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Photo Australian War Memorial, Canberra.

SHAGGY RIDGE

In September 1943 the Allies launched their counter-offensive to drive the Japanese from New Guinea. 7th Australian Division air landed at Nadzab in the Markham Valley and advanced south-easterly on Lae, while 9th Australian Division, after an amphibious landing on Huon Gulf, converged on the town from the east. On the capture of Lae, 9th Division moved by sea to the attack on Finschafen while 7th Division moved up the Markham with the object of crossing the Finisterre range and reaching the coast near Madang.

The way into the Finisterres was barred by the formidable Shaggy Ridge, a precipitous feature rising some 2,500 feet above the plateau. This feature was dominated by the Pimple, a high, pointed hill which could be approached only on a one man front up a razor-backed spur. With all the best of the ground, the Japanese defended Shaggy Ridge and its approaches inch by inch. Through weeks of heavy, difficult fighting the Australian troops edged their way forward until finally the Pimple was taken by assault.

The picture shows troops of 7th Division making a track up one of the faces of the Ridge.

AMF GOLD MEDAL ESSAY, 1961

SENIOR SECTION

Lieutenant Colonel C. L. Thompson, M.B.E.,
R. of O., Royal Australian Infantry.

"In World War II fifteen months elapsed between the outbreak of hostilities and the first occasion on which an Australian division went into action.

- 1. Analyse the factors which had a bearing on this timing.*
- 2. Discuss the means by which, in the event of a limited war in South East Asia, an ARA/CMF division could be speedily deployed for action."*

IT is wrong to assume that the circumstances which delayed the 6th Division of the 2nd AIF from joining battle will be the same in any future conflict. Political aims, the nation's fiscal policy, the climate of public opinion, the availability of resources or lack of them, and the manner in which the cold war turns to hot, could all play a significant role.

From a study of the past, two factors stand out with signal clearness, namely —

- (a) The degree of training needed to make the force a cohesive fighting team, and
- (b) The problem of transporting and maintaining that force, complete with all its supporting arms, to and in the theatre of operations.

In short, it is a matter of degree of readiness. This is especially vexing for Australia which relies to such an extent on its citizen soldiers. But a critical study of the factors which had a bearing on getting ready 6 Division for battle provides a fruitful experience in preparing for future hostility.

At the outbreak of war in September, 1939, the Australian Army, comprising the militia and a small nucleus of regular soldiers, was little different from the 1916 pattern. Its role in 1939 was to man selected coastal areas and await the invader. Almost nothing had been done, in spite of the nation's economic growth, to set up an arsenal for war. Yet the astonishing success which the 2nd AIF achieved later was a vindication

of the nation's ability to "produce the goods" once the aim had been made clear. This singleness of purpose helped in 1951 to produce a magnificent fighting machine in Korea, and, no doubt, will come to the fore again — but only if the lessons are heeded now. The complications of modern war, especially in the production of trained men and the equipment, puts "time" at a premium. It must be mastered in peace time if the nation is to control it on the outbreak of war.

Background to 1939

To a large extent the delay in getting 6 Division into battle can be traced to the attitude of Australia's political leaders in the years following World War I and in the peoples' complacency regarding military problems. Possibly the greatest single factor could be the prevailing impression that Australia's youth could be transformed into effective soldiers with only a few weeks' training. It was not until the 1937 Imperial Defence Conference that the British Chiefs of Staff pronounced that a Dominion's contribution during the early phase of war would be dependent upon the preparatory measures taken in time of peace. The Conference recorded that promises to raise, train, and arm divisions would have little value if those forces could not be armed nor transported to the theatre of operations.

The alarming sequence of events in Europe after Germany introduced conscription in 1935 cast an ominous shadow over the world. The Australian plan

of defence was still based on protection by the British Navy and the employment of local forces against raids. As the threat of war increased, various measures were taken to re-arm and enlarge the Army. Unfortunately, weapons needed could not be obtained from Britain as they were required urgently to re-equip the expanding British Army. In fact, this vital aspect of equipping a force was to be a telling point in preparing the early formations both in the United Kingdom and in Australia. It was a pity that the Government before the war sought counsel from senior British officers for the solution of Australian defence problems. These officers, no matter how good, had only limited experience of rearmament in Australia and the climate of public opinion. Vacillation at the political level prevailed. It was not till March, 1939, that it was decided to form two regular brigades. Thus, it was hoped to have available at all times a compact regular force, and a supply of permanent instructors for the militia. Eventually the Government approved measures to increase camp training for the militia to sixteen days with an additional sixteen days' home training in each year — but this was only one week before the outbreak of war.

The Militia

In any post-mortem it is easy to say that the pre-war militia system — an organisation of five divisions — failed to produce an army at short notice. Nevertheless, its efforts were not entirely

wasted. It did produce some very valuable officers — especially commanders — and a keen body of N.C.Os. But this effectiveness owed much more to the calibre of the officers serving, some of whom were veterans of the First AIF, and also to a small and highly skilled group of professional soldiers, rather than to the system itself. Herein lies the first important challenge; namely, what were the shortcomings of the militia as a training organisation? The answer can be summarised as:—

- (a) No adequate instruction was provided for the members at all levels—due to the lack of professional training staff.
- (b) Rapidity of turnover, no assured continuity of attendance and difficulty for members to get away to annual camp.
- (c) The failure of the Government to recognise early enough the need to acquire in peace time adequate weapons and equipment.
- (d) There was no positive plan as to the nation's role when war came — in fact, the mobilisation target could never be achieved with effectiveness.

If this was the painful situation at the outbreak of war affecting the existing military structure, it requires little imagination to appreciate the ramifications of the problem when the Government announced the formation of an additional division — the 6th Division — on the 14th September, 1939.

The delay now being discussed was not born at the time this Division was formed. It had its origins in a chain of events and policy, stretching back for many years. The mistakes of the past and problems of mobilisation became manifest during the early life and the struggle for maturity of this Division. They can be analysed under the following headings:—

- (a) Recruiting and organisation.
- (b) Equipping the Force.
- (c) Shipment and concentration of the Division.
- (d) How the force should be employed.
- (a) *Recruitment and Organisation.*

The 6th Division had to start from scratch. Although the senior officers were selected and many young officers volunteered from the militia, there was a shortage of junior leaders. Unit commanders in the militia strove to retain their own personnel since it was hoped that, somehow or other, militia units as a whole would get away. To add to this difficulty the Government left doubt in the minds of many as to whether or not the Division would in fact be sent overseas. By October, an extensive schedule of reserved occupations was proclaimed, which prohibited many from joining. Efforts were made to obtain volunteers for the new Division as the militia commenced its own camp training programme.

Only about 5,000 of the recruits came from the militia and very few of Australia's Regular Army were posted to the

division. Most of the units in the formation had an RMC graduate as the Adjutant and, of course, the senior appointments on the Divisional and Brigade Headquarters were selected from the professional soldier group. Only four of the lieutenants who graduated from the R.M.C. in 1939 found their way at that time to the 6th Division. The decision to keep the militia in being prevented the transfer of qualified instructors to the new force. Gradually N.C.Os. were selected from the new recruits. Young subalterns or sergeants with militia experience set about the training of their platoons. This in itself was excellent experience, but poor training for the new recruits, especially when the officer himself had little training.

The young officers did not all arrive at the same time. In the early weeks a steady trickle reported for duty, but the lack of officers placed a severe burden on those who were already wrestling with the problem of teaching many men with few instructors. Late in November, 1939, the 16th Brigade reported that the standard of efficiency of the officers was the chief weakness, and that the rate of further progress would depend on the capacity of those officers to improve.

By instalments the Division shipped to Palestine, beginning in earnest the training for battle. The force was therefore located in a theatre area, and away from home distractions. After the sea voyage the training programmes stood still while

hardening up took place. By degrees, units eventually undertook battalion training. Brigade training did not commence till about October, 1940. However, there were some benefits of this long period of training which are referred to by the Official Historian in "To Benghazi" in the following terms—

"In this time nearly all the officers and sergeants had attended one or more schools in the Middle East; and the unfit had been weeded out. Learning time had given the men an added confidence in themselves and young men had full trust in their leaders."

The Historian also drew attention to the fact that majors and senior captains were the least strong layer because they had not had the necessary training in the militia.

The shortage of equipment had a shackling effect on the progress of the force and training could proceed only at a cautious pace. In the meantime the Government went ahead to form three other A.I.F. Divisions during June, 1940. These formations too, were all clamouring for equipment.

The 6th Division seemed to be fated not to hasten into battle. Even in the early days of recruitment in Australia there was no accommodation available for it as the militia was using all the existing camps. Again, on arrival in Palestine, time was taken up in building the new training camp.

Looking back it was not the quality of the men that caused

the delay. They were eager and quick to learn. Rather, the fault lay in the slowness with which the equipment arrived and the problem of finding sufficient skilled instructors to pass on the technical training to large numbers of men at the one time.

(b) Equipping the Force.

The problem of equipment was intense. The Army Staff, aware of the lack of equipment and time to obtain it, were anxious not to lose what they had for the militia by handing it over to the 6th Division. As a consequence this Division went short for a long time. To make matters worse the British Army had reorganised its Divisions on a three Brigade basis, discarding the 1918 weapons. Australia settled for a compromise (four brigades), undertaking to equip part herself and to rely on Britain for the remainder. As a result the 6th Division had very few supporting weapons. As late as June, 1940, the Division was requesting the Australian authorities to send to it in Palestine Lewis guns and machine guns of 1918 vintage. At this stage 2-inch mortars and anti-tank weapons were a theoretical make-believe; the troops training with token weapons made of wood.

Even as late at December, 1940, the Division was supported by only two of its three artillery regiments; one of which had the use of 18 pounders, brought from Australia. A chronic vehicle shortage always existed in the Division and this was made good only within the last few days of December, 1940, by taking 180

trucks from the recently arrived 7th Division. Ammunition was so short that "live" practice with infantry took place only once before going into battle. Shortages in binoculars, compasses, cable and telephones were not made good for a long time to come.

As if the problems of equipment were not enough, delays were experienced in getting from Australia certain Engineer and Medical units. These problems were all part of the growing pains of the administrative system that was being set up, sufficient in size not only to maintain the 6th Division, but also two other AIF Divisions that were on their way to the Middle East.

Without a doubt the Australian Army had over reached itself — a little everywhere, but strong nowhere.

(c) Shipment and concentration of the Division.

It was not till 28th November, 1939, that it was decided to send the Division overseas. This decision was on the understanding that no equipment or material needed for the militia would be made available to the Division. The first convoy carrying the 16th Brigade left Australia in January, 1940. It was not till May that shipping could be arranged for the 17th and 19th Brigades; the 18th Brigade convoy being diverted to England due to the entry of Italy into the war. This resulted in the Australian force being short by one of its brigades.

The problem of concentration in Australia was accentuated by

distance and the raising on a State basis of the various units that made up the whole formation. This resulted in isolation of groups and imposed a big administrative and command problem, especially at a time when it was vital that the force should be welded into a cohesive fighting team. In Palestine the need to replace men and train reinforcements became apparent. Units were therefore ordered to share in setting up training establishments which imposed a further manpower drain. But unless the matter was resolutely solved the Division had no chance of remaining a fighting entity if casualties could not be replaced. This aspect of maintenance is of special significance for Australia if the nation intends to send a force overseas.

Modern warfare is the application of fire-power to ground and if the full orchestra of the Division cannot be tested, it cannot be said that it is ready for battle. Thus the lack of equipment, the administrative problems of bringing the components of a force together and consequent delay in training as a Division all helped to stall off the day when the infantry could be fronted up to the enemy.

(d) How the force should be employed.

Failure to have a clear aim for the Division at its inception was possibly the main reason why so many of the militia held back from joining. Even when recruiting was under way it had to compete with the militia for its share of resources, the Govern-

ment being unable or unwilling to determine priorities.

As early as 1940 the Middle East Headquarters wanted to employ one of the Australian Brigades on security duties. But the Government had directed that the Division must be used as a whole. Again in September efforts were made to deploy the Division contrary to the wishes of its Commander who had a definite charter from the Government as to how the force should be employed.

These incidents illustrate how lack of co-operation between Governments furnishing forces to a theatre of operation can cause dissension at the senior command level. The importance of pre-planning, and the consequent understanding of how the force will be used is vital to the Commander and the training policy to be followed.

Summary so far.

The lessons learnt from the foregoing are:—

- (a) The force for mobilising must be one within the capacity of the nation to maintain.
- (b) Planning and production must go on in peace time to ensure an adequate weapons arsenal.
- (c) The training of officers and if possible N.C.Os. during peace time must be of the highest quality.
- (d) Special allocation of training resources must be made on mobilisation to handle recruits. This organisation should be "in being" and kept fresh during peace time.

- (e) The exact role and scope of action should be determined beforehand, so that as many leaders as possible can be acclimatised tactically, technically and administratively with the problems to be faced in likely theatres of operations.

The Future

In the light of the lessons learnt from a study of the past it is possible to make suggestions for the reduction of time between mobilisation and readiness for action.

An ARA/CMF Division of the type in being today is a significant advancement on the organisation Australia had in the past. The Division not only has within its framework units and formations entirely manned by regular army members but also a CMF component, containing a substantial core of professional officers, warrant officers and N.C.Os. If the ARA units can be built up and maintained at full strength (and equipment shortages made good), at least one portion of the force can be alerted quickly for readiness. This in itself is a valuable contribution, but not the answer.

The weakness lies in the training of the CMF side of the team. Above all, the Division should not be committed piecemeal to action, hastily employing first the ARA units, and then progressively each CMF formation as it reaches maturity. The fundamental point of this essay is that the Division should be used as a complete whole — a team. This implies delay sufficient to train the weakest link. Herein lies the challenge!

A major factor in the consideration of this problem is that of transporting the force from the mainland to South East Asia and the establishment of the logistic support sufficient to maintain the Division as a fighting entity. Such a demand not only encompasses the initial support of the force but also a continuing flow of reinforcements and the replacement of all the items used by the force. Looked at as a whole, Australia, in fighting a war in South East Asia, will need to take action simultaneously in two areas, namely:—

- (a) Concentration of the Division in Australia
- (b) Setting up the overseas base.

Thus the ARA units of the Division could play a valuable role in moving overseas early after mobilisation to set up the base, whilst the CMF complement goes ahead with its training. Sound and realistic planning therefore is necessary in peace if the time needed to make the Division battleworthy is to be streamlined. Even at the best, it is calculated that at least six to eight months will elapse before training is complete.

The task of getting ready requires joint action in peace time both by Army HQ and the Division itself. To plan correctly an estimate must be made of the training time to be allotted to bring the CMF up to standard. Once this timing block has been decided, it is then possible to plan the phasing of overseas base development and to allot the tasks to be carried

Getting the CMF Component of the Division Ready for the Battle (The example used is for Infantry)

Pre Mobilisation

by ARA - Army HQ
Responsibility

- (1) Recruiting teams.
- (2) Training teams to handle the Recruit Training Camp. (4 weeks' course). Skeleton staff maintains plans, syllabi training aids, stores, upkeep of camp, practice in training techniques.

By the ARA at Divisional HQ

Maintains in readiness the Divisional Concentration area, plans for transporting units to concentration, syllabi for refresher training, etc.

Mobilisation

1st week

ARA teams set up Recruiting Centres

Getting Camp ready

CMF on leave

2nd week

Recruits enter Camp

Units fly to concentration area.

3rd week

Units undergo Refresher course.

4th week

5th week

Recruits join Units

2nd month

Platoon training

3rd month

Company training

4th month

Battalion training

5th month

Final leave —
Fly to S.E. Asia

6th month

Battle Group
Training

7th month

Divisional training

8th month

Ready for Battle

The above block syllabus shows one month for each Commander up the scale. During the month's training an allocation has been made of one week to each phase of war — e.g. (1) Defence, (2) Advance and patrols, (3) Attack, (4) Withdrawal.

Table 1

out by the ARA side. Presuming that the CMF will not be at full strength when the call comes, activity along the following avenues will take place within the first few weeks:—

- (1) Recruitment.
- (2) Opening training centres to handle the recruits.
- (3) Concentrating the CMF units of the Division for training, preparatory to accepting the recruits.

Before proceeding, Table 1 shows in summarised form how the first eight months may be taken up.

It may be possible to shorten the time, but not by much. The above syllabus allows for the minimum requirement and even then takes seven to eight months. In this age public opinion may still demand time for final leave. The essential point is that inadequate training does more harm than good. For the Division to have the chance to give a good account of itself in its first action, it must be really efficient. Even if the time for training the infantry can be reduced, the force itself is powerless without the full employment of all its supporting units. Certainly, most of the supporting units, especially the artillery, will take every day of the suggested time to become fully trained.

Recruitment

Even if there is no shortage of CMF recruits for the Division in peace time, there is always the uncertainty as to who will be available on mobilisation. At

the best some recruiting will be necessary for the Division, even to supply reinforcements and satisfy other demands of the Army. If the target for recruits is within a reasonable compass there should be no difficulty in obtaining the numbers provided the Government's call is positive and stimulates young men with the necessary zeal to serve their country. There should be no man-power restriction at this stage and this will help CMF members of the Division who might otherwise be prohibited from serving.

Recruits should not be posted direct to the Division. After reception processes for medical, clothing, etc., they should be given a few days' leave to complete domestic arrangements. After this leave they would enter the Recruit Training Camp specially set up in each State by the ARA to give them a four weeks' course. During this early period the CMF units would be concentrated at their training locality and members would undergo a short refresher course to prepare themselves for receiving the recruits. When the recruits arrive, platoon training or its equivalent could then commence; some five or six weeks having passed since mobilisation was ordered.

Among the recruits will be men with previous military training. Such men should not be held back at the Recruit Centre once it can be seen that they have a reasonable military knowledge. They should be passed without delay to their units.

Recruit Training

There is no short cut to recruit training, but excellent instruction does minimise the time required to give the new soldier his military foundation. In the case of the infantry (and, in fact for all soldiers) the four weeks' period described above must be used to master the 3 R's of recruit training — drill, weapons and bushcraft. In fact, the problem could be likened to the handling of a National Service intake, but only four weeks are available to turn the recruit into a soldier ready to join his platoon to commence this phase of training.

Regular soldiers should carry out the recruit instruction so that it is at the highest level of quality and also to handle maximum numbers. Therefore it will be necessary in peace time to earmark the instructors as the stretching of ARA resources to fill postings on mobilisation will be intense. To help ease this problem there should be established in peace time a training group. At the beginning probably only a handful of highly qualified officers and warrant officers will be needed. Their task will include the problems of preparing and keeping up to date the syllabi to be used and overseeing the maintenance of the camp sites and the supply of training stores and aids. This team should also examine techniques for training large numbers of men with the minimum number of instructors. In this regard the following are suggested:—

(a) Improve instruction by demonstrations, using speci-

ally qualified personnel — a team arrangement, one doing the demonstration, another the instruction, with third and fourth, etc., members moving amongst the squads to correct faults. Thought should be given to using specially raised stages or platforms and seating the pupils so that they can view clearly all that is taking place.

- (b) Use specially made enlarged models to highlight mechanisms, description, etc.
- (c) Use closed circuit television for weapon mechanism, map reading. (Closed circuit television is used to instruct medical students in surgery, etc.)
- (d) Issue all recruits with illustrated pamphlets and aid-memoirs on the various lessons. Also examine the use of self-testing cards so that recruits can check their own progress.
- (e) Consider the best way to use tutorial classes at night to revise the day's work.

Within reason there should be no holding back of recruits. With the improvement in general education today it is probable that recruits may be more receptive than in the past. Backward recruits therefore should be pushed on in the hope that by repetition they will improve by the end of the four weeks' course. If they are not up to standard by this stage, they should repeat the course. This procedure would solve the problems in the early days of setting

up special wings to deal with the recruit who was not absorbing the teaching.

To maintain the interest of large classes there should exist a spirit of intense co-operation between recruits and instructors. This will demand the finest quality of instruction and skill in man management. Short cuts in teaching, and elimination of non-essentials should be the aim of those charged with the responsibility of planning the syllabi.

Improved techniques must be sought to teach the recruit the firing of his weapons. Train-fire aids will not be suitable to practice recruits in large numbers. It would be better, therefore, to construct a number of shooting galleries and let the recruit perfect his shooting at short ranges. This is a subject which lends itself to development by progressive thinking. Gone are the days when recruits were taught one lesson at a time. Rather the challenge is to teach a series of functions all at one sitting. A positive "shoot to kill" attitude can be greatly encouraged by exciting shooting on close ranges at under fifty yards. For instance, using a shot gun the recruit wins a greater degree of confidence and graduates to the automatic weapons more naturally.

Map reading lessons can be made more practical by using films based on the topography close to the camp. Pupils will appreciate more easily the lessons when they work over the same countryside as shown in the films.

At first glance the experienced instructor may contend the four weeks are too short for the recruit. But in four weeks much can be done to develop in the individual the sense of obedience, confidence in himself, and his weapons, and a skill in field-work, all sufficient to initiate him into platoon training when he joins his unit. He cannot delay longer at recruit camp as the Division will be just ready to receive him.

It is realised that there is a natural limit to what a man can absorb, but everything must be done at the Recruit Centre to get across "the message." For this reason, the man will be required to work at night, but in return as much of the daily administrative and domestic duties for keeping the camp going should be undertaken by permanent staff — say, older men specially recruited for the purpose. The young recruit will get his share of these duties when he reaches his unit.

Unit Training

The units should be concentrated whilst in Australia at a suitable training area — for instance, Queensland. Here they would be away from home disturbances and able to settle down to a hard and thorough period of training. The training areas should be known beforehand and kept in a reasonable state of readiness. For instance, equipment, clothing and camp resources should be within handy reach — preferably at a Depot Area set up adjacent to the Divisional Concentration Training Centre. A special peace

time staff should be available and be trained in the functions necessary to move the units of the Division from their various home States. It is imperative that CMF units of the Division be practised annually in moving to Camp, if not to the wartime concentration locale, then to an alternative site. Provision for air transport is therefore a vital necessity in peace time organisation. If air transport cannot be arranged now, a most serious difficulty will exist when mobilisation occurs. Granted the Division may have the help of our allies in the provision of air transport when it comes to fly to S.E. Asia; but surely a prime effort must be made to practise the personnel in air travel in peace time.

Great emphasis should be placed on the refresher course which will be carried out as soon as each unit concentrates. This course will put everyone "on net" and enable a check to be made of the technique to be used when recruits are received. The actual details of this course must be worked out in peace time by the ARA staff. To ensure a uniform level of instruction at the refresher course and to maintain a common doctrine, most of the teaching should be done by the ARA Staff already with each unit or at least, under their guidance.

The Table of Training referred to earlier proposes that the division should spend at least five months in Australia before going on final leave. By this time it will have reached battalion or equivalent standard. The unit's

ARA Staff, during its peace time activities, should have prepared in outline and perhaps in some detail, the actual scope of the training syllabus to be used for this period of training. Test exercises from platoon to the battalion level should have been thought out by the Divisional Headquarters during peace time and used as a constant check on training progress.

ARA Framework Within the Division

The proportion of ARA Members to CMF in the present establishment for the Division is reasonably satisfactory, but some deficiencies exist. For instance, thought should be given to the question of whether regular officers should command CMF units. The lessons learnt from the study in the first part of this essay show that the old militia owed much of its success to the officers with First War experience. We have now run out of CMF Officers with Second War background. As a general rule the young commanding officers today have not had war experience, nor will those who are likely to be appointed in the future have had any better background. Also, there is always the possibility that the CMF member who is in command on mobilisation may, for some reason, not be able to get away immediately. So important is it that the CO should have a firm grip on his unit just prior to, and following mobilisation, that the suitability of the CMF commander is now challenged. This paper puts forward the view that regular officers should com-

mand in peace time CMF units selected from the ARA/CMF Division. Their greater knowledge would do much to ensure a higher standard of training and their professional integrity would be an example to all junior officers. The ARA CO would therefore have on mobilisation, a first hand working knowledge of his officers and this would help him in unit development after concentration. Another point is that the modern CMF commander is usually so fully engaged in his civilian employment that he has not the time available to devote to army matters and training that a professional officer could give. Units having regular army COs would, of course, have CMF officers acting as deputies. Thus valuable training could be gained by the CMF officer, who no doubt would gain a command if the war continued. After all, the problem of this essay is to have the best team available in the shortest time.

At the Divisional level the Headquarters could do with the help of several ARA Liaison Officers. These professional officers would be available to carry out special assignments and thus leave the other officers free to handle the normal functions of their appointment. The LOs could be the working link between the AHQ permanent body set up to arrange concentration on mobilisation and the units — remembering the distance that separates units in Australia today. They could also undertake duties in connection with the maintenance of the Divisional concentration area.

Another advantage of having regular members holding key positions in the units is that they would be able to gain during their careers experience of the terrain and circumstances in which the units might operate in war. This would be valuable training and it could be passed on to the CMF members. In brief, the regular staff should be fully briefed and practised in their duties on mobilisation, not only in Australia, but also overseas.

Training the CMF

The larger the numbers enlisted in the CMF in peace time, the fewer the army will need to recruit on mobilisation. The better the training given to the CMF, the shorter the final preparation for war. Thus action in two directions is required —

- (a) Steady recruitment to the CMF and ability to retain members.
- (b) Provision for excellent training of the CMF at all levels.

In regard to the above, the following comment is offered:— It is the Government's responsibility to provide the effective inspiration for young men to join the CMF. Recruits of excellent calibre are coming forward, but there are not enough. A better response may be obtained if the appeal was put as a challenge to serve the nation; emphasising the need for peace time training so that time would not be wasted on mobilisation; and a plea to parents and employers to give permission to young men to enlist. Lip service to an advertisement is not enough. The lead

must come from the highest political level. Therefore, an urgent CMF recruiting drive with a warm personal appeal should be commenced to replace the cold official invitation that at present stems from the current army advertisements.

Our present rate of turnover is far too high. An independent survey of members recently discharged should be conducted by professional experts to find the reasons for leaving the CMF. If the causes can be accurately obtained steps can be taken to remedy deficiencies.

The best judge of training is the soldier himself. If he is a satisfied customer, he is the best recruiting agent the country can have. As the function of the CMF must be the training of junior leaders (and this was found wanting in 1939) a critical survey of peace time training could, with profit, be undertaken. Have we been too ambitious in our training directives at the unit level? Is the CMF commitment as regards time too severe? In this regard we are better to have a lower tempo with 100% attendances than a higher standard with varied attendance and rapid turnover.

Officer Training

The standard of officer training was one of the main weaknesses when the Second AIF was formed. If CMF units are training properly, they have neither the time nor the resources to undertake coaching. Officers obtain their training in two ways — practice in commanding at their particular rank, and by study for examinations. The

former experience should be provided at the unit under the direction of the commanding officer. The latter should come from a specialised centre conducted by the Area Command — for example, using the Staff and Command Group with the full-time help of the best ARA staff.

Preparation for a CMF officer examination is a serious business and candidates should be seconded to this academy for a year's training or longer. This kind of officer instruction would be most rewarding for the potential leader at all levels, especially for First Appointment. It would be a means of passing on a common doctrine to all students.

As the demands of the Army on mobilisation will be intense — there will no doubt be other formations as well as the Division which is the subject of this essay — valuable training could be given at this centre to officers who have some special role on mobilisation, and also provide a pool to help fill reinforcement postings to the Division selected for overseas service. In fact officers at this centre should be instructed in the duties of their actual mobilisation posting.

Whilst on the subject of training, it is opportune to draw attention to the limited availability of text books. There should be ample supplies of text books for keen students. If cost is a problem, students would no doubt be willing to pay for their own text books. At the CMF recruit level, the Army would benefit by the issue of a booklet in pictorial form illustrating

the main fundamentals required to be learnt by the young soldier. Such a book would have good public relations value in impressing the young soldier that the Army is doing all it can to aid him in his journey to proficiency.

Private Soldier Training

The standard of general instruction is high but the opportunity should never be lost to remind instructors that prior preparation of a subject is essential for a good lesson. When training time at night is valuable, the most careful planning should go into lesson preparation. If there is a fault in our present CMF training, it is that more time could be devoted to interesting repetition work to ensure that lessons have been mastered — especially in weapon training. Too often a good lesson is followed by an indifferent period or by nothing happening at all. The level must be high all the time. Quality is wanted before quantity.

Weapons, Equipment, etc.

The first year of the Second World War found the Australian Army devoid of modern fighting equipment. This severely delayed the training and equipping of the divisions especially earmarked for early battle. This is still our weakness today. Given time the situation will improve. The situation may be poor today but a year hence, better; several years hence, adequate supplies may be available. Such a state of affairs means the priorities must be determined as to what units are to receive

equipment ahead of others during peace time and if necessary on mobilisation. We cannot be strong everywhere at once. Therefore, a selection must be made of the units that will comprise the first division for overseas and resources concentrated in that quarter.

The problem of moving and maintaining the Division in the theatre of operations is important. It may not be politically practicable at this stage to establish an overseas logistic base. Therefore, a careful appreciation must be made as to how long it will take to set up the base from which the force can be supplied. Some of the items such as tanks and guns cannot be taken by air. Therefore the question of safe sea passage is vital. If we are lucky, at least one of the battle groups in the first Division will be comprised of ARA members. This unit could be the one which is flown away shortly after mobilisation to set up the overseas base. It follows, therefore, that a programme must be prepared now as to the procurement, assembly, storage and shipment of all the supplies needed for the Division. Reconnaissance and selection of likely overseas bases should go on continuously so that the difficulties of setting up each are known and appropriate plans prepared.

The rapid use of an ARA Battle Group in setting up the base overseas could do much to facilitate divisional concentration. Some of the logistic support units would no doubt have to leave the mainland very soon

after mobilisation. In such cases these units should be manned in peace time with a high proportion of regular soldiers or enlist the services of citizen soldiers who have their daily employment in skills needed in these units. Shipping requirements for guns, tanks and heavy equipment must be known well before mobilisation. At the highest level shipping should be earmarked for transportation of these items so that delay in concentrating the ships is reduced when mobilisation occurs. A number of ships should be listed so that alternate space will be available if selected ships were not in home waters at the time required.

The maintenance of the Division is a study in itself and the aim of pre-planning is incomplete if it only goes as far as getting the Division overseas. Training of reinforcements, the supply of junior leaders and so on must go on concurrently with the preparation of the main body.

Divisional Headquarters and Pre-Planning

It is vital that the divisional headquarters should consist principally of ARA members. Thus in peace time, from the GOC downwards the G, A and Q staffs could receive full-time training in their particular fields. Valuable intelligence can go on in peace time; in fact visits may even be made to likely operations areas. Tactical exercises and settings could be prepared with an eye to the future. Thus the CMF, especially the officers, could be indoctrinated

well before mobilisation as to the likely role of their unit.

More important still, the Regular Army officers of the headquarters could have the opportunity of working with, or knowing, allied forces with which they may one day have to co-operate. Clear orders beforehand as to the Division's battle role and exactly how it would be commanded at the theatre combat-level, should eliminate many of the problems which faced the 2nd AIF in its relations with Middle-East Headquarters.

Armoured Support

In view of the time needed to train tank crews and school them in battle techniques, it is recommended that the regiment furnishing the armoured support be comprised of ARA personnel. The shipping of the tanks overseas may have to be fitted in with availability of shipping and this might occur soon after mobilisation. The CMF members in Armour would depart later as reinforcements and every minute of the time after mobilisation would be needed to bring them up to the necessary pitch of training. The important factor is to be ready to ship the armoured equipment overseas and as such ARA members must be ready to depart at little notice. The armour must be available when the force undergoes its final training in the theatre of operations.

Engineer Support

The demands for engineering aid will be twofold — firstly, the need for engineering support in the normal training and prepa-

ration of the division back in Australia; and secondly, for help in setting up the overseas base and solving problems associated with the arrival of units during the first six to eight months. Therefore, provision for the additional engineering aid should be made by raising special engineer task units which would be available to carry out the work decided upon by an Engineer Project Group attached to the CRE of the Division. This body would act similarly to a professional Engineer Consulting firm.

CMF personnel could man the normal engineer support within the Division, but, in view of the importance of having units available and fully trained at the time of mobilisation, ARA members should form the bulk of the special engineer task units.

ARA/CMF Relationship

This paper repeatedly emphasises the need for the appointment of Regular officers to all key postings in the Division so that the necessary drive can be given and continuity of effect made once mobilisation is ordered. CMF officer members may feel, therefore, that they are being left out of the team. But in actual fact the only CMF officers who would be effected could be potential commanders at the senior level. This is the price that must be paid if we are to have any change of getting the first division away early and into battle without undue delay. From an overall army viewpoint there will be places for all, as the senior CMF officers would no doubt find appoint-

ment in the next division to be raised or in coming to the ARA/CMF Division as reinforcements at a later stage. For this reason, it is vital that adequate facilities exist to train senior CMF officers so that their services and rich experiences are not lost by some unfounded contention that they are not wanted. Special provision for their training could be made for them as members of the CMF Academy suggested earlier in this paper.

We would do well to remember that an army is a team — not a one-sided army in favour of ARA, but one army where each member is a partner in a huge enterprise.

Summary

Participation of the complete Division in a limited war in South East Asia will take time. Just how much will depend on its degree of readiness. This will evolve from a number of practical steps which must be taken in peace time. The summary in Table 2 lists the factors that hindered the deployment of the 6th Division, and at the same time compares the steps discussed in this essay; the implementation of which will shorten the interval between mobilisation and battle.

Conclusion

The problem discussed in this essay—preparing a citizen army for war — is one of the great challenges that faces Australia. Even at the best a citizen soldier has only limited time available for training in peace time and, in these busy times the demands on the CMF must be reasonable.

Table of Comparisons

<i>First Division of 2nd AIF</i>	<i>The ARA/CMF Division</i>
1. Not in being on mobilisation. Got off to a bad start with recruits—was in competition with Militia.	Division "in being" and not in competition with any existing force. Has available within its framework a useful ARA formation ready soon after mobilisation.
2. Militia keen but weak in:— (a) training techniques (b) trained officers (c) manpower restrictions held back its members	Propose to set up a CMF Academy to train officers for promotion with best instruction. Regular COs to lead units. Adequate supply of text-books. No manpower restrictions.
3. Shortage of equipment caused serious hold up in training.	This is the immediate problem, but gets better as next few years go by. Better to use old equipment than none at all. Definite systems of priorities should be used to earmark items for units.
4. No adequate recruit training for members joining 2nd AIF.	Have special teams in being before mobilisation — use of aids, sound preparation in peace time. Camps kept ready to receive recruits.
5. Delay in shipping—problems of concentrating the Division.	Use of air travel in CMF training. Earmark ships to be used on mobilisation so that they are available for swift diversion from civilian to military needs.
6. Logistic support inadequate.	Plan and reconnaissance now as to how the ARA units will set up overseas bases; liaison with allies.
7. No certainty as to how the force should be used.	Pre-plan and co-operate with allies — carry out reconnaissance of likely areas. Clear orders by Government as to the Division's role.

Table 2

When mobilisation comes Australia may have only a short period to get its force ready for overseas. Thus every aspect of preparation and training must be planned beforehand and kept up to date as techniques change. The crux of the matter is to be found in the quality of outlook of the politician, the professional soldier and the citizen.

But in practice the answer must be found in ARA leadership — by having the ability to learn from the past, the courage to test in the present the desired organisation, and the willingness to be continuously searching for fresh ideas. For this it must have the goodwill of the nation.

APOLOGY

In the March 1962 issue the photograph of Salamaua reproduced as a frontispiece, was from the collection of the Australian War Memorial Canberra. It is regretted that the usual acknowledgment to the Australian War Memorial was omitted.

ROAD

REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY DIVISION (USA)

Lieutenant Colonel Carl P. Keiser, US Army

Reprinted from the January, 1962, issue of Military Review, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, USA

ROAD, the U.S. Army's newest idea on division organisation, is a realistic approach to the facts of today's and tomorrow's military life — one that will better prepare us to fight under the most diverse circumstances. Like the fighter who would take on all comers, the Army must be ready to quickly alter its weapons and tactics to defeat any opponent in any arena.

As the Army prepares itself to meet the challenge it is most important that its officer corps understand the basic philosophies that underlie the ROAD organisation and its employment doctrine. It is also important that we look beyond the immediate task of reorganisation, for ROAD will profoundly influence the future of the Army.

ROAD is rapidly moving from an idea to a reality. Since 25th May, 1961, when President Kennedy announced the decision to reshape the Army's divisions, much of the foundation for the reorganisation has been laid. Tables of organisation and equipment (TOE's) have been drafted. The United States Continental Army Command has set the service schools to work

writing training literature for the new divisions and the schools have begun to incorporate ROAD in their curricula.

In its 1960-61 academic year, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College was able to orient a number of its classes on the ROAD concept of organisation. The 1961-62 classes will receive instruction on both the ROAD and the pentomic divisions, and by the fall of 1962 all Command and General Staff College instruction will be based on ROAD.

The division level training literature on ROAD organisation and doctrine will be published soon in two field manuals. Field Manual 61-100, The Division, will contain the fundamentals of organisation and employment of all ROAD divisions. Field Manual 54-2, Division Logistics and the Support Command also will be common to all divisions.

Other manuals covering the division's subordinate units and many special subjects, such as airborne operations, are being written by the service schools. Much of this literature will be ready for publication in time to support the actual reorganisation.

In early 1962 the first ROAD divisions are to be formed. Sometime in 1963, all active Army divisions and some of the Reserve component divisions should be fully organized under the new structure. TOE's and training literature will be available to support their new organizations and their personnel should include a substantial number of service school graduates with a working knowledge of ROAD doctrine.

Tailor Unit to Meet Need

The basic philosophy of ROAD is to fit the unit to meet the need.


The ROAD formula does not provide a universal division capable of doing all things. Rather, it is a standard division structure upon which the capabilities for doing specific tasks can be built. To the common division base, combat battalions — airborne infantry, mechanized infantry, just plain infantry, and armor — can be added in whatever numbers and types the division needs to perform its

anticipated missions. The division then assumes the character, capabilities, and limitations of its particular combination of combat battalions. In other words, it becomes exactly what its combat battalions make it.

When a division is to operate in a known environment — for example, jungles, mountains, deserts, plains — it will be given the battalions that best suit it for its operational setting and probable opposition. For some very practical reasons, such as the requirements in personnel and funds, type divisions — mechanized, airborne, armored, and infantry — will be established.

To simplify the "tailoring" process, the combat battalions themselves are similar in structure. Each is composed of a headquarters company and three identical companies of its particular arm. Infantry, airborne infantry, mechanized infantry, and tank battalions are generally the same except for variations in quantity and type of equipment.

DIVISION BASE



Since early in World War II, United States armoured division commanders have tailored their subordinate commands to perform specific tasks. Fighting forces were formed by attaching combat battalions to the three small combat command headquarters. ROAD adopts this scheme of tailoring within the division, replacing the title "combat command" with "brigade." Without combat battalions, the brigade is nothing more than a small headquarters having essentially no combat capability. With combat battalions attached to it, the brigade, like the division, assumes the character of its battalions.

This versatility does not stop at the brigade. The concept of matching the command's capabilities to the requirements of the job carries down to the battalion and company levels. The brigade commander may employ his attached combat battalions without attachments, or he may form battalion task forces with combinations of arms and services that he believes are best able to do the jobs he has assigned to them. Cross-attachment of companies between battalions is the method used to build these battalion task forces. Cross attachment of platoons to form company task forces is a further extension of the concept.

ROAD gives us a doctrine of building the organisation to meet the needs of the task — from Department of the Army level all the way down to the fighting company.

Functionalised Support

ROAD also represents a new look at some old ideas on administrative support — and adapts some of these ideas to the division and lower levels. It breaks away from the tradition of support by separate technical service units, each directly responsible to the division commander, and in its place prescribes a division level logistical commander and functionalised logistical support.

The division's administrative support units are grouped into a support command. This is not new. Division trains and support commands have been used before. What is new is that all divisions will have a support command and all division support commands will be similar in structure.

Logistical units within the support command are grouped functionally. Repair parts supply, and essentially all field maintenance, regardless of whether it is performed on engines, radios, canvas, or rifles, are carried out by a maintenance battalion. Supply, from rations to barbed wire, except medical, is handled by a supply and transportation battalion. The support units are designed to be fragmented. Each part is capable of joining and supporting a combat unit when that combat unit cannot be supported from a central location.

Reorganisation Effects

How will ROAD affect the Army of tomorrow? Some of its effects such as changes in strengths of divisions, different

blocks on the organisation charts, and new numbers on the TOE, are apparent. That the new division will require more men and equipment is also obvious. However, there are some other implications that may prove to be ROAD'S most important affects and these, too, should be obvious in the light of ROAD'S fundamental concepts of combined-arms employment and logistical functionalisation.

For many years we have been a branch oriented Army. Infantry has been the "Queen of Battles," artillery the "King"; armour has called itself "a way of life." Until they reached Command and General Staff College level, officers have attended branch oriented schools, Quartermaster, Armour, Ordnance, and the like. We continue to have branch associations and branch journals and each branch, justly proud of its heritage, seeks to further branch esprit-de-corps.

In the new division, some units that were formerly identified by branch lose that identification. Ordnance, Quartermaster, and Transportation Corps units no longer appear as such on the organisation chart. Their members are absorbed in functional logistical units. Others, particularly infantry and armoured units, now are more likely to be organised for combat into combined-arms task forces. This means that commanders, both logistical and combat arms, and at levels down to the company, must now direct their thinking toward combined-arms employment — and away from traditional branch orientation. This

is essential if we are to derive the greatest benefit from the ROAD concept. This is not a prophecy of doom for the branches of service, because we will continue to need the specialists they produce. But it is a forecast for a closer integration of the branches at the division unit level, and a definite need for leaders who are well-grounded in combined - arms operations.

Granting that ROAD dictates a combined-arms attitude on the part of brigade, battalion, and company commanders, how should this attitude be developed? Obviously training commanders in combined - arms employment must start at an appropriate level in our service schools. Admittedly, our schools at Knox, Sill, and Benning now teach combined - arms employment. However, they are primarily branch oriented schools. Leavenworth (Command and General Staff College), teaching at the division level and higher, is the lowest echelon in the school system which is formally recognised as a combined - arms institution.

New Teaching Requirements

It is readily apparent that, somehow, the school system must meet the requirement for teaching employment of the new combinations of arms and services at levels below the Command and General Staff College. There are a number of ways in which this could be done. While it is not the purpose of this article to develop the final answer to this and other problems, it would appear that either

the branch school curricula may have to be altered to the point that these schools are no longer branch oriented, or there may have to be combined - arms schools established below the Leavenworth level for combat arms and the technical service officers. The Army's School System may take on quite a different appearance as a result of ROAD.

How far will functionalisation of logistical support have to be extended as a result of ROAD? Will maintenance and supply by technical service continue to be feasible at corps, field army, theatre, or even departmental level? Or will functionalisation at division prove unworkable without similar functionalisation of support at higher levels? Perhaps only experience will provide the real answers to these questions. However, it is apparent that ROAD will have its impact on the logistical system above the division echelon.

The idea of a common base for all divisions, together with common training manuals at the division level, and the possibility of lower level combined-arms training present some interesting thoughts on tomorrow's officer. This fellow should be pretty much at home in any division, be it mechanised,

armour, airborne, or infantry. He should be able to transfer easily from one type division to another without having to learn new organisations.

Tomorrow's mechanised infantry battalion commander should be equally at home commanding a force heavy with tanks, or one predominantly infantry. He should be quite able to build his subordinate units in whatever fashion he feels will best accomplish the tasks he has assigned -- and he should be able to match the missions and forces he intends to give his subordinate commanders with their personalities and experience.

ROAD is a sizable step toward integration of the arms and services into more effective combat teams. While it does not eliminate the need for branch specialists, it is a move away from branch orientation and a move towards a combined-arms attitude. In the long run, ROAD may have significant effects upon our service school system and our concepts of logistical and technical service organisations and operations. It should produce commanders who can capitalise on the capabilities of all arms and services and who are at home in any type division. These may prove to be ROAD'S most far-reaching results.

GUERRILLA DETERRENT

Flight Lieutenant H. W. Parker
Royal Australian Air Force

A MAN who is unconventional in his love-life or in Mess may well be judged wrong, but in war throughout history the unorthodox has won many more battles than it has lost and experience in World Wars I and II has clearly shown that it must be well respected as a formidable enemy, so no apology is offered for the views put forward in this paper.

Situation

General

A future war may be limited or global. In either case our enemy is likely to be less civilized, from our Christian viewpoint, than was the enemy in World Wars I and II, but will have the advantage of being technically advanced. He has a large peasant population which holds life cheap, and has the inherent cunning and hardiness (necessary for existence) to do dirty work under vile conditions. The enemy will also be a fanatic.

A limited war against a Communist foe is likely to be fought in country where guerrilla warfare can play a large part, and it is a Communist conceit, even if unfounded in fact, that they hold a monopoly in this field.

In a global war there are, amongst others, two interesting possibilities. Firstly—

Australia might be isolated from her Allies, the Communist submarine fleet playing a leading role, and occupied by a numerically far superior enemy — for it is a part of Communist geopolitical theory that the world can be dominated from the centres of the land and ocean masses, that is to say the Moscow-Sydney axis. Such an event would leave us the choice either to give up or to fight on as guerrillas. The latter is the only sound course open but success would be dependent upon planning, preparation and training in time of peace.

The second possibility is that Australia is left on the touch-line of a nuclear exchange between the great powers, and so, with ample room to disperse and with few worthwhile targets, can keep her forces intact to be a deciding factor in the broken-backed war to follow. As remaining enemy forces would probably be scattered and without conventional logistic support they could fight only as guerrillas, and we would have to fight them at their own game.

The mere existence of the nuclear threat makes dispersal vital in modern war and this gives ideal targets and opportunities to the guerrilla fighter or raider. We must understand

their minds and methods to protect ourselves from them.

Our Men

We are now more dependent upon the highly trained technician and his logistic supporter than ever before. So much technical training and practice goes into making these men that not enough time has been available for their individual training in the bloodier side of war, so to the trained guerrilla they are easy meat. Such men are of much greater value to us, intrinsically, than their counterparts in past wars and their loss would be more felt as they are costly in time and money to replace. This applies particularly to our aircrews. They are a worthwhile target for what, in time of peace, would be called murder. The more valuable a man is to us, the better he should be trained to preserve himself by killing the enemy — not only when he happens to have an aircraft or a tank with him as the means to do so.

The bulk of Australia's population is city bred and its life confined to a city environment. This factor deprives many of the instinctive advantages enjoyed by the countryman or peasant in any form of clandestine warfare. Furthermore, because our standard of living is high, and we are used to much in the way of comfort and amenities, much training is needed before the individual can be relied upon, under the normal conditions of mental strain, fatigue and discomfort met with in guerrilla warfare, to make sound decisions unbiased by the temptation to

take a chance in order to cut short the period of discomfort. Many operations and attempted escapes have failed because this temptation has not been resisted.

The aim of this paper is to outline the reason for and means of training personnel in basic guerrilla warfare.

The Reason for Training

In April 1959, Sir John Latham, addressing the Australian-American Association Federal Council, said —

"Australia should train her young men in guerrilla warfare so that the country would be too hot and thorny for an aggressor to want it".

Such a man as Sir John would not say this lightly, and it seems logical that if we are to train men so, we should start with the best, as we already have them in the Armed Forces. Such training would be an adjunct to the training they now have and would, in addition, produce a higher degree of physical fitness, stability, confidence and a broader outlook. It is frightening to think of the losses which can be directly attributed to the narrow mind.

As escape, evasion and survival on land are, in fact, a passive phase of guerrilla warfare, the trained guerrilla has more chance of success than the man who has only a short survival or code of conduct course to help him. In war today there is no room for a passive method where an aggressive means could be used instead, and none should be committed to a phase of war,

active or passive, which he does not fully understand. War is now a desperate enterprise, without chivalry or glamour. Our potential enemies believe that the end justifies the means, so each of our men must be given the training to survive, and that, above all else, is guerrilla training.

It is not the aim of this paper to suggest brutalising our men, but rather to build up on their basic decency with training, planning and preparation.

Preparation and Training

National Guerrilla Effort

Guerrilla wars against an invading enemy have been fought throughout history. Those planned before enemy occupation have been more successful than those which were not. Where the latter have succeeded the fighters have relied largely on outside support.

In early planning it is wise to allow for the worst case. In this instance planning should start with the assumption that no outside support is forthcoming.

The accepted principles of war apply to guerrilla warfare as much as to any other form of war, but with changed values. After the selection of the aim, security and surprise are paramount. With them, all other principles can be applied, but without them, none.

To train guerrillas as a deterrent to a potential aggressor without having the machinery to set them to work is to threaten with a gun which is not loaded. Threats are wrong unless backed by the right, the intention and the means to carry them out.

The following paragraphs show briefly and by phases, the type of factors which would have to be considered in the organisation of a national guerrilla effort.

Phase I

Policy. A policy must be determined to use guerrilla force, if need be, against an invader, and to this end no instrument of surrender or capitulation must ever be issued so that continuity of a form of government is assured, either in hiding or in exile. Thus under Article 14/2 of the Third (POW) Convention and 14/6 of the Fourth (Red Cross) Convention recognition is given to the fighters as members of a resistance movement.

While it is not likely that our potential enemies would respect the Conventions unless it suited them to do so, it is important that the guerrilla should be fighting for what is right and by accepted standards of patriotism. If this is not so, any resistance movement will deteriorate into disorganised banditry and dubious political moves.

Planning. A central co-ordinating staff would be needed to control the efforts of a number of field staffs each working on one of the headings shown below. Existing Service, police, and civilian records would be used for the screening and selection of these staffs, and it must be remembered that efficient selection and screening from such records could only be undertaken in time of peace, and would be quite impossible after enemy occupation, leaving the resistance movement open to enemy penetration.

The field staffs would investigate, and the co-ordinating staff would collate their findings on the following —

- (a) Material resources (Service, civilian and improvised) supply, replenishment and dumps.
- (b) Personnel resources.
- (c) Clearance, selection and training of potential leaders.
- (d) Communications.
- (e) Field reconnaissance of —
 - (i) Potential target data.
 - (ii) Hiding and training areas.
 - (iii) Routes, dumps and bases.
 - (iv) Technical, cartographic and photographic data.
 - (v) Detailed operational training and planning.
 - (vi) Recruiting, public relations and propaganda.

From the findings of the field staffs, the co-ordinating staff must form an operational policy, within which local commanders can harass an invader continuously with the minimum use of communications or lateral liaison, which can compromise guerrilla action and may also hamper the initiative of the local commander.

Both policy and planning must depend upon a decision to place guerrillas under military law on mobilisation to give them the degree of responsibility to a superior called for by the Convention, as well as to stop bandits, black marketeers, the owners of pot-stills and those with strange political notions from using the name of resistance to further their own ends,

as many did in World War II. It is also important that the word "Collaboration" should be clearly defined. For example, the policeman who continues to direct traffic or to apprehend the common thief after occupation must be protected, but the guerrilla must have the means to deal with those who oppose the resistance, shielding themselves with parrot cries of "law and order"—in fact, Quislings. It is hard to think of ones fellow countrymen as such, but those who would loot the homes of bush fire victims have the qualities needed to become a Quisling.

Phase II

This phase is the build up, and should cover the selection and training, first of the junior leaders then the rank and file. During this phase the doctrine of "need to know" must be strictly applied, but guarded press releases through public relations channels would start to apply the deterrent aspect of the organisation.

Training should range from basic individual skills to mobilisation and deployment exercises which should be opposed.

Phase III

This phase covers the re-grouping of the structure from its embryo state to a fighting force. Commands are established and responsibilities allotted on a regional basis. Detailed plans for mobilisation and deployment are issued together with communication channels and codewords to set the organisation to work, and the essential intelligence element must be established.

In time of peace the entire organisation must be kept under constant review as circumstances change.

The foregoing paragraphs show only the bare bones of the vast amount of work needed to form a resistance movement and it is easy to see how hard this would be in the face of enemy opposition.

Guerrilla Warfare and the Forces

If men are to be trained in the skills of guerrilla warfare, obviously the Forces must be the source of that training, but in progressing to tactical training it is better to exercise guerrillas against conventional troops so that both may learn and develop a flexible tactical doctrine suited to their environment.

At first sight it may seem that of the three Services, only the Army need be concerned. This is not entirely the case. Past wars have proved that air support is of the highest value to guerrilla warfare, and that guerrillas can give assistance to the air arm by collecting target data, marking, denying terrain to the enemy by night and destroying enemy aircraft on the ground.

Previously, air support for clandestine operations has come from outside the occupied zone. However, Australia seems to lend itself to the use of an "underground airforce". This notion may at first seem far-fetched, but in view of the vast remoteness of parts of this country, and the developments in STOL and

VTOL aircraft it should not be entirely dismissed without examination.

It must also be remembered that, paradoxically, the Air Force, because of its static bases and stable communications is best placed to launch and deploy guerrilla effort, though not to man it, beyond a few specialists.

Conclusion

Guerrilla warfare is an attitude of mind as much as it is a method of fighting, and the individual, to become guerrilla minded must develop in himself the qualities of patience, self-discipline, imagination, unselfishness and endurance to the highest degree.

In conventional fighting some can get by with such qualities present to a point of mediocrity.

The film guerrilla, to give entertainment, must be a flamboyant and ruthless daredevil, but not so his counterpart in real life. He has the harder task of backing determination and conviction by being, at all times, a most reasonable man.

Of those who decry the idea of guerrilla warfare, many do so because they are unwilling to feel participation in a grim picture of loneliness, hardship and discomfort with no apparent end in sight. They would prefer the order, the shared effort and comparative certainty of conventional warfare. They are thinking wishfully. May this not pose a challenge to us all?

Strategic Review

SOUTH VIETNAM

WITH the expulsion of the French from Indo China in 1955 the Communists gained an operational base in South East Asia. From this base — North Vietnam — they have never ceased to harass the other successor states of the French colony. All the usual Communist techniques have been employed — subversive propaganda, sabotage, vilification of the West, terrorism, assassination, anti-colonialism, and guerrilla activities. The pressure has been particularly severe in Laos and South Vietnam.

Immediately after the French collapse the probable course of events was foreseen by the Western Powers, and the South East Asia Treaty Organisation was formed to counter the threat. But SEATO was not, as some people supposed, another NATO for the states to be protected could never muster sufficient military strength to create a defensive shield. From the beginning it was apparent that if military action became necessary the chief burden would have to be borne by the non-Asian members. The South East Asian states which are not members of SEATO — Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam — were, and still are, even less able

to defend themselves against Communist overt and covert attacks.

There have been times when it has seemed that SEATO was about to intervene in support of the established government of one or other of the states, and some at least of the Asian members have expressed dissatisfaction at its failure to do so. It would appear that SEATO's tardiness has been due chiefly to the unwillingness of the two European members — Britain and France — to become deeply involved in this part of the world.

The United States has given strong financial support to the new states, but for various reasons this has not in all cases established the social and economic stability which is the first line of defence against the advance of Communism. In Laos personal rivalries in high places have kept the political situation in a state of flux, while in South Vietnam the Government of President Diem has been unwilling to undertake the reforms necessary for the country's progress.

While the spotlight has been focussed on the endless political manoeuvrings in Laos, it has gradually become apparent that

South Vietnam was in even greater peril. Terrorism and guerrilla warfare have been steadily increasing, and evidence has been accumulating that these activities are directed and supported by the Communist regime in North Vietnam. Radio Hanoi has never ceased to pour out a stream of propaganda directed at the South Vietnamese. Recently Radio Hanoi crowned its propaganda campaign with the announcement that a Communist party had been formed in South Vietnam with the primary object of "leading the people in their struggle for reunification with the North". Radio Hanoi then called upon the people of North Vietnam to provide a solid base for the "struggle".

There is nothing new in this well-worn Communist line of attack. What is new, refreshingly new, is the reaction it produced. President Diem agreed to institute some at least of the reforms necessary to make American economic and military aid effective. In return he got a substantial increase in financial support and the US Government devised a scheme to step up military support without immediately committing American troops to the battle. This increased military support has taken the form of the establishment of the United States Military Assistance Command (Vietnam). Since the establishment of this Command there has been a sharp increase in the number of United States service personnel operating "in support of" the South Vietnamese Army.

The public statements issued by the United States Government have been at some pains to explain that the function of the new Command is not to direct the anti-guerrilla campaign nor to participate in it. Its function is to ensure that the South Vietnamese Army does in fact receive the logistic support provided by the American Government at the times and places such support is required. Since logistic support is not much use unless it reaches the forward area, it may be inferred that American service men are undertaking its delivery to the fighting troops. Further, it may be inferred that the United States would not have appointed a senior general to the new Command unless it had decided that this was the place beyond which the Communist tide in South East Asia could not be permitted to flow. If it should become necessary, operational functions can be added to the Command very quickly and smoothly.

Disarmament

Almost every day some reference to a disarmament conference appears in our morning papers. The discussion has gone on for so long, and has taken so many twists and turns, that the average reader is probably so confused that he simply does not bother to read these references any more. It may be informative, therefore, to sketch the main lines that the present series of conferences have followed.

The talks began in October 1958 at a time when the Soviet was engaged in a series of large-scale nuclear weapons tests. At

the first conference the Soviet proposed a blanket ban on all nuclear weapons tests without any system of international inspection or control. As the negotiations proceeded they reluctantly agreed to inspection "in principle". Throughout 1959 and 1960 they argued about the practical means of applying the principle of inspection, but in the end came pretty close to agreement with Western ideas. In December 1960 they joined the unanimous vote of the United Nations Assembly approving international inspection and supervision.

In 1961, however, the Soviet suddenly somersaulted and put forward new proposals which would have completely nullified the effectiveness of international control. Soon afterwards they began their latest series of massive tests, claiming that the tests were necessary to Soviet security. On completion of their tests they returned to their original position and rejected any idea of a ban on nuclear weapons testing except as part of a general disarmament treaty. In January of this year they were insisting that the only basis of discussion to which they would agree was one which excluded international inspection. They were also expressing opposition to the Western proposals to give nuclear testing high priority on the agenda of

new disarmament discussions. This, of course, takes the discussion right back to the point where it started three years ago.

As usual Mr. Khrushchev has attempted to obscure the real issue with a smoke screen. His proposal for a king-sized "summit conference", attended by some 18 or more heads of state, is nicely calculated to deceive anyone who has never attended a business conference. We are accustomed to the blaze of publicity which accompanies the meeting of only four heads of state, and which makes it virtually impossible for them to engage in any real negotiations. Imagine what it would be like with 18 or so of them there. In any case, if it were remotely possible for agreement to be reached in such circumstances, the decisions would be taken by the four or five great powers. The rest of them would be nothing more than a very noisy chorus. The Western powers have rightly declined to join the circus.

There is one thing we can safely say about disarmament. Millions and millions of words are going to be spoken and written about it before agreement is reached, if indeed agreement can be reached before the war in which we are engaged comes to an end in one way or another.

E.G.K.

SCHOOL CADETS

1962

Prepared by the Directorate of Cadets, Army Headquarters

IN his article "A Forgotten Army" (Australian Army Journal No. 150, November, 1961) Major K. J. Stanley discusses the attitudes of the ARA and CMF towards the Australian Cadet Corps, and offers useful suggestions towards developing the potential of the Cadet Corps as a major source of recruits, particularly for the CMF. It is encouraging to know that a CMF officer has seen fit to reflect on this situation, and to express his views clearly to readers of this Journal.

Except on one or two points, this brief paper does not take issue with Major Stanley's statements, nor is it a comprehensive review of all the problems which the existence of a Cadet Corps poses. Its purpose is rather to indicate AHQ policy on some matters affecting the Cadet Corps, together with information on some recent developments in the training of the Corps, which may not be known to those who are not directly concerned in the organisation and training of school cadets.

The Aim of Cadet Training

On 1st January, 1962, the following revised aim of cadet training became effective:—

- (a) To give school cadets a foundation of military knowledge and discipline.
- (b) To develop the qualities of leadership.
- (c) To develop a sense of citizenship and patriotism.
- (d) To develop interest in the role of the Army.
- (e) To encourage cadets, by association, to continue some form of military service after leaving school.

The essential difference between the old and the new aim lies in the fact that there will now be a more positive approach to motivating cadets towards some form of later military service.

In a personal letter explaining the reasons for the new aim to all Headmasters of Schools having cadet units, the Minister for the Army, stated, *inter alia*:—

"Under the National Service system most cadets were called up for military service after leaving school and on reaching the age of 18 years. Under that system the Citizen Military Forces had no recruitment problems, but they did have a requirement for young men with good leadership qualities. The

Army looked to previous members of the Cadet Corps to provide a substantial number of junior leaders, and was gratified by the response.

"The Army still has the same need for leaders and will continue to rely on the Cadet Corps for providing a large proportion of them. The difficulty is that with the suspension of National Service, school cadets, whether they possess leadership qualities or not, do not as a matter of course undertake military service after leaving school. Quite apart from the provision of leaders, a school cadet who subsequently joins either the Regular Army or the Citizen Military Forces is a much more valuable recruit than a youth without any previous training.

"In addition to the problem of maintaining the Army at its appropriate strength, and attracting to it the right sort of potential leaders, there is the wider problem of absorbing the energies of youth in activities which are wholesome for the participants and beneficial to the nation. I suggest that service in the Army provides such an activity in that it encourages habits of discipline, self-respect and social responsibility".

The Army and the Schools

To bring the needs of the Army, and the prospects of an Army career before interested school cadets and others in a position to influence cadets in their choice of careers, the following activities are sponsored by the Army each year:—

- (a) Sixty selected school cadets visit the Royal Military Col-

lege to see at first hand the training and way of life at the College.

- (b) Thirty Headmasters are invited to visit the RMC to receive briefings and inspect its organisation and facilities.
- (c) A party of ARA cadet staff members, which may include Officers of Cadets, visits selected AHQ training establishments in order that they may be better equipped to advise school cadets on service career opportunities.
- (d) The Army Team of Lecturers visits many schools in its itinerary of each State, including both schools which have and which do not have cadet units.

The Affiliation of School Cadet Units with CMF Units

Ways and means to establish and maintain close contact between CMF units and school cadet units have been closely examined in Commands and at AHQ. As a result of this examination, current AHQ policy in this matter is:—

"The affiliation of CMF Units and School Cadet Units should continue to the maximum extent possible in Commands and should be encouraged at all times. Because of the different training standards and conditions of service it is neither desirable nor practical that formal integrated training be practised. It is intended that affiliations, as arranged by Commands, should lead to informal co-operation and assistance to

the mutual benefit of the affiliated units, and that through this form of contact, a wider interest in, and knowledge of the role of the adult Army will be generated in cadets".

Suitable affiliated activities including liaison are implemented at the discretion of Commands, having regard to local conditions, and there are many examples of highly beneficial exercises, etc., where a CMF unit has given excellent assistance and facilities to the affiliated cadet unit. A further point of contact is made by the attachment of CMF officers to Cadet brigades and battalions to assist in the organisation and conduct of cadet training.

There is no doubt that affiliations, sincerely practised, pay dividends to both types of unit. It is equally true that a successful affiliation programme requires conscious and continuous efforts by CMF units to maintain the interest of school cadets because of the many other attractions to the teen-age group, and the large annual turnover in most cadet units. Major Stanley properly stresses the need for this action.

Postings to Cadet Staffs

It is desirable that there should be a reasonable proportion of relatively young officers, preferably RMC or OCS graduates, in the cadet staff establishment. However, the young officer "fresh from Duntroon" has neither the military experience nor social maturity required to command a cadet battalion. Further, the require-

ments for completion of tertiary education, filling junior leaders postings in the field force, etc. reduce greatly the number of young officers who might be available for cadet staff postings. Officer appointments in cadet staffs are in the ranks of lieutenant colonel (brigade commander), major and captain (battalion commander), which acknowledges that appointees will have at least a few years' experience before being posted to Cadets.

Where they are available, young officer graduates from both RMC and OCS can and do give invaluable assistance in cadet training, e.g. during the vacation periods of their University and Technical College courses.

Throughout the Army, there will always be a number of officers in terminal appointments, and it is to be expected that some of these will be posted to cadet staffs. The important thing is not that the officer is in a terminal appointment, but that by virtue of his longer service and experience, his contribution to cadet training, his influence on school cadets generally, and his relationships with Headmasters, parents, and local bodies are more effective, acceptable, and harmonious.

It is perhaps unnecessary to say that by far the great majority of members of cadet staffs are clearly aware of the importance of their contact with, and their responsibilities towards school cadets. Their task is a busy one, many of them being required to spend up to 13

weeks each year in camp, as well as supervising bivouacs, range practices, etc., at other times convenient to schools, and when most of their colleagues elsewhere in the ARA are happily "standing down".

Cadet Training — Some Aspects

Cadet training follows in general the basic and minor collective training for infantry soldiers of the AMF. Certain specialist subjects, at the regimental level, are taught to older cadets, the retention of whose interest, in a field of great competition from many other attractions, remains a constant challenge to cadet training staffs. In this regard the lack of availability of the most modern infantry weapons in the cadet Corps must be accepted as a problem for some years to come. In the field of specialist training, Assault Pioneer Sections have been successfully introduced in most Commands. Basic MT training is also being considered.

It has been possible to issue a limited number of the SLR to cadet battalions for familiarisation purposes, with the prospect of increasing this issue in due course. "Trainfire" rifle practices adapted for cadets are to be introduced shortly.

The value of adventure training is undoubted. It is encouraged and conducted to the extent practicable in Commands. Usually each annual camp training syllabus contains an exercise of this nature. Other specially arranged adventure training exercises include the recent Exercise "Overland" in the rugged and desolate south-west of Tas-

mania involving naval and air assistance to the cadet party, and Exercise "Roughstuff" in very rough country between Victor Harbour and Cape Jervis, South Australia. There have been and will be many more such exercises.

A Neglected Army?

Cadet activities absorb a due proportion of the annual Army vote, and the amount is such that it could not possibly indicate an attitude of neglect or lack of encouragement, when the pressing needs for funds elsewhere in the service are also borne in mind. Likewise the annual expenditure does not lead to the Cadet Corps being forgotten! Also, let us not forget that, apart from the military ingredients of the cadet training programme, and our natural desire to receive as many recruits as possible into the ARA and CMF from the Cadet Corps, the Army is making a contribution, not easily measurable but none the less important, in the development of our country's most valuable asset — its youth. This cadet training does by providing:—

- (a) A healthy, instructive, and disciplined activity as a counter to youth delinquency tendencies.
- (b) Group associations, e.g. cadet camps and courses which mix together boys of different social backgrounds, religious faiths, and attitudes. This must inevitably help to produce better citizens.
- (c) In the case of Papua-New Guinea, a positive assistance

towards the later assumption of responsible leadership by the indigenous peoples of the Territory at various levels.

As we are now training up to 38,000 cadets each year, it is suggested that a fundamental characteristic of the activity is economy, and not neglect.





Shigeru Yoshida. (William Heinemann, Ltd., London, and 317 Collins Street Melbourne.)

Shigeru Yoshida was Foreign Minister in Japan's first post-war Cabinet and Prime Minister in the years 1946-47 and 1949-55. His first period of office coincided with the shock of defeat and the initial impact of the military occupation; the second with Japan's recovery from the economic effects of the war. He is thus in a position to write authoritatively about events and developments of immense interest to all Pacific countries.

Before the war Shigeru Yoshida belonged to the liberal element in Japanese society which opposed the adventurers who sought the aggrandisement of their country by military conquest. In his earlier political life he strove, unfortunately without much success, to curb the influence of the militarists — using the term in its true meaning — who used their position in the old Japanese political machine to further their ambitions. A highly educated, cultivated man, he naturally preferred diplomacy to the sword. His knowledge of the world convinced him that the extreme policies being pursued by Germany and Italy could not in the long run succeed in face of the opposition of

Great Britain and the United States. Consequently he strove to educate his countrymen to the advantages of the long view, as against any passing benefits that might be secured from precipitate action. However, his opponents had too firm a grip of the organs of political persuasion, and his Party was unable to check the military adventures in China which led step by step to her southward drive in 1941. For his part in attempting to stem the tide he suffered political eclipse and imprisonment.

Yoshida contends that if the Japanese people had had any effective say in the matter they would never have chosen war as a solution to their difficulties. Education had carried them past the point where war is desirable for its own sake. They were misled by clever propaganda nicely calculated to play on the romantic and heroic element in the Japanese character, and distracted by the formidable economic difficulties which beset them in the nineteen-thirties. However, by no means all soldiers and sailors supported the idea of military conquest. The drive came from small but powerful factions in the Navy and the Army.

Yoshida thinks that the Allied Occupation Forces in Japan did

a fairly good job, and he expresses great admiration for General MacArthur's fairness and far-sightedness. He considers that the professional soldiers on MacArthur's staff had a much firmer grasp of the realities of Japanese life than the Far Eastern experts sent out to "modernise" their political and economic institutions. While the soldiers insisted on drastic reforms they were far-sighted enough to refrain from encouraging the Communists. If MacArthur's staff made a number of bad mistakes they did, generally, contribute heavily to the formation of the new Japan.

Mr. Yoshida is at pains to explain that the new Japan does not pose a military threat to anyone. Rearmament is expressly forbidden by the new Constitution. This provision arose from the natural reaction of the Japanese people against the military cliques which had led them to ruin. Throughout Japan generals and admirals are at a discount. The people are bent upon the task of raising their living standards, and they are unwilling to take the slightest risk of political power again falling into the hands of military adventurers. While this attitude is in one sense reassuring, it nevertheless raises serious problems in the defence of the Pacific area against Communist imperialism.

Mr. Yoshida has some interesting things to say about the economic and social changes that are taking place in Japan. The land tenure reforms instituted by the Occupation, coupled

with improved methods of agriculture, have led to striking increases in the production of foodstuffs. In 1955 the production of rice, Japan's staple food, increased by 24.5 per cent over the years 1950-51. Further improvements on the 1955 figure of 9.8 per cent and 15.4 per cent were achieved in the years 1956 and 1957 respectively. By 1957 the output of electric power was double that of pre-war years. Industrial production generally now stands at two and a half times the pre-war level. In the field of overseas trade, in the year 1934-35 neither exports nor imports totalled more than one billion dollars, but in 1957 exports amounted to 2,858,000,000 dollars and imports to 4,283,000,000 dollars.

From any Australian point of view, not least from that of the soldier, this is an important and authoritative book. Its perusal will contribute very considerably to our understanding of the new Japan and her place in our world. Amidst the problems which beset us today it is time that we revised our ideas of these people. To cling to the prejudices and hatreds of the past is to blind ourselves to the realities of the present.

— E.G.K.

PEACE AND WAR — A Soldier's Life — by Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Morgan. (Hodder and Stoughton, Ltd., London, and 425 Little Collins Street, Melbourne.)

Since the end of World War 2 autobiographies of soldiers, sailors, airmen and statesmen have been produced in a steady

stream. From the soldier's point of view, indeed from almost any point of view, few of them are so interesting, so entertaining and so instructive as General Morgan's account of his working life.

General Morgan was commissioned in the Royal Artillery in 1913 and joined his unit in India early in 1914. When World War 1 broke out in August of that year he went to France with the Indian Corps, where he served for the four years of the conflict, first with his unit, then as a staff captain on a brigade headquarters. After the war he returned to regimental duties in India, attended the Staff College at Quetta in 1927, and in 1934 became a battery commander in the first anti-aircraft brigade to be formed in Great Britain. After some staff service at the War Office and on the headquarters of a division, he became commander of the Support Group of the newly-formed Armoured Division, and in that capacity served in France in World War 2 until the British Army was driven from the Continent at Dunkirk. Then followed various staff and command postings in the United Kingdom until in 1943 he was appointed Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (Designate) (COSSAC), charged with the preparation of plans for the allied assault on Hitler's "Fortress Europe." When General Eisenhower was eventually appointed to the supreme command, Sir Frederick Morgan became his Deputy Chief of Staff and continued in that appointment until the end of the war.

In 1945 he became the Chief of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration in West Germany. In 1947 he retired from the Army, and in 1951 became Controller of the British Atomic Energy Authority.

The most striking impression that emerges from the first part of Sir Frederick's story — from 1913 to 1939 — is the hopeless inadequacy of the military preparations to meet the crises that were clearly approaching. In military circles it is fashionable to lay all the blame on the statesmen who failed to provide the necessary funds. General Morgan shows that many soldiers, by their resistance to change, by their stubborn adherence to outworn methods and ideas, were as culpable as anyone. For instance, when it was discovered in 1937 that there was a shortage of ten thousand officers against mobilisation requirements there were still only some half-dozen regiments that would accept young officers without private means. When the Commandant of the Staff College suggested that perhaps the time had come to convert the College Hunt Club into a Flying Club he was virtually accused of blasphemy. Horsed cavalry regiments strenuously resisted conversion to armour, and when the change was forced upon them they literally "sulked in their tents." To cap it all, the efforts of the few enlightened and energetic military souls were more often than not frustrated by the powerful brakes of the Civil Service, an organisation which the General con-

siders to be dedicated to suppressing initiative and impeding progress.

General Morgan does not go into the details of the planning for Operation Overlord, nor does he closely examine the strategy of the operations which carried the allied armies from Normandy to the Baltic. In this part of his book he is concerned chiefly with the clash of personalities and the often conflicting interests of the British and American high commands. Seen from his point of view, from the position of Deputy Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander, the persistent British effort to obtain a more direct share in the management of operations concurrently with the steep decline in their military contribution, seriously complicated the work of Supreme Headquarters. While fully appreciating General Montgomery's talents, he shows how that officer's penchant for telling his superiors what they ought to do, and his persistence in pressing his opinions upon commanders and staff officers already bearing heavy burdens, was a constant source of distraction and irritation at Eisenhower's headquarters.

On his appointment as Deputy Chief of Staff, General Morgan made up his mind that his job was to serve his commander, not to represent the interests of his own army. That was the job of the liaison officers. Some people in his own army did not see it quite like that. His discussion of the problem could be very instructive indeed to any officer appointed to the staff of an

allied headquarters, or concerned with the operation of such an establishment.

From first to last General Morgan writes with a frankness that is illuminating and a sense of humour that is highly entertaining. His narrative is intensely personal. Events are not presented from the point of view of high policy, but from the point of view of the officers who had to wrestle with them. One reads this autobiography, not because one feels one ought to, but because one wants to. And that is an unusual quality in books of this nature.

— E.G.K.

A HANDFUL OF RICE, by William Allister (Martin Secker and Warburg Ltd., and William Heinemann Ltd., 317 Collins Street, Melbourne). Aust. Retail Price, 22/6.

Cockney, Scot, Sikh, Newfoundlander, Texan, Eurasian, Australian, French - Canadian, Dutch, Punjabi; PWs in a camp in Malaya; slave labourers of the Japanese; forced to serve the higher interests of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere! The setting is not new and numerous accounts bear out the cruel reality of what is by now part of modern history. Many Australians can add volumes to the sober paragraphs of official documents by way of personal experience. This novel is written by one who has "gained" that experience, from the fall of Hong Kong on Christmas Day, 1941, until the end of the war. He would thus know what he is talking about and as

the story progresses one may have a slight suspicion that the novel is not meant to be pure fiction. The author may be excused if he takes this opportunity of grinding an axe.

The circumstances under which Allied soldiers lived and died at Japanese hands are of secondary importance to the book and provide only the background, however vivid. From this environment the author draws the characters who by action and by words ask the questions which make the story wholesome. Can prolonged starvation and suffering break all men or only some? Although a strong leadership cannot relieve suffering and a unified aim and purpose cannot provide food under the circumstances — can they still be means of seeing it through? Where does an officer's responsibility for the welfare of his men end, if ever? When is the soldier released from his oath of obedience, if at all? These questions were relevant throughout history and have, I believe, adequately been answered. But the circumstances by which the problem is thrown up change and pose the questions again and again. In this book the circumstances are novel indeed.

In this stark story of conflict — survival at all cost or death by hunger, disease and brutality — man is stripped to his naked soul. The test is probably more revealing than the test of the battlefield. On the battlefield a man seldom stands completely alone. But here it is not "them or us," here it is "you or me."

Lines are drawn to define good or evil, but the good gives advantage to the evil and evil harbours some good; truth becomes veiled; concepts of courage and cowardice overlap. Man recognises the values essential for survival, but little else. Yet, from this leaderless, down-trodden mass arise the strong ones, those who by sheer strength of character, by being true to themselves, by consistent and uncompromising application of their own principles, whether they be right or wrong, stand out.

One is Captain Welland, the businessman, the organiser, the negotiator: ". . . Business is craft. Learn the rules and they yield results. It gives you money. Money opens doors, smashes restrictions, sets you free. There's all kinds of power, but money power's the strongest. Success means thinking a certain way. You need optimism and keen judgment, free of moral prejudice. You learn to focus on essentials, free of humbug. But you take risks when the return warrants it as in the case of the Yukon. Fortune favours the brave. Small gains are not worth the risk. I learned that from watching. That's why I am moving to the top here. But it's all small potatoes." For his "small potatoes" men died, died by starvation, exhaustion, disease. The enemy supplied the bare minimum, but Welland took even from that and with his Japanese opposite number engaged in a huge black market operation. "Life is a battle, especially in this hole. Dog eat dog. Has to be because there is

not enough for all. I face facts, somebody's got to suffer and it's bloody well not going to be me. Law of the jungle. Here the only ideal worth considering is survival. The rules for that were laid a million years ago." "You're right about this being a life and death affair. It is. And in a battle for survival we can't be queasy. Scruples? Forget 'em. This is a jungle — get that straight — a savage jungle — no rules, no laws, no principles."

This was the creed he lived by and to which he remained true. Thus he took over the leadership of the Allied officers of the camp, poisoning and corrupting, wiping out the dividing lines, cheating, stealing; threatening, bribing whenever one remembers a little spark of honour, whenever one halfheartedly tries to free himself from the bonds of Welland's satanic domination. They maintained a status by the grace of the enemy, enjoying the privileges granted by the collaborator. And Welland used them and despised them. His rule was almost absolute, enforced by those who took his bribes: "The vileness, the ugliness. What snakes we are . . . and I am the worst . . . how clearly he painted me in all my nakedness . . . how right he is . . . do I really give a good goddam whether they live or die? Sure I do, but do I care enough? Enough to give up my comforts — my position — to make an enemy of Welland? I don't. I should — but I don't — not really . . . oh, my God. How did I ever get into this? What a worm. Crawling around a muck hole in a forgotten corner of

the world, clinging desperately to a few piddling luxuries . . . and I can't bring myself to let them go." No, they could not, not even for the prize of honour, not even for the lives of their NCO's and men.

The Japanese are relegated to an almost neutral position. Happy as long as the job gets done. But those who count are in Welland's pocket. "They (the men) hope an incident will attract the attention of Commandant Watanabe, eh? And he'll toss us out, right? Good idea. There's only one thing wrong with it. For your information, my friend, Captain Watanabe, your revered Commandant, is right under my thumb! I've been in on a few choice deals with him and have him right where I want him. Watanabe not only knows what's going on, he's getting a healthy cut out of it himself. He is right behind me, ready to back me up with troops, new laws, anything I advise."

The uglier the exploiters, the filthier their spineless followers — the more heroic emerge the leaders of the exploited. Most of all Blacky Valois, the French-Canadian miner, uneducated, simple, quiet, slow to come to grips with his surroundings, but determined and courageous once things are clear to him and a plan of action is decided upon by the course of events. The stubborn fighter when the war was fought, fights once more when he understands that fighting is to be done and who is to be fought. And he is big enough to forego fighting when the sacrifice of his life will do. This

figure in the novel and the conduct of his comrades compensates for the infamy. Blacky and his mates grow with the story and the story with them. Slow and insignificant at first, but as the course proceeds towards the inevitable mutiny, the climax, Blacky has grown to a hero, convincingly real.

Although it is a pity that the issues never touch on the underlying problem of aid given to

the enemy by both sides, regardless of what is the outcome, the novel has still a lot to commend it to the enquiring reader. Most novels with a message finally state the obvious. Mr. Allister's fine work lies in the excellent characterisations and avoids the pitfall. One can hardly enjoy the book, but once read it will give ample food for thought.

— Sgt. W. Fladung, RAAEC.

All men dream, but not equally. Those who dream by night in the dusty recesses of their minds wake in the day to find that it was vanity; but the dreamers of the day are dangerous men, for they act their dream with open eyes, to make it possible.

T. E. Lawrence