AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

A Periodical Review of Military Literature

Number 158

July, 1962

Distribution:
The Journal is issued through Base Ordnance Depots on the scale of One per Officer, Officer of Cadets, and Cadet Under Officer.
The AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL is printed and published for the Directorate of Military Training by Renown Press Pty. Ltd.

Contributions, which should be addressed to The Editor, Australian Army Journal, Army Headquarters, Albert Park Barracks, Melbourne, are invited from all ranks of the Army, Cadet Corps and Reserve of Officers. £5 will be paid to the author of the best article published in each issue. In addition, annual prizes of £30 and £10 respectively to the authors gaining first and second places for the year.
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The views expressed in the articles in this Journal are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent General Staff opinion or policy.
DERNA 1941

Towards the end of 1940 a powerful Italian Army on the western frontier of Egypt was preparing to advance into the Nile Delta, capture Alexandria and the Suez Canal, and link up with the Italian forces in East Africa.

Although he had available only a fraction of the Italian strength, the British Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal Lord Wavell, determined to anticipate his opponent's offensive. Early in December, with not much more than one armoured and one infantry division he suddenly pounced on the Italian fortified camps and rolled them up from south to north. 6 Australian Division was then brought forward to play the principal role in the capture of the strong fortresses of Bardia and Tobruk.

Wavell lost no time in launching his pursuit. While 6 Australian Division followed up the retreating enemy along the coast, the few tanks of 7 Armoured Division still in working order moved by an inland route and cut the Italian's line of retreat. This operation, which is rated as one of the most successful pursuits in history, completed the total destruction of the Italian Army in Libya.

The picture shows Australian infantry moving up towards an Italian rearguard position near Derna in January 1941.
THE
MALAYAN CAMPAIGN
1941-42

THE JAPANESE THRUST DOWN
THE GRIK ROAD
DECEMBER, 1941

Lieutenant Colonel S. P. Weir, M.C.
Royal Australian Infantry

This is the third of four articles which deal with the operations studied by I RAR, during their recent tour in North Malaya. In this particular study the area is very well known to all members of the battalion.

Japanese Landing

Simultaneous with the Japanese landings at Singora and Kota Bahru on 8th December, 42 Regimental Group was landed at Patani midway between them. There was some fairly strong resistance to the initial landing but this was quickly overcome and the advanced guard was soon speeding on its way to the Malayan frontier at Betong.

42 Regiment, one of the four regiments of 5 Infantry Division, was amongst the best in the Japanese Army. It had achieved a high reputation in the war in China and was well fitted for its task of seizing intact, within a week, the bridges over the Perak at Kuala Kangsar. This would both speed the advance south and cut off 11 Division in North Malaya. The Regimental Commander was a skilful and experienced leader, and he had attached to his headquarters a senior staff officer from Army Headquarters. Two light tank companies, each of 10 8-ton tanks, an artillery battery of eight 75 millimetre guns and a section of engineers were attached to the Regiment for the operation.

British Preparations and Reaction

Anticipating the possibility of a Japanese thrust from Patani through Kroph, it was planned to delay the Japanese at a suitable defensive position known as "The Ledge", about 30 miles inside Thailand. The force earmarked for this role with Kroph-column, as it was called, was 3/16 Punjab from 15 Brigade, 5/14 Punjab from the Penang Garrison, a mountain battery and an anti-tank battery from 11 Division artillery.

Before the war this force had prepared a two battalion defensive position astride the Baling road 3 miles West of Kroph. There was still ample evidence of this strong position 20 years later.
Engineers had also prepared for demolition the narrow road running south to Grik.

At 1330 hours on 8th December Krohcol was ordered to occupy The Ledge. When the order to advance was received only 3/16 Punjab was ready to move, the remainder of the force had not been assembled. The battalion started alone, crossed the frontier about 1500 hours, and to their dismay immediately ran into road blocks manned by about 300 Thai troops. After much delay they halted for the night about three miles inside Thailand. Progress next day was even slower, and after Thai resistance ceased suddenly in the afternoon the column occupied Betong, 7 miles from Kroh, for the night. On the 10th, two sections of the 2/3 Australian Reserve Motor Transport Company were used to rush 3/16 Punjab to The Ledge. Five miles short of it the leading company, now on foot, was fired on. They had lost the race to The Ledge and were now set upon by the tanks and lorried infantry in the Japanese advanced guard who had covered 75 miles in about 60 hours. The battle continued in that area for the rest of the day and 3/16 Punjab, with two companies cut off, took up a defensive position for the night behind a road bridge they had demolished. Meanwhile the other battalion of the column, 5/14 Punjab (less one company), had arrived at Kroh with the mountain battery. They were ordered to a defensive position about 12 miles behind the 3/16.

Next day one of the missing companies of 3/16 Punjab rejoined the battalion; the other was lost. Successive attacks in strength during the afternoon were repulsed by the Punjabs in their position near The Ledge, but at the cost of heavy casualties, and outflanking movements were threatening the position. The depleted battalion withdrew through 5/14 Punjab on the afternoon of the 12th and moved back to Kroh. It was at this juncture that Major General Murray-Lyon, one hundred miles away at Alor Star, received the news that only 350 men of 3/16 Punjab had reached Kroh. The speed and weight of the Japanese thrust by 42 Regiment had now become a real threat to his communications.

Following up his successes on the 12th, the enemy quickly made contact during the night of the 12th/13th, with 5/14 Punjab in their position north of Betong. To avoid becoming too heavily engaged this battalion withdrew about midday on the 13th to Betong, from where, after destroying the road bridge, it moved to join 3/16 Punjab in the prepared defensive position just west of Kroh. This withdrawal uncovered the road running south from the village of Kroh through Grik to link with the main west coast road at Kuala Kangsar.

The Kroh-Kuala Kangsar Road

The 30 miles of road between Kroh and Grik was a narrow unmetalled track fit only for use by light motor vehicles in dry weather. Five miles of it was, and still is, a private road
through the bare Klian Intan tin mountain area. Here one can still see the concrete pipes which were sunk into the road before the war as demolition chambers. The road denial opportunities in that area were very great, but were never used. The rest of the road to Grik wound its narrow way through dense jungle and a few small patches of rubber.

South of Grik the road was a narrow laterite strip which for the most part wound its way through thick jungle. It was not in good condition and was badly drained. It passed through many defiles. In 1941 there was only about one third of the padi cultivation which exists today, and very little rubber had been planted.

From Grik south the road follows the Perak Valley and consequently is separated from the west coast by a high, rugged mountain range.

The Japanese Turn South

On 14th December while part of the Japanese force secured Kroh and brought pressure against the two battalions to the west, the remainder turned south down the mountain track. The advanced guard moved off without its vehicles, and without the two companies of light tanks which were with the force. Some of the troops rode bicycles, others towed mortars and machine guns in hand carts, whilst the gunners pulled a few of the light guns with dragropes.

By the 13th the new danger to the III Corps communications had been appreciated and General Heath ordered a small force to Grik.

Next day C Company of 2 Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, commanded by Major Kennard, with one armoured car and one 3-inch mortar drove the 100 miles from Ipoh to Grik to reinforce the weak force of volunteers and engineers already there.

2 Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders

It is an opportune time to give a brief description of this fine battalion. It arrived in Malaya in 1939 as part of 12 Indian Brigade and promptly set about a vigorous training programme in jungle warfare. Under its enterprising commander, Lieutenant Colonel Stewart, it made good progress, and when war came was easily the best trained of the British and Indian battalions. Their interest in the jungle had earned for them the nickname "Jungle Beasts".

In December, 1941, their organisation included four rifle companies each of three platoons, and a fifth company of recruits. There were four 3-inch mortars in the mortar platoon, and the Anti-aircraft and Pioneer platoons were up to strength. In addition to their 16 carriers they had seven armoured cars in a combined Armoured Car/Carrier Platoon. Four of the cars were Lancasters with two Vickers machine guns and one .5-inch anti-tank machine gun; the other three were Marmon-Harringtons each with one Vickers and an anti-tank rifle.

Colonel Stewart in his History of 2 A & SH says that: "Used as mobile forts, these armoured cars became the framework on
which the battalion tactics were built up”. Another feature of their tactics was that they were trained to fight in self-contained dispersed company groups of varying composition, controlled by directives rather than by detailed orders, each company group ready to form a firm base if attacked, or if not engaged to strike at any enemy attacking another group.

It was a company of this battalion then that had been rushed up the Grik Road to delay any Japanese advance south.

The Initial Delaying Battle

On 14th December 13 platoon of C Company 2 A & SH took up a position at Kampong Krunei about 12 miles north of Grik. They dug weapon pits, prepared the bridge behind them for blowing and lived in the mosque while they waited for the Japanese. Late on the morning of the 16th the leading Japanese scouts on bicycles approached the position and were fired on. One was killed and the platoon withdrew to a new position near the 104 milestone blowing the bridge behind them. Contact was soon made with the new position and after a skirmish lasting about an hour the Japanese withdrew. When they attacked about an hour later 13 Platoon had withdrawn to a new ambush position about 2 miles from Grik. Here another successful ambush including the armoured car was sprung. Grik was abandoned that same day and the company fell back to a new ambush position about 3 miles south.

Next day there was contact again about midday and after a short fire fight the withdrawal continued in a longer bound. This was fortunate, as a company of Japanese led by a fifth columnist had moved quickly along a jungle path to cut behind the British at Kampong Kenayat. Late that afternoon a platoon, whilst withdrawing after engaging the Japanese near Bukit Nak San, was attacked from the air.

The Corps Commander on the 17th decided that the thrust down the Grik road was by a large Japanese force moving rapidly to cut his communications. He promptly ordered 1 Independent Company (one British and three Indian platoons) to assist the hard-pressed company of the Argylls.

At about 0500 hours on the 18th the bridge at Lawin was blown and the British forces, now strengthened by the arrival of the Independent Company, occupied a position south of Lawin. Another vigorous Japanese attack forced a further withdrawal, this time to Sumpitan. In the delaying battle 13 Platoon was cut off and lost, but their sacrifice had allowed the rest of the force to dig in behind the small stream at Sumpitan, and thus be strong enough to repel the Japanese attack about 1600 hours that afternoon. I Independent Company had suffered heavily in this fighting. Both sides patrolled vigorously during the night.

The Argyll’s at Sumpitan

Meanwhile General Heath had decided late on the 17th to take 12 Brigade under his own command and move it direct to
Kuala Kangsar to stop the enemy advance down the Grik Road.

By the time Lieutenant Colonel Stewart reached Lenggong at about 0700 hours on the 19th, a troop of four 4.5 howitzers was in position to support the force at Sumpitan. The CO had orders to deny the approach from Grik to Kuala Kangsar for an unspecified time, the timing to depend on the withdrawal of 11 Division past Kuala Kangsar. (This was thought to be 3 or 4 days).

The rest of the Argylls reached Lenggong at about 0830 hours in trucks of the 2/3 Australian Reserve Motor Transport Company and moved forward to join C Company at Sumpitan 5 miles north. By 1130 hours D Company group had cleared the Japanese from south of the creek and took up a position on high ground south of the road bend 200 yards from the bridge which was held by the Japanese. The remainder of the battalion deployed in Company groups in depth down the road.

About 1430 hours an attempt was made by carriers and armoured cars to retake the bridge but it was called off when a tree across the road halted forward movement. The Japanese were actively probing around the flanks and the CO, whose new orders were to hold Kota Tampan for as long as possible, withdrew the battalion at last light to a position two miles south. A Company group dug in at the road fork a mile and a half north of Lenggong, B and D Companies were at half mile intervals back along the road, whilst the remainder of the battalion, including the now tired and depleted C Company, were 1 mile south of Lenggong. The armoured cars patrolled back to Kota Tampan at the head of the causeway over the Chendorah Lakes where one company of 5/2 Punjab was positioned to protect the Argylls flanks from the river threat. One platoon of the Independent Company was in a watching role on the river bank at Temelong. This screen was withdrawn at first light on the 20th and thus was unable to provide the very information it has been sited to get, for it was not until 1615 hours that a friendly Chinese reported that about 200 Japanese had passed through Temelong about midday. Some were marching down both banks, and others were in native boats and rafts. This outflanking move accounted for the lack of pressure down the road and was indeed a grave threat. The CO realised that if the Japanese gained the causeway across the swamp south of Kota Tampan it was the end not only of the Argylls but of Kuala Kangsar and much of 11 Division as well.

One company group quickly moved back in trucks to a position at the 57 milestone where they repulsed a Japanese thrust along a track from the river. The Argylls found that the Japanese were calling "Punjabi, Punjabi" in an attempt to pass for members of a platoon of the 5/2 Punjab which had been stationed at the river, a mile away, and which they had dispersed at the outset of their attack.
Although the thrust had been checked the possibility of further encircling moves was obvious. The remainder of the battalion began to withdraw at 1715 hours. It was quickly followed up by the Japanese, who ran into a series of ambushes and lost heavily. By 2200 hours, having covered Kota Tampan until dark as required, the battalion was behind the causeway, which was then demolished.

That night the battalion once more dug in by company groups along 2 miles of road running south from the 55 milestone. Meanwhile to prevent further enemy attempts to use the river and outflank the defence, the Commander of 12 Brigade ordered 5/2 Punjab to occupy the road on the western shore of Chendorah Lake in depth and send a detachment to the Power Station. The Punjabis reached their position late that evening.

Having been frustrated in their efforts to envelop the Argylls on the 20th, the Japanese, who were now only a day's march from their objectives, next morning at 0800 hours, commenced a series of desperate attacks to break through the stubborn defenders. The first attack came against the front and flank of the two leading companies, D and A, but was thrown back with heavy losses. About 0930 hours a force burst out of the jungle and flung themselves against the third company. B Company held their ground and caused the Japanese to break off the battle.

Shortly after midday the CO was told that the 5/2 Punjab were moving up astride the Durian Causeway behind him and that he could withdraw at his discretion. He decided, however, to dispose of yet another attack developing, this time against his advanced headquarters and C Company group. Again the Japanese were thrown back after close fighting. About 1500 hours, as soon as the enemy had dispersed, the leading companies began leap-frogging back until finally a successful ambush at about 1830 hours by the Pioneer and Anti-aircraft platoons checked the Japanese follow-up and allowed the Argylls to withdraw complete through the 5/2 Punjab. They took up a reserve position at Kati, 5 miles north of the junction of the Grik road with the main road.

Decision to Withdraw 11 Division

At midnight that night the delaying force on the Grik road reverted to command of 11 Division. In view of the ease with which the Japanese could outflank the 12 Brigade position on the Grik road by crossing the lake and threatening the main road and railway at Sungai Siput, the Divisional Commander decided that the withdrawal of 11 Division behind the Perak River could not long be delayed. That night he withdrew 28 Brigade to a position at Lawin at the junction of the Grik and the main roads, and ordered 3 Cavalry Regiment to delay any outflanking advance south to the pontoon bridge at Blanja, where a battalion group was to hold a bridgehead.

During the night 5/2 Punjab concentrated on the road in the
Kampong Sauk-48 milestone area, but next day, the 22nd, was notable for lack of Japanese pressure. Feeling that the absence of pressure was ominous and that the enemy might be moving directly on Sungei Siput, the Divisional Commander decided to withdraw behind the Perak River that night. Except for the bridgehead at Blanja all troops of 11 Division were behind the Perak by first light on the 23rd, and the Iskander (road) and Enggor (rail) bridges had been blown. That night the pontoon bridge at Blanja was sunk and the bridgehead detachment withdrawn. The Japanese 42 Regiment had lost its race for the bridges.

Comments on the Operations

The surprise Japanese thrust down the Grik road failed to achieve its objectives of capturing the Perak bridges and cutting off 11 Division, but it forced III Corps to withdraw more hastily from west of the Perak than it would otherwise have done. Further, the threat to British communications east of the river caused the commander to abandon any plan for disputing the Japanese crossings in the Kuala Kangsar area.

From its bold conception, the enemy thrust was pressed with a vigour and determination that nearly proved decisive. The swift thrust of 100 miles from Patani to Kroh in 6 days unbalanced the defenders and produced an unexpected threat against the rear of 11 Division. However, instead of striking west the Regiment discarded its tanks and vehicles and drove south before any destruction could be effected on the track south from Kroh.

Surprise was complete for British attention was concentrated on the disasters at Jitra and Alor Star, and a southward thrust seemed unlikely.

Unfortunately for the Japanese, the task of delaying their large force was entrusted to C Company, 2 Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. On a road ideal for the purpose this well-trained and skilfully led company was able to impose considerable delay on the resourceful, determined Japanese. They were tired and battered when relieved at Sumpitan by the rest of the battalion, which quickly counter-attacked to take the pressure off C Company and the badly mauled Independent Company now assisting them. The Argylls then fought an aggressive delaying battle in which they managed to gain sufficient time to enable 11 Division to get clear and cross the Perak. This delaying action was one of the few bright spots in the whole Malayan campaign and is a good example of the value of training and leadership in enabling small forces to fight on effectively against overwhelming odds.

The failure to have Kroh-column poised and ready to dash to The Ledge was a major reason why the Japanese were able to make such swift gains early and so wrest the initiative from the defenders.
THE transition from sleep to wakefulness should, we are informed by the medicine man, be effected as gently as possible; by the gentle touch of a wifely hand perhaps or the soothing voice of an old retainer.

In the domestic realm the transition is occasionally effected in a more violent manner, as, for instance when the woman of the house having vainly tried to rouse her laggard husband from his torpor, resorts to violent shaking, coupled with the acid comment, “Get up out of that or you'll be late for your work, if you ever do any work”. This, let it be said, is a necessary exception to the general rule.

In the Army there is never any question of the gentle hand. The slumber of the soldiery is shattered by the strident notes of the bugle blaring forth its insistent message on the morning air, effectively murdering sleep, and causing exquisite pain to the unfortunates who had supped well but not too wisely the previous night.

I have heard the bugle sounding in many lands, and I have always admired the strategic position taken up by the Bugler, when sounding Reveille in places where it is possible to direct missiles effectively at his person. In such circumstances he usually takes his stance at a point where he is out of range for boots, mess tins and other miscellaneous articles of kit, directed in hot anger at his unoffending head by the irate soldiery.

What kind of person is this Bugler, this man with his highly polished instrument hanging by a green cord from his shoulder, this disturber of the peace of the morning. He is a man who takes a justifiable pride in his job and holds with a certain modicum of truth, that next to the Commanding Officer he is the most important man in the Battalion. He will tell you that there is no movement of the battalion in which he does not play a leading part. In this he is probably correct, because on his shoulder rests the responsibility of informing the battalion through the medium of his Bugle of the times of its routine daily duties.

Buglers by nature are a temperamental lot as befits all musicians, and any approach to them on the subject of Bugling should be done adroitly. In search of information on the subject I approached a well-known exponent of the art, and after a general reference to the weather, the state of the country and the prospects for Baldoyle,
I got down to the business of quiet and unobtrusive interrogation.

He informed me that he was 24 years a bugler and probably the best man in his business. It took him twelve months to learn how to blow bugle calls and four years to perfect his technique. His best performance, he thought, was his rendering of the "Last Post". In the 24 years that he had been blowing his Bugle, he had worn out fifteen green Bugle cords and had expended sixteen gallons of Brasso in polishing his Bugle. It was true that he had always been the best dressed man in the battalion and had never missed sounding a call in the proper manner, except on one occasion when he was pushed for time and had to blow for reveille, through the open window while kneeling on his bed. He was downright ashamed of this episode and very glad that it never came to the ears of the Commanding Officer.

I asked him whether he did not consider that blowing Reveille on a bugle was a brutal way of rousing his comrades from their well-earned sleep. He paused for a while and then conceded reluctantly that "I might have a point there". With this admission by the great man I launched forth on my scheme for awakening the troops in the gentle manner.

Briefly, my scheme was this: The Signal Corps in its usual efficient manner would wire all the Barrack Rooms to the Guard Room. In the Guard Room there would be installed a gramophone GS Mark I, with records, two-sided, assorted, and needles GS Mark V, gramophones for the playing of. At the time prescribed in the Daily Routine for the sounding of Reveille the Guard Commander would place a record on the gramophone in two movements, place a needle on the record in one movement, release the spring and so make music. The records would be carefully chosen so as to be appropriate to each day of the week. For example, on the day after pay-day a possible record would be "Drink to me only with thine eyes", or "I don't want to be a soldier". For the day before pay-day we could try "Brother can you spare a dime", or "Money is the root of all Evil". There is no end to the way the changes could be rung on the records. Now, I said, "What do you think of my scheme?"

The Bugler by this time was red in the face and controlling his anger with difficulty. He said: "First of all I will tell you a story and then I will tell you what I think of your scheme. In the early days of the Army when the art of bugling was in its infancy, there was a Bugler in a certain battalion whose bugling was, as they say, 'No great shakes'. One day he was sounding the Sunset call, or I should say, trying to sound it, when an Acting unpaid Corporal passed by and remarked, sarcastic like, to the Bugler - 'Go round and tell them, son'. That remark, to a budding artist, was more than he could bear so he promptly complained to the Corporal's Company Commander. The Company Commander sent for the Cor-
poral and ascertained from him that the facts as stated by the Bugler were correct. Whereupon, he said to the Corporal: 'This Bugler may not be very good, but he is doing his best and he can do no more. By the way, Corporal, what are you?' 'I am an Acting unpaid Corporal', replied the NCO. 'Well, I don't object to your acting the Corporal', replied the Company Commander 'but I have a grave objection to your acting the clown. You're a Private, now!'

"As for your scheme, I think it is barbarous. You would substitute for the clear, crystal notes of the Bugle, music or what passes for music from a mechanical box. Remember that the bugle has been an instrument of communication for all armies for several hundred years, and its notes have been heard over many a battlefield and you . . . you . . . No, Sir, Bugling may be a dying art, but it is not dead yet". Drawing himself up to his full height of 5 ft 7 ins he saluted and said, "I bid you good day, sir".

I beat a hasty retreat, ruminating on the folly of trespassing on the indulgence of an artist. But was he right when he said that Bugling was a dying art? I wonder.

COMPETITION FOR AUTHORS

The Board of Review has made the undermentioned awards for the best original articles published in the March and April issues.

March—"Moscow Turns to Asia" by Staff Sergeant P. G. Gittins, RAE.

April—"Guerilla Deterrent" by Flight Lieutenant H. W. Parker, RAAF.
THE attempt by the fourteen-nation conference at Geneva to "neutralise" Laos never even looked like succeeding, though it appeared to be favoured by both sides. The Communists saw in the proposed "neutralist" government, which was to include members of the Red Pathet Lao organisation, a vehicle for further infiltration to the point where pretence could be thrown off and the government taken over. The United States, having failed to create a strong anti-Communist Laos with the unstable materials at her disposal, saw in the neutralist proposal the next best thing.

If the United States Government ever really thought that the arrangement would work, nations closer to the scene had no such illusion. They saw clearly enough that if the arrangement worked at all, it would work in favour of the Communists. It was quite impossible to prevent the North Vietnamese from training Lao- tian guerrillas, and from stiffening them with some of their own experienced revolutionary fighters. Nor was it possible to prevent North Vietnam from sending in arms over the rugged frontier, or the Chinese and Russians from flying them in.

The American decision to leave Laos to a "neutralist" government, if indeed one could be formed, alarmed Thailand and the Philippines and caused them to wonder out loud if the SEATO alliance was any more than a scrap of paper after all. The inactivity of SEATO in the face of the obvious threat caused a lot of other people besides the Foreign Ministers of Thailand and the Philippines to wonder about the same thing, and about much more besides.

The Communists lost no time in exploiting the uncertainties of the situation by passing through Laos bands of trained revolutionaries and supplies to support the local Red Viet Cong in South Vietnam. The immediate result was a sharp increase in Viet Cong activities — and successes.

To allay the fears of her SEATO allies and to stop the rot in South Vietnam, America set up a military command in that country. However, instead of repeating the error of trying to combat Asian guerrillas with conventional forces, she decided to train the South Vietnamese to defeat the guerrillas by methods similar to those successfully employed in Malaya. One of their first steps was to secure the loan
of a number of experienced advisers from the British Government.

While taking satisfaction at these measures it is worth while remembering that the struggle in Malaya was a long drawn out affair. There the Communists started their campaign of terrorism and subversion about 1948. It was not until 1957 that the scales were turned against them, and even then it took three more years before they were finally mopped up.

At the peak of their effort the Malayan Communists numbered about 11,000. The South Vietnam guerrillas are twice as strong as that. More importantly, the Malayan guerrillas never received much material assistance from outside, for Thailand took all possible steps to prevent her territory from being used for the passage of supplies. The Viet Cong, however, has behind it a firm supply base in North Vietnam and a line of communication through Laos which cannot be cut unless the situation in that country unexpectedly improves.

In Malaya the civil and military authorities were centralised in the person of one man. In South Vietnam the American military command has to establish and maintain co-operation with the civil authorities through constant negotiation.

These considerations lead to the prediction that the guerilla war in South Vietnam is likely to go on for a long time. Practically the only advantage enjoyed by our side is that they do not have to start from the beginning as they did in Malaya. The experience gained there is worth a great deal if it is used correctly.

Against the benefits of this experience must be balanced the Viet Cong's command of outside assistance. That the Communists are fully aware of the importance of this asset is shown by their recent offensive in Laos, an offensive aimed at broadening and securing their communications.

The Communists' advance brought them close enough to the Thai frontier to seriously alarm that country and create a crisis in the affairs of SEATO. Clearly if the Organisation failed to act this time any confidence the South East Asian members still had in it would completely evaporate. Fortunately the American Government took the initiative in responding promptly to the Thai request for assistance by sending in a substantial body of troops. The American lead was followed by Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom who have also sent forces to support the Thais in resisting any attempt to cross their frontier. In addition Australia has responded to a request for assistance from the Government of South Vietnam by agreeing to send them some military instructors.

These events are of momentous importance to Australia, for they have at last demonstrated that the non-Asian members of SEATO are prepared to fight to stop any further Communist encroachments into the Treaty area. Hitherto SEATO has laboured under the disadvantage
of the hesitancy of the European members to become involved in military commitments in an area which, in comparison with their other more immediate interests, is of minor importance to them.

In Europe the Communist advance has been checked for 17 years by the firm resolution and the united action of the NATO powers. In South East Asia the advance has been allowed to continue up to this point because neither of those two essential qualities have been brought to bear. However, because they have now been brought to bear it is not to be supposed that the task is going to be an easy one. The line held is long and perilously weak, and is threatened by the Red Chinese in the Himalayan area and by their satellites further south, from Burma to the Mekong delta. And the difficulty of resistance is enhanced by the vast mass of propaganda playing upon racial feelings, social unrest and the bitterness left behind by the colonial era. The battle, in fact, has only just been joined.

The situation marks a significant stage in the development of Australia's foreign relations and defence system. For the first time in our history we have sent military assistance to countries outside the British Commonwealth in time of peace, if we may stretch the term to include the relentless struggle in which we are engaged. For some years we have been talking about supporting and assisting our allies on our northern approaches. Now, following the American lead, we have actually done it. The effects of this discharge of our treaty obligations, of this demonstration of our readiness to fight beyond our own beaches, could be far-reaching.

— E.G.K.

Of all Clausewitz's blind spots, the blindest was that he never grasped that the true aim of war is peace and not victory; therefore that peace should be the ruling aim of policy, and victory only the means towards its achievement.

— General J. F. C. Fuller
THE COMMANDER AND THE CIVIL POPULATION

Lieutenant Colonel J. D. M. Moss
Royal Australian Infantry

The presence of a civilian population in the theatre of operations presents military commanders with two problems:

(a) How to obtain the maximum assistance from the local population in the form of local resources, labour, intelligence, and the use of local facilities;

(b) How to prevent the harm and hindrance that can be caused to the military effort by an uncontrolled, destitute, or hostile population.

The manner in which commanders tackle these problems will vary greatly, and depend on such variables as national or allied policy, the requirements of the military situation, participation of allies, the nature of the enemy, the nature and attitudes of the governments and peoples in the area, the state of development of the countries, cultural, geographic and sociological features of the area, and other related factors.

Overall Policy

The overall policy concerning the military and civil relationships in the theatre of operations is established at government or allied council level, and promulgated to the armed forces commander in his directive. Initially this directive may only establish the force commander’s authority in relation to the civil population and governments in the area, and guidance in regard to specific matters may not be made available to the commander until after the outbreak of war.

Force Commander’s Authority

The degree of authority granted to the force commander in relation to the civil population may vary greatly. At the lower end of the scale is a minimum degree of authority granted by a treaty or other form of agreement, which may involve only a liaison relationship between the military commander and the civil population, the host government, and local government agencies. At the other end of the scale is a form of administration or degree of authority by which a commander exercises full or partial executive, legislative and judicial powers over a country or area.

The force commander has the right to delegate his authority in regard to the civil population in whole or in part, and will delegate it to those commanders who require such authority to accomplish their missions. In
most operations divisions and area headquarters will require some civil affairs authority.¹

General Considerations

Military activities in connection with the civil population and local governments are designed to support the commander's mission, and in the absence of more specific directions are based on the following general considerations.

Local Population

The attitude of the people in the area of operations may vary from unfriendly to friendly to a substantial degree, but the population may not necessarily be co-operative. There will certainly be some hostile members. It will usually be difficult and often impossible to distinguish by sight hostile members of the indigenous population.

Whether the local inhabitants are friendly or hostile, they are certain to have different customs, language and religion, which must be taken into account if their co-operation is to be obtained. Even if the population is not openly hostile, pilferage can be expected.

Throughout the theatre guerrilla activity and enemy infiltration must be expected at all times. As insurgents and guerrillas are dependent on the support or at least the tolerance of the local population for their existence, in areas where they have been operating, the local population are unlikely to be co-operative to the government and allied forces, and measures may have to be taken to isolate certain elements.

In most areas in South East Asia the bulk of the population will probably be apathetic towards the political issues involved, unless they are convinced that the Communists will be defeated.

Communist Tactics

The Communist tactics of infiltration, insurgency and guerrilla operations for gaining control over a country will be intensified at the outbreak of hostilities with the objects of:

(a) Neutralising as many as possible of the military and security forces in the area.

(b) Hampering the logistic support of military forces by action against rear areas and communication routes.

(c) Creating refugees and evacuation problems designed to hamper military operations.

(d) Disrupting civilian facilities, government and economy.

Relations with Governments

Military forces normally operate in friendly or allied countries under a treaty or agreement, which sets out the powers of the commander in relation to the government. These are probably limited to strengthening the existing government and governmental machinery, with possibly an emphasis on supporting those factions which are most nearly aligned to allied policy. The military commanders normally have no authority to remove government officials, and must rely on the co-operation of the

1. The term "Civil Affairs" is used throughout this paper to avoid confusion. In considering enemy territories, the term "Military Government" should be substituted.
local government to provide assistance to their efforts.

In occupied countries, direct military control may have to be established over the whole or part of the civilian government machinery until it is possible to establish an efficient and popularly accepted government, stable economic and financial conditions, and a respect for law and order. Immediate convenience points to the retention of administrative personnel in their present positions, as presumably they know their jobs and can carry on essential activities. In the interests of economy, the duties of military personnel should be restricted to supervision over the civilian staff. It may be, however, that virtually every office-holder and employee in the existing government is either overtly hostile to the occupying power, or is so intimately associated with an organisation opposed to the occupation that his removal is called for. Under these circumstances, military personnel may have to be employed as operating officials of the local government until trustworthy civilians can be found.

In liberating territories of friendly countries, the situation may be similar. The retreating enemy will probably remove or kill all officials sympathetic to the allied cause, and it may well be necessary to initially appoint temporary officials to maintain law and order until the friendly national government can establish control.

Treatment of the Local Population

Within the limits of international law, a commander has the right to demand and enforce such obedience from the inhabitants of an occupied area as may be necessary to accomplish his mission and to administer the area. He may compel persons, including public officials, to perform work which is necessary for the needs of the army of occupation and for public welfare, such as burying military and civilian dead, operation of public utilities — water, power, sanitation etc., the provision of food, shelter, clothing, transportation, or the health of the local population. Initially stern measures may be necessary in occupied territory in order to maintain law and order and establish control; however when conditions warrant and as soon as possible these measures should be relaxed in the interests of gaining the support of the population.

If a guest-host relationship exists, or the military forces are present under an agreement, the military commander can expect co-operation and assistance from the local population to a reasonable degree. In return the indigenous government and population can expect courteous and fair treatment from the military and a respect for their property in so far as the military situation permits.

The local government authorities will normally be the point of contact for relations between the military and civil population, and whenever possible control and executive functions of civil administration should be exercised through the civil authorities. This use of civilians will usually enhance control and create better relations between
the military and civilian populations, as well as economy in military personnel.

**Respect for Existing Laws**

Closely bound up with the treatment of the local population, is the position of the military forces in regard to the existing civil law of the country in which they are operating. In friendly or neutral countries, the usual policy is to retain all local laws in force unless they specifically hinder military operations. In such cases the observance of the laws is usually waived by mutual agreement.

Under international law, the laws of a country under occupation remain in force, and although a military commander has the authority to alter local laws in certain situations, he should use this authority only when it is absolutely necessary.

**Protection of Cultural Objects**

By international agreement, armed forces are bound to refrain from any use of cultural property (e.g. monuments, archaeological sites, and buildings of historical or artistic interest) for purposes which are likely to expose it to destruction or damage, and to refrain from any act of hostility directed against such property. The armed forces also have an obligation to prohibit, prevent and, if necessary stop any form of theft, pillage, or misappropriation of, and any acts of vandalism directed against cultural property and religious edifices.

**Protection of Archives and Records**

Archives and records of all branches of government are of immediate and continuing interest to the local government and, in occupied countries, to the military government. It is essential to locate and protect them.

**Local Procurement**

From a purely military point of view, the maximum utilisation of local facilities and resources is most desirable, and in some cases essential, in solving the logistic problems and in saving time and transportation. However, military procurement, particularly in undeveloped and under-developed countries, may have such adverse effects on the local population and the economy of a country, that, in the interests of the overall aim, it may be necessary to forego some of the initial military benefits to be obtained by the full use of local procurement.

The extent to which planning can be based on the use of local resources will differ in every situation, and consideration must be given to existing agreements, and the political, social and economic conditions in the countries under consideration. Many of the matters to be considered are outside the field of military responsibility, and guidance will be required from higher authority. As a general rule, local procurement should be avoided when it results in the subsequent importation of similar items for civil consumption.

The maximum possible use should be made of local labour in support of military operations. In undeveloped countries it may be difficult to obtain suitable and adequate labour to meet the
requirements, because of the general shortage of skilled workers and the seasonal nature of agricultural work. Under such conditions it may be necessary to import civilian labour. In some areas the local population may be unwilling to work either because of political convictions or because of their fear of attacks by local dissidents, infiltrators or guerrillas. It may therefore be necessary to impose a degree of regimentation on the civil population and to provide protection to the local work force. Food, accommodation, clothing, and medical facilities may also have to be provided.

The entry of the armed services into the local procurement and labour fields has an inflationary effect on the civil economy and care must be taken to maintain as sound a currency as circumstances will permit by adhering to the wage and price scales agreed to by a friendly government. If occupation of enemy territory is involved, and occupation currency is issued, the issuing authority must insure the stability of the currency and take measures to prevent inflation.

Military procurement of local resources and use of properties and services are frequently a source of friction and misunderstanding with local civilians, and arrangements for such procurement should be made with the highest possible level of central or local government authority.

Assistance to Local Population

Specific policies will be laid down by higher authority regarding the type and extent of assistance to be provided by the military forces for the support of the local population. In the absence of specific policy, it is assumed for planning purposes that no economic rehabilitation will be undertaken, except that which can be accomplished from the resources available within the command. Restoration of agricultural production will usually be given priority.

The provision of relief supplies is limited to the minimum essential to prevent disease, starvation or such unrest as might interfere with military operations. Supplies required for relief of distress within the area of combat operations are given a logistic priority second only to the military supplies essential to combat.

Military resources are not diverted for civilian use except where failure to do so would endanger the security of friendly forces or seriously interfere with attaining military objectives. Captured enemy supplies and materials are used to provide assistance and relief of the local population after the military requirements have been met.

In friendly territories the government security and police forces are responsible for maintaining law and order, and it is generally advisable to use some civilian guards and national civilian police forces on appropriate police and installation security duties and to control civilians. If adequate civilian police are not available, and the security of military property is endangered, commanders may take appropriate military action.
THE COMMANDER AND THE CIVIL POPULATION

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Refugees

Refugees can become a serious hazard to military operations, and therefore a commander should make efforts to keep the civilian population in place. However, if he is unsuccessful in keeping them in place or if the situation or policy dictates evacuation of civilians, a plan must be provided for their control and care.

So long as movement of refugees does not cause damage to or delay military operations, their progress should not be hindered. Generally the most satisfactory way to control refugee traffic is to guide it in the general direction desired rather than try to prevent it; but control must be maintained. Whenever practicable, control should be exercised by existing civil authorities, supervised by provost.

Staging areas are essential at any place where refugees are held up for any length of time. Provision of food, water, medical attention and sanitary arrangements is essential together with whatever covered accommodation can be provided. Arrangements should be made with intelligence agencies to screen the civilians at appropriate places to detect enemy agents, guerrillas and other dangerous elements.

Civil Affairs Organisation

General

To assist commanders in dealing with the civil population, and thus to attain their aims, Civil Affairs staffs are provided on all headquarters down to and including division and area headquarters.

In addition, Civil Affairs units are provided for general and specific tasks. The Civil Affairs unit is organised as required into Civil Affairs groups. Each group consists of a small administrative headquarters and up to 30 basic self-contained detachments, which are allotted to combat headquarters and on an area basis, to towns and rural areas, as required. Specialist and technical officers are added to basic detachments for the particular town or locality in which they are operating. These specialists include experts in such matters as finance, law, agriculture, fire-fighting etc.

The Civil Affairs organisation forms an integral part of the operational force. Its tasks are included in the commander's plan and transmitted through command channels. The Civil Affairs channel is used only for technical and domestic instructions.

In allied operations, it will be normal to form an integrated
allied Civil Affairs organisation as opposed to establishing separate national spheres of influence. Integration of personnel may be effected at all levels but should not extend to the command of Civil Affairs units by officers of another nation.

Civil Affairs Policy

All Civil Affairs operations must support the commander's mission and take the form of either:

(a) Providing resources from the civil population to support the military effort, or
(b) Controlling and supporting the civil population so that it does not interfere with the conduct of military operations.

Continuity of policy is accomplished by establishing overall policy at governmental or top command levels and transmitting this policy through command channels for implementation. In an area of operations such policy must be issued by the theatre or area commander.

Civil Affairs operations are inter-related with psychological warfare operations, counter-guerrilla and counter-insurgency operations, and public relations activities. It is essential that these activities be closely coordinated to ensure that they do not work at cross purposes, but instead support and complement each other and the military operations.

Conclusion

The problems associated with the civilian population and refugees in a theatre of operations in South East Asia are very complex, and the ability of a commander to solve these problems may be a deciding factor in the success or failure of his mission. The Civil Affairs machinery exists to assist the commander to solve his problems; he must understand and use this machinery.

How many instances have we seen, and suffered, wherein good staff officers have commanded catastrophe while born leaders have organised staff disaster for their chiefs.

— General Sir Frederick Morgan
MODERN GUERRILLA WARFARE, Edited by Franklin Mark Osanka. (The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 60 Fifth Avenue, New York 11, NY, U.S.A.

Until quite recently most soldiers, when they considered guerilla warfare at all, have been concerned primarily with the effectiveness of guerilla tactics when employed against conventional armies. Only now is it being recognised by soldiers of the Western World that guerilla warfare is the safest method of waging open conflict within the restraints of the “balance of terror” imposed by nuclear weapons of mass destruction. On the other hand, the Communists, and particularly the Asian Communists, had, long before the nuclear restraints came into being, made guerilla warfare in all its aspects the chief means of winning their way to power and expanding their conquests. So long as the Asian Communists confined their activities to internal revolutionary conflict, Western soldiers took little notice. However, the decisive defeat inflicted by the Viet Minh guerillas on the powerful conventional forces of France in Indo China brought about a realisation that much more attention would have to be given to this form of warfare. Since then further successes won by the Communists in South East Asia have emphasised the need for closer study and a deeper understanding of guerilla methods.

Unfortunately the West has no great tradition of guerilla warfare, particularly guerilla warfare waged in the international sphere. Although we are by no means without experience in combating guerilla tactics, no substantial body of literature had been developed on the subject. Such writings as did exist were mainly isolated personal accounts. Official literature was almost exclusively confined to the protection of conventional forces against guerilla activities.

This gap in our military literature and thinking has now been filled by the publication of MODERN GUERRILLA WARFARE, the first comprehensive background study of the uses of guerillas in modern warfare. In 37 contributions, including the basic writings of Lenin and Che Guevara on the subject, leading civilian and military authorities describe and analyse major guerilla movements of the last 20 years. There is also a statement of American policy in dealing with Communist guerilla movements.
This book shows how the Communists have mastered guerilla tactics and applied them to the contemporary scene in various parts of the world. It shows, too, that this form of warfare is being understood in the Western World, and that effective counter-guerilla measures have been devised.

Part 1 surveys the history of guerilla activity in modern times, with emphasis on recent applications. Parts II to VII give detailed descriptions of guerilla warfare in Russia, China, the Philippines, Greece, Indo China, Laos, Vietnam and Malaya, while Part VIII deals with the nationalist guerilla movements in Cuba and Algeria. Part IX is concerned with counter-guerilla procedures and policies.

A research bibliography of more than 600 references, probably the most extensive of its kind in existence, is arranged by geographic areas and historical sequence. In addition, each section of the book offers a further list of readings.

After service with the US Marines, the editor of the book, Mr. Osanka, graduated as Bachelor of Science and Master of Arts at Northern Illinois University, and is at present a member of the social science research staff of the George Washington University. He is to be congratulated for the service he has rendered to Western soldiers in compiling this comprehensive and authoritative account of modern guerilla warfare.

— E.G.K.


To a European community living on the fringe of Asia, the history of the neighbouring countries is a matter of some importance. Yet how many Australians, apart from a few scholars and specialists, know anything about the story of the peoples on our near north. While it is completely proper that we should be conversant with the story of the development of our own European culture, it is no less important that we should know something about the other peoples who live in this part of the world.

One reason for this lack of knowledge about Asia is that, apart from hopelessly biassed accounts and superficial travel books, literature on the subject has not been readily available outside scholastic circles. Recently, however, books for the general reader have begun to make their appearance. The latest work of this kind to become available is THE MAKING OF MODERN BURMA which tells the story of that country from the time of the first European contacts until the signing of the Sino-Burmese Frontier Agreement in 1960.

Covering the period that it does, the story told by Dorothy Woodman is of course a micro-cosm of the story of European colonialism in Asia, which followed, and overlapped part of, the long period of Asian aggression and colonialism in Europe.
It is not a pretty story for colonialism is rarely a pretty subject. But it does enable us to see something of the Asian peoples' view of recent history from which their current attitudes so largely derive, and to appreciate that the West is not the only culture with a long tradition of struggle against alien domination.

We are all too prone to take a foreshortened view of European colonialism in Asia, to see only the peace and good government it conferred upon the subject peoples in its later stages. Generally we overlook the earlier period when the pursuit of profit was the overriding consideration, indeed almost the only consideration, that motivated the European advanced guards. Or, if we do take in this period at all, we see the Asian as an obstinate obstructionist and the European as a peaceful trader going about his business in an upright, honest manner. To get a true perspective we need to look at the picture through Asian eyes, to learn something of the intrigues, machinations and armed aggressions perpetrated by the European trading companies and their governments.

The Portuguese were the first Europeans to establish regular contact with Burma, contacts initially confined to annual visits of the trading fleets. Then came the Dutch, whose visitation was merely an offshoot of their larger enterprise in the islands that now comprise Indonesia. In 1617 the English East India Company sent two traders to Rangoon, and from that date the story becomes one of constant encroachments until annexation by the British Crown in 1886.

The whole process was in fact a triangular contest for control, for China brought forward her ancient claims to sovereignty and France got her finger into the pie. The negotiations, if one may call such cynical proceedings negotiations, between the three contenders for control blandly ignored Burmese interests, opinions and desires. In the end the French were pushed aside, Britain conceded China a free hand in Tibet for a free hand in Burma, and incorporated the country in the Empire. Some of the inhabitants, however, continued armed resistance until well into the present century. In fact the country was not completely pacified before it regained its independence in 1948. The old bone of contention between Burma and China — demarcation of the frontier — was not settled until 1960.

In writing her book, Miss Woodman has made use of many state papers and other documents which, in the normal course of events, are available only to scholars and research workers. From them, and from many other sources as well, she has weaved up an absorbing and authoritative story of one of our nearest neighbours. It is at once the most readable and most searching account of Burma over the last 400 years that has come to the notice of this reviewer.

— E.G.K.
RADITZER, by Peter Matthiessen.  
(William Heinemann Ltd., London, and 317 Collins Street, Melbourne.)

This is Peter Matthiessen’s third novel and can be said to fall into the category of a war book.

However it is a war book with a difference in that, whilst all the action takes place during the war, it is not a shooting war in the strict sense of the word.

The main characters are in the United States Navy and the story opens on a troopship bound for Pearl Harbour. The two main characters, Raditzer and Stark are assigned to fire watch and one gets the impression that the US Navy have a somewhat strange way of going about their duties. As Mr. Matthiessen served in the US Navy one assumes that he is drawing from personal memories.

As far as war is concerned, that is where the bellicose part of the book ends and the rest of the action takes place in Pearl Harbour where one of the characters serves his country in a laundry and the other in a kitchen.

Raditzer is a no-hoper, with a bad background, no education and a record that plainly stinks. Stark on the other hand is of a good family, well educated and what can be called an average, mainly decent citizen. His inability to be unpleasant to his fellow mortals gets him landed with Raditzer for the rest of his service.

The story is a fascinating one which shows how Raditzer’s evilness gets the better of Stark’s goodness, with the totally unexpected effect on Raditzer himself, when this does happen.

Like so many novels of today the book has a psychiatric theme, but is still fascinating reading. Mr. Matthiessen has an unusual style and at times one finds oneself re-reading sentences in order to be sure one has got the real meaning. It is not intended to suggest that Mr. Matthiessen’s English is faulty but it is that type of book that one must keep up with all the time — the sort of book that has to be read.

One is thankful on finishing the book to find that there is no possibility of Raditzer being written into a series — he is so nasty a person that the brief acquaintance is enough.

— G.M.C.

A VERY QUIET WAR, by Ralph Arnold. (Rupert Hart-Davis, London, and William Heinemann Ltd., 317 Collins Street, Melbourne.)

In this light-hearted little book, Mr. Arnold, an entertaining author, has written an account of his experiences as a public relations officer in World War II.

Like so many other well-educated young Englishmen, Ralph Arnold found himself, soon after the outbreak of war, reporting as a newly commissioned 2nd Lieutenant at an Infantry Training Centre. He got a bad start, for he had been posted to a distinguished Scots highland regiment and, badly advised by a Sassenach tailor, he committed
the heinous crime of arriving in trousers instead of trews. But that was not his only defect as an officer. Soon after his arrival, he found himself, with many others of his kind, paraded in the mess dining room where the adjutant solemnly proceeded to demonstrate the correct sequence of employment for the various table implements and glasses at dinner. Presumably the CO, notwithstanding the desperate nature of the nation’s situation, considered this capability an essential part of training for war.

However, Arnold never joined his regiment. Before his training was finished his cousin, Sir Edmund Ironside, then Chief of the Imperial General Staff, sent for him to become his ADC. When General Ironside relinquished his appointment, Arnold qualified at an Intelligence course. Soon afterwards he was posted as Public Relations Officer at Scottish Command, apparently for the sole reason that he “had done some writing” before the war. His next assignment was PRO to General Slim’s army in Burma. There, reading between the lines, he did a pretty good job in restoring order and morale in the Press Camp, and generally putting public relations on a firm working basis. From there he went on to become the head of the public relations section at Supreme Headquarters, South East Asia Command.

Without any malice, Arnold sketches the sharp contrast between Slim’s and Mountbatten’s approach to public relations. The former was concerned that his troops had become a forgotten army and were not getting anything like their fair share of news space, The latter took a great interest in his own share of the limelight, and saw that he got it.

If Arnold does not give us any food for thought in the strategic or tactical spheres, he does give us a glimpse of work and life on the fringes of higher headquarters. And he does it very entertainingly.

— E.G.K.

Those who will not learn from history are doomed to repeat it.

— George Santayana.
The Guerilla as a Fighter

Idealistic, implacable, nocturnal and preferably a native of the area, the guerilla fighter must make maximum use of surprise, weapons, terrain and his physical stamina to combat and conquer conventional forces.

The first question which arises is, "What should the guerilla fighter be like?" One must reply that preferably the guerilla fighter should be an inhabitant of the area. There he has friends to whom he can turn for help. He will know the area because it is his. This personal knowledge of the terrain is an important factor in guerilla warfare.

The guerilla is a nocturnal fighter. This means he must have all the attributes required for night operations. He must be cunning; he must march to the battlefield over hills and dales so that no one becomes aware of his presence; and having the benefit of the factor of surprise he must fall upon the enemy. He must immediately exploit the panic which all surprises cause and throw himself violently into the struggle. He must allow no weakness on the part of his companions, and he must immediately correct any indication of weakness should it arise. He must fall upon the enemy like a typhoon, destroying everything, giving no quarter and expecting none if the tactical circumstances make this necessary. He must mete out justice to those who are to be tried and sow panic among the enemy. However, at the same time, he must treat benevolently the defenceless vanquished and also respect those that die.

A wounded soldier must be given medical treatment and must be given the best possible help unless his earlier life makes him subject to punishment by the death penalty. In this case, he will be treated in accordance with his past. One must never take a prisoner unless he can be brought to a solid base of operations impregnable to the enemy. Unless he is a
well-known criminal, a prisoner is to be set free after he has been interrogated.

The guerilla fighter must be ready to risk his life as often as necessary or to give it without the slightest hesitation at the required moment. But, at the same time, he must be cautious and never expose himself unnecessarily. All necessary precautions must be taken to prevent an adverse conclusion of any operation or battle. That is why it is so very important that, in any battle, total vigilance be exercised over areas from which enemy reinforcements can arrive, and also to prevent a siege. The consequences of a siege are grave not only with respect to the physical disaster they can cause, but also with respect to the moral disaster which may bring a loss of faith in the outcome of the struggle.

Without reservation, there must be audacity. The dangers and the possibilities of an action must be correctly analysed. There must always be readiness to take an optimistic attitude towards circumstances and to seek a favourable decision even when an analysis of the advantages and disadvantages may not warrant it.

If the guerilla is to survive amid the conditions of the struggle and the actions of the enemy, he must have a quality of adaptability which will permit him to identify himself with the environment in which he lives. He must adapt himself to it as his ally and exploit it as much as possible. At the same time, he must have a quick imagination and instantaneous resourcefulness which will permit him to change the course of events by using a decisive course of action.

A guerilla must never leave a wounded companion to the mercy of any enemy because it is virtually certain that his fate will be death. Regardless of the difficulty, he must evacuate the wounded from the combat zone to a safe place.

At the same time, he must be tight-lipped. Everything that is said or is heard in his presence

1. Throughout this work the fear of a 'siege' is apparent. Actually, Guerara means encirclement. Mao also acknowledges that the encirclement is the thing to be most feared. German experience in Russia also indicated that the only really effective way of stamping out guerilla activity was by encircling the affected area and completely exterminating the guerilla band. For a description of German methods and the directive they issued to combat guerilla groups see Dixon, Communist Guerilla Warfare (Frederick A. Praeger. New York, 1954). 201-223. In capsule form, the German concept is given in figure 1. The Germans designated a guerilla area as a "cauldron" and gave these four basic methods for destroying a cauldron by encirclement.

THE SPIDER'S WEB THE PARTRIDGE DRIVE

SPLITTING THE CAULDRON SHOCK UNIT ACTION
must always be strictly reserved to his own knowledge, and he must never permit himself to utter one single word too many. This must even be the case among his own fellow fighters: obviously, the enemy will try to infiltrate agents into the guerilla force in order to learn the plans, places, and means of existence available to and utilised by the guerillas.

In addition to the moral qualities we have stressed, the guerilla must possess some very important physical qualities. The guerilla fighter must be untiring. There will be times when he will have to go to a still more distant place when his exhaustion appears intolerable. He must always have a radiating face and manifest the deepest of convictions. This will allow him to take still another step, still do his utmost, and follow it up with another, and another, and another until he arrives at the place designated by his leaders.

He must be long-suffering to the most extreme degree in order to overcome the privations of hunger, thirst, and lack of clothing and shelter to which he is exposed at all times. He must also be able to withstand illnesses and wounds which many times will have to be cured without major medical care. His only doctor may be Nature's healing action. It must be this way, because the fighter who leaves the battle zone in order to seek medical help for some illness or wound is, in most cases, executed by the enemy.

Persons with such notable characteristics of devotion and firmness must have an ideal which permits them to be effective under the adverse conditions we have described. Such an ideal must be simple, not complex, without great pretention, and in general need not be profound. But it must be so firm and clear that without the slightest hesitation a man will give his life for the ideal. Among nearly all farmers such an ideal is the right to have a piece of land for himself in order that he may work it and enjoy the fruits of just social treatment. Among the workers such an ideal is to have work, to be paid an adequate wage, and also to receive just social treatment. Among students and professionals, more abstract ideals are found such as those of freedom, for which they fight.

All this leads us to ask how a guerilla fighter lives. His normal pattern of life is the hike. Let us use as example a guerilla fighter in the mountains situated in wooded regions, who lives under constant harassment by the enemy. Under such conditions, in order to change position, a guerilla moves without stopping to eat during daylight. When darkness has fallen, an encampment is established in some clearing near some watercourse. Each group eats together and camp-fires are made from materials at hand.

The guerilla fighter eats when he can, and all that he can. Sometimes enormous amounts of rations disappear in the gullets of the fighters, while at others two or three days of fasting occur.
Under the conditions described, encampments must be easily movable, and no traces left which will give them away. Vigilance must be extreme: for every 10 men that sleep, one or two must be on watch. Sentinels must be continually relieved and all entrances to the encampment must always be under observation.

Within the pattern of the life of the fighter, combat is the most interesting event. It brings to all the greatest joy and makes them march with renewed spirit. Combat, the climax of the guerilla’s life, takes place at suitable moments when some enemy encampment has been found, investigated, and determined to be so weak that it can be annihilated. Alternatively, an enemy column may advance into the territory immediately occupied by the liberating forces. The two cases are different.

Against an encampment, action will be widespread and will fundamentally attempt to defeat the members of the column that come to break the siege, inasmuch as an entrenched enemy is never the favourite prey of the guerilla. The ideal prey is the enemy in movement — nervous, lacking knowledge of the terrain, fearing everything, without natural protection for self-defence. An unfavourable condition exists when the enemy is entrenched and has powerful arms to repel attack. However, this is never the situation when a large column is suddenly attacked in two or three places and fragmented. Then the attackers can withdraw before any reaction can take place, because they cannot surround and completely destroy the enemy columns.

If it is not possible to rout the enemy through hunger or thirst or through a direct attack of those who are entrenched in the encampment, then the siege should be lifted after it has inflicted its destructive impact on the invading column. In cases where the guerilla force is too weak and the invading column is too strong, action might be centred upon the advance guard. There are some who have a special predilection for this operation, whatever other result they may wish to achieve, and time after time they attack the same advance position. Thus, real mutinies are provoked. The advance guard must always be hit again, even though other points of the column might also be attacked.

The degree of ease with which the guerilla fighter can accomplish his mission and adapt himself to his environment depends upon his equipment. The guerilla fighter has individual characteristics, even though he is attached to the small units that form his group of action. He must keep in his knapsack, in addition to his usual equipment, all the necessaries which will enable him to remain alone for some time.

2. This is a favourite tactic evidently devised by Guevara himself. It is mentioned repeatedly and is an excellent example of psychological warfare of a rather unusual sort.
In giving the list of equipment, we refer essentially to that which a fighter can carry in the situations existing at the beginning of the war, in difficult terrain, during frequent rains, in relative cold, and when being pursued by the enemy. In other words, we refer to the situation that existed at the beginning of the Cuban War of Liberation.

The equipment of a guerilla fighter is divided into essentials and accessories. Among the first is the hammock which allows him to rest adequately. He will always be able to find two trees from which he can suspend it. In case he should have to sleep on the ground, the hammock can serve as a mattress. In case there is rain or when the soil is wet — a frequent event in the tropical mountain zone — the hammock is indispensable in order to be able to sleep if a piece of nylon waterproof cloth is used with it. Nylon can be stretched to form a roof to cover the hammock: a string is attached at each of the four corners, the middle resting on another length of string. The last string serves to divide the waters, and thus a small campaign tent is formed.

A blanket is indispensable because during the night it gets very cold in the mountains. It is also necessary to carry some cover which permits one to face the great changes in temperature. Dress consists of work shirt and work trousers, be they uniform or not. The shoes must be of best possible construction, and one of the most important articles of which one should have a reserve are shoes: without them marching is very difficult.

Inasmuch as the guerilla fighter carries his movable house in his knapsack, his knapsack is also very important. Primitive ones can be made from any bag to which are attached rope handles; but better ones are made of leather and can be purchased or can be made by some leather worker.

The guerilla fighter should always carry some personal food supply in reserve, in addition to that issued to the troops or eaten during rest stops.

The following are indispensable: butter or oil are the most important because they furnish the fats required by the body; canned goods that must not be consumed except in circumstances when it is not materially possible to obtain food for cooking, unless there are so many cans their weight hinders the march; canned fish, of great nutritive value; condensed milk, an excellent food because of the quantity of sugar it contains and for the taste which gives it the character of a treat; powdered milk, which is always useful; sugar is another important part of the equipment; so is salt, which makes hardship more bearable. Also useful are seasonings for food. The most common are onions and garlic, though there are others which vary according to the characteristics of the country.

To care for his rifle, the guerilla needs special greases which must be very carefully applied — sewing machine oil is quite good if special grease is not
available. Scraps and bits of cloth will be useful in caring for weapons as well as a little pail in which he can clean them, for this must be done quite often. The cartridge belt should be of standard manufacture, or else home-made according to the circumstances, but it must be sufficiently good so that not a single round is lost. Bullets are the basis of the struggle. They must be guarded like gold for without them all else is in vain.

The guerilla must carry a canteen or a water flask because he must drink in quantity and it is not always possible to find water when it is needed. He must carry general purpose medicines such as penicillin or other antibiotics, drugs such as aspirin to treat fever and those for the endemic illnesses of the locality. These might be tablets against malaria, sulfa drugs against diarrhoea, anti-parasite agents of various kinds — in other words, the medical supply must be adjusted to the characteristics of the area. All drugs should be well packed and of the oral type whenever possible. In places where there are poisonous animals it is well to carry the antidote serum. The rest of the medical equipment must be surgical. In addition, there might be small individual supplies of drugs for treating minor ailments.

Very important in the life of a fighter are cigars, cigarettes, or pipe tobacco, for the smoke that can be enjoyed during moments of rest is a great boon to the solitary soldier. A pipe is best, for it allows the fullest use, in times of shortages, of the tobacco of cigarette and cigar butts. Matches are important not only in order to light cigarettes but also to light fires. Fires are one of the greatest needs of life in the mountains during rains. It is preferable to carry both matches and a lighter so that if one fails the other can be used.

It is convenient to carry soap, not only for personal cleanliness but also to clean eating utensils. Intestinal disorders are frequently caused by spoiled food which is mixed with new food in a dirty utensil. With all the described equipment, a guerilla fighter can feel secure enough to survive in the mountains under any adverse condition for the time necessary to master the situation.

There are accessories which at times are useful and at other times constitute a hindrance but which, in general, are very useful. The compass is one. In any given zone, the compass is used mostly as a complement to orientation because increasing familiarity with the terrain makes that instrument unnecessary. Furthermore, the compass is very difficult to use in mountainous terrain because the route it indicates frequently is not the ideal one to move from one place to another. The straight route is likely to be interrupted by insurmountable obstacles. Also useful is an extra piece of nylon cloth in order to cover equipment during a rain. It must be stressed that in tropical countries rain is very constant during certain months and that water is the enemy of the
warrior's equipment, his food, his weapons, his medicines, his papers, or his garments. A change of clothing may be carried, but usually this is something new recruits already have. Usually only a pair of slacks and underwear are carried and other articles such as towels omitted. The life of a guerilla fighter teaches safeguarding energy to carry the knapsack from one place to another and rejects everything which is not essential.

The prerequisites of cleanliness are a piece of soap which will serve for washing of belongings as well as for personal cleanliness, and tooth brush and paste. It is also advisable to carry some books which can be exchanged among other members of the force. The books should be good biographies of heroes of the past, histories or economic geographies (preferably about the country), and some general works which will tend to raise the cultural level of the soldiers. These lessen the tendency to card games and other forms of distraction which sometimes loom too large in the life of the guerilla fighter.

Whenever there is extra space in the knapsack, it should be filled with articles of food, except in areas which offer very advantageous conditions for food supply. Candy or foods of lesser importance might be carried to augment the basic diet. Hard biscuits might be among these, but they occupy much space and they easily crumble. In the mountains, it is useful to carry a machete. In more humid places, it is useful to have a small bottle of gasoline or to obtain some resinous material from pine trees which will permit quick starting of a fire even though the wood is wet.

Among the usual equipment of the guerilla fighter must be a pencil and notebook to enable him to make notes, to write letters to the outside, or to communicate with other guerillas. He should always carry a sewing kit.

A guerilla who carries all these articles will have a solid house on his shoulders — a considerable weight, but adequate to make his life more comfortable amid the hard work of the campaign.

Organisation for Bush Warfare

Flexibility is foremost in the guerilla leader's mind. Just as the conventional forces commander must be ready to change his tactics — so must the unconventional leader be prepared to reverse his field to stay with the situation.

The organisation of a bush war cannot be described as following a rigid scheme. There are innumerable differences resulting from adaptation to the environment to which the principles apply. For reasons of exposition, we shall assume that our experience has universal value. However, we must stress that as we explain it, there always exists the possibility that new ways of doing things can be found which

3. Mao Tse-tung. Selected Works, II, 154: "The principle of command in guerrilla war is opposed both to absolute centralisation and to absolute decentralisation; it demands a centralised command in strategy and a decentralised command in campaigns and battles."
are more suited to the characteristics of the particular armed group.

The number of units in a guerilla force is one of the most difficult problems to define. There are different numbers of men, different organisations of troops, as we have experienced. We shall suppose a force located in favourable mountainous territory under conditions that are not so bad as to force them to move continually, but not so good as to enable them to have a permanent base of operations. An armed nucleus located in such a setting should not have as its tactical unit more than 150 men. It may even be that this number is too many and the ideal might be 100 men. This constitutes a column, and it is commanded, following the Cuban military hierarchy, by a major (commandante). It may be well to repeat that in our war we abolished the ranks of corporal and sergeant because we considered these to be representatives of tyranny.

Basing ourselves on these premises, a major commands a force of 100 to 150 men and has as many captains under him as there are groups of 30 to 40 men. The captain leads and organises his platoon so that it fights almost always as a unit, and he is in charge of the distribution of supplies and the general organisation of the unit. In guerilla warfare, the squad is the functional unit. Each squad has approximately eight to 12 men and is commanded by a lieutenant who has duties analogous to those of a captain for his group, but who is always subordinated to his captain.

The operational reality of guerilla warfare, which is waged in small groups, makes the squad the real unit. Eight to 10 men are the most that can act together in a fight under such conditions. Therefore the lesser groups must execute the orders of their immediate chief often while separated from the captain although active on the same front. One thing that must never be done is to fragment the unit and to maintain it as such at times when there is no fight. For every squad and platoon, the immediate successor must have been named in case the chief is killed; the successor must be sufficiently trained to be able to take immediate charge of his new responsibility.

One of the fundamental problems of this troop concerns food: lowest-ranking men must receive the same treatment as the chief. This is of prime importance not only with respect to chronic malnutrition, but also because the distribution of food is the only regular daily occurrence. The troop is very sensitive to justice and measures all rations in a critical spirit. Never, therefore, must the least degree of favouritism influence anything. If for any reason the food is distributed among the entire column, some order must be established and must be strictly respected. At the same time the quantity and quality of food allocated to every person must be specified.

4. Some readers may recall that Batista was a first sergeant in the Cuban Army before he seized power.
In the distribution of clothing, the problem is different because here are articles of individual use. Two criteria must be considered. First, the claimant's need. Second, the system of seniority and merit. This is difficult to define and must be set down in special charts by someone entrusted with them and approved by the chief of the column. The same procedure must be followed with all other articles which may arrive and which are not for collective use.

Tobacco and cigarettes must be distributed according to the general rule of equal treatment for everyone.

The task of distribution must be handled by persons who are especially entrusted with it. It is advisable that these be part of headquarters. Indeed, headquarters has very important administrative tasks of co-ordination, and other tasks should normally be given to it. The most intelligent officers should be part of headquarters, and its soldiers should be diligent and imbued with the highest spirit of devotion, inasmuch as the demands made of them will, in most cases, be greater than those made of the rest of the troops. However, in matters of food they have no right to any special treatment.

Every guerilla fighter carries his own complete equipment, but there are a number of articles of special social importance to the column which must be fairly distributed. For these two criteria may be established, depending on the numbers of unarmed persons in the troop. One solution is to distribute all the objects such as medical supplies, extra food, clothing, general surplus foods, and heavy weapons equally among all platoons. Each platoon would then be responsible for the custody of the material assigned to it. Every captain would distribute the goods among the squads and each squad leader would distribute them among his men. Another solution when there are unarmed men in the troops, is to form squads or platoons especially entrusted with the transportation of these supplies. Using these men will be very beneficial, since it unburdens the combat soldier while those who are unarmed do not have the weight or the responsibility of the rifle. In this manner, the danger of losing supplies is reduced; in addition, they are more concentrated. At the same time, this arrangement constitutes an incentive for the porters to carry more and to demonstrate more enthusiasm because one of the rewards may be the opportunity to carry a rifle in the future. Such platoons should march last in the column and should have the same duties and receive the same treatment as the rest of the troops.

The tasks to be executed by a column vary with its activities. If it remains permanently in the encampment, it must have special security teams. Seasoned, specialised troops should be detailed to this task which should entitle them to some premium. This, in general, might consist of some independence or in some surplus delicacies or tobacco to be distributed among members of units which have
extraordinary tasks. Of course, these supplies must have been initially distributed to the entire column. For example, if there are 100 men and 115 packages of cigarettes, these 15 extra packages could be distributed among the members of the units to which I have referred. The vanguard and the rear guard, distinct from the rest, will have as their duty the primary responsibility for security. Nevertheless, each platoon must keep up its own. The more that areas distant from the encampment are kept under surveillance — if the camp is in open space — the greater the security of the group.

The places selected must be at some altitude; they must command a wide area by day and be difficult to approach at night. If several days are to be spent there, it is convenient to establish defensive works which allow and sustain adequate fire in case of attack. These defences may be destroyed as the guerillas withdraw from the site. If circumstances do not require the absolute obliteration of the column’s tracks, they may simply be abandoned.

At sites where permanent encampments are set up, defences must be clearly and perfectly established. It must be noted that in mountainous areas the mortar is the only effective heavy weapon. Using cover suited to the materials of the area (timber, stones), perfect shelters can be built which will impede the approach of enemy forces and protect your men from howitzer fire.

It is very important to maintain discipline within the encampment. Discipline must retain educational characteristics. The guerillas must go to bed and arise at definite hours. They must not be permitted to engage in games which do not have a social function or which have a tendency to impair the morals of the troop. Alcoholic beverages and gambling must be forbidden. Supervision should be entrusted to a commission on internal order elected from among the fighters of greatest revolutionary merit. Among other duties they prevent the kindling of fires visible from a distance at night and betraying columns of smoke during daylight. They also make sure that the encampment is thoroughly policed when the column leaves it, if it is desired to keep secret the halt made at that site.

Much care must be taken with campfires because their traces remain a long time. It may be necessary to cover them with earth and to also bury papers, tin cans, and food waste.

During the march absolute silence must be enforced over the column. Orders are passed along by gestures or whispers from person to person until the last man is reached. If the guerilla force marches through unfamiliar areas, clearing a path for itself or being guided by someone, the vanguard will precede it by some 100 or 200 metres as dictated by the terrain. In places where confusion may arise as to the route, one man is stationed at each fork in the road to wait for the next group, and so on until the last of the rear guard has been reached. The rear guard will also march
separately from the rest of the column to watch the paths left behind and to attempt to conceal the column’s tracks. If side-paths offer danger, there must be a group to watch such paths until the last man has passed. It is most practical that these groups be provided from one special platoon. However, they can also come from each platoon, in which case each group would entrust its mission to the group of the next platoon and return to its place; and so on until the entire troop has passed.

Not only must the march be at a specified pace; it must always be maintained in an established order so that it shall be known that Platoon No. 1 is the vanguard; that Platoon No. 2 comes next; that in the middle is Platoon No. 3 with the headquarters; then follows Platoon No. 4; and finally, that the rear guard is Platoon No. 5. Regardless of the number of platoons in the column, their order must always be maintained. During night marches, silence must be complete and the ranks closed so that no one loses his way and thereby creates risks from voices being raised or light being lit. At night light is the guerilla’s enemy.

Of course, if this march has as its object an attack, when the desired place has been reached to which all will return after the mission has been fulfilled, all superfluous equipment (knapsacks, pots, and so on) should be left behind so that each platoon will proceed only with its arms and other battle equipment. The target of the attack must have been studied by trustworthy men who will have made the contacts, observed the pattern of enemy guards, the layout of the position, the number of men defending it, and so on. Then the definitive plan of attack is made, and the fighters station themselves. It must be remembered, however, that a sizable part of the troops must be reserved to engage enemy reinforcements. The enemy’s attack on the position may be only a ruse designed to lure reinforcements into an ambush. Therefore, one man must be able to quickly communicate with the command post because it may be necessary to retreat quickly in order to prevent being attacked from the rear. In any case, guards must always be posted along the approaches to the combat area when the siege is being initiated or a direct attack takes place.

When besieging, one need only to wait and to dig trenches which come ever closer to the enemy thus always trying to come to grips with him by all means. Above all, one should try with fire to make him come out. When he is well encircled, the Molotov cocktail is extraordinarily effective. If one is not within range of a cocktail, he can use a shotgun with special attachment. This consists of a 16-gauge sawed-off shotgun to which a pair of supports has been attached in such a manner that with the end of the butt stock they form a tripod. When so prepared, the weapon rests at an angle of about 45 degrees.

5. Oddly enough, for all his disdain for conventional warfare this is the classic seventeenth and eighteenth century method of conducting a siege.
This can be varied by moving the supports forward or backward. The weapon is loaded with an open cartridge which has been emptied of shot. The cartridge is then perfectly suited to receive a stick which becomes the projectile and protrudes from the mouth of the shotgun barrel. To the protruding end of the stick is attached a tin with a rubber buffer and a gasoline bottle. This apparatus will throw incendiary bottles 100 metres or more and can be aimed rather accurately. It is the ideal weapon for sieges in which the enemy has many fortifications made of wood or inflammable material. It is also good for shooting at tanks in rugged terrain.

Once the siege has ended with a triumph, or has been raised after the objective has been achieved, all the platoons retire in their normal order to pick up their knapsacks and return to normal life.

The organisation, fighting ability, heroism and spirit of the guerrilla group will undergo their most crucial test during a siege — the most dangerous situation in a war. In the jargon of our guerrilla fighters during our war, the term “siege anxiety” was applied to the anxious expression some of the scared ones wore. The officials of the deposed regime pompously referred to their campaigns as “siege and annihilation”. Nonetheless, for a guerrilla force familiar with the terrain, united ideologically and emotionally with the leader, this is not a serious problem. All that one need do is to take shelter, try to prevent the advance of the enemy, impede his use of heavy equipment, and await the night, the natural ally of the guerrilla fighter. When it becomes dark, then, with greatest silence possible, and after having explored and chosen the best path, the guerrilla force will utilise the best available means of escape while observing complete silence. Under such conditions it is very difficult to impede the escape of a group of men from a siege.

Combat

Vulnerable are the vanguards and the point men are marked for mayhem by the guerrilla, who also uses encirclement and night attack as morale-breaking manoeuvres.

During the first stage of guerrilla warfare, enemy columns will make deep incursions into rebel territory. According to the strengths of these columns, two types of attack can be made. One, systematically carried out over a period of months, will cause the enemy forces to lose their offensive capability. It habitually precedes the other type, and is carried out against the vanguards. Unfavourable terrain will prevent the column from advancing with adequate defence on their flanks. In this manner, there will always be a portion of the vanguard which penetrates and exposes its members as it seeks to assure the security of the rest of the column. The vanguard usually is a small force and cannot count upon reserves. Therefore, no matter how strong the remainder of the enemy's force, the destruction of this tip of the
vanguard will always occur. The system is simple and requires only a little co-ordination. The moment the head of the van-
guard appears at the pre-
determined place, the attacking
guerilla force must, as suddenly as possible, break through to the
designated men and deliver a
devastating fire. Then a small
group contains the rest of the
column for a few moments so
that weapons, ammunition, and
equipment can be gathered. The
guerilla soldier must always be
aware that the enemy is the
source of his weapons. Except
for special circumstances, he
must not wage a battle which is
not likely to gain him such
equipment.

When the strength of the
guerilla force permits, the enemy
column should be completely en-
circled. At least, this must be the
impression created. In such an
instance, the guerilla vanguard
must be so strong and so well
tenrenched that it can resist
a frontal assault. At the
instant the enemy is held up
in some special place, the
guerilla forces of the rear guard
attack his flanks. Inasmuch as
the selected place will have
characteristics which will make
flank manoeuvres difficult for
the enemy, it will be easy to
station snipers who will be able
to contain the entire column —
perhaps eight or 10 times greater
in number — within the circle of
fire. When that happens (pro-
vided, of course, there are
sufficient men), all routes must
be blocked in order to deny him
any reinforcements. Gradually,
the circle must be tightened,
especially at night. The guerilla
has faith in the night, but the
enemy's fear will increase in the
darkness.

In this manner, an enemy
column can be totally destroyed
with relative ease. Or such heavy
losses can be inflicted upon it as
to force a return to camp and
require much time for regroup-
ing.

When the guerilla force is very
small, and it is desired by all
means to detain the enemy
column or to slow its advance,
groups of sharp-shooters should
be used. They should number
from two to 10 men stationed at
each of the four cardinal points
around the column. In this
manner the enemy column will
be fired upon from the right
flank, for instance. When the
enemy centres his attention on
this flank and attacks it, he
will, at that precise moment, be
fired upon from the opposite
flank. At still another moment,
the rear guard will be attacked,
or the vanguard, and so on. With
a small expenditure of ammuni-
tion the enemy can be permanc-
ently held in check.

The technique for attacking a
convoy or an enemy position
must be adapted to suit the
conditions or the site selected for
combat. Generally, one must be
certain that the first attack
upon an encircled place will be
a surprise during darkness

6. Mao Tse-tung. Selected Works, II, 130:
"Ingenious devices such as making a
noise in the east while attacking in the
west, appearing now in the south and
now in the north, hit-and-run and night
action should be constantly employed to
mislead, entice and confuse the enemy".
In addition, Mao gives a dissertation on
the guerilla view on encirclement.
against some advance post. If one has the advantage of surprise an attack carried out by fearless men can easily liquidate a position. For a regular siege, the escape routes can be controlled with a few men. Moreover, the access routes can be defended with men so dispersed and concealed that if one of them is passed, he can withdraw or simply yield while a second sniper remains, and so on. In situations where the factor of surprise does not exist, success or failure of the attempt to take the encampment will depend on the ability of the besieging force to contain the efforts of the relief columns. In such instances the enemy will usually have the support of artillery, mortars, and aeroplanes in addition to tanks.

In terrain suitable for guerilla warfare, the tank is not very formidable. It must pass through narrow paths and is easy prey to mines. In general, the offensive capability which these vehicles have when in formation, loses its value because they must proceed in single file or, at the most, two by two. The best and safest weapon against tanks is the mine; but in hand-to-hand fighting so easy to execute in rugged terrain, the Molotov cocktail is of extraordinary value. We have not yet mentioned the bazooka which can be a most decisive weapon for a guerilla force. However, they are difficult to obtain at least during the early days of a guerilla war.

A covered trench affords protection against mortar fire. The mortar is a formidable weapon against an encircled force. Conversely, its use against moving targets diminishes its power unless it is used in great numbers. Artillery is not very important in this kind of struggle since it must be sited in places of easy access, and it cannot reach targets which move about. Aircraft are the principal arms of the oppressing forces, but their power of attack is much reduced by the fact that small concealed trenches are their only targets. They can drop high-explosive bombs or bombs of jellied gasoline, but these are more a nuisance than a real danger. Moreover, whenever one has come as close as possible to the enemy's defensive lines, attacks by enemy aircraft endanger the positions of his vanguard.

A good means of defence against armoured cars are steep ditches dug across their path in such a way that the vehicles easily fall into them, but have difficulty coming out. These ditches are easily concealed from the enemy, especially during night marches or when he cannot order infantry to precede the tanks because of the resistance of the guerilla forces.

Another common form of enemy advance, in areas that are not very rugged, is in trucks that are more or less open. The columns are preceded by some armoured vehicles followed by infantry in trucks. According to the strength of the guerilla force, the entire column can be encircled, or it can be decimated.
by attacking some of the trucks and simultaneously exploding mines. Then one must act rapidly to gather up the weapons of fallen enemies and withdraw. If conditions allow it, a total siege can be executed.

The shotgun is an excellent weapon for attacking open trucks, and it should be utilised to the fullest extent of its power. The shot pattern of a 16-gauge shotgun loaded with buckshot can cover 10 metres, killing some of the truck's occupants, wounding others, and causing great confusion. Hand grenades are also excellent for such attacks.

Ammunition is the greatest problem of the guerilla fighter. Weapons can almost always be obtained and kept by the guerilla force. However, once ammunition is fired, it is gone. Usually, weapons are captured with their ammunition but only very rarely is ammunition alone seized. Not every weapon seized with its own ammunition can contribute to the total supply since there is no reserve stock. The tactical principle of conserving rounds is fundamental in this type of war.

No guerilla leader, who thinks of himself as such, would neglect the retreat. A retreat must be well timed, nimble, and insure the recovery of all wounded men and equipment, be it knapsacks, ammunition, or other material. A rebel must never be surprised while in retreat, nor must he permit the course of the struggle to encircle him.

For all these reasons, the path selected must be watched at all points from which the enemy forces might possibly advance with troops in order to attempt to close a circle. A message system must be established which permits rapid warning to comrades that some force is attempting to encircle them.

During the battle, there should always be unarmed men. These men will recover the rifle of a wounded or fallen comrade, or seize the weapon of a prisoner. They can be put in charge of prisoners, transport the wounded, or carry messages. It is important to have a good group of messengers of proved ability, and with feet of iron, who can forward the necessary messages expeditiously.

There are many variations in the number of men that are required in addition to armed fighters, but they may be reckoned at two or three for every 10 fighters. Among them are some who aid the fight by acting as rear guards, or defending the lines of retreat, or establishing the messenger system.

When a defensive type of war is waged — that is, when the guerilla force is engaged in preventing an invading column from passing a specific point — then the fight becomes a war of positions. The already mentioned element of surprise must always be sought from the beginning. The entire defensive apparatus must be established in such a manner that the enemy vanguard always falls into an ambush. A very important point to remember is the psychology

8. Mao Tse-tung. Selected Works, II, 125: "Gather a big force to strike at an enemy segment, remains one of the principles for field operations in guerilla warfare."
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connected with the fact that in a fight, invariably the enemy in the vanguard are killed. This creates in the opposite army a disinclination to be part of the vanguard. It is obvious that a column which does not have a vanguard cannot move unless someone assumes this responsibility.

It becomes clear that more men and more weapons are required in defence than in offence. It is clear that many soldiers are required to block off all the possible paths — and they can be many — leading to a zone. Here additional use must be made of all traps and means of attack against armoured vehicles; and strict security must be established to protect trench networks. In general, in this type of combat, the order must be given to die in defence; but every defender must be given the greatest chance of survival.

The more concealed a trench is from distant observation, the better. Above all, it is well to cover it with a roof to neutralise the effect of mortars. The shells of mortars used in the field — those of 60 or 81 millimetres — cannot go through a good roof well constructed out of the materials of the area. These may be a layer of wood, earth, or stones covered with some material which hides the roof from the view of the enemy. The shelter must always have an exit which will enable the defender to escape in emergencies without greatly endangering his life.

In this type of war, the work of those not directly concerned with fighting (those who do not carry a weapon) is extremely important. We have already stated several characteristics of communications in places of combat. These communications are a branch within the guerilla organisation. Communication with the farthest headquarters, or with the farthest group of guerillas, if there is one, must be so established that it is always possible to reach them by the most rapid method known in the region. This is as true in areas easily defended — that is, in terrain suited to guerilla warfare — as it is in unsuitable terrain. It cannot be expected, for instance, that a guerilla force fighting in unsuitable terrain would be able to use modern systems of communications. This is because such installations can be of use only to fixed garrisons that can defend such systems.

In all these situations, we have been talking of our own war of liberation. Communications are complemented by daily and correct intelligence concerning all the activities of the enemy. The espionage system must be very well studied, well worked out, and its agents chosen with maximum care. Enormous harm can be done by a counter spy. Even without referring to such an extreme example, great harm can result from incorrect information, regardless of whether it tends to exaggerate or underestimate dangers.

A most important characteristic of guerilla war is the notable difference between the information the rebel force possesses and that known to the
enemy. The enemy’s agents must pass through zones that are totally hostile; they encounter the gloomy silence of the populace. In each case the defenders can count on a friend or a relative.

It is clear that preparation must be made to expel the enemy from the affected territory. Guerillas must profoundly upset methods of supply and completely destroy lines of communication. The disruption of enemy efforts to supply himself forces him to invest large numbers of men in such attempts.

In all these combat situations, very important factors are reserves and, if at all possible, their proper utilisation. The guerilla army, by its very character, can count on reserves in only few instances. Therefore, when involved in an action, the efforts of even the last individual must be regulated and fully utilised. However, despite these characteristics a number of men must be kept ready to respond to an unforeseen situation, to contain a counter offensive, or to help decide a situation at a precise moment. Depending upon the organisation of the guerilla force and the situation at the time, a “general utility platoon” must be held ready for such necessities. Such a platoon must always reach those places in greatest danger. It might be called “the suicide platoon” or some other such name, but in reality it will have to accomplish the functions which the name indicates. This suicide platoon must get to all the places where the action will be decided: attacks designed to surprise the vanguard, defence of those sites that are most vulnerable and most dangerous, or any place from which the enemy may threaten to break the stability of the firing line. Such a platoon must be composed entirely of volunteers, and it should be considered almost a privilege for a guerilla fighter to be admitted to membership. In time such a platoon will become the spoiled child of the guerilla column, and any fighter in this unit can count on the respect and admiration of all his colleagues.

To be continued.