


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CONTENTS

	Page
About Instructions and Things <i>Colonel N. A. M. Nicholls</i>	5
Military Free Fall — Parachuting <i>Major E. M. McCormick</i>	10
The Struggle in Vietnam—Strategic Review	18
When Friends Fall Out <i>Staff Sergeant P. G. Gittins</i>	21
What It Takes	<i>Major Thoung Htaik</i> 38
Book Reviews	43



Photo Australian War Memorial, Canberra

AUSTRALIAN TROOPS IN FRANCE, WORLD WAR I

When the first battle of the Somme ended in mid-November 1917, 1st Anzac Corps found itself in occupation of the worst sector of the front. The whole area was a dreary sea of mud thinly studded with the spectral ruins of farmhouses, trees and burnt-out derelict tanks. With winter coming on, the most urgent tasks facing the Australian troops were improvements to the defences and the elimination of awkward little salients. One such salient near Gueudecourt was given up by the Germans only after several Australian attacks.

The picture shows a section of the front line (Biscuit Trench) near Gueudecourt held by 8 Battalion on 19 December, 1916. The officer using the binoculars is Lieutenant A. D. Temple and the soldier Private J. A. Hawkins, later killed in action.

ABOUT INSTRUCTIONS AND THINGS

Colonel N. A. M. Nicholls, OBE
Australian Staff Corps

FROM time to time every headquarters must issue instructions. In a trained and well-disciplined body that the Army undoubtedly is, acceptance and obedience to orders is traditional. Those who receive the instructions are not pre-occupied looking for loopholes and escapes. They realise the need for control and are willing and able to play their part. Seldom should it be necessary to emphasise or to attempt to give added force to an instruction which is going to be obeyed anyway.

Instructions should be in no more and in no less detail than is required to enable an educated person of average intelligence to bring about the aim of the instruction as effectively and as quickly as possible. Speed and efficiency will not be possible if the instruction is incomplete or obscurely worded to the extent that amplifying or complementary instructions become necessary at any intermediate point between the issuing authority and the point of action. Under our system of administration, policy-making headquarters

cannot function efficiently within a reasonable staff ceiling unless they divorce themselves from the detailed implementation of policy. To relieve the pressure on intermediate headquarters, delegations should be made to the lowest level at which the particular decision or type of decision can reasonably be taken. The reference of a decision to higher authority can be justified only if there is a requirement for superior judgment or if the higher authority has access to information or advice which is not available at the lower level. To seek reasons for making a delegation might be termed the negative approach against what would seem to be the positive approach of automatic delegation unless there is a valid reason for withholding it.

We must be realistic in our understanding of high-sounding phrases such as "the exercise of superior judgment". Similarly, we must be careful of incorrectly assuming that the chances of a wrong decision are automatically reduced if it is referred to higher authority. No-one doubts that a commander should be wiser and

more experienced than his subordinates. Also, by virtue of the scope of his responsibilities in the senior appointment, he should have a better appreciation of any wider issues. In the circumstances that a given question will be decided personally by the superior commander, then, providing that the decision requires the exercise of his greater experience or his better knowledge of the broader issues, his decision should be the better. But how many of the decisions which are ordered to be referred to higher authority are taken personally by the commander in circumstances where he must draw on the margin of his superior experience and knowledge? Surely the point is that the majority of decisions which are ordered to be referred to higher authority, as distinct from those which subordinate commanders refer on their own initiative, are taken by the staff without reference to the superior commander. Taking into consideration the breadth of administrative experience which officers are able to gain in peace, no-one would argue that rank for rank a subordinate commander is any less capable of making a correct decision than a staff officer at the superior headquarters except on the occasions when the staff officer has the advantage of important relevant information.

The effect of better access to technical advice undoubtedly can be a factor contributing to a capacity for better decisions at the superior headquarters. However, in many instances the advice available to the senior

headquarters would not be so different or so much better that it would give rise to a different answer in the usual administrative decision.

The majority of questions referred by direction to a superior headquarters usually are approved or not approved, as the case may be, as recommended by the subordinate commander. In cases where the superior headquarters makes a decision contrary to that suggested by the subordinate commander, it is interesting to note that in proportion the number of recommendations for approval which are rejected greatly exceed the relatively few, and, in fact, the almost isolated instances where approval is given to something which has been not recommended from below. In other words, superior headquarters usually accept the advice of their subordinate headquarters and subordinate commanders except a few of their recommendations to be returned "not approved", but it is quite an event when the superior headquarters approves a submission which a subordinate commander has suggested should be not approved. It might be reasoned that this points to a lack of responsibility on the part of subordinate commanders and implies that the better decisions are more likely to emanate from higher authority. This is not the case. It is human nature to make the best of a good story to get what one wants, and the great majority of commanders feel justified in recommending for approval anything within reason which might be beneficial to

their command, even though they may realise that the balance of the chances is against approval by the superior headquarters. It would be revealing to know what percentage of submissions rejected by higher authority would be similarly rejected at the lower level if the responsibility for the decision had been delegated.

For much the same reason that most people would find that there is more to successful serious gambling than an ability to win or lose a few pennies among friends, the art of making sound decisions is not easily acquired and practised under simulated conditions. Not for one moment is it suggested that the officer who is accustomed to making only peacetime administrative decisions is fully trained to make the many complex decisions which he will face in war, but in the same manner that the person who has played for pennies knows more about the game than one who has never played, the officer who is accustomed to taking even relatively minor administrative decisions is infinitely better off than the one to whom any decision is a rare experience. Too infrequently is a request for a decision returned to its originator with a remark to the effect that it never should have been referred, that the originator has access to information on which to base the decision and that he had better make it himself and get on with the job as he should have in the first place.

If one can accept the weight of opinion at most levels in the Army, the main weakness in the

way we run our system of administration is insufficient delegation of authority which leads to over-centralised administration. No-one seems quite sure how and when the problem began, but it certainly gained momentum during the latter part of World War II. Like most other problems of a similar nature, it developed slowly and seemingly for no particular reason. But the background is interesting if only to demonstrate that even remotely similar conditions do not exist now.

At the time when the problem became more obvious, the eventual outcome of the war seemed beyond any reasonable doubt, but the end could not be seen. Expansion and promotion had produced a generation of younger officers whose considerable wartime experience was unavoidably narrow. Some of the "old hands" fancied that already they could hear the faint, distant sounds of the approaching problems of demobilisation and disbandment and the return of peace accounting, whilst among those who could never be accused of parochialism there were more and more who understandably were inclined towards the attitude that nothing mattered unless it contributed to immediate local success. Also, there were the well-known "characters", successful commanders, who proudly and usually incorrectly boasted that they never bothered about administration. There is no point in attempting to list all the possible contributing causes, the few that readily come to mind are sufficient to show that at the

time commanders and their administrative staff officers felt justified in issuing more restrictive instructions which, in the aggregate, amounted to greater centralisation of administration. Similarly, there is no need to speculate whether we would have been better or worse off if the problem had been solved in another way, but it would seem that the effects of what were intended originally to be short term measures are still being felt almost 20 years later under completely different circumstances. Never have we been in a better position to make the system work in the way it was intended.

What is our attitude towards mistakes? Is it, as it should be, that no-one should make too many mistakes and that the same person should not make the same error twice. Or do we allow as little as possible margin for the exercise of judgment and, regardless of the circumstances, as soon as one unfortunate makes the inevitable mistake, twist and complicate procedures to make it virtually impossible for something even remotely similar to happen anywhere in the Army? As children we were amused when we first heard the story of the soldier who was marching out of step with the rest of his unit. What would be our reaction if the point of the story was that when one man lost the step the rest of the unit was ordered to change?

Legal documents are drawn up against the possibility, always lurking in the background, that they might be interpreted by a

court of law. It is fact that army instructions are frequently produced as evidence in courts-martial, but for years there has been no known case where the detailed wording of the interpretation of an instruction has been in question. Normal army instructions are not legal documents and if they are produced in court usually it will be to establish a fact such as the existence of a procedure or a lawful order. There is no need for instructions to cover every possible shade of meaning, much less is there room for pseudo-legal terms and expressions which only add to the length of an order and confuse the intended simple thought behind it. As one of our well-known, now retired, officers once said, "First clear your mind and decide exactly what you want to happen. Then tell them to do it in good, simple English". As an illustration of how the pen can drift, the following is part of an actual current instruction, changed only to conceal its origin and the subject: "It is the duty of NCO's to ensure that a member's personal messing gear remains in the personal custody of such member at all times unless required for army purposes, in which event, they shall be returned to the member as soon as possible. In no circumstances, shall personal messing gear be retained for long periods in QM stores etc.". It is an interesting mental exercise to work out what the writer wanted to say and how best to express it.

There is no problem about knowing who is responsible for what goes on in a formation,

unit, sub-unit etc. Commanders themselves are the last to need reminding, and among this hardy race undoubtedly it is the commanding officers of units who usually feel that they must answer for the sins and omissions of all. How pointless to harrass them by telling them that they are responsible for this, by reminding them that they are responsible for something else and by directing them to ensure that . . . and so on. Regardless of what is intended, commanding officers can do very few of these things themselves and at the same time hope to command and train a unit. They will be forced to delegate, as indeed they should. Rarely is anything additional achieved by referring specifically to the commanding officer, and the elusive "they" who write such instructions must wonder why there is not the desired reaction on the rare occasions when there is a genuine need for commanders to take a special direct, per-

sonal interest in a particular detailed aspect of administration.

This article reaches no conclusions. It ends with a question, a statement and a plea.

- (a) In the Army we are indeed fortunate that orders and instructions may be issued in the knowledge that with rare exceptions those who receive them will carry them out to the best of their ability. Why make their task any more difficult than is necessary:
 - (b) Our administrative system is good. We will never experience the upper limits of its efficiency until responsibility with authority for decision is delegated as near as possible to the point of action.
 - (c) Please let us not increase the burden of administration by twisting and adding to detailed procedures whenever a mistake is made.
-

MILITARY FREE FALL PARACHUTING

Major E. M. McCormick
Royal Australian Infantry

FREE fall parachuting or skydiving is an established sport in Europe and the USA and it is rapidly gaining popularity as a sport in Australia. The general public have little or no idea of what it is all about, and it is therefore not surprising that many servicemen are unaware that free fall parachuting has a military application or that it is taught at various service parachute schools throughout the world including that of Australia. The aim of this article is to give some idea of what is involved in free fall parachuting and of its military potential.

Free fall parachuting is an extremely personal thing, demanding a high degree of courage, control and co-ordination. The normal military method of statichute parachuting can be taught, by drill, to any person with the correct psychological attitude and normal physical co-ordination, but this is not true of free fall parachuting. The statichute parachutist need

only carry out the techniques drilled into him to complete a successful descent. His parachute is activated automatically and he is within voice control of his instructor throughout the descent. The free fall parachutist must constantly make his own decisions and speedily act upon them. During the vital period when he is falling free he is on his own out of contact with, and unable to obtain any advice from, his instructor. He must react constantly and correctly to fast changing conditions, watch his instruments, and activate his own parachute.

The statichute parachutist has very little control over his parachute once it is open. He can slow down his speed of movement over the ground but he cannot accurately steer his parachute on to a target. This causes the parachutists to land relatively widely dispersed and this dispersion increases with the speed and dropping height of the aircraft. To minimise the dispersion the parachutists are

dropped from relatively low altitudes; 1,000 ft. where the reserve parachute is worn and 400 ft. when no reserve parachutes are used. Even so this demands drop zones of a minimum of 1,500 yards for a 30-man stick. Using faster transport the distance is increased, and from a C-124 aircraft it is over 2 miles. When normal human errors in calculation of the exit point and wind changes are taken into consideration, it is clear that a relatively large area is required to drop static parachute parachutists. In addition to this it is obvious to the enemy that transports flying at that height will probably be dropping paratroopers.

The free fall parachutist exits from the aircraft at high altitude. He then falls freely through the air with no visible means of support, until he reaches his parachute opening height where he activates his parachute and steers towards his objective. During the period of free fall the parachutist flies his body and controls it by using his limbs in the same manner as a pilot controls his aircraft by elevators, ailerons and rudder. Like the aircraft pilot there is only so much theoretical training he can receive on the ground after which he must gain experience by practical flying. Unlike the student aircraft pilot, the student free fall parachutist must carry out his initial flying training completely on his own without benefit of dual control or any means of communication with his instructor. He is further handicapped in that he can only fly down and although he can,


when competent, carry out the same aerobatics as an aircraft he can never regain lost height. This means that if he gets below the minimum height required to operate his parachute he will crash. He must therefore have some means of accurately assessing his height above ground level at any time during the period of free fall. This need is even more apparent when it is realised that he is falling at speeds of 120 to 200 mph.

The parachutist's basic equipment consists of a harness holding a main parachute on his back and a smaller reserve parachute in front below his chest. The reserve parachute has a small instrument panel, mounted on top, holding a stop watch and altimeter. He is also equipped with goggles and a crash helmet but apart from this no other special equipment is required.

Normally a man exiting from an aircraft at height, and delaying the opening of his parachute, would tumble uncontrollably as he fell. He may go head over heels or spin round and round on his stomach or back. Spinning can result in injury and the man may black out and crash to his death. Uncontrolled tumbling may result in the man becoming entangled with his parachute on its development causing injury to himself and malfunction and damage to the parachute. If he is also loaded with a 60 lb pack this may well be torn loose by his various gyrations. Such tendencies must therefore be eliminated if the man is to have control during the period of free fall and this

is done by assuming a symmetrical position which is aerodynamically stable. There are various stable positions which can be used by the parachutist during the period of free fall and the basic one is the cross position. In this position the parachutist spreads his arms and legs in the form of a cross,

hence the name. (See Figure 1.) Using the cross position he reaches terminal velocity of 174 feet per second in 12 seconds, thereafter he continues to fall at a constant speed of 174 feet per second or approximately 120 mph. This is the position first taught to all student free fall parachutists and as he pro-



CROSS POSITION

Figure 1

gresses the student can control his body, turn and roll etc., from this position. As his proficiency increases he then adopts more advanced positions such as the delta position (See Figure 2). In this position the man looks

rather like a swept wing jet fighter and he increases his rate of descent whilst at the same time moving across the ground at approximately 10 yards per second. He uses this position to move over the point on the



Figure 2

ground on which he wishes to actuate his parachute. In addition to these two positions the parachutist can, by adopting other advanced positions, fall feet first in the vertical position or head first and carry out various aerobatics.

The free fall parachute is like a normal parachute with a hole in it. This hole enables a constant flow of air to escape from the canopy and establishes a thrust which pushes the canopy in the opposite direction at a speed of 6 to 8 mph (See Figure 3). This speed may be up to 12 mph dependent on the shape and number of holes in the canopy. These holes may be triangular, T or U shaped or various combinations of these. Generally the greater the area missing the greater the drive given to the parachute. The canopy has a steering device attached to it which works by

diverting the escaping flow of air. This enables the parachutist to turn the canopy in any direction and direct the thrust along any desired axis so as to increase or decrease his speed of movement across the ground.

Thus by steering his body during the fall and controlling his parachute when it develops, the free fall parachutist can, in a 6,000 ft fall, move 1,000 yds approximately over the ground in any direction. This in turn allows him to land with accuracy in very small spaces which could not normally be considered as dropping zones. He can, by controlling his parachute, land close to his companions without the dispersion inherent in all statichute descents. All this can be done in daylight or darkness and the free fall parachutist is thus much more flexible than the statichute parachutist.




Figure 3

If the free fall parachutist's ability to manoeuvre is applied tactically certain obvious advantages accrue. He can be dropped into areas which are unsuitable for static line parachutists. Areas such as small valleys in mountainous country where the terrain prevents aircraft from flying 1,000 ft above the dropping zone and areas, prevalent in the tropics, where only small dropping zones, demanding great control during the descent, are available. These are obvious advantages but they would not themselves justify the training of free fall parachutists unless these parachutists can carry with them the equipment required for the job in hand.

In the United States free fall troops are dropped with 60 lb loads including such equipment as 3.5 RL's, M1 Rifles, PRC 10 Radios, and full field packs. They have repeatedly demonstrated their usefulness on various demonstrations and manoeuvres. In a demonstration conducted by 101 US Airborne Division, six men jumped from a helicopter at 8,000 ft with full equipment. Ten minutes after leaving the aircraft they were assembled in their position on the ground. The spectators, who were expecting them, did not see them nor did they hear the noise of the aircraft at that height. To all intents the parachutists were invisible and soundless in the dark.

In other manoeuvres, free fallers have landed undetected on HQ's and rear echelons, creating havoc and escaping without casualties. On another occasion a group took 3 minutes

55 seconds from the time of leaving the aircraft to get into radio contact with a helicopter and lay the ground signals required to guide it in to a landing.

The free fall parachutist is not detectable by radar and is more or less invisible during night descents. When it is realised that the noise of the aircraft flying at height is not usually detectable and that a single small aircraft is often unidentifiable on radar screens because of other traffic, the advantages of using free fall parachutists become clearer. Surprise is gained both by the unheralded approach of the soldiers and by the fact that a single aircraft at height even if detected is not liable to suggest that paratroopers are in fact being dropped.

By applying the characteristics of flexibility and surprise the free fall parachutist can be used with telling effect by small scale raiding parties, long range reconnaissance patrols, guerrilla liaison groups and by the pathfinder teams employed in major airborne or airlanded operations. Free fall parachuting is the ideal method of placing men on the ground in such operations where men are required to arrive, undetected, behind enemy lines. This technique could also be used on larger scale operations, but as the number of troops involved in the drop increases so will the advantages decrease. For example, the greater the size of the force used the more room will be required for the parachutists to manoeuvre and the greater will be the dispersion. In

addition, the numerous aircraft needed for a large scale operation will decrease the element of surprise. The free fall parachutist is of necessity much more lightly equipped and he requires more training than the normal paratrooper. Free fall parachuting is therefore unlikely to be used on large scale operations, but it is the ideal technique where one or more small parachute landings are required.

The fact that free fall parachuting is not suited to large scale operations leads many experts to believe that it is only an interim technique as improvements to the statichute technique will, in the not so distant future, give the statichute many of the advantages possessed today by the free fall parachutist. They claim that the stabilised parachute will eventually replace the free fall

parachute. The stabilised parachute does not develop immediately it is pulled from the bag. The mouth of the canopy is held closed by a reefing device so that the parachute streams out above the parachutist until a predetermined height where the reefing device is released and the canopy develops normally. Already the Russians are dropping parachutists from greater heights and from faster aircraft using this method, and it does appear to be the technique of the future for large-scale operations as it requires little or no special training to convert trained statichuteists. However, although it allows parachutists to be dropped from greater heights with consequently less danger to the carrier aircraft, it does not overcome the drawback of dispersion nor is the parachutist able to move



Parachutist free-falling in the cross position.

across the ground during the period of stabilised fall. The stabilised fall parachutist cannot land with the same accuracy as the free fall parachutist, nor does he have the same manoeuvrability. It would therefore appear that rather than free fall parachuting being replaced by stabilised fall parachuting, both techniques will advance together, each employed where its characteristics are most advantageous; free fall parachuting in small drops, raids and clandestine operations; stabilised fall parachuting in large scale conventional parachute operations.

In conclusion it can be said that free fall parachuting is a

specialist technique suitable for special tasks. It does not replace the existing statichute techniques nor can it itself be replaced by an improved statichute technique.

Free fall parachuting is not an interim measure and its capabilities cannot be ignored by conventional military theorists. In an age of specialisation, the specialist will always better the amateur, no matter how keen, and the benefits obtainable from the military employment of free fall parachuting techniques are well worth any extra time and money which may be required to train such specialist parachutists.

Strategic Review

THE STRUGGLE IN VIETNAM

OF recent months Soviet activities in Berlin, combined with their series of nuclear weapon tests, have tended to obscure the steadily increasing Communist pressure on South Vietnam. This threat is more immediately important to Australia because it is occurring in an area in which we are more directly interested and in which, through our membership of SEATO, we could become militarily involved.

South Vietnam is one of the successor states of the old French colony of Indo-China. The state was brought into being by the Geneva conference of 1954 as part of the solution to the problem which followed the French military collapse after their long struggle with the Communist Vietminh guerrillas. This conference divided the territory of Vietnam at the 17th parallel of latitude in the hope that the boundary would constitute a dividing line between the Communist dominated North and the Nationalist South.

The Geneva settlement made elaborate provisions to hinder any resort to arms by either the South Vietnam Nationalists or the North Vietnam Communists, and for free elections which it was hoped would eventually lead

to re-unification of the country. A control commission was appointed to supervise the execution of these provisions. In fact the commission has been powerless in the face of Communist intransigence.

The partition of the country raised serious economic problems for each of the two parts, each of which required assistance from external sources. Naturally the Communist Vietminh, the dominating political party in the North, sought this aid from Communist countries, chiefly from China, while the South looked to the United States for support. Unfortunately the economic difficulties of the South have been aggravated by the continuous stream of refugees from the North. Between 1955 and 1960 over a million refugees crossed the border, a human flood that has placed a great strain on an economy which has never had a chance to become stabilised.

From the beginning Ho Chi Minh, at the head of the Vietminh Party, set out to organise the North along strictly orthodox Communist lines. For some years the effort to socialise all aspects of life absorbed most of his energies, but he never lost sight of the expansionist aim inherent

in the Communist dogma. On the other hand the South, under the leadership of President Ngo Dinh Diem, has been struggling to establish a free society more or less on Western lines. This task has been made more than usually difficult because of the lack of administrative experience and the all too common corruptibility of officials.

Behind a smoke screen of gobbledegook, Ho Chi Chinh has steadily pursued his twin aims of the consolidation of Communist power in the North and the "liberation" of the South.

About the middle of 1959 Ho Chi Minh apparently felt that consolidation in the North was far enough advanced to provide the firm base for more active operations against the South. Since that time these operations have been developed on a steadily increasing scale along the familiar Communist lines of assault, on the one hand a continuous barrage of subversive propaganda directed against the South Vietnamese Government, and on the other guerrilla operations and terrorism.

In January 1961 Radio Hanoi announced the formation of a "National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam". Ho Chi Minh welcomed the formation of this organisation as a practical step towards the "liberation of the South Vietnamese people in their struggle against the tyrannous Diem regime", and predicted that it would lead to the "re-unification of North and South Vietnam under one roof".

Since its formation the National Front has employed all

possible means for undermining the confidence and loyalty of the South Vietnamese people. Radio Hanoi has directed a continuous stream of vilification against President Diem, Government officials and the United States. Every constructive act undertaken by the Government is represented as "another rivet in the chains binding the people", while American aid is represented to be the old "colonialism" in a new form. Radio and leaflet propaganda is cleverly supplemented by a whispering campaign started and maintained in full swing by Communist infiltrators.

The Communist guerrilla forces in South Vietnam are operating on the same lines as the guerrillas who played the leading role in the defeat of the French in Indo-China and who gave so much trouble in Malaya. One estimate places their number at some 12,000 fully armed men, whose achievements over the past two years are impressive. Unofficial reports place the number of bridges destroyed or badly damaged at some three hundred. Miles of railway have been torn up. Large quantities of equipment and stores, including medical supplies, have been stolen or destroyed. Terrorism and sabotage have forced some 200 elementary schools with about 25,000 pupils to close down.

In the areas dominated by the guerrillas the Vietminh levies its own taxes in the form of money or agricultural produce. People who co-operate with the Government, or who show the slightest resistance to the guerrillas, are

summarily despatched. Most reports agree that some 4,000 people have been murdered or kidnapped in the last two years.

Some idea of the scale of the guerrilla operations may be obtained from the fact that a force estimated to be at least a thousand strong recently attacked a town about 50 miles from Saigon. After four hours' heavy fighting the garrison beat off the attack, but not before the guerrillas had destroyed public institutions, looted Government stores and raided stocks of arms, ammunition and food.

Behind the guerrilla forces is the North Vietnam regular army of 350,000 men, backed by a "People's Militia" 200,000 strong. In contravention of the Geneva Agreement, an air force and a navy have been established and equipped from Communist bloc sources. Since 1954 about twenty new military airfields have been built, some of them able to accommodate all types of aircraft.

The Communists have won their successes in South Vietnam chiefly for two reasons — the inexperience of the administration, and the tendency of both the South Vietnamese and the American Governments to regard the problem as a purely military one to be solved on conventional lines. Such coun-

ter - subversion measures as have been undertaken have been inadequate, badly timed and ill-conceived. Until recently the armed forces were investing far too heavily in equipment and training inappropriate to anti-guerrilla operations.

However, South Vietnam has now responded with a new programme of positive action. On the economic side, taxation reform and a series of agricultural and industrial projects are designed to improve the national economy. The army is to be re-equipped and retrained for the task actually facing it. The rural population is to be regrouped into communities similar to the "new villages" set up in Malaya. Malaya is being asked to provide advisers experienced in the anti-guerrilla operations successfully undertaken in that country.

No-one can say for certain whether these proposals will succeed. The Communists have made such inroads that a major and sustained effort will be required to push them back. Certainly they will respond by stepping up their own efforts. The result of the struggle is bound to exert a powerful influence, perhaps a decisive influence, on the course of subsequent events in South East Asia.

— E.G.K.

WHEN FRIENDS FALL OUT

AN ANALYSIS OF THE CLASH BETWEEN RED CHINA AND SOVIET RUSSIA

Staff Sergeant P. G. Gittins
Royal Australian Engineers

"Sweet words multiply friends, and a faithful friend is a sure defence. He that hath found such a one hath found a treasure".

— *The Apocrypha.*

THE discovery and development of nuclear weapons has brought about a situation in which Western civilisation and perhaps human society in general, can continue to exist only if an absolute monopoly in the control of nuclear weapons is created. This monopoly can be gained and exercised only through a World Empire, for which the historical stage had already been set prior to and independently of the discovery of nuclear weapons. The attempt at World Empire will be made, and is, in fact, the objective of the Third World War which, in its preliminary stages, has already begun.

It should not require argument to state that the present candidates for leadership in the World Empire are three only — America, Soviet Russia, and China, the latter two arrayed against the former.

Contrary to Marx's theory that the World Revolution would first

triumph in the most highly capitalised and industrial countries of Western Europe, such as Britain and Germany, it was in backward semi-oriental Russia that the leaven first began its deadly work; and it was not long before the insidious doctrines enunciated in Moscow were making headway among the unorganised, ignorant, illiterate and credulous masses of Central Asia, the Far East, and South East Asia. There the desire to be free from foreign rule, the desire to end the traditional standards of poverty and backwardness, and the resentment born of the white man's assumed superiority over the coloured races, provided the best possible soil for planting the seeds of world Communism.

In the face of the Russian Communist expansion, it has been difficult to tell where the Soviet frontiers really lie in many parts of Asia; and even where they are discernible, they

hardly signify anything more than the situation of the moment. Today the Soviet Union is bounded on the West by uncertain and hostile satellites, and on the other side by that aggressive new mammoth of the East — Red China.

The Chinese Communists, even at this stage, are already a problem for their allies. But what will they be like after they become a nuclear Power? This is something for the whole world to worry about, including, or especially Russia. The threat of Communist China becoming a nuclear Power might force the Soviet Union to co-operate with the West.

Russia, like the United States, is a great Power — with or without nuclear weapons. Does it wish to see this advantage reduced by the emergence of other nuclear Powers, such as China? This is the crucial question it must soon decide.

This does not mean that Russia and China are about to fight — they need each other too much and they still face a common enemy in the West. But it almost certainly does mean that Russian talk of "peaceful co-existence" is not going to achieve anything very peaceful — even if Khrushchev is sincere. For Mao cannot afford to relax the pressure on the Western forces that hem China in.

Just how basic is the difference or dispute between the two giants of Communism?

It is as basic as the history and geography of the two nations, for the conflict goes back to the days of the czars

and emperors seeking to extend their power among the Mongols, Turkics, Kazaks, and Tadzhiks who grazed their herds on the ill-defined 5,000 mile long borderland between the two empires. For Mao Tse-tung the rivalry is personal, too. He regards Khrushchev as an inexperienced upstart, lacking true revolutionary fervour, and he is embarrassed that Russia's progress outstrips China's.

The most detailed account of their dispute was a controversial document made public in the London "Sunday Times" some months ago by Soviet affairs expert, Isaac Deutscher. Over 5,000 words long, it quoted Khrushchev as accusing Mao Tse-tung of "disloyalty", "subversive agitation" and "incitement to world war". The document had purportedly been sent from Khrushchev's office to several foreign Communist headquarters. It cited two basic charges against Mao:—

- (a) China's rulers have "hatched a sort of plan for the division of world Communism into two zones, a so-called Western Zone for which the USSR should be responsible, and a so-called Eastern Zone under China". Moscow opposes this because it has a flavour of racialism.
- (b) Mao is not only willing to risk war but has actually used "beautiful but outdated and irrelevant Chinese legends and proverbs to advocate preventive war". Moscow's reply: "World war can and should be avoided".

Historical Background Notes

But this quarrel of the Communist giants goes back a long way. Some would say it goes back to the 20's, when Stalin sacrificed the Chinese Communist Party to Chiang Kai-shek; others would say to the immediate post war years when the Russians stripped Manchuria bare and gave no help to the revolutionary Chinese.

The Russians themselves, in a secret circular about the sins of the Chinese Communist Party, dated 21st June, 1960, tried to localise the quarrel. It began, they say, in effect, only when China started ignoring the letter and the spirit of the 12 party Moscow Declaration of 1957.

The Chinese, on the other hand, in a critically important and hitherto secret letter dated 10th September, 1960, replying not only to the Soviet circular, but to the Soviet charges brought against them at Bucharest in June, go back to 1956. The real differences, they insist, started at the 20th Party Congress, when in his de-Stalinisation speech, Khrushchev denied Stalin's "positive" role, without any previous discussion with the "fraternal parties". Further they say, they objected strongly to the Soviet mobilisation against Poland in 1956, which they effectively restrained, and also to an alleged Russian plan to have the Polish Party collectively condemned by all the Communist Parties of the world.

For good measure, the letter declares that there had been a sharp difference between China

and Russia about the handling of the Hungarian uprising. At one time, the Chinese letter stated, the Russians had decided to withdraw their troops, the Chinese had effectively intervened to stop them.

But the quarrel did not begin to take real shape until 1958, and it did not come out into the open until last year. It was a dramatic year indeed, and during the course of it, the main issues between Moscow and Peking were swiftly crystallised.

It is a fascinating aspect of the letter, that its compilers — devoted Communists — did not discuss in any detail what we should consider the dramatic, the concrete points of difference, but concentrated on doctrinal issues, at first sight meaningless to us, but wonderfully and terribly alive to them, and conditioning all their actions — therefore, in effect, alive to us too.

Some of the "concrete" issues are serious enough: they ranged from the now notorious withdrawal of Soviet technicians from China last August (1960) (it now appears that the reason for this was that the Chinese were using them in a way the Russians did not approve of and that they were being doctrinally perverted by the Chinese) to Soviet reluctance to supply the Chinese with nuclear weapons, and, even more interesting, the breakdown of a scheme for a unified Pacific naval command. (Moscow was afraid that the Chinese would draw the Soviet Union into a war over Formosa.)

All these and many more issues were freely aired at the

Moscow conference. Not the least were the strong Soviet objections to Chinese actions in India and Algeria. These, claim the Russians, were calculated to destroy the confidence of the bourgeois world in the Communist desire for peace, and to inflame Afro-Asian suspicions of international Communism.

But the whole weight of the debate centred on matters of guiding doctrine. There were six controversial issues:—

- (1) Is war inevitable? The Russians say that times have changed since Lenin laid down the doctrine of the inevitability of war and that it no longer holds. The Chinese say that war cannot be avoided as long as imperialism exists.
- (2) Must local wars lead to general wars? The Russians say the danger of this happening is too great to gamble with. The Chinese insist that local wars can and must be pursued.
- (3) Can Socialism be achieved without violence? The Russians — since 1956 — have been saying "Yes", the Chinese however, deny it categorically except as the rarest exception, citing Lenin to support them.
- (4) Is peaceful co-existence a good idea? The Russians say it is not only good in itself, but necessary and, in the fulness of time, will benefit the cause of Socialism. The Chinese say it is good only as a temporary tactical move to deceive the West.

- (5) Should Communist support be given to non-Communist liberation movements? The Russians say "Yes", everything that weakens the great imperialist Powers must benefit the Socialist camp. The Chinese say "No", it is a waste of both money and resources, it discourages genuine revolutionaries, it strengthens the Imperialist camp by enlarging the area of anti-Communism.
- (6) How should the present epoch be defined in Marxist terms? The Chinese insist that this is an epoch "of wars and revolutions" whilst the Soviet view is that it is an epoch "of the disintegration of imperialism, of transition to Socialism, and of the formation and consolidation of a world system of Socialism".

With the latter point, it was supremely important to agree on the correct definition, because from this, all Communist appraisals and actions must flow.

There were other points of disagreement, but more revealing even than the points at issue was the tone of the argument.

The chronology of the dispute in its acute form may be dated from January 1960. Then, at the Rome meeting of the Presidium of the World Peace Council, the Chinese accused the Soviet Union of seeking to isolate China in order to achieve an understanding with America. This was followed in April by a propaganda campaign indirectly criticising Khrushchev's policies. The Russians, although not re-

plying in public, sent several sharply critical letters to Peking after the Moscow Summit conference.

At the same time the Chinese offended Communist proprieties by using the World Federation of Trade Unions in Peking to press their views, and this was the background of the Bucharest conference in June.

At the last minute the Russians decided to use this conference for an all-out attack on the Chinese. Mr. Khrushchev launched his direct attack on Mao Tse-tung — a violent and largely impromptu tirade in the shoe - thumping Khrushchev manner, during the course of which he got round to calling Mao "an ultra Leftist, an ultra dogmatist, a Left revisionist", and telling the Chinese that they knew nothing about modern war.

But for once he was answered in kind. The Chinese spokesman, Pheng-chen, directly accused him of fixing the meeting for the sole purpose of attacking China and undermining Chinese prestige. He claimed Khrushchev was giving people totally wrong ideas about the true nature of imperialism and underestimating its strength. Furthermore, as the Chinese had already shown in Korea and Japan, they knew more about war than most people.

It was in this mood that the Bucharest conference, applauded in the Communist press as a triumph of solidarity, broke up. The Chinese had agreed to sign the communique only for the sake of preserving the appearance of unity.

Between June and November 1960, two things happened. First the Moscow-Peking polemic was pushed to new lengths. Then the Chinese issued a letter claiming the Soviet party had forgotten its responsibilities as the leading party, that its attacks on the Chinese party had severely damaged its prestige, that it was not merely failing to support, but was actually opposing struggles for liberation all over the world, that although negotiation with the imperialists might be necessary, there was no need to glorify them, that China wanted neither war nor co-existence, but a "third way" which she was happy to call "cold war".

This document and a Soviet circular served as the main base for discussion at the Moscow conference, a conference that was so secret that its existence was not even admitted until it was over.

For more than a week the "fraternal" parties had their say. The Chinese attack in full session, when it finally came in a speech by Tseng Hsiao-ping, the Secretary-general, seems to have had a shattering effect. The Soviet party was opportunist and revisionist, it lacked deep knowledge of Marxism, its ideas about disarmament were absurd, its aid to Nehru and Nasser was an "opportunist mistake", peaceful co-existence could mean nothing, the Soviet idea of a division of labour among the countries of the Socialist camp was wrong, and China must go her own way.

Initially, many delegates to the conference had been uneasy.

They had not liked Khrushchev's overbearing manner, they had not liked the way they had been isolated — not merely from the ordinary Russians, but from each other by police guards — they had not liked the way the Russians had tried to regiment them. However, the bitterness of the Chinese attack had its effect. The upshot was the celebrated Moscow Declaration, which was a compromise of sorts, a papering over of the cracks.

The Russians won their main points — at least for the purposes of the Declaration — but to satisfy the Chinese they had to lay a heavy emphasis on the revolutionary dynamic.

But it scarcely is a secret that Peking's zealots reject Khrushchev's belief that Communism can conquer by "peaceful means". Time and time again they have said that "just wars" are desirable — and it appears that within a year they will have the beginnings of an atomic arsenal to back up their words. Nor is it a secret that the Chinese are trying to achieve leadership of all revolutionary groups in Africa, Asia and Latin America. For example in one recent three month period, Peking welcomed 37 delegations from the underdeveloped world and sent off 24 delegations in return.

Why China Will Not Break With Russia

But Red China couldn't break with the Soviet Union even if she wanted to. The alliance with Soviet Russia is the capstone of Red China's whole national

policy. Just glance at China's military situation. Not a few Western commentators stress the might of the army and the air force, but they gloss over the fact that these forces are hopelessly tied to Soviet Russia by the umbilical cord of supply. In case of hostilities, any break with Russia would cause Peking's mighty military machine to grind to a halt within weeks for lack of replacements.

A key provision of the Soviet-Chinese pact of 14th February, 1950, was the supply of Soviet "advisers" to China's armed forces. This virtually gives Moscow a built-in control of the whole military establishment, a control however, that is slowly but surely being reduced. The Soviet grip on Red China's air force is even more impressive. Peking is as yet unable to manufacture warplanes or essential aircraft parts in any quantity. Most planes are Soviet made and Soviet serviced. Moreover, China's present oil production is inadequate and its jets must be fuelled by tankers via the long routes from the Black Sea and the Baltic. China also depends upon Soviet Russia for such essentials as anti-aircraft guns and high level radar range-finders, as well as telecommunication equipment.

Red China's navy is similarly subservient to the Soviet Union. By treaty in 1945 Russia gained control of Port Arthur and Darien. It subsequently returned both as a gesture of apparent withdrawal, but it retained the right to use Port Arthur, including its powerful naval base. On

Hainan Island in the south, it is rumoured that Russia (with Peking's consent) has developed a formidable submarine base which could make the whole South China Sea untenable to the "Free World".

The Russian Military Threat

There are eight Soviet 1500 mile range missile bases in Siberia in addition to Siberian links in the Soviet chain of 10-6000 mile range intercontinental missile bases extending from Western Russia to North Eastern Siberia. The Siberian medium range bases are directed against Alaska, Japan, Okinawa and Formosa. They can also be directed at targets in China. The long range bases are directed primarily at the United States.

Another estimated 22 medium range bases in the Kola Peninsula, Barents Sea area, and Western and Central Russia, are directed at Britain, Scandinavia, Western Europe, North Africa and the Middle East.

In December 1960, reports came to the Western World that the Soviet Union is building a 3000 mile range missile base on the Kamchatka Peninsula, and the target area appears to be Communist China. It was alleged that Japanese intelligence authorities have aerial photographs of the project — identified as "K-1" by defence planners — which they say does not conform with the known pattern of other existing Soviet missile bases in Siberia. They also admit, significantly, that photographs of the Kamchatka and Lake Baikal bases are now six months old.

The Russian Economic Grip

The permanent Russian-China nexus is equally striking in the economic area. China's industrialisation programme, launched in 1953 with the first Five Year Plan, is clearly a joint enterprise.

While major development projects are being built in northern China, the Russians have been building new power and heavy industry areas in their Far East Provinces. Red China's vaunted new developments — the oil and chemical industries at Lanchow, the rebuilt iron and steel combine at Anshan, the new steel centre at Tai-yuan, the all-round build up at Harbin — are uniformly within the Russian orbit. Is it not reasonable to assume that if Chinese Communist leaders harboured dreams of autonomy, they would not have interwoven their new industrial plant so closely with the Siberian economy.

The development scheme to harness the power of the Amu River and its tributaries, the Argun and the Ussuri (which form a boundary between Siberia and Manchuria) ties China even more firmly to Russia. When completed, this immense complex may generate as much as 70,000 million kilowatt hours of electric energy a year, in ominous contrast to Red China's present total capacity of some 20,000 million Kilowatt hours. It will power the cities of Anshan, Mukden, Harbin, and Peking in China, and the province of Amur, part of Khabarovsk, plus the cities of Chita and Birobidzhan in Asiatic Russia.

The railroad building programme of China also shows convincingly that the Chinese economy is committed to a permanent linkage with Russia. Most of the new railways — with the notable exception of the Chekiang-Kiangsi line in Southern China — lead to the Soviet frontiers. The 1750 mile railroad from Lanchow to the Siberian border is almost complete. The Peking-Pastow line has been extended to Lanchow, thus providing rail communication from Peking to Russian Kazakstan, opening the whole rich northwest China to Russian economic penetration. Two other railroads link China to the Russian economy. One is the Central China line, the other a daring project across the desert of Outer Mongolia to the Irkutsk-Lake Baikal district of Siberia, where the main Soviet atom plants are located.

Soviet influence pervades all Manchuria behind the complacent front of Chinese officialdom. In the event of serious disagreement, Russia could swallow Manchuria with effortless ease.

Moscow's stranglehold on Communist China's economy is sustained by money and technical assistance. Chinese technical schools, despite an intense and rapid expansion, cannot supply more than one fifth of the skilled technicians required to develop her economy. The day when Red China will have a viable economic system is far off. It lacks facilities — despite fantastic claims of the "great leap forward" — to manufacture

heavy machinery, automobiles, tractors, locomotives, railroad rolling stock, aircraft, aluminium, copper products, most chemicals and nuclear products. These are pre-requisites for a modernised economy and most of them must still be imported from Soviet Russia or its satellite states. As for the war materiel, China's own arsenals can turn out only small arms and light artillery, all other military equipment must be purchased from the Soviets, or smuggled in through illicit trade.

Red China's military power and new modernised economy, in sum, are utterly dependent on Russia.

In August 1960, when the dispute between the two Powers was at its peak, reports came to the Western world of a mass exodus of Soviet technicians from China. It was estimated that within one ten day period alone, between 300 and 500 Russians left Peking for Moscow with their families at short notice on orders from the Soviet Embassy. In some instances the Chinese themselves expelled the Russians, claiming that they were trying to stir dissension among the communes. In other instances the Russians complained that they were expected not only to work on dams during the day, but also to lecture Chinese Communist groups at night.

To replace the Russian technicians, Peking tried to recruit friendly Polish technicians. This however, did not prove at all successful.

Since April 1961 however, Soviet technicians and advisers have been quietly re-entering China for the first time since the mass exodus. There is no reliable estimate of the number, but one Asian Embassy in Peking has reported to Hong Kong that in response to an enquiry, the Chinese Foreign Ministry officially confirmed that "a number of Soviet trail blazers, technical innovators, and geological prospecting workers" had recently been "welcomed to Peking". Their arrival has been associated with technical talks which were held in Peking last April when a new trade agreement was announced between Russia and China.

The Foreign Ministry added—in the familiar comradesly jargon, that "the arrival of Russian technicians testified to eternal and unbreakable Sino-Russian friendship, stronger than steel, and deeper than the sea". However, all evidence indicates that the Chinese, confronted with a critical food shortage and the need for concentrating on food production rather than expansion of heavy industry, are consolidating this development rather than pressing on at the initial breakneck speed of the "Great Leap Forward".

The return of the Soviet experts however, even though on a modest scale, stresses China's continued and vital dependence on Russian aid, which certainly was not made manifest with spectacular generosity in the new Sino-Soviet trade agreement.

Effects of the Dispute on Other Communist Nations

This "clash of the giants" has not passed without having some effect on other Communist nations. What follows now is a brief summary of these effects:—

Mongolia

When the Mongolian Peoples Republic was created in 1921 with the help of the Soviet Union, this marked the beginnings of the Soviet appropriation of Chinese border provinces. The independence of the state was fictitious from the very beginning. When the Japanese troops approached from Manchuria, Outer Mongolia was occupied in 1936 by Soviet troops on the grounds of a defence alliance. These Soviet troops continued to remain on her borders with strong armoured formations and aircraft, even after 1945. Since the trans-Siberian railway runs through the southern part of Outer Mongolia for a distance of 1550 miles and the country also flanks Manchuria and Sinkiang, its inclusion in the Soviet sphere of influence is of strategic importance. Its southern boundary with China, which passes through the Gobi Desert, stands wide open to Soviet expansionistic efforts.

Today Mongolia has new importance as a border state between Russia and China, a prize disputed between the two, and a potential Western listening post in the heart of Communist Asia. This is an importance that Mongolia has not enjoyed since the 13th Century, when Genghis

Khan's Mongol empire stretched from China's Yellow Sea to the Adriatic.

Despite its one-time glory, the Mongol Empire fell on evil times. Weakened by a series of epidemic diseases, their fiery spirit tempered by the gentle philosophy of Buddha, the Mongols became a subject people, pawns in the rivalry between the Russian czars and the Chinese emperors. The Chinese exerted nominal rule over the Mongols until 1911, when the Chinese Empire itself fell apart, and the Mongols announced their independence.

But no sooner had the Bolsheviks won control of Russia than they spurred a Red revolution in Mongolia. In 1921 Mongolia became the first Communist State ruled by a religious leader — the last Mongol "living Buddha", who was duly deposed three years later. Mongolia again became a virtual colony, this time of Stalin's Russia.

But even in their darkest days, the Chinese Communists never accepted this as a final solution of the Outer Mongolia problem. In 1937 Mao said: "When the people's revolution has been victorious in China, the Outer Mongolian Republic will automatically become part of the Chinese federation".

Mao's victory in China came just 11 years ago, and he promptly began reasserting China's claims to all the vast semi-autonomous borderlands that had come under Stalin's sway. Sinkiang and Manchuria were gradually taken over, as was Tibet seized and ruthlessly

suppressed. But Outer Mongolia, the only large area of one-time Chinese rule, has not returned to Peking — yet.

It was this rise of a new China, combined with Russia's drive to develop the "virgin lands" of neighbouring Siberia, which quickly brought new importance to Mongolia. In the past decade, the Soviets have poured in some 350 million dollars in credits, plus machinery and technicians. The Chinese moved in with another 115 million dollars, as well as thousands of labourers to perform those tasks — such as ditch digging — which the Mongols consider unworthy of men. The two rival's combined aid has amounted to a per capita total of 465 dollars in the past five years — more than Sino-Soviet aid to any other people.

With help from both its rival neighbours, Outer Mongolia has increased industrial production by more than half in the last three years. But this has not been accomplished without severe stresses and strains which have threatened to split the Mongolian Communist Party in half. The big showdown came in 1959 when a "conservative" faction of the Party openly opposed Premier Tsendenbal's drive for all-out industrialisation and his attempts to collectivise the nomad farmers and herdsmen. The "conservatives" argued that Soviet planners were pushing them too far too fast.

Tsendenbal won that fight, and he has held closely to the Soviet line ever since. Last July he heaped praises on Khrushchev (while never mentioning Mao's

aid) and pointedly came out in favour of Russian "co-existence doctrine". "Another war is not fatally inevitable", he declared in contrast to repeated Chinese assertions. "There is a possibility of avoiding it".

Now, as the West moves into this touchy arena of Communist power politics, one recalls an old legend of China; Whoever disturbs Mongolia's buried dragon eggs will release dragons upon the earth.

Sinkiang

The Soviet Union has always made more use of economic pressure and political intrigue than of armed force in Central Asia for extending her sphere of influence. Trade caravans as a rule, have proved far more useful than whole regiments of Cossacks. In this way Turkestan was drawn into the Russian sphere of influence some 80 years ago, and since that time, many frontier "adjustments" have followed.

One of the semi-autonomous borderlands that came under Stalin's influence was that of Sinkiang. This is not unnatural as the Soviet Union borders Sinkiang for a distance of some 1,000 miles. In Sinkiang, as in Tibet, the Chinese are an invading minority. Half a million Chinese are outnumbered by 4½ million hard-riding, xenophobic Moslem herdsmen, the Uighurs and Kazakhs.

It was not long after his victory over the Nationalists that Mao began to give Sinkiang his close attention. With only 65,000 Uighur and Kazakh party members, the Chinese Communists,

from the beginning relied not on persuasion but on the People's Liberation Army to lead Sinkiang through what the party called "its difficult period". In that period, landowners were dispossessed and shot, tight food rationing imposed, and 1,200 "incorrigibles" shunted into six big forced labour camps near Kuldja, Nilki, and Kunes.

When Peking proclaimed the "Great Leap Forward", Sinkiang, normally a pastoral land, was marked out for a big coal and steel centre at Kuldja. While grain rotted in the fields, and neglected herds died, farmers were dragged into factories, construction sites, and 451 communes.

Early in their occupation, the Chinese Reds wiped out Sinkiang's original Moslem leaders. Looking for someone else to lead them, the restive Moslems turned to one Abraim Aysaev, an Uighur regional official who had been thinking dangerous thoughts since returning from a Communist sponsored trip to Russia and the Middle East in 1958.

Discovered by the secret police early in 1959, Aysaev was summoned to the Party headquarters. That night, according to the Communists, he returned to his hotel and killed himself. Fearing public outcry, the Reds buried him without a funeral.

Since then, according to refugees from Sinkiang, who have made it to Hong Kong, Russian inspired and directed Moslem resistance has flickered across Sinkiang. The Russians of course, deny they have anything to do with the Sinkiang unrest.

From an economic point of view, Sinkiang is a most important region. It was here, in the northwest of the Province, that the Russians first found oil in 1937. Today, Chinese geologists have made rich new strikes. Karamai (reasonably close to the Soviet border) was disclosed by the Chinese Communists in 1956 and full production was achieved early in 1959 following completion of a 90-mile pipeline to the Tushantze refinery. Several other extensive oil basins have been located in Sinkiang which is fast becoming a major supplier of China's petroleum products.

Furthermore, it is in Sinkiang that the major part of China's nuclear research and development programme is being carried out — once again guided and directed by Russian technicians and "know-how".

A rich economic area such as this, with a people extremely hostile to the present Peking Government, could well provide the battleground for the two Communist giants.

Manchuria

The effort to win ice-free ports on the Pacific has made Manchuria the objective of Russian expansionism for the last 100 years. During China's era of weakness, Russia repeatedly succeeded in joining large areas of this province to her Siberian territory. Finally, Russia's push southwards led to a clash with Japan, who, for her part, regarded Manchuria and Korea as her own sphere of interest.

Contrary to her traditional strategy of withdrawal into the

depths of her vast expanses, Russia, this time misjudging the military strength of Japan, accepted open battle. The armies of the czar were badly beaten on the Yalu, and at Mukden, and his fleet sunk at Tsushima.

Following the Russian Revolution which occurred at the end of World War I, the United States prevented Japan from establishing herself east of Lake Baikal. The bill for this was presented at Pearl Harbour.

The Japanese attempted a camouflaged occupation of Manchuria in 1931 by the establishment of the "Empire of Manchuria". After their surrender in 1945, Manchuria was returned to China at the Yalta conference. Nevertheless the Soviet Union was conceded special rights: re-occupation of Port Arthur, use of the harbour of Darien, and control of the railway line leading to the latter point, which practically meant military control of the province.

Since that time, Mao has reached an agreement with Moscow on the railway. But any effort of the Soviet Union to widen the sphere of her political and economic influence in Manchuria — which is bounded on three sides by Siberia — will operate detrimentally to Moscow's relations with Peking.

Korea

If the reports now circulating are correct, General MacArthur would appear to be justified in claiming, as he did recently, that at the time of the Korean War the menace of Chinese Communism could have been eliminated without the use of nuclear

weapons. According to these reports, the Korean War was provoked by Mao Tse-tung against the wishes of Stalin.

It has always been General MacArthur's belief that Stalin would have made no move to save the Chinese Communists from defeat particularly as the United States then enjoyed a monopoly of nuclear weapons. The facts may never be known, but Stalin's consistent indifference towards the Chinese Communists is undoubtedly a factor in current Chinese Soviet tensions. Mao gained power in spite of, rather than with the help of, Moscow, and Khrushchev is probably right in accusing him of unwillingness to accept Soviet leadership.

Albania

Albania, the small Communist country (1½ million in 23,000 square miles) linking Yugoslavia and Western Greece, has quarrelled bitterly with Russia and come under Red Chinese influence. Details of the savage struggle between General Enver Hoxha and the Kremlin over the past year have only just been learned by the West.

Albania is now receiving financial credits, new factories and good supplies from China (despite the fact that China is undergoing a disastrous famine) and Chinese experts are replacing Russians in Tirana, the Albanian capital. China has also granted Albania a five year credit of 125 million dollars, though China itself owes the Soviet more than 300 million dollars for supplies it received last year. Not unnaturally, Mr.

Khrushchev is reported to be very, very angry with the Peking Government because of its constant failing to meet its commitments to Russia.

The crisis in Albanian food production has been at the bottom of the struggle. It is now known that in Moscow in November 1960, at a meeting of Communist leaders, Hoxha said: — "Only 15 days' supply of wheat remained in stock. After a delay of 45 days the Soviet Union promised us 10,000 tons instead of 50,000 tons. The Soviet rats were able to eat while the Albanian people were dying of hunger, and we were asked to produce gold".

In a personal attack on Khrushchev, Hoxha said: "You have distorted the theses of Lenin to suit your own purposes. The cult of personality does not apply only to Stalin". And Hoxha was one of Stalin's most fervent admirers.

Another aspect of the Soviet-Albanian dissension is said to be Soviet friendship for Yugoslavia, which Russia once hated and reviled for its "Communism in one country" policy. Hoxha resents Khrushchev's amity with Tito and fears some deal to Albania's disadvantage. From this common hatred of Yugoslavia stemmed the courtship of China and Albania.

The Chinese Communists regard the Yugoslavs as heretical Communists who are betraying the world revolution. The Albanians have been feuding with the Yugoslavs for centuries. Mr. Khrushchev, on the other hand, has been friendly with the

Jugoslav leader, Marshal Tito. The Chinese Communists charge that Mr. Khrushchev is not only too tolerant of "revisionism" within the Communist world, but is also too soft towards the capitalist countries.

The Effect of the Dispute on Communist World Propaganda Activities

Africa

Who would have forecast a few years ago that Russia and China would be locked in a battle for the soul of Africa? Yet, according to a report drafted by the British Foreign Office, that is what is happening now.

Superficially, Russia may seem to be winning hands down with its new economic agreement for Ghana and its support for Egypt, but the Chinese are far from sleeping.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry never fails to cable congratulations to each new African country as it emerges to full status. It is also first to invite the leaders of new African nations to China and to take full advantage of their anti-British statements. Africans, invited to inspect the Chinese homeland, are generally impressed with the industriousness of the country, the emancipation of women, and the organisation of agriculture and industry. Chairman Mao himself spares time cordially to greet the African visitors.

While China welcomes visitors from Africa, it has also taken a

positive role as far as possible in African affairs. The Chinese diplomatic mission, for example, is influential now in the running of Guinea. Chinese ambassadors are at work in Cairo, Rabat, and Khartoum, and the Sudan and Morocco are both fertile fields. Perhaps it is an ominous sign that Chinese troops, specially trained in desert warfare, are being mobilised in Shanghai.

Where China and Russia differ is in their interpretation of Marxist principles on the liberation of African countries. The Russians are content to see the former colonial territories develop on their present lines, without violent revolution. The Chinese are bitterly opposed to "capitalist" liberation movements, and think the non-capitalist world should withhold all aid from the struggling colonial powers. This is the main point of difference between Moscow and Peking as the Communist world plots its future relations with the West.

The Chinese feel that the African peoples will swing more certainly towards Communism if their first days as independent nations are difficult. As they suffer with the birth pains of independence, they will feel, China hopes, that their one true friend is Mao.

And all those votes in the United Nations Assembly would certainly be worth having as China plans her future, a future in which she hopes she will take over the leadership of Communism.

Latin America

In October 1960, Cuba established diplomatic relations with Red China. What did this act of recognition really mean? Primarily it opened the gate, already partly ajar through Russian efforts, to a new flood of Communist propaganda and plotting in the Americas. The instrument presumably will be the eager young Chinese Red agents who are already beginning to pour into Cuba.

Red newcomers are already distributing forms to the "Cuban Chinese" demanding information about relatives on the mainland — an obvious opening for blackmail which will turn every Chinese into an unwilling Red agent. Rumours are spreading that those who have been openly anti-Communist will be seized and deported to China.

The Reds have other weapons besides blackmail, all of which will be sharpened by the presence of a Red Embassy in Havana. As travel between Cuba and China becomes easier, the Chinese are starting to invite groups of students, workers and government officials to visit their country in the hope that they will come home to extol Chinese aims and accomplishments. The small-circulation weekly newspaper, "Kwong Wah Po" of Santiago de Cuba, has acquired new equipment and plans to expand. Hsinhua News Agency of Peking opened an office in Havana some months ago. Working hand in glove with Tass and Castro's Prensa Latina, it is spreading a propaganda news network over the hemisphere.

One of China's specific aims includes the building up of their almost non-existent trade with Cuba and ultimately with all of Latin America. The first step was the signing of a Trade Pact with Cuba last July (1961) exchanging Chinese products for half a million tons of Cuban sugar.

Having established their first diplomatic and economic foothold in Cuba, China is now pushing a propaganda offensive throughout the whole of South America — an era long regarded by Moscow as a Soviet preserve for Communist intrigue. There has been a sharp increase in the dissemination of Chinese propaganda in the Spanish language. Radio broadcasts beamed to Latin America have been amplified in Portuguese as well as Spanish. The official Communist Chinese news service, the New China News Agency, is now represented in Cuba, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Uruguay. The number of visiting delegations from Latin America has exceeded for the first time Peking-invited pilgrims from all other parts of the free world.

Western intelligence authorities believe, also, that an institute has been established in Peking to train Latin American Communists, agents and cadres in the Maoist technique of infiltration and subversion.

During the first six months of this year (1961) Latin American countries have sent no fewer than 59 delegations to China. In the same six months the Chinese sent nine delegations to Latin America compared with seven for the whole of 1959.

Chinese trade-aid delegations are now openly competing against their Soviet counterparts. Peking's clear aim is to displace Moscow as the centre of World Communism and to replace Khrushchev with Mao as its guiding light.

Conclusion

The strategic position of the Soviet Union in Asia is dependent on the strength of her political position. As long as Communist China stands with her, the Soviet Union is well nigh invincible in Asia, militarily.

The combined military potential of these two Great Powers is almost unlimited in respect of men and raw materials. The Soviet armament industry on both sides of the Urals is adequate for the demands of a long war, and the Asian way of life is better suited for modern war than the Western. The operational basis for a land war in Asia does not exist in the cities but in an element which is immune to the influence of an adversary — the enormous territorial expanse which offers the defender unlimited freedom of manoeuvre with all the advantages of the internal lines of supply, and renders illusory any blitzkrieg methods on the part of the attacker.

It is conceivable that the expansion of Soviet power in the Far East — perhaps even the world — has reached its zenith, and that in the not too distant future there will be a shift of power from Soviet Russia to Red China. Already the first basic moves have been made.

China aims to remove all Western influence from the mainland of Asia — as she has already done from her own mainland. Her further aim appears to be to dominate Asia, not to conquer other countries by military operations, but to get them to look to Peking by means of ideological and political graduations of pressure. Mao Tse-tung has said that during his lifetime China will not commit military aggression beyond her legal frontiers, but it is just a matter of agreement about where those legal frontiers lie.

Last November Khrushchev's policy of "peaceful co-existence" received support from the majority of Communist nations. He may be given unanimous support in the coming October Communist Party Congress. But the Chinese only paid lip service to the previous agreement, and they are in no friendlier mood now. Last July, China's Liu promised the crowds in Peking's Square of Heavenly Peace, that Mao's "absolutely correct leadership would end in victory. We can triumph by our own unaided efforts, despite the great difficulties we face". This is obvious defiance of Moscow.

At the latter end of July, Khrushchev struck back. He not only played host to the leaders of North Vietnam and North Korea — both of whom owe their posts to Chinese military intervention against the West — but he joined Korea's Kim Ill Sung in signing a mutual defence treaty, making it plain that Russia and not China was to be the guardian of Asian Communism.

By summoning the Asian Communist leaders to Moscow, moreover, Khrushchev effectively prevented them from attending a rival attraction, the celebration of the 40th Anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party. Nor did Russia bother to send any delegation to Peking. Instead, Moscow's chief of liaison with foreign Communist

parties, Suslov, flew to Outer Mongolia to help celebrate the Communist 14th Anniversary there.

The struggle for the soul of the Communist movement still goes on. It is inevitable that one day — perhaps in the foreseeable future — these “giants of world revolution” must clash militarily.

COMPETITION FOR AUTHORS

The Board of Review has awarded first place and the prize of £5 for the best original article published in the November issue to “Training in the CME”, by Major H. L. Bell, Royal Australian Infantry.

WHAT IT TAKES

ESSENTIALS OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Major Thoug Htaik, Burma Army

Reprinted from the August 1961 issue of the Military Review, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, USA

UNCONVENTIONAL warfare demands unconventional thinking. What follows are some ideas for those who would want to counter the unconventional elements and guerrillas in any country. They are unconventional ideas; they may seem erratic to those unable to think beyond the narrow grooves of conventional training; they may even be revolting to those for whom unquestioning obedience is all-important.

But let us start with the assumption that, when one is faced with a ruthless and unscrupulous enemy, it is courting disaster to talk about chivalry, about international law, about Geneva Conventions. True, the ends do not always justify the means, but it is equally true that very often they do, especially in this world of Realpolitik. More often than not it is the results which count rather than what and how you do it. Accomplishment of mission is important for any military commander, but for the Special Forces commander this should be the overriding factor to which he should subordinate everything

else. For him an assigned mission is an ultimate goal. He cannot afford to fail: a Special Forces commander with a record of failures has lost his usefulness.

To say that the end may justify the means does not necessarily mean that one must employ dirty or underhanded methods. It merely means that in the execution of orders, intelligent interpretation and vigorous application are essential. Blind obedience has no place here. Befehl ist Befehl (order is order) surely will lead to disaster in special operations.

Qualities

A Special Forces commander may seem to be deviating from the path that would logically be taken by those who are carrying out the order "to the letter". Indeed, he may even violate the order when there is no other way of accomplishing his mission than to embark upon a course of action that inevitably involves breach of orders. Yet in so doing he may well be doing exactly what his superior would want him to do, but due to the nature

of the operations could not foresee.

Surely, no one will question the importance of obedience in military discipline. And there should be no exception to the principle of obedience to orders — although it would always be more appropriate and useful to speak of intelligent obedience to orders. In this respect the problem of the independently operating subordinate can be made easier by giving mission-type orders, leaving wide latitude to the subordinate in carrying out his mission. Tell him what to do and not how. Thus we can eliminate the element of "disobedience with good intention".

The relationship of Field Marshal (then General) Sir William Slim and General Stilwell in the Burma Campaign is illuminating here. Stilwell, although he was at that time Commander in Chief of the Chinese forces in Burma, Commanding General of the (US) China-Burma-India Theatre and also Deputy Supreme Commander of the (Combined) Southeast Asia Command, had agreed to put himself under the operational control of General Slim until his (Stilwell's) forces got to Kamaing, in northern Burma. Slim, the (British) 14th Army Commander, knowing Stilwell's temperament, gave as few orders as possible. When Stilwell was about to pass from Slim's command he said to him: "Well, General, I've been a good subordinate to you. I obeyed all your orders!" To which Slim retorted: "Yes, you old devil, but only because the few I did give you were the ones you wanted!"

Unconventional Leaders

Stilwell was indeed the kind of unconventional soldier who is most successful in special operations. It is hardly a coincidence that almost all the known experts in this type of warfare are themselves unconventional in the truest sense of the word. Orde Wingate, for instance, reputedly kept a grease-stained tunic around to put on at the special occasions when he would meet senior officers, as a way to show his indifference to them. He was laughed at and scorned when he vehemently expounded his unconventional theories.

Lawrence of Arabia, a non-conformist in more than one way, was similarly criticised when he refused to attack the Turks on the traditional lines and resorted to guerrilla fighting. But Lawrence had shrewdly perceived that the enemy's weakest link was supplies and that the Arabs' main objective, therefore, had to be the war materials which were so scarce and precious in the Turkish Army. With uncanny appreciation, Lawrence saw that, in the face of an enemy with overwhelming manpower but relatively few supplies, one must strike at the supplies. Ironically, if in such a situation one seeks to reduce the enemy's troop strength, this even ameliorates his problems because he will have fewer mouths to feed. On the other hand, if you cut his supply lines and if you destroy his stores, you are hitting him where it hurts the most.

Excessive control and centralised supervision are difficult to reconcile with such operations.

An illustration of this may be seen in the tragic raid on Tobruk by the British during World War II. The plan originally was to raid Tobruk by Commandos with the help of Long-Range Desert Groups. As this plan was reviewed by higher headquarters, it was modified successively and air, naval, and marine elements were added to the original Commandos. Eventually, there evolved the concept of an amphibious rail together with a ground attack by Commandos. Yet the whole operation ended in failure. The high-level plan proved too rigid in operation.

So the first essential in special type operations is to choose commanders who have, above anything else, abundant qualities of resourcefulness, initiative, and quickness of decision, and to give them the widest latitude in the execution of their missions.

Importance of Special Training

Thorough special training is another essential. By special training is meant that type which would yield best results in a particular area under particular conditions. Needless to say, the area in which troops are trained should, as nearly as possible, resemble the area in which you are going to operate. Thus Wingate's training at Ramgarh paid good results in Burmese jungles. In this sense each unit for special operations needs unique training for each particular operation. The nature of this training will depend upon the unit, and upon time and facilities available. Some military

figures (including some fairly prominent ones) hold that Special Forces are superfluous and wasteful, and that they are detrimental to esprit de corps. This is a question that can be argued either way. Rather, one needs to bear in mind that this is an age of specialisation and that amateurs are always bound to fail when pitted against specialists. The truth of this conclusion was borne out time and again by brilliant successes of Special Forces units in World War II.

Let me give a few examples of special training that proved successful. Before the raid on Tobruk, the British brought in some military personnel who were fluent in German — most of them natives of Germany who had become refugees from that country. These men were given special training by German-speaking officers. They always wore real German issue uniforms, even to their underwear and socks; any cigarettes or chocolate they carried were German; and they were not allowed to speak to their officers except in German. When they marched it was in the German manner, with hands swinging across the body, and they saluted in the fashion of the German Army. Eventually, these men — acting and, indeed, almost feeling themselves to be German soldiers — passed through the gates of Tobruk, completely deceiving the enemy at the gates. Comparable training had been received by Skorzeny's raiders who operated behind the United States lines during the Battle of the Bulge:

They were not only attired but acted and talked as if they were part of the United States Army.

The second essential in special operations is the training peculiar to each operation and its particular conditions. The unit and the men must not only be equipped and armed to suit the type of raid or operation, but the composition of the unit also should be tailored to the special needs and the training be designed for the particular occasion.

Exploitation of Local Guerrillas

Last, but by no means least, guerrillas should be exploited to the fullest. Current doctrine taught at US service schools is that success of military plans should never be made dependent upon the accomplishment of missions assigned to the guerrillas. This approach is, of course, based entirely on conventional military thinking; to me, as a citizen and soldier of an Asian nation, it carries an implication of lack of appreciation of the potential of guerrillas.

It is true that it is an ideal not to depend upon foreign elements and carry success by one's own forces alone. It is also true that US troops are likely to be far better equipped and better trained and armed than the guerrillas. But this is no reason to underestimate the guerrillas. When you are facing an enemy who exploits guerrillas to the fullest in areas most suitable for guerrilla warfare, and who regards guerrillas as one major element of his armed forces, this

underestimation of guerrillas may bring disastrous results. In many places it has already brought such results. Perhaps the best example here is the recent Cuban debacle. It has been reported that great reliance was placed upon a popular uprising against Fidel Castro and that the invasion itself was undertaken to take pressure off the guerrillas in the Escambray Mountains. Yet it is also reported that nothing was done to get full co-operation of the local guerrillas. This lack of co-operation between the invasion forces and the local guerrillas was, in all likelihood, one of the causes of the failure of the whole venture.

The third essential of special operations is, then, the fullest utilisation of friendly guerrillas whenever they are present. It should be added that even where they are not present, if there is any sign of guerrilla potential, trusted indigenous people should be organised and trained as guerrillas. Whenever possible, these guerrilla activities should be well co-ordinated by Special Forces liaison teams who live and fight with the local guerrillas. It also would be a great advantage for a regular soldier to turn into and fight as a guerrilla whenever cut off or purposely left behind the enemy lines by his unit.

Summary

Essentials of special operations may be summarised briefly as follows:

1. Leaders for special operations should be chosen for their

- resourcefulness, initiative, and quickness of decision.
2. Each special operation needs unique training, equipment, weapons, and organisation
3. Unconventional forces should make maximum use of friendly guerrillas.
- specially tailored for the particular undertaking.
-

No Communist Government can derive its support from the workers and peasants, whose interests are opposed to the professional revolutionaries and career politicians. Every Communist Government, without a single exception, derives its support from the secret police. Lenin has said well, "Force and hatred are the twin foundations of the Soviet power". It is truer than he knew when he said it.

— Lin Yutang.



A TOUCH OF THUNDER, by Brian Cooper (William Heinemann Ltd., 317 Collins Street, Melbourne).

In 1942 a Japanese army conquered Burma and advanced to the eastern frontier of India. In August the Indian Congress Party, at a meeting in Bombay, demanded the immediate grant of full independence. Following the arrest of the Congress leaders widespread disorders occurred throughout the country.

Taking these facts as a background, the author of this book has constructed a thrilling cloak and dagger story about the security of the communications of the army facing the Japanese on the frontier. As the tension caused by arrests spreads through the country, the Area Intelligence Officer and his friend the District Police Superintendent become aware of the existence of some sort of a plot in their zone of responsibility.

At an early stage in their investigations the IO complicates his already harassed life by getting married. Fortunately this rash act leads to a clue which points to the disruption of rail communications as the principal objective of the conspirators. From that point the story unfolds with many unexpected

twists and turns, and the introduction of numerous colourful characters from which the reader may make his own attempt to pick the villains. And, if he feels like undertaking a bit of sabotage himself, he may find out how to make a satisfactory explosive from easily obtainable materials.

Besides being a thriller in the best traditions of the breed, this book gives an insight into the different motives which move men — and women — to desperate deeds.

— E.G.K.

MARSHAL FOCH — A STUDY IN LEADERSHIP, by Lieutenant Colonel T. M. Hunter, Historical Section, Army Headquarters, Ottawa, Canada (The Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery Ottawa. Cat. No. DA3-4361, price \$1.50).

This analysis of the leadership of Marshal Foch, who was Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies on the Western Front in the closing months of World War I, is one of a series of military history studies produced by the Historical Section of Canadian Army Headquarters for their Directorate of Military Training. Like the other volumes in the series, this one is a model of composition and presentation, well printed and adequately

mapped. Its modest price brings it within the reach of everyone interested in the art of military leadership.

Ferdinand Foch was 19 years of age and at school when the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 broke out. Foch promptly enlisted in the infantry, but the war was over before he saw active service. Nevertheless, the bad training methods to which he had been subjected taught him one valuable lesson which he never forgot — "What is required of leaders is that they should command".

After the war Foch returned to his studies but soon answered a call for officers for the new army which France was beginning to form. Commissioned in the artillery in 1874, he served through the usual run of regimental and minor staff postings before entering the Ecole Supérieure de Guerre in 1885. Except for brief tours of regimental duty, Foch spent the next 25 years of his life at the School, first as a student, then as instructor and chief instructor, and finally as Commandant. During this period he advanced in rank from captain to brigadier-general and wrote his two military classics — "The Principles of War" and "The Conduct of War".

The outbreak of World War II in 1914 found Foch in command of an army corps which he handled with such skill that he was quickly promoted to the command of an army. His natural tenacity and fighting spirit, reinforced by years of in-

tellectual preparation, enabled him to play a prominent, perhaps decisive, role in the hectic operations which finally halted the first great German onslaught. When the Germans made their second attempt to envelop the allies' left, Foch was made Assistant to the French Commander-in-Chief and sent to "co-ordinate the actions of the allied armies on the northern wing". With this nebulous directive as his only authority, Foch, by sheer force of personality, indomitable courage and rapidity of decision, succeeded in securing sufficient co-ordination to defeat the German movement.

Throughout the bitter years of 1916 and 1917 many attempts to establish a unified allied command failed for various reasons. In March 1918 the Germans broke the long stalemate on the Western Front with a powerful assault which threatened to split the British and French armies. This crisis forced the allied leaders to accept the principle of unified command and Foch, who was at that time Chief of the French General Staff, was appointed Commander-in-Chief. The Germans followed up their initial success with four more great offensives in rapid succession. During this period — from March 18 to mid-July — the allied cause was in a state of continuous crisis. Some at least of the allied leaders began to lose heart. But not Foch. Handling his reserves with superb skill, sometimes in the face of opposition from his two chief subordinates, he always managed to have enough strength at the critical point to halt the Ger-

man assault before irreparable damage had been done.

When the German effort finally spent itself in July, Foch turned to the counter-offensive. His skill in reconciling the conflicting national interests of his subordinates without abandoning his own intentions, carried his offensive through a series of co-ordinated blows to final victory on November 11th. The supreme moment of his professional life came when he faced the German armistice delegation in his train in the Forest of Compiegne—

"It was the best day in my life. When I saw them in front of me on the other side of the table, I said to myself: 'There is the German Empire'. I can assure you I was a proud man".

This is by far the best biography of Foch that I have read. While concentrating on the professional affairs, the author gives us enough details of Foch's private life to bring the man alive. His compelling personality, his powerful intellect and his deep piety, stand out from the pages like a sharply-etched portrait. Foch himself maintained that the personality of the commander was the all-important factor in the conduct of war. Few authors could have shown the application of this factor so well as Colonel Hunter.

—E.G.K.

THE GRAVE OF THE TWIN HILLS, by Bowen Hosford (William Heinemann Ltd., London and 317 Collins Street, Melbourne).

Perhaps the Western mind will never quite understand the

philosophy of the Japanese, but few who read this book could deny that the author has tried to help towards such an understanding. Alton Burrage had flown many a wartime mission over Japan, and he is now returning there as a newspaper reporter. Burrage's twin brother had been shot down over Japan, and Burrage himself carries the scars of one of his missions.

The scar in his soul, however, is more sensitive than any physical scar, so that his mind is clouded by a black hatred. As the story unfolds, Burrage discovers that some Japanese villagers outside Yamato had erected a memorial to an unknown American airman. Burrage visits the village, and writes a story about the memorial that is to be read internationally.

During his stay in Japan he meets Amiko, eventually falls in love with her, and from her learns the secret of the grave of the Twin Hills. His experiences and his now found love help to salve the scars in his soul, as he moves slowly towards a fuller understanding of the Japanese.

— W.J.G.

CHILDREN OF THE ASHES, by Robert Junck (William Heinemann Ltd., 317 Collins Street, Melbourne).

Much has been written about and around this subject of the first atomic bomb; in the first instance by people close to the happening in both time and space.

This appreciation by Robert Junck, an Austrian by birth, and

now a citizen of the United States, was written after two visits to Hiroshima, one in 1957 and the second in 1959.

The author has stated that he aims in his writings to be "something between the historian, who is often slow to catch the most of our fast moving times, and the newspaper reporter, who rarely has the time to concentrate more exclusively on one subject". He has achieved his aim in this book, which is an excellent review of a disaster new to mankind.

His research into events and his sifting of a mass of eyewitness reports, has resulted in him concentrating on three survivors in contrast: Kazou M., a boy of imagination and integrity who was driven by his experience into a hatred of life which ultimately led to the committing of a senseless murder; Icharo Kawamoto, who is, now that Hiroshima has become a boom city, one of the few who devote themselves to the cure of those still suffering from radiation sickness and other ill-effects of the Bomb, and frail, crippled, but still beautiful, Tokie Uematsu, who did not dare marry the man she loved for fear that their descendants might be genetically affected.

Probably because of the scope of the subject, this book is not an easy one to read, requiring a degree of concentration beyond that which one is usually prepared to give to books of this type. However, this is a book to read, if one really wishes to give serious thought to the many

varied aspects and implications of man's investigations and inventions in the atomic field.

—Major W. C. Newman.

A HISTORY OF JAPAN, 1334-1615, by George Sansom. (The Cresset Press, 11 Fitzroy Square, London, W.1, and William Heinemann Ltd., 317 Collins Street, Melbourne.)

This is the second volume of Sir George Sansom's History of Japan. The first volume, published in 1959, traces the development of Japanese society from the earliest times to 1334. This second volume carries the story forward to 1615. The third will take it to Commodore Perry's visit in 1854 when the long period of Japanese isolation ended.

This volume describes the rise of a new feudal system from the ruins of the ancient order. Since this was a particularly turbulent period in Japanese history, much of it is taken up with the rise and fall of great feudal families, and with excellent descriptions of the military operations in the incessant civil wars. At the same time, Sir George is deeply concerned with the institutional and economic developments which, despite the political disorders, took place during this period and formed the basis of future progress.

This scholarly work is intended for the student of oriental history rather than for the person who wants nothing more than a brief outline of the history of Japan. The outline, of

course, will give us no more than a little shallow and restricted knowledge. If we want to *understand* the peoples who live in the same part of the world as we do, it is to scholars like Sir

George Sansom that we must turn for guidance. To the serious student of Japan, this book comes as an authoritative addition to the literature on the subject. —E.G.K.

AN OFFICER'S SERVANT

THE first private soldier I knew well has remained in my mind as the "typical good soldier". McA— became my batman when I joined a battalion in the South African War and went straight out on trek. He took complete charge of my personal comfort and within an hour had gone through my equipment with an experienced eye and named several articles of which I was deficient — a mug for shaving water was one, I remember. He produced them the same evening. I inquired whence he had conjured them; we were out on the veldt many miles from any shop or habitation. He merely said: "There they are, sir, that's all you need to know, and you needn't be afraid to find your friends missing them". I never asked questions again.

My bivouac shelter when we reached camp was always pitched in the best spot, the only difficulty was when it was so obviously the best place that a senior officer claimed it. Presently I was put in charge of the battalion machine-gun and told to obtain a pony to ride with it if possible. McA— procured both pony and forage (the procurement involved a possibly nefarious transaction with the Australian troops who formed part of the column). He was an intelligent man, a marksman, and had a clean character sheet, so I asked him why he had not gone in for promotion. Too much trouble and responsibility was his only explanation. He was time expired at the end of the South African War, and I never saw him again. In the 1914-18 War he came back to the Army at once, and finding that men of his knowledge were invaluable, he accepted the responsibility of rank and was a company sergeant-major when he was killed at Loos.

— F.M. Earl Wavell, "The Good Soldier", 1948.