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CONTENTS

	Page
Malayan Campaign 1941/42 <i>Major J. A. Clark</i>	5
Experiences in Short	
Course Training <i>General Frhr Geyr von Schweppenburg</i>	18
Algeria — Strategic Review	26
Book Reviews	29
La Guerra de Guerrillas <i>"Che" Guevara</i>	32

The views expressed in the articles in this Journal are the author's own and do not necessarily represent General Staff opinion or policy.



Photo Australian War Memorial, Canberra.

TOBRUK

In the early Stages of World War II the British forces in the Middle East were faced by a formidable Italian army which had crossed the western frontier of Egypt and was preparing to advance on Alexandria and Cairo. The British Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal Lord Wavell, anticipated his adversary by launching an offensive with numerically inferior forces on 6th December, 1940. In a series of battles in the frontier area, the British 7 Armoured Division and 4 Indian Division heavily defeated the Italians, and on 3rd-4th January, 1941, 6 Australian Division captured their stronghold of Bardia.

After Bardia 6 Australian Division, supported by 7 Royal Tank Regiment, moved on to Tobruk, a strong Italian fortress garrisoned by some 25,000 troops, 200 guns and some tanks. Early on 21st January the Division punched a hole a mile wide and a mile deep in the southern face of the defences, followed up rapidly, and by the afternoon of the next day had overcome the last pocket of resistance. Besides 25,000 prisoners, the booty included 208 guns, 87 tanks, hundreds of motor vehicles and an immense quantity of military stores.

The picture shows infantry of the Division crossing the Italian wire on the morning of 21st January.

THE MALAYAN CAMPAIGN

THE BATTLE FOR GURUN DECEMBER, 1941

Major J. A. Clark
Royal Australian Infantry

THIS is the second of four articles in the series dealing with battles studied by 1 RAR in 1961 during their tour of duty in Malaya.

B Company was given the task of investigating the events at Gurun, of conducting a tour of the area, and of putting the results of their studies on paper.

We began our study by having the five company officers read the available books on the subject. Then each officer with an interpreter went on to the ground to find the defensive positions and consider the conduct of the battle. Five days were spent by these teams checking and rechecking the information they gained before the troops of B Company thoroughly searched the area for trenches, abandoned weapons, ammunition, equipment, and for anything else of interest.

Whereas, before the battle, the local inhabitants at Jitra had been sent into the jungle by the civil authorities, this was not the case at Gurun, for as we will see, events moved too fast for such a course. Over 150 local people were interviewed. Many of these could give no information at all,

or contradicted others. But on one important issue we found 25 local inhabitants to confirm that troops were in a particular area that the text books state was unoccupied.


The Gurun Position

In 1938 General Bond, then GOC Malaya, decided that the best natural defensive position in North Malaya was in the Gurun area. This Gurun position, 19 miles south of Alor Star, at the junction of the large, flat, rice-growing area with undulating country thickly covered by large rubber plantations, became known as the Bond line. In 1940, when Lieutenant General Percival replaced General Bond he too agreed on its natural defensive qualities.

The line ran from the slopes of Kedah Peak on the left astride the Alor Star road and railway to the jungle two miles East of the main road. The forward edge of the line had small but dominating features which commanded the approaches across the padi and swamp to the north. As the road and railway ran for miles through the middle of this flat country, the Bond

TO SADAO & SINGORA

TO PATANI

**NORTHERN MALAYA**

ROADS: TRACKS: RAILWAY:

INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY: SWAMP * * * * *

BRITISH DEFENSIVE POSITIONS:

JAPANESE ADVANCE: REGIMENTS INVOLVED: = 41ST INF. REGT.

DATES OF ACTIONS: (14) (15) (16) (17) (18-20) (19-20)

(ALL DEC. 1941)

SCALE:

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 MILES

Map 1

line looked a formidable task for an attacker.

The three airfields in the Sungei Patani area to the south seemed assured of maximum protection for a considerable period.

The main spur from Kedah Peak (3992 feet) runs down to the road at the 20½ mile post. East of the road for a mile each side of this point were padi fields which ran across to the railway. In December 1941, these fields, like most in the area, were flooded for the normal growth of padi, which at the time was about three feet high. North of the padi, from the 19½ mile post there were rubber plantations and other scattered trees. Opposite these, west of the road, the padi extended for miles to the north west. A strip of rubber from 100 to 300 yards wide ran down the east side of the road from the 19¾ mile stone to the 20½ mile stone. There was mainly rubber between the railway and the jungle edge to the east, and like most rubber in the area at the time it was between 5 and 12 years old, and about as many inches thick. It gave good protection from air observation. The high ground in the area is shown shaded on Maps 2 and 3. The rest of the area is flat. Kedah Peak was, and still is, covered in dense jungle which ran right down to the road.


The Withdrawal From Jitra

It will be recalled that the rearguard of 11 Division broke contact with the Japanese at about 0430 hours on 13 December, on the line of the Sungei

Kedah at Kepala Batas. Like so many other demolitions in the campaign the two bridges over this quite formidable obstacle were not completely destroyed, and in less than an hour vehicles were able to cross the river.

By 1000 hours that day the Japanese had closed up to the river on the south side of Alor Star. Here the river line was held by rearguards from 28 Brigade, while 6 Brigade held a line astride the road and railway about 9 miles south at Simpang Ampat. What was left of 15 Brigade was in reserve further south down the road. The division had paused behind the river barrier to reorganise its scattered units, but there was considerable confusion in the area as large numbers of stragglers, many without arms, made their way back from Jitra to rejoin their units. This confusion was not lessened by the presence of Japanese snipers who, wearing Malayan dress, had infiltrated into the area.

The road and rail bridges at Alor Star had not been prepared for demolition, though the charges had been stored alongside them. These charges were hastily laid during the night of 12/13th December. Two Japanese raiding parties attempted to capture these bridges intact just after 1000 hours, but failed. Both were blown, the road bridge completely, but the railway bridge, though damaged, failed to fall even after an armoured train had passed over it. A counter-attack by 2/9 Gurkhas foiled the first Japanese attempt that day to secure a bridgehead.



New bridge built on remains of road bridge over Sungei Kedah at Alor Star.

It was obvious by this time that many of the British and Indian troops were in no condition to withstand an attack in strength. The Divisional Commander accordingly ordered the withdrawal to continue to the reconnoitred but unprepared position at Gurun some 20 miles further south. In heavy rain, and with many mishaps, a badly congested stream of traffic moved south during the night to Gurun. Owing to orders going astray, 6 Brigade's withdrawal started very late and its rear battalion (1/8 Punjab), weary and hungry, did not reach the crossroads north of Gurun until midday on the 14th.

The state of the Division then, when all troops were on the Gurun line, was that it was now

about half strength in men and equipment. In 6 Brigade the three battalions had each lost over 100 men. The CO 1/8 Punjab had been killed, 2/16 Punjab had lost carriers and trucks as well as about one company in men. 2 East Surreys had lost 8 of their carriers at Alor Star when a small bridge was blown prematurely. In addition they had lost about 100 men and some other vehicles and equipment. 15 Brigade, which was nearly destroyed at Jitra, was down to 500 strong with very little of its equipment. 2/2 and 2/9 Gurkhas were still reasonably intact but 2/1 Gurkhas had only about two companies left. A number of field and anti-tank guns had been lost together with communications equipment, vehicles and

key personnel. But above all, morale, already badly shaken by events at Jitra, was now considerably lower after the strenuous withdrawal of about 30 miles, on foot and in foul weather over two nights. Needless to say the only aircraft in the sky were Japanese. By this time they had been using the British stocks of bombs and petrol at the Alor Star airfield for 24 hours.

The Defensive Layout

The defensive position at Gurun had been reconnoitred months before and the intention had been that, when required, civilian labour would dig the defences. Officers had carried out several "Tactical Exercises Without Troops" in the area and some units had dug positions there. An elaborate position had been prepared for Rear Divisional Headquarters near Sungei Patani. Preparation was ordered on 8th December but nothing was done as, although the necessary civilian labour was found, in the confusion of the retreat it had dispersed. In consequence when the troops, who had been fighting or on the move for a week, arrived in the area they had once again to set about this arduous task. They had very little time for the Japanese advanced far more quickly than had been expected.

The Battle

Our examination on the ground of the defensive layout given in the British Official History and our discussions of their official version of the battle raised doubts as to the way the battle was really fought. Accord-


ingly, both the official version and our version of the battle are given. Following these we have given the reasons for the calamity and have drawn conclusions.

The Battle as Described in the British Official History (See Map 2)

The 11 Division plan for the occupation of the new position placed 6 Brigade on the left covering the railway and the trunk road, with 28 Brigade on its right and the depleted 15 Brigade about 500 strong, in reserve. The 88 Field Regiment, with an extra field battery and three anti-tank batteries, provided the support for both brigades. Observation was however restricted and the forward localities had only a limited field of fire.

The following is a summary from the official version of the important events in the battle:—

- (a) 1400 hours 14th December. About a dozen Japanese lorries carrying infantry and preceded by three tanks, arrived near the cross roads. The presence of tanks came as a great surprise, for it had been expected that the damage to the bridges over the Kedah and other rivers would keep them out of the battle for several days. The tanks were engaged by anti-tank guns; one was hit and the others withdrew.
- (b) 1400-1600 hours. Japanese infantry steadily reinforced and 1/8 Punjab area penetrated. Morale was shaky and some retrograde movements began.



Map 2

- (c) 1600 hours. Brigadier Lay organised a counter-attack and restored the position around milestone 20. This gave new spirit to the tired troops, but the cross roads remained in enemy hands.
- (d) During a visit that afternoon by the Corps Commander, the GOC 11 Division urged that the time had come to concentrate in order to avoid defeat in detail. He submitted that any further withdrawals should be by long bounds by lorries or rail. He was told that his immediate task was to hold the Japanese at Gurun.
- (e) In an effort to drive the enemy north of the cross roads Brigadier Lay had planned a counter-attack by one company of 2 East Surrey for first light on the 15th.
- (f) 0130 hours 15th December. After a heavy and accurate mortar bombardment the Japanese attacked down the main road, broke through the right of 1/8 Punjab and infiltrated deep into 6 Brigade's area. Not only was Headquarters 2 East Surrey overwhelmed, the commanding officer and five other officers being killed, but also 6 Brigade Headquarters, the whole of which was lost, except the Brigadier, who was away at the time.
- (g) Meanwhile the Commanding officer of 1/8 Punjab, thinking that the enemy had overrun the forward companies of 2 East Surrey on his right, and that he was completely isolated, withdrew what remained of his battalion and a company of the East Surreys to the West to Yen. This left the main road and the whole position west of it completely undefended.
- (h) Brigadier Carpendale (28 Brigade) took prompt action and managed to hold the Japanese around Gurun using troops from his own and 15 Brigade.
- (j) The Divisional Commander ordered an immediate withdrawal to a position about 7 miles south, as a preliminary to a withdrawal south of the Muda River that night.
- (k) The enemy suffered casualties from artillery fire and did not follow us closely.

Neither General Percival's account of this battle nor the brief Japanese version in Colonel Tsuji's book agree with this official version. Of particular interest from a military history point of view are the defensive layout adopted and the conduct of the defence.

The Defensive Layout — Our Version

"The Gurun position is the best natural defensive position in North Malaya". The topography has already been described. High ground is shown on maps and the positions occupied, according to the Official History, are on Map 2. Bearing these in mind the following facts are pertinent:—

- (a) The left forward company of 1/8 Punjab was on flat ground in 3 to 4 foot high padi. In December it is

- impossible to dig in wet padi.
- (b) The high ground at the cross roads and 100 yards east was not occupied even though this area dominates the approaches from the north.
 - (c) 2 East Surreys were spread in depth over 2 miles. With the serious communication difficulties existing this is hard to understand.
 - (d) 2/2 Gurkhas, 3 miles east of the road, and facing the jungle, doesn't appear to be deployed for the same battle.
 - (e) The rail and road crossing at Chempedak appears to be held in great strength and in depth, but the main road appears to be much more lightly held.
 - (f) On the road axis, companies are so dispersed that they are not mutually supporting.
 - (g) Communication difficulties within brigades and battalions can be imagined.
 - (h) General Percival states that Brigadier Lay counter-attacked the cross roads. In the layout shown this is most unlikely. The British Official History states that Brigadier Lay counter-attacked and restored the position around milestone 20, but could not regain the cross roads. It is fairly obvious from the layout that Brigadier Lay would have to counter-attack if the right forward company of 1/8 Punjab fell to the enemy. However, a defence is usually pretty shaky if a brigade counter-attack has to go in to retake a forward com-

pany. Why should Brigadier Lay plan to commit a further company at first light on the 15th to retake the cross roads? If this area was so important why wasn't it occupied in the first place?

From the above facts we deduced that perhaps the troops of 11 Division did not occupy the positions as shown on Map 2. As a result of our investigations on the ground we submit the following probable layout of the division on 14th and 15th December at Gurun (Map 3).

28 Indian Brigade. The locations shown on Map 2 of 2/1 and 2/9 Gurkhas are not disputed. Local inhabitants confirm that "Indian" troops were in these locations and extensive diggings can still be seen. These were either dug before the war, dug by the two battalions, or started by the two battalions and improved by the Japanese when they were preparing to defend Malaya themselves.

New rubber has been planted in the area shown in Map 2 to have been occupied by 2/2 Gurkhas. As a result no diggings could be found. It is easy to be wise after the event but it is hard to find a reason for siting a battalion (one of the only two at nearly full strength) in this area. On Map 3 we have shown the more likely location of the battalion. Extensive diggings were found there, and a 1937 pattern water bottle was picked up in the trenches which are British type. Whilst the position could have been dug later by the Japanese this is unlikely, but could not be confirmed by the

locals. A plantation manager, who was in the Kedah Volunteers before and during the war, was quite adamant that there were diggings in the area when he did "Tactical Exercises without Troops" there in 1941.

15 Indian Brigade. Diggings confirm the presence of the remnants of this brigade in the area shown on Map 2.

6 Indian Brigade, 1/8 Punjab we assume to have had only three companies at the time. Local inhabitants and diggings suggest that one company was at and east of the cross roads. This may have been a screen position. There is ample evidence that a company was located east of the road at the 19 $\frac{3}{4}$ mile post as shown on Map 2. The third company was located on the main spur of Kedah Peak as shown on Map 2. Local inhabitants and the advanced state of the digging suggest that this company position was dug before the war. Battalion headquarters was also located in this area.

2 East Surreys. No diggings could be found in any of the positions shown on Map 2. Local inhabitants state that there were no troops in the rear company position as shown. Diggings sufficient for two company positions were found in the areas shown on Map 3. The diggings in the forward company area are extensive, whilst those in the company area south of this position were hastily dug fighting pits. Local inhabitants maintain that the Japanese improved the position shown north of the lateral road. As cultivation and resettlement has taken place

near the railway station, and no diggings could be found, we therefore have assumed the probable location of the third company. The forward company north of the road we have assumed to have been the one under command of 1/8 Punjab. Headquarters 6 Indian Brigade was established in six shops on the road just north of Gurun itself.

Divisional Troops. According to local inhabitants there was a battery of 25 pounders behind the road running east from Gurun itself. The other three battery positions could not be located but they are assumed to have been near the main road south of Gurun.

Main Divisional Headquarters was located in Harvard Estate 4 miles south of Gurun.


The elaborate Rear Divisional Headquarters was in rubber in the KLM Estate 3 miles east of Sungei Patani. A lot of engineer effort had gone into providing a road system and adequate hard standing. These still exist.

The Battle — Our Version

The suggested layout of 11 Division is shown on Map 3.

From our investigations we believe that events at Gurun were probably as follows:—

At 0600 hours 13th December Rear Divisional Headquarters started moving from its area near Sungei Patani. Before the service units left they established dumps of clothing, supplies and ammunition on the Gurun position. Some were east of the crossroads and others in Gurun township itself.



THE BATTLE FOR GURUN 1/R.A.R. VERSION.

ROADS ROADS SECONDARY OR ESTATE RAILWAY

RUBBER SWAMP PADDY JUNGLE APPROX. OVER 50 FT HEIGHTS

COMPANY POSN. ESTIMATED POSN. BATTALION AREA

BRIGADE BOUNDARY ARTILLERY BATTERY

ABBREVIATIONS: PJB = PUNJAB; GR = GURKHA RIFLES.

SCALE: MILES

Map 3

At 1200 hours 14th December the last troops of 1/8 Punjab arrived at the cross roads from Simpang Ampat.

About 1400 hours a Japanese bomber dropped five bombs on the company of 1/8 Punjab at the crossroads. Three Japanese medium tanks and about 12 truck loads of infantry advanced towards the cross roads. One tank was hit by fire from a 2 pounder and the others withdrew back along the road. In the next two hours there was a build-up of Japanese infantry of 21 Regiment who were now leading the advance, and who after sharp attacks, forced the two forward companies back to positions in the padi west of the road. The Japanese then pressed on down the road until they were held up by the company of 1/8 Punjab near the 20 mile-stone. Once through this company they were through the Divisional position. At about 1600 hours Brigadier Lay personally led a counter-attack by what was left of the carrier platoon of 2 East Surrey, his brigade reserve. They forced the Japanese back and almost reached the cross roads, before further Japanese pressure forced them back. The position was eventually stabilised about the 20 mile stone.

That evening Brigadier Lay ordered the reserve company of 2 East Surrey to regain the cross roads at first light next morning. Once he gained this key position he would reinforce it.

At about 2200 hours heavy mortar fire began to fall on 1/8 Punjab positions and after three

hours of this a battalion of 21 Regiment attacked straight down the road. They quickly broke through the company of 1/8 Punjab on the road. The CO of this battalion, out of communication with 6 Brigade Headquarters and other units, thought that the Japanese had broken through on his right and that he was isolated. He decided to withdraw westward to Yen on the coast about 8 miles away, and took with him his own three companies and one from 2 East Surrey.


Japanese patrols had thrust forward rapidly and attacked the Headquarters of both 2 East Surrey and 6 Brigade. Both were overwhelmed and most officers were killed.

Meanwhile Brigadier Carpendale rushed a force to the 21 mile stone where a fierce battle raged at about first light.

At about 0600 hours the GOC went forward and decided that the situation was serious and he would have to withdraw south.

At about 0730 hours the Japanese bombed the railway bridge in front of 2/16 Punjab, presumably to prevent its destruction, (the Kampong in the area is now called Kampong Titi Bom—meaning bombed bridge), and launched an attack on the Punjabs. Brigadier Lay, who had been away from his headquarters when it was overwhelmed, now ordered 2 East Surrey to attack the flank of the Japanese thrust down the road. This had little effect.

The battle at the 21 mile stone continued until about 1000 hours, and both sides suffered heavy



Kedah Peak (3,922 ft) from a point $\frac{1}{2}$ a mile west of cross roads.

casualties. (A monument to their dead built by the Japanese is still at this site.)

The thrust down the railway was held by 2/9 Gurkhas and part of 2 East Surrey.

The GOC at about 1000 hours decided that the situation was even worse than he thought, and that he would have to get across the Sungei Muda, about 20 miles south, that night.

Between 1000 and 1200 hours the Division withdrew whilst its artillery inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. A rearguard action was fought on the road east from Gurun as the main elements of the division withdrew south through the rubber in Harvard Estate where in their haste they discarded much

ammunition, food and many weapons.

Only small Japanese forces followed the division to the south, for their main thrust turned inland at Gurun on minor roads to try and intercept 11 Division in the Taiping area.

The Reasons for the Loss at Gurun

The main reason for the very quick loss at Gurun is that the tired, dispirited troops fought badly. The constant Japanese pressure for seven days was more than most of the Indian troops could stand. The causes of failure at Jitra — lack of training, poor control, low morale and aggressive Japanese tactics — were all aggravated by a retreat of over 30 miles on foot in 36 hours. These factors, together

with relentless Japanese pressure, forced the division into many errors. Bridges were not properly destroyed, some were blown prematurely and many not at all. Orders were late or never given. Troops received little or no rest and were forced to operate in the most trying weather conditions, and without a friendly aircraft in the sky. Communications barely functioned and commanders, for the most part, were out of touch with events. The net result of all this was that morale was very low. It should be quite clear that it didn't matter which positions were occupied by 11 Indian Division at Gurun, for the battle was lost before it started. A chance to rest and reorganise might have made a difference, but the Japanese saw to it that there was no respite.

Despite all this there were other factors which contributed to the defeat at Gurun. First of these was that 15 Brigade was no longer an effective force. It meant in effect that the position had to be held by only two brigades. This resulted in two good battalion positions north of the road from the cross roads to the railway not being occupied, and in 6 Brigade being deployed with all three battalions forward. In the left battalion, 1/8 Punjab companies were widely dispersed and open to defeat in detail.

It seems extraordinary that following successive defeats at Changlun, Asun and Jitra by tanks and infantry thrusting through on a narrow front astride the road, that the Divisional Commander did not deploy in depth on the road to

meet a similar threat. For some reason he allowed 28 Brigade to deploy on a wide front to the east.

The abandonment of their positions by 1/8 Punjab at a critical time during the night was an unpardonable sin, and exposed the whole division to annihilation.

The false assessments of Japanese capabilities on land, on the sea, and in the air, all contributed to the defeat at Gurun. On land there were too few troops, and, in North Malaya, planning and training for Matarador was undertaken at the expense of preparation and training for the defensive battles. Even some of the engineer effort lavished on Rear Divisional Headquarters would have greatly strengthened the Gurun line, and a few air sorties against the Japanese columns on the Alor Star road would have taken heavy toll.

Conclusions

In less than 24 hours at Gurun a Japanese force of two battalions, boldly handled and extremely aggressive, mauled and almost destroyed 11 Indian Division. Once again lack of preparation, a low standard of training, poor control, inadequate communications and low morale led to defeat by a force considerably inferior in strength.

11 Indian Division in 7 days had been reduced to less than half strength. It was exhausted by continuous fighting and by day and night movement. Morale, though not yet broken, was approaching breaking point.

EXPERIENCES IN SHORT COURSE TRAINING

General Leo Freiherr Geyr von Schweppenburg
German Army (Ret.)

Translated by Sergeant W. G. Fladung, RAAEC
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Before his retirement, General Leo Geyr von Schweppenburg was a professional officer of the German Army, with a long family tradition of military service. Before World War II he was for a time German Military Attache in London. During the war he commanded with great distinction armoured formations on the Eastern and Western fronts. This article from an experienced soldier is a valuable contribution to the discussion of the problem of rapidly expanding the Army in time of war.—

Editor.

General

MODERN warfare and the effectiveness of modern weapons result in high casualties. In atomic warfare they can occur in numbers beyond our imagination.

Thus, reserves trained in peacetime will not be sufficient to replenish or replace decimated or annihilated units for any length of time.

Considering this fact and taking into account the increased demands made on the home forces and the exhaustive utilisation of their strength, it appears that a mental and technical preparation for a military "crash course" is necessary. This

"crash course", to make sense, must be revolutionary. Its value depends very much on the quality of the instructor assigned to it. Even in the regular army in peace time, this quality leaves much to be desired, mainly because the type of man wanted is given better financial reward by industry.

What is discussed in the following pages is not a cleverly formulated "hypothesis". It is a practice tested by the German panzerwaffe¹ (armour) during the final, the worst period of need in World War II.

This rough and ready crash course training provided more than half the personnel of German fighting units at Arnheim and the Battle of the Bulge.

The very intelligent present German Minister of Defence mentioned a short time ago, before a large meeting, the great difficulty of throwing outdated concepts overboard. He is right, of course. But regarding military training, he has not applied this principle as yet.

The aim is to make a soldier who can efficiently fight an enemy and to train that soldier

1. Panzerwaffe: Armoured troops, including panzer-grenadiere (see note 8), Anti-tank Artillery and Assault guns (see note 10).

in the shortest span of time. It is also a matter of being quite clear about what to throw overboard as a mental encumbrance.

This is asking for very, very much. In its final form it poses the question whether desk or battlefield experience decides issues.

One of the smartest and most widely experienced soldiers of German wartime airborne troops, now a college lecturer, was asked: How much of what his replacement troops had learned in training could they actually use in combat? His answer: Twenty per cent. This is a devastating assessment of conventional training methods. It is also true that the greatest casualty rate occurs with troops freshly arrived from garrisons and that much had to be learned in action which could have been taught, and should have been taught, in training.

The greatest sin committed in training in many armies, especially the German, is "Drill". It was justified a long time ago, for instance at the time when the adjutant of Frederic the Great, Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben had to regroup, into units, loose formations of rangers (Jaeger)² in an era of close-order battle formations.

The atomic age requires an almost 180 degrees about-turn. It requires within the training period, whether condensed to three months or extended to 12 months, primarily one thing: the mental, psychological and technical preparation of the soldier for "the merciless loneli-

ness of the individual fighter in an open form of battle". This was aptly named in an intelligent brochure on the subject. This holds true in a modern conventional war as much as in an atomic war.

This type of open warfare becomes necessity when the means for direction and communication have become nil, even with the most up-to-date equipment.

Those who know of the reactionary post-Napoleonic epoch in the various armies, e.g. the Russian of Nicholas II, or the Prussian, also know how quickly war experience is forgotten and replaced by the change-resisting mentality of older generations in influential positions. This trend still exists today.

We would like to cite one classical example of recruit training from the Prussian cavalry, bearing in mind that this took place a hundred years after the exploits of the Frederician Seydlitz, and 50 years after the Jaegers (rangers) of Yorck von Wartenburg in the Napoleonic campaigns. It is given in an extract from a letter of Prince Albrecht of Prussia, dated 7th February 1854, addressed to the Chief of Staff of the Corps

2. Jaeger: Lit. translated — Hunter. Traditional name given to rifle units with special training in marksmanship, forest, bush and mountain warfare, later extended to parachute troops. Suggests a quality of independent fighting. Closely resembling the US Ranger units except for the exclusiveness of the latter.
3. Seydlitz: Famous cavalry leader, non-aristocratic officer elevated to general's rank under Frederic II, known for daring surprise actions.
Yorck von Wartenburg: Prussian general, approached Russians and negotiated alliance to liberate Europe from Napoleon, re-organised Prussian army which had been defeated by Napoleon.

of Cavalry, Major in the Regiment of Hussars of the Guard, Freiherr von Geyr:

"Last week, His Majesty ordered the recruits of the body-guard company of the Garde du Corps to perform foot drill in the marble hall of the palace!!! at Potsdam. In spite of the mirror like surface of the polished marble floor, marching, halts, change of direction, turns, ceremonial marches etc. were performed with utter disregard for death; but everything came off with excellent bearing and presence of mind and one could not notice that the men moved on the smooth, slippery surface of the court. It must be said that the drill was performed with utmost precision. I was deathly afraid that one would fall at any moment. As I found out, the performance was planned originally as drill with the rifle and when the king ordered march exercises Douhoff's face turned pale, his one eye grew bigger and bigger and finally he closed both. Lieutenant Count Kirstberg was in charge of the detail".

It is unnecessary to comment on this. Sensible officers could do little about this sort of mentality.

It is still profitable to give some thought to an order which Guderian, as Inspector-General for Armoured Troops in the West, had reason to issue after a conversation with the author. This was in May 1943, and the order was given to an arm which had 3½ years of generally successful warfare to its credit.

"Inspector-General
of
Armoured Troops

29th May, 1943

It has been reported to me that the training of Armoured, and Motorised Divisions in the West frequently takes a course which does in no way give justice to the urgency of the situation.

I therefore order:

1. The first priority for all arms is weapon training. Even with little ammunition a high standard of firing proficiency can be attained.
2. I forbid:
 - (a) Drill exercises as opposed to battle training, or to prepare for battle training.
 - (b) Drill as duty function on parade ground, sports oval etc.
 - (c) Training separated by time and syllabus into units, for instance, four weeks section, three weeks platoon, one week company training.

Training is to be organically integrated from the very beginning. It must not happen that an organisation finds itself functioning in battalion formation for the first time when facing the enemy, in case of an early committal to action.

3. Our recognised shortcomings will be given preferential attention, for instance: Night fighting, night and twilight firing, combat in forest and bush country, camouflage and concealment. I recommend training exercises and schooling of troops according to new training pamphlets issued by O.K.H. (AHQ).

- i. Rifleman and Section in Night Action.
- ii. Combat in Forests.
- iii. Camouflage and Concealment'.

4. Finally, I admonish superiors, including those at higher levels, to make maximum use of all available time and to insure variety of training by constant supervision of weekly training schedules.

signed: Guderian".

Pre-requisites for "Crash Course" Training

- (a) Instructors trained for the purpose.
- (b) Availability of a demonstration section⁴. This is to be increased when required.
- (c) Reconnaissance of the area, prior to the exercise, by the superior in charge, even in case of small, or night and twilight exercises.
- (d) A battle course.
- (e) Suitable terrain beyond the limits of the garrison training area, as far as this is possible under peace-time conditions.

Vote seeking governments and electors' representatives generally claim that they can not afford, under the prevailing shortage of space in many parts of the continent, to set aside urgently needed training grounds, in spite of the continuance of relatively short terms of military service. But, to use a comment of Frederic II, "They will have an army which is proficient only by their own standards".

Principles of Application

Maxim: Only vital and life saving war training must be undertaken.

The aim is to make soldiers, nothing else.

- (a) The place for daily training is the battle course. Time planning is of utmost importance. The whole of the training period, whether three months or more are available, is to be calculated and utilised in a manner creditable to a businessman of wide organisational and financial experience. The instrument with which to accomplish this is the training plan. This plan will be constantly supervised by superiors and can be interchanged by units for added stimulus and exchange of ideas.
- (b) The goal of training is the ranger-like⁵, experienced, independently-thinking, fighting man.
- (c) The battle course must provide good instructional facilities for the organic training of the foot soldier in the essential battle requirements; weapon training, concealment and

4. Camouflage and concealment: The term "Tarnung" is used in the original article, which in German stands for either camouflage or concealment, or for both.

5. Demonstration Section: The translator used the term "section", although the original states "Gruppe" which can either denote the tactical unit "section" or a group generally. This is pointed out because the term "group" may have been intended instead of only a "section", considering that the German Army used demonstration "groups" up to divisional size. ("Panzer Lehr Division" = Armour Demonstration Division).

camouflage, entrenching, scouting. *These activities must not be separated by time, or taught one by one, they must be taught simultaneously as connected functions.* The firing range in its pure form is therefore outdated. Such a "lift-out" section of ground is unlikely to exist anywhere in the reality of war.

- (d) The emphasis of training is on efficient, compared with that of the enemy, superior shooting. It constitutes the best chance for survival.
- (e) Instruction in marksmanship begins immediately with the live round. The traditional theoretical and practical humbug (trajectories, drill rounds, dummy rounds) is dispensed with. As soon as the soldier knows the first firing positions it is left to his judgment whether to fire or hold his fire. On the battle course the trainee will not know when, where and what targets will appear for how long and at what distance.
- (f) In regard to weapons, basic infantry training is to include only the assault rifle, machine carbine and the sniper's rifle⁶. (Platoon weapons).
- (g) Firing positions are to be taught the second day after induction, regardless whether outfitting is complete or not. Night training begins within the first three days, so does firing at late dusk or early dawn. The dummy round is to be eliminated from the very beginning of training.

- (h) *Drill in any form or by any name is not permissible.* Essential discipline can be taught incidentally by way of the daily routine; assembly etc.

The separate and systematic instruction of at first the individual, then the section and then the platoon in the traditional method is forbidden. Organic growth methods are used instead. After only a few days of instruction in single combat, training is varied by one day section training, one day platoon training and again one day section training. Faults and sloppiness must be picked up and eliminated calmly by way of revision or employment of the demonstration unit.

The guiding thought must be the creation of usable small units in the shortest possible time.

- (i) A considerable part of the training time, about 33%, should be devoted to night, dawn and dusk warfare. Darkness, soundless movements, night and twilight firing, soundless trenching, and hand to hand combat are important situations which have to be considered. About 25% of the available training ammunition is to be used in night and twilight firing by all arms.

6. Assault Rifle: German; Sturmgewehr, at present the FN Rifle. Machine carbine: The translator used the term applied in the Aust. Army, although the term machine pistol is used in the German text — Maschinenpistole. Sniper's Rifle: Standard rifle with telescopic sights, slightly modified. The British term has been used.

- (j) Night training is to be based on special night training schedules.
- (k) Trenching and camouflage are basic elements of combat. Both are to be taught along the lines of a "Field Fortifications and Camouflage" pamphlet; keeping in mind that the trained soldier has to be able to meet certain vital trenching and camouflage requirements when in action. He must, under field conditions, by day or night, be able to dig in and camouflage his person and all his personal equipment used in battle, and construct such cover as foxholes, section weapon pits, communication trenches, circular and angular slit trenches.
- (l) At all times the performance of training tasks by individual, section or platoon is to be observed from the "enemy side" by an instructor equipped with field glasses, preferably a member with thorough war experience. The instructor/observer holds a red flag and on showing this the activity is stopped immediately. The faults are then eliminated, one by one, until the instructor is satisfied.
- (m) In all training activities, by individuals as well as small units, competitive spirit is to be used in the most suitable applications.
- (n) To train the soldier in independent thought, spontaneous exercises are indispensable. Such an exer-

cise may be performed by a group of recruits with only little skill and unsatisfactory results, but it can then be used for the purpose of demonstration and improved upon either by direct teaching and revision or by example through the skilled repeat performance by the demonstration unit. Fault finding and self criticism by the trainees concerned are valuable training aids.

Although this method of training costs money, organisational skill and above all, thought and mental effort, it will make up for it in lives saved.

Conclusions

The technique of "crash course" training, reflecting closely the realities of war, is not simple. Firstly, to be successful, the senior instructor must have complete command of the subject matter. The shorter the available training time, the better the quality of the senior instructor and his assistants must be.

Arms and Services which require training of a complicated technical nature, for instance Signal troops, demand about $\frac{1}{4}$ more time than "panzer grenadiere". To fill the high demands for specialists in a modern army, the sensible allocation of technically trained enlistees by the

7. *Panzer Grenadiere: Infantry and Armour*, complementing each other to such an extent that the organisation can not be defined as predominantly Armour or Infantry. The term "mounted infantry" is only correct in so far as the fighting method is concerned. But while the panzer grenadier unit is a permanent organisation, mounted infantry is a means to suit an occasional exigency.

Co-operation of Pioneers^a with other Arms during Recruit Training

(partially by sand model demonstration)

Other Arm concerned and situation of training	Type and Details of training
<i>Armour</i>	
1. Attacks with Mounted Section.	1. Knowledge and recognition of tanks.
2. Road building on the Battle-field.	2. Principles of tank warfare.
3. Attacks across minefields.	3. Improvised bridging, access roads, fording.
	4. Radio communications (short introduction).
	5. Clearing of minefield gaps for tanks.
<i>Artillery (S.P.)^a Artillery (Anti-tank)</i>	
1. Laying of minefields.	1. Laying of minefields, minefields protected by anti-tank gun.
2. Fighting patrols.	2. Support of assault-pioneer fighting patrol by single, self-propelled gun or heavy anti-tank weapon.
<i>Panzer grenadiers' (heavy weapons)</i>	
1. Fighting patrols.	1. Battle inoculation by overhead machine gun fire.
2. Crossing of rivers.	2. Exploitation of diversion barrage.
	3. Fire control of weapons with flat and weapons with high trajectories (co-ordination).
	4. Co-operation of fighting patrol with heavy weapons.
<i>Artillery</i>	
1. Assault on fortified positions.	1. Use of fire cover.
2. Crossing of rivers.	2. Knowledge of lethal dispersion and effective ranges.

Table 1

8. Pioneers: Pioneers in the German Army had the double function of pioneers and engineers. Assault pioneers were those pioneers (engineers) who served with other arms, for instance infantry, and retained their pioneer corps identity.

9. Artillery, S.P.: In the German text "Sturmgeschütze", literally translated: Assault gun. A gun mounted on tank chassis. In Aust. Army terminology: self-propelled gun.
Artillery, A.T.: Panzerjaeger in the German text. Literally tank hunter, the gun either tractor drawn or mounted on tank chassis or as tank armament.

recruiting authorities is a great help. The Swiss Army applies this method with success. In countries in which for internal political reasons or prejudice universal military training does not take place, specialised and suitable knowledge or qualifications attained, i.e. driver's licence, the apprenticeship examination passed in a desirable trade etc. could be promoted by courses, scholarships and such.

The individual Russian soldier was in some activities, i.e. camouflage and concealment, forest fighting, night combat, generally superior. He is closer to nature than Western man. Training in these activities should therefore be emphasised. I mention the comments of a well-known, war-experienced German soldier. He emphasised, when these questions were discussed, that the man in the West turns the light on whenever necessary, the Russian countryman, however, is used to getting along in the dark and semi-dark and can work without any trouble.

The instructional personnel of the regular Wehrmacht and the mentality of its leadership never took short term training into consideration.

Camouflage and concealment were "Cinderellas" amongst training subjects. In the beginning of the century, at the time of the Russo-Japanese War, when a new Infantry Manual was being prepared, one of the two advisers to the Kaiser stated that it made no difference at all whether a regiment entered the battlefield in "Field grey" or the historic "Prussian Blue".

Night training was without system in the German Army. It was practically restricted to troop movements at night. On the British side, the Ghurkas in World War I and the New Zealanders in World War II were dangerously efficient night fighters, in addition to the Russians.

Any kind of short term training stands or falls with the quality and training of the instructional staff. This quality is still unsatisfactory today, even in the regular forces.

Short term training demands a system of its own. It must be created in addition to the system established for long-term serving troops, with special consideration for reserves for the use of troops operating away from bases and those defending the bases as such.

A truly strict rationing of service time was an unknown concept in most European armies before World War II. Today, if only for economic reasons, periods of military service carry a vastly different value than they did at the time when the "value of time" could be and was squandered.

The old German Army, in spite of all its other qualities, has never had a tradition for saving time.

An indication of what can be, and was taught, in a very short time, which was actually done during the final phase of World War II, is given in Table 1.

Strategic Review

ALGERIA

THE present turmoil in Algeria clearly marks the end of another phase in the West in the Mediterranean basin. Two and a half centuries before the beginning of the Christian era, Rome and the Phoenician colonists of Cathage fought three long and bitter wars for supremacy of the inland sea. Roman victory brought peace to the area until, with the collapse of Byzantine rule in AD 538-68, the whole of the north African littoral fell into disorder. In the 7th century the first impact of the Arab Islamic invasions swept through the country and on into Spain. The Islamic armies restored order in the towns and established a new civilisation, but the bedouins who followed in their wake engaged in a predatory form of nomadism which ravaged the countryside and ruined the agricultural system of the native Berbers.

Under the Arab Caliphs, Algeria enjoyed only short periods of peace and orderly government. In the 16th century the country became a province of the Turkish Empire, but was in fact nothing more than a grazing ground for turbulent nomadic tribes and a base for the pirate fleets which preyed upon Mediterranean shipping and ravaged the coasts of Europe. Algeria became a purely piratical state, maintaining itself by the capture

and sale of Christian slaves and merchandise. The curtailment of these activities by European navies in the 18th century further impoverished a country where neither agriculture nor commerce flourished, and where order was inadequately maintained.

In 1830 France seized the town of Algiers, ostensibly to destroy the last stronghold of the pirates, but actually as a first step towards the restoration of French hegemony in the Mediterranean which had been lost to the British during the Napoleonic wars. Initially France aimed at little more than the occupation of a fairly small area. This proved to be impracticable, and between 1830 and 1848 France occupied most of northern Algeria. In 1848 this area was formally declared French territory. Successive French governments blew hot and cold over the Algerian problem, sometimes wishing to restrict their authority to the coastal areas. Generally, however, the tendency was towards the extension of authority and the encouragement of French colonists to settle on lands made available to them by the enclosure of nomadic grazing grounds.

Concurrently with the settlement of large numbers of French colonists on the land and in the towns, the native Moslem society

recovered its cohesion and benefited from orderly conditions of life and the introduction of European techniques. Compared with the anarchy of the immediate past, this relative security and prosperity led to a revival of Islamic culture which, in turn, resulted in a desire for a greater share in the government of the country. In response to these aspirations, the French tried many expedients, including the incorporation of some areas in metropolitan France with representation in the French parliament. None of these expedients proved successful, and in the end organised rebellion broke out on a considerable scale.

In planning their rebellion, the Algerians did not make the old mistake of attempting to engage in pitched battles with their more heavily equipped adversaries. By adhering strictly to classical guerilla strategy and tactics, they imposed on France a military and economic burden which at last became unupportable. At length the point was reached when by far the greater proportion of Frenchmen, already disillusioned by their defeat in Indo China, were no longer prepared to support the Algerian war. Further, for economic reasons alone, it was clearly impossible for France to continue a struggle in which victory seemed as far off as ever, and at the same time to maintain her place in the NATO alliance and her authority in European affairs. The recent referendum shows that nearly all Frenchmen approve their government's action in making peace with the rebels on the

basis of Algerian independence. There really was no alternative, unpalatable as the fact may be to the French residents of Algeria.

The die-hard Frenchmen in Algeria and some ultra-conservative elements of French officer corps undertook to wreck the settlement by instituting a form of guerilla warfare of their own. Their object appears to be twofold; firstly by creating conditions of chaos in which the transfer of the administrative machinery would be impossible, and secondly by the murderous slaughter of Moslems to provoke counter-slaughter of Europeans in order to force the French Army to retain control.

The Moslem population has shown an astonishingly firm discipline in face of murderous attacks and many casualties. So far such reprisals as have taken place have been on a very minor scale, and have not produced the inter-racial warfare hoped for by the dissidents. This discipline may be taken as a measure of the organisation and control which it is possible for guerilla leaders to impose on a sympathetic population.

While there are undoubtedly some regular French officers who are prepared to turn a blind eye on terrorist activities, there is no sign that the army as a whole will waver in its loyalty to the government. On the contrary, the Army units in Algeria are showing great steadiness in an emotionally disturbing situation, and are resolutely carrying out their orders. In France the referendum has shown that

there is no chance whatever of the government being overthrown.

Since both the French government and the French people are resolved upon acceptance of the agreed settlement, the dissidents appear to be doomed to failure. Once they are driven from their strongholds and the predominantly European areas, they will be without bases and in the midst of a largely hostile population. Guerilla warfare can hardly be waged under those conditions on any considerable

scale, though sporadic outrages may continue for some time. Failing some totally unforeseen development it would appear that the conditions essential for the success of the "secret army organisation" simply do not exist. It seems certain that another chapter in the ebb and flow of conquest in the Mediterranean is about to close. It is to be hoped that this time the Moslems of Algeria will treat their European minority with more tolerance than they have exercised in the past.

E.G.K.

The combat arms soldier and small unit remain the cutting edge of new tactical concepts, but with a whole new recognition of the importance of MAN. The soldier, and particularly the combat arms, small unit, soldier-leader, is coming into new focus. The very special character and skills required of this ultimate weapon offer unparalleled challenges to the young citizen and soldier . . .

The challenges and the rewards of service, in all parts of this One Army, are keeping pace with the times. New weapons and new field equipment are reaching the troop units. The training and supporting factors are improving.

The new Army is not changing just for change's sake. The essential and traditional features which build esprit de corps are not being sacrificed. This indispensable ingredient of battlefield victory is, rather, being strengthened as the Army moves forward.

General Bruce C. Clarke, US Army



THE CONDUCT OF WAR 1789-1961 by Major General J. F. C. Fuller. (Eyre and Spottiswoode, London.)

GENERAL Fuller is one of the best known contemporary writers on the conduct of war and was a member of the small school of British officers which in the years between the two world wars tried to bring about a better appreciation of the role of armour in future conflicts. Any book from the pen of this distinguished military thinker is an important work which merits the attention of every thoughtful soldier.

This book is a study of the developments in the methods of making war — and of making peace — during the last 200 years. In assessing Clausewitz's influence on modern military thought, Fuller points out that the blind spot in that military philosopher's thinking was his failure to grasp the truth that the true aim of war is a satisfactory peace and not merely a military victory. The stubborn adherence of many of Clausewitz's disciples to his fallacious view of the aim of war, plus the triumph of American idealism over the facts of European life, caused World War I to result, not in a stable peace, but in a state

of affairs which was bound in the nature of things to lead to another great conflict.

Fuller's chapters on the conduct of World War 2 are a masterly analysis of the events which led to an even more unsatisfactory peace than that which followed the first conflict. While giving Churchill and Roosevelt full credit for their magnificent leadership, he considers that the former's failure until it was too late to see beyond the last winning shot, coupled with the latter's misappreciation of Russian aims, throws upon them a heavy share of the responsibility for the disadvantageous position in which Western Europe, indeed the whole Western World, finds itself today. In the military sphere, Eisenhower's inability to see anything beyond purely military considerations contributed powerfully to the unfortunate result. In Fuller's view the blind pursuit of unconditional surrender as the primary war aim benefited no-one but the Russians.

The outstanding feature of this book is its exposition of the relationship of military operations to national policy and interest, and its emphasis upon the dangers attendant upon allowing them to become separated.

By placing the reader in the context of developments over the last 200 years, it gives him the background necessary for profitable reflections on the future.

E.G.K.

THE BEARDLESS WARRIORS

by Richard Matheson. (William Heinemann, Ltd., London and 317 Collins Street, Melbourne.)

In sharp contrast to General Fuller, Richard Matheson is not in the least concerned with the higher direction of war. In this book at any rate he is concerned solely with the effects of desperate and prolonged fighting on young soldiers thrown into battle without adequate training and preparation for the ordeal. He makes his points by telling the story of an 18-year-old American soldier, Everett Hackermeyer, in a 10 days battle on the Western Front in the winter of 1944.

Matheson's description of the fighting is stark, powerful and realistic. He presents the battle through the soldiers' eyes, even junior officers are but shadowy figures on the edge of the turmoil. Attacks and counter-attacks crowd one upon another in an endless sequence which saps the soldiers' vitality and crushes their capacity for thought. These battle scenes are at least as good as anything of the kind that has been written about modern war.

Matheson, however, is not so happy in his choice of characters. The central figure, Hackermeyer, is a "dead-end kid" whose background was scarcely calculated to give him a balanced view of any aspect of life or to assist him in forming social

relationships in any circumstances. With the exception of the truly magnificent sergeant, none of the others quite fits into the category of the normal, run-of-the-mill characters which constitutes by far the greater proportion of the soldiers of a citizen army. There is something a little odd about every one of them. Matheson would have conveyed his message more effectively if his characters had conformed more closely to the general pattern. Against this, there is the secondary message of the psychologically warped Hackermeyer acquiring stability and learning the meaning of love through the leadership and example of his sergeant.

Apart from its powerful descriptions of the battle as seen and experienced by the other ranks, this book has another message for the soldier, perhaps a message that Matheson never intended to convey. One gets the impression that the training of those men left much to be desired. They could handle their weapons well enough, but they seem to have had only very sketchy notions of their functions as members of a fighting team. Collective training seems to have been defective, while psychological preparation for the ordeal of battle seems to have been neglected. A simulated battle course, or a week or two in a divisional battle school, would have done them all a lot of good.

Besides being an exciting, well-told war story, this book is useful background reading in that it presents an impressive

picture of the conditions of conflict which the hastily raised war time citizen soldiers have to be trained and prepared to cope with. It gives anyone with no actual experience of war a useful

point to work back from. And if you are looking for an example of a stout-hearted fighting NCO, you will find one in the squad leader.

E.G.K.

Inasmuch as the Soviet Union and the US agreed in the declaration of principles in September, at the end of the McCloy-Zorin talks, on the goal of general and complete disarmament, the problem now becomes an attempt to implement that goal stage by stage. The Soviet Union and the US have a basic disagreement which must be resolved on this question. We believe that there must be adequate inspection, to make sure that each side is disarming and staying in accordance with the agreements which they make. The Soviet Union has stated that it will permit us, or the international body, to inspect those weapons which are destroyed but will not permit us to carry out an inspection to see what weapons remain. One side could destroy a hundred bombers but still have a thousand or two thousand bombers left. If you are really going to provide for orderly disarmament, it seems to me you have to inspect not only those weapons which have been destroyed, but also those weapons that remain. Otherwise we do not have any guarantee of security for either side. If we can agree to an effective inspection system so that each country can know that the other is living up to its agreement, then, in my opinion, we can move into general and complete disarmament.

President John F. Kennedy



LA GUERRA DE GUERRILLAS

Condensation of the book by
"Che" Guevara

From the March 1962 issue of ARMY Magazine
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INTRODUCTION

ONE of the quixotic facts of this century is that pathologically secretive revolutionaries and dictators have outlined in great detail their plans for seizing and maintaining power. Even more quixotic, however, has been the refusal of the normally frank democracy and its leaders to believe these writings even when the unfolding sequence of events follows the pattern outlined in the writings.

If we Americans can rationalise away our lack of belief in the writings of Lenin, Hitler, Mao and Stalin because of our general non-involvement with the countries involved prior to World War II, we cannot laugh away or ignore either the threats of Khrushchev or the dangers to our national interests by recent events in Cuba. Therefore, this abridgment of a book by Ernesto Guevara, Fidel Castro's field commander during the Cuban Revolution, is of major interest and concern to all of us. Che

Guevara, an Argentinian by birth, is now President of the National Bank of Cuba and a driving, if not the driving force, in pushing Cuba ever deeper into the Communist orbit.

It is known that Che Guevara has long been a Communist, although the record doesn't show that he ever received a formal Communist education in Moscow. He must, however, have read many of the works of leading Communists. Consequently, he has undoubtedly been influenced by the writings of Mao Tse-tung on guerilla warfare. The exact extent is unknown although there is a uniformity in thought as the various editorial notes accompanying this condensation will indicate.

This book is a warning similar to other revolutionary writings. On the more hopeful side, one sees guerilla-like events also beginning to occur in Cuba itself, for it would appear that Communist revolutionaries quickly forget the high ideals they proclaim when fighting.

At the same time it must be noted that the US press has reported that Spanish language editions of this book are flooding Latin America and that Moscow has announced that a Russian language edition is to be published later this year.

There is in all this a major concern for soldiers. The United States Army has had little experience against guerillas since the Indian wars. Our modern wars have been tidy affairs with little or no disruption of our rear areas except by normal enemy bombardment, or other action with which we were equally normally prepared to cope. Therefore, we have no body of experience for dealing with rear-area security when presented with a guerilla threat.

Field Manual 31-21, Guerilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations, concerns itself almost exclusively with the use of guerillas in support of our operations and says nothing about defence. Our doctrine would appear to be contained in the statement, "security is the commander's responsibility". This, however, is insufficient, as the German experience in Russia proved. Too late, the Germans began to organise anti-guerilla bands, to create methods of procedure and to prepare special units. The damage had been done. The senseless terrorism and reprisals of the SS could not be undone and the entire German rear area was aflame with guerilla action. It is an accepted fact that this guerilla activity was a major factor in the Russian victory.

While present troop training schedules call for sessions devoted to defence against guerillas, we have developed no great body of official literature on the subject.

It is true that FM 31-15, Operations Against Airborne Attack, Guerilla Action, and Infiltration exists. However, it was published in January 1953 and includes very little concerning anti-guerilla tactics as such. In essence, this manual states: "The commander charged with the responsibility of defending an area exposed to a guerilla threat must skilfully combine offensive and defensive tactics in a ratio commensurate with the forces which he has available". However, it is too late to try the "skilfully combine" advice in the midst of a full-scale guerilla threat. It must be done now. Therefore, the abridgment that follows should provide much

The author of the book "La Guerra de Guerrillas" is commonly known as "Che Guevara". In the introduction he is also referred to as Ernesto Guevara. In conversation, an Argentinian frequently interposes the word "che" (pronounced as the che in "cherub" or "cherubim") which really has no translation and no meaning. It is used in "Oye Che!" which means "Hey you!" or "Mira Che" which means "look". Consequently Argentinians are usually referred to as "ches" in other Latin American countries in the same way as citizens of the U.S.A., be they southerners or not, are called "Yanquis". The Australian automatic nicknames are "Nobby", Clark, "Chalky" White, "Dusty" Miller, etc. Guevara's baptismal name is Ernesto, by which he is more formally addressed. He had to leave Argentina to avoid military conscription and took refuge in Mexico, after short unwelcome sojourns in other South American countries, where he met up with Fidel Castro. Since occupying an important position it is understood he has taken out Cuban nationality. However, the nickname has stuck.—Editor. A.A.J.

material for sober speculation. How would we as an army meet concerted guerilla activity, given the austerity of our current organisation?

A few words about the condensation that follows are in order. Repetitive material has been omitted. However, only a few changes have been made in the wording so as to insure retention of the full flavour of the original work. This has meant, in some cases, retention of the tortured and involved phraseology which appears to be characteristic of works of this type.

The briefings in italics at the beginning of each section are editorial insertions that do not appear in the original.

— The Editors of "Army".

PART I —

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Essentials of Guerilla Warfare

The guerilla force is the fighting vanguard of the people's struggle against their oppressors and its agent — the professional army. Guerillas strike and flee ... give the enemy no rest. Their final purpose is to annihilate the enemy and to obtain victory.

The armed victory of the Cuban people over the Batista dictatorship, an epic triumph recognised throughout the world, clearly demonstrates the ability of a people to free themselves, by means of guerilla warfare, from a government that is oppressing them.

The Cuban Revolution made three fundamental contributions to the mechanics of revolutionary movements in America:

- (1) The forces of the people can win a war against the army.
- (2) It is not necessary to wait for the fulfillment of all conditions for a revolution because the focus of insurrection can create them.
- (3) The area for the armed struggle in under-developed America is the rural regions.

Independent of an analysis to be made later, we place the foregoing conclusions of the Cuban revolutionary experience at the head of this work as its basic contribution.

War is subject to a definite system of scientific laws. Anyone violating them will meet defeat. Guerilla warfare is governed by these same laws² but is also subject to special laws that derive from the particular geographic and social conditions in each country.

Our present task is to analyse this type of struggle and the rules to be followed by a people seeking their freedom.

First, it is necessary to determine the combatants in a guerilla war. On the one side is the centre of oppression and its agent — the professional army. On the other side is the population of the nation in question. It is important to point out that

1. There is an important point here: United States Army doctrine in FM 31-21 visualises guerilla warfare in support of conventional forces and as part of an over-all campaign. Guevara is visualising guerilla activity as a revolutionary action to overthrow an established government. Thus, paragraph 18 of FM 31-21 states: "Guerilla operations are not ordinarily effective unless coordinated with conventional military operations. The theatre commander must often support the guerillas with arms, ammunition, and equipment".
2. See Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, II, 124: "Guerilla warfare is different from regular warfare only in degree and in the form of manifestation".

guerilla warfare is a struggle of the people. The guerilla force is merely the fighting vanguard of the people and derives its great strength from its roots in the mass of the population. The guerilla force is not, therefore, to be regarded as numerically inferior to the army it is fighting although it is inferior in firepower. It is necessary to resort to guerilla warfare when there is support from a majority group but only a limited quantity of arms to defend against oppression.

The guerilla counts, therefore, on the support of the entire population of a locality. This is an indispensable condition. We can see this very clearly if we consider the example of bands of robbers operating in a region. The band has all the characteristics of a guerilla army: homogeneity, respect for the chief, bravery, knowledge of the terrain and even, in many cases, complete understanding of the tactics to be used. The band lacks only the support of the people. Inevitably, therefore, the robber band is arrested and exterminated.

For the proper analysis of guerilla warfare, it should be noted that there are two different types: first, the guerillas supplement the effort of a large regular army as in the case of the Ukrainian guerillas; second, an armed group is fighting against an established government. We are not interested in the first type. We are interested only in the type where an armed group is carrying on a fight against an established colonial (or other) power. This is a group

that has its base in a rural region and is operating in and from that region.

It is important to remember that guerilla fighting is only a beginning or preparation for conventional warfare. The possibilities for the growth of the guerilla force and for changing the type of fighting to conventional warfare are as numerous as the possibilities for defeating the enemy in each of the separate battles or skirmishes that take place. For this reason, it is a fundamental principle that there must never be a lost battle or skirmish.

The fundamental tactic is to strike and flee continually so that the enemy gets no rest. Though this appears somewhat negative in character, it is, nevertheless, consistent with the general strategy of guerilla warfare, which has the same final purpose as any other form of warfare: to annihilate the enemy and to secure victory.

War is a struggle in which both sides attempt to annihilate one another.³ In order to achieve this purpose, they use force, subterfuge, trickery or any other device at their disposal. Military strategy and tactics reveal the aspirations of the military leaders and their methods of achieving objectives. The

3. The interesting point here is that Guevara means there are no conventional type military objectives in a guerilla war: a given hill or town is meaningless as an objective. The objective is always to annihilate whatever force the guerillas attack. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, II, 121, uses this same type of thought when Mao says, "All guiding principles for military operations proceed without exception from one basic principle; that is, to strive as far as possible to preserve one's own strength and annihilate that of the enemy".

method always contemplates taking advantage of all the weak points of the enemy. If we compare a war of position with a guerilla war, we can see that in a war of position the action of each platoon of a large unit corresponds to the action of a guerilla force. The platoon may commit acts of treachery, will engage in night operations, and will attempt to achieve surprise. If it does not use these methods, it is only because it has not found the watching enemy off guard. However, the guerilla force is a self-contained unit free to move anywhere, and there are always large areas unguarded by the enemy. Consequently, it is always possible to use the tactics described and to take advantage of surprise. Therefore, it is the duty of the guerilla to use these tactics.

Guerilla combat is a phase of warfare that cannot of itself attain complete victory. It is one of the primary phases of war of liberation and continues to grow in importance as the guerilla army acquires the characteristics of a regular army. When the guerilla army acquires a regular status, then it will be ready for decisive attacks on the enemy and thus secure victory. The triumph will always be the product of the regular army even though the regular army had its origins in a guerilla force.

Guerilla Strategy

The first duty of the guerilla is to keep from being destroyed. Action against the enemy should be constant. A strong base of operations is essential but this may be expanded as the guerilla

force becomes stronger. There finally comes the time to advance against the strongholds of the enemy . . . to defeat him and attain the final objective — victory.

Strategy means the analysis of the objectives to be achieved in light of the total military situation and the courses of action available to achieve those objectives.

For a correct understanding of strategy to be followed by a guerilla force, it is necessary to make a profound analysis of the courses of action available to the enemy. The guerilla must analyse the resources available to the enemy, his strength in men, his mobility, his popular support, his armament, and his leadership. From this analysis, the guerilla must adapt his own strategy so as to obtain his final objective which is to defeat the enemy army.

There are other fundamental matters to be studied: the enemy's tactics for using his equipment; exact estimates of the value of a tank in a struggle of this kind; the value of a plane; and the kind of arms and equipment possessed by the enemy. It is important to note here that if a guerilla has a choice, he must always choose the weapons of his enemy because the guerilla always lacks equipment and arms. Therefore, if he chooses the enemy's

4. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, II, 151, says: "Since the war is protracted and ruthless, it becomes possible for guerilla units to go through the necessary process of steeling and to change gradually into regular armies; consequently, with their mode of operations gradually transformed into that of regular armies, guerilla warfare will develop into mobile warfare".

weapons the enemy will be the guerilla's supplier. Once this study is made and the objectives evaluated and analysed, it is necessary to begin planning for the achievement of the final objective. These plans will be made in advance but will be changed as needed to meet unforeseen circumstances that arise during the fighting.

In the beginning, the primary duty of the guerilla is to keep himself from being destroyed. It will gradually become easier for guerilla units to adapt themselves to the new manner of life involved in fleeing from and avoiding the enemy forces sent for their destruction. This objective attained, the guerillas will find positions whose inaccessibility prevents the enemy from attacking them. Gradually larger forces will be created and the process of weakening the enemy should begin. The weakening will take place initially in locations nearest the points of active fighting against the guerilla army. Later, the weakening can be extended to deeper portions of the enemy territory where his communications and bases of operation can be struck and harassed to the maximum extent of the guerilla capability.

The striking action should be constant. An enemy soldier in the zone of operations should not be allowed to sleep. The outposts should be systematically attacked and destroyed. At all times the impression should be created that the enemy is completely surrounded. This can be done by the use of patrols. To



Fidel Castro

accomplish this, the complete cooperation of the people is necessary as well as a thorough knowledge of the terrain. These are two essential factors to which the guerilla must constantly pay attention.

Certain well-organised groups that have shown ability in heretofore less dangerous work may now be used for sabotage duties. This is a terrible weapon which can paralyse entire armies or the industrial life of an entire area. It leaves the inhabitants without industry, light, water, communications, or even the ability to leave their homes except at certain hours. If this be accomplished, the enemy's morale, in-

cluding that of combat units, will be weakened.

All of this presupposes an enlargement of the area involved in the guerilla action although there should never be an exaggerated increase of this territory. A strong base of operations⁵ must be maintained at all times, and it must continue to be strengthened during the course of the war. It is, of course, necessary to take measures to insure the indoctrination of the inhabitants of the base region as well as to take necessary precautions against the implacable foes of the revolution.

When the original guerilla force has reached suitable strength in men and arms, it should form new guerilla columns. Ultimately, the territory occupied by the various columns is too small to contain them. The columns advance toward the regions strongly defended by the enemy. Then, the columns unite to form a compact battle front able to engage in a war of position as in the case of a regular army. However, the old guerilla army must not become separated from its base because the work of forming new guerilla forces behind the enemy lines must continue. These forces then operate in the same manner as the first until the new territory is overcome.

Thus the moment comes for attacking, for besieging cities, for routing reinforcements, for increasingly daring action by the excited masses in all of the national territory, for the attainment of the final objective—victory.

Guerilla Tactics

Guerilla forces are mobile, use surprise, deception and sabotage. Night operations are normal. They have full knowledge of the terrain and peoples in the area of operations. They rearm with captured weapons and ammunition and depend upon captured stores for many essential supplies.

In military terminology, tactics constitute the practical methods of achieving great strategic objectives.

Mobility is a fundamental characteristic of a guerilla force. In a few minutes it can be far from the immediate scene of action, or in a few hours it can be far from the region of action, if this is necessary. This permits a constantly changing front and thus avoids any form of encirclement. Consistent with the phase of the war a guerilla force can devote itself exclusively to avoiding encirclement and to prevent being trapped into a decisive, unfavourable battle, or it can conduct counter-encirclement operations. In these a small group of men is presumably surrounded by the enemy when suddenly the enemy finds himself surrounded by a larger contingent. The first men, situated in an impregnable position, were merely the decoy to lure the enemy into a trap to be surrounded or annihilated in some manner.

5. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, II, 134-144, says, "Guerilla warfare could not be maintained and developed for long without base areas, which are indeed its rear." He then gives a complete discussion of various types of base areas and the problems involved in establishing them.

A characteristic of this war of mobility is what is called "minuet", by analogy with the dance of the same name. For example, the guerillas surround an enemy column with small groups of five or six men in several locations (situated so they will not in turn be surrounded). Then fighting is initiated at one of these points, and the enemy advances towards the attacking force. The guerillas retreat, keeping contact with the enemy. Now, another group initiates an attack. The enemy will move to the new point and the guerillas repeat their former action. With such successive operations an enemy column can be immobilised without great danger. The enemy is forced to use large quantities of equipment, and the morale of his troops is weakened.

This same procedure can be used at night, with greater aggressiveness because it is much more difficult to surround the guerillas. We can say that night fighting is another characteristic of guerilla forces. It permits them to advance and to manoeuvre in territory that is not well known and thus avoid betrayal by informers. The numerical inferiority of a guerilla forces requires that attacks take place by surprise. This is the great advantage that enables guerillas to inflict casualties on the enemy, without loss to themselves.

A guerilla soldier killed in action should never be left with his arms and equipment. It is the duty of every guerilla soldier to recover at once the precious weapons and equipment of a

fallen comrade. The manner of using weapons is another characteristic of guerilla warfare. In any combat between a regular force and guerillas, each side can be identified by the nature of its fire. The regular army fires heavy concentrations, but the guerillas fire separate, accurate bursts.

Another fundamental characteristic of the guerilla soldier is his ability to adapt himself to any conditions or to turn changing battlefield situations to his advantage. In contrast to the rigid methods of classical warfare, the guerilla invents his own tactics for each moment of the fight and constantly surprises the enemy.

Primarily, there are three kinds of defensive positions: elastic positions, special positions which the enemy cannot pass, and positions suitable for diversionary actions. Instances are frequent where the enemy observes with surprise that a gradual, easy advance is suddenly and forcefully stopped, with no possibility of going farther. This is because the positions held by the guerillas, when it has been possible to make a complete study of the terrain, are impregnable. It is not necessary to count how many soldiers may attack but how many can defend a position. Once this number is determined the position can be defended against a battalion almost always, if not always. The great task of the leader is to make the proper choice of the time and location for defending a position to the end.

The manner of attack of a guerilla army is also different: it

begins with surprise — furious, implacable — and suddenly the assault is completely stopped. The surviving enemy force believes the attackers have gone, becomes calm again and resumes normal activities within the position or besieged city. Suddenly the same kind of attack breaks out in another place. As another example, a post defending a sector is suddenly attacked, overcome, and falls to the guerillas. The basic features are surprise and rapidity of attack.

Sabotage is always an effective weapon when well handled. Sabotage should never be used against unimportant means of production so that it needlessly paralyses an unessential sector of the population and leaves people without work. Sabotage against a soft-drink factory is ridiculous, whereas sabotage against a central electric plant is absolutely correct and commendable. In the first instance a few workers are affected and there is no effect on general industrial activity. In the second, workers are also affected but this is entirely justified by the total paralysis of the life of the region.

Aviation is one of the favourite weapons of the regular army. However, this weapon cannot be used effectively in the first stages of guerilla warfare, for there are only small, hidden groups of men scattered in rough terrain.⁶ The effectiveness of the air weapon depends upon systematic destruction of organised and visible positions of defence. For these conditions to exist, there must be large concentra-

tions of men in the defences, but this is not true of guerilla positions. Aviation can, nevertheless, be effective against marching columns in level or unprotected terrain. This danger, however, is easily avoided by night marches.

One of the enemy's weakest points is his highway and rail transport. It is practically impossible to guard every part of a road or railway. Therefore, traffic can be stopped by explosives placed at any unguarded point. Explosions can be caused when a vehicle is passing not only to make the vehicle unusable, but also to cause considerable loss of enemy lives and materiel.

There are various sources for explosives: they can be brought from other regions; they can be obtained from unexploded bombs or shells of the enemy; or they can be made in secret laboratories within the guerilla area. There are many ways of using explosives; the manufacture of bombs and other devices depends upon the resources of the guerilla forces.

The practice of concealing guerilla groups along roads to explode mines and annihilate survivors is most remunerative against equipment and weapons. The surprised enemy does not use his ammunition and does not have time to escape. Thus, the guerillas obtain considerable results at little cost.

6. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, II, 127 says: "It is precisely because they are weak and small that they can appear and disappear mysteriously in the enemy's rear and completely baffle him — such great freedom of action is something that massive regular armies can never enjoy."

As these blows are struck the enemy will change his tactics and instead of sending out vehicles separately will use motorised columns. Nevertheless, it is possible by proper choice of location to achieve the same results by breaking up the column and concentrating forces on one vehicle. In these instances it is always necessary to observe the essential features of guerilla tactics, which are:

- (1) Absolute knowledge of the terrain;
- (2) Safeguarding escape routes;
- (3) Knowledge and vigilance as to all secondary roads leading to the place of attack;
- (4) Knowledge of the populace of the area and its total capabilities as to supplies and transport;
- (5) Temporary concealment or permanent concealment when it is necessary to leave wounded comrades;
- (6) Numerical superiority at a particular point of the action;
- (7) Complete mobility; and possibility of counting on reserve forces.

If all these tactical requirements are fulfilled, surprise actions against the enemy's lines of communication can yield high dividends.

A fundamental part of guerilla tactics is the manner of treating inhabitants of the region. The treatment of the enemy is also important. Toward the enemy the rule to follow should be one of absolute ruthlessness at the time of attack, absolute implacability toward all contemptible

persons engaging in betrayals and assassinations; but the greatest possible clemency toward soldiers who in fighting are fulfilling, or believe they are fulfilling their military duty. It is a good rule, so long as there are no important bases of operations or impregnable positions, not to take prisoners. Survivors should be left at liberty; wounded enemy should be given all care possible at the time of the action. Conduct toward the civilian populace should be governed by great respect for their traditions and customs, in order to demonstrate effectively the moral superiority of the guerilla soldiers over their opponents. Except in special circumstances, there should be no executions without giving the accused person an opportunity to clear himself of the charges.

Favourable Terrain

The rougher and more inaccessible the terrain the more confident the guerilla is. From almost impenetrable refuge he goes out constantly to harass and fight the enemy. The radius of operations depends upon the situation but safe lines of internal communication must be maintained.

Guerilla warfare will not always be waged in terrain favourable for the application of its tactics. However, when the guerilla force is established in regions difficult of access, in wild and rough country, with steep mountains, or impassable deserts or marshes, the terrain is favourable. The general tactics will always tend to be the

same and based on the fundamental postulates of guerilla warfare.⁷

The guerilla force should fight from the first moment it has assured its survival. It must go out constantly from its place of refuge to fight. Its mobility does not have to be so great as when the terrain is unfavourable. It must adapt itself to the circumstances of the enemy but does not need to have the extensive mobility required in regions where the enemy can quickly concentrate large numbers of men. Nor are night operations so important in this kind of fighting, because operations and especially movement of forces often are possible by day, always subject to the enemy's vigilance on the ground and in the air. Also, the actions can last much longer in the mountains with smaller forces used, and very probably the enemy can be prevented from bringing reinforcements to the scene of the fighting. Vigilance over possible routes of access is, of course, an axiom that must never be forgotten by the guerilla, but his aggressiveness (because of the difficulties of preventing the enemy from receiving reinforcements) can be even greater. It is possible to come closer to the enemy, to harass and fight him more directly and for a longer time, always subject to circumstances such as, for example, the quantity of equipment available.

Warfare in favourable terrain, and particularly in the mountains, in opposition to so many advantages, includes the disadvantage that it is difficult, because of the considerable pre-

cautions taken by the enemy in these regions, to seize in a single operation a considerable quantity of arms and equipment. (The guerilla soldier must never forget that the enemy should be the source of supply for arms and equipment.) However, much more rapidly than in unfavourable terrain, the guerilla force can become firmly established and form a centre for carrying on a war of positions. It forms installations protected from aviation or long-range artillery, creates necessary small industries and activities such as hospitals, education and training centres and other essentials like warehouses and radio broadcasting stations.

The radius of operations of a guerilla force of this type can be as wide as the conditions or operations of adjacent guerilla forces permit. Everything depends upon the time required to proceed from a place of operations to a place of safety. This means assuming and calculating that marches will be made at night, that it is not possible to operate farther than five or six hours' march from the point of minimum safety. Of course, small guerilla bands can radiate from the areas of safety weakening the territory.

Weapons preferred for this type of warfare are those of long range with little expenditure of ammunitions, with support from automatic and semi-automatic

7. FM 31-21, 14, states: "The most secure terrain sometimes cannot be used as the base area because guerilla forces should be within striking distance of profitable targets". The difference in thought stems from the U.S. concept of using guerillas in support of conventional forces, whereas Guevara is interested in fomenting revolution.

weapons. One of the weapons most recommended is the Garand M1 rifle, although it must be used by people with some experience, because it uses too much ammunition. Semi-heavy weapons such as machine guns mounted on tripods can be used in favourable terrain with a greater margin of safety for the weapons and their users, but they should always be used as defensive weapons and not for attack.

An ideal armament for a guerilla force of 25 men would be 10 to 15 ordinary manually operated rifles, some 10 automatic weapons divided between Garand rifles and small portable machine guns, counting on the support of automatic weapons that are light and easily transported such as US Browning machine guns and the more modern Belgian FAL and M14. Among the small portable machine guns, those of 9 mm. are preferable, as greater quantities of ammunition can be carried and their more simple construction the better facilitates changing replacement parts. All of this should be adapted to the armament of the enemy because we are going to use enemy equipment when it falls into our hands. The enemy will find that heavy armament is practically useless: the aviation can see nothing and serves no purpose, and tanks and artillery can accomplish little due to difficulty of advancing in these regions.

Supply is very important. In general, regions that are difficult of access have for that very reason a difficult supply prob-

lem because farmers, and therefore supplies of farm products, are lacking. It is necessary to have stable supply lines and a minimum of goods always on hand to provide against any unfavourable contingency.

In such areas of operations, possibilities for sabotage on a large scale are lacking because there are few constructions, few telephone lines, aqueducts or other facilities that can be damaged by direct action.

To assure supplies, it is important to have animals. For rough terrain mules are best. Adequate pastures must be available for feeding them. These animals can travel over extremely rough and difficult ground where other animals cannot. In the most difficult conditions, resort must be had to transport by men. A man can carry a load of 25 kilograms (say 55 pounds) for many hours a day and for many days.

Lines of communication with the exterior must have a number of intermediate points in the hands of persons who can be trusted. Here products can be stored and persons acting as intermediaries can be concealed at certain times. In addition, internal lines of communication must be established, depending on the degree of development reached by the guerilla force. In some areas of operations during the last Cuban war, telephone lines many kilometers long were provided and roads were built. There was always an adequate messenger service to cover all areas in the shortest time possible.

Unfavourable Terrain

In heavily populated and built-up areas, guerilla groups must be kept small. Night movement is standard operational procedure. Stealth, secrecy and surprise are commonplace. Security is difficult and guerillas use propaganda to sway the masses to their side of the conflict.

Unfavourable regions are those without woods or other cover, that are not very rough, and have many roads or other means of communication. To wage war in this type of terrain all the fundamental features of guerilla warfare are used. However, the manner of using them is changed. There is a change, we can say, in the quantity but not in the quality of these features. For example, mobility of guerillas in such terrain should be exceptional; attacks should preferably take place at night and should be extremely rapid, almost explosive; withdrawals should be not only rapid but should be toward points different from the original location, as far as possible from the action. Always remember that it is not possible to find a protected place inaccessible to the repressive forces.

Men can march between 30 and 50 kilometers (say 18 to 30 miles) during the hours of night and into the early hours of daylight. However, the area of operation cannot be completely controlled, and there is danger that the inhabitants will see and hear the guerillas pass and will report to the persecuting army. It is always preferable in such cases to act at night, al-

though this rule will not always hold true, as there will be times when the hours of dawn will be better. The enemy should never be allowed to become accustomed to certain ways of fighting: the places, the time, and the manner of carrying out operations should be varied constantly.

Explosions of mines in roads and the destruction of bridges are very important methods to be taken into account. There can be less aggressiveness with regard to continuing attacks, but while they are occurring they can be very violent. Other weapons such as mines and shotguns can be used. The shotgun is a terrifying weapon for use against the usually uncovered vehicles carrying troops and also against unprotected vehicles (buses and similar vehicles).

The number of men in a guerilla group of this kind should not be greater than 10 or 15. It is of great importance to consider always the limitations with respect to the number in a single combat group. Ten, 12 or 15 men can be concealed in some location and at the same time offer strong resistance to the enemy and support one another. On the other hand, four or five would be perhaps too few. However, if the number exceeds 10, the possibilities are much greater that the enemy may localise them in their original camp or on some march.

It should be remembered that the rate of marching of a guerilla force is equal to the rate of its slowest man. It is more difficult to find uniformity of

marching rate among 20, 30 or 40 men, than among 10. Also, the guerilla of the plains should be a good runner. It is in the plains that the practice of striking and fleeing should be used to the maximum. Guerillas of the plains have the great disadvantage that they can be rapidly surrounded and have no safe place where they can put up a firm resistance. For these reasons they must live for long periods under conditions of absolute secrecy, because they can trust only those whose loyalty has been completely proved. Repressions by the enemy are generally violent and brutal, reaching not only heads of families but also women and children. In many instances, pressure over persons that are not very strong-willed can cause them to give information as to the location of guerilla forces and how they are operating, permitting immediate encirclement with consequences that are always disagreeable, if not mortal.

One of the weapons that can be used by a guerilla force — a weapon of heavy type that is of great value because of easy handling and transport — is the bazooka (the anti-tank grenade for rifles can replace it). It will of course be taken from the enemy. It is ideal for firing on either armoured or unarmoured vehicles carrying troops, and for quickly overcoming small posts with reduced effort. However, only three shells can be carried by each man.

Naturally, none of the heavy weapons taken from the enemy must be wasted. However, there

are weapons, such as the tripod-mounted machine guns and heavy machine guns of calibre .50, which, if taken, can be used temporarily with the thought of abandoning them eventually. There should be no combat, under the unfavourable conditions we are describing, to defend a heavy machine gun or some other weapon of this type. The weapon should be used only until the tactical moment arrives when it is advisable to abandon it. In our war of liberation, abandoning a weapon constituted a serious crime for which no excuse was permitted other than the one just pointed out; we specified this as the only situation that would not bring punishment. The ideal weapon for the guerilla in unfavourable terrain is the rapid-fire personal weapon.

The very characteristics of easy access usually make the region populous, and the area usually includes a farming population. This greatly facilitates the problem of supply. By dealing with people who can be trusted, among those who make contact with establishments distributing provisions to the inhabitants, it is quite possible to maintain a guerilla force without devoting time or much money to long and dangerous lines of supply. It should be emphasised, in this connection, that the smaller the number of men the easier it will be to supply them. Essential supplies such as hammocks, blankets, waterproof cloth, mosquito netting, shoes, medicines, and food are found directly in the region. They are

objects of daily use by the inhabitants.

Communications will be greatly facilitated by being able to count on a greater number of men and many more ways of transmission. However, there will be much more difficulty as regards insuring that a message will reach a distant point, because trust must be placed in a number of persons. Thus, there will be danger of the eventual capture of one of the messengers constantly crossing enemy territory. If the messages are not very important they may be transmitted orally; if they are important they should be transmitted in writing and in code, because experience shows that oral transmission from person to person can completely distort any message sent in this way.

For the reasons pointed out, in addition to being more difficult, industrial activities by guerillas become less important. It will not be possible to make shoe soles or weapons. Activities of this kind will practically be limited to small well-concealed workshops for reloading cartridges, making some types of mines and detonating devices; in short, what is appropriate for the moment. On the other hand, it is possible to count on all the workshops of friendly inhabitants for the kinds of work that are necessary.

This brings us to two logical conclusions arising from what has been said. One is that conditions for guerilla warfare are the reverse of those that favour the productive development of the region in question. All the

favourable circumstances for production, all of the facilities to make human life easier, are unfavourable for the guerilla forces; the more facilities there are for the life of the inhabitants, the more uncertain, the more difficult and nomadic will be the life of the guerilla. The title of this section is indeed "Warfare in Unfavourable Terrain" because all that is favourable to human life, with accompanying means of communication, urban or semi-urban centres, large concentrations of people, and ground easily worked by machinery places the guerilla at a disadvantage.

The second conclusion is that, if guerilla activities must necessarily include important work among the masses, this work is much more important in unfavourable regions, in regions where a single enemy attack can result in catastrophe. In such regions there must be continual work in propaganda, continual effort to unite the workers, the peasants, and other social classes in the region, in order to arrive at a complete homogeneity of the internal front in favour of the guerilla forces. This work among the people, this continual activity as regards relations between the guerilla forces and the inhabitants of the region, must also take into account individual cases of recalcitrant enemies and eliminate such enemies without leniency when they constitute a danger. In such matters, guerillas must be ruthless. There can be no enemies in dangerous places within the area of operations.

Suburban Areas

Guerilla forces in suburban areas must not operate independently of other forces in the conflict but must gear their operations to the objectives and plans of other forces in other areas. Forces must be small, must be trained in sabotage, and must maintain extremely severe discipline.

When the guerilla fight can be directed at harassing cities, and guerilla forces are able to penetrate and establish themselves with a certain degree of security in the surrounding countryside, it will be necessary to give these forces special instruction or, we should say, organisation.

It must be pointed out that a suburban guerilla force cannot be formed by its own efforts. It can be formed only after the creation of certain conditions necessary for its existence. This indicates that a suburban guerilla force will be directly under the orders of leaders located in other areas. Therefore, such a force does not carry out independent actions, except in accordance with previously established strategic plans. The action must support activities of larger groups located in another area. This is a smaller scale of operations than used by other types of guerilla forces but it will definitely contribute to the success of some particular tactical objectives. A suburban guerilla force will not be able to choose between sabotage of telephone services, or other forms of sabotage, or surprising a patrol of soldiers on a distant road — it will do exactly what it is told to do. If

it is called upon to cut or damage telephone lines, electric power cables, sewers, railways, or aqueducts, it will confine itself to the performance of these duties to the best of its ability.

The numerical strength of such a force should not exceed four or five men. Limitation to this number is important because the suburban guerilla force must be regarded as acting in an area that is exceptionally unfavourable; the vigilance of the enemy is much greater and the possibilities of reprisals and of betrayals increase enormously. A suburban guerilla force is at a disadvantage because it is unable to withdraw very far from the scene of operations. Nevertheless some withdrawal, to remain completely concealed during the day, should be combined with rapidity of movement and action. Such a force is especially suited for night actions without changing its manner of operating until the insurrection has progressed to the point of besieging the city and the inhabitants can participate as active combatants.

Essential qualities of guerillas of this type are discipline — perhaps to a greater degree than in the case of other guerillas — and discretion. They cannot count on more than two or three friendly houses for shelter and food. It is almost certain that seizure under these conditions means death. Their weapons will not be the same as those of other guerillas, and will consist of weapons for personal defence that do not prevent rapid flight and safe concealment. The best weapons are a carbine, one or

two sawed-off shotguns and pistols for the other members of the group.

Armed attacks should never be made except by surprise on one or two members of the enemy troops or of the enemy's secret service. The action must be concentrated on the sabotage ordered.

Ample supplies of equipment and tools should be provided for the work. There should be appropriate saws, large quantities of dynamite, picks and spades, and apparatus for tearing up railway lines. In short, adequate mechanical equipment is necessary for all that is to be done. The equipment should be concealed in safe places which can be easily reached by those who will use it.

If there is more than one guerilla force, they will be under the command of a single leader who will give orders for the necessary work through trusted persons engaged in civil

occupations. In certain instances, the guerillas can continue their peaceful occupations. This is usually very difficult because the suburban guerilla force is a group of men performing unlawful acts and operating under the extremely unfavourable conditions described.

There has been lack of appreciation of the value of guerilla fighting in the suburbs, but it is, in fact, very important. Appropriate operations of this kind, extended over a wide area, can almost completely paralyse the commercial and industrial life of the area and cause disturbance and distress to the entire population. This makes the people anxious for violent developments to bring an end to their troubles. If thought is given at the beginning of the war to future possibilities, specialists can be organised for suburban fighting. Then action can be carried out much more rapidly and with a saving for the nation in lives and precious time.

(To be continued)