite claims by the Party, these men hold most of the power.

Each Australian State has a Party structure organised according to the numerical strength and the geographic locations involved. There is a controlling State Headquarters, with Districts, Sections and Branches as required. The Branch is the basic organisation of the Party and one is formed whenever sufficient members can be grouped together. They are formed in factories and similar work places, suburban localities, country centres, and in any substantial group of similar interests where enough people can be influenced.

### Communist Weapons

The membership of the Communist Party of Australia totals a little under 6,000, which represents one Communist for every 2,000 of population. However, apart from actual members, it is estimated that there are nearly 50,000 Communist sympathisers, which represents one in every 240 of population, and this is a large figure for a nation of only 12,000,000 people. Despite their small numbers, there are estimated to be approximately 2,000 Communists in positions of authority in industry, commerce and education, and it is from such positions that they assist the ultimate aim of Communism, which is the overthrow of Western democracy.

The Communist Party throughout the free world can be likened to an iceberg — mobile, dangerous and only one-ninth visible above the surface. The visible

Communists are the "soap-boxers" who, despite much ridicule and abuse, continually preach the Communist doctrine and have very little effect upon the mass of people in a country such as Australia. On the other hand, the eight-ninths we do not see are the danger. Where and when they will strike is sometimes obscure. How they strike will be to use every subterfuge available. Lenin gave this advice to his followers:—

"Go the whole length of any sacrifice, if need be, resort to strategy, adroitness, illegal proceedings, reticence, subterfuge — to anything, in order to penetrate the existing organs of a nation's administration and carry on Communist work inside them at any cost".

The Press almost daily reports some aspect of Communist infiltration into government departments, of Communist-led strikes in vital industries, and, too frequently for comfort, of Communist Spy Nets. Yet most of us are complacent, and few realise that these tactics are all a part of this revolutionary new warfare, a new concept of strategy of waging war without a battlefield. Of course, the "weapons" used in this type of warfare are not new and were not invented by the Soviets, but they have given them a face-lift and scientific application.

This Communist attack can best be described under the three headings of:

Espionage  
Sabotage  
Subversion

No matter how insignificant a Communist may appear, it can be certain that he is using either one or all of these weapons to advance the spread of Communism.

### Espionage

In the days when wars were fought by professional armies and international political affairs centred largely on military alliances, espionage was, in the main, connected with military aims and objectives. Today, however, espionage covers a much wider field and embraces not only the defence forces, but the political, economic and sociological apparatus of a nation as well.

International Communism, from its headquarters in Moscow, directs its world-wide espionage activities through secret intelligence organisations, special agents or through the local Communist parties in the country concerned. The ideology of Communism has adherents in every non-Communist nation who are willing to take an active part in espionage or other clandestine operations.

The organisation behind the Soviet espionage system is very large, and is probably far larger than the total Intelligence services of the entire free world. Their Embassies, Legations and diplomatic agencies in non-Communist countries assist.

The activities associated with espionage include:

- (a) The acquisition of national secrets in relation to treaties, alliances, defence, military capabilities and weapons.

- (b) Obtaining information about persons who may be used with or without their knowledge, for espionage purposes.
- (c) Recruitment of espionage agents amongst adherents to or sympathisers with the ideology of Communism.
- (d) Infiltration, for the purposes of espionage, of the machinery of the government, industry, social organisations and the armed forces.
- (e) Selection of targets for subsequent sabotage and subversion.
- (f) Organisation of a local fifth column group designed to operate in time of war or during a national emergency.
- (g) Penetration of Counter Intelligence organisations.

The Soviet espionage system has been functioning since the formation of the first Communist state in 1917 and has been very successful. The exact degree of success cannot be gauged, but a look at the spy networks which have been unmasked will indicate how valuable their espionage system has been.

*Network No. 1.* Unmasked in Canada in 1945. It included the British scientist Alan Nunn May and succeeded in probing developments in radar and the early secrets of the allied atom bomb effort which induced the Russians to start work on nuclear weapon development.

*Network No. 2.* Discovered in the USA following the conviction of Klaus Fuchs, the British

atom spy, in 1950. It was operated by Antoli Yakovlev who was the Soviet Vice-Consul in New York. It included Harry Gold, David Greenglass, Martin Sobell and the Rosenbergs who were executed for treason. This has been rated the most damaging spy network in history. It gave the Russians the radio proximity fuze and sketches of early US atom bombs which it is estimated reduced the Western nuclear development lead by at least two years.

*Network No. 3.* This existed in Australia and was revealed by Vladimir Petrov and his wife who defected in 1954. His agents penetrated Defence and External Affairs secrets.

*Network No. 4.* Revealed in 1961 in Britain and was controlled by Gordon Lonsdale, who was really a Russian named Conon Molody. Submarine and other secret naval information stolen by Harry Houghton and Ethel Gee were passed to the Russians.

Other instances have been the defections of Pontecorvo, the scientist, Burgess and Maclean, the Foreign Office experts, and George Blake, a British Secret Service agent. All of these passed vital information to the Russians, particularly Blake, who betrayed 40 British agents who have all since disappeared. A more recent case was that of William Vassall, an Admiralty clerk, who, in 1962 was convicted of supplying vital information to the Russians. Vassall was an effeminate dandy who was motivated by the greed for money and fear that his homosexual

tendencies would be made known. He operated on such a scale that it is now estimated that there are very few naval secrets of that time which are not known to the Russians.

### **Espionage in Australia**

In April 1954 Vladimir Mik-tailovitch Petrov and his wife were granted political asylum in Australia.

Petrov was a Third Secretary at the Soviet Embassy and had the additional duties of controlling the work of Voks, the Soviet organisation concerned with the propagation of Soviet culture in Australia. These were his official functions, but in 1951 after he had been in Australia a year, he was appointed the temporary MVD resident which made him the chief of the Soviet espionage effort in Australia.

Mrs. Petrov, before leaving the USSR had been assigned certain espionage duties in Australia. She was a cipher expert and held the rank of Captain. Her regular task at the Embassy was that of accountant and secretary to the Ambassador.

As the result of the defection of the Petrovs and the information they made available, a Royal Commission on Espionage was conducted in 1954. The report of this Commission concluded that it plainly appeared that for many years the Government of the USSR had been using its Embassy at Canberra as a cloak under which to control and operate espionage organisations in Australia.

There are basically two of these organisations which warrant description.

The MVD (Ministerstvo Vnutrennikn Del) or Ministry of Internal Affairs, which is the organisation concerned with all espionage other than that of a military nature.

The GRU (Glavnoe Razvedyvatelnoc Upravlenie) or Chief Military Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of the Armed Forces, is the organisation concerned with espionage in connection with the Navy, Army, Air Force, and Counter Intelligence agencies.

An interesting point about both these organisations is that they are carefully insulated from one another and that members of each may know of the existence of the other but would know nothing of the personnel, internal organisation or operations of any organisation other than their own. This was the case with Petrov, who was the MVD resident.

From this it will be seen that it is more than likely that there is an extensive espionage network functioning in Australia. Unfortunately, the methods of operation of the possible espionage organisations is outside the scope of this article, but obviously those who are responsible for safeguarding our secrets must do all in their power to prevent any effective operation of a foreign power in breaking our security.

### **Sabotage**

The term sabotage is derived from the French word sabot, a wooden shoe worn by the lower classes in some European countries. The word sabotage is said

to have come into being when a disgruntled French factory worker took off his wooden shoe or "sabot", and threw it into the gears of the machinery at the factory where he was employed. He did this as an act of revenge against his employers and was successful in causing a stoppage of the entire factory. Since then any act of wanton, deliberate destruction of property to further one's own ends, has been known as sabotage.

Not all sabotage is physical or violent. There is a passive sabotage directed at an opponent's morale or material resources by non-violent means, and psychological sabotage which is the manipulation of crowds to cause strikes and riots and to cause panic.

Sabotage in all its forms has been a strong weapon in the cold war and has aided the advance in world Communism. Cases of violent sabotage are common in European nations and in many Asian countries, but very few suspected cases of sabotage have been recorded in Australia. Passive sabotage, however, is in continual use, particularly within the Trade Union Movement. There are innumerable instances of disturbances, lock-out strikes and go-slow campaigns which have been organised by the Communists within the Trade Union Movement. They are very careful, however, to ensure that they are not directly involved. An example of a method used is the story of a "red" shop-steward who once organised "go-slow" work in a shipyard by simply putting the word around that if

the men worked too hard, work would run out and they could look forward to a period of unemployment. This was successful for a while and succeeded in reducing production considerably.

Communists will never miss an opportunity to sabotage the administration of economy of the country and to prevent their success it is essential that everyone is alert to this threat.

### Subversion

The aim of Communist subversion is corruption. Corruption of our political, economic and defence machinery, of our educational system — corruption of our ideal and of our faith. This is Communist subversion, and it has as targets every man, woman and child who live under the democratic system.

Communist subversion is no less active in Australia than in any other country and it does have some success. The reasons for this are:—

1. It is aimed at individuals who wittingly, or unwittingly, will support the Communist cause.
2. It is always carefully camouflaged so as not to appear as having been engineered by the Communists.
3. It is always based on knowledge and evaluated information concerning the people to which it is directed.
4. Any method may be used if it achieves the required result.

The tactics of subversion are many and varied, and are



flexible enough to meet any situation. Some of the methods used are:

- (1) *Infiltration* — into every organ of the government and community, every association, social or sports club, our educational system, our religious groups and our public services. In fact, any collective group will be subject to infiltration and thus eventual subversion, as well as for the purpose of committing espionage and sabotage.
- (2) *Propaganda* is used extensively by the Communists to spread Communist ideas, doctrines and principles and for the persuasion of people of the logic and justness of their cause, and the erroneousness and injustices of the cause of democracy. It is estimated that the Communists spend £1,000,000,000 a year to influence the Free World by direct and indirect propaganda and an unending flood of this propaganda reaches Australia.
- (3) *"Front Organisations"*... — There are a number of "front" organisations which are controlled and manipulated by Communists under cover. These are used to further the Communist cause and gives them access to people difficult to influence directly. The largest and most active of these "front" organisations in Australia are Peace Councils, Soviet and Chinese Friendship Societies, the Eureka Youth League and the Union of Australian

Women. Between them the "front" organisations cover almost every field of national and communal activity.

- (4) *Creation of "Fractions"* — "Fractions" are very active groups of Communists within non-Communist institutions. From within these institutions and in particular the Trade Unions, these Communist groups are able to cause discontent, carry out economic sabotage, and discredit the legitimate leaders and to further the influence of the Communist Party.
- (5) *Blackmail, Intimidation and Terrorism* are used by the Communists in many countries but rarely in Australia. However, violence to the Communists is commonplace and when the time is appropriate it will be used.

### Conclusion

These tactics and many others are used by Australian Communists who are well-organised and actively working now among the work force, youth, intellectuals, the armed forces and religious groups. The efforts are co-ordinated and directed by the various Committees and sub-Committees appointed by the Party's Central Committee. There are Committees formed to look after Trade Unions, Propaganda, Peace Movements, Cultural activities, Youth, Women, "Front" Organisations and other aspects, all with the object of furthering Communist Party influence in every section of the Australian community.

To meet the present threat by this largely hidden enemy, it is emphasised that every officer and soldier has a most important part to play. What this part is may at times be hard to determine but one thing is certain, inactivity is wrong. All ranks must be trained to meet any situation whether it be aimed at them by conventional weapons or by insidious means.

A recent Press statement directed at the general public in New Zealand contained a number of lessons, the principles behind which can be applied with profit to many such problems:

- (a) "Do not join a deputation unless you know who the head of the deputation is and what he stands for. If you see strangers in the group, it is better to appear as a *deputation of one*.
- (b) "If you are asked to chair a 'non-political' peace meeting, make certain you know who the members are, what they stand for, and satisfy yourself beforehand that the views they will expound are truly non-political.
- (c) "Do not permit yourself to be organised into 'spontaneous' demonstrations. If you must demonstrate make sure you know whose is the organising hand.
- (d) "If you must carry a placard, better it be your own, otherwise satisfy yourself as to its true origin.
- (e) "Pious sounding peace petitions have a peculiar habit of being used by Communists for their own political purposes. If you wish to express views, take an extra five minutes and write your own letter".

The threat is a very real one and is one which must be met if our way of life is to be preserved. The Communists use strong-minded and spartan-like fanatics to wage their never-ending campaign, and to oppose them we must have soldiers who are fully aware of Communist aims, strategy, tactics and capabilities. Our soldiers must also have a thorough grounding in the basic principles of freedom and democracy because only with this as his armour and truth as his weapon will the advances of Communism be halted.

# DO YOU KNOW THE DRACONE?

Lieutenant C. J. Akeroyd  
Royal Australian Engineers

THE Pentropic Division in Battle, Part 2, Administration 1961, briefly mentions the Dracone in Section 23. Apart from this, no other general information is available. The concept of the barge appearing in the rear of the divisional area has prompted this article.

This paper describes the Dracone and some ancillary equipment, and attempts to suggest a modus operandi for the towed container.

This container was conceived by Profesor W. R. Hawthorne, CBE, Sc.D, FRS, in November 1956. He has guided its progress throughout. In 1959 two companies were formed to back technical development and marketing. Commercial production was immediately undertaken, research being continued meanwhile.

## Construction

A base of woven nylon fabric is rubber coated on both sides. Several strips of this composition are sewn together, meeting in nose and tail assemblies to make a sausage shape. The rubber on the outside is commonly known as neoprene and that on the inside as nitrile. Potable

water cannot be carried in nitrile, though special non-tainting linings are available if required.

The barge floats because the contents have a lower specific gravity than salt water. Suitable cargo includes petrol, kerosene, avtur and lubricating oils, to mention only a few which have obvious military application. It floats with about one-sixth of its surface above water, and when air inflated, the reverse is true.


Attached to the tail end is a tail pipe. This is supported in water by a float which also serves as a seal to protect the contents. Loading and discharging the barge is carried out through the tail pipe.

## Associated Equipment

Internal inspection is necessary at about six monthly intervals or when internal defects are suspected. The Dracone is brought ashore, laid out flat and inflated. Any air blower which can support 10 inches of water gauge is sufficient for this purpose. The nose assembly is removed and a temporary cover, drilled with small holes, is inserted instead. Air blown

through the tail pipe inflates the Dracone. Sufficient escapes through the small holes to en-

sure that fresh air continually circulates. Commercial safety precautions for the inspection of



Diver emerging. An average sized man has no trouble negotiating the "door" of the "D" type Dracone pictured here.

a closed vessel are observed, the inspector being treated as a diver.

Mention was made earlier of filling and discharging the barge. Filling may be undertaken by gravity or by pumping, but emptying must be carried out by using a positive displacement or self-priming centrifugal pump. Either of these pumps should empty all but about 10 gallons of the cargo. The rate of discharge is limited only by the capacity of the pump itself. A rate of 36,000 gallons an hour has been achieved.


Other equipment includes tow ropes, aids for recognition at sea and a fitted stabiliser skirt designed to eliminate snaking in the barge when under tow.

### Delivery

The Dracone is reasonably robust and when deflated and packed, may be transported by road, rail, ship or air. The specifications for weight and size of typical barges, are available in Section 23 of Part 2, Administration. Packaging may take any one of the following forms:—

- (a) Rolling on a reel.
- (b) Flaking down on a pallet to form layers in a pyramidal shape.
- (c) Rolling into a cargo net.
- (d) Inflating the Dracone for delivery by water.

The barge is therefore flexible enough for transportation to almost any place.



Dracone viewed from the "tail end". The tail pipe and stabilizer ring are shown. For storage purposes in this state the Dracone is only semi-inflated.

### Operations

With the Dracone in the area where it is to be used, the next problem is to launch and fill it ready for bulk deliveries into the rear area. Launching may be achieved by:—


- (a) Mounting the reel on a pontoon and then unrolling it.
- (b) Simply putting the pallet in the water with a fork lift machine.
- (c) Releasing the cargo net from the jib of a crane or the derrick of a ship.

The barge is then inflated and towed to the bulk source of fuel and filled by one of the methods indicated above.

Typical sources might be a tanker ship, Landing Ship Medium (LSM), or even a refinery. Special precautions would have to be taken if the LSM

were used. For example, the problem of earthing static electricity may arise, but as this craft is fitted with powerful pumps for taking on and discharging its own fuel, the problem should not be insurmountable.

The Dracone will then be towed to the point of discharge. This may be undertaken by any vessel which can develop about 50 bhp RAE already has an ideal craft in the current Workboat 40. This motor boat has sufficient room available to carry the discharge pump and the air blower. Fitted bunk space will accommodate two men if operations away from base must be undertaken for between 1-3 days. The craft itself is transportable by sea or land having an all up weight of only about 10 tons. It is very robust, is an excellent tug and its value to the army has been proved.



An empty barge on its way to the filling point. It is air inflated and in this case has a very short tow wire.

If no port facilities exist at the discharge point, a flexible hose may be rowed out to the workboat, the pump coupled and discharge begun. It is normal practise to allow the barge to sink as it empties of fuel. On shore suitable receipt containers may be fitted to vehicles or on the ground. They may include collapsible fabric or metal tanks or rolling fluid transporters. Discharge completed, the Dracone is coupled to the blower and inflated. At the same time the flexible hose is taken ashore. The work boat then returns with its tow to the bulk source.

The derivatives and refinements on this system are innumerable. One that comes to mind envisages a "nest" of Dracones, available for quick discharge of the tanker ship and

thus releasing it for further work. The nest is kept in a protected base and drawn on as required.

### Conclusion


The Dracone will no doubt become a familiar item of equipment in the rear area, particularly when the tactical threat is large enough to force dispersion of port facilities in war. In a short space of time it has proved that it is ideal for:—

- (a) Transporting certain cargoes by sea.
- (b) Temporary floating storage of these cargoes if required for this purpose.

No doubt as technical knowledge is increased, more advanced uses will be made of this radical concept of liquid transportation.



Empty Dracone being towed on short wire, nose cone making bow wave.



**THE RED ARMY OF CHINA,**  
by Major Edgar O'Ballance.  
(Faber and Faber, 24 Russell  
Square, London, W.C.1).

Until the Korean War the Chinese soldier was generally looked upon by Westerners with contemptuous amusement. Then, overlooking the peculiarities of that conflict, many of us went to the other extreme. It has indeed been difficult to arrive at a balanced evaluation of the worth of the fighting forces of Red China because, although much of the necessary material was available, it had not been presented in a readily accessible form. In this book Major O'Ballance has assembled the evidence in a very readable form, and in doing so he has rendered a signal service to all concerned with developments in Asia.

In these pages Major O'Ballance not only gives a first-rate account of the development of the Red Chinese Army; he also gives an understandable outline of the revolutionary struggle that has been taking place in that country from 1911 until the present day.

The story begins with the painful birth of the Red Army, its early desperate struggles for survival, and the lasting partnership formed between its two great leaders — Mao Tse-tung

and Chu Teh. Most Australian soldiers are aware that Chiang Kai-shek attempted to suppress the Communists in a series of "extermination campaigns", and that to escape the net Mao Tse-tung undertook a "Long March". Few of them, however, are aware of the magnitude of the operations and the number of men engaged. Probably fewer still know that there was not one "Long March" but several under different leaders, each one of them a great military epic of leadership, endurance and discipline. These marches were much more than straightforward military movements. Whole communities moved, taking with them the factories needed to produce clothing, ammunition and other essential commodities. Opposed in front by strong Nationalist armies, harassed on flanks and rear by local war lords and continually bombed from the air, they forced the passage of great and turbulent rivers, crossed icy mountain ranges, negotiated swamps and deserts. Losses were heavy but discipline never broke down. For instance, Mao Tse-tung's column marched between 6,000 and 8,000 miles. His 20,000 survivors — he lost more than 10,000 on the way — marched for 368 days, of which they spent 235 days actually on the move, crossed 18



mountain ranges, five of which are perennially snow-covered, crossed 24 major rivers, marched through 12 provinces, broke through the armies of 12 war lords, and temporarily occupied 62 cities and towns. Ho Lung started from Hunan with 45,000 men and battled his way through the opposing Nationalists to a secure refuge on the borders of Tibet. He fought a skirmish of some sort almost every day and a major battle on an average of once a week. On the way he sustained some 25,000 battle casualties. People who can accomplish feats like these command our respect.

In assessing the value of the Chinese Red Army today, Major O'Ballance arrives at the conclusion that in its present stage of development, particularly in training and equipment, it could hardly expect to win a prolonged struggle with a first class power. He is probably right if the war is fought on conventional lines. But he overlooks the fact that the Chinese Red Army did decisively defeat a first class power in Indo China by sticking to the strategy and tactics which suited its peculiar characteristics, and committing itself to conventional battle only in the most favourable circumstances. Since he made his appreciation the Chinese have won another conventional victory on the Indian frontier, and its proteges are not doing so badly in South Vietnam. There is no reason to suppose that Mao Tse-tung will obligingly engage in a form of warfare which suits his adversaries. Neither is there any reason to suppose that the tide of his suc-

cess can be turned by acting and, more importantly, thinking along conventional lines. It does not seem that Mao is going to give us the chance to fight a "limited" conventional war in South East Asia, but we do have a revolutionary war on our hands.

Nevertheless, this book contains the material necessary for an assessment of the rulers of Red China and the men who follow them. It is, therefore, worthy of serious study by statesmen and soldiers concerned with current events in Asia and on our northern approaches. Major O'Ballance's list of acknowledgements shows that he has done an immense amount of research for us. Unlike so much of the literature about China, his book is well mapped and easy to read.

— E.G.K.

**THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, by Leonard Beaton and John Maddox. (Published by Chatto and Windus, 40-42 William IV Street, London, W.C.2, for the Institute of Strategic Studies.)**

The game of international power politics as played in this year of grace contains an entirely new element, an element which statesmen have never before had to take into their calculations. In the past it was always possible, as between evenly matched powers, to calculate that clever strategy plus superior technical efficiency could bring about the desired political result at something less than a prohibitively high cost.

For all practical purposes the advent of an evenly matched nuclear capability between the two great opposing power blocs eliminated this possibility. It is no longer possible to win an all-out war with any margin of profit, if indeed it is possible to win it at all in the generally accepted sense of the term.

It can be argued that the balance of nuclear terror is a powerful factor in preventing the two great rivals from engaging in direct conflict of any sort. While this argument may or may not be valid, the trend of events suggests that neither side is likely to take the big risk, to press any issue to the point where a mutually destructive nuclear exchange is virtually certain.

The leaders of both power blocs are endeavouring to attract satellites to themselves in the time-honoured way. But neither side wishes to see any satellite, its own or its rival's, armed with nuclear weapons. The risks are already too finely balanced to encourage any extension of them.

The possibility that the possession of nuclear weapons may spread to other countries is an extremely important factor in current international politics. This book is an assessment of the practical, not merely the theoretical, likelihood that other countries will decide that their security depends on acquiring nuclear weapons. It has been written in the conviction that previous studies of this subject have concentrated too much on the purely technical aspects of

the problem, to the neglect of the political, economic and strategic factors which will actually influence the decisions of governments.

To remedy this defect the authors not only examine and explain the technical developments which may simplify and cheapen the manufacture of nuclear weapons; they also assess the factors which are as likely to restrain as to encourage governments in this step. This treatment certainly produces a balanced appreciation of the subject. The authors then proceed to a study of the programmes of today's small or embryo nuclear powers, and conclude with some practical suggestions for restricting the spread of nuclear weapons.

John Maddox is the science correspondent of the Manchester Guardian who has earned a reputation for the facility with which he can make complex scientific subjects comprehensible to the layman. Leonard Beaton is the defence correspondent of the same paper. Their reputations will be enhanced by their joint effort in producing this book. It is comprehensive, down-to-earth, and devoid of technical jargon. They explain in sufficient detail, but in no more than sufficient detail, how the material for nuclear warheads is produced. The emphasis is on costs, industrial effort and sources of supply, rather than on the mysterious interior of an atomic reactor. The scientist already knows, while the layman does not need to know in order to make an

appreciation of the real problem. In contradistinction to many studies of this subject, the authors have gone exhaustively into the means of delivery, which is as much a part of the basic problem as the warheads themselves.

Concentration on essentials characterises the whole book. In slightly more than 200 pages the authors appear to have covered the whole range of the subject. The book should appeal to everyone with an interest in current international affairs.

— E.G.K.

**ALAMEIN, by C. E. Lucas Phillips.** (William Heinemann Ltd., London, and 317 Collins Street, Melbourne.)

Alamein ranks among the great battles of history, for much more turned upon it than the mere defeat of Rommel's army. It destroyed Mussolini's ambition to ride in triumph into Cairo and any ideas Hitler might have entertained about a German drive through the Middle East to the Persian oil fields. It saved Malta and it gave the Allies a firm grip on the eastern Mediterranean. It marked the turn of the tide in the whole war for, in Churchill's words, "Before Alamein we scarcely won a battle; after Alamein we never lost one".

Alamein has been carefully studied by many soldiers, but until this book appeared most of the available literature took the detached view of a directing staff or the narrowly circumscribed view of a single indivi-

dual involved in it. The first concentrated upon the plans and their execution and seldom got down to details of the actual fighting. The second gave too little attention to the plans and too much to one man's personal experience.

In this book Brigadier Phillips brilliantly presents the most complete account of the battle that has so far been published, an account that emphatically reminds us that when all has been said about operational and administrative planning, battles are won by the fighting soldiers. He shows us in a very striking way the dependence of the general upon his troops and the dependence of the troops upon their general.

Brigadier Phillips, who fought at Alamein as a regimental commander, develops his story with great deliberation. He first sets the stage with a lively and accurate description of the scene, the wilderness of the Western Desert and the peculiar demands it made on the men who fought over it, the characteristics of the Eighth Army and its adversaries, and penetrating sketches of the personalities of the senior commanders on both sides.

For one reason or another several able writers have endeavoured to show that Montgomery's success, in sharp contrast to his predecessors' lack of it, rested chiefly on the fact that he had greater resources than they did. To be sure, he had a lot more than they did, but, as Brigadier Phillips shows, much of it was his own creation. Before he got any additional

resources at all he had made his inheritance into a better army simply by abolishing the "Jock Columns" and other ineffective improvisations, restoring its proper organisation and giving it simple, clear-cut orders. It was these measures, taken by Montgomery immediately on arrival, that more than anything else put the Eighth Army back into serious business. In all history there is no more striking example of the impact of the personality of the Commander upon his troops.

Brigadier Phillips gives a masterly description of the battle at all levels. He gives a clear account of Montgomery's initial plan and his day-to-day handling of the changing situation. Then at each stage of the protracted struggle he takes us right down to the actions of the fighting units, the battles within the battle. This treatment enables the reader to see Alamein not only as the marks on an instructor's map, but also as an affair of flesh and blood, of fire and steel and human heroism. While his excellent sketch maps enable us to see each separate struggle in its correct relation to the general pattern of the battle, his powerful, vivid descriptions of the fighting show us Alamein as the participants of both sides saw it, from generals to privates. In these pages the men of whom he writes are not remote, formalised figures. Through the deft presentation of their personal idiosyncracies we know them as the men of the desert armies knew them.

Brigadier Phillips gives a full account of the part played by 9 Australian Division in the battle. However, in describing some of its personalities he falls into the curious error of stating that the division was commanded by a CMF officer because "the Australian Government expressly debarred any officer of the Staff Corps from being appointed to a command". The brigadier has evidently been misinformed for General Morshead's predecessor in command of the division was a Staff Corps officer (General Wynter) while, even before Alamein, General Lavarack had commanded 1 Australian Corps in Syria and the Netherlands East Indies, to say nothing of several regimental and brigade commanders in the Middle East alone.

However, this small error fades into insignificance against his memorable account of the hard, bitter fighting in the Australian sector, 9th Armoured Brigade's epic charge against the German guns on the Rahman Track, and the gallant defence of *Snipe*.

This is military history at its best. It is also magnificent military literature.

— E.G.K.

**PEACE AT ALAMEIN**, by **Giuliano Palladino**. (Hodder and Stoughton Ltd., London, and 425 Little Collins Street, Melbourne.)

This book, originally published in Italian, is described in the sub-title as a novel. This is hardly an apt description for the story has no plot though the

theme is clear enough. It is an account of the personal experiences of an Italian infantry officer in North Africa over the period covered by Rommel's first offensive to his defeat at El Alamein.

Palladino certainly got the most out of the good and the bad characteristics of the brilliance of moon and stars, the solitude, the quietness, and the effects of illimitable space on the human mind. His descriptions of the heat, of the sandstorms, and of the flies strongly reinforce one's resolve never to revisit the place.

As an officer, Palladino seems to be rather vague and ineffectual. All the officers do in fact. They never seem to really know where they were going or what they were supposed to be doing. If Palladino knew what was going on he certainly keeps it a secret. Unless you knew something of the events in North Africa you wouldn't have the faintest idea what he was talking about. If Palladino and his brother officers are representative of the Italian commissioned grades, it is easy to understand why Italy's armies were beaten so soundly and so quickly.

All the same, Palladino does show us, unintentionally perhaps, some of the difficulties under which Rommel laboured at Alamein, difficulties that are often overlooked by students of the campaign. We must see the battle from both sides. He shows us in a very vivid way the gradual loss of morale and physical condition caused by the perpetual shortage of supplies

which in the end induced in all ranks a sense of indifference to events. Morale was not improved by the feeling that their German allies held them in low esteem and got all the best of the rations. Palladino might have been impressed by German military efficiency but he felt deeply their arrogant attitude towards his own troops.

For Palladino and his company officers Alamein was just a mighty bombardment, followed by miles of weary and rather aimless marching. Eventually the unit more or less disintegrated for want of leadership at any level. Palladino and a few friends simply sat down waiting for the 8th Army to gather them in.

There are some fine descriptive passages in this book, but it has little military value. It makes pleasant, easy reading, but it adds little to one's professional knowledge.

— E.G.K.

**THE COLONEL'S SON**, by Nigel Eldridge. (Peter Davies Ltd., London, and William Heinemann Ltd., 317 Collins Street, Melbourne.)

This is a delightful story about children which will be thoroughly enjoyed by everyone over the age of eight, especially by those with a yen for soldiering.

The little hero, aged eight, is the son of a colonel sent to India in the early 'twenties to command a British cavalry regiment which has just been amal-

gamated with another regiment of equally ancient lineage. Immediately upon arrival he becomes involved in the squabbles and jealousies which the children of both parties to the amalgamation have acquired from their parents. Through the clear-sighted perceptive eyes of these children we are shown many things — glimpses of India in the heyday of the British Raj, the lavish hospitality of the princes, regimental life and the community of interest that should exist between all ranks and their families in a good unit. The boy can learn horsemanship under the blistering tongue of the sergeant major and be on intimate terms with the troops, and still remain the colonel's son. And he can show us many details of a day that has passed away.

Anyone who likes children will like this book. And anyone who is not above being taught by a child may learn from it several valuable lessons in the art of parenthood.

I have read it three times — once for myself and twice straight off for the two small ones who stayed with us over Christmas. They were thrilled with the rogue elephant, fascinated by the repulsive plague rat and loved the cobras. I understand, though, that some difference of opinion arose when, on return to the farm, they tried to make the old grey mare into a tent-pegging charger. I am going to read it again one of these days.

— E.G.K.

**SOLDIER FROM THE SEA**, by Alexander Fullerton. (Peter Davies Ltd., and William Heinemann Ltd., 317 Collins Street, Melbourne.)

The theme of this novel is the conflict between duty and desire. A great British counter-offensive against the Japanese in Malaya is in the final stages of preparation. Two pairs of commandos go ashore from a submarine on successive nights to examine the beach selected for the landing. The first pair returns with the information that their end of the beach is clear of defences and obstacles. The second pair find that their half fairly bristles with concealed trenches and emplacements. Clearly the Japanese have smelt a rat. The commandos are delayed by a Japanese patrol and fail to make the rendezvous with the submarine.

Knowing that unless they get their information out pretty quickly the invasion will go in as planned and be bloodily repulsed, the pair set out for Burma on foot. On their way they find a delectable Eurasian girl hiding with two English children in a deserted village. Whereupon one of the officers persuades himself that the duty of getting the refugees to safety ranks equally with his duty of getting his information out in time to be of any value. It would not be fair to say here whether he succeeds in having it both ways. It is a good adventurous yarn, with some interesting glimpses of colonial rule as seen through Asian eyes.

— E.G.K.

**ADMIRAL RODNEY, by Captain Donald Macintyre. (Peter Davies Ltd., London, and William Heinemann Ltd., 317 Collins Street, Melbourne.) M**

Admirers of the Royal Navy are prone to imagine that the history of that glorious fighting force begins with Nelson. Actually Nelson owed much to many earlier admirals who laboured to shape the Navy which, fired by his genius, entered upon its golden age.

One such admiral was George Brydges Rodney. Born into a family of modest means but excellent "connections", young George had no difficulty about entering the Royal Navy when at the age of twelve his parents decided upon a seafaring career. There were no examinations to be passed, no educational qualifications to be produced. The aspiring sailor's father simply had to find a captain who would take the boy on as a midshipman. Alternatively, if he was not acquainted with a captain he could persuade an influential friend to secure the boy's appointment by other means.

The navy that Rodney entered reflected the England of that day. It was an age of privilege. Theoretically a democracy, England was in fact ruled by an oligarchy devoted primarily to the furtherance of its own interests. In Government service of any kind advancement depended on influence rather than on ability. Some officers remained midshipmen all their lives, others ascended the ladder very quickly indeed. Nevertheless, despite the many claims

made upon them, the admirers generally managed to ensure that hopeless incompetents were side-tracked in one way or another.

Rodney received his first command at the end of a long period of peace during which the fleet had been badly neglected. There was scarcely a ship fit to take its place in the line of battle. The crews were ill-trained, while the general body of the officers was inexperienced, riven by jealousies and devoid of discipline. If Rodney could do little more than write bitter complaints about the state of the ships, he made it his life's work to bring the personnel to a high level of competence and discipline. When his first action as an admiral was ruined by the ill-discipline of some of his captains, this resolve became almost an obsession.

After a somewhat chequered career, Rodney found himself in command of the fleet in the West Indies during the American War of Independence. As usual, his ships were in a shocking condition and his crews riddled with scurvy. While Rodney fought the Admiralty for improved equipment, his personal physician, Gilbert Blane, laboured to improve the health of the crews. Blane saw in lemon juice the most readily obtainable anti-scorbutic, but both he and his chief had to fight hard to persuade the financial authorities to authorise its supply. In the end Rodney had a well-found, highly trained and reasonably healthy fleet. With it he decisively broke French

naval power in the western hemisphere at the battle of the Saintes on 12 April 1782.

Captain Macintyre has done much more than write a biography of one of Britain's great admirals. He has given us a lively and informative picture of service life of the day, together with its background of political intrigue and ambition. In his descriptions of naval affairs he never becomes too technical for the layman. On the contrary he makes it easy for the most confirmed landlubber to follow with understanding the intricate manoeuvres of the cumbersome fleets that battled for naval supremacy.

This is one of those books that the layman picks up with the intention of skimming through, and finishes by reading every line with interest and pleasure.

— E.G.K.

**SUBMARINERS V.C., by Rear-Admiral Sir William Jameson. (Peter Davies, London, and 317 Collins Street, Melbourne.)**

At a time when most items of warlike equipment seem to be in danger of becoming obsolescent almost before they are brought into service, one at least appears to have an assured future. If the invention of atomic energy terminated the usefulness of many costly devices, it enhanced the value of the submarine.

The crews of the powerful nuclear - powered submarines now being developed have a

proud tradition from which to draw their inspiration. Although comparatively "young" in the annals of naval warfare, the submarine service exerted a tremendous influence on the course of two great wars, and earned an unsurpassed reputation for courage, tenacity and resourcefulness.

In this book Rear Admiral Jameson tells the stories of 12 British submarine exploits which earned the coveted Victoria Cross. His first epic is that of Lieutenant N. D. Holbrook, V.C., who in 1914 took the tiny, primitive B.11 through the minefields and past the bristling batteries of the narrow Dardanelles to sink the Turkish battleship *Mesoudieh* off the Gallipoli coast. His next tells of the amazing exploits of Lieutenant Commander E. C. Boyle, V.C., who in a slightly, but only slightly, better vessel twice penetrated the whole length of the Dardanelles and spent a total of 78 days in the Sea of Marmora. On the score of physical endurance alone this was a remarkable feat.

The Admiral gives a detailed account of the successful attack by the British midget X class submarines on the German battleship *Tirpitz* in Alten Fiord in Norway. These little craft carried a crew of three. They carried no torpedoes and had to lay their charges right under the target. Later, some of these vessels were tropicalised, and two of them penetrated the Strait of Johore and sank a Japanese cruiser lying off the Singapore dockyard.



Admiral Jameson is, of course, a first class story teller and in these tales of sea warriors he certainly does his reputation no harm. He has the rare gift of explaining technicalities without

becoming technical. It will be a sad day indeed if the epics of high adventure he here presents so attractively ever cease to evoke a response in the young men of our nation.

— E.G.K.

### REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE

Numerous correspondents have raised the query whether the verses at the beginning of the article "Revolutionary Warfare" in AAJ No. 164, January 1963, were in fact written by Henry Lawson. The author, Colonel M. P. O'Hare, quoted the lines from memory, but, on the authority of Miss Patricia Lucas of the Baillieu Library, Melbourne University, we are able to assure our readers that they were written by Henry Lawson in 1898. Since the lines are evidence not only of Lawson's prophetic vision, but carry a *double-edged message for us today*, they are given below in full.

### AS FAR AS YOUR RIFLES COVER

Do you think, you slaves of a thousand years to  
poverty, wealth and pride,  
You can crush the spirit that has been free in a land  
that's new and wide?  
When you've scattered the last of the farmer bands,  
and the war for awhile is over,  
You will hold the land — ay, you'll hold the land — the  
land that your rifles cover.

Till your gold has levelled each mountain range where  
a wounded man can hide,  
Till your gold has lighted the moonless night on the  
plains where the rebels ride;  
Till the future is proved, and the past is bribed from  
the son of the land's dead lover —  
You may hold the land — you may hold the land just  
as far as your rifles cover.

— Henry Lawson, 1898.