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CONTENTS

	Page
The Malayan Campaign 1941-42 <i>Lieutenant Colonel S. P. Weir</i>	5
It's New	<i>Major H. L. Bell</i> 13
La Guerra de Guerrillas	<i>"Che" Guevara</i> 20
Caution or Elan	<i>Daidolos</i> 31
Agreement in Laos — Strategic Review	37
Artillery in South Australia 1840-1960	<i>Lieutenant D. N. Brook</i> 39
Book Reviews	46

The views expressed in the articles in this Journal are the author's own and do not necessarily represent General Staff opinion or policy.



Photo: Australian War Memorial, Canberra.

YPRES

When World War I broke out on 4th August, 1914, a short period of mobile operations took place in the western theatre of operations. Then the machine-gun, the magazine rifle and the spade brought movement to a halt and stalemate settled down on the Western Front. Towards the western end of the unbroken trench systems which stretched from Switzerland to the sea a deep and narrow British salient covering the city of Ypres was thrust forward into the German lines.

The water table around Ypres was very close to the surface, and a few weeks of fighting broke the drainage ditches and converted the Salient into a morass in which guns, vehicles and even men sank out of sight. Pack animals had to be used to move supplies forward, and even for them a half a mile in 14 hours was not bad going.

For many Australian units of the first A.I.F., service in the Salient was their worst experience in the whole war. Today the impressive Menin Road memorial stands, not as a monument to the art of generalship, but to the human spirit that can rise above the frightful conditions to which men were subjected there.

The picture shows mule transport moving through the ruined city towards the Salient.

THE MALAYAN CAMPAIGN 1941-42

CROSSING THE PERAK RIVER DECEMBER, 1941

Lieutenant Colonel S. P. Weir, MC,
Royal Australian Infantry

THIS is the fourth and final article dealing with the studies made by 1 RAR in 1961 of battles in North Malaya. In this case the study produced ideas and techniques that were found useful when improvised crossings of the Perak were carried out in the Kuala Kangsar area. Once again interrogation of local inhabitants followed by detailed reconnaissance brought to light many interesting aspects which were not available in the very limited writings on this phase of the campaign.

The River


The Perak River is by far the largest river on the west coast of Malaya. It rises in the mountain mass north east of Grik that is Thailand's southern border with Malaya, and from Grik runs almost due south for about 120 miles to enter the sea near Telok Anson. Devastating flooding was a regular feature until a dam for hydro-electric purposes and flood control was built about 15 miles upstream

from Kuala Kangsar. The impounded waters became the Chendorah Lakes which produce a defile on the Grik road.

The river in the Kuala Kangsar area is over 300 yards across, but in normal times most of this is quite shallow though the narrow deep channel is rarely less than six feet deep. It generally flows at about three knots between banks varying from ten to fifty feet high. In 1941 there was extensive native cultivation on the west bank as far south as Blanja, but there was practically no habitation on the east bank for there the banks merge into the rugged mountains.

The Bridges

Three bridges spanned the river 20 years ago — a railway bridge at Enggor, a road bridge at Kuala Kangsar and a pontoon bridge at Blanja, 30 miles south of Kuala Kangsar. The Victoria railway bridge at Enggor, four miles north of Kuala Kangsar, was five steel spans resting on concrete pylons and abutments





Victoria rail bridge, from west side. Original abutment at right and new span replaced by Japanese.

about 50 feet high. It carried the north-south railway line. About a mile south the Iskander road bridge of concrete and steel rose nearly 100 feet above the water. Named after the previous Sultan of Perak, whose palace was three miles downstream, it carried the main west coast road across the 400 yards gap. Thirty miles downstream a pontoon road bridge about 500 yards long linked the alternative road route with the east bank village of Blanja.

Defence Potential

The river by any standards was a considerable obstacle. It was wide and deep and mostly ran through undeveloped country. At times it was fordable to men and animals, but never to vehicles. As the battle developed and British losses

mounted, it seemed more than ever to offer that measure of security and delay so urgently needed by 11 Division to allow them to rest and reorganise.

The main weakness of the Perak as an obstacle was that it ran not across the north-south communications, but more or less parallel with them, during the greater part of its course from Kuala Kangsar. This fact combined with the nearness of the coastline, which in the absence of adequate naval and air forces could not be protected, militated against the adoption of delaying tactics in an area otherwise eminently suitable.

British Plans


On 17th December General Percival decided that III Corps should withdraw behind the Perak River where, while avoid-

ing becoming too committed, it should prevent the enemy from crossing for as long as possible. General Heath, however, considered that the lateral road from Kuala Kangsar to Blanja on the west bank, which was not duplicated on the rugged east bank, would enable the enemy to move rapidly to any point he chose for a crossing with little fear of being forestalled. This fact, and the possible danger to his right flank from the column on the Grik road, made him decide that he could not afford to dispute the crossing at Kuala Kangsar. He therefore ordered 11 Division to the general line Sungei Siput-Siputeh, and told Murray-Lyon, GOC 11 Division, to make use of the short pause in the operations which would occur while the


enemy crossed the river, to rest and reorganise his weary troops.

The Withdrawal

During the night 22nd/23rd, first 12 Brigade, and then 28 Brigade crossed the Iskandar bridge, and by first light on the 23rd all British forces, except a bridgehead at Blanja, were east of the Perak. When all troops and equipment were across the river, charges on both of the bridges were fired. The abutment and first span of the Victoria bridge were effectively destroyed and at the Iskandar bridge the second and third spans on the western side were dropped into the water by blowing the main girder pins from their pylons. Next night the Blanja pontoon bridge was sunk and the mooring ropes cut.



Iskandar Bridge — One of the spans dropped by British demolitions. Remains of old piles used by Japanese for repairs are visible above water level.



PERAK RIVER CROSSING.

- | | | |
|----------------|---|--------------------|
| MAIN ROAD | SECONDARY ROADS | FAIR WEATHER ROADS |
| RAILWAY | RIVERS | CONTOUR LINE 500 |
| JUNGLE | PADI | RUBBER |
| BUILT UP AREAS | AREAS WITH HOUSES AT FREQUENT INTERVALS | SCRUB |
| | | TREE CULTIVATION |

Scale:



Japanese Plans for Seizing the Bridges

It will be recalled from the previous article that it was the task of seizing the Perak bridges intact which spurred on 42 Regiment in its thrust down the Grik road. Similarly the rest of 5 Division, after bursting through at Jitra, was urged on by Army Headquarters to quickly seize the three bridges across the Perak River and forestall any British attempt to destroy them.

So important did the Japanese planners consider the bridges that they earmarked a battalion of 5 Division, after the landing at Singora, to don Thai army uniforms and by deceit and speed to rush the 200 miles to the Perak bridges and seize them intact. The lack of Thai co-operation is alleged by Colonel Tsuji to have frustrated this plan which he considered would have shortened the campaign by a month.

On the 21st a message was dropped to 42 Regiment near Lenggong directing them to send a strong patrol across the Perak to seize the southern end of the road bridge before it was demolished, but this mission was not accomplished. Meantime the commander of the Japanese light bomber force came forward with a plan to bomb the southern end of the bridges to cut the leads to the charges, and by continuous air attack to prevent them being replaced. The Japanese plans to capture the Perak bridges and to forestall their demolition had failed, but they quickly set about formulating a plan for a crossing.

The Japanese Crossings

General Yamashita ordered his forces to close up on the Perak River with 5 Division opposite the Blanja bridge site and the leading regiment of the Imperial Guards Division at Kuala Kangsar. Boats and bridging equipment were hastily assembled at the selected crossing places and orders were issued for the crossings to be made on the night 26th/27th December.

During daylight on the 26th, 4 Guards Regiment assembled under cover north of the Victoria railway bridge, and that night crossed the river in small assault craft, some of which had motors. The river was flowing quite fast and was higher than normal. Although the British made no effort to oppose the crossing, some of the local inhabitants reported hearing firing from the east bank. This could have been the Japanese themselves, in the dark and confusion, firing at noises. By first light the bridgehead was secured and patrols were soon moving east towards Sungei Siput. Light vehicles were by now being ferried over on rafts constructed from the heavier boats.

5 Division at Blanja encountered some opposition from 2/1 Gurkha Rifles and its supporting artillery, but their strong assault, north of the pontoon bridge site, was soon successful. Thus the Japanese to their astonishment were able, without opposition, to cross the biggest obstacle they had yet met.

Bridging Operations

Immediately the bridgehead had been secured in the Enggor area the Japanese engineers began constructing a temporary road bridge about 600 yards north of the demolished rail bridge. Local inhabitants were impressed for this work, and by using local materials including rubber and palm trees, a temporary bridge was completed in less than a week. For part of the time the river dropped and it was possible to wade across. The effectiveness of this bridging was shown by the fact that on the 31st of December a company of tanks was attacking at Kampar 50 miles away.


At the same time work started on a wooden railway bridge about a mile north of the Victoria bridge. The timber in this

bridge was more substantial and it took nearly three weeks to complete. At the same time the necessary railway tracks had been laid on both sides of the river. The remains of these tracks and of the bridges themselves were still to be seen in 1961.

Later a second rail bridge was built about 100 yards north of the Victoria bridge. The latter took nearly six months to repair. However, after two months it was being used by vehicles.

It took nearly six months to restore the Iskander bridge.

Once again it was the Japanese engineers who, by a remarkable effort, enabled the Japanese drive to continue at great speed. Their techniques may have been crude but they were effective. As always, engin-



Victoria Bridge — west bank. The end of the span replaced by Japanese is visible and the different construction will be noticed.

eer reconnaissance elements well forward in the advanced guard enabled maximum time to be devoted to planning and preparation of the bridging tasks. One of the functions of these reconnaissance elements was to locate the saw mills in the captured towns and villages and earmark suitable timber for rapid use. Local timber such as rubber trees and coconut palms was freely used to supplement the 20 truckloads of bridging material carried by each engineer regiment. The Japanese had no hesitation in impressing local labour for their work and at

times demolished houses and buildings to get suitable timber.

Conclusion

Once again the British underestimated the ability of the Japanese to overcome a major obstacle. Certainly they managed to get their forces behind the Perak River and effectively demolish the bridges, but by not presenting any opposition they allowed the Japanese infantry to cross unopposed in the easiest of crossing places, and then permitted them, unimpeded, to construct a road bridge in less than five days.

COMPETITION FOR AUTHORS

The Board of Review has awarded first place and the prize of £5 for the best original articles published in the May and June issues as follows:—

MAY — The Campaign in Malaya 1941/42 — The Battle for Jitra, by Lieutenant Colonel S. P. Weir, MC, Royal Australian Infantry.

JUNE — Experiences in Short Course Training, by General Leo Freiherr Geyr von Schweppenburg, German Army (Retired).

IT'S NEW!

A PLEA FOR SOME INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONAL THINKING

Major H. L. Bell,
Royal Australian Infantry

"To meet ambushes which usually take the form of a volley followed by flight — which, in very dense jungle, it may be impossible to discover or guard against by means of flankers — the Commander in Chief would wish the following plan to be tried; Supposing the fire of the enemy to be delivered from the right, a portion of the force in front should be ready to dash along the road for 100 yards or so — the party should then turn to the right and sweep round with a view to intercepting the enemy in his flight. A party in rear should similarly enter the jungle to their right with the same object. The different parties must be previously told off, put under the command of selected leaders, and must act with promptitude and dash".

NEW!
"IT'S NEW! NEW!

Oozoo detergent, the NEW detergent. Makes clothes whiter, cleans them faster, kills bacteria — makes wash day a happy day" — on and on ad nauseum.

And so this 20th Century civilisation of ours is bombarded 24 hours a day by Press, TV, wireless, neon signs, hoardings and even with people towing advertisements by aeroplane; all devoted to a ceaseless effort of convincing us that we need the product.

"It's NEW — so it must be good!" — the motto of our century.

Yet the new detergent isn't necessarily good, is it? (One such brand — now defunct — raised rashes on the skins of

children). Like all new things it has to be tested, compared with others and evaluated before verdict can be fairly pronounced. Yet the average citizen blindly accepts the rash claims of the "new" product until its failure proves otherwise.

However, the world won't stop because a new brand of soap is a failure. But when army officers, who lay claim to being professional men, think along the lines of the gullible housewife, then we are headed for real trouble. If an army blindly seizes on something merely because it happens to be "New", then the failure of the product, should it fail, could result in defeat and disaster. And yet, the army officer of today, more and more is tending to march in step with the herd mentality of modern society.

The Military Mind

Probably the most common criticism of the military mind is its record of resistance to change. This criticism, whilst often unfair, has, in the past, been based on strong grounds. Through the centuries soldiers have tended to resist new ideas, to cling to outmoded concepts, and to let their "hearts rule their heads" in their attitude to professional problems. Even as late as the 1920's an eminent general was heard to say "The horse still has its place on the battlefield". Even if the horse had been supreme on the field of battle there probably weren't, by that time, sufficient mares and stallions in the whole Empire to keep a mounted arm in horseflesh for the duration of a major war!

General Sir Ian Hamilton in his memoirs, makes excellent reference to the military mind of his period. As a subaltern, he applied to attend a school. This provoked a thrill of horror among the officers of his regiment for it was, at that time, a proud boast of the Gordon Highlanders that they had never sent an officer to a school or course. And famous, indeed, was the outcome of Sir Hiram Maxim's offer of his invention (the forerunner of the Vickers Gun) to Denmark, an offer made in the hope that this tiny country, by possession of the gun, could defend itself against its powerful neighbour. The Danish authorities replied that such a tiny country as theirs could not afford such a device — its consumption of ammunition would make the cost prohibitive!

But today all this has changed as the rapid acceleration of technological progress erodes the bastions of conservatism and hide-bound tradition. So much so, that, far from being resistant to change, the military mind is tending to go to the opposite extreme — "change for the sake of change". Whereas in years gone by, courageous indeed was the officer who introduced a new idea, now almost the same courage is needed by the officer who opposes it. He has to fight the 20th Century custom of blind acceptance of everything that is "new" and has to oppose his fellow officers who observe this custom.

These officers, the ones who push the "new" idea, but have given it little independent thought, can be broken up into several categories. Look around your own mess — at least half of these categories will be represented. There will of course be a minority of people who do really think for themselves professionally and perhaps there will even be the odd "human vegetable" who doesn't even think at all. Let us, then, examine these categories.

The "Panacea" Thinker

To this fellow, the New Idea comes as a panacea, a "curer of all ills". He really never understood the Old Idea. He is usually too lazy to bother learning it; sometimes he just simply isn't capable of learning it. To him, the New Idea comes as a ray of hope. Perhaps it will solve his problem with one clean sweep — "it's 'NEW' so it must be good!"

Examples? There are many, but two current ones stand out above all others — The Pentropic organisation and Trainfire. Quite a few years ago, in 1942, one Liddell Hart propounded a theory in favour of a five-sided organisation. Since his further writings on this subject after the war, his ideas seem to have profoundly affected many United States military thinkers, and the American adoption of the Pentropic system can not unreasonably be attributed to Liddell Hart's influence. Yet how many of the people who loudly acclaimed the arrival of our "new" organisation had ever even heard about it prior to the Army Reorganisation? Precious few, I would hazard, and even if they had, would probably have dismissed it as "not so good as the present system which has been tried and-proven in war" (the exact words used by one officer *circa* 1953).

I find it significant to note that every officer of my acquaintance who has any original tactical thought, has expressed misgivings about many aspects of our present organisation. Most of the doubters have, I confess, spoken in minor points, but some officers have been radically opposed. In contrast, I find that many of the officers who accept the new organisation 100 per cent without reservation, tend to be those, who, far from being expert on the new organisation weren't much good on the old one either. Why should this be so? Because the fellow who couldn't master the Old Idea will always seize upon the New with-

out hesitation, hoping that with its success he will succeed too.

As for Trainfire, long articles on this subject were published in United Kingdom and American military literature for some years, yet how many of the present Trainfire enthusiasts ever read them. As an Army we seem to have lost interest in small arms training, which until someone invents a death-ray gun, will surely remain our "bread and butter" for some years to come. All those officers who shared my fate of three years in National Service will agree that the "old" musketry training system, with its requirements of plenty of time and first class instructors, was not really geared to the mass production training needed for mobilisation. Yet to have suggested then that the system was inadequate, was to have invited rebuke by officers who probably are now Trainfire devotees. Why? Because they didn't ever really understand the old system, knew (but would never admit) that it wasn't getting results, and now hope that perhaps Trainfire might be the answer.

The "Fashionable" Thinker

This one is a very abundant species. Before the Boer War he thought that squares were pretty "hot stuff". After it, however, he was an enthusiast for open-order fighting, but by 1916 had been converted to the mass tactics of that day. He is a "progressive" or likes to think he is; he often, in fact, reads military literature. Whenever some new technique or weapon crops up he will be in

the front rank of those selling it. Yet observe him closely. You will notice that he never sells the "new" until it has become the "Official Gospel".

Remember when we all turned tropical a few years ago? The "fashionable" thinkers certainly went wild then and the infantry broke out into a rash of contact drills and perimeter defences. To have suggested the inclusion of open warfare tactics in a syllabus was unthinkable, it simply just wasn't the fashion. The mere fact that many areas of South East Asia have about as much jungle as Hyde Park did not enter the heads of many people and it has taken about five years for the Army as a whole to realise that one must train in both close and open conditions, if one is to survive.

Go back 10 or 15 years. It was fashionable then to orient one's thoughts to the United Kingdom, so the "Fashionable" thinkers tended to pursue a course which suggested that the British Army could do no wrong. The "Fashionable" thinker dismissed the Army of the other great democracy, USA, as rather poor stuff. Yet anyone who has had dealings with the British Army knows full well, that like any other army, far from doing no wrong it can do plenty of things wrong. (And, may I add, I take as much pride in British military tradition as anyone). But today it is different — it is now "fashionable" to think American so the "Fashionable" thinkers slavishly pursue a devotion to all things originating from the United States. The amazing part

of it all is that very often the same fellow who was a British enthusiast ten years ago is now the very same fellow who is a pseudo-American.

But the "fashionable" thinker doesn't stop at "new" methods and ideas, he also pushes the "new" weapon. Witness the enthusiasts for our "new" US 105 mm gun. "New" did you say? Well, I think it must surely be a contender for one of the oldest pieces of military equipment in use today by the major armies of the world. Far from being an outstanding improvement on its predecessor (the 25 pounder) it is possibly, all factors considered, not as good. Yet we had to adopt it for several very sound reasons which in our likely theatre of war outweigh the others. But do the "fashionable" thinkers reason on these lines? No, they seize upon and become devotees of the "105". Why? To prove that they are "up to date" (It's "new" so it must be good!)

The "Gospel Spreader"

One of the most unbalanced, but enthusiastic thinkers is the "gospel spreader". His very enthusiasm can be dangerous, for it may sway the thought of other officers in his own misguided direction.

When an officer is taught a "new" method at great expense or has been sent overseas to learn it, it is a natural reaction for him to become an enthusiast. Apart from this many officers feel a need to justify this lengthy training on an overseas trip.

Perhaps John Masters summed up these gentlemen best in his

book "Bugles and a Tiger" — "Susceptible young men would go back to their Regiments — they would tell their colonels victory could be achieved only by men who could do six hand-springs (Physical Training School) or that no one need worry about anything except gas —one whiff, and the war would be over (Gas School); or that the rest of the battalion existed merely as coolies and body-guards for the sacred, all conquering machine - guns (Machine-Gun School); and so on. The colonels were not impressed; life in the battalions went on as usual in spite of 'The Word' that had been brought to them".

That, however was in pre-war years. Today, as society reels under the blast of high-pressure salesmanship, many officers seem only too eager to believe the first smooth talking purveyor of the "new" idea who comes along. What we need are officers who accord the salesman a full hearing, but then make up their OWN minds as to the quality of his wares.

The "Woolly" Thinker

Not too abundant this one fortunately, but in sufficient numbers to make himself felt. This one grasps the "new" without really understanding its implications. Very often, even if the "new" is successful, he uses it incorrectly through woolly thinking. Perhaps one or two samples will illustrate the point.

Once upon a time a very junior platoon commander stood on a hill in Korea and com-

plained that due to the poor construction of his platoon's bunkers, the fields of fire had been restricted. He suggested that perhaps some open weapon pits could remedy this defect. To this suggestion he received the answer "But one of the 'new' developments of the Korean war was that we can only defend from bunker systems". Here was a classic example of the "woolly" thinker. Because the Korean bunker systems were "New", then, hey presto, it must be a development of modern war. But was it? These systems only developed because the line was static, giving time for their construction and giving time for the aggregation of fire power which made bunkering essential for survival. Had the war remained one of movement the bunkers would never have been constructed. And why was the line static? For no tactical reason, but for political reasons while the truce talks dragged on at Panmunjom all those weary months. Without the talks the line would have shifted, their way or ours, but shifted most surely. And here we have an officer accepting a situation as the correct one solely because it was "new", without applying his reasoning power to an examination of the situation.

A few years ago in a certain Command, a brigade covering force exercise was studied at exhaustive length and performed by the major units in that Command. Admittedly the story had a limited nuclear threat thrown in (You know, the "limited" threat which is there so we'll think about it but isn't used be-

cause it would have ruined the exercise!) but, by and large, it was a good old "conventional" open warfare exercise. It envisaged the various parts of the brigade delaying the enemy on a series of obstacles along the road systems. This brigade was spread out over many miles of ground, as covering forces usually have been, and doubtless will continue to be. As a result of this excellent exercise many officers got into their heads the idea that "this is the 'new' way of defence" e.g. battalions several miles apart. What these "woolly" thinkers never realised was, that there was very little "new" in the whole thing. (Other than the Interim Logistical system and the "limited" nuclear threat which I recall wasn't invoked), but, that this was the very first time for years that an extensive study was given to the role of a covering force. It had been for years something that we always trotted out for five minutes discussion but never really considered. I would not be surprised if in the years ahead some fellow sites his battalion on a 10 miles frontage merely because he went to this exercise. "It was 'new' so it must have been good!"

The "Simple Truster"

This one comes in two varieties. Firstly there is the fellow who is too lazy to think for himself and accepts the "new" on the grounds that "it must have been worked out by someone with more brains than I". The second is the really simple fellow who not only takes this view, but believes it, too.

Now please do not misunderstand me. I am not inciting officers to collective disobedience. Whatever our own views on a subject, once we are told to carry it out, then that is the stone-cold end of the matter; we obey it and implement it. But loyal implementation of a policy is one thing; blind acceptance of something merely because it was written in a higher headquarters is another.

The "simple truster" will always offer up the line that "the book" must be right because it was written by an expert. Was it? We have an officer careers plan, which all things considered, is a very good one. One feels sure that Army Headquarters takes pains to ensure that an idiot is not posted to a vital appointment but it would, at the same time, be wrong to assume that every officer posted to such an appointment is necessarily an expert in that field. How do we get "experts"? Well, usually by putting them in the job so that they will gain the experience and knowledge necessary to become one. Instructors posted to the Jungle Training Centre are not necessarily experienced veterans of jungle service. People have instructed at the School of Infantry who have never commanded a rifle platoon. I was a member of the Army Team of Lecturers, but on arrival at that organisation, had only ever given orations on such subjects as "Aiming off for Wind" and "The Theory of The Group". So it is very dangerous to automatically assume that because something "New" comes from above, its author is necessarily an expert.

To be fair, on most occasions the "new" offering is being circulated for trial, criticism and experiment.

But the "simple truster" doesn't usually realise this, he just blindly accepts.

The "Gadget Man"

Here is a true son of the 20th Century, with its ever accelerating production of new machinery designed to replace the hand of man. He seizes on the "new" gadget, and assumes that because it is "new" it replaces all other gadgets that preceded it, including human beings.

He has a golden future ahead of him with the ever accelerating rate of new inventions. As soon as infra-red ray equipment comes into general usage, as one day it must, he will assume that the need for good night training is no longer vital. As portable types of surveillance radar come into use he will assume that the need for clearing patrols and "stand to's" will have passed. Because in his eagerness to push the "new" he will overlook the fact that these devices, war winners though they may possibly be, are a supplement to the really trained soldier and not a replacement for him. And if you want an example of an army's misplaced trust in "gadgets" as a replacement of trained men, then look to the early days of the Korean conflict where the road-bound allies were well chewed up by the North Koreans.

Conclusion

All this may sound rather exaggerated. Yet all these types exist, some extreme, some mild; but they are all present and I have met the lot; and you too will have done so. Once the greatest threat to military efficiency was the soldier's resistance to change — now we have just as great a threat in this mad rush towards "change for the sake of change". We must keep up with the Joneses — it is our modern way of life and to be "different", or to have a doubting mind, is to bring troubles on oneself. (If you don't believe me, just question your instructor's facts, at your next school or course). It is not suggested that we oppose "new" trends—rather the reverse. What is needed however, are officers who will not accept something because someone else told them, or because someone else wrote it, but because they, as thinking individuals reasoned it out for themselves.

Look back to the front of this article, and you will see a quotation. Read it. It is a pretty good description of what is obviously a jungle contact drill. The author? A fellow called Roberts, Field-Marshal Lord Roberts. When and where? — "Instruction for the Guidance of General and other officers commanding columns in Burma" — paragraph 17, 20th November, 1886.

What's "New"?



LA GUERRA DE GUERRILLAS

Condensation of the book by
"Che" Guevara

From the May 1961 issue of ARMY Magazine USA.

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Part III — Organisation of the Guerilla Front Supply

A guerilla force is not self-sustaining. Food, clothing, munitions — all of the requirements of war — must be obtained by capture or theft and from farmers in areas where the guerillas are operating.

PROPER supply is fundamental for the guerilla. The group of men, in touch with the soil, have to live off the products of that soil. At the same time they must allow the people who live in the area to continue to live.

In the beginning, one will live only on what the farmers may have. It will be possible to go to some store to buy something, but never to have supply lines, because there is no area in which to set them up.

Slowly, the area will be cleared, and then one can count on a greater ease in being able to act. The fundamental rule is to always pay for any goods taken from a friend. These goods

may be the products of the soil or of commercial establishments. Many times these things are donated; but there are other times when the economic conditions of the same rural area make gifts impossible. There are times when the very needs of war make it impossible to pay simply because of lack of money. In such instances the businessman should always be given a requisition or an IOU — something that certifies the debt.

If conditions continue to improve, taxes can be imposed. These should be as light as possible, especially for the small producer. Above all, care must be taken to maintain good relations between the farmers and the guerilla army which comes from that class of society.

Meat is of prime necessity. If a secure area cannot be had, farms should be set up by farmers not connected with the rebel army. These farms should be dedicated to the production of

chickens, eggs, and livestock that can be killed and their meat preserved.

In this way, hides are also obtained. Then a tanning industry — more or less elementary — can be developed to provide the necessary material for shoes, a fundamental need for fighting.

Salt is vital. When near the sea, it is necessary to set up small salt-drying basins which will assure the required production to provide a surplus after supplying the troops.

There will come a time when problems of supplying food to the troops in the area will be solved. Yet many other products will be needed: hides for shoes, if a leather industry cannot be created that will supply the zone; material for clothing and other necessary things for the same troops; paper, newsprint, or a mimeograph machine, ink, and all the other accessories.

The need for articles from the outside world will increase as the guerillas continue to organise and as their organisation becomes more complex. In order to protect the organisation adequately, it is vital that the organisation for the line of supply functions perfectly.

In all supply lines that pass through the countryside, it is necessary to have a series of houses, terminals, or way stations where supplies can be hidden during the day, ready to continue the following night. These houses should be known only to those directly in charge of supplies. The inhabitants of the house should be told as little

as possible, even though they are people in whom the organisation has great confidence.

Civilian Organisation

Senor Inside and Senor Outside are both important to the guerilla force which must depend upon, but never trust, civilians within its zone of operations — and enlist support and supply from outside sources.

The civilian organisation of the insurrectionary movement is very important on both the internal and the external fronts. First, we will describe the work of the internal front.

We can say that the internal front is dominated, at least relatively, by the liberation forces. Also, it is supposed to be a region adequate for guerilla warfare. When these conditions do not exist (that is, when guerilla battles are developing in areas that are not suitable), the guerilla organisation extends but does not increase in depth. It makes channels into new areas, but it cannot have an internal organisation because the whole region is permeated by the enemy. On the internal front, we can have a series of organisations which carry on their specific mission of better functioning of the administration.

It must always be kept in mind that the zone must never, for any reason, be impoverished by the direct action of the rebel army. Indirectly, however, such direct action may be the cause of impoverishment because it precipitates an enemy blockade. The enemy's propaganda will attempt to blame the guerillas for

the condition. For precisely this reason, direct causes of conflict should not be created. For example, there should be no regulations to prevent farmers in the liberated territory from selling their products outside this area, except under certain extreme or transitory circumstances which should be carefully explained to them.

Farmers should also have connections which will permit the organisation of the guerilla army, at any moment, to direct the disposal of harvests and sell them in enemy territory through a series of more or less benevolent middlemen benefactors (more or less) of the farmer class. In all such cases, along with the devotion to the cause which makes the merchant defy the dangers involved, cupidity naturally makes him take these risks to gain profits.

When the guerilla group has achieved a certain measure of development, it should establish a series of routes varying from the tiny footpath, only wide enough for a mule, to the good truck road. As a general rule, these roads help overcome the supply problem in areas where there is no other solution. They should not be used except under circumstances where it is almost certain that the position can be maintained against an enemy attack. The roads should be established between points that make communications convenient but not vital. No danger should be involved in their construction.

Other means of communication can also be established. A

very important one is the telephone, which can be spread across the mountains by using the trees as wire posts. The wires cannot be observed from above by the enemy. In the use of the telephone, we presuppose an area that the enemy cannot penetrate.

Storehouses are very important. In establishing a point where a beginning of permanent guerilla organisation may be undertaken, very well-kept storehouses should be set up to assure minimum care of merchandise and, above all, to control its equitable distribution.

On the external front, the functions are different as regards both quality and quantity. For example, propaganda should be of a national and educational type. It should explain the victories won by the guerillas, call the attention of workers and farmers to successful battles and give news of victories achieved on the local front. Tax collecting must be totally clandestine, the utmost care being taken to protect the entire chain from the smallest collector to the treasurer of the organisation.

This organisation should be spread out in complementary zones to form a whole. The zones can be provinces, counties, states, cities, or villages, depending on the size of the movement. In all of these, there must be a finance committee which will take care of the organisation of tax collections. Money can be collected by means of bonds or direct donations or even, if the war is far enough advanced,

through taxes. The industrialist will have to pay taxes because of the great strength of the insurrectionary army.

Supply should be conditioned to the needs of the guerillas. It must be so organised that merchandise moves in a chain. The more common articles are procured in nearby places. Scarce ones, or those impossible to get anywhere else, can be sought from the major centres. Thus, one tries to keep the chain a limited one: the mission must be known to as few people as possible in order to make the chain last longer.

This is the framework of a civilian organisation inside and outside of guerilla territory during a people's struggle. I repeat that I speak from my experience in Cuba. We are providing a framework, not a bible.

Role of Women

Women have abilities as communicators and culinary artists but they are not necessarily deadlier than the male.

The role that women can play, in the whole development of the revolutionary process, is extraordinarily important. It is well to emphasise this, because in all countries with a colonial mentality, a woman is underestimated to the extent that there is real discrimination against her.

Naturally, there are not many women combatants. When the internal front has been consolidated and the least indispensable combatants are being discharged, women can be set to work at a considerable number

of specific occupations. One of the most important — perhaps the most important — would be communications between different combat forces; above all, those in enemy territory.

As a simple messenger, whether the message be oral or written, the woman is much freer than a man. She attracts less attention and, at the same time, inspires less of a feeling of fear in any enemy soldier, who often commits his brutal acts out of fear of an unknown force that may attack him, for that is the way the guerillas operate.

Contacts between forces separated from each other, messages beyond the lines and even outside the country, including things of some size such as bullets, are carried by women in special underclothing. But all the time they also can carry on their usual peacetime pursuits. To be able to count on a well-prepared meal is very pleasing to a soldier subjected to the hard conditions of guerilla life.

A very important job for women is the teaching of elementary reading and even revolutionary theory. Essentially, they teach not only the local farmers but may also teach the revolutionary soldiers. The school administration (part of the civilian organisation) should rely fundamentally on women because they are able to inculcate greater enthusiasm in children and have the sympathy of the school population.

In health affairs, women play important roles as nurses or even doctors because they have a tenderness infinitely greater

than that of a rude companion in arms, a tenderness which is so much appreciated when a man is defenceless, without any comforts, perhaps suffering great pain, and exposed to the many dangers of this kind of war.

Health

Medical care is in direct ratio to the success of the guerilla force, ranging from primitive in the early days to modern hospitalisation as success crowns the revolution.

The organisation of hospitals depends greatly on the stage of development of the guerillas. We can distinguish three fundamental types of hospital organisations which correspond to stages of development of the guerilla's fight.

In this historic development, we have first the nomad phase. In this, the doctor, if this is what he is, travels constantly with his companions. He is simply one more man and very probably has to carry on all the other functions of a guerilla, including fighting. Always he will have with him the tiring and at times hopeless task of treating casualties who could be saved with proper treatment. However, the means do not always exist for such treatment. In this state of the development of the guerillas, the doctor fully realises his character as a true altruist who brings to the men the necessary consolation from his poorly equipped knapsack.

In the course of normal events in guerilla warfare, one becomes "semi-nomad". At this time, there are camps that are fre-

quented by guerilla troops. There are friendly houses that can be completely trusted, where things can be taken care of, where the injured may be left, and where each time the tendency of the troops to spend time is more marked. At this time the doctor's job is less fatiguing. He can have emergency surgical equipment in his knapsack, and at a friendly house a more complete set for less hasty operations. During this semi-nomad phase, if one can get to places completely inaccessible to the enemy, there can be hospitals or nursing homes where the sick and wounded can recuperate.

In the third phase, there are areas that the enemy cannot control and where a true hospital organisation can be established.

When a man falls in the front line, some stretcher bearers, if the guerilla organisation has them, will carry him to the first-aid post. Then the soldier passes through the first hospital and on to a second centre where there are surgeons and specialists, depending on the organisation. At this centre, all necessary operations are performed to save his life or to improve his condition. This is the second echelon.

Afterwards, in the third echelon, hospitals are set up with the greatest possible number of modern conveniences for the close examination of wounds or to diagnose any illness which may also affect the inhabitants of the area. These hospitals in the third group correspond to those in a settled community. They are not only centres of rehabilitation and of surgery that

is not urgent, but in addition, are connected with the civilian population so that hygienists can carry on their teaching function. Dispensaries should also be set up which permit adequate personal attention. The hospitals of this third echelon will be able to have, depending on the supply capacity of the civilian organisations, facilities that will allow laboratory diagnosis and X-ray-ing.

Necessary medicines should be obtained through contacts with health organisations in the enemy's rear area. Sometimes they can be had even from the International Red Cross. However, one should not count on this, especially in the early days of the struggle. It is necessary to organise an administration that will permit the rapid transportation of needed medicines in case of danger and to continue to supply everything necessary to all hospitals, military and civilian.

Sabotage

Indiscriminate sabotage has little purpose; carefully planned, it is perhaps the best tool in the hands of determined revolutionaries.

Sabotage is an invaluable weapon of people who fight a guerilla war. Its organisation corresponds to the civilian or underground part, because sabotage should obviously be carried on only outside the areas controlled by the rebel army. But this organisation should be commanded by and receive orders only directly from the guerilla general staff which decides the industries, communi-

cations, or other types of objectives to be attacked.

Sabotage has nothing to do with terrorism. Terrorism and personal assassination are absolutely different phases. We sincerely believe that terrorism is a negative weapon which in no way produces the desired effects. It can turn people against a revolutionary movement, and it brings with it a loss of lives among those taking part which is much greater than the return. On the other hand, personal assassination is permissible under certain carefully chosen circumstances. It should be performed only when the head of the instruments of repression must be eliminated.

There are two types of sabotage: one on a national scale for certain major objectives, and a local one for the combat lines. On a national scale it is aimed directly at the destruction of all communications. Rapid communications are the enemy army's greatest weapon against the rebels in less rugged areas. We must, therefore, constantly attack this weapon by destroying railroad bridges, sewers, electric lights, telephones, and aqueducts. Lastly, everything necessary for a normal, modern life should be destroyed.

At certain times, the vital industries of each region will be destroyed with the proper equipment. When this is done, it is necessary to have an over-all concept of the problem and to be sure that one is not unnecessarily destroying the source of employment. Otherwise, hunger and a massive displacement of

workers will result. Industries belong to supporters of the regime and should be destroyed unless the destruction brings about very serious social consequences. We must always try to convince the workers of the need for the destruction.

In the combat area also, sabotage should be carried out in the same way, but with much more daring, dedication, and frequency. In these cases, the tremendous help of the quick-moving patrols of the rebel army can be depended upon because they can go down into the zones and assist the members of the civil organisation to do the job.

Sabotage includes appropriation of merchandise, cutting supply lines as much as possible, frightening farmers from selling their products, burning vehicles travelling on roads to create roadblocks. In each case of sabotage, it is desirable to have some contact with the enemy, whether at a distance or up close, and to follow the hit-and-run system. It is not necessary to make a big demonstration but only to point out to the adversary that, where there is sabotage, there also are guerilla forces ready to fight. This causes him to keep his troop strength up and to move carefully or not at all.

In this way, all cities near the guerilla zone of operations will slowly become paralyzed.

War Industry

Movement and applied fire-power are the prime requirements for successful guerilla

force — therefore shoe-making and gunsmithing are important war industries.

In the guerilla army's view, war industry is the product of a fairly long development. Moreover, it should be well located geographically. As soon as zones are liberated and tight blockades set up around the enemy's supplies, the necessary different departments will be organised. We have already covered this.

So far as manufacturing is concerned, there are two fundamentals: shoe-making and leather-working. Troops cannot walk without shoes in rough country and stony terrain. It is very difficult to march under these conditions, and only natives of the area, and not even all of them, can do it. The rest must have shoes.

The rebel shoe industry is divided into two parts: one applies half soles and repairs damaged shoes, the other makes crude shoes. The rebel force should be able to count on a small shoe machine, very easily come by in these areas, to set up a cottage type industry operated by many persons. Along with shoe-making should go the machine shop where all sorts of canvas or leather equipment used by the troops can be made and repaired. These include cartridge belts and knapsacks, which, while not vital, contribute to comfort and give the troops a feeling of self-sufficiency and well-being.

Another basic industry for small internal organisations of guerillas is the gunsmith's. It

also has a variety of functions: repair of small arms, the manufacture of some types of weapons invented locally, and the construction and handling of mines with varied mechanisms. When conditions are good, it is wise to join to this an outfit for manufacturing powder.

Someone should be in charge of communications, too. He would be not only in charge of communications relating to propaganda and with the outside world, such as the radio, but also the telephones and all types of roads, and he depends on the necessary civil organisation to carry on his job. It must be remembered that we are at war, that we can be attacked by the enemy and that, at times, many lives depend on rapid communications.

To keep the troops content, it is well to have cigar or cigarette factories. Leaf tobacco can be purchased in selected places and then brought to the free area where it can be prepared for consumption.

Another important industry is tanning. These are simple undertakings which can be carried on anywhere and are adapted to the situation of the guerillas. Tanning requires certain small concrete buildings and a great deal of salt. However, it is a tremendous advantage to the shoe-making industry to have its raw material right at hand.

Salt should be made in the territory of the revolution, concentrating it in large amounts. To make salt, it is necessary to go to areas of high saline concentration and to evaporate it.

The sea is the best source. It is not necessary to purify the salt by removing all attached impurities because it can be eaten in its simple form. However, at first it doesn't taste very good.

Meat should be preserved as jerked beef. This is simple to do and is a means of saving many lives in a serious situation. For a long time it can be preserved with salt in large barrels. It can be prepared regardless of the external situation.

Information

Intelligence, obtained by any means, and Fifth Column activities to sow terror are potent guerilla weapons.

"Know yourself and your enemy and you will be able to fight a hundred battles without defeat". This Chinese maxim is as worthwhile for guerilla war as a biblical psalm. Nothing helps a fighting force more than correct information. It should be spontaneously given by the inhabitants of the area where the army will be and it should deal with what is going on in a specific place. Moreover, it should be reliable. Women should infiltrate and make permanent contact with the enemy soldiers and slowly find out what we need to know. A co-ordinated system must be devised to permit the crossing of enemy lines into the guerilla camp without a hitch.

If this is done well and by capable agents, it will be possible to sleep sounder in the insurgent camp.

In those areas where the guerilla organisation is dominant or which it frequently visits,

all people are its information agents. Nevertheless, it is good to have people especially selected for this purpose because one cannot depend on the views of farmers, so accustomed to exaggerate and who know little of the precise language of war. One will be able to make the information machinery not only the very important auxiliary arm that it is, but also a counter-offensive agent. This can be done for example, by means of the "sowers of fear" who may move about among enemy soldiers to sow fear and instability. Mobility, the primary tactic, can be developed to the maximum. By knowing exactly the places where the enemy troops are going to attack, it is very easy to run away or, in time, to attack them in the most unexpected places.

Training and Indoctrination

Guerillas receive basic training too. Weapons firing is the heavy class but they learn other arts of war as well. And "troop information" appears — even in the field.

The very life of the guerilla leader is fundamentally the training of the liberating soldier, and no one can be a leader who has not learned his difficult job in the daily use of his arms. The soldier will be able to live with some companions who teach him something about the handling of arms, the basic notions of finding one's way, how to behave towards the civilian population, to fight, and other essentials. However, the precious time of the guerilla leader should not be wasted in the details of instruc-

tion. That happens only when there is already a large liberated area, and large numbers of soldiers are needed to perform a combat function. Then basic training centres are established.

At such times these centres perform a very important function. They produce the new soldier who has not yet passed through that great sieve of formidable privations that convert him into a real fighting man. After he has passed through this difficult test, he reaches the stage of joining the circle of a beggar army that leaves no signs of its passing on any side. There must be physical exercises, basically of two types: agile gymnastics with instruction for the commando-type war which demands agility in attack and in retreat; and violent marching which stretches the recruit to the farthest point of endurance and hardens him for this life. He must, above all, get used to life in the open air. He must suffer all the changes of weather in close contact with nature, as he will do when on guerilla operations.

The training centres must have workers who take care of its supply functions. For that purpose, there must be stables, barns, orchards, dairy herd — everything to insure that it will not become a burden on the general budget of the guerilla army. The students can be rotated in the work of supply, assigning it to the worst elements as punishment or simply on a voluntary basis.

All this depends on the characteristics peculiar to the

zone where the training centre is established. We think it is a good principle to put volunteers there and to fill up the details for necessary work with those who behave the worst or have the least aptitude for learning the art of war.

The centre must have its small health organisation, with a doctor or male nurse, as conditions allow, to provide recruits with the best possible attention.

Rifle practice is the fundamental element of instruction. The guerilla must have much training in marksmanship and must be taught to expend the least possible quantity of ammunition.

The most important part of recruit training, and which must never be neglected, is indoctrination. It is important because men come in without a clear conception of why they came; they have vague concepts of personal liberty, freedom of the press, or other logical foundations. Therefore, indoctrination must be instilled for as long a time as possible and with the greatest dedication. During these courses, the elements of the history of the country are taught and economic facts are explained clearly as well as the facts which motivated each historic event. The reaction of national heroes to certain injustices are explained; and, afterwards, the domestic situation or the situation in the area is analysed. This constitutes a single primer which can be well studied by all members of the rebel army as a guide for what will come later.

In addition, there must be a training school for teachers so they can agree on the textbooks to be used and on the experiences which each one may be able to provide in the educational aspect of the movement.

Of all measures of military training, one of the most important is disciplinary punishment. Discipline must be (it is necessary to repeat this again and again) one of the bases for the action of a guerilla force. Discipline must be, as we also said previously, a force which springs from an internal conviction and which is perfectly reasoned out. In this way, a person develops an internal discipline. When this discipline is broken, it is always necessary to punish the guilty, regardless of his position. His punishment must be drastic, and must be applied in a way that hurts.

This is important, for in a guerilla soldier loss of liberty does not manifest itself in the same way that duress affects a garrison soldier. Ten days in the guardhouse can be a wonderful rest for a guerilla soldier: he eats, he does not have to march, he does not work, there is none of the usual guard duty. He can sleep as much as he wants, he can take it easy, he can read, and so on. From this it is deduced that the deprivation of freedom under guerilla conditions is not advisable.

There are times when the combat morale of the individual is very high, and pride in himself is considerable. The deprivation of his right to bear arms can provoke positive reactions

and constitute for him a true punishment. In these cases, it is correct to apply such punishment.

Long periods of guard duty at night and forced marches can also be punishments; but the marches have the grave drawback that they are not practicable because they have no other objective than that of punishment and of tiring out the guerilla soldier. To insure such punishment requires other guards, who also get tired.

Moreover, punitive guard duty has the inconvenient aspect that others must watch the offenders.

In the forces directly under my command, I established for minor infractions the punishment of arrest with deprivation of candy and cigarettes, and total deprivation of food in the worst. Although the punishment was terrible and is advisable only under very special circumstances, the results can be wonderful.

Concluded.

To invite constant attention to the fact that vast areas of the world have lost their freedom as the result of the exercise of Soviet force and power is entirely proper, it seems to me, especially when they are talking about freedom and accusing the Western Powers of colonialism.

Actually, this is the twilight, the sunset of colonialism as we have known it, and there are few areas of the world left that are still colonial in the old sense of that word.

Meanwhile, the Soviet imperialism has been extended to cover all of Eastern Europe to the Black Sea, so that the modern colonialist is not Britain or France but the Soviet Union. I think this is something we should invite attention to whenever we have an opportunity, because it is sometimes overlooked, especially by the African powers who think of colonialists as merely those who have been former masters. They overlook entirely the position of the Soviet Union and what it has done, largely because they have had no contact with it.

— *Ambassador Adlai Stevenson*

CAUTION

OR ELAN

ADVANCE TO CONTACT

Daldolos

TACTICAL thought generally is governed by the requirement to produce "orthodox" answers for promotion examinations, written and oral. This is especially so in regard to timings, where yardsticks reign supreme. "Time and space" is undoubtedly the Cinderella of appreciations.

The narrative of the 1961 written tactics examination was a classic of its type; that this situation was used as the basis for testing officers' tactical ability shows clearly the firm grip of the doctrine of slow and sure. The situation presented a pentropic battalion group advanced guard (Mission: steam-roller minor opposition), which had made contact with, and adopted a defensive posture before what could be deduced as a company group screen (Mission: delay, and extricate itself in good order). The narrative omitted to say whether the commanding officer had been relieved of his command, however another battalion was ordered to the attack, 20 hours later, to clear the road within another 29 hours. During this farce, the enemy main position 14 miles away would be developing still

further in nearly two days of bonus delay presented to them.

This is the application of the doctrine expressed in "Pentropic Division in Battle, Part 1".

"... speed in closing up to his main position can only be achieved by continued relentless and aggressive offensive action".

The advanced guard must clear opposition with which it is capable of dealing. It must use quick and aggressive action to destroy delaying positions to avoid time consuming deployment of the main body. The formation commander must impress this need on his advanced guard commander, who in turn must demand it to a far greater degree from the vanguard commander, who really holds the key to the rate of advance.

Covering troops to the force are limited in ability to determine enemy dispositions. The force must expect dispersed and well concealed delaying forces to concentrate in the wake of the mobile troops. The vanguard cannot be allowed to precipitate itself into ambushes, committing the main guard to extricating it in costly operations from comparatively minor enemy forces;

it must move at best speed in the tactical formation appropriate to the terrain.

It is on contact that speed becomes critical. The aim of enemy delaying positions is to inflict maximum delay and damage, with minimum loss to itself in order to repeat the performance further down the line. This attitude must be capitalised on. However, when an enemy force commits itself to a Thermopylae, the prize it is shielding is a rich one indeed, demanding immediate destruction of the obstacle.

Consider a company group vanguard, in well covered terrain, making contact. Enemy intentions are known — the variable is his strength. Our identification of his weapons is inconclusive, and the vanguard

commander is faced with "one recoilless rifle, two light machine guns, plus?" The prime requirements are:—

- (a) Preservation of freedom of action of the main guard.
- (b) Prevention of a repetition on the next hill.
- (c) Speed of action.

His first reaction will therefore be to commit his point platoon and armoured troop to fire positions to:—

- (a) Form a firm base against a frontal thrust down the axis.
- (b) Attempt to move the enemy by fire.
- (c) Act as fire support if he must attack.

Simultaneously, the next platoon is despatched on a flank




FIGURE 1. CONTACT AND PROPOSED DEPLOYMENT.

march to a position in rear of the enemy as a block. The remaining two rifle platoons move to the other flank, one to secure a start line selected from map and aerial photograph, and act as reserve in the attack, the other to assault. The weapons platoon takes up positions to give fire support. With this drill in operation, the orders for the attack will be little more than confirmation of what is already happening. The fire plan at this level will be so elementary as to impose no delay waiting for its preparation.

The flank move of the platoons to their assigned areas is carried out in tactical formation, so that if the position is stronger than initial information indicates, they will make contact but retain freedom of action. If the position is of platoon strength, as the weapon identification indicates, the attack is pressed home and the enemy attempts to withdraw to a further delaying position. The rear ambush then takes its toll.

An enemy notable in ability to melt away is unlikely to be totally destroyed. The ambush should, however, break up the enemy as a cohesive force, and capture some or all of the heavier weapons. This particular force will not become a regular acquaintance as the advance progresses. Should the position prove stubborn, but still be considered by the vanguard commander to be within his capabilities, he can commit the block platoon to a rear attack.

If the enemy is in greater strength than estimated, one

or both flank forces will eventually draw further fire. When the vanguard commander realises that the battle is beyond him, he passes it back to the advanced guard commander. His responsibility does not, however, cease there; he must, as far as possible:—

- (a) Secure the front from enemy penetration.
- (b) Acquire more information for the advanced guard commander.
- (c) Provide security for main-guard manoeuvre to the flanks.
- (d) Release the armour to a forward rally for re-deployment.

The two forward flanking platoons conform to the fire support platoon, each at the same time despatching a reconnaissance patrol to feel the flanks. Thus, as the advanced guard commander takes control, the vanguard re-deploys, and seeks additional information on enemy strengths and dispositions.

In the interim, the advanced guard commander has been continually kept in the picture on the progress of the battle and all other information available, including terrain reports, by his liaison officer who is with the vanguard commander. The advanced guard commander has, therefore, by the time he receives or takes over command of the battle, completed most of his appreciation progressively and has given his preliminary orders in anticipation of an advanced guard deployment. All that is necessary is final information




FIGURE 2. FURTHER CONTACT DURING DEPLOYMENT.

from the reconnaissance patrols for the commander to confirm his orders, or, if a substantially larger force is revealed, convert the deployment for the attack into the firm base for divisional action.

This pattern of continual simultaneous action, with commanders at all levels exercising the maximum of drive and aggressiveness, taking immediate automatic action on every foreseeable requirement, can result in destruction of the enemy, not by slowly and steadily crushing him, but capitalising on his desire to reap reward at little cost, and creed of breaking off unprofitable engagements. Unusually stubborn resistance can only indicate the enemy main

body is most vulnerable and calls for our urgent violent action to close with it.

An advanced guard action in this fashion could result in resumption of the advance inside 2 or 3 hours instead of the 49 hours envisaged in the original example — a reasonable saving by any standard, and this without undue risk.

At the bottom of the scale, a great deal of trouble can result from the "single shot" type contact, where the point platoon commander has no real clue as to the size of enemy force. It is obvious that abortive platoon attacks taking 10-30 minutes to mount against a lone sniper, who has departed in the interim, are intolerable. Similarly, the lead-




FIGURE 3 REDEPLOYMENT AND RECONNAISSANCE IDENTIFICATIONS

ing section cannot be allowed to charge into the maw of an enemy company or platoon which has held its fire for just that reason. If the platoon commander has reason to suspect that the enemy is in section strength or less, he must immediately go through the same deployment drill for a quick attack as did the vanguard commander:—

- (a) Commit fire support element to a firm base.
- (b) Attempt to move by fire, and at the same time —
 - (i) Despatch long hook right (left).
 - (ii) Despatch short hook left (right).
- (c) Assault.
- (d) Ambush remnants.

Alternatively, if the position is found to be stronger than originally met the ear, the platoon commander, instead of assaulting should—

- (e) Despatch reconnaissance patrols.
- (f) Hand over to the vanguard commander.
- (g) Re-group on the firm base.

To avoid wasting time in pressing home the attack, if the attempt to move (or kill) by fire is unsuccessful and as the platoon deploys for the attack, the fire support section does not just await H Hour. The section commander works his men forward into better fire positions, advancing by fire and movement along the axis if the lightness or

lack of opposition allows him to do so. This in itself will break one or two man opposition. The engagement will be over inside a couple of minutes and the platoon called back to the advance. If, on the other hand, weapons of section strength reveal themselves, and the fire section is stopped, the platoon is already deploying for the attack and no time is lost.

In all this, the only time consuming element is that of movement of troops over the ground. It is obvious that ground, and obstacles not apparent from maps or air photos will sometimes militate against the full employment of the drills. However, at the very worst, this deployment will provide valuable reconnaissance, if a larger scale deployment becomes necessary, on which to base planning.

THE AMF GOLD MEDAL AND AACS PRIZE ESSAY

The subjects for the 1962 AMF Gold Medal and AACS Prize Essay are:—

Senior Section (Substantive majors and above) —

“The continuance of Communist revolutionary warfare in South East Asia is a threat to Australia’s security and it is possible that the AMF could become involved in counter-insurgency operations in South Vietnam. Give your views on how an Australian force of one battle group should be organised, trained and equipped if it were decided to employ such a force in South Vietnam”.

Junior Section (Members of the AMF up to and including substantive captains).

“The technique of short-range vertical envelopment using fixed and rotary wing aircraft is rapidly becoming prominent as a tactical concept. How can this concept be applied to both anti-insurgency and limited war operations in South East Asia”.

Entries close with the Secretary, Military Board, AHQ, Canberra on 1st November, 1962. Entries, which must be typewritten and submitted in quadruplicate, must be strictly anonymous. Each competitor will adopt a motto and enclose with his essay a sealed envelope with his motto and the section identification on the outside and his name and address inside.

Strategic Review

AGREEMENT IN LAOS

THE "agreement" between the rival factions in the troubled kingdom of Laos has probably led many people to suppose that the triangular dispute has at last been settled and that stability has been restored. These hopes seem to be based on the calculation that Moscow is anxious to avoid the development of a Korean situation in Laos, and that Peking, in view of the serious setbacks to the programme in Communist China, is in no position to intervene. While these calculations may or may not be correct, the fact remains that the coalition produced by the agreement does not appear to be a workable government.

The neutralist Prince Souvanna Phouma takes the portfolios of Prime Minister and Minister for Defence. However, no formula seems to have been worked out for the unification, or even for the effective control, of Phouma's own Right-wing forces or for the Communist Pathet Lao guerillas. Until these rival military factions are brought under effective centralised control there can be no guarantee that they will not continue their activities.

While the Ministry of Education goes to the Right-wing, the

Ministry of Information goes to the Left. Since the former requires much time for its activities to produce their effects, while the latter, through its control of the organs of public information, can spread its gospel immediately, the advantage here would seem to lie with the Communists.

The Right-wing General Phoumi Nosovan as Finance Minister will have control of the Treasury, but the Communist Prince Souphanowong, as Minister for Economic Affairs, will have a big say in how the money will be spent, or ought to be spent. This "balance" of interests will probably result in nothing being done to improve the economic conditions of the people, which is the crux of the whole problem.

Nevertheless, there are some grounds for hoping that the agreement may produce a temporary settlement at any rate. By the promptitude of her reactions to the threat to Thailand and her actions in South Vietnam, the United States has made it clear that she is not going to be thrust willy-nilly out of this area, and that she is not going to abandon the people who rely on her support. These actions may well have shown Moscow

and Peking that their chances of gathering the sort of dividends they are seeking have receded for the time being. Nevertheless, the freedom with which the North Vietnamese are able to reinforce and supply through southern Laos the Viet Cong in South Vietnam will have to be stopped in order to remove the threat to Thailand and to enable economic betterment in South Vietnam to proceed. Probably a decisive military defeat is the only method of persuading the Viet Cong to give up the struggle, and in guerilla warfare that is usually a long and costly process.

Portuguese Africa

The "slant" usually given to the news about the Portuguese possessions in Africa creates the impression that colonialism of the worst type is still being practised there. A long report recently published by the International Labour Office, one of the oldest and most effective organs of the United Nations, throws a somewhat different light on the subject.

In 1961 Ghana complained to the ILO that the international agreement to abolish forced labour, ratified by the Portu-

guese Government in 1959, was not being adhered to in Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea. The ILO promptly appointed a committee of inquiry, consisting of a Swiss, a Uruguayan and a Senegalese. After hearing evidence from both Portugal and Ghana, the committee made extensive first-hand inquiries in the territories concerned.

In their report the members of the committee categorically rejected the charge that the Portuguese signed the forced labour agreement in bad faith in order to be able to continue their "brutal labour policy" under its cover. The members state that they were permitted to go where they liked, see what they liked, and talk with whom they liked. They found no evidence of forced labour in the territories they visited. On the contrary they were impressed by the industrial developments and economic improvements they observed.

It remains to be seen whether this report will be given the same publicity as reports derogatory of Portuguese administration have received.

— E.G.K.

ARTILLERY IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA

1840 - 1960

Lieutenant D. N. Brook,
Royal Australian Artillery

THE first volunteer military units were formed in South Australia in 1840. Although several cavalry and infantry units were formed in that year, Reedbeds Cavalry for example, there are no records of any drills or other training taking place. The formation of an artillery unit was considered, but it was decided to await the arrival of guns from England.

In 1854, with the Crimean War in progress, the Volunteer Military Forces Act gave fresh impetus to the volunteer movement. An Artillery Corps of two companies was formed with Captain A. H. Freeling, RE, the Surveyor-General, in command with the local rank of lieutenant colonel. The establishment of the Corps was 1 lieutenant colonel, 2 captains, 4 lieutenants, 3 sergeants, 3 corporals and 100-120 gunners.

The first parade was held on 11th November, 1854, at 1700 hours. Later the parades were held on Mondays at 1630 hours.

In 1855 the fear of a Russian invasion passed, and the Corps was disbanded in February of the following year.

The volunteer movement was revived in 1859, and the Adelaide and Port Adelaide Artillery Companies were formed. In addition, the Defence Committee recommended that a 6-gun battery of Royal Artillery be brought out from the United Kingdom at an estimated cost of £7,421/4/11. The Committee further recommended that the volunteers be equipped with six heavy guns and that three British instructors be brought out to train them. At this time the weapons in South Australia were:—

- Two 9-pr. guns,
- Four 6-pr. guns,
- Two 24-pr. howitzers,
- Two 4.4-in. mortars,
- Twelve carronades (ships' guns),
- 2,000 Enfield rifles,
- 500 muskets,
- 1,000 cavalry swords.

Apparently no Royal Artillery personnel could be spared from the United Kingdom, for neither the battery nor the instructors were sent out. The South Australian Government called tenders for the supply of ten guns and got them for £5,200. The



Colonel L. B. Matthews, South Australian Field Artillery, 1900.

strength of the Corps on 3rd June, 1860, was 4 officers and 85 other ranks. £250 was voted for the 1860 ammunition supply — seventy-five 1½ lbs. blank rounds.

By 1865 the strength of the Artillery Companies had dropped to 39, all part-time volunteers serving without pay. In that year a commission was appointed by the Governor, Sir Domnick Daly, to report upon the usefulness of the South Australian defence forces. The commission recommended the purchase of the equipment for a complete battery of field artillery, the raising of an Artillery Corps of 200 part-time volunteers and the loan of 50 instructors from the Royal Artillery. The volunteers were to be called up for full time duty at certain times of the year. The commission also found that there was little incentive for volunteers to join the artillery, since they were not issued with a rifle, the work was generally more laborious than that of the other arms, and they had to purchase an expensive uniform. Further, accurate firing practice was impossible with the old smooth-bore guns.

Very little seems to have been done to give effect to the commission's recommendations, but in 1868 the artillery was reorganised to form the South Australian Volunteer Artillery of 1 and 2 Companies.

By 1870 the Volunteer Military Forces existed on paper only, and the strength of each company was down to a half battery. From 1872 to 1876 there were no volunteer forces at all.

However, in 1877, with the Russo-Turkish War in progress, military training was started again and the two artillery companies were reformed.

On 3rd May, 1877, Major F. M. Downes, RA, took over the re-organisation of the Volunteer Defence Forces. The two artillery companies became "A" Battery (Field) and "B" Battery (Garrison).¹ The plans for Fort Largs were drawn up, and the fort was to be occupied by "B" Battery. Fort Glanville was also considered about this time, and eventually a ring of forts was established from Largs Bay to Glenelg.

The Permanent Artillery was formed in 1882, and for many years these troops constituted the only full-time military force in South Australia. These troops were stationed at Fort Glanville. Fort Largs was completed in 1883 at a cost of £86,000. The first guns were two 9-in. muzzle loaders.

In 1896 "A" Battery had its headquarters in the area behind the present Art Gallery, and the staff office is still standing. The Childrens' Library is now housed there. The Battery was armed with four 16-pr. RML guns which fired HE and shrapnel, and the personnel wore a navy-blue uniform with white helmets.

In 1899 Torrens Parade Ground was established, and from it forty members of "A" Battery left for service as mounted infantry in the South African War. They must have acquitted themselves very well for they collected three DSOs


1. S.A. Government Gazette Vol. 1, 3rd May, 1877.

between them. At one stage during this war every officer of "A" Battery was on active service, and the Battery was commanded by the medical officer, with the result that manoeuvres often became a little confused.

In 1902 the South Australian Government bought two 6-in.

breech-loading guns for Fort Largs and six 15 pounders for "A" Battery.

After 1902, when the Commonwealth Government assumed responsibility for Australian defence, "A" Battery became No. 1 S.A. Battery, Australian Field



South Australian Artillery, Government House Guard 1890. Taken at Adelaide Barracks.



Officer A Battery, South Australian Field Artillery, 1882.



South Australian Field Artillery 1885.

Artillery, of 13th Brigade.² When the Battery was issued with 18-pr. guns before the outbreak of war in 1914, the 15 pounders were sent to the Royal Military College, Duntroon, where many of the first class of Staff Cadets used them for gun drill.

In 1911 No. 1 S.A. Battery became 13 Battery, AFA.³ At the Christmas-New Year period each year the Battery went into camp at Granite Island, Victor Harbour, and fired out to sea, the OP being on the Bluff. Other camps were held at Smithfield, Morgan and Nairne. General Sir Cyril Brudenell White, then a captain, was the gunnery instructor of the Battery at this time.

On 1st July, 1914, 13 Battery was divided into two batteries, the 34th and the 35th.⁴ When World War I broke out 18 Battery AIF was formed from these two units and went overseas, landing at Suez on 12th December, 1915. During the war 18 Battery won over 40 decorations and fired some 146,260 rounds. The Battery was disbanded in Belgium on 24th February, 1919.

Many South Australian gunners served in 13 Field Brigade, AFA, raised at Tel-el-Kebir on 9th March, 1916. This unit was commanded by Colonel H. O. Caddy, CMG, DSO, VD, and served in France in 1916-18 as part of the 5th Divisional Artillery.

During the war Fort Largs and Fort Glanville were used as prisoner of war camps.

On 12th March, 1921, 18 Battery became 49 Battery and

joined 50 and 113 (How) Batteries in 13 Field Brigade, AFA.⁵ 48 Battery, which belonged to 22 Cavalry Brigade, was attached for administration. All units were manned by troops called up under the universal service provisions of the Defence Act until 1929 when voluntary service was introduced.

A short time before the outbreak of World War II the title "Regiment" was substituted for "Brigade" but the exact date of the change cannot be traced.

When World War II broke out the Regiment went into camp at Woodside for continuous training. On 28th April, 1940, the commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel T. C. Eastick, was ordered to form a new regiment, the 2/7th, for service overseas with the 2nd AIF. During the war several more regiments had their beginnings in 13 Regiment, eg, 2/3 and 2/14 Field Regiments and 29 Anti-Tank Regiment.

In December, 1941, 13 Field Regiment went to New Guinea where, after a period of coast defence duties, it fought with 6 Division in the Dobodura area.

The Regiment was reformed in 1948 when the Citizen Military Forces were reconstituted. Most of the officers who joined at this time had been pre-war members of the Regiment which consisted of "P," "Q" and "R" Batteries. The recent (Pentropic) reorganisation has eliminated "R" Battery.

2. Military Order 254/1907.
3. Military Order 57/1911.
4. Military Order 313/1914.
5. Military Order 95/1921.



SOUTH EAST ASIA, by Bruce Petty (Grayflower Publications, 117 Collins Street, Melbourne).

As the title says, the book is about South East Asia, but apart from a series of short explanatory paragraphs, the book is all drawings.

Mr. Petty has been a contributor to the famous British Journal "Punch", which of course is a humorous paper. Contributors are liable to get a permanent label of "cartoonist" or "humorous artist". None of the drawings in this book are cartoons and it is remarkable that a man who can crack "Punch", which is not easy to do (though they do have a charming way of refusing contributions) can draw with so much feeling.

It is the aim of all artists to achieve a style and Mr. Petty has done this. However, all the drawings are not in one style. A remarkable fact is that the majority of the departures are in cases where politics are depicted. This, perhaps, will give psychiatrists food for thought.

The book is divided into sections covering a particular aspect, such as People, Religion, Children and the various South East Asian countries are represented in each section.

Children appear a lot in the book and Mr. Petty has been able

to capture that approach of great concentration and other worldliness which is so often evident when children play — particularly alone with such mundane things as bits of wood or even old French ammunition.

In the religion section there are some delightful, simple, touching drawings of prayer positions and impressions of Hindu gods which, other than Shiva, so often tend to be grotesque.

The Australian Army, represented by 6 platoon, "B" Company, I RAR, is strikingly depicted whilst anti-guerilla operations are realistically portrayed.

When one travels one remembers incidents that occurred. Single, simple happenings that impress themselves and form a kaleidoscopic whole impression of a place. The average traveller who has not the skill or patience to sketch the incident eventually forgets it. Mr. Petty had the skill and the patience to sketch and this book is a record of these little incidents, things a camera can seldom capture. Little impressions, such as an Indonesian spectacle-frame maker at work, a Thai boxing match and a woman carrying a child on the hip. There is an amazing, bold impression of a cock fight that will really hit anyone who has

seen such a match, and when Mr. Petty gets on to politics one can sense the somewhat bitter satirical feeling that imbued him when he was drawing.

The book is introduced by Ronald Searle, the creator of the famous St. Trinian's characters. Mr. Searle once published a book of drawings on Paris of which, in many ways, Bruce Petty's drawings are very reminiscent.

This book is a jewel. An ordinary travel book is read, perhaps referred to again, lent and sometimes forgotten. The beauty of this one is that one can always dip into it and get renewed enjoyment, each time discovering something that had been passed over previously, seeing new movement in the Thai dancers, finding new smells in the market places.

The endpaper drawing, depicting a near-empty Australia overshadowed by the teeming life of Asia, conveys a more powerful message than a whole library of printed words.

Soldiers and their families who have served in South East Asia will find this book a delightful reminder of their sojourn there. Mr. Petty's sketches will recall many of the sights over which they wept or laughed and may, perhaps, give to their own observations a deeper appreciation of Asian life.

Grayflower Publications are to be congratulated, not only for selecting this work for their first venture in the publishing field, but for the really excellent way in which they have presented Mr. Petty's sketches.

— G.M.C.

GUERRILLA WARFARE ON THE AMBER COAST, by K. V. Taurus (Voyages Press, 35 West 75th Street, New York City 23, USA).

For a good many years now the Western World has been engaged in a life and death struggle with the forces of atheistic Communism. While the vital issues at stake are being largely fought out in the ideological and economic fields, armed conflict is taking place in various places around the periphery of the free world. Generally this conflict takes the form of guerilla warfare in one or more of its manifestations.

Recently we have become acutely aware of the dangers of peripheral guerilla wars being waged by our enemies, particularly in the South East Asia region. In our preoccupation with the study of the methods being employed against us we tend to overlook the fact that the Communists are not the only ones who have practised guerilla warfare in modern times, that sectors of the free world have engaged in this form of conflict.

This book tells the story of the guerilla struggle waged by the Lithuanian people against the Soviet occupying forces. That they eventually had to abandon the struggle was due primarily to the fact that they received no support from outside. The Lithuanian guerilla movement was never short of volunteers but, completely cut off from the outside world, its supply of munitions gradually dwindled until it had nothing left to fight with.

The highly developed nature of the country, the lack of space in which to manoeuvre and the scarcity of areas inaccessible to conventional forces, did not provide the conditions in which guerillas usually thrive. Despite these disadvantages, the Lithuanians gave the Soviet forces a pretty lively time and scored many notable successes. But they never had any chance of scoring a Dien Bien Phu or of capturing enough weapons to enable them to continue the struggle.

The book is of interest in that it depicts guerilla warfare waged under physical conditions far different from those to which we are giving so much attention. The author demonstrates the different techniques employed by a Western community, techniques which after all are but another facet of a form of warfare with which we are deeply concerned.

More importantly, perhaps, the author shows that Communist fanaticism is not an essential motivating force for guerillas. He shows that when his freedom is at stake, Western man is quite capable of doing all that the Communist can do.

— E.G.K.

BATTLE FOR CRETE, by John Hall Spencer. (William Heinemann Ltd, London and 317 Collins Street, Melbourne).

The battle for Crete was the first major engagement in which a completely successful assault was delivered solely by airborne troops. Since this feat has never been repeated, the battle is a unique episode in military ex-

perience. And, since airborne forces figure so prominently in modern military thinking, Crete provides the soldier with a fruitful source of study and inspiration, both from the point of view of their employment and from the point of view of defence against them.

In October 1940 the Italian forces in Albania invaded Greece but their offensive soon bogged down in the face of fierce resistance. In accordance with their treaty obligations, the British sent a few air squadrons to support the Greeks, the only force they had readily available at the time. Soon afterwards information of the German build-up in eastern Europe began to come in and it was by no means certain whether or not the enemy was contemplating a southward thrust through the Balkans and Turkey. Early in 1941 the British Government decided that it was necessary to secure the island of Crete and to send a military force from the Middle East to stiffen the Greek resistance against the expected German attack. Hitler, fairly well informed on the progress of the negotiations, concluded that he would have to eliminate the potential threat to his flank before launching his offensive against Russia.

From the beginning it was apparent that the force which could be sent to Greece would be perilously small, and the Government ordered urgent measures to strengthen the defences of Crete. Towards the end of March, 6 Australian Division, 1 New Zealand Division and 1

Armoured Brigade began arriving in Greece. On 6th April Hitler struck before the British force had been fully deployed. Even if it had been standing ready to receive the blow the odds were hopeless. By the third week of the month withdrawal was decided upon, and in the fourth week the British formations, after a long and difficult retreat, were being evacuated by the Royal Navy, leaving practically all their equipment except personal weapons behind.

The powerful and rapid German pursuit, their overwhelming air superiority, indifferent army planning, the fuelling requirements of the ships engaged and other factors all combined to make the evacuation very much of a scramble. Many units became mixed up; some ships landed their troops on Crete, some went on to Egypt, irrespective of the formation to which their passengers belonged. Consequently it was a pretty motley throng that a scratch and inexperienced staff under General Freyberg had to sort out on Crete. It might not have been so bad if the Government's orders had been carried out. But they had not; practically nothing had been done to put Crete in a state of defence.

The Germans gave Freyberg little time to sort out the muddle, form units out of the heterogeneous collection of troops and prepare his defences. On 20th May, after days of intensive air bombardment, the parachutists and glider borne troops landed at three points on the island. Ten days later Crete, and some 10,000

British prisoners were in their hands.

Crete was one of the hardest fought battles of the war, a close-in desperate struggle in which for a time victory could have fallen to either side. The author cleverly pieces the story together from many points of view; from those of the opposing commanders and staffs planning and directing the operations, and from the personal accounts of many individuals who participated in them. The personal experiences of attackers and defenders stand side by side, soldiers, sailors and airmen.

If this method is not altogether conducive to a meticulous tactical examination of the operation, it has the great merit of enabling the reader to taste the full flavour of the battle. Tactical studies seldom bring out the all-important human aspects of the struggle — the crushing effects of intensive air bombardment, the paralysis engendered by surprise, the confusion and the uncertainty, the rush of events and the lost opportunities. To feel these things, as the author makes you feel them in this book, is to have learnt a great deal about any battle, and particularly a battle in which you have to attack from the air or defend yourself against troops landed from the air. In the final analysis all battles are won, not by the planners, but by the men who fight them. And this was a soldier's battle if ever there was one.

In addition to his vivid description of the fighting, and of what the participants thought

and felt during the fighting, Mr. Spencer tells of the confused negotiations between the British and Greek Governments which led to the expedition to Greece, and of the misunderstandings between the Chiefs of Staff in London and the commanders in the Middle East over the decision to defend Crete. Although he does not go so far as to say that the battle was lost before it was joined, he shows that sloth and inefficiency in preparing the island's defences placed the troops at a very considerable disadvantage from the very beginning.

Why on earth the author and publishers failed to include a few more simple sketch maps is a mystery. Two or three more simple drawings would have made the text so much easier to follow. Still, it is a good book for all that.

— E.G.K.

THE SPYCATCHER OMNIBUS, the Spy and Counter Spy Adventures of Lieutenant Colonel Oreste Pinto, by Lieutenant Colonel Oreste Pinto. (Hodder and Stoughton Ltd, London and 425 Little Collins Street, Melbourne).

If you have any intentions, or even dreams of becoming a spy, or of joining the counter-intelligence service, or if you are merely looking for some good travel or bed-time reading, this is the book for you. It is at once a text book for spies and counter-spies and thoroughly good entertainment.

In 1908 Oreste Pinto, a young Dutchman, was sent to Paris by his father to study philosophy at

the Sorbonne. In Paris he became very friendly and shared an apartment with a Frenchman of about his own age. Eventually the Frenchman revealed that he was employed by the Deuxieme Bureau, the French intelligence organisation, and invited him to participate in the work. Pinto agreed and received his apprenticeship in counter-intelligence work in France before World War I. Then, on completion of his studies, he married an English girl and settled down in England. However, when war broke out in 1914 his French friend got in touch with him and persuaded him to work for the Bureau throughout the conflict. When World War II broke out in 1939 Pinto joined the British intelligence service and worked mostly on counter-espionage activities, and when the Allies landed in Europe he transferred to the Dutch intelligence service.

In the course of his long experience, Colonel Pinto learnt most of the tricks of the game, particularly the science of interrogation. In speaking of this science, the Colonel feels that the really competent interrogator has no need for brain-washing or torture. Patience and an infinite capacity for detail almost invariably get more reliable results. He gives an extensive set of rules for interrogation officers, and illustrates their practical application in his accounts of some of the numerous interrogations he conducted.

Colonel Pinto is at some pains to point out that in great alliances national jealousies often operate against effective

counter-intelligence work. To illustrate this point he quotes at some length the case of Christain Lindemans, at one time a prominent figure in the underground Resistance movement in German-occupied Holland.

When the Allies were advancing towards the Rhine Lindemans turned up on their side of the lines. A chance encounter led Pinto to have a closer look at Lindemans' clandestine activities. One clue led to another until Pinto very strongly suspected that Lindemans, while acting as a Dutch Resistance leader, was actually working for the enemy. Meanwhile British 21 Army Group had asked the Dutch Headquarters if they could provide a reliable man to prepare the local Dutch Resistance men to co-operate with the airborne troops about to be dropped at Arnhem. By the time this information reached Pinto, Lindemans had left on his mission and it was too late to do anything even if he could have got anyone to believe the evidence against the Resistance hero. From further evidence he collected afterwards, Pinto maintains that the presence of strong German forces at the scene of the parachute drop was due solely to Lindemans' treachery. Later, Pinto had Lindemans arrested and the British interrogators extracted from him a full confession. Nevertheless there was much opposition to bringing to trial the former Resistance leader, and in the end Lindemans committed suicide before his guilt was formally proved in a court of law. Colonel Pinto has no faith in the espionage abilities

of women, as distinct from their value as Resistance workers. He tells one long story to prove his point and, like most of his other stories, you are not sure whether the person under suspicion is one of ours or one of theirs until the very end. Which is exactly what good spy stories ought to be like.

—E.G.K.

THE NEW GERMANY AND THE OLD NAZIS, by T. H. Tetens. (Martin Secker and Warburg, London, and William Heinemann Ltd, 317 Collins Street, Melbourne).

The inhabitants of countries with long democratic traditions are prone to believe that any people can become a democracy by simply getting rid of whatever other system of rule they have been accustomed to, and providing themselves with the necessary political machinery. Events since the liquidation of the old colonial empires have shown that there is a world of difference between setting up the institutions and making them work. Quite apart from the fact that true democracy is much more than a political machine, several practical difficulties stand squarely in the road towards a really successful fulfilment of the experiment. Not the least of these difficulties are the characteristics of the people and the vested interests of the old regime.

For democracy to be successful its essence must be understood and appreciated by the mass of the people. Too readily we assume that other people will gladly embrace democracy if

given the opportunity. We fail to see that some people may have a totally different approach to life, that they may neither understand nor appreciate democratic institutions. When this is the case the adherents of the old regime have, of course, a much better chance of maintaining their interests, though perhaps in a modified form.

In this book the author sets out to demonstrate that the German people have little real attachment to democracy and that, consequently, it has not been difficult for very many Nazis to regain positions of influence and power in the new republic. He presents us with a formidable mass of documented evidence to suggest that the Nazi organisation is by no means defunct, and that anti-Semitism is still a force in Germany.

According to the evidence he produces, the Nazi party still lives on in the guise of numerous superficially innocent organisations, and still dreams and works for an eventual return to power. Against this evidence we should balance the fact that the conditions which made the original rise of the Nazis possible do not obtain today.

Without more intimate knowledge of the Germany of today one cannot express an opinion on the validity of Mr. Tetens' presentation. Before forming an opinion one would like to see some evidence from the other side. In the meantime one can only say that Mr. Tetens has written a book which must at least be disturbing to everyone with the peace and stability of Europe at heart.

—E.G.K.
