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Photo: Australian War Memorial, Canberra.

#### NEW GUINEA, AUGUST-SEPTEMBER, 1942

The trackless swampy or mountainous jungles of New Guinea presented the Allied troops with tremendous difficulties in getting forward their heavy weapons and supplies. Not the least of these difficulties was the problem of getting artillery pieces into suitable firing positions. In many cases 25-pounder guns had to be dismantled and manhandled to places within range of the target.

The picture shows Australian gunners taking forward the barrel of a 25-pounder on an improvised sledge.

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# VALUE FOR TIME

Brigadier S. M. McDonald, MC,  
Active Citizen Military Forces  
and  
Major A. D. Wells,  
Royal Australian Armoured Corps

WE have viewed the CMF system from practically every aspect; from unit level looking up, from command and staff level looking down, from the ARA angle and from the CMF angle. Our aim in writing this article is to highlight a balanced set of maxims for the conduct of the CMF.

The maxims, which we consider must be observed to gain full value from the CMF system, are discussed under the following eight headings:—

- (a) Command.
- (b) Discipline.
- (c) Administration.
- (d) Mutual Understanding.
- (e) Organisation.
- (f) Training Cycle.
- (g) Value for Time.
- (h) Recruiting.

### Command

Command is a word with an illusive meaning, more so in practice than in theory. A unit without command is like a ship without its rudder, i.e., it cannot be steered towards a goal. Likewise a unit without direction

cannot fulfil its purpose. Direction must come from the commander through his staff down through the chain of command. For this direction to be effective it must be practical. It can only be practical if every facet of the unit is known and understood by the commander. With a CMF unit this gives rise to a peculiar problem. Because of the time involved it is not possible for the CMF CO to gain, and keep abreast with, all the required detailed knowledge; however, the principal ARA staff officer can and should. Therefore, the CO and the executive officer or adjutant must be a perfect team, as commander and adviser each understanding and assisting the other to the best of his ability and in perfect harmony. Personal idiosyncrasies, pride, whims and desires must be suppressed for the good of the unit as a whole and the attainment of their mutual aim. (Note: If their aim is not mutual then something is very, very wrong).

When on view there is the commander and his ARA staff

officer; when not on view there are two people hammering out problems and plans, but arriving at and implementing the one unanimous decision.

Simple military phrases such as "You WILL do so and so . . ." or "I WANT such and such by 1000 hours tomorrow" are words true soldiers expect; not "Could you do so and so . . . please?" — alas, all too frequently heard. The commander must follow through every order he issues to ensure its execution; if there is a failure he must, without hesitation, crack down hard on the offender. This drill need only be repeated two or three times before officers and men alike spring to attention with respect whenever he appears, which incidentally, should be frequently. This soldierly act of respect is normal procedure in a good unit.

#### THE COMMANDER MUST COMMAND.

#### Discipline

Perhaps the greatest fallacy of all is the popular belief, in some places, that "volunteers must be handled with kid gloves". This is utter nonsense. The kid glove policy wrecks a soldier and wrecks a unit — it drains both of all snap and vitality, it disillusiones the newer members, and the unit, at best, stagnates, but more usually degenerates.

Young men join the army expecting to be treated as soldiers. So why spoil their expectations? So much can be gained by firm and snappy handling, nothing can be lost. Of course the faint-hearted and

social drones wilt, but they are certainly no loss. Quite the contrary, their clogging presence is removed, the unit is stripped to a solid foundation in all ranks, and upon this foundation a sound organisation is built. This is not idle theory, but well proved fact. Only the pruned fruit tree bears good healthy fruit!

Consistent and effective disciplinary action taken against late comers (all ranks), for an example, makes syllabi adherence from the time aspect simple. Members must either be on time or apply for leave of absence. Training will benefit as planning figures become realistic, not inspired guesses.

One unit commenced to solve its vehicle maintenance problem by promulgating a Routine Order making it an offence to start up vehicles without first performing first parade servicing. The CMF members, who possessed a distinct "fighter pilot" attitude, quickly changed their thinking after the first few disciplinary actions.

By this single act servicing was placed in its correct perspective and on a firm footing. With constant supervision it progressed to the point where crews took such a pride in their vehicles that voluntary and unpaid servicing parades became a normal activity.

#### Administration

In tactics we learn that an attack or an advance should be launched from a firm base. Likewise, if a CMF unit is to progress,

its base must be firm, i.e., its administration must be sound. This principle is even more applicable to the specialist and technical units whose training involves equipment to a greater degree. Administration is the master maxim. If unit administration is faulty, the unit fails to progress beyond "Lesson 1", as that wonderful instructional potential — the ARA cadre, are fully committed accounting for and maintaining stores, processing breakages and repairs, investigating pay discrepancies, issuing clothing to a floating population, then spending hours travelling and trying to recover it. This rather common predicament is wrong. If it applies, immediate steps must be taken to lessen the administrative load so that the cadre may concentrate more on training. The administrative load can be reduced considerably by applying the following principles:—

- (a) *Foresight* — Administrative planning in reasonable detail must be not less than six months in advance. In fact, 12 to 18 months is advisable. A little foresight allows for an ability to anticipate future problems so that training plans are uninterrupted. Anything less than soundly based arrangements are muddles and are entirely unacceptable. Muddles have such a shattering effect on respect and morale.
- (b) *Economy* — Labour and time within a CMF unit are two very scarce commodities. With proper foresight administrative planning can

aim at their economical use. Plans that are costly in labour have only one effect, namely to entirely divert the ARA cadre from training. This must not happen.

- (c) *Flexibility* — The lazy mind working in a rut cannot practise this principle nor even comprehend it. It is the creative mind that enjoys flexibility and its rewards. We sometimes forget that flexibility is also a principle of war. If we cannot practise flexibility during peace how then do we expect to be masters of it in war? (See further discussion under Organisation).
- (d) *Simplicity* — Peace-time accounting procedure makes it imperative that administrative plans be simple and easily understood. Administrative errors are so time-consuming. The administrative procedures laid down for the army are quite sound and simple, provided the initial entry is correct.
- (e) The economical use of Time and the application of the Principle of Co-operation are discussed later in this article.

The CMF members of the unit according to their role and posting must assume their full share of the administrative responsibilities along with the ARA Cadre, the whole being interwoven and dovetailed to produce a common result. The situation of all becoming auditors of one another can be avoided by correct training, patience and hard work. It is a most satisfying and



rewarding experience to find the administrative machine beginning to purr, not grinding along. Once it begins to purr the rapidity with which it gains momentum is often astounding.

To become obsessed with administration to the detriment of training must be avoided. Training is the master; administration the servant — not vice versa! When a unit is administratively sound it will be found that little continued effort is required to keep it so.

Finally, it should be realised, time allows the CMF to take over certain administrative chores only according to their role and posting — not all!

### Mutual Understanding

The importance of ARA/CMF teamwork has already been emphasised. Good teamwork is not possible unless each understands the other. ARA members must realise that soldiering for the CMF is not their main career (otherwise they would have joined the regular army long ago). Hence the need for a tolerant and helpful approach, resisting the temptation to measure CMF capability and capacity against ARA. Time is a telling factor. Giving way to such a temptation only produces constant criticism — a quick destroyer of goodwill and teamwork. On the other hand, the CMF members should try to appreciate the ARA outlook and respect the rules and regulations to which they must adhere. Nothing destroys goodwill more swiftly than intolerance towards the others correct approach to

the job. We each have our own instructions to honour. Ignoring the need for maintenance, careless approach to loss and damage of stores, careless marking of roll books, and the lackadaisical approach towards routine matters, must not under any circumstances be tolerated by the CO. It creates unnecessary additional work for the cadre and has a damaging effect on goodwill and training, not to mention the incurred wrath of higher formation A and Q — a wrath which normally seeks its outlet through the ARA, not the CMF members.

We have heard so much about the "one army" — a worthy concept that is possible if we are prepared to co-operate to the full and support each other. All must endeavour to improve standards and contribute something worthwhile. It is easy to be selfish and pick the plums. A good unit is one where both ARA and CMF join to shoulder the common load. There is but one aim and that is to produce an efficient unit capable of performing its role.

### Organisation

Another popular fallacy, presumably inspired by over-emphasis of "esprit de corps", is that at all costs the war organisation of the unit must be preserved. Certainly, a soldier can identify himself with his sub-unit, but is this worthwhile when the sub-unit is inefficient? Sub-units cannot be efficient unless the individual is first thoroughly trained. It stands to reason that effort can be greatly economised when resources are

pooled. This is best achieved by placing individual training under regimental control, so for that period of its training cycle devoted to individual training the unit becomes a school. It is suggested the unit reorganise when the training cycle demands, on lines similar to the parent corps AHQ School, with the CO becoming the CI, and the unit parading by wings. It is not suggested this reorganisation be total, just for training purposes only; sub-units still must be responsible for routine administration. After all, flexibility is a principle of war; here is a chance to practise it.

By this method, full use can be made of time (always scarce), control is centralised, a set standard of training is reached throughout the whole unit and, what is more important, effort is economised. Further, the commander now has an additional opportunity of projecting his personality on training. We ask which is preferred; an "esprit de corps" more imaginary than real, or a trained soldier who when you examine it closely, is really the person who builds "esprit de corps" anyway.

One word of warning — for the training organisation to be successful its foundation must be built upon rock, not sand. Many officers and NCO's are trainee only in the rank they wear — they are not necessarily trained. Also, it is wise to remember each one of us has a ceiling. The key organisers and instructors must be selected in accordance with their capability and the amount of time they can

devote — not their seniority! This also helps notice be given to dead and wilting wood.

### Training Cycle

This point will no doubt be considered by many readers to be so basic that it does not warrant a mention. Perhaps that is why it is so often overlooked. But whether a training cycle exists or not it is worthless unless it is:—


- (a) Practical
- (b) Challenging
- (c) Annual, but progressive within a larger cycle based upon a period of say three to four years.
- (d) Ingrained in the mind of each unit member.

Unfortunately, further explanation is necessary because of the variety of interpretations placed upon the word "practical". The training cycle can be considered practical only if:—

- (a) Every member of the unit is usefully employed all the time.
- (b) Wastage rate decreases sharply. The attendance is large and regular.
- (c) Planning is concurrent.

We are training for war. To successfully and confidently launch troops into battle we employ Battle Procedure, which provides a means of gaining best value from the time available. During peace training we can practise for war by employing concurrent planning. Call it "Training Procedure" if you wish, but the aim is the same: to make the best use of time. To relax in war is fatal. As we train

# SUGGESTED ANNUAL TRAINING CYCLE - C.M.F. UNIT



**FIGURE 1**

## NOTES

(a) The parade card is designed from this cycle.

(b) Fixed points are:—

Public holidays  
Exams set by AHQ  
Camp (to a degree)

The rest is flexible and can be varied to suit local conditions.

(c) The CO's map/model exercise and TEWT are designed to orient and familiarise all unit leaders with the main camp exercise with troops.

(d) All courses shown should be constituted as such, with pay being made available from the 20 days annual course vote per member.

(e) For best continuity and value for time the concentrated course is recommended i.e. shortest duration between parades.

(f) The officer training course concentrates entirely upon regimental subjects (A, B and D). General subjects (C, E and DA21A) can be gained whilst on rotation to respective Command and Staff Training Unit.

(g) Members not attending courses undergo individual training (re-capitulation) during weekly night parades (not shown).

(h) Individual training ceases during first week of annual camp. Collective training commences and continues until camp ends. Low level collective training is carried on throughout the year at sub-unit bivouacs held in the field.

(i) Recruit courses A and B lead nicely into the Individual Training period prior to camp. Graduates from Recruit course C may be used as General Dutymen during camp but they must be told at the commencement of their course this is part of soldiering. Next year it will be someone else's turn.

VALUE FOR TIME

so do we fight. Therefore to relax during peace training must be considered an unforgivable sin of soldiering.

How often do we see a unit concentrating on a single event until it passes? The unit then rests and relaxes awhile (not to mention some mutual back-patting) before attention is focused upon the next activity. This results in the unit progressing jerkily, if indeed it progresses at all. Concurrent planning economises in time, allowing smooth and rapid progress from event to event.

It is suggested that the training cycle be based upon a period of 12 months culminating with Annual Camp. This annual cycle, however, must be part of a larger cycle designed to allow training to progress smoothly from year to year, advancing and expanding from firm base to firm base. Training can then abide by the principles and be co-ordinated. To assist with administration application should be made for pay periods to coincide with the cycle. But how often does the converse apply — training being tailored to suit administrative requirements?

It is simple to ingrain the training cycle upon the mind of each unit member. No ponderous and involved training instruction is necessary, just a single self-explanatory diagram drawn on the piece of paper — as depicted in Figure 1 — but on display to all and to be read in conjunction with the parade card. This cycle then allows the CMF member to plan his year, for unlike the ARA, soldiering

is not his full-time occupation, or way of life, and time is so important.

### Value for Time

If the commander and staff of each unit ask themselves this question: "Does every member of this unit receive value for time" and then give an honest "yes" nothing more need be said. However, if the honest answer is "no" or a hesitant or doubtful "yes", a training change is needed.

There is so much to teach, the inexperienced and untrained leader is bewildered and flits awkwardly and without confidence from one thing to another or, worse, leaves it to unguided subordinates to muddle along completely uncertain of the path they are following. A child is not taught to run before it can walk, therefore training at first must be thoroughly basic, then progressive. The guiding light is the role of the unit. The aim of training is to first produce the soldier, then and only then, the sub-unit (not vice versa) then and only then, the unit capable of performing its role. With the amount of time at present available for CMF training it is doubtful if the latter can be achieved, but a high standard of sub-unit training is certainly possible. It is possible only if the aim is maintained, which means the ruthless discarding of the "could knows" and the low priority "must knows". Time only permits attention to the high priority "must knows", but they must be known by all!

Training of course must be challenging, interesting and

realistic; however, we have heard these words so frequently they have tended to lose their meaning. Training can only be made appealing by hard work, a little imagination and a lot of human understanding.

A measurement of "value for time" is the consistent re-appearance of the same eager faces at parades, and a steady inflow of recruits who become regular and happy attenders.

### Recruiting

It is quite pointless to advertise unless there is something to sell. If the unit is inefficient, there is nothing to sell, and recruiting is a waste of time. Advertising will certainly produce recruits but they soon drift away, condemning the Army. They are bad publicity. All that is left is the realisation that a great deal of hard work and valuable time has been consumed for nothing: i.e. —

Recruiting + wastage = 0

What is worse, the inefficient unit remains with its own rotting effect, infecting neighbouring units; all bringing discredit to the Army in general.

The cart was never much good before the horse. This recruiting dilemma (alas all too common) is just another variation of this old truism.

First of all produce a firm base, then organise a practical system for handling recruits and absorbing them into the establishment and then advertise, and behold, the unit will grow; maybe slowly at first, then rapidly as the word of the happy

soldier is passed from mouth to mouth (the best form of advertising) until that glorious state of affairs exists when a waiting list is formed. Not idle theory but fact, as a few units already know.

Once a recruit course is under way it is wrong to feed in new recruits. They must be set aside until the next course commences. How this is done is up to the unit, but it must not divert effort. This small problem can be turned to advantage for it allows a recruit filter to be imposed at the outset. Instead of grabbing the recruit immediately, which appears to be the normal practice to build up numbers and is inspired no doubt by fear of losing him, his name and particulars should be recorded and he should be told to report back two parades prior to commencement of the next recruit course (for kitting and final documentation). If he shows up then he really wants to join the unit, if he fails to appear the unit has lost nothing, on the contrary valuable time and effort have been saved — he was a potential non-effective anyway.

This policy results in recruits joining the unit in easily organised drafts — the training cycle, designed to assimilate these drafts, is not interrupted and training progresses smoothly. Also, by employing this system all recruits join and progress together, none can feel they are out of depth, or conversely, being held back, as they do with the "sporadic intermingling" policy.

The staff at higher formation do not measure the overall effectiveness of a unit by its recruiting rate — the true guide is its wastage rate and the number of non-effectives held on strength.

Finally it is worth remembering the efficient unit experiences little difficulty in attracting recruits. Basically, most young men enjoy soldiering. Give the young Australian real soldiering, not a pretence of it, and recruiting is no longer a problem.

### Conclusion

Several times already during Australia's brief history she has relied upon her volunteer war-

time army. If hostilities commence she will do so again and the Citizen soldier will form the bulk of our Service. Most officers realise deep down in their hearts that the CMF potential is only half-realised, yet many are content to raise the telescope to the blind eye and leave it there. An efficient CMF may one day prove vital in safe-guarding our comfort and way of life, perhaps sooner than some care to think. There is nothing new in the thoughts put forward in this article. They lie quite openly in our military text books, and with a little moral courage, judgment and energy, can easily be applied.

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### COMPETITION FOR AUTHORS


The Board of Review has made the undermentioned awards for the best original articles published in the Australian Army Journal in the financial year 1961-62:—

First prize of £30 — "Training in the CMF", by Major H. H. Bell.

Second prize of £10 — "When Friends Fall Out", by Staff Sergeant P. G. Gittins.

# THE CASE FOR UMBRELLAS

CAPTAIN H.B. CHAMBERLAIN  
ROYAL AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY



IT has been unofficially reported from a well-informed source that a requirement for a raincoat for the Australian Army does not exist. The spokesman concerned hesitated to disclose the reasons for this decision or even hint at the manner of the ponderous and detailed examination which lay behind it. The body charged with obtaining all the evidence is to be commended on its stand. To eliminate from its corporate mind the fact that most modern armies have acceded to popular demand took great courage. The mere fact that our own Navy, Air Force and Womens Services have seen fit to employ the item is obviously a product of muddled thinking. To even consider that the Australian soldier could successfully wear such a garment produces a vision of extraordinary miscalculation.

One can possibly imagine some of the factors which underwent consideration. The association of words was undoubtedly of great significance. Trench coat is a term which engenders thinking in terms of static warfare. Macintosh may not have ap-


pealed to certain members of the committee for reasons of racial prejudice. In any case that which was good enough for a World War I digger is good enough for us. Many a man has been kept partly dry by manipulating the traditional sheets ground around his shoulders. The fact that this item is cumbersome, inadequate and takes infinite patience to endure must surely have been outweighed by more serious considerations. If a hair shirt had been inserted in the scale of issue it could hardly have served less purpose. Any soldier on exercises will hesitate to use the item during a shower for the simple reason that to employ it as a ground sheet it operates best when dry. If worn during a heavy shower it will generally ensure that the soldier is completely soaked from the hips down.

The presence of the greatcoat on the scale was surely a decisive factor. Such an item will absorb several times its weight in water thus ensuring that the body is exercised by carrying extra weight. The saving grace of course is that it is made of



wool and therefore is a must, regardless of its value as a garment. It will be conceded that when a soldier is on exercises he must continue to keep dry as best he can. Not much harm can come if a man is wet provided he is not also unduly cold for long periods. Much of the soldier's time is spent in barracks, returning to or from home and at times on leave. It is then that some means is needed to keep him dry. Undoubtedly the committee has made some recommendations for an alternative. In this event any adverse criticism of the decision would be most irregular.

At item which has achieved considerable acclaim in both temperate and tropical climates is the umbrella. Old ideas die hard, and it would be reasonable to assume that the introduction of this item as a piece of equipment may receive steady opposition. Most would tend to give it only a casual glance and discard it. No one would suggest this has happened to the raincoat. To persist with the umbrella, however, it should be noted that there are certain advantages. It is effective in hot steamy climates and causes no physical discomfort to the member when in actual use. It can be folded into a comparatively small unit when not in use and could be perhaps attached to the belt in the manner of a side arm. In certain situations it could even be employed as such. The employment of the item in field exercises would be limited, but so also would the raincoat. It is in barracks and on off duty



occasions where its value could be most effective.

Consideration of cost, production and ordnance holdings would have to be considered in great detail. The secondment of a group of experienced officers for a period of a few months to study the implications would be necessary. To this group could be added the advice of one or two civilian representatives. Their long experience in this field would be invaluable. The ensuing user trials could provide an interesting study in public reaction. Whilst their everyday use is possible in most circumstances, a great deal of imagination and implementation

of techniques would be necessary for parade ground work. Trifling objections such as the inability to carry the umbrella whilst shouldering arms should be over-ruled. The tremendous advantages to be gained over the use of the raincoat under such circumstances would soon become obvious.


Clearly a distinction would have to be made between officers

and other ranks umbrellas. A silver topped handle would give way to a plastic handle. Whereas the material covering the former would be fine and light in texture, the latter could well get by with a coarser and possibly porous material. This feature would help to maintain the traditional aspect without necessarily ensuring that the equipment was completely effective.

Certain disadvantages come to mind. The superstitious minded would be careful not to open them during kit inspections in barrack buildings. An unusually high wind could cause a correspondingly high increase in the number of loss and damage reports to be processed. These, however, are insignificant when compared with the disadvantages associated with the raincoat and no doubt enumerated in great detail during the discussions which led to discarding the idea.

Formal decisions require no less formal summing up. The presumption that a member may wish to remain dry during a shower is no doubt based on a pattern of human behaviour. Erudite observations of how soldiers behave under rain could well have disclosed some strange, deep seated desire to avoid ruining the crease in starched cotton uniforms. In any case it is more than likely that soldiers behave differently during rain than sailors, airmen and the womens' services.

The introduction of the umbrella should therefore be given the most urgent consideration.





It is a most flexible instrument, tried and tested in sun and rain. A tightly furlled one could well perform the additional function of swagger stick. A modified form can be seen used as a pace stick or shooting stick complete with folding seat. That which has long been recognised as a piece of the well dressed gentleman's accoutrement could add nothing but distinction to a very versatile range of equipment. The item which in 1938 was looked upon as the symbol of peace in our time could well become the standard of limited war in the meantime.



# REVOLUTIONARY GUERRILLA WARFARE

Major P. O. M. Woodhill  
Royal Australian Infantry

**REVOLUTIONARY** guerilla warfare is the form of warfare being waged today by the Communist forces in South East Asia. It is a form of warfare which in two major conflicts has enabled the Communists to achieve overwhelming victories against numerically and materially superior forces. Unless it can be successfully challenged, the whole of Asia is in danger of being slowly engulfed by the encroaching tide of Communist subversion and aggression.

There is nothing new in this form of warfare. It has existed since the dawn of history, but has generally been relegated to a minor place in the waging of war. In the Western concept of warfare its relative importance is clearly indicated by the brief consideration given to it in our training manuals. It remained for Mao Tse-tung to realise its full potentialities in certain environments and situations, such as in South East Asia.

In 1937, after 10 years of grim struggle for survival against the forces of Chiang Kai-Shek, Mao wrote a pamphlet "Yu Chi Chan", in which he presented a systematic study of the guerilla warfare that had been developed during this period. This treatise has since become the basic text book for revolutionary move-

ments throughout the world, and has clearly established Mao as the architect of a new form of warfare. It has provided the principles and strategy for the Vietminh campaign in Indo China; for the resistance movement in Algeria, for Castro's successful revolution in Cuba, and it provides the basis of the present Communist insurgency in Laos and South Vietnam.

The significance of this new form of politico military action is in Mao's realisation that the terrain and peasant based society of Asia presents problems of logistics and movement that require solutions in their own terms. He argues that, "it is necessary in such situations to be completely unsympathetic to abstract formulas and rules, and to study with sympathy the conditions of actual fighting for these will change in accordance with the political and economic situation and the realisation of the people's aspirations. These progressive changes in conditions create new methods". And again, that "revolutionary class war or a revolutionary national war has its special circumstances and characteristics in addition to the circumstances of war in general. Thus, besides the general laws of war, it has some special laws of its own. Without

understanding these special circumstances and characteristics, and without understanding its special laws, we cannot direct a revolutionary war and win victory in it".

The validity and force of these arguments escaped the French. Confident and complacent in their military tradition and technological superiority, they put their faith in the laws of war in general without change in form to fit the context. This, Mao said, "was like whittling down the feet to fit the shoes. They refused to admit that fighting the Red Army required strategy and tactics different from those for fighting other forces. Relying on superiority in various aspects, they underestimated us and stuck to their old methods of warfare".

The most profound difference between Revolutionary Warfare and conventional warfare is in the emphasis that Revolutionary Warfare places on the ideological nature of the struggle and the need to establish a broad base of popular support. Revolutionary War is never confined within the bounds of military action. "It is a fusion of military, political, economic, social and psychological ingredients into a complete and effective instrument for waging a national war in conjunction with regular forces. The Red Army exists not merely to fight; besides fighting to destroy the enemy's military strength, it should also shoulder such important tasks as agitating the masses, organising them, and arming them and helping them to revolutionary political power, and even establishing organisa-

tions of the Communist Party. When the Red Army fights, it fights not merely for the sake of fighting but to agitate the masses, to organise them, to arm them and to help them establish revolutionary political power; apart from such objectives, fighting loses its meaning and the Red Army the reason for its existence".

This type of warfare has been and will continue to be fundamental to all Communist subversive and agrarian based revolutionary movements. Even the concept of regular warfare, as envisaged by Mao, "is still of a guerilla character and on a low level and cannot be spoken of in the same breath with the warfare of foreign armies, and in a sense this type of warfare is only guerilla warfare on a higher level".

This does not mean that Mao considered regular warfare to be of a secondary importance. He fully realised that ultimately in the final stages of a revolutionary war victory could only be achieved by orthodox forces. He said, "In sum, while we must promote guerilla warfare as a necessary strategical auxiliary to orthodox operations, we must neither assign it the primary position in our war strategy nor substitute it for mobile and positional warfare as conducted by orthodox forces".

### The Stages of Revolutionary Warfare

A Revolutionary War against an organised regime is not a spontaneous affair. It is a gradual process of evolution passing

through a series of merging phases. To nurture this development, particularly in its embryonic stage, there must be a safe area or sanctuary from which it can be safely organised and provided with the basic requirements, without which even guerilla's cannot survive. This area Bernard Fall has called the "active sanctuary" and defines as "a territory contiguous to a rebellious area which though ostensibly not involved in the conflict, provides the rebel side with shelter, training facilities, equipment, and if it can get away with it — troops". As the Vietminh drew their sustenance and support from the sanctuary of South China, so the Viet Cong and Pathet Lao now draw sustenance and support from the sanctuary of North Vietnam.

The first stage in the development of a revolutionary war is one which is devoted to organisation, the setting up of base areas, the establishment of Communist cells in villages, securing and training volunteers, the formation of local militia and enlisting the support of sympathisers willing to supply food and information. The whole object is to persuade as many people as possible to commit themselves to the movement so that it gradually acquires "the quality of mass". Military operations during this period will be of an isolated and sporadic nature and of secondary importance to the gaining of popular support.

In the second stage there is an increasing resort to more active measures. The object now is to

break down and destroy the existing authority by any and every means possible. In this the Communists have shown themselves to be completely ruthless; any means justifying the end. Acts of terrorism and sabotage become more frequent. Collaborators and reactionary elements are assassinated. At the same time there is a gradual build up of guerilla strength. As more and more weapons and ammunition are acquired in surprise attacks on outposts and ambush of small columns, so the size of guerilla forces and the frequency and size of attacks increase.

The final stage is reached when a significant percentage of the local guerilla forces are transformed into orthodox regular formations capable of engaging the enemy in conventional battle. In this stage the object is to wear down, harass and extend the enemy and finally accomplish his destruction in detail by a concentration of force against his weakest points.

### **The Strategy and Tactics of Revolutionary Warfare**

The strategy and tactics of revolutionary guerilla warfare are fundamentally different from those employed in conventional warfare. "There is in guerilla warfare no such thing as a decisive battle; there is nothing comparable to the fixed passive defence that characterises orthodox war. In guerilla warfare, the transformation of a moving situation into a positional defence situation never arises. The general features of reconnaissance, partial deployment,

general deployment and development of the attack that are usual in mobile warfare are not common in guerilla war".

Guerilla strategy is based primarily on the principles of surprise and deception, mobility and lightning hit and run attacks. Guerillas fight only when the scales are heavily weighted in their favour. At all costs they avoid static situations and endeavour to keep operations as fluid as possible. Where conventional forces consider dispersion of forces as inviting defeat in detail, guerillas deliberately adopt this tactic to their advantage by moving rapidly and secretly in small groups to strike where and when they are least expected. "The tactics we have worked out during the struggle" said Mao, "are indeed different from any employed in ancient or modern times in China or elsewhere. With our tactics the struggle of the masses is daily expanding and no enemy however powerful can cope with us. Ours are guerilla tactics; they consist mainly of the following points:—

- Disperse the forces among the masses to arouse them and concentrate the forces to deal with the enemy.
- The enemy advance, we retreat; the enemy halts, we harass.
- The enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue.
- These tactics are just like casting a net; we should be able to cast the net wide or draw it in at any moment. We cast it wide to win over

the masses and draw it in to deal with the enemy".

In such circumstances there is likely to be no recognisable front line. The enemy's rear is the guerillas' front. Everywhere in the rear we must expect attack by guerillas. Such attacks will not confine themselves to harassing communications. Gun positions, administrative areas and even front line troops may be attacked by guerillas. These guerillas are not roving bands of insurgents. They will act on a co-ordinated plan and will have behind them a thoroughly organised guerilla base into which they will seek to lure units and even formations. Guerilla activity will take place not only in rough country and forests. It will be just as intense in the plains, in densely settled areas along the canals, swamps and paddy fields of the main delta areas.

In every village there will be cells charged with manifold duties, such as espionage, supply of food, political indoctrination and administration, and local guerilla activities. Even women and children will play their role. For every man in a guerilla force carrying a rifle, there must be a large number of civilians providing the food, clothing and other resources he must have to survive and fight. "A guerilla force is like the top of an iceberg, the supporting civilian organisation, without which it cannot survive, is the much larger part that cannot be seen".<sup>1</sup> An army can thus expect to have surrounding it on all

1. Franklin A. Lindsay: *Unconventional Warfare*, Foreign Affairs, January, 1962.

sides, an intensively and widely organised intelligence network watching its every move and passing information ahead into enemy territory.

This intelligence network is a decisive factor in guerilla operations, enabling them to strike under conditions of their own choosing. "As a corollary, guerillas deny all information to the enemy who is enveloped in an impenetrable fog. Total inability to get information was a constant complaint of the Nationalists during the first four suppressive campaigns, as it was later of the Japanese in China and of the French in both Indo China and Algeria. This is a characteristic of all guerilla wars. The enemy stands as on a lighted stage; from the darkness around him, thousands of unseen eyes intimately study his every move, his every gesture. When he strikes out he hits the air; his antagonists are unsubstantial, as intangible as fleeting shadows in the moonlight".<sup>2</sup>

### The Strategy and Tactics of Counter Revolutionary Warfare

In tackling the problems presented by this insidious form of warfare, the Western powers have failed to find an effective answer. Their approach to the problem is still restricted by conventional military thinking. It is maintained "that the army task is to counter Communist military activity and thus to assist the friendly government to maintain or resume control of cities, villages, communications, key points and country areas.

"To achieve this, the army conducts anti-guerilla opera-

tions. As special unit guerilla forces are seldom available, this task will normally be undertaken by conventional forces". This is very dangerous thinking. There is abundant evidence to prove that unless conventional forces are specially cut, tailored and fitted as anti-guerilla forces, their success is highly improbable. It is also dangerous to think that the anti-guerilla effort can be clearly compartmented into the regular, irregular and the political effort. The Communists do not observe such distinctions.

The anti-guerilla forces must be as closely integrated as the guerilla forces, with a total overall strategy for all elements. It must be realised that in the environment of South East Asia a purely military decision by orthodox forces is unobtainable and that in meeting the guerilla threat, the emphasis must lie in the development and training of special forces.

The only opportunity for obtaining a military decision in South East Asia is in Laos. Here there are no masses from which guerillas are derived and receive their support. The population is so sparse and scattered and, in many cases, so primitive and isolated that large scale guerilla activity would find little basis for existence. Here Communists could be forced into the unwanted role of fighting a conventional war at a considerable disadvantage to themselves. This opportunity, however, appears to be lost.

2. Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith: Introduction to Mao Tse Tung's "Yu Chi Chan".



It is clear then that the strategy for any anti-Communist campaign in South East Asia must be based on both political and military objectives pursued with equal vigour and consistency in both fields. Without success in the political field there is little hope of achieving any lasting military victory. The evidence of history suggests that it is almost impossible to destroy a revolutionary guerilla movement after it has survived the first phase and has acquired the sympathetic support of a significant segment of the population.

The logical solution of the West in such a situation is to intervene in the early stages before the Communists have gained sufficient control over the masses to support their guerilla operations. Intervention has already been delayed too long in South Vietnam. Here the revolution is well into the second stage. Regaining control in this area will now require an effort consistent with that of a major protracted war.

Intervention of a third party in a revolutionary guerilla war, however, poses a difficult problem as to the nature and scope of the assistance to be given. Obviously assistance should be restricted to advice, equipment and training, if possible. If military intervention by organised formations becomes necessary to stem the tide, it should at first be confined to guaranteeing the security of the major key centres, thus leaving the local military forces free to pursue a mobile offensive anti-guerilla campaign. However,

such a clear division will rarely be possible. It is almost inevitable that sooner or later such forces would be drawn into the general conflict.

Whatever the degree of involvement, the principles of action remain the same. In fighting guerillas the strategy and tactics of guerillas must be used against the guerillas themselves, and these tactics are based upon the fundamental principles of security (of base areas), mobility (to locate and isolate) and offensive action (to destroy).

The first and continuing requirement will be to establish and secure the key base installations upon which logistic support will depend. Such installations should be highly concentrated in order to simplify their protection and economise in forces required for defence. Unlike base areas under conditions of regular warfare, they cannot rely on the security normally afforded by their position well behind the front line.

In this type of warfare there is no front line and no rear area, therefore administrative areas must be capable of their own defence according to varying circumstances. In addition to main logistic areas it will be necessary to establish forward administrative areas, as bases for offensive operations. These bases again must be defended by fighting troops, so must be kept to the minimum to avoid tying up troops in the defence of an increasingly large number of fixed installations. As one French military commentator has written "There should be no

fortified forts except those necessary for promoting mobility". This concentration, however, conflicts with the need to establish control over the civil population which implies a large degree of dispersal. Balancing these two requirements is one of the major problems to be faced in fighting a revolutionary guerilla war.

Having achieved the security of key installations and bases, forces must be mobile and flexible in order to launch offensive operations. This mobility, as proved by the French, cannot be achieved with wheels. It must be based primarily on the cross-country performance of units on foot. This implies the ability and fitness of the individual soldier to live hard under tough conditions. Such mobility, however, will only give a parity with the enemy. To gain the tactical initiative he must be out-matched in mobility. This can only be achieved by massive air support, both offensive and logistic. In this, para-troopers and helicopter-borne commando type troops will be essential.

The initiative having been obtained by superior mobility and flexibility, the object will

then be to keep the guerillas off-balance and to tire them out with continuous offensive action; to exhaust their limited resources and divorce them from civilian support and their food supplies; to strike deep at their base areas and supply routes and gradually force them into more and more isolated areas.

It should be obvious that in such a role we cannot commit units as they are normally constituted. The conventional army cannot cope with the task. By the very nature of its sophistication and logistic requirements it is fatally roadbound. In order to pursue the guerilla into his jungle retreat and avoid the ambush that is inevitable if movement is confined to known roads and tracks, units and formations must be ruthlessly pruned of their heavy arms and equipments and those elements which bind them to the road and the necessity of maintaining a vulnerable and costly land line of communications.

Likewise orthodox tactical techniques are just as inappropriate in such a situation and will require similar modification to shape them to the needs of this peculiar and original form of warfare.

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#### COMPETITION FOR AUTHORS

The Board of Review has awarded first place and the prize of £5 for the best original article published in the July issue to "The Commander and the Civil Population" by Lieutenant Colonel J. D. M. Moss, Royal Australian Infantry.

# Strategic Review

## The Struggle in South East Asia

IF Japan's motives in attempting to extend her empire to include South East Asia and Indonesia in World War II are studied it will be seen that she engaged on this enterprise for a more substantial prize than military glory for its own sake. These areas contained raw materials — notably oil, tin, rubber and rice — essential for her economic growth. American, British and Dutch efforts to check her military activities in China by restricting her supplies of these materials confirmed her belief that the only way to make sure of them was by military conquest.

These materials are still the dominating factor in the struggle for power in South East Asia. Complete control of them would not only give China the means of boosting her industrialisation programme, but it would also give her a powerful lever for forcing the countries concerned into the Communist orbit. In addition it would deprive the Western world of access to these materials.

Some 60 per cent. of the world's supply of tin comes from this area, and about 90 per cent. of the natural rubber. Some 12 million tons of petroleum are produced annually. But for the purposes of economic warfare, rice is probably the most impor-

tant commodity. South East Asia has been aptly called the "bread-basket" of Asia for by far the greater part of the world's supply of this cereal, the staple food of Asia, is grown in the rich river deltas of the Vietnams, Cambodia, Thailand and Burma.

Direct control of the rice production of South East Asia would do two things for Communist China. Firstly, it would enable her to relieve the pressure caused by her own chronic shortage of food brought about by her communisation of agriculture and her rising industrial population. Secondly, it would enable her to exert very powerful pressure on India and Indonesia, perhaps to the extent of forcing them more and more into the Communist bloc.

While there may be ideological differences between Russia and China, it is clear that in the immediate future they are not likely to reach the stage of a deep cleavage of interests. For the time being at any rate the differences arise from the methods to be employed rather than from the object to be achieved. If it is indeed true that Russia favours an indirect approach while China advocates direct action, the difference in method is not at all likely to weaken the Communist effort in South East Asia. On the con-

trary, in this area the two methods are mutually supporting.

Generally, the indirect method gives support to a neutralist government whenever there appears to be an eventual chance of bringing it under Communist domination. Since most of the governments in this area are in more or less serious economic difficulties, support usually takes the form of massive supplies of the materials they need without attaching to them any too-obvious conditions. The nature of the conditions do not as a rule become apparent until the government is so dependent on the supplies that it is virtually economically impossible for it to turn back.

Once the receiving government is deeply committed it has placed itself in the position where it can no longer suppress or ignore the local Communist Party. Judiciously applied "persuasion" can bring about the inclusion of Communist elements in the government, usually in key posts. When that happens the victory is more than half won, for experience shows that once a strong Communist element is included in a government, that government very soon becomes the tool of Moscow or Peking. The external and internal pressures become too strong to resist.

The direct method of approach employs violence to bring about the downfall of a government opposed to Communism. In South East Asia this violence takes the form of insurgent guerilla warfare heavily suppor-

ted with men and equipment from adjacent Communist countries.

Subversive propaganda is common to both methods.

The complementary nature of the two methods can be seen at work in Laos. Here the guerilla activities of the Pathet Lao brought about a situation in which the government became virtually powerless to carry on the business of the country. Since the Western powers were apparently unwilling to be drawn into direct military support of the right-wing government, protracted negotiations have resulted in the formation of a neutralist government containing a powerful Communist element. Unless the current of experience is reversed the Communist element will soon be in full control. In the meantime it is in a position to ensure, and no doubt will ensure, that men and supplies for the Viet Cong insurgent guerillas in South Vietnam move freely, if not openly, through Laos.

The struggle in South Vietnam is likely to be a protracted one. President Ngo-dinh-Diem has already shown that he is not an easy nut to crack. He has not accepted aid from the Communist bloc and, despite the many successes of the Viet Cong guerillas, he has steadfastly resisted pressure to include Communists in his government. In fact he will not have anything to do with Communists at all. He has accepted, indeed he asked for, SEATO military assistance to reorganise and train the national army along lines which

will enable it to take on the guerillas at their own game.

Newspaper and other observers fitting about in South East Asia are ready enough to tell us about the alleged inefficiency, if not downright corruption, of Diem's regime, and nearly always round off their despatches by telling his American advisers what they really ought to be doing. Actually Diem, with American advice and support, is doing a great deal that is both positively and permanently constructive.

The Communist has always made his appeal to the underprivileged, and where the underprivileged has been ignorant as well as poor he has achieved his greatest successes. In South East Asia the underprivileged are mostly peasants. President Diem is taking energetic measures to cure his peasants of both their ignorance and their poverty and, at the same time, to combat the disruptive activities of the Viet Cong.

Taking his lesson from Malaya, Diem is steadily building self-contained fortified villages throughout the agricultural districts. Each village is built round a centre containing the school, hospital, post office, shops and entertainment places. The people are housed in cheap, but sound dwellings specially designed for the climate. With each house there goes a patch of ground big enough to grow the family fruit and vegetable supply, and some marketable products as well. And each family still has its share in the work and returns of the commonly owned village rice fields.

In addition to primary education in the village school, efforts are being made to teach villagers with the necessary aptitudes trades and skills which will make each settlement more self-contained, and at the same time provide diversified employment for its people. Similar efforts are being made to lift and diversify agriculture by improving the quality and the yield of the rice, and by experimenting with other kinds of crops.

When the French eventually departed from Indo China they did not bequeath to the successor governments an administrative machine comparable with the ones handed over by the British in India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon. It is not easy to form an efficient administration, indeed any administration at all, when people with experience or training for action at any level are practically non-existent. It is still less easy when the country is caught in the aftermath of war, when subversive propaganda is rife and when guerilla bands are active. When we take all these things into consideration we may see that Diem is not doing so badly.

It is easy enough for itinerant correspondents to criticise Diem and his American advisers. Both had to learn the hard way. Both deserve all the help and co-operation, all the moral and material support we can give them. If they fail, rather if we all fail, it is highly probable that all South East Asia will be drawn into the Communist orbit.

— E. G. K.

## SOME THOUGHTS ON

# AFRICA

Brigadier E. Logan  
Australian Staff Corps

THE comments in this article are based on personal observations made during a four weeks' visit to the Western, Central and Eastern regions of Africa in 1961. Discussion of South Africa's "apartheid" policy has been excluded because its effect could not be assessed at first hand.

The emergent countries of Africa are making their presence felt more and more in world affairs. It is important that we keep adding to our fund of general knowledge of such affairs. Perhaps this article will contribute its part.

The countries visited included Senegal, Republique du Congo, Ghana, Nigeria, Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Tanganyika, Zanzibar, and Kenya.

### Ex-French Territories

Conditions in Senegal, Republique du Congo and the territories of former French Equatorial Africa naturally have many points of similarity. French influence and tutelage are still greatly in evidence. Relationships between peoples of French and African origin appear cordial and little evidence of colour bar exists. Whilst political power is nominally in the hands of Africans, a great deal of the administration,

economy and social structure of the countries depend on the services of Frenchmen and the backing of France.

France still maintains military control of the areas concerned and although assisting each of the countries to form small forces of its own, still has considerable overseas forces there. The presence of these forces appears to be accepted and welcomed by the inhabitants of the various countries who realise their value in maintaining internal security and in preventing the possible spread of disaffection from neighbouring territories. Relations between military commanders and governmental authorities cause no trouble.

It was difficult to meet people who could provide first hand evidence of the real feelings of the indigenous population or to decide whether they were satisfied with the progress made towards complete independence.

There appeared to be no interest of any consequence by the Senegalese regarding any form of union with Gambia.

### Ghana

The fortunate position Ghana has enjoyed since independence because of good prices for cocoa

and the existence of large overseas credits is rapidly coming to an end. Considerable progress has been made in extending education, Ghanainizing administration and on some of the essential services (ports, roads etc.) required. However, much money has been wasted on spectacular projects not immediately essential to progress in raising living standards (Ghana air lines, city buildings in Accra,

inadequately planned housing at Tema, large Army etc.). Recurring maintenance costs and grandiose schemes of capital development, which will in turn create greater maintenance costs, are to be financed by considerable increases in direct and indirect taxation. Elimination of wasteful projects has not had the attention it deserves. Internal troubles are inevitable.



Politically, Nkrumah has become virtually a dictator. Multi-party politics have been reduced almost to a unitary basis. The basis of community action and self help seems to be derived more from Eastern than Western ideas. Preventive detention plays its part in maintaining Nkrumah's position. Policies have been largely concerned with external affairs and Pan Africanism. The official press is anti-British, anti-Western and quite unbalanced in its allegations regarding the evils of colonialism and neo-colonialism.

Despite this attitude on the part of Nkrumah and the Government, Ghana expects considerable help from the outside world, particularly the West and America, in providing capital for development of bauxite and other industries including the £65 million Volta Dam project. Unless she reassesses the position, cleans up graft and inefficient economic planning and changes her attitude to Western countries, she might well find herself without outside support. Russia may step into the breach for political reasons, but such aid usually has many more strings attached to it than that provided by the West. In the meantime, internal politics may be more difficult to control. This may have a salutary effect on her future attitude to external affairs.

### Nigeria

Internal progress in Nigeria has been slower but far more soundly based than in Ghana. Tribal differences, the great gap between the type of rule and

educational standards existing in the Northern compared with the Western and Eastern regions, jealousies between regions and between the Federal and Regional governments, are all factors which can lead to considerable internal political strife. At present these things are under control due largely to the character and ability of the Prime Minister, ably backed by a sound civil service.

Externally, leadership from Nigeria has been sound in relation to the Monrovia group of countries whilst her attitude to Britain and the West has assisted greatly in attracting overseas capital.

The discovery and development of oil in the Eastern and part of the Western Regions, and the sensible manner in which the oil company concerned has gone about the training of indigenous personnel, are factors of importance in the maintenance of stability and progress in Nigeria. The research and development of agricultural and timber resources are examples of long term planning which will pay considerable dividends in the future.

### West Africa

In all the countries of West Africa visited, the white settler problem is virtually non-existent. The ex-French territories are the most dependent on the West, and in particular on France, for administrative, economic, military, and technical aid and at present do not appear to be unduly worried about this. Ghana has progressed most in nationalism and



the use of local inhabitants in administration. However, she has progressed erratically, her economy is not so soundly based as it might be and her attitude to the West is such that she is likely to lose the confidence required to attract much needed capital. Her dabbling in pan-Africanism and in the affairs of the Casablanca Group of nations, together with the policies of Nkrumah both in internal as well as external matters, make it likely that she is heading for considerable trouble. Nigeria has progressed soundly if somewhat conservatively. Her large population makes her extremely important and providing she can maintain control over the very many factors which tend to pull her apart internally, she should prove to be the most stable country in the area with considerable potential for leadership in West Africa.

#### Southern Rhodesia

The aims of this country's present Government are:—

- (a) To establish a multi-racial society (doing away with discrimination) in which citizens are judged on merit not race.
- (b) To maintain the present standard of living of the European as far as practicable whilst at the same time providing the opportunity for the African to reach similar standards.

In the past there has not been any real urgency in efforts to bring Africans to higher standards. Now, with the writing on the wall that eventually there

will be a majority of Africans in Parliament, the present Government is trying to lay foundations for that time which will ensure protection of and continued participation by Europeans and other minorities in all walks of life in the country.

Whilst undoubtedly the European element will be forced to change faster that it considers desirable and may be forced to accept worse conditions and lower standards than it would like, there is a determination present in this element to adhere to its country and to continue with its planned development in furtherance of the Government's aims.

Provided pressures from external sources do not grow too great, it is believed that Europeans could control internal pressures for a sufficient period to permit them to achieve the bulk of their aims. The danger to them is in not backing their policy with continued capital investment and in spirit. The set determination to make the "partnership" policy work within their own terms may well drive them towards South Africa and out of range of Commonwealth influence if they do not receive adequate backing. This would be a considerable blow to the hopes of British policy in places such as Northern Rhodesia and Kenya.

Southern Rhodesia, with its significant indigenous population of European origin, will be the key country in Africa regarding the success or failure of the "partnership" policy. The trends in other countries in

Africa and in many countries throughout the world are such that the possibility of complete success is, to say the least, very doubtful.

### Northern Rhodesia

There is evidence of a similar determination on the part of the European population in Northern Rhodesia to that which exists in Southern Rhodesia.

Economically, this country is of major importance and from the copper belt comes a considerable part of the finance for development not only in Northern Rhodesia but in Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

Politically it is probable that an African majority in Parliament may be achieved quicker than in Southern Rhodesia. Up to now, proposals on the Constitution have been so complicated as to be impracticable, and have the backing of neither the African nor the European.

There is ample evidence that the Africans will not agree to any policy of partnership in which the rate of progress of Africans is controlled so that they achieve their positions as a result of merit. On the other hand, the Europeans are of the same mind as those in Southern Rhodesia. The result is an impasse.

It is difficult to forecast the future with any accuracy. Eventually the African political majority will prevail. What terms the minorities achieve remain to be seen.

### Nyasaland

In Nyasaland, an African political majority has already

been achieved. The white settler problem is not very significant. There would be nothing to prevent Nyasaland achieving its independence in the same manner as Tanganyika except that:

- (a) Its budget cannot be balanced unless approximately £5 million per annum is received from outside sources. (This is at present supplied by the Federation from funds received from Northern Rhodesia).
- (b) It is part of the Federation and may not be permitted to secede.

Dr. Banda is an implacable enemy of Federation at present but has not suggested a solution to the economic problem. He is likely to accept a lowering of living standards rather than remain connected with the Federation.

### Central Africa

The Federal Government's policy is similar to that of Southern Rhodesia. The Africans in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia are bitterly opposed to its policy and to its existence.

The Europeans in Northern and Southern Rhodesia are generally in favour of a continued Federation provided it can be maintained on virtually European terms. Neither element is particularly concerned as to whether Nyasaland remains in such a Federation. Since at least in Northern Rhodesia the political power is likely to pass to the Africans in the not-too-distant future, the hopes of maintaining the Federation in anything like its present form are extremely slim. Alternatives are

being sought. The most likely to succeed would seem to be some form of Central African Commission which could administer such things as railways, trunk roads, water storage, irrigation and electrical power supply on behalf of the three countries concerned.

### Tanganyika

Since the visit on which these comments are based, Tanganyika has become independent and has also experienced a change in Prime Ministers.

However, she has been able to attain such a state without undue strife because:—

- (a) There was virtually no significant white settler problem.
- (b) She had a unitary party system.
- (c) Her first Prime Minister was and continues to be sensible and moderate in all his views and actions.
- (d) Although relatively poor, she can balance her budget except for expenditure on Armed Forces which is paid by the United Kingdom.

Although some tribal problems exist, they are unlikely to be of the same significance as those in Kenya.

The most important problems to be solved concern Tanganyika's relationship with other East African countries, including the form which the East African Commission will take in the future. The continuance of the East African Commission in a suitable form is extremely important to the economy and infrastructure of the country.

Sensible proposals have been made. It remains to be seen whether they will be accepted by the other countries concerned.

### Kenya

At the time of the visit, there appeared to be some hope that under Kenyatta the two major political parties — Kenya African National Union (KANU) and Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) — would come closer together in their objectives and tend towards the unitary party system which seems more suited to emergent African countries than a multi-party system modelled on Westminster.

These expectations have failed largely because all minorities, including Europeans, Indians and the various smaller African tribes, distrust and fear the policies and actions of the Kikuyu.

Land tenure, protection of European and other minorities' rights, doubt as to African motives and actions, are all problems facing Kenyans today. Doubt and fear caused by protracted Mau Mau action in the past, coupled with distrust of Kenyatta and Mboya, lead to much unsettlement among the European population where there is no real determination to pursue a partnership policy.

Europeans own what must be some of the richest and most attractive farming land in the world. The steps taken to share very much of this with Africans have not been very great in the past and are too slow to catch up with African opinion at

present. Nor has the problem of giving Africans education and administrative responsibilities been tackled with the speed it might have been.

The economy of the country depends largely on the agriculture, whatever persons own the farms. Until Africans have the know-how and managing ability the white settler is essential for the maintenance of the economy. The hope in pursuing a partnership policy can only lie in trusting that by the time Africans do have the standard of ability required they will also have sufficient sense of responsibility to permit the white population to provide its fair share in all aspects of political, economic, social and technical life in the community. However, Africans will achieve political power before this can happen. It therefore depends entirely on the attitude of the African leaders as to whether the rights of all can be protected and whether the various races in the community can be made to pull together. One cannot help feeling pessimistic as to the eventual outcome.

Doubts of the country's stability are making it difficult to attract overseas capital investment which could also seriously affect the pace at which living and social standards can be raised.

The African attitude against the retention of bases or facilities of any sort for British armed forces in Kenya is so strong that it is a waste of money for Britain to continue building assets there and this has now

been realised by the British Government.

Before Kenya gains her independence there are some external problems which require solution. Whether they will be solved before this happens remains to be seen. Some settlement of the borders between Kenya, Somaliland and Ethiopia is necessary which will satisfy the nomadic tribes in that area. The secession to Kenya by purchase or other means of the coastal strip at present under the sovereignty of the Sultan of Zanzibar, is necessary for both economic and political reasons. Kenyan co-operation in finding a means for the East African Commission to function effectively would greatly help the economy.

#### Zanzibar

Troubles in Zanzibar derive from a weak Sultan, the rivalry existing between Arab and African, and interference from Egypt. Weak police action has had to be bolstered by military action supplied by forces in East Africa at present controlled by the United Kingdom.

The solution to most of these matters could perhaps result from a union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar.

#### East Africa

Although Uganda was not visited, the chances that she will gain independence in 1962 are strong. There is no significant white settler problem and tribal differences appear to have receded. It seems, therefore, that Uganda will achieve her independence with as little trouble as has Tanganyika.

The time is certainly not ripe for the East African countries to federate, particularly with problems unsolved in Kenya and Zanzibar and with rumours of possible participation by Somaliland and Ethiopia.

The interim step which should be pursued vigorously now is the finding of a satisfactory formula by Tanganyika, Kenya, Uganda and Zanzibar to the effective working of some successor to the East African Commission.

### Conclusion

Countries having predominantly African populations and relatively insignificant "white settler" problems are the ex-French territories of West Africa, Ghana, Nigeria, Nyasaland, Tanganyika, Zanzibar and Uganda. Those with significant "minorities" problems are Kenya, Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia.

The ex-French territories appear to depend much more than others on the former colonial power's aid in economic, administrative, technical, social and military matters. Although no major troubles are evident now, it is a matter for speculation as to whether the ties will prove to be too rigid to withstand the possible pressures which may be built up within the indigenous populations in the long term. Of the other countries having no significant "white settler" problems, Ghana appears to have progressed too far left and too erratically to inspire Western confidence; Nigeria, Tanganyika

and Uganda appear to be making the transition to independence satisfactorily if somewhat conservatively; Zanzibar might solve her problems by selling the coastal strip to Kenya and joining Tanganyika; and Nyasaland will probably accept lower living standards and independence rather than be a part of the Central African Federation.

It is the countries of Kenya, Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia which will determine the fate of the British Government's cherished "partnership" policy. In Kenya the outlook is not good, the minorities and the Kikuyu are not likely to settle their differences in such a manner as to permit real partnership and one can only forecast unrest for many years.

In Northern Rhodesia, the Africans will attain a political majority that will force the pace of events in a way which could lead to considerable trouble before a satisfactory solution for the minorities can be achieved. In Southern Rhodesia, the success of the partnership policy depends on whether the European population will be able to achieve it on their own terms and whether the rest of the world will have sufficient confidence in this policy to continue to support the Government with capital investment. Altogether, taking into account events in South Africa, it would seem that "partnership" in Africa will remain a cherished dream for a few philosophers.

# THE ARMED HELICOPTER

Captain B. H. Cooper,  
Royal Australian Artillery

*The author, Captain B. H. Cooper, is being trained in America as a helicopter pilot instructor. During his training he has observed armed helicopters in use by the United States Army.—Editor.*

A HELICOPTER has been described as an assembly of push-pull rods, mixing levers, bell cranks, swash plates and bearings. Actually it is a machine that can fly in all directions, a machine that has proved itself an asset to the armed services in war and civilians in peace.

In Korea and Malaya this machine successfully performed re-supply, troop lift and casualty evacuation missions over difficult terrain. During the Korean conflict over 12,000 casualties were evacuated by helicopter.

Now the concept of the armed helicopter is in the developmental stage. The term includes all helicopters fitted with either rockets, missiles, machine-guns and/or cannon.

The purpose of arming the helicopter is:—

- (a) Self-defence.
- (b) Supporting fire.




Fig. 1 — Possible .30 MMG mounting on Bell H13 Sioux



Fig. 2 — Bell HU-1 Iroquois Launching Anti Tank Guided Missile

Whether the requirement is self-defence or supporting fire depends on the type of helicopter employed. In the case of the light observation helicopter the primary purpose of the armament is self-defence, with the secondary purpose of suppressive fire in support of an attacking force. With the utility or light transport type helicopter the sole purpose is supporting fire.

In the United States and France much effort has been spent in the last five years on development of this concept. In the United States experimentation with armament kits and the development of tactical doctrine is being carried out. At present there are two schools of thought


relating to the employment of the armed helicopter:—

- (a) In a role similar to, and forward of, the divisional reconnaissance regiment.
- (b) Employed purely as a weapons platform to support ground forces.

In my opinion these aircraft could be employed to carry out both tasks, dependent upon the training, equipment and capability of the enemy. An armed helicopter unit could be organised as shown in Figure I. Some of the avenues of employment for this unit are:—

- (a) *Reconnaissance* — This is reconnaissance forward of the division during or prior to the advance. This mission

## Company Headquarters



## Notes:—

- (a) Weapons Pl — 4 Light transport/utility type helicopters armed with rockets.
- (b) Rifle Pl — 4 Light transport/utility type helicopters capable of carrying a rifle platoon.
- (c) Recce Pl — 8 Light observation type helicopters armed with machine-guns, and 4 utility type helicopters armed with anti-tank guided missiles.

Figure 1

would be carried out by light observation helicopters armed with machine guns or cannon. Arming these helicopters gives them the means of self protection and the ability to reconnoitre by the application of fire.

(b) *Internal Security — Anti-Guerilla Warfare* — The mobility of an armed helicopter force would decrease the size and number of units which would otherwise have to be employed on this task. The armament would




Fig. 3 — Possible Rocket mounting on Bell HU-1 Iroquois






Fig. 4 — Sikorsky H34 Launching 4.5" rocket.

include machine-guns, cannon and rockets. This armed helicopter force would support helicopter-borne infantry.

- (c) *Securing Key Terrain* — A combination of armed helicopters and helicopter-borne infantry could seize key terrain more rapidly than conventional ground forces, particularly in a tropical environment.
- (d) *Armed Escort for Airmobile Operations* — Here we envisage a large scale mission in which attacking infantry is airlifted to its objective by helicopter. Protection is

afforded by employing armed helicopters as artillery. These armed helicopters would be employed to give protection along the approach route and at the landing zone. At the present stage of development the employment of the armed helicopter against a heavily defended area is not envisaged.

These are but a few of the many tasks that could be undertaken by an armed helicopter unit. The advantages conferred by a unit of this type are increased mobility of fire power and flexibility of tactics.

# TACTICAL EXAMINATIONS

Major K. E. Gallard  
Royal Australian Infantry

AT some time an officer is faced with the necessity to qualify at certain tactical examinations for higher rank. The unfortunate percentage of failures and necessary repeats would seem to indicate that many find such qualification extremely difficult. Among the failures a goodly number have gone to a great deal of trouble to prepare for the event and naturally are most discouraged.

The system is often blamed because it is said that it is virtually impossible to test an officer or a group of officers for command within the tenets of a tactical exercise without troops. This may be so but, in peace time, no better system has yet been devised.

Tentative analysis of recent examinations reveals two basic faults — an inability to apply knowledge to a practical situation and a deplorable lack of examination technique. The former may be remedied by attendance at TEWT's. For the latter something better than mere attendance at formal lectures and set reading on the subject is undoubtedly necessary.

## Examination Boards

Contrary to common belief, all examination boards are scrupulously fair in assessing candi-

dates. When syndicates are made up it is not unusual for a board member to refuse to have a certain officer in his syndicate during an important sequence of an exercise for personal reasons. Similarly, the old chestnut that the Board has been told "to fail Smith" and "to pass Bloggs" is absolutely without justification. So far as an examination board is concerned, past performances and possible bright futures have no place in their deliberations. They deal with the present and each officer as an unknown individual. The basic fact is that there is no room for doubt. Unlike a court of law, there is no "reasonable doubt". If there is a doubt, invariably the Board President will indicate a failure. Therefore, it requires no great cogitation for any prospective candidate to realise that it is necessary to read the reports on previous qualifying courses and in particular "Remarks by the Board".

Remember, mere knowledge is not enough. Certainly it is probably the most important requirement. However, the Board is interested in the candidate's appreciation and knowledge. The main characteristics in this application are logical thought processes and above all commonsense. For example, an excellent thesis which could not

possibly work in practice, is hardly a recommendation for qualification.

At this stage it would be illogical to deny that one should not cater for a particular Board member's pet subject or idiosyncrasy. If such a facet to a Board member's nature is known then it would be quite foolish to argue off in an opposite direction unless one is absolutely certain of one's ground.

Remember also that Examination Boards are composed of experienced, sympathetic human beings. There are exceptions, but generally speaking the average candidate would be surprised how far the Board will go to make the path to qualification as easy as possible. Nevertheless, realise from the outset that there is no "reasonable doubt". The Army must also win.

### Preparation

Since 1945, officers have come to accept coaching for examinations as a right and demand much time off to attend coaching studies. In fact, many officers rely entirely on coaching courses for all their preparation either from sheer laziness or from the legitimate reason of overwork in their particular appointment at the time.

Coaching courses are fine for brushing up acquired knowledge, explaining principles and difficult passages in text books. Despite a great deal of preparation each year, coaching courses are at best ad hoc affairs. The instructors arrive at the same time as the students, having been dragged away from their

jobs so that their frenzied preparation is often reflected in their work. Because of the large numbers and varied requirements of the students, the course more often than not makes a pretence at covering the field with usually indifferent results. This is caused by the increasing tendency towards centralised courses which invariably stretch the resources of the formation committed to conducting them.

If we are to continue with coaching courses then they must be realistic. The reading must be left to the student. Have discussion groups and above all conduct TEWT's to give candidates much needed practical experience. Have indoor exercises, outdoor exercises, any sort of exercises that will make the student officer think for himself and expound his ideas to an audience.

In any case, the candidate (like it or not) has the ultimate responsibility to prepare himself for his examination and not the coaching staff. Therefore the prospective candidate is well advised to attend as many practical exercises as possible either on the staff or as a student.

Constructively, it would appear better if unit HQ could allow prospective officer candidates to write and conduct their own coaching courses over a long period of say six months supervised by an experienced officer. This does happen and the results are very effective. The inevitable plea that CMF appointments preclude such courses has some validity. However, assistance from higher formation should be

possible and should be given. One cannot imagine why we are all too busy!

### Approach to the Task

Unfortunately these days many young officers appear diffident in asking for advice. If there is an experienced officer available then get his advice on preparation. Some basic rules are given here, but there is nothing so good as first-hand advice from one who has already qualified. There is a mutual responsibility here between the seeker and the giver.

The first rule is to get hold of a pamphlet and read the requirement. In general, remember the aim of the qualifying course when you peruse the syllabus. Then plan the necessary study programme in relation to time available, allowing time for revision. Then, stick to it. If the programme lags make up the lost ground at all costs. The subsequent psychological satisfaction will be well worth the extra effort.

Attend every available practical outdoor exercise. Volunteer if necessary to staff NCO promotion examinations. Take every opportunity for public expression. This is good practice and will get you close to the heart of the matter. The nuts and bolts of minor examinations are all part of the overall necessary experience.

If there is time, get out your copy of "Training for War" and draft a TEWT. Again, knowing the details of production will subsequently be of real value.

Reading should consist of a steady progression through the detail of the syllabus. Read up on more than one subject at a time to maintain interest. Probably the most boring task is the learning of establishments which must be known in some detail. The tedious nature of this task can be somewhat relieved by comparing each separate establishment with its enemy counterpart. In this way a great deal of both enemy and own troops establishments will be assimilated.

Knowledge of the "enemy" orbat, establishments and tactics is absolutely essential if a tactical situation is to have any significance. Lean towards the conventional tactical doctrine. Internal security operations, guerilla and other semi-clandestine types of warfare usually do not enter the scope of qualifying courses.

One does not "learn" tactics. One reads and accepts principles and doctrine. Tactics are, in effect, the application of proven principles and concepts of employment of weapons in the form of firepower, machines in the form of mobility and manpower in the occupation or capture of tactical ground. Therefore, it is essential that the characteristics of all weapons, "ours" and "theirs" is known, the capabilities and roles of the various combat and logistic units, and especially be sure exactly what a section, platoon and a battalion can do in the various phases of war.

Recognition of the tactically important pieces of ground will

come with practice, both in indoor and outdoor exercises. Services officers in particular should endeavour to do some ground reconnaissance with their colleagues of the combat arms. Any subsequent arguments relating to ground of tactical importance will improve the tactical knowledge of both. Learn to describe ground correctly and in sequence, laying emphasis on approaches, tactical features, obstacles etc. This is a small accomplishment that is well worth while. At some time during a qualifying course it may become the lot of any candidate to do a spot of map reading and to describe ground.

Finally, round off preparation by being conversant with appreciations and cultivate the ability to express thoughts in a logical and practical manner. Learn to use the word "therefore" after a stated fact.

### On Course

First of all the candidate must realise that he is on his own and if fully prepared should turn a deaf ear to the thoughts and problems of other aspirants. One may often be led astray by listening and paying heed to the confident remarks of others. Pay attention to appearances and social behaviour. Being a great success in the mess may win you less, not from the point of view of personal behaviour, but rather from the inability to burn the candle at both ends. Ample time is allowed for digression. Therefore, use these periods for letting off steam.

There will always be a trial period before the course which

will not count towards qualifying, contrary to any opinion you may have heard. The staff who are available to assist you in the pre-course period are there to help. Use this period for what it is, to brush up your techniques or even acquire a technique, and don't be resentful of any good advice that is given in good faith.

During the wind up period try yourself out and don't get discouraged. Above all, at this stage, don't study endlessly far into the night and during the week-ends. It's too late to "mash" so learn to relax. One hears this word a lot — "relax". Cultivate it, otherwise any candidate will be a nervous wreck at the end of the course. However, even during the trial period get into the habit of producing neat and well presented work. Don't settle for anything slipshod, but don't be driven to finish a task, particularly a written task, if you run out of time. It will be soon enough to have to work under pressure when the time comes.

### The Examination

Then will come the day of inquisition when most are subjected to a mild form of torture until the first appearance of the results. Be assured that the Board members want the candidate to relax and are really interested in seeing your wares. The torture is mostly self-inflicted. Relax and enjoy it. One hears all sorts of admonitions about only speaking when spoken to. All right, but if one has something worthwhile to say — then say it if the oppor-

tunity offers. You're about to sell yourself and whoever heard of a successful salesman who was dumb or a shrinking violet.

The usual procedure is to be given a practical problem for consideration on which the candidate is invited to make notes from which he may speak if called upon to do so and which must be handed in for perusal by the Board. Therefore, cultivate the habit of neatness and clear presentation, even in the field. It will help if called to give a solution to a problem.

On consideration of a problem, think back to the nuts and bolts of a TEWT. What is the aim of the problem? For example, if the final phrase is "and as CO 3 RAR give your verbal orders", then the aim of the problem is probably twofold:

- (a) To test the candidate's knowledge of the sequence and detail of verbal orders.
- (a) To assess the candidate's personality as a commander.

With the aim of the problem in mind it will be easier to produce an answer.


A further word about written work. Make it neat and readable. Nothing exasperates an examiner more than to have to puzzle over written work. Cultivate good minor staff duties. If it's difficult to write on a straight line across a blank page — use ruled paper. Rule a margin and

look to correct spacing. Make written work an example of good staff work. When writing orders or appreciation use the correct format even if asked for "notes". The time taken to look up the form in "Staff Duties in the Field" will be well worthwhile.

Many verbal answers given from "notes" will usually be in the form of an appreciation. Ideas should be developed in the same way. State the facts and draw the conclusions, summing up with a practical argument in favour of the given solution. If the argument is given first the candidate may find that early cross-examination may chop it to pieces without allowing for the reasons to come out in a logical sequence. By all means be brief but always give reasons so that the examiner can be appraised of a process of logical thought. As stated earlier, use the word "therefore" after each stated fact.

Never hold post mortems and don't listen to others. The candidate is on his own and will qualify on his own merits. Comparisons are difficult to make during the final days of a qualifying course. Don't be stampeded into ideas that will involve a complete turnabout in thinking. Better to go it alone. If you qualify you may be told why. If you fail you'll certainly be told why.

Finally — good luck!



**THE END OF IT ALL, by Jack Danvers (William Heinemann, Ltd, London, and 317 Collins Street, Melbourne).**

While "deterrence" is a new word in military terminology, the idea it expresses is by no means new. For a good long time it has lain at the foundation of the argument in favour of powerful defence forces with which to "deter" potential aggressors from attacking and potential victims from resisting. In the early years of this century deterrence was the idea behind Great Britain's resolve to maintain a navy at least equal to the combined navies of any other two powers, and to build two battleships for every one that Germany built.

In the pre-Hiroshima era the concept had a chance of working, though it often failed as it did in 1914. But because the time factor in moments of international crisis was not even remotely so important as it is in these days of guided missiles, and because the threat to society was neither so immediate nor so vast, the argument escaped the intensity and depth of examination demanded by today's conditions. In the old days strategy was left to statesmen and their service advisers.

Society generally accepted their pronouncements as the last word on the subject.

Of recent years the very immensity of the threat to society posed by the development of inter-continental guided missiles with tremendously powerful war-heads has attracted the attention of scholars and research workers with no personal service interests or responsibilities. While the scholars have not been able to devise any universally acceptable answer, they have at any rate been able to demonstrate that each of the systems of nuclear deterrence so far advanced contains in-built contradictions. These criticisms vary in emphasis, but they all have a common denominator in challenging the assumption that all governments can be relied upon to act rationally in a moment of extreme pressure and tension.

In following these arguments through the rarefied atmosphere of theoretical discussion, we are apt to forget the actual physical effects on society of a massive nuclear exchange. It remains for the dramatist and the novelist to bring us back to earth, to demonstrate the appalling menace of nuclear warfare in terms of human personalities

and universally experienced emotions.

That is what Mr. Danvers has set out to do in this book. He rolls up the curtain on a group of scientists assembled in Melbourne to hear an exposition of a new method of accelerating the growth of food-stuffs, a discovery which the demonstration shows can pretty well solve the world's food problem. But hanging over the conference is the darkening shadow of an international crisis moving rapidly towards its climax. Responsible men are not reacting rationally as the theorists assume they will act in all circumstances. Gripped by fear and mistrust, they are swept along in an inexorable flow of events. The attempt of the scientists to warn humanity of the impending disaster fails. And then the accident — the thousand to one chance which the strategic theorists acknowledge and on which patrons of the sport of kings sometimes successfully gamble — sends the clouds of missiles soaring on their deadly missions. Throughout Europe, Russia, America, Australia and much of Asia the mechanisms of society are obliterated in a mighty impact of simultaneous blows. Following the bombs comes a rain of containers, automatically set in motion when the first button was pressed, which spread deadly new viruses throughout the stricken world. And here theory goes wrong, for the men and the records with the antidotes have been obliterated in the nuclear exchanges. The remnants of the social apparatus are unable to

cope with the racing new diseases; slowly, inexorably human life disappears from the face of the earth.

Mr. Danver's tale is all the more compelling because of the restrained manner of its telling. It is a great pity that he padded it out with a lot of superficial ideological discussion. But for all that it is a book we ought to read in order that we may fully appreciate the real nature of the weapons and theories we so readily talk about.

— E. G. K.

**THE FLEET THAT JACK BUILT**, by William Jameson (Rupert Hart-Davis, London, and William Heinemann, Ltd, 317 Collins Street, Melbourne).

For the first half of the 19th century the Royal Navy remained essentially similar in composition, outlook and doctrine to the fleet with which Nelson won his great victory at Trafalgar in 1805. It was not until 1868 that Britain's first ironclad battleship was launched, amidst the doubts, dislikes and even the jeers of many admirals and captains of the old tradition. The transformation thus begun bore full fruit when in 1918 the German Navy surrendered to the Grand Fleet at Scapa Flow.

There are of course several ways of telling the story of this transformation and the results it produced. Admiral Jameson has elected to tell it in terms of the men responsible for the revolution and the commanders who led the navy it produced in World War I. The book comprises biographies of nine great



admirals, each complete in itself but so skilfully linked together that it constitutes a unified piece of important naval history.

Jameson divides his book into three main parts — the Fore-runners, the Builders and the Users. The first biography, that of Admiral Keppel (1809-1904), gives a picture of the fleet and its personnel in the days of sail when seamanship — the ability to lay the ship and the squadron alongside the enemy at close range in any weather conditions — was the recipe for victory.

Part two contains biographies of Wilson (1842-1921), Beresford (1846-1919), Fisher (1841-1920) and Scott (1853-1924). These were the men whose foresight and tenacity produced the new fleet of steel, steam and long range guns, torpedoes and submarines, and trained it to use the new equipments without losing the Nelson touch.

Part Three tells the story of Jellicoe (1859-1935), Beatty (1871-1936), Tyrwhitt (1870-1951) and Keyes (1872-1945). These were the men who in World War I used the instrument their predecessors had created. Jellicoe and Beatty commanded the Grand Fleet, Tyrwhitt the Harwich Force and Keyes the Dover Patrol. If the instrument was not so perfect as it might have been, its leaders handled it with faultless dash and commendable skill.

Handled skilfully, history told in terms of the men who made it can be more instructive than history told by other methods, for the reader's interest is maintained without conscious effort or application. Admiral Jameson

writes with a lucidity and warmth, backed by a thorough understanding of his subject, which is at once enjoyable and instructive. One does not have to be a sailor to appreciate this book. It is written for the layman as well as the professional and contains what so many books of this kind frequently omit — good clear sketches to illustrate the text.

— E. G. K.

**WHERE THE RIVER BENDS,**  
by J. M. Scott (William Heinemann, Ltd, 317 Collins Street, Melbourne).

A writer is commissioned to compile the history of a wealthy industrial family. Quite early in his researches he discovers that the millionaire head of the concern would not have come into the inheritance if his cousin had not been presumed to have lost his life while attempting to escape from a Japanese prison camp in Burma. The cousin's fiancée does not share the presumption; she refuses to believe he is dead. Confirmation of her belief comes in the form of two strange messages, both of which suggest that the inheriting cousin is implicated in a wicked fraud. She and the writer, and a professional friend of the writer set out to unravel the mystery.

It would be a pity to go any further, for to do so would spoil the story for those with a taste for following slender clues through Burmese jungles, and having lots of adventures on the way. It is a good yarn, even if the long arm of coincidence does reach a bit far at times.

— E. G. K.