AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL



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Number 154 March, 1962

CONTENTS

SALAMAUA

In July 1942 a Japanese force landed in the Buna-Gona area on the north-eastern coast of New Guinea, and advanced on Port Moresby across the Owen Stanley range to Imita Ridge where it was finally halted on 17 September. In a costly counter-offensive, Australian troops drove the Japanese back across the Owen Stanleys and captured their base at Buna.

While these operations were taking place another Japanese force, advancing from Salamaua, was checked almost on the edge of the vital airstrip at Wau. A long and arduous counter-offensive through a tangled mass of high ridges and deep valleys drove them back and recaptured Salamaua.

The picture shows Australian troops examining Japanese defences in typical jungle country between Wau and Salamaua.

HOW TOUGH IS TOUGH

Major Reginald Hargreaves,
British Army, Retired

Reprinted from the December 1961 MILITARY REVIEW, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, USA.

IT is a standard gibe that in peace the armed forces busy themselves preparing for the last war. What is so often overlooked is that it would be far easier to plan for the next war, if it were known against whom it would be waged, and exactly where the struggle would be fought.

In these days of quasi-peace the Western Powers can entertain few doubts as to the identity of their most likely antagonists. With the approximate parity in nuclear weapons operating as a deterrent to their employment, greater attention must be devoted to the likelihood of a conflict arising that would be fought with conventional weapons on more or less traditional lines. In envisaging this possibility, the further problem has to be considered — would such a war be fought against one or another of the principal opponents themselves, or with one of their obedient stooges?

Behind both the campaign in Korea and the bitter struggle in Malaya loomed the two colossi of Communist-imperialism, although the Soviet armed forces never openly took the field. In the current trouble spot of Laos the Pathet Lao guerrillas are based on North Vietnam, but everyone is perfectly aware that they are inspired and supported by the Chinese Communists.

Warfare waged by cat's-paw forces for a limited objective, and primarily designed to distract and fritter away anti-Communist manpower and resources, constitutes a challenge the Western Alliance must always be prepared to meet with the utmost resolution and dispatch. Sometimes a determined display of force — as in Lebanon — will obviate the need for its active employment. Sometimes— as in Korea — the counter-challenge will have to be made good by a resort to arms that stops short only at the introduction of major nuclear weapons. It is solely by such thoroughgoing measures that the satellite forces fronting for the manipulators of Sino-Soviet policy can be brought to question the advisability of "sticking their necks out" primarily for someone else's benefit.

With two-thirds of the world to choose from, the Communist leaders are in a position to foment a war in any one of a number of territories. These territories differ widely in their climatic and topographical characteristics, each making special and peculiar demands

on the troops committed to fight in them. There is every likelihood of the Communist leaders continuing their successful attempts to stage these exigent localised wars of attrition. Thus the question inevitably arises — is the training of the Western serviceman sufficiently diversified and rigorous for him to go into action anywhere in the world without the handicap of insufficient preparation for the task confronting him?

Climate and Terrain

Because Communist forces are so widely deployed, the possible theatres of war are almost endless. Even in a single theatre the variety of physical characteristics of terrain and climate are wide. Our soldiers would find that fighting conditions in the Himalayan crags and the mountain ranges of the Pamirs differ widely from those in the jungles of Laos. The only thing common to both areas is an absence of anything like a developed road system.

On India's northwest frontier there are good highways penetrating into Afghanistan and into some of the tribal areas to the south. But lateral communications are sparse and difficult. In Laos the Western serviceman would find himself committed exclusively to jungle fighting. On NATO's northern flank he would face conditions in Norway that called for training such as normally reserved for the French Alpini. To defend the oilfields at the head of the Persian Gulf, operations could as well commit him to the Lut Desert as to the tangle of peaks that run from Isfahan to Kerman.

All of this suggests, among other things, that it is high time that our soldiers are reintroduced to their feet, as furnishing the best all-round means of locomotion. This means all soldiers — not just infantrymen. For it appears to have been far too widely overlooked that there are many localities in which the employment of the armoured troop carrier and much of the motorised transport, upon which the supply services have come to rely, would virtually be out of the question.

Lessons From the Past

A similar situation to that which arose in 1944 — when the Allied 5th and 8th Armies, fighting in Italy, had to fall back almost exclusively on pack transport — could easily occur elsewhere. Veterans of the Korean campaigns will have no difficulty in recalling many situations in which wheeled transport was useless, and the unit or the individual could move only by putting one foot steadily in front of the other. To many of the troops it was a new and painfully wearing process. The Western serviceman of World War II had been encouraged to rely on mechanical transport to such a degree as to inhibit his marching powers almost entirely.

This is starkly revealed by an incident chronicled by Captain Antony Kimmins, Royal Navy. Shortly after the descent on North Africa Kimmins landed in the disembarkation area. He records:

I talked with an American

soldier while halting to bind up his blistered feet, on the second day after we landed. He had been as game as you make 'em, but was furious with himself and his civilian occupation. 'How can you expect us to march?' he fumed. 'A few months ago I was a bell-hop in Chicago. I used to drive there in my automobile in the morning, go up and down in the elevator all day long, and take my girl friend to the movies in my automobile in the evening. Hell! I've never used my legs before'. But he got up and staggered on just the same.

The thought is not to be repressed, however, that had this unfortunate youngster's training included the weekly 20-mile route march common to most infantry battalions in pre-1914 days, he would have been an infinitely less distressed and considerably more efficient soldier; not that his plight was in any way uncommon.

Conditioning by Marching

Major John Dalgleish, in his book, *How We Planned the Second Front*, relates that when the troops gathered on Britain's south coast prior to embarkation for Normandy and D-day, an important point affecting the maintenance of morale was the marching distance between marshalling areas and embarkation areas. One pioneer company had marched 15 miles with full packs, and they had arrived at the embarkation point "flaked out". This was a bad thing, and the field force laid it down that the maximum distance to be marched must not exceed five miles. Eventually, this distance was reduced to three miles. It is evident that contemporary planning had lamentably failed to recall Suvorov's wise dictum that, "Victory depends upon the feet; the hands are only the tools of victory".

That this dangerous neglect to cultivate the soldier's marching powers has not been remedied is witnessed by a recent report from Western Germany. A contingent of British troops, returning from a combined exercise with Bundeswehr elements, reported unfavourably on the German rations, but gleefully added, "we were taken everywhere by armoured troop carriers and hardly had to march at all". All this mechanical transport was provided by the descendants of the men who, under Frederick the Great, marched 170 miles in less than a fortnight to fight and win the battle of Rossbach; and then immediately retraced their steps to crush the Austrians at Leuthen.

Difference in Background

What is so frequently and dangerously overlooked is the fundamental difference in the composition of the armies of the Western Powers and those of the Sino-Russian powers and their satellites.

The majority of Western recruits are urbanites, with all the city-bred individual's advantages — and defects. Readily responsive to instruction, speedily rendered adept with all the mechanical aids to warfare, at the same time they are far more excitable and pernickety,

and less hardy physically than men brought up under the harsher conditions that accompany manual labour on the soil. Training toughens the town-dweller, and by the time he is ready to join a unit he has some right to consider himself tough. But the point is — in this context, just how tough is tough?

The Russian and Chinese armies, like those of their satellites, are made up almost exclusively of men of extremely virile, hard-wearing peasant stock. Writing of the Russian soldier, in particular, Otto Skorzeny has recorded:

They can sleep without hurt in wringing-wet clothes, march incredible distances, live on roots from the fields, and digest anything. They can tear hunks from a long-dead horse, and march on, refreshed. They can drink from marshes and shell holes; and subsist virtually without supply columns, since they never hesitate to employ a human chain of old men and women to man-handle food and hump ammunition. We were amazed at the stoicism with which they bore their injuries. They could stand far more pain than a Western European. I myself saw a soldier, both of whose arms had been amputated a few hours earlier, get up from his mattress and walk unaided to the latrine in the yard. I believe he considered it perfectly natural that none of the hospital staff offered him any assistance.

To which may be added that, with the fullblooded oriental the sheer capacity for survival, like his stoicism under strain, his incredible stamina, and his disregard of injury or deprivation, is even more pronounced than with the semi-Asiatic Russian.

Realistic Training

The Western serviceman, under everyday garrison conditions, is entitled to all the amenities with which he can be furnished. It cannot be too strongly emphasised or too clearly borne in mind that such conditions represent the abnormal. His normal state is that of a man committed to warfare, with everything reduced to that condition of primitiveness of which conflict itself is the highest expression.

For all that, training programmes rarely make provision for an exercise based upon sustained and stringent deprivation. Yet such a condition of temporarily having to do without arises in wartime over and over again. A detached force is ordered to hold on to an outlying position, which for the time being cannot be reached by any ordinary means. To attempt an airdrop— such as Wingate's Chindits relied upon for their supplies when fighting in the Burmese jungle — would be only to draw attention to a location dangerously enough exposed as it is. Everything, from ammunition to emergency rations, has to be hoarded to the final round, the last crumb of food and shred of tobacco, the ultimate drop of water — everything.

It is in such a situation that some drastic earlier training in deprivation — in the art and science of surviving on nothing

much more than the smell of an oily rag — would pay off handsomely. To undergo the experience of progressively "doing without" as part of the normal military education would greatly minimize its shock-potential when it has to be endured in the face of the enemy.

Sir Charles Snow, in his *Science and Government,* has cogently pointed out that:

Societies at about the same level of technology will produce similar inventions. It is quite unrealistic, and very dangerous, to imagine that the West as a whole can expect a permanent and decisive lead in military technology over the East as a whole. That expectation is a typical piece of gadgeteer's thinking. It has done the West more harm than any other kind of thinking. History and science do not work that way.

If the West can aspire to hold its own in the invention and fabrication of weapons of mass destruction, then the nuclear deterrent will continue to operate. But the longer it persists, the greater the chance that, in matters that reach the stage of armed dispute, resort will be made to conventional weapons and the men who wield them. If the Western Powers can achieve and maintain parity with their Communist opponents in the means of waging scientific warfare, an equal effort is demanded of them to indoctrinate and train their manpower to attain a physical and mental toughness equal, if not superior, to that of their antagonists.

Decline of Nations

So far, history has invariably shown that degeneration follows upon a high state of civilisation; the record of ancient times is the story of the decline and fall of one great nation after another. Civilisation, after a certain point, tends to render a nation enervated and unfit for the struggle of life at a primitive level. Its people, thereupon, suffer conquest by others hardier and more ruthless who have attained no such exquisiteness of cultivation — although subconsciously the "barbarian" may envy it and long for it. Just as the Greeks were destroyed by the unregarding power of Rome, so Rome itself — become decadent and soft — fell before the ruthless onrush of the Goths. In later days France — cultivated, civilised, refined, and sensitive— was overwhelmed by the rough and brutal strength of the Germany of 1870.

Primitive peoples live under far harsher conditions than are known to more civilised nations. It follows that natural selection has greater play; weaklings die out at an early age, and those who survive to manhood are better adapted to the struggle of existence than the beneficiaries of a tenderly nurtured, luxurious way of life. Their grosser instincts are more powerful, more resilient.

Remedying the Situation

The first step in countering a danger is to recognise its existence.

The durable qualities boasted by the early Romans and the

Goths nowadays characterise the warrior-masses of Communist imperialism, which are nothing less than the hordes of Genghis Khan and Tamerlane rendered doubly dangerous by possession of the most modern weapons. And it is upon their primitive level of forcefulness, endurance, and indifference to death or mutilation that the defenders of the Free World must be prepared to meet them. Their toughness must find something more than a match in ours — and toughness means a good deal more than exhibiting a hairy chest and relapsing into squalor at the very first opportunity.

There are, of course, specialist formations among the allied battle order that can compare in genuine toughness with any body of men that Communist imperialism can put into the field: the United States Special Forces Groups and the best of the Fleet Marine Force, the Parachute Regiment and the Royal Marine Commandos, the French Foreign Legion. But campaigns are not won by a few hand-picked *corps d'elite;* they are won — or lost — according to the quality of the run of the ordinary rank and file. And their quality depends on the type of training to which they are subjected.

On their arrival in India, for example, the divisions that were to prove the backbone of the successful fight for Burma's recovery were no better and no worse than any other wartime formations. But it was painfully obvious that, as they stood, they were quite unequal to the task of fighting Japanese troops especially schooled for operations in this particular theatre of war. So they were put to training, and they were trained the hard way — as were all their reinforcements. It took time, and it called for a lot of weeding out of those who found the demands made upon them altogether too gruelling. In the end, what had been an ordinary run-of-the mill formation turned into a body of men capable of bringing a wily, resourceful, and exceedingly tough enemy to surrender.

The Attraction of Hardship

It is a cardinal mistake, moreover, to believe that easygoing, undemanding training is the lure which attracts men to the ranks. On the contrary, as a recent British Parliamentary Report affirmed, "The arms which have least difficulty in attracting recruits are those where training is rigorous, discipline is strict, and smartness highly developed".

"Aptitude for war", Napoleon insisted, "is aptitude for movement"; and in his day movement meant marching. "All the mystery of movement and combat", wrote Marshal Saxe, "is in the legs, and it is to the legs that we should apply ourselves". In short, toughness — that is training — should start at the legs and work upward. What the Western serviceman must try to achieve is a barbarian body controlled by a civilised mind. With that, he is one up on his most probable opponents. With that, but with nothing short of that, he will be really tough.

MOSCOW TURNS TO ASIA

Staff Sergeant P. G. Gittins
Royal Australian Engineers

"The Kremlin today is like a reckless company board of directors that has been overobsessed with making its firm the biggest in the world".

Life — International Edition, 18th March, 1957.

IT has never been difficult to blame some process or regime or individual for the usual deplorable state of world affairs. Early in the 16th century, Sir Thomas More could think of nothing more horrible on this earth than "ye most terrible death that all the Turkes in Turkey could deuyse". Some generations ago, Napolean was the scourge of Europe. Less than a generation ago it was Hitler and the Nazis. Now we feel if only there were no Russians, everything would be perfect. But there ARE Russians, and, whether we like it or not, we have to take notice of both what they say and what they do.

The Western World can take little comfort from the Communist Party Congress which was held in Moscow last October. For all the differences between Moscow and Peking at the Kremlin Communist Party Congress, the question is being asked whether any secret arrangements between them have been reached on South East Asia. No indication has reached the outside world of what they may have decided, but it is clearly evident that the Russians have begun a big build-up of interest in all South East Asian territories.

Pravda has notably switched to this area, with particular attention to South Vietnam, and it appears that the Soviet public is being prepared for something. Is the heat going to be "turned on" in South East Asia in a big way? To the Western World that is the "sixty-four dollar question".

The Soviet campaign was renewed when General Taylor reported to President Kennedy and the United States National Security Council on the South Vietnam situation. Great prominence was given to charges of United States intervention, to deterioration of relations between South East Asian states, mentioning Thailand and Cambodia in addition to Vietnam and to their relations with the United States.

Furthermore, there was no sign that Khrushchev would be more accommodating over Berlin, and his final speech was tough and uncompromising. In addition to this, the West now has to contend with the repercussions of Russia's nuclear

tests, with interference to Western access to the Eastern zone of Berlin, and with the sinister broadside against Finland and Scandinavia.

Something pretty big happened in the Kremlin. No less a person than Khrushchev himself made that plain by:—

(a) Launching the most vigorous attacks yet on the so-called Stalinist anti-party group, headed by such prominent figures as Molotov, Malenkov, Bulganin, Kaganovich and Voroshilov.

(b Attacking the Albanian Communists in such a way as to drag the Soviet's ideological breach with Red China into the open again.

Western diplomats have studied every move made at the Congress because of the impact shifts of personality and power in the Kremlin could have on the world situation. Obviously Khrushchev has very good reason for his new line. And it is equally obvious, both from the vigour of Molotov's criticisms and Khrushchev's strong reaction that this is no sideshow.

The West is the more puzzled because when the disagreements between Khrushchev and the group came to light in 1956, some leakages about it were permitted from Moscow. But there was nothing comparable then to the latest public disclosures.

Assessing the impact of the Congress is all the more difficult too, because it is not easy to assess the significance of what happened, especially since the Russians are careful about what they "leak" from its proceedings. The main purpose of the Congress — which it carried out — was to debate and adopt the new 20-year programme for a Russian Utopia. But proceedings seemed to have veered off course because of pressure against the Stalinists from those who suffered under Stalin's tyranny and who are now demanding retribution and change. But even allowing for these worries, Khrushchev seemed as supremely confident at the end as he did at the beginning of the Congress.

There appears to be no atmosphere of crisis in Moscow, nothing to suggest any threat to overthrow Khrushchev, no feeling that a coup is being hatched up and no sign of the existence of any collective organisation capable of taking over from Khrushchev.

Russia Challenges China

The Russian new party programme is predominantly two things. First, it is the blue-print for the transition from socialism to full Communism, and secondly it is a supreme bid to project Russia, and not China, as the fountainhead of world Communism. The central theme is that Communism is winning all along the line, nothing can halt it, and capitalism is doomed.

Again, as in the past, Khrushchev claimed that war was not inevitable — presumably directed at Mao Tse-tung — and that although war would not prevent the triumph of Communism, the cost would be so great that it could not be considered.

At the conclusion of the Congress, the Chinese Premier, Chou En-lai, flew home immediately. After indirectly criticising Khrushchev, the Chinese made no attempt to disguise their differences with Russia, even to the point of a tribute to Stalin in the "People's Daily" and pictures of him on display.

But back in Russia, the eviction of Stalin's remains from his position of honour next to Lenin, and the public humiliation of Voroshilov and Molotov were seen as final acts of internal triumph for Khrushchev.

However, Khrushchev's leadership of the Communist Bloc is being continually challenged by Mao Tse-tung, and he is forced, therefore, to maintain a more militant international line than he might otherwise choose. We are set then, it seems, for a protracted period of acute crises — over Berlin, in South East Asia, in Africa, and in Latin America. It is unlikely there will be a hot war, but there is no doubt that the cold war will become even colder.

Russia and the Cold War in Asia

The partitioned countries of Asia — Korea, Vietnam and Laos — stand as monuments to the cold war. In all of these countries there were (and are) men who believe it is possible to do business with the Communists, despite the glaring tragic fact that millions lost their lives in the Communist inspired "hot" wars that swept these countries. Families were split apart, cities and industries reduced to ashes and the countryside laid waste.

In a period of intense nationalism, and in an area where newly granted independence provides a natural outlet for national expression, the tragedy of partition is all the greater for the peoples involved.

It is the deep sense of patriotism — all the brighter because of its newness — that the Communists are now seeking to exploit in a campaign that promises greater success than any direct military campaign. It is possible that the Communists using this spirit of fierce nationalism, will take over through ballots instead of bullets.

Russia and Korea

North Korea has become a sore spot in Moscow-Peking relationships. Soviet Russia, controlling a mixed puppet regime of Soviet specialists and Moscow trained Koreans, still rules the northern half of divided Korea, which, with Outer Mongolia, now remains the only area of Communist Asia outside Peking's influence.

South Korea, with its excellent intelligence sources in the north, claims that the Russians have firmly resisted strong, insidious and persistent attempts by Peking to gain control to the extent even of purges which expelled members of the Chinese faction from the North Korean Communist Party. There has been nothing like an open breach yet between the two Communist giants, but the elements of discord undoubtedly exist.

Established in North Korea, long before Mao Tse-tung

"liberated" China, the Russians clearly intended to stay, because they did not loot Korean heavy industry as they did in Manchurian plants. The United States Reparations Commissioner, E. W. Pauley, who visited Korea and Manchuria in 1946, reported that while the Russians had removed a tremendous amount of industrial equipment from Manchuria, there was "little if any" evidence of stripping in North Korea.

Moscow is resolved to maintain Soviet authority in Korea primarily because of the importance of the Vladivostock and Eastern Siberian area, to which Korea provides a natural approach. On the sea side, the Bay of Peter the Great, where Vladivostock is located, has been unilaterally closed to all foreign shipping.

The restored and re-equipped North Korean army is now under the tight command of Koreans who have been trained in Russia and who have served with the Red Army.

President Kim Ill Sung himself is one of these dedicated Moscow adherents, whilst many top Korean officers and technical specialists are actually Russian citizens, their families having first transferred to Manchuria under Czarist rule and then to Central Asia. These specialists have control of the nuclear weapons which Russia has set up in North Korea.

President Kim Ill Sung has made several "grateful" tours of Red China and thanked his "Big Brothers" in Peking for their generosity, but his fealty to Moscow remains unassailable. He has refused to adopt, or support, Mao's "commune" system, adhering to the less drastic "collectivisation" model of Russia. In many of his policy speeches he has endorsed Khrushchev's criticisms of China and has called upon all Communists to follow the Soviet Party — "the centre of the International Communist movement".

In September 1960, Kim Ill Sung proposed federation of North and South Korea as a "provisional measure" for the eventual unification of the country. This was the preamble to a deal which was to be offered by Khrushchev in October 1960 when he was scheduled to visit North Korea. However this tour was postponed through fear of anti-Soviet student rioting.

In July 1961, Russia signed a treaty pledging it to defend North Korea in case of attack. Khrushchev claimed that the treaty had no aggressive aim behind it, and that in fact, Russia was not in favour of signing military agreements. He was quoted as saying:—

"We have been obliged to sign this treaty because the Governments of the United States and other Powers, including Japan, have turned down all our proposals towards relaxing tension and ensuring security in the Far East. Now it is necessary to warn aggressive forces that if an attack is made on the Korean Democratic Republic, the Soviet Union will regard this as an attack on itself, and will support that country with all its strength and by all means".

This treaty was regarded as a success for Khrushchev as North Korea had tended to "sit on the fence" during the 1960 Communist "Summit" Conference when Chinese-Russian differences were debated.

Russia and Japan

Over the last few years Russian policy regarding Japan has consisted of colossal diplomatic blunders and open threats.

In December 1958 the Soviet Union blundered seriously on two fronts in its policy towards Japan. On the diplomatic front, the Soviet Ambassador let it be announced that he had asked leaders of the Opposition Socialist Party for an interview. This was interpreted as a direct attempt to intervene in Japanese politics. Prelude to this request was a strong Soviet note warning Japan against continuing her security arrangements with the United States. The Soviet Union had said Russia would guarantee the neutrality of Japan; however, in view of her past record (in World War II when Russia disregarded her non-aggression pact and attacked Mavkmry) this was hardly regarded seriously.

Six months later, in May 1959, Russia again demanded that Japan abolish United States military bases in Japan and adopt neutralism for the sake of peace in the Far East.

Again in June 1960 the Soviet Government warned Japan that she was exposing herself to "definite dangers" by her new Security Treaty with the United States. The Soviet Government "deems it essential once again to point out the fateful consequences resulting from the American-Japanese military agreement to the Japanese people". The Soviet statement claimed that the agreement had been carried out against the will of the Japanese people and that it would lead to further deterioration of the situation in the Far East. It added that after the "well known declarations of the Soviet Government there could be no doubt that aggressive actions by United States aircraft from Japanese bases would not go unpunished".

In the Western World, few believe that the ratification of the United States-Japan Treaty is the end of the affair. Most believe that the value of the treaty will depend on the willingness of the Japanese people to accept it. Behind Japanese opposition to the security treaty lies the fear of becoming involved in nuclear war; a fear shared by other small countries since Khrushchev became openly threatening. The Japanese find no comfort and little security in America's pledge that their nuclear annihilation will bring prompt reprisals against their destroyer.

The Russians have never ceased to work for the liquidation of American bases overseas. Now some of the Western World strategists are asking whether a "strategical policy which rests on bases that are indefensible" is sound.

From the economic-industrial aspect, there are only four great industrial complexes in the world today — the US-Canadian,

the Sino-Soviet, the Western European, and the Japanese. Without doubt, the switch of any one of these would change the balance of world power. To have the industrial economic might of Japan on the West's side is, therefore, an asset of the first magnitude. In strategic terms its value is no less.

The four main islands extend in an arc of about 1,500 miles along the north-eastern Asian coastline. Beyond, within easy range of the Japanese air bases, is the main concentration of Communist military and industrial force in the Far East in the North Korean - Manchurian - Soviet Far East complex.

The calculated war has probably gone for ever, but in the event of a miscalculated war, Japan will be a shield protecting the Western flank of Canada and the United States. Without its two major naval installations and nine air bases, the United States could not risk the deployment of its forces in Korea and in the confined Okinawan base. And that would inevitably open the way for the Communists to become master of all they survey in Asia.

Russia and Indonesia

Russia is offering a serious challenge to American influence in Indonesia. There was at least one striking effect from Mr. Khrushchev's tour of Indonesia in February 1960. It showed that whatever detailed influence the United States had gained during the years of the young republic's independence, Indonesia has a stronger emotional relationship with the Soviet Union.

Hitting out at criticism of Indonesia's friendship with the Soviet Union, in March 1960 President Sukarno said:—

"Does not the Soviet Union sympathise with us and support us? It is not more than reasonable that we should be friendly with them".

Early in 1960, allegations were made by Dr. Mohamad Rasjid, a former Indonesian Ambassador in Rome, that President Sukarno had offered the Russians the harbour of Amboina to set up an air and naval base. He claimed that a Russian ship had sounded the entire area of the harbour and detailed charts were being made. This statement was denied by the Indonesian Government, but it was significant that during his tour of Indonesia, Mr. Khrushchev paid a visit there, ostensibly to inspect the site of a new university which was to be built with the help of Soviet credits.

During this visit of Mr. Khrushchev, Indonesia was promised 250 million dollars credit, industrial equipment, technical advice and military equipment.

Information also reached the Western World that Khrushchev resolved to re-establish Moscow dominance of the Indonesian Communist Movement. Soviet propaganda broadcasts beamed to Indonesia were stepped up from 15 to 17½ hours a week, whilst the Chinese Communists broadcasts were reduced to 14 hours a week. And as another blow in the propaganda war, Russia is paying most of the bills for the sports arenas being con-

structed for the 1962 Asian Games. Twenty Asian nations will compete in the Indonesian Soviet-aided stadiums.

Late in December 1960, Indonesian Army leader, General Nasution, postponed his visit to Australia. Instead he went to Moscow to buy arms. At a press interview he was quoted as saying:—

"President Sukarno has assigned me to expedite purchase of various equipment under an existing contract between Indonesia and Russia. This equipment will be used to reinforce air, sea, and ground forces in answer to Dutch war preparations in West New Guinea".

The Indonesians had previously received considerable quantities of equipment from Soviet Russia including two modern destroyers, torpedo boats, and two submarines. The Air Force had received at least 60 late model MiG jet fighters and more than 20 Ilyushin twin jet bombers, and 6 helicopters.

In January 1961 Russia and Indonesia signed an agreement in Moscow which the Indonesian National Security Minister (General Nasution) said would be a "good weapon for peace against colonialism, which endangers peace". The Soviet leaders left no doubt that Russia was behind Indonesia in her dispute with Holland over Dutch New Guinea. Furthermore, they granted Indonesia a loan of some £130 million sterling in military supplies.

Throughout 1961, Russia gave Indonesia considerable military, economic and financial assistance and stepped up her propaganda warfare supporting Indonesian claims to Dutch New Guinea.

Donor nations can never be sure of the effects of their generosity these days. Indonesia is already overloaded with credit, without the capacity for it. As America has discovered, the more you give sometimes, the more is wasted and less respect accrues to the donor. In terms of competitive co-existence, the Soviet aid to Indonesia is payment for Indonesia's neutrality in the hope that it will continue. Mr. Khrushchev claims (in March 1960) that he has no wish to see Indonesia go Communist, indeed there is no doubt that Indonesia would be an embarrassment to the Communist bloc. But if Mr. Khrushchev can regard a neutral and independent Indonesia (with her continual pressing demands for Dutch New Guinea) as a thorn in the side of the West, it is obvious that a complete re-shaping of Western policy towards Indonesia is necessary before the Soviet can lose the initiative.

Russia and Thailand

Since October 1958 there have been several reported instances of Russian spy rings being exposed and Russian diplomatic corps members being expelled from the country, yet despite this and the fact that Thailand is a SEATO member nation, in November 1960, Marshal Sarit, Thailand's strong arm anti-Communist ruler, accepted an offer of increased trade and technical and scientific assistance from Russia.

Marshal Sarit solemnly requested the Soviet Ambassador, Nikolavey, not to suborn honest Thai citizens in "underground activities" and the Ambassador, with a suitably straight face, gave unequivocal assurances on this point. This unexpected development must have aroused more suspicion in Peking than in Washington.

It is true that Thai leaders have not attempted to conceal their discontent with what they regard as an attitude of weak compromise by the West towards the events in Laos. It is equally true, however, that Thailand has learnt from the experience of India, Cambodia and Laos that a willingness to accept aid from the Communist bloc is a sure way of increasing aid from the West.

The Moscow offer was furthermore another warning to Peking that the Soviet is not inhibited by a comradely feeling that the Chinese are entitled to a monopoly of Communist manoeuvre in Asia.

Angry and afraid in the wake of the West's failure to act effectively in Laos, Thai officials may well reckon friendship with the Russians may well be the best way to protect Thailand from its gravest threat — Red China.

Russia and Laos

Laos is, without doubt, the most heavily subverted of all the states of Indo China enjoying the protection (for what it is worth) of SEATO. In the seven years that have elapsed since the signing of the Geneva Agreement, the Communists (both Russia and China) have succeeded in creating over a wide area in South East Asia, the political base and the military machinery necessary to apply the Communist's basic lessons in guerrilla warfare.

In December 1960 the United States accused Russia and her partners of being "squarely and solely" responsible for the civil war in Laos. This accusation was made in a formal reply to Soviet charges that the US had interfered in Laos by supporting the right wing forces of General Phoumi Nosavan. The American note stated:—

"It is the Communists and Communist fostered subversive activities, the guerrilla warfare of the Pathet Lao forces and now the Soviet air lift of weapons which have led directly to the suffering and chaos which have befallen Laos".

Prior to this, in August 1959, Britain had expressed to Russia her grave concern at the "alarming" turn of events in Laos.

Ever since the Geneva Agreement there has been fighting and internal unrest in Laos. Plans to bring peace and an early settlement on the Government of Laos have been painfully slow—even by Laotian standards. For many months in 1961, the Royal forces, supported by Washington, and the Pathet Lao, backed by Moscow, have been — in theory — working for the formation of a coalition government led by the neutralist, Prince Souvanna Phouma.

By 3rd December 1961, the 14 nation conference on Laos announced an important series of

agreements opening the way to a complete settlement. The biggest concession by the Communists was the withdrawal of their demand for the right of veto in the International Control Commission, whilst the West waived its insistence for permanent bases for inspection teams in Laos.

A partition of the country might please both sides for the time being. The Pathet Lao would have won half Laos and could prepare, as in South Vietnam, to take the other half. As for the West, control of the Mekong Valley would at least calm Thailand's fear of Communism on her border, and help to hold SEATO together for the time being. The process of Western defeat would not be reversed, but it might be slowed down a little.

The most attractive, though risky, solution, if the Pathet Lao agreed, and General Phoumi agreed, would be a Souvanna Phouma coalition government to restore peace and confidence and then elections in about two year's time.

Russia and Cambodia

One of the best-known sayings of the late John Foster Dulles — "neutrality is immoral" — remains an apt summary of Western opinion today about Cambodia.

Cambodia's head of State, Prince Sihanouk, does not like Communism. He argues with great success against the pro-Communist newspapers and politicians within his country. Yet he would never think for a moment of turning anti-Communist or supporting SEATO.

Cambodians see SEATO not as the sword of righteousness but as a weapon helping unpopular Asian dictators maintain power — thus in the long run, increasing the Communist chances of victory. So Sihanouk remains on friendly terms with the Soviet Union and China, allowing both to maintain vast embassies in his capital at Pnom Penh.

In June 1960, Cambodia and Russia signed two supplementary agreements to put a giant Russian aid hospital on the outskirts of the Cambodian capital into full scale operation.

Under these agreements, Russia agreed to train Cambodian doctors and provide Cambodia with medical specialists and medicines for two years. Twenty Cambodian doctors are to get training in Russia until 1962 and Russia is to send 18 doctors to Cambodia and 6 French language interpreters to help them with their work. Russia also agreed to build a block of 14 flats behind the hospital for the hospital staff.

Does Cambodian neutrality strengthen the Communist position in South East Asia? The argument seems more true in reverse. If Cambodia became anti-Communist Moscow and Peking would try to start guerrilla warfare and the last peaceful nation in the heavily strained Indo China area would be dragged into the battle. On the other hand, in Cambodia today the Communists make little or no headway. The regime, free from the demands of war, is able

to spend a quarter of its income on education and to raise slowly living standards.

Russia and Vietnam

Three years ago South Vietnam seemed relatively stable, but since about August 1960 guerrilla attacks have mounted in number and ferocity. The guerrillas are operating in large bands, some hundreds strong, armed with mortars, bazookas, and machine guns. Communist terrorists have slaughtered hundreds of non-Communist Vietnamese village leaders and have stepped up their campaign against the Diem Government. Atrocities have caused the death of 1,400 people and the kidnapping of 700 others.

Soviet transport aircraft flying from North Vietnam regularly drop supplies to the guerrillas operating in the south, yet a little over a year ago the Soviet press accused the United States of threatening the peace of Asia by stockpiling arms in South Vietnam.

However, this is an old complaint. From Moscow, as well as Hanoi and Peking, comes an unending stream of attack on the "traitor" Ngo Dinh Diem and his American supporters.

The battle for South Vietnam will become a life and death struggle in the next few weeks when the nation's rice harvest is rushed to Saigon. Saigon, now largely isolated, can be starved. Famine in the capital could deal a death blow to Diem's regime. The Communists, already in control of large parts of the countryside of South Vietnam would then be able to move into the capital.

Russia and Burma

Apart from two "goodwill tours" — in 1955 and in 1960 — by Mr. Khrushchev, Burma appears to be relatively free from Russian influence. However, as with other neutral nations of South East Asia, Burma has been the recipient of several Russian gifts; a luxury hotel on the outskirts of Rangoon and a visa to the moon for Burmese General Ne Win!

But however disinterested Russia may appear to be, there still remains the fact that two of her diplomatic staff have been expelled for spying.

Russia and India

India, with its Communist state of Kerala and Communist city of Calcutta, is a prime target of the Soviet Union. She is a target in respect of economic warfare — Russia having offered to industrialise India "with no strings attached". In 1958 the Soviet Union and India concluded a five year trade agreement, both countries undertaking to "increase the volume of trade with each other to a maximum level on the basis of equality and mutual advantage". The agreement, as reported by *Tass* provides for each side extending most favoured nation treatment to the other. India will get equipment for power installations, oil drilling, the coal industry and irrigation, as well as agricultural machinery, metals and other goods.

In March 1959, Russia agreed to help India build an oil refinery at Barauni in Bihar State to handle crude oil from Nahorkatiya oilfield in Assam. In July 1959, India accepted a Soviet offer of £135 million credit as aid for a third five year plan. Previous Soviet aid totalled £137 million sterling.

India's foreign policy in the hands of Mr. Nehru was emotionally based on the "Pancha Shila" or "five principles of peaceful co-existence" — which meant non-interference and mutual co-operation. The policy suited India's pivotal position between West and East, between the Middle East, the Far East and South East Asia. In respect of China, India's foreign policy was supported by the feeling that outlaw policy practised by Western countries was childish and dangerous. Since the border disputes, however, India has the feeling that if she holds firm, expansionist China will encounter the mighty disapproval of Russia. China's longest border, they say, is with Russia. Already the Russians have learned in Manchuria something of China's ethnocentric drive. What of Mongolia and Sinkiang? For future allies in the containment of China, India is looking more and more to Moscow.

Despite the massive aid programme instituted by Russia, and the possibility of having a Russian "Ally" in any border disputes with Red China, India is still concerned over the Russian espionage activity in her country. In January 1961 it was discovered that members of the Russian Embassy in New Delhi had been involved in active espionage. Indians, including several Government officials, were arrested on security warrants and the names of their contacts inside the Russian Embassy were known to the police. But the government proceeded with caution — it was policy to show unswerving friendship towards Russia in the hope that one day Moscow would persuade Peking that the Indian frontier was no place for military adventure. But according to reliable sources the espionage which the Russians were organising was concentrated on India's road building and military activities on the Sino-India border.

Russia and Pakistan

After some 10 years of resistance, Pakistan in February 1961 agreed to accept economic aid from the Soviet Union. It also agreed to accept credit from Moscow for oil prospecting, and to allow Russian technicians to undertake the search. The Russians have said publicly that they expect to find oil and have made no secret of their interest in offering competition to the dominant Anglo-American oil companies.

During this year (1961) Pakistan showed very definite signs of moving towards a foreign policy position that is less committed to the United States. After their interest in the oil agreement, the Pakistan Government accepted Communist credits worth 30 million dollars.

Like Thailand, Pakistan has also decided that the benefits of

Soviet aid are no longer unacceptable, and may even be inspiring to the other side.

Russia and Nepal

In 1958 (June 2nd) King Mahendra signed an agreement for American aid worth £670,000 — and the West smiled. Forty-eight hours later he left on a goodwill visit to Moscow — and the Russians laughed. Before he left, Mahendra told his people in a broadcast he hoped the visit would "strengthen further our friendly relations with the Soviet".

When he left Moscow, the Russians gave him a fully equipped 50 bed hospital and an Ilyushin 14 jet plane. On Mahendra's part, this flirting with the Russians could be clever anticipation. For would the Chinese Reds dare move against a country on such friendly terms with Russia?

Russia and Afghanistan

Like the withered kernel in the centre of a nut, Afghanistan is encased in a hard shell of formidable neighbours — Russia in the north, Persia in the west, Pakistan in the south and China in the east.

In relations between Afghanistan and her northern neighbour, the USSR, there have been important developments in recent years. There is little racial, religious or geographical distinction to be found between the dwellers on the north and south banks of the Oxus, which constitutes much of the Russo-Afghan frontier. But it is an important factor that whereas the Afghan-Pakistani frontier region is rugged and economically a liability rather than an asset, the northern Afghan provinces of Maimana, Mazar-i-Sharif and Kataghan are the source of much of Afghanistan's wealth deriving from the raising of karakul lambs, the growing of cotton, and the working of mineral deposits such as coal and sulphur. The Afghan government have in addition based considerable hopes for the development of the country on the exploitation of the oil resources believed to exist in these areas.

Arrangements were completed in 1952 for an oil survey, including test drilling, by Western technicians working under the UN Technical Assistance Administration. In August of that year, the Soviet Charge d'Affaires in Kabul informed the Afghan Government that the employment of Western technicians on this work in Northern Afghanistan was regarded as an unfriendly act. In reply, although denying the Soviet Government's right to interfere in Afghan internal affairs, the project was shelved.

On the other hand, there has been considerable development towards closer Russo-Afghan ties. A four year commercial agreement was made in July 1950, and a Soviet Trade Agency is operating in Kabul. Since 1953, Afghanistan has accepted numerous Russian offers of technical assistance. According to a Soviet broadcast on 17th September 1954, the current year had marked the beginning of a new stage in the development of

Soviet technical aid to Afghanistan. Credit had been granted by the USSR for the building of grain silos and mills, for the construction of oil storage tanks, and for additional development of road, air, and radio communications. In 1954 a Soviet cultural mission visited Kabul.

Mr. Bulganin and Mr. Khrushchev visited the country in December 1955, and in joint statements issued later it was announced that the 1931 Afghan-Soviet treaty of neutrality and non-aggression would be extended for ten years. It had been decided to "expand the friendly political, economic, and cultural contacts" between the two countries. Representatives would meet to consider co-operation in developing agriculture, hydro-electric stations, irrigation systems, motor vehicle repair shops, and the re-construction of Kabul airport. The USSR agreed in principle to extend a long term loan of 100 million dollars for the development of Afghan economy, providing an agreement was signed at the end of January 1957.

Five years ago the Russians moved in to Afghanistan and set out, most successfully, to show their beneficence. The Americans had been in the country since the end of World War 2: the Russians suddenly decided that anything the Americans could do, they could do better.

The Afghans wanted sealed roads in Kabul, which for six months in the year was a bog heap, and for the next six months a dust bowl. They asked the Americans to build the roads, and the Americans had replied, correctly enough, that it was much better to reclaim desert. The Russians built the roads — very good ones too — and put Russian buses and taxis on them. The Americans got Pan-American airways to bolster up the Afghan airline. The very day the contract was announced, the Russians revealed that they were building a very fine new airport at Kabul. The Americans made a fine colour film of Afghanistan— the Russians made an even better one. The Afghans wanted more bread, and the Americans tried to provide it with an irrigation project. The Russians built a bakery in Kabul and silos to store the wheat. The Americans complained that the Russians' bread was full of stones and that the streets melted in summer, but the Afghans liked the bread and drove happily on the streets. Highly valued Persian lamb skins, once earning dollars, now began earning roubles. Faithfully the Afghans kept the Russians out of their schools. They were determined there would be no Communist subversion of their country. But when MiG fighters and helicopters arrived from Russia for the Afghan Air Force, it was essential that cadets should receive their training in the Soviet Union.

A sort of Russian Colombo Plan took technical students off to Soviet schools — none have gone to American schools.

Afghanistan's history of its relations with its neighbours has been a pretty sorry one. Today, many in Kabul feel that in the Soviet Union they have found a real friend.

In the country's northern province, Soviet aid is transforming potholed Afghan roads into paved super highways, including one that runs from the Russian railheads and ports on the Oxus river, 390 miles south to Kabul. US aid includes construction of some 500 miles of road from Kabul south and east to the Pakistan border. Although it was not intended that way, the roads will provide the Russians with a perfect network of all weather roads from the Oxus to the Khyber Pass, the traditional invasion route into India from the North. A primitive country is not only being developed, it is being made strategically useful.

The presence of Russian troops in Afghanistan has been reported since 1954, but apparently little notice taken of it. However, reports from May 1959 indicate that the Soviet has increased the number of troops there, and this has caused a certain amount of tension and nervousness around Meshed, capital of Persia's Khorasan Province. From Afghanistan Russian troops could move forward to divide Pakistan from Persia — her neighbour in the Baghdad Pact. Troops and forward dumps of military equipment have been located at Herat, which straddles a main approach to Persia.

In Britain, the present Red Army penetration recalls fears of the Russian southward drive through Afghanistan which haunted Queen Victoria's Viceroy in India, Lord Curzon, nearly a century ago.

A small air force is in existence, but once again this is supplemented by Russian "advisors and technicians", MiG fighters and Ilyushin jet bombers. More significant, a network of airfields has been constructed in northern Afghanistan, greatly reducing bomber range to Teheran, capital of anti-Communist Iran and Karachi, a major city of anti-Communist Pakistan. Scarcely 40 miles away from Kabul lies the huge new Pagram airfield, with runways long enough to take Russia's biggest jets.

Just recently the Soviet Government newspaper, *Izvestia*, claimed that the CENTO powers plan to partition Afghanistan between Pakistan and Iran, and warned that if they tried to put this into effect, "a military conflict will be inevitable". It would be a serious mistake to assume that Russia could remain indifferent to such a development, *Izvestia* said. Pakistan and Afghanistan have broken off diplomatic relations, the Afghanistan Embassy in Karachi was closed, and the Pakistan Consulate in Afghanistan was closed.

It appears that Afghanistan has now passed the Communist point of no return.

Russia and Ceylon

Independence in Ceylon was won fairly easily, but the proud nationalism evident elsewhere in Asia has taken a long time to strike in Ceylon. For many years Ceylon has needed a strong government — now, at long last, it appears she has it. With her political path well set on the road to socialism, it is possible that another Republic within the

Commonwealth may be declared soon. Politicians have talked of ending the present dominion status for years, but the Prime Minister, Mrs. Bandaranaike is the first to think of action.

But development is extremely slow. Unless more of the numerous plans are put into action, socialism in Ceylon will be merely the distribution of poverty. Foreign capital, especially for tea and rubber estates must flow more rapidly. And it is in this respect that, as in other nations of Asia, Russia has come to the fore.

In June 1960, cut rate prices for fuel oils on a grand scale were offered to Ceylon by the Russian Government. Russia was prepared to supply all Ceylon's requirements of petrol, paraffin, gas oil and fuel oil at about 20 per cent. lower than the current prices. Prior to this offer, during the period 1958-1959, the Russians offered assistance in some 16 ambitious industrial projects, but only one, a sugar factory, ever got beyond the planning stage.

However, in December 1961, it was announced that Russia was making a considerable increase in her aid and would build a steel mill, a flour mill, a grain elevator, and a tyre factory. Ceylonese engineers would be trained in the Soviet Union.

It is significant too, that during the past twelve months, since Ceylon has received more aid from Russia, she has become a much more outspoken member of the Afro-Asian bloc, many times offering severe and harsh criticism to the West.

Conclusion

Present Soviet foreign policy can only be appreciated when two facts are borne in mind — firstly that it is the continuation (although largely in different forms) of four centuries of Russian Empire building, and secondly that since 1945, Russia has changed from being merely one of a number of world powers of broadly comparable strength, to being one of the three great world powers. (United States of America, Russia, and China).

Soviet foreign policy is furthermore very much affected by two assumptions — that the spread of Communism throughout the world is inevitable, and that, while this is happening, the leading capitalist countries of the world may, in order to prevent or delay economic collapse, start a war between themselves or with the Soviet Union.

Economic expansion, or the spread of influence by the establishment of trading and financial connections with other parts of the world, differs from military and political expansion in that it can be to the advantage of both sides concerned. In the past, Russia has never been a great trading nation — but today this has been well and truly remedied. Soviet leaders are attaching much more importance to economic and political expansion than outright military action.

In the West we have made the fundamental error in regarding Communism as the challenge, whereas the real challenge lies in the circumstances that cause

Communism to prosper in under-developed countries. It is these economic circumstances that the Russians have and are exploiting to the limit.

To the extent that there has been no open Communist aggression in Asia since 1954, SEATO and the Western military deterrent in the Far East may fairly be claimed to have been successful. But the assumption that might be drawn from this — that SEATO and the other military deterrents, have been, and will continue to be, an effective barrier against Communist penetration — is both misleading and dangerous. It would appear that even in SEATO there is little study of Communist theories and tactics. These theories and tactics, when applied, inevitably produce shocks and sometimes a total lack of comprehension to the Western world.

How much more of Asia will be lost to Communism before impotent Western "fire brigades" are replaced by effective salvage teams?

The strength and deployment of our forces in combination with those of our allies should be sufficiently powerful and mobile to prevent *the steady erosion of the Free World through limited wars; and it is* this role that should constitute the primary mission of our overseas forces. Non-nuclear wars, and sublimited or guerrilla warfare have since 1945 constituted the most active and constant threat to Free World security . . . our objective now is to increase our ability to confine our response to non-nuclear weapons, and to lessen the incentive for any limited aggression by making clear what our response will accomplish. In most areas of the world, the main burden of local defence against overt attack, subversion, and guerrilla warfare must rest on local populations and forces . . . we must be prepared to make a substantial contribution in the form of strong, highly mobile forces trained in this type of warfare, some of which must be deployed in forward areas, with a substantial airlift and sealift capacity and pre-stocked overseas bases.

— *President John F. Kennedy*

THE UNITED NATIONS

IT is probably true to say that the period from 1918 to 1962 has produced more major disappointments for Western civilisation than any other half century in its history. The Western democracies fought World War 1 as "a war to end war", as a crusade which would forever, or at any rate for the foreseeable future, put a stop to military aggression and curb overweening nationalistic ambition. As the instrument of their faith and purpose the victorious allies instituted the League of Nations. Although it was not in any sense a World Government, nearly everyone except confirmed cynics saw the League as an international organisation capable of settling disputes without resort to arms.

For the first ten years or so the League seemed to be working fairly well. Looking back we can see that this illusion arose from the simple fact that during this time the League was not faced with any serious problems. Such international disputes as did occur were of a minor nature. The disputants never had any real intention of fighting; at heart they were prepared to settle the matter through the good offices of the League.

The first test occurred when Japan invaded the Chinese province of Manchuria. China appealed to the League. After a lengthy debate a majority of members screwed themselves up to the point of passing a vote of censure on Japan. Japan simply resigned, and the League took no further action.

The second setback occurred when Italy launched her unprovoked attack on Abyssinia, an act which was clearly a recurrence of imperialistic ambition. There was much talk of applying economic sanctions against the aggressor. But Italy had played the diplomatic game with great skill, and in the end Great Britain was found to be the only great power willing to apply the proposed sanctions, and then only in conjunction with others. Since there were no other acceptors the proposal collapsed and the League suffered its first major setback.

These two failures virtually killed the League of Nations. Thereafter it was nothing more than a polite debating society devoid of any authority, of even the weight of organised public opinion.

After that disappointment followed upon disappointment. The re-armament of the nations was

followed by World War II, in the course of which Russia appeared to become a good neighbour and the sinister aspects of her socio-economic creed were lost sight of.

Towards the end of the conflict the Allies revived the League of Nations under a new name and a new constituton. Seeking to rectify the weaknesses of the old constitution, the sponsors of the United Nations clothed the new organisation with more power and authority than the old League ever possessed.

In the final analysis, however, the exercise of the authority of the United Nations depended on the unanimous vote of the five permanent members of the council — China (Formosa), France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. Time after time Russia has cast her veto to prevent any action being taken against Communist aggression anywhere in the world.

In an effort to break the impasse the United States sponsored an amendment which gave more power to the General Assembly. At the time this seemed sound enough, but it has not worked out in the way the sponsors expected. When it was established in 1945 the United Nations had 51 members, of which 19 were pro-Western, six pro-Soviet and 26 uncommitted. Since then the successor states of the British and French Empires have raised the membership to 104, of which 23 are pro-Western, 10 pro-Soviet and 71 uncommitted.

At first sight it would appear that the 71 uncommitted members constitute a body of opinion which, while standing aside from the unending dispute between the Soviet and the West, can be marshalled against any overt act of armed aggression. The trend of events in the United Nations, however, clearly indicates that many of the 71 neutralists are "uncommitted" on the side of the Soviet.

These new nations are entering the stage of nationalism at the time when the more mature Western nations are emerging from it. The "new boys" are fiercely nationalistic. The basic stock-in-trade of every politician — and in their new-found liberty they have produced an awful lot of politicians — is nationalism and anti-colonialism. Like Cato's "Carthage must be destroyed", the theme of nationalism and anti-colonialism must somehow or other be worked into every utterance of every politician. Such men are an easy target for Soviet blandishments. The merest whisper that any proposal is tainted with colonialism is enough to set them against it.

Taking this view of the membership, it is not hard to see why the United Nations failed to censure India's act of aggression in seizing Goa. Without giving any support to the intransigent Portuguese attitude, India's action is clearly a violation of her United Nations engagements. Abstinence from such acts is clearly implied in the conditions of members. The avoidance or suppression of aggression in all its forms and

on any scale is the pillar on which the United Nations rests. If the pillar is broken the whole edifice falls to the ground. The fact that the United Nations has not pronounced even the mildest of reproofs has not broken the pillar, but is has weakened it.

At the other end of the scale, the positive action the United Nations did take in the Congo has landed it in serious trouble. Within a week of the Belgian handover of authority to the local jerry-built political structure the Congolese "army" had mutineed, gone on the rampage, and murdered and maltreated many Europeans. Since no one else was willing to tackle the problem, the United Nations stepped in to restore order with the blessings of the Western Powers. Order has not been so easy to restore for, when they ran out of Europeans, the Congolese took to slaughtering each other.

In addition to the general turmoil, the United Nations struck a knotty problem — what to do about the breakaway province of Katanga. The manner in which this problem has been solved — if it has indeed been solved — has given rise to deep heart-searchings amongst some of the great Powers. On the face of it at any rate the Katangans were doing no more than insist upon the right of self-determination, the right to separate themselves from the remainder of Congo, with which they have no tribal or social affiliations. The action of the United Nations in compelling them by force to remain within the Congo "state" would seem to be a violation of the cherished principle of self-determination. No doubt there are several complicating considerations behind the United Nations' action. Nevertheless it remains completely true that the United Nations has compelled the Katangan Government to submit to the central Congolese Government, despite the fact that not one per cent. of Katangans have the slightest desire to be associated in any way with the rest of what was once known as the Belgian Congo.

Maybe the United Nations will not die from these self-inflicted wounds. Certainly we should do everything possible to assist the recovery. But we ought to bear in mind that the patient is very sick indeed. It might not be a bad idea to keep our powder dry — just in case.

— E.G.K.

THE UNITED STATES ARMY DIVISION

Reprinted from an unsigned article in the October, 1961 issue of An Cosantoir, Eire.

The reorganisation of the US Division is designed to meet the varying needs for a fast, mobile and flexible ground force. The authorities, satisfied with preparations to meet nuclear war, have now concentrated on the requirements of non-nuclear combat and the result is a new concept in army organisation called R.O.A.D. This organisation develops a new degree of standardisation which will facilitate training as well as the tailoring of the division to suit the missions and terrain in which it will fight. It will be introduced by gradual implementation, beginning early in 1962.

The infantry, armoured and mechanised divisions are constructed by adding various mixes of combat manoeuvre battalions to a common division base. The fourth type of division, the airborne, will be similarly constructed and will have the same degree of flexibility when finalised.

Elements of the New Division

The division base in common to all four types and its strength can vary from 6,000 to 7,200. Each base will consist of a command and control element, a combat element, a combat support element and an administrative support element. It includes among its command and control elements three brigade headquarters which are capable of controlling the tactical operations of several attached manoeuvre battalions and other attached support elements. The basic manoeuvre elements will be tactically and administratively self-sufficient battalions. In other words the building blocks of the new division are:—

(a) The Division base
(b) Combat manoeuvre battalions.

Battalion strengths will vary from 600 to 900 depending on type (i.e.) whether armoured, mechanised, infantry or airborne. A notable feature, however, is the fact that all battalions are essentially of one combat arm, armour in the tank battalion and infantry in the infantry and mechanised battalions. This simplifies the task of training. Even these basic blocks are still further subdivisible into smaller self-sufficient blocks (companies) and these sub-blocks can be taken from the parent block and fitted on to another block. In this way special task forces can easily be built up.

The strength of a typical division would be approximately 15,000 with the airborne division approximately 14,000. Once organised for a particular strategic mission the composition of the division would remain relatively stable. Administrative support for the division is provided by a support element which provides supplies, field maintenance, medical support and other administrative requirements. This arrangement permits lower echelon commanders to devote maximum attention to tactical operations.

Important equipment changes call for increases in armoured personnel carriers, artillery, recoilless rifles for assault-fire and aircraft for tactical mobility.

The Division Base

The command and control element includes division headquarters and three brigade headquarters. Each brigade headquarters can control the tactical operations of from one to five attached combat battalions, as well as combat support and administrative support elements needed to support this force. These latter elements are supplied from the division base. Normally, however, the brigade headquarters will not enter administrative channels between division headquarters and attached battalions.

The combat element of the division base consists of division artillery and the reconnaissance squadron. Three 105mm howitzer battalions and two general support battalions comprise the division artillery. The two general support battalions may be armed with various medium artillery such as the 155mm or 8-inch howitzer or missile type artillery weapons. In the case of the armour and mechanised divisions visualise the 105mm pieces and all general support weapons as being self-propelled; this is not necessarily so in the other two types. Here again any one of the three light artillery battalions are capable of attachment to a brigade if the situation requires it. Also, an attachment from the general support artillery could be made should the division commander deem this appropriate.

The reconnaissance squadron —eyes and ears of the division— has three troops capable of ground mobile operations and married up with an air cavalry troop. This aerial troop extends the division's surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. All of its functions are tactical.

Combat Support Element

The combat support element of the division base includes an engineer battalion, a signal battalion, and an aviation battalion. Basically, the engineer and signal battalions have engineer and signal missions in support of the division.

The aviation battalion has three missions. It is responsible for reconnaissance and surveillance tasks required by division headquarters. Working closely with the air cavalry troop of the reconnaissance squadron, it extends, rather than duplicates, these capabilities of the division. This squadron operates the complicated surveillance devices such as the Army's Mohawk

plane and drones. Its third mission, and a most important one, is transportation of troops during an air-mobile operation. It can airlift one infantry company, and can also fly emergency supply and evacuation missions.

The administrative support element of the division base consists of a division support command headquarters, a headquarters company, an administrative company, a medical battalion, a supply-and-transport battalion, and a maintenance battalion. This division support command is an operational unit, directly under the division commander. To the division it provides administrative support on a functional basis so as to furnish supply, field maintenance, medical support, and administrative services.

The term "Functional basis" and its application within the division framework combines many of the support elements of the technical services in the supply-and-transport battalion and in the maintenance battalion. In these two battalions are centred re-supply, maintenance, and other logistical functions which formerly were performed by the divisional units of quartermaster, transportation, chemical, ordnance, signal, medical and engineers. It is true that the engineer and signal battalions in the combat support command perform some of these functions for themselves. But other users of signal and engineer equipment receive their support from the support command.

Much administrative support of the division during field operations is retained, to the maximum degree possible, above division. This will allow the division commander, his staff, and his subordinate commanders the maximum time to devote to tactical operations.

Combat Manoeuvre Battalions

Varying in strength from only 800 men for the tank battalion to 900 in the parachute infantry battalion, all four battalions have many similarities. All are administratively and tactically self-sufficient. Each type of battalion is essentially of one combat arm. For example, armour soldiers will be assigned to the tank battalion, and infantrymen to battalions of mechanised infantry, infantry, and parachute infantry. This method of assignment makes training easier and more economical.

If a battalion is decimated as a result of a nuclear blast, it can be moved to a rear area and replaced by another battalion, until it is refitted. In a given situation companies can be withdrawn intact from a combat manoeuvre battalion and cross-assigned to another type of unit. Simultaneously, the battalion, minus one or two companies, can accept, support, and deploy companies of another type.

In order to form the division on its base and tailor it for a specific area and a specific mission, one can add to it any number of combat manoeuvre blocks. Current thought assigns an optimum of 10 or 11 battalions and a maximum of 15.

Conclusion

The advantages of this new organisation are:—

(a) It provides a flexible army structure capable of rapid expansion in the event of mobilisation to meet varying degrees of world tension.
(b) It makes for great compatibility for combined operations with armed forces of allied nations.
(c) It improves tactical mobility, both ground and air, and also non-nuclear firepower.
(d) The command and control structure provides maximum battlefield effectiveness.
(e) Formations can be tailored to the demands of the operational area and enemy capabilities.
(f) It will permit the incorporation of new weapons now under development as they become available, without the necessity for further reorganisation.
(g) It facilitates training.

In summary, the reorganisation provides an increase in firepower, armoured tracked vehicles, aircraft and improves the cross-country mobility of the division. This increased firepower and improved mobility together with increased organisational flexibility and improved command and control facilities produces superior combat power.

The foil may curve in the lunge; but there is nothing beautiful about beginning the battle with a crooked foil. The strict aim, the strong doctrine, may give a little in the actual fight with facts; but that is no reason for beginning with a weak doctrine or a crooked aim.

— G. K. Chesterton

COUNTERING THE SPREAD OF COMMUNISM

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"A wise player ought to accept his throws and score them, not bewail his luck".

— *Sophocles*

THERE is little point in recounting in detail the history of the 16 years since World War II in order to prove the successes won during this period by the Communists. An up-to-date atlas and one week's newspapers will show that the area of direct Communist rule, together with areas of Communist influence, totals more than Hitler's Germany was ever able to achieve.

Yet Hitler was fought to a standstill and finally defeated. The dilemma today is that no matter what weapons have been used in the cold war, Communism has not been brought to decisive battle. Communism itself, like so many of its standard-bearers, is a guerrilla — elusive, clandestine, striking hard and never accepting battle unless the odds are overwhelmingly in its favour.

How can such a guerrilla enemy be fought? Certainly not without understanding the true nature of the enemy, and then selecting those weapons which can most effectively engage him. This is the key to countering the spread of Communism.

What is Communism? It is naive to consider it as "the opposite to democracy"; this is to seek to define it in terms acceptable to us, without acknowledging the undoubted fact that words no longer have the same meaning once the idealogical iron curtain is crossed. Democracy lacks standard definition, and is an abstract which varies subjectively between nation and nation, person and person. Communism is rigidly defined, and is a universal and detailed guide to action. But if clear definition is difficult, the aims of Communism are all too clear. Khrushchev's "We shall bury you" is not the homely expression of a grass-roots dictator — it is the avowed intention of Communism, the destruction of capitalism. The basis of Communism is the theory of two irreconcilable societies, each governed by immutable laws, between whom struggle is inevitable; the ultimate success of one — Communism — is historically assured.

"Peaceful co-existence", even forgetting that as a formula it

has been offered only in a propaganda context, is logically impossible. The Communist or capitalist who would "will" such co-existence (and the "will for co-existence" is an essential part of the formula) automatically ceases to be a member of either camp, whether you define your terms in the language of East or West.

Marxist-Leninist dogma, however, does not necessarily demand the constant extension of the borders of the Soviet Union, except under special circumstances (as, for example, to preserve the "first land of socialism" from encroachment, as was the justification for their post-World War II expansion). But there is no question that the dogma requires the extension of the Soviet system, using world revolution as the base, the USSR as the lever.[1] Consequently there can be no doubt that this extension means ultimate world domination by the leaders of the Soviet system.

For the non-Communist world, the significance of the Soviet theory of world revolution lies in the fact that there are already two revolutions which seem ready-made vehicles for the Soviet aim — the one, of rising nationalism in former dependencies; the other, of rising expectations in all under-developed areas.[2] The Communist leadership (whether Soviet of Chinese) recognises the value of these existing revolutions as starting-points to ultimate world revolution, and fosters the more extreme elements in these local "revolutions" in every way possible. Yet the West often mistakes their actions as political opportunism, not realising that to the Communists they are inevitable to the eventual success of Marxism - Leninism. The Chinese may starve, and have to buy quantities of grain from the West, but her promises of food for Cuba must be made good!

Communist ideology is clear and inflexible — the capitalist system is an historic phase in the evolution of a world proletariat, and will be defeated by Marxist-Leninist forces. The defeat of an enemy who has these characteristics and beliefs presents a formidable problem, for as Professor Toynbee points out, these beliefs give the Communist something akin to a religion in which man replaces God and inevitability the Sermon on the Mount. To a Communist, even a defeat is only another stage towards ultimate victory.

In any ideological conflict, there are three families of weapons which may be used — the military, the political and the socio-economic. Which of these will have most effect upon an enemy of the type we face?

Militarily, the "pure war" of Clausewitz — of unlimited objectives and absolute victory — is untenable when to "shoot the works"[3] cannot lead to absolute victory for one side or the other. The nuclear deterrent is of demonstrably little value in

1. Stalin, J. V., "Problems of Leninism", Moscow 1947. p.122.
2. Acheson, D. "Power and Diplomacy", Harvard UP, Cambridge Mass., 1959. p.21.
3. Gen. Mark Clark in Subcommittee Report on Korea and Related Matters to the Senate Judiciary Committee, 1955. p.7

limited war — Korea and Indo-China are clear illustrations of this. Deterrence requires proportion to the task in hand; "an opponent whose purpose is, say, the subversion of Baghdad, may find it difficult to believe our claim that his initiative involves the destruction of Moscow *and* New York".[4]

The present American Government has in design an answer to this problem of disproportionate deterrence in what it terms "credibility"[5] — a display of both nuclear *and* conventional force to convince the Communists that the West is prepared to take action. This re-establishes the importance of conventional forces — the US Army alone had slumped from its 1952 peak of 1,596,000 to an approximate 800,000 in 1958 — and action such as the swift reinforcement of US troops in Europe during the current crisis demonstrates a willingness to meet conventional force with conventional force.

Yet the military weapon, particularly given the balance it now has, is a last resort and obviously regarded as such by both East and West.[6] It is the possession and the credibility of this weapon that will give us time to use those weapons whose significance the West seems only recently to have realised — the political and the socio-economic.

The conflict of East and West is too often seen in black and white — if you are not for the West, you are a Communist. Yet it is questionable whether we can expect non-Western under-developed nations to embrace Western ideals. The pre-conditions of democracy (Western style) has been defined as a reasonably high level of literacy, the general spread of education, a degree of prosperity reaching above bare subsistence, a homogeneous and integrated society, the maintenance of peace for a substantial period, and a strong and stable middle class.[7] Yet even a Western country like Germany, possessing all these in some degree, fell short of democratic government. Parliamentary democracy rests upon the premises of liberalism, and its cornerstone is freedom of expression of all opinions short of anarchy. A new state needs a working machinery of government — "What is first needed is not an opposition but a majority".[8] What the people as a whole seem to want is not individual but national freedom, not political participation but a share in economic advance in which the government is likely to have to be the prime mover.

4. King, J. E. Jnr., "Limited Defense", New Republic, 1957. p.18.
5. Time Newsmagazine, 15th September, 1961, p.12. This policy has been strongly advocated by Gen. Maxwell B. Taylor (Retd.), now military adviser to the President.
6. There is ample evidence for this statement. One of the most convincing arguments for this is made by Marion Toscano, Head of the Research Department of the Italian Foreign Office and Professor of Diplomatic History, University of Rome, in an article "Reflections on the Current International Situation", International Affairs, Vol. 35, No. 1, January 1959, p.10. This does not refer to communist-inspired "popular revolutionary armies", against whom the only effective long-term answer would appear to lie in astute political propaganda and economic aid.
7. Emerson, R., Professor of Government, Howard University, in an article "The Erosion of Democracy", Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, November 1960, p.4.
8. Emerson, ibid, p.6.

The West cannot expect these new states to be moulded in its own image, particularly where strong anti-imperialist forces exist. Pakistan's military democracy, Indonesia's "guided democracy", the governments of Vietnam, Burma and even Cuba may not be democratic in the Western sense — but there is no reason why they should not be anti-Communist. The West can accept in uncommitted nations governments differing from our own, as the history of the British Commonwealth since World War II clearly shows. This the Communist cannot do. History is *not* on the side of the Communists; the West can honestly support neutral governments, and must.

The last and perhaps most effective weapon in our hands is the socio-economic. This is a weapon that the Communists also use, but it suits our purposes even better than theirs. The economic pre-conditions to democracy mentioned above are also pre-conditions to any form of stable and secure government, and such government, with popular support, is antipathetic to Communism. To assist underdeveloped countries to socio-economic integrity is to create an effective anti-Communist bulwark.

The best method of assistance has been hotly debated, yet it is significant that criticism of foreign aid programmes (of which the popular but plausible "The Ugly American" is a good example) has been levelled at techniques rather than aims. Much of Western aid has been haunted by the shadows of imperialism, self-interest and an appalling lack of knowledge about the consequences of "giving". Much of the aid has been misdirected and ineffective. Since the post-war necessity of Marshall Aid, the most valued form of aid — both to the countries themselves and for its direct contribution to economic development — has come from sources such as the Colombo Plan (US $8,000 million spent in the first ten years[9]), the large American foundations such as Ford, and direct investment in industrial development, rather than by outright "grants-in-aid". The intention of the present US Administration (announced in the President's recent Foreign Aid Message to Congress) to reduce military aid in favour of economic aid, to increase the foreign aid programme but with emphasis upon long-term, low-interest loans rather than upon outright grants, and setting up the Peace Corps, may well go far towards the development of more effective programmes.

Yet it is not without problems. The greatest of these is the inadequacy of assistance schemes to date — for example, direct American private investment abroad (which is one of the most effective forms of aid) runs at about US $1 billion annually. To compare with Great Britain's overseas investment pattern prior to 1914, total investment should be of the nature of US $600 billion, with an annual return of 30 times the present

9. "Current Notes on International Affairs", Vol. 32, No. 6, June 1961, p.12.

investment rate.[10] And aid programmes themselves are not fully understood — witness the US Senate's recent cut in the President's Foreign Aid Bill.

These, then, are the weapons; how can we apply them to an area such as South East Asia, where Communist expansion has been most marked in recent years?

The military weapon, expressed through such forces as SEATO, must be credible, to prevent overt aggression and allow time for our other weapons to be employed. Politically, the West must make it clear that it supports self-government, even anti-Western self-government, and does not seek to impose Western democracy under Eastern dictators. Economically, we must offer not money but a share in technological and agricultural development — investment, not charity.

Time is our second great enemy. Before such policies can be effective we may well lose the little that if left of Indo-China, and may suffer other reverses. But ultimately the only weapons that can defeat Communism are those that deny it the ground in which to take root — military preparedness, economic growth and political stability.

"If the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to the battle?"

St. Paul.

10. Viner, J., Walker Professor of Economics and International Finance, Princeton University, in an article "Economic Foreign Policy", Foreign *Affairs, Vol. 39, No. 4, July 1961, p.560.*

The most probable *threat to our survival is apathy and an* unwillingness to face facts, coupled with the idea that there is no need to do anything until the real threat is there. Time may be on our side if we make use of it now, but it certainly will not be so if we neglect to take timely action and expect to put right all the deficiencies at the last minute.

ANTI-TANK WEAPONS AND THEIR INFLUENCE IN BATTLE

Major N. A. Shackelton, CD, Canadian Army

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SINCE the end of the Second World War there has been significant progress in the development of both armoured fighting vehicles and anti-tank weapons. How these trends will affect future operations is cause for serious speculation.

It may be argued that in the latest tanks the optimum degree of gun power, armoured protection and mobility has been achieved within the highest acceptable weight limitation. On the other hand, the widespread introduction of the recoilless, the rocket-propelled and the guided anti-tank missiles, together with the employment of high-powered anti-tank guns constitutes an increasing threat to the continued existence of the tank.

Present concepts of conventional warfare are based to a great extent upon operations of the Second World War. Experience gained in that conflict is also an important factor in the design of equipment; but it is conceivable that the improvements and innovations in the field of anti-tank weapons have rendered some of this military doctrine obsolete. Therefore, it is the intention to discuss the influence that anti-tank weapons will exercise on armoured and infantry operations and what changes in equipment and training may be necessary to meet this threat.

Anti-Tank Weapons in the Second World War

During the Second World War there was a steady increase in the penetrating power of anti-tank weapons and in the thickness of tank protective armour. On different occasions the advantage was held by either the anti-tank gun or the tank. Although both the Joseph Stalin and the German Tiger tanks enjoyed relative invulnerability from the gun-fire of less heavy vehicles, there is little doubt that anti-tank weapons had gained ascendancy over the tank by the end of the war.

Such an advantage enabled crippling losses to be inflicted upon an enemy who lacked the means of defence against these weapons. In discussing the early successes of the Germans in Russia, General von Mellenthin relates that in some instances a solitary anti-tank gun was capable of destroying Soviet armour at the rate of 30 tanks

an hour.[1] To a great extent the reverses suffered by the British Army in the Desert Campaigns of 1941 resulted from an enemy superiority in the quality of anti-tank weapons. Operation "Battle Axe" began on 15th June, 1941 with a British preponderance of four-to-one over the Germans in tanks. Two days later, 80 per cent. of the British force was out of action — largely the consequence of anti-tank guns and a dozen German 88-mm. anti-aircraft guns deployed in the anti-tank role.[2]

Again, in Normandy on 8th August, 1944 anti-tank guns were employed with devastating effect against Canadian and British armour. For example, in one period of less than 48 hours a screen of German 88-mm. guns destroyed more than 150 tanks.[3] This action is especially noteworthy inasmuch as the Allies enjoyed a tremendous material superiority, particularly in artillery and air power.

On the occasions when armour could exploit its mobility unimpeded by strong anti-tank defences it produced dramatic results. Among the better examples are the German invasion of France, General Wavell's victories over the Italians, the initial stages of the German invasion of Russia, and the Allied sweep across Europe following the break-through in Normandy. But, in each instance, success was attributable primarily to either superior equipment and numbers, massive air support, faulty leadership and the disintegration of the losing side, or a combination of these factors. Except in isolated cases, adequate anti-tank weapons, organised into coherent defences were notable by their absence.

Throughout most of the war, however, these circumstances did not prevail. Much of the time armoured troops found themselves involved in operations against an enemy who was firmly established in dug-in positions, and who was usually well provided with anti-tank protection in the form of guns and tanks. It was under these conditions that the existing formulae governing the conduct of the attack and the defence was evolved, the main requisite of which is close co-operation between infantry, armour and artillery. In brief, attacking infantry, accompanied by armour, advances with the support of artillery. The armour provides instant fire support against targets which hinder the progress of the infantry on to the objective. The infantry deals with the short-range anti-tank weapons encountered during their advance. The longer range weapons are dealt with by the armour or with the assistance of the artillery.

As long as troops are required to close with and destroy the enemy — as they must do in conventional operations, there seems no alternative to these basic tactical principles. Yet their application becomes increasingly complicated by fac-

1. Major-General F. W. Von Mellenthin, Panzer Battles 1939-45, Cassel and Company Ltd., London. p. 295.
2. B. H. Liddell Hart, The Tanks, Vol. II, Cassel and Company Ltd., London. pp. 94 and 95.
3. Milton Shulman, Defeat in the West, Martin Secker and Warburg, London. p. 150.

tors which have been introduced since the war. These include the substantial increase in the battle effectiveness of the Soviet tank arm, improvements in the power of Soviet anti-tank artillery and the adoption of the recoilless and rocket-propelled anti-tank weapons in quantity. In addition, there is the question of the guided anti-tank missiles: the fact that possession of these has not been made known is little reason for assuming that their development in the Soviet Army has been ignored.

The nature of this problem can perhaps best be illustrated by a comparison of the existing Soviet divisions with those of the wartime German Army. In 1944 the Panzer - grenadier Division comprised 14,000 men. Its anti-tank equipment ranged from guns of 20-mm. to 88-mm. calibre. There were 168 of these weapons in the division, not counting guns on tanks nor those possessing a secondary anti-tank role. In the German infantry division of 1944 there were 143 anti-tank weapons. In contrast, the Soviet Mechanised Division of 15,576 men contains 355 anti-tank weapons. These extend from the 40-mm. infantry anti-tank launcher to the 107-mm. recoilless anti-tank gun. However, an assessment of the mechanised division's anti-tank capabilities must also take into account those guns on tanks and self-propelled mounts. Excluding those on amphibious tanks, these amount to a further 326 guns.

In their design and development of anti-tank weapons it is probable that the Soviets have not overlooked those features of German equipment which proved successful during the war. It might even be assumed that the Soviet weapons introduced since that time are superior to their German counterparts. For this reason the performance data on certain of the German weapons can provide interesting criteria for an approximate assessment of comparable weapons in the Soviet Army.

The largest anti-tank gun produced by the Germans was the 128-mm. self-propelled Jagdtiger. At 1000 yards this gun could penetrate 200-mm. of armour at 30 degrees. The self-propelled Jagdpanther version of the famous 88-mm. gun could penetrate 169-mm. of armour at the same range and angle of attack. The performance of the 50-mm. towed anti-tank gun under these conditions was 56-mm. penetration. Another exceptional weapon of that period was the Panzerfaust 60 — an anti-tank grenade launcher with a range of about 80 yards. It could penetrate 200-mm. of armour.

Anti-Tank Weapons in the Defence

How modern anti-tank equipment can affect the course of a battle may be appreciated from a review of a hypothetical attack against elements of a mechanised division in the defence. Assuming that the attack is launched 2000 yards from the objective, and visibility permits, troops who have crossed the start line can expect to come under the direct fire of 122-mm. and 152-mm. guns of Joseph Stalin 3 tanks and self-propelled mounts.

These vehicles will be difficult to locate because of their low silhouette and frequent changes in fire position. They will also be difficult to destroy. In a hull down position the 200-mm. turret frontal armour of the JS 3 renders it virtually invulnerable, at these ranges, to all but the most powerful anti-tank weapons.

When the leading tanks are 1500 yards from the objective the fire of the JS 3's and self-propelled guns will be joined by that of the 107-mm. Recoilless Anti-Tank Gun B-11. A further advance of 500 yards brings the attacking troops within range of the 82-mm. Recoilless Anti-Tank Gun B-10. There is a total of five B-10's and B-11's in the motor rifle battalion. They can penetrate nine inches of armour. Back blast necessitates the siting of these guns in shallow pits with their tubes above ground level. This type of weapon often reveals its position on firing, at which time both crew and gun are vulnerable to well-placed high-explosive shell.

As the distance to the objective is shortened to 1000 yards and less, some of the 225 medium tanks of the division will begin to make their presence felt. In the defence a proportion of these vehicles is held back for the counter-attack, but the remainder are decentralised under the command of forward units. The 36-ton T 54 Medium Tank mounts a 100-mm. gun. It is likely that its performance against armour is comparable, if not superior, to that of the German 88-mm. gun. However, judging from the weight of the T 54 it is probable that this vehicle is insufficiently armoured to withstand modern tank gunfire at the more common battle ranges. It may therefore be expected to make maximum use of ground and strive to achieve first round hits with what appears to be a highly effective gun.

The next weapons to be encountered in the advance are the 85-mm. and 57mm. guns of the anti-tank batteries. These are towed equipments and will usually be dug-in and well camouflaged. Lacking mobility, they can be expected to hold their fire until a vital hit is more or less guaranteed. Frequently, they will be sited to engage approaching tanks from the flanks. Their destruction or neutralisation by assaulting armour depends upon vigilance, mutual support within troops and the immediate application of high-explosive gun-fire or smoke.

In the final stages of the attack those tanks which accompany the assaulting infantry onto the objective will be confronted by the Infantry Anti-Tank Launcher RPG 2. This is a panzerfaust type of weapon. It fires an 82-mm. hollow charge projectile a distance of about 90 yards. The performance of its wartime German counter-part would indicate that the penetrating power of the RPG 2 is in the order of 200-mm.

There are 27 RPG 2's in a motor rifle battalion. This permits allotment down to the section level. The short length of the launcher (four feet)

facilitates its concealment. It also enables the operator to shelter the weapon below ground level when his position is under fire. With good discipline and fire control the RPG 2 operator cannot be expected to disclose his position until the attacking armour is well within range. His location and destruction is therefore a primary responsibility of the foot soldier.

Tactical and Equipment Implications

As we have noted, in conventional war all training, equipment and organisation must be designed with one ultimate object in view, that is to enable the infantry to close with and destroy the enemy. There is no alternative. But, with the volume of fire that can be directed against them, this is an almost impossible task for the most resolute infantry, without the immediate close support of armour. Unless infantry can summon instantly the gun-fire of supporting tanks, an attacking company can be halted in confusion by one well-concealed machine-gun, particularly if the gun is dug in and served by a determined enemy.

The question is, can the tank survive long enough on the modern battlefield to carry out the vital role of infantry support? In considering this problem it would be well to look once again at a Soviet division in the defence. In conventional war it is estimated that a forward division will occupy an area with a frontage and depth up to nine and five miles, respectively. In this 45 square miles may be found more than 680 anti-tank weapons, including tanks and self-propelled guns. This means that in each square mile of defended area, assaulting tanks will encounter an average of 15 weapons capable of penetrating armour at some range or another. From these figures it would appear that, unless there are improvements in our capacity to meet the anti-tank threat, the lot of armoured units in future operations will be hazardous, to say the least.

Tank Destroyers

The anti-tank equipment of the Soviet Army falls into two broad categories: that which is mounted in armoured fighting vehicles and that which is not. Perhaps the former presents the less difficult problem. In considering the T 54 Medium Tank, there is good reason for supposing that the latest versions of Western main battle tanks hold the advantage. However, at ranges under 1000 yards there are few, if indeed any tanks sufficiently armoured to withstand 100-mm. anti-tank gunfire, especially if they are engaged from the flanks. Therefore, unless we are prepared to match the T 54 in numbers, some other means must be found for its destruction.

Much the same argument applies to the JS 3 and the heavy self-propelled guns, except that the JS 3 will be more difficult to destroy because of its heavy armour. In addition its 122-mm. gun presents a lethal

threat at any range at which a tank engagement can occur.

The numerical superiority of the Soviet tank arm has long been recognised. One result has been the development of the guided anti-tank missile. These weapons have been produced by a number of countries. Their characteristics of weight, range and effectiveness vary considerably; they all possess a good degree of accuracy and the best can halt the heaviest tanks at more than 200 yards. To date, these weapons seem to have been relegated to a defensive role; yet they have potentialities which are well suited for offensive operations.

An obvious course is to launch these weapons from a tracked armoured vehicle fitted with overhead cover. To withstand fragments from artillery, mortar and rocket projectiles, it would be necessary to provide armour up to main battle tank standards. The absence of a turret would lessen the total weight of the vehicle besides lowering the silhouette. Organised into tank destroyer squadrons, such vehicles concentrate on the destruction of enemy tanks. Another possibility which merits consideration is that of launching anti-tank guided missiles from very low flying helicopters. How effective this would be depends, of course, upon the efficiency of Soviet radar and anti-aircraft defences.

The Assault Tank

From the tank commander's point of view the static ground mounted anti-tank weapons probably constitute the more serious threat. They are usually well concealed; ranges and fields of fire have been carefully plotted beforehand; and by withholding their fire until the opportune moment the defenders have the advantage of devastating surprise. It is doubtful if there is an absolute solution to this problem. Nevertheless, certain measures can be introduced which would increase the tank commander's prospects of success in his task of supporting infantry. This would entail the adoption of an assault tank to supplement the fire of the tank troop.

Since the war tank designers have concentrated to a great extent upon the development of a standard battle tank which mounts a dual-purpose gun possessing armour - penetrating and anti-personnel capabilities. There is much to be said for this policy. A diversity of vehicles increases costs, and when there is a general shortage of equipment it can add to the difficulties of command. This would be most evident in re-grouping after an operation in which disproportionate casualties have been sustained by one particular type of vehicle. However, in pursuing the standard battle tank policy, the size and quality of the Soviet tank arm has dictated that the emphasis be placed on the armour penetrating requirements of the dual-purpose gun. For this reason the anti-personnel effectiveness of the tank gun falls short of that which could be produced by a gun of similar weight, designed specifically for the destruction of men occupying field defences.

Because of its high rate of fire, the anti-tank weapon must be subjected to smashing retaliatory fire the instant its position is revealed. This demands a high explosive shell of at least 120-mm. Such a projectile, possessing an air burst capability, is probably the minimum size of shell that could be expected to put both the anti-tank gun and its crew out of action in one round. Guns of this type could be mounted on the standard battle tank with relatively few alterations to the turret.

The feasibility of this proposal is apparent from a brief examination of the German 150-mm. Heavy Infantry Gun. The barrel of this gun was less than six feet in length; the total weight including wheels, trail and gun shield, etc., was less than 3400 pounds. It fired an 84-pound shell 5140 yards. In the turret of a tank, a gun of this type would require less space than existing dual-purpose tank guns.

The need to supplement the tank troop with equipment of this kind is again underlined when we consider the extraordinary demands which are made upon the mental and physical resources of the troop leader during an attack. He must read a map, send and receive messages over at least two radio channels, direct the movements of his troop, keep the infantry in sight, respond to signals for fire support, direct his gunner and driver, and at the same time be constantly on the alert for enemy tanks and anti-tank weapons. This was an exacting task during the Second World War: in the future, opposing anti-tank forces will be more than doubled.

It is considered that two assault tanks should be added to each four-tank troop. Their primary role would be anti-tank weapon destruction. In the course of an attack in support of infantry the tank troop would operate in the normal fashion; but the assault tanks would always be in the immediate support of the leading tanks. They would bring down speculative fire on likely anti-tank gun positions and instantly engage those weapons firing at the leading tanks. In this manner tank troops could be supported until they and the infantry reached the enemy forward defended localities.

Because of the numerous short-range anti-tank weapons held at the motor rifle company level, it is unlikely that armour of any kind will be able to accompany the infantry in the final one or two hundred yards of the assault. Not until the infantry have cleared the intervening ground of anti-tank launcher crews would they be joined on the objective by the armour.

Conclusion

The problem of enemy anti-tank weapons will be a dominant factor in a future war. In the event of hostilities, armoured forces will be confronted by at least twice the number of anti-tank weapons met during operations of the Second World War. Furthermore, it is extremely likely that these weapons will be

encountered under much less favourable conditions than prevailed at that time. It is clearly impracticable to increase the tank's weight of armoured protection. Nor can any significant increase in speed or tactical mobility be achieved by reducing the weight of armoured protection without rendering the tank so vulnerable that its value in the infantry support role is nullified.

The only resource appears to be an increase in the quantity and effectiveness of fire power. The guided anti-tank missile, mounted in a tracked armoured vehicle could, to some extent, redress the handicap imposed by the potential enemy's numerical superiority in tanks and self-propelled guns. The launching of guided missiles from helicopters also has possibilities. But the ground mounted anti - tank weapon is a different matter. Without overwhelming air and artillery support these weapons can inflict unacceptable losses on attacking armour. If this fact is recognised, there seems no alternative but to strengthen the tank troop with vehicles and equipment designed for the specific function of destroying anti-tank weapons.

COMPETITION FOR AUTHORS

The Board of Review has awarded first places and prizes of £5 for the best original articles published in the January and February issues as follows:—

January — "When Friends Fall Out" by Staff Sergeant P. G. Gittins, Royal Australian Engineers.

February — "Finding Your Way" by Lieutenant Colonel C. L. Thompson, MBE, R of O, Royal Australian Infantry.

THE "MOZART" LEAVES AT NINE by Harris Greene (William Heinemann, Ltd., 317 Collins Street, Melbourne).

World War II has passed into the realm of military history with a vast literature of its own. However, the immediate aftermath of the war is not nearly so well documented; a literature dealing with this phase of the conflict is only now beginning to develop. *The "Mozart" Leaves at Nine* is an important contribution to this new literature about a period which is as full of human drama as the actual conflict itself.

Older members of the armed forces will recall the period immediately after the war when the allied armies occupied the territory of their enemies. An important function of the occupation forces was the dismantling of the political and social apparatus created by the Nazis and their Japanese equivalent, the apprehension of war criminals, and the re-organisation of political institutions on the Western democratic pattern.

The setting for this story is Salzburg, Austria, in 1947, when the re-education programme was drawing to its close. Anyone who participated in the Occupation will recall all the characters in this book, and will readily discern similarities in events within their own experience. There are the solid, hard-working officers devotedly trying to make a good job of their tasks, the people working the black market for all it was worth, the opportunists seeking the promotion they failed to achieve during the war, the well-meaning but ineffectual ones, the liquor and the all-pervading immorality. And the Russians. Even at that stage the war-time co-operation between the Western Allies and the Soviets was wearing pretty thin. Complicating everything were the die-hard Nazis stirring up trouble in and out of the internment camps.

With this material Harris Greene has weaved up a novel which is at once instructive and exciting. If his satire is keen-edged, it is tempered with compassion for the unfortunates caught in a vast web of intrigue, vengeance and well-meaning futility. While spinning an enthralling story — the sort of story which continually tempts the reader to take peeks at pages further on — Mr. Greene leaves us with a good deal to think about.

— E.G.K.