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FRONTISPIECE

On 21st July, 1942, a Japanese force landed in the Gona-Buna area on the north-eastern coast of New Guinea, overcame the small Australian garrison, and advanced on Port Moresby across the Owen Stanley range to Imita Ridge where it was finally halted on 17th September. In an arduous and costly counter-offensive, Australian troops drove the Japanese back across the Owen Stanleys to their base area around Buna where American troops joined in the fighting.

The reduction of the strongly fortified Japanese positions proved a slow and costly operation. The enemy fought desperately for every yard of ground in an area which imposed severe disadvantages on the attack. To support the infantry, light tanks of the Royal Australian Armoured Corps were brought into the battle. These lightly-armoured tanks were unsuitable for this type of operation, but they were the heaviest vehicles which could be brought to the front with the means available.

Despite the unsuitability of their vehicles and the terrain, the tank crews gave effective support to the infantry and made a major contribution to final victory.

The picture shows tanks and infantry in action near Giropa Point.

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Photo Australian War Memorial Canberra

Giropa Point

AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

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COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE 81 m.m. MORTAR SECTION

Edited by
Lieutenant-Colonel I. B. Ferguson
Royal Australian Infantry

This article does not represent official policy. A programme for the evaluation of the organisation and handling of the Pentropic Division has been prepared at Army Headquarters, and the problem stated in this article is one of the many to be examined. Constructive contributions of this type are valuable and will be considered during the progress of the evaluation.

— Editor.

AUTHORSHIP of this paper is purely nominal in that its conclusions represent the views of a group which has been fortunate enough to have been able to study the tactical problems inherent in the introduction of 81 mm mortars to the pentropic infantry battalion.

(a) The proposals made in this paper are based on the assumption that a need was felt for company commanders to be guaranteed the immediate and intimate support of mortars, hence the allocation to each company of two mortars.

(b) If this is conceded it is submitted that such a decentralisation of mortars tends to isolate mortar support to individual companies. This makes it difficult to explain the obvious advantages of concentrated fire power inherent in centralised command and control, even though official policy recognises the need for centralised control of mortars under various conditions and suggests its means for bringing it about.

Organisation

Within the infantry battalion there are 16 81 mm mortars. These were originally allotted on the basis of six organised as a platoon and the remainder allotted at the scale of two per rifle company.

The introduction of the 81 mm mortar as part of the battalion support weapons group will provide the battalion commander with a tremendous increase in fire power more than equivalent to that of a light

battery. The characteristics of the 81 mm mortar make it an adjunct to the field artillery. The advantages of this additional fire power, however, will not be attained unless the command and control of the mortars is centralised at the highest possible level. This is the overriding principle in the employment of artillery and should be applied within the limitations of range and communications to the handling of the 81 mm mortar.

Command in this sense relates to the mortar. It means that the sub-unit or unit commanding mortars placed under its command, has the authority to move and deploy these mortars to suit its own purpose. Control on the other hand relates to the bomb and means control of fire.

To achieve centralised command and control all the mortars should be grouped under one command. This would entail the formation of a mortar company within the battalion.

Ammunition

- (a) Regardless of the final organisation adopted, the characteristic of a high rate of fire of the mortar presents an ammunition re-supply problem which is aggravated by the permanent allocation of mortar sections to companies.
- (b) Any reorganisation of the battalion mortars which takes account of the centralisation of control of mortar fire and reduces the number of widely dispersed fire units would have the advantage of:

- (i) making the best use of ammunition available.
- (ii) reducing the purely physical aspects of re-supply.

Fire Unit

To achieve more efficient neutralisation and to simplify control, the fire unit should be at least 4-6 mortars. Six mortars, however, is the maximum number that one command post could be expected to effectively control. It follows therefore that the battalion mortars should be grouped into platoons of four to six mortars.

Present Organisation

Based on the present figure of 16 mortars, it would be possible to achieve centralised command and control by grouping the battalion mortars into two platoons of six mortars and one of four. This could be achieved without materially affecting the existing battalion establishment by making use of the platoon commanders of the weapons platoons in rifle companies to command and control the three mortar platoons. This solution would provide an interim answer to the soundest tactical employment of 16 mortars.

This still presents an unbalanced organisation which would create difficulties in deployment brought about by the varying sizes of fire units, thus the total number of mortars should be increased to 18 or decreased to 12.

Eighteen mortars would present command and control problems for little gain in fire sup-

port. Twelve mortars would be preferable for the following reasons:—

- (a) Platoons of four mortars would be easier to control.
- (b) The protection, camouflage and selection of base-plate positions would be simplified.
- (c) A platoon of four mortars will provide a saving in personnel to provide command post staffs which are essential to centralised fire control.

There would be little appreciable loss in fire power.

Proposed Organisation

Assuming 12 mortars to be the ideal number, then to achieve economy in mortars and ammunition, and maximum flexibility in fire-power, the following organisation is recommended:—

- (a) *Company Headquarters* providing a Fire Direction Centre (FDC) and five Mobile Fire Controller's parties, each comprising one Mobile Fire Controller and two signallers available for use by each of the companies.
- (b) *Three platoons* of four 81 mm mortars, each Platoon Headquarters providing a small command post.

Observation

Although the fire power of the mortars may be centralised it may be desirable to place some guaranteed fire power at the disposal of company commanders by allotting mortars at priority call. To provide for this and also to ensure effective observation

over the battalion location, it will be necessary to provide for Mobile Controllers on a scale of one per company.

Communications

Wireless

Wireless communications will provide the key to centralised and flexible fire support. Two wireless nets within the company will suffice:—

- (a) *Company Net*
 - (i) *Control*
Fire Direction Centre.
 - (ii) *Sub-stations*
Platoon command posts. Company commander (at Battalion Headquarters working with Commanding Officer Field Regiment). All Mobile Fire Controllers.
- (b) *Three platoon nets*
 - (i) *Control*
Platoon command post.
 - (ii) *Sub-station*
Mobile Fire Controllers (who have been allotted mortars).
- (c) A possible wireless diagram is shown at Figure 1.

Line

The amount of line laid at any one time will depend upon such factors as the ground and distances involved, and the time the mortars are likely to remain in one position. Depending on these factors some or all of the following lines may be laid:—

- (a) *Administration lines.* Line linking the Fire Direction Centre, platoon positions, and the Battalion command post through an exchange at the Fire Direction Centre.

- (b) *Company Fire-orders line.* An omnibus circuit connecting the Fire Direction Centre and the platoon positions. This circuit is reserved for fire orders.
- (c) *Observation Post lines.* The observation post should normally be connected by line direct to its own platoon positions. The Observation Post line may alternatively be laid to the exchange at the Fire Direction Centre.

Duties of Officers

Company Commander. The company commander's primary duties are:—

- (a) To arrange for the fire of his company to be produced when and where it is required.
- (b) To command his company provided that his platoons have not been grouped for some specific operation.
- (c) To allot his platoons to companies in support or at priority call, as directed by the battalion commander.
- (d) He is responsible for the deployment of his company in accordance with the requirements laid down by the battalion commander.

Company Second-in-Command. The main duties of the company second-in-command are:—

- (a) To supervise the supply and replenishment of ammunition.
- (b) To act as the company commander's deputy in the base plate area(s).
- (c) In deployment, he selects the three platoon positions and the Fire Direction

Centre within the area allotted by the company commander.

Command Post Officer (CPO). The Command Post Officer is responsible for the organisation and control of the Fire Direction Centre. In deployment he is responsible for bringing the three platoons of the company on to a grid for link shooting as soon as possible, so that their fire can be controlled as one unit.

The Platoon Commander. He commands the mortars of his platoon in action. In deployment he is responsible for the detailed reconnaissance of the platoon position within the area allotted by the Company Second-in-Command. He is responsible for technical duties concerned with fire control and establishes a platoon command post for this purpose.

The Advance

General

When a company of mortars in action is ordered to advance, it may do so either:—

- (a) as a whole, or
 (b) by platoons, with one or more platoons remaining in action while the remainder move.

Method (b) will be normal in order to provide continuous support.

Reconnaissance

Observation Posts. The control of observation and the deployment of Observation Posts or Mobile Fire Controllers will be planned by the company commander. The composition of the advance guard will include the

necessary number of Mobile Fire Controller parties to ensure adequate fire support.

Mortar Areas. Reconnaissance must be carefully planned and must be continuous throughout the advance. Positions must be prepared as close behind the leading infantry as possible, so that as much range as possible is gained by each move.

In a rapid advance, although reconnoitred, base plate positions may not be occupied until fire is required. Alternatively it may be necessary to "leap-frog" platoons forward. The company commander with the assistance of leading Mobile Fire Controller must plan the movement of his mortars with great care so that necessary fire power is always available.

The Attack

Control

Fire power is the main contribution of any support weapon in this phase of war. Centralised control of fire power will provide for concentration of fire and also flexibility, that is, the ability to transfer a great weight of fire from one point to any other. It will, however, be necessary to retain a proportion of mortars on call to assault companies to answer impromptu calls for fire. This will be done by allotting a platoon or section at priority call to the attacking companies, together with the necessary Mobile Fire Controllers.

Such fire-units allotted at priority call will be superimposed on the attack fire plan in such a way that if they are lifted to answer an impromptu call for

fire, no gap will result in the fire plan. They would also normally be the fire unit moved forward for re-organisation.

Command

The mortars of the battalion should be grouped under centralised command and deployed by the company commander in such a position or positions that no further movement is necessary during the assault stages of the attack.

Fire Plans

The company commander must maintain the closest liaison with the artillery commander to ensure that the guns and mortars are fully integrated in the attack fire plan.

Observation

The company commander must plan his observation to cater for registration of targets and subsequent observation throughout all stages of the attack. This will entail the deployment of static or "anchor observation posts" to watch the fire plan and the provision of Mobile Fire Controllers with forward companies.

Defence

Control

The same considerations of centralised control of fire apply in defence except that where frontages are large some decentralisation down to platoons may have to be accepted on account of range. This should be avoided where possible.

Defensive Fire Plans

The mortar defensive fire plan must be closely co-ordinated by

the artillery and mortar commanders. Where possible defensive fire plans should be pre-planned to bring down a specified weight of fire from the maximum number of fire-units without delay.

Observation

Mortar observation posts must be deployed to cover the front and sited to provide the maximum depth to observation throughout the battalion locality.

Ideally all mortar observation posts should be capable of calling for fire from all fire-units within range. The platoon and company wireless nets provide this facility.

Withdrawal

The principles of control at the highest level, and the movement of fire-units by "leap-frogging" to provide for continuous support applies to the withdrawal phase in the same manner as the Advance.

Summary

The characteristics of the 81 mm mortar will give a battalion commander the facility of close and intimate fire support equivalent to that of a field regiment,

provided that the weapon is handled correctly. Concentration and flexibility should be the underlying principles followed in the tactical employment of this mortar.

Concentration and flexibility can only be achieved by re-grouping the battalion mortars to give centralised command and control over their movement and firepower.

Even though the mortars are centralised for control of fire power, company commanders can still be guaranteed a minimum of the fire of two mortars whenever desired. However, with centralised control and its inherent economy and flexibility a greater weight of fire support can normally be anticipated than by the use of isolated mortar sections.

This paper has outlined a possible way of achieving this. Although no attempt has been made to show how this would be possible technically, it can be done in the same way as it was possible with the 4.2 in. mortar. On a similar scale, the fire control method used would be basically no different to "link shooting" three separate sections under the old organisation.

Encirclement Methods

in

Guerrilla Warfare

Major Thoung Htaik, Burma Army

Reprinted from the June 1961 issue of **MILITARY REVIEW**, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, U.S.A.

"GUERRILLA" is a word greatly misunderstood in the West. Although it frequently has been used in military terminology, guerrillas and guerrilla warfare never have received the attention they deserve. Faced now by an overwhelming series of Communist successes based on clever application of guerrilla principles and forces, the West no longer can delay giving its closest attention to this form of warfare.

Between the Indian wars and the retaking of the Philippine Islands in World War II the US Army had little opportunity to get to know the guerrilla and his ways. But lack of experience and historical neglect do not diminish the importance and complexities of guerrilla warfare. They work together to make it more difficult to catch up.

US Army doctrine and field manuals are vague on the subject of guerrilla warfare but a large body of useful information may be found in the writings of Sun Tzu, Lenin, Marx, Khrushchev, Guevara, and Mao. Without understanding the positive aspects of guerrilla theory and operations set forth by these

practitioners, it would be futile to attempt to develop anti-guerrilla methods, into which category encirclement tactics fall.

Tactics Unchanged

In sketching the essential elements of Communist practice that are relevant to an examination of encirclement tactics, this article stresses the teachings of Mao and the actions of the Chinese Communists for the simple reason they have refined the theory and brought it to its present high state of development. Red Chinese forces also would pose the greatest guerrilla threat to allied forces in any future international conflict.

The present-day Red Chinese Army has its roots in guerrilla organization and tactics. Mao Tse-tung admitted that "The Chinese Red Army was born after the failure of the first great revolution, starting as guerrilla units". More often than not the Chinese Reds have adopted guerrilla type warfare as their principal form of combat. After 10 months of anti-Japanese war, Mao's directive to the 8th Route Army was "... basically guerrilla warfare, but lose

no chance for mobile warfare under favourable conditions".

Indeed, the Chinese have reverted to such tactics whenever they have faced a stronger enemy, which would be the situation should they make war against the United States. The following excerpt shows that as recently as the Korean Conflict they had not changed their tactics.

When (the Turks) could hold out no longer, they backed away slowly. The road climbs a canyon which narrows at the top. As the Turks backed down it, Chinese fired from across the canyon and from above the road on the same side. Going up, the Turks had been very suspicious of disorganised thousands coming down the sides of the road — South Korean soldiers, civilians . . . and men who said nothing at all and did not look up when the Turkish column passed. Now these suspicions were justified. All along that narrow and lonesome road weary countrymen dropped their rice sacks and pulled rifles out of them. Men wearing South Korean uniforms took them off and exposed the Chinese uniforms underneath. Each village was a threat and every haystack required investigating. Turks with bullets through their brains fell off vehicles when the countryside appeared deserted, and yelling mobs of Chinese attached in the dark.¹

From this and other well-known examples it is important to regard the entire Red Chinese Army as a *guerrilla* force in the broadest sense of the word. Mao

has amply proved the strategic importance of guerrillas in his writings, of which more than nine chapters were devoted to "Strategic Problems in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War".

Antiguerrilla Policy

It follows, therefore, that we must have a clearly stated anti-guerrilla policy on government level and well-defined anti-guerrilla doctrine and tactics on the military level. An even more basic proposition derives from the widespread Communist use of guerrilla methods on the international scene. We would be greatly handicapped if we limited ourselves only to defensive anti-guerrilla strategy and tactics.

Most authorities advocate the use of encirclement tactics in fighting guerrilla forces. F. O. Miksche says:

The most effective way is to surround them. This can be done by isolating good-sized regions by concentric and simultaneous attacks. These regions are subsequently subdivided into separate sections in which the bands of guerrillas are cut off one by one and destroyed. But such operations can be very costly.²

Unfortunately, the latter part of his statement often is overlooked. Miksche draws on German experience in World War II to show just how costly they are. In spite of this disadvantage he still advises encirclement.

¹ C. Aubrey Dixon and Otto Heilbrunn, *Communist Guerrilla Warfare*, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, p 193.

² F. O. Miksche, *Secret Forces*, Faber & Faber Ltd., London, p 169.

Brigadier Dixon and Otto Heilbrunn arrived at the same conclusion. They say that:

Obviously, while in the fight against armies encircling is only one of the tactical moves possible, it is the main tactical device to eliminate the bands once and for all.³

Judgment based on experience in Burma leads me to believe that these conclusions are neither valid nor practical. Nor are they applicable in all varieties of terrain and climate. Although they are acceptable to a degree, they are misleading because they fail to emphasise certain critical actions that must be taken to defeat guerrilla forces.

Ineffective in Vast Areas

Encirclement tactics as described by the cited authorities are not effective tactics in all situations. They are not applicable and are bound to fail in big countries where there are vast areas over which to operate. They are most unsuitable, especially for Western armies whose most critical weakness may be shortage of manpower.

Miksche himself casts doubt on the practicability of his suggested methods in jungle country where the guerrilla fighting men suddenly transform themselves into peaceful peasants.

Dixon and Heilbrunn likewise indicate the difficulties met by the Germans in using encirclement tactics:

Combing of the jungle, lakes, marshes, and swamps is possible only on foot and after careful preparation. If one were satis-

fied to march along the few forest lanes, which can usually be traversed only with the help of track vehicles, the action would result in failure. The bandits would simply sit tight in their camouflaged camps and dug-outs . . .⁴

How could these tactics possibly succeed in Communist China with an area of 9,736,000 square kilometers and 20 million soldiers all fighting as guerrillas? Moreover, Mao is well-prepared for this type of warfare. After expounding his theories on mobile warfare and repudiating Li Li San's proposal for the Red Army to fight as a regular army ("Every single gun must go to the Red Army") Mao described the guerrilla character of his army as follows:

. . . we must honestly admit the guerrilla character of the Red Army rather than repudiate guerrilla-ism wholesale. On the contrary, this guerrilla character is precisely our distinguishing feature, our strong point, our means for defeating the enemy. Fight when we can win and run away when we cannot.

Outstanding Characteristics

Thus we can point to the two most outstanding characteristics of the Red Chinese Army as its guerrilla character and its use of hit-and-run tactics. The latter were adopted as early as May 1928.

. . . a basic principle, simple in character, with regard to guerrilla warfare was already set

³ Dixon and Heilbrunn, *op. cit.*, p 131.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p 145.

forth in keeping with the conditions of the time, namely, the formula in 16 words: 'enemy advances, we retreat; enemy halts, we harass; enemy tires, we attack; enemy retreats, we pursue'.

When Mao's enemy, the Nationalist Chinese Army, first adopted encirclement and annihilation tactics in the Kiangsi base area, Mao developed further his 16-word formula with the principle of "luring the enemy to penetrate deep", which simply meant retreating or withdrawing into base areas. Mao, therefore, was well-prepared for encirclement tactics.

Support of Local Populace

Encirclement is practically impossible in a country as vast as China, especially when guerrillas fight as Lawrence's in Arabia, "... a vapour, blowing where they listed". Moreover, the Chinese enjoyed perfect confidence and support of the local populace when they fought against the Japanese invaders and the Kuomintang regime.

When the people's condition is excellent, so that an information blockade can be enforced, it is often possible by adopting all kinds of deceptive measures, effectively to drive the enemy into the pitfall of making erroneous judgments and taking erroneous actions, thus depriving him of his superiority and the initiative ... In order to win victory we must try our best to seal the eyes and the ears of the enemy, making him blind and deaf, and to create confusion in the minds of the enemy commanders, driving them distracted.

Although US forces probably could count upon sympathy of non-Communist elements in China, there is no reason to be optimistic on this point.

The encirclement technique of moving to the "stop" or "assembly line" before closing the circle is surely the critical step, as the Germans recognised in their anti-guerrilla campaigns. This is almost impossible to accomplish against an enemy who is using informers and spies on a large scale. He will simply slip through to safer regions before simultaneous encirclement can be carried out.

The key to effective counter-tactics in the face of withdrawal into the hinterlands is not to let the guerrilla forces reach their bases. Obviously, we cannot stop their withdrawal, but we can deny them use of their bases.

A corollary to hit-and-run tactics is to let them strike but do not let them run away.

Airborne Forces

Airborne forces are ideally suited for anti-guerrilla operations of the first type. Their specific task is to cut off the enemy on their withdrawal routes. Mao pointed out that when the enemy attempted to encircle and to annihilate he simply withdrew his forces into their "bases" where they could enjoy full support of the people. There the guerrillas would recuperate and train further for Counter-offensives. The task of airborne forces, therefore, is to cut the enemy off while they are retreating and to annihilate them, in full co-ordination with

the main forces pressing the guerrillas from the front. The aim is to strike them when and where they are most vulnerable.

Beating the enemy at his own game is another sure way to destroy him. Napoleon's orders to Marshal Lefebvre on 12th September, 1813 was to use partisan methods when dealing with partisans. Dropping troops who can fight as guerrillas behind enemy lines is in keeping with this principle. Their task is not only to harass but to destroy. This method implies the sustained support of the forces by air and overall air superiority in numbers as well as over the area where our troops are operating. Instead of guerrillas attacking our bases, we should carry the fight to them by attacking their bases.

It is extremely important to get active support of the local populace. We can count upon strong anti-Communist feeling among people in countries where we might operate, but this does not automatically ensure their overt co-operation. If the people are co-operative, they can assist by passing along information about guerrilla activities, people in contact or under influence of guerrillas, sympathisers, and those who have helped the guerrillas. In some instances, it has proved helpful to set up a system whereby information may be reported anonymously. Whether the source is known or anonymous, great care must be taken NOT to act solely on the basis of such reports. By the same token, reliable informants sometimes should receive a re-

ward in keeping with the value of the information they have supplied.

As in the case of tactics and almost every other aspect of anti-guerrilla operations, there can be no set rules in these matters. Consideration should be given to the use and integration into US forces of the local guerrillas. We must visualise linkup with our main forces although there is no doubt that with proper training and adequate air-drops we can operate for sustained periods.

Locate Enemy Force

Traditionally, guerrillas use ambush and hit-and-run tactics. Stalin, Kovpak, Mao and Che Guevara all have preached their use. In fighting guerrillas the most difficult job is to locate them. Everyone who has fought them will agree that it is more difficult to locate them than to destroy them. Locating the enemy force is always Phase I of anti-guerrilla operations. Many anti-guerrilla campaigns fail in this first phase, much less ever reach the second phase of destroying them.

I have said "Let them strike" because that is the surest way to locate them. If you are hit, you are sure where the enemy is. But you must prepare extremely well to minimise your casualties. You must change your tactics constantly. There can never be any blueprint in anti-guerrilla warfare; tactics always must be shifted to fit the situation.

During the fighting in Burma, we once held our casualties to nil yet destroyed a guerrilla force

of 12, by the simple expedient of putting all our combat troops in the first vehicle when moving through a guerrilla infested area. We knew their usual practice of allowing the first vehicle in a column to pass through unharmed and then ambush the main column. Our other column had laid an ambush on the enemy route of withdrawal.

This incident also emphasises the importance of keeping a mobile reserve whose sole task is to destroy guerrillas ambushing our units. Communications between the ambushed unit and the mobile reserve must be continuous and reliable. While our units fight the enemy ambush party, communications personnel notify the mobile reserve, including possible routes over which enemy troops can retreat. A few *Very* pistol rounds will let the reserve know that the ambush has been sprung.

If the mobile reserve could be helicopterborne, reaction time would be even quicker. The great disadvantage to the use of aircraft against guerrillas is loss of surprise, but that is not too serious a drawback because contact nearly always nullifies surprise.

Principles Remain the Same

Although we must change our tactics constantly, the underlying principles remain the same. Our experience in Burma brings out the following points:

- Plan and prepare thoroughly.

- Consider the use of any ingenious tactical device that will minimise casualties.

- Keep a highly mobile reserve.

- Maintain communications between units on the move and the reserve.

- Establish and practise standing operating procedure reporting methods.

- Know the local terrain — a requisite for commanders at all levels.

- Train thoroughly to counter ambushes, to fix fire discipline, and to fight on foot.

These are the most effective ways to fight guerrillas. They worked against the Japanese in World War II and against the Communists in Burma.

It should be emphasised that encirclement tactics, especially when loosely applied, are practicable only in exceptional circumstances and are totally ineffective against guerrillas in a vast country. It should be noted that Chinese (Kuomintang) "encirclement and annihilation" tactics and German encirclement tactics were improvised methods developed during the war. We should not be content with these improvisations. Now is the time to develop our own methods. Such an approach to anti-guerrilla strategy and tactics is summarised as follows:

Strategically: cut off the enemy by the use of airborne forces, so that they cannot retreat to their bases; destroy guerrilla bases by operating offensively behind enemy lines.

Tactically: let them hit but do not let them run.

Strategic Review

BERLIN AND THE BOMB

THERE is at least one faintly amusing aspect of the Soviet nuclear explosions that most people have overlooked — they have blasted into silence the various brands of peacemongers who have been lecturing us about peace with a strong Communist bias. It is going to be interesting to see how these people explain away this affront to the conscience of the world. And it is going to be interesting, too, to see how the so-called neutral bloc, particularly those members who have been persistently neutral on the Soviet side, react to the flagrant defiance of the appeal of the United Nations.

The situation created by the explosion of the 50 megaton bomb is, perhaps, the United Nations' last chance of saving itself from degenerating into a worthless debating society, a sort of international club where delegates engage in endless talk while enjoying first-class travel and costly amenities at public expense. On this occasion the delegates ought to remember that the original club — the League of Nations — lost the last vestige of any appearance of performing a useful service to

mankind when it failed to do more than censure Japan for her seizure of Manchuria in 1931. Japan promptly resigned and the League tamely let her go. At the very least they should have refused to accept her resignation and voted for her expulsion. Failure to do at least this much killed the League as effectively as if it had been closed down at once.

Before the Soviets exploded the big one the United Nations agreed to a strongly-supported appeal asking them to refrain from doing so. By ignoring this appeal Russia has, in effect, rudely and brutally told the United Nations to go jump in the lake.

If they wish to keep the United Nations in business as an effective instrument of international politics, the delegations which voted for the appeal, and they constitute a majority, have only one sound course open to them — they must vote for Russia's expulsion from the organisation. If they don't do that they might as well go jump in the lake for, so far as real issues are concerned, the United Nations will be as dead as its

predecessor. Member governments ought then to consider whether the money lavished on expensive delegations could be better spent building up their defences.

Most of us are all too prone to think of the Soviet dictatorship as being immune to the influence of Russian public opinion. Probably it is in the sense that we understand public opinion and the part it plays in national policies. But the Russian leaders, the men at the top, are subject to pressures just the same.

Within the Russian Communist party there is undoubtedly a powerful group which believes that in the past Khrushchev has followed too soft a line. Fanatically devoted to the Marx-Leninist doctrine, this group believes that either the West will conquer the Soviet or the Soviet will conquer the West. If Khrushchev is to retain his position, and perhaps his head, he must pay heed to the constant pressure exerted by this group. He may not want war, but in order to preserve his own position he is skating dangerously close to the edge of it.

Bearing this in mind we can now establish the relationship between the Soviets' activities at Berlin and their resumption of nuclear testing. Clearly, if Communism is to be steadily expanded without resorting to war, the world must be led to believe that Russia is invincible in both diplomacy and military power.

While Berlin is geographically unimportant, it has come to be regarded as the testing ground between the Soviets and the West. Khrushchev apparently believes that the Western Powers' expressions of resolve to defend Berlin are so much hot air, that in the end they will abandon the city rather than fight. His big bombs were undoubtedly timed to play upon Western nerves. And not without some success either, for already a few voices have suggested that Russia might after all be ahead of us in the nuclear field.

Khrushchev hopes that if he can force the allies out of Berlin by a shrewdly-calculated series of minor encroachments, he will have demonstrated to the world that his diplomacy is irresistible and that the West quailed before his display of military might. 1st November, 1961.

—E. G. K.



QUARTER- BLOKERY

'JOE SOAP'



Reprinted from the April 1961 issue of An Cosantoir, Eire

MUSING over a pint of the national brew in my local hostlery I was joined by an old Army friend of bygone days, a friend of whom it might truly be said that "he carried a pack when men were men".

Knowing that he was allergic to Quartermasters when he was in the Service, I asked him if he had ever got round to defining a Quartermaster. He paused a while, sipped his brew and retorted with much feeling, "I have indeed", and here is how it runs:

"Quartermaster: a strange bird, when attacked covers itself with indents and talks backwards". This, I thought, is a highly prejudiced opinion, but let us examine the genus Quartermaster and see whether or not it is justified.

Much water has flowed under the bridge, since I first beheld a Quartermaster. It goes back to the time when I decided to discard the pen for the "tented field" to place the Field Marshal's baton in my haversack (where incidentally it has remained ever since), in short to

embrace the profession of Arms. With a number of others I went through the prancings, coughings and repetition of numbers which, with other things, is inevitable in a medical examination, swore my allegiance in the usual manner and was then dispatched to the nearest soldier factory where civilians are enlarged into soldiers.

On arrival, the Orderly Sergeant viewed us with a feeling of distaste which he tried, without much success, to conceal. He briefly initiated us into the mysteries of standing to attention, turning to the right, marching in step and halting. We were formed up "two deep" and almost miraculously turned in the right direction on command and then "moved off". It would be a travesty of the truth to describe the manoeuvre as "marching off".

Arrived at a hut we were again put through the ritual of medical examination. I have always believed that man carries within himself the seeds of corruption and decay, but I beg leave to doubt that there could

be any noticeable decay or corruption in the corpus vile in the short space of 24 hours. I learned, later, that this is part of the "System", and the "System" must, on no account, be questioned. Great indeed is the "System"!!

The last of the motley crew having been passed sound in wind and limb, the Sergeant very politely informed us that we were now about to visit the Quartermaster Stores, there to be issued with that heterogeneous collection of articles briefly referred to as a soldier's kit, without which no soldier is properly equipped to take part in the military evolutions which form part of his peace-time training or to take his place in "war's magnificently stern array".

The Stores

We got under way and eventually arrived at the Quartermaster's Stores — that emporium which is said to contain everything that a soldier requires, except money — where we "pulled up". we didn't "Halt" because we had not, as yet, assimilated the sergeant's brief instructions on this military manoeuvre.

The Sergeant went into the Stores and after a while came out and called us in, by the simple expedient of beckoning with his finger and calling "You lot, come on". We entered and there seated at a table I beheld my first Quartermaster. Of rubicund mien and with a waist line which told all too plainly of the

premature development of a middle age spread, he sat, in lordly ease, with a number of very large books on his right which I afterwards learned were called ledgers. On his left he had a multifarious collection of small and large pieces of paper which, I was informed by the cognoscenti were in fact Indents and receipts and delivery vouchers, all part of the paper war, waged incessantly by the votaries of Quarterblokey. Many ill-disposed persons allege that the competency of the Quarter-bloke is due, in no small measure, to his illicit consumption of that collection of comestibles, briefly referred to as "the rations". I beg leave to doubt the accuracy of that statement.

The Quarterbloke looked us over, and then queried laconically, "Recruits?" to which the Sergeant replied, "Yes, Sir". The Quarterbloke then called out "Quartermaster Sergeant", whereupon, there appeared like the Geni of the Lamp an almost exact facsimile of the Quarterbloke himself, only a little more rotund, and with a shiny and benevolent appearance: A laconic order from the Quarterbloke, "Issue Kit", was followed by a shout of "Storeman" from the benevolent CQMS and almost simultaneously there appeared a hard-bitten old soldier, bowed down by years of service and the "hodding" of heavy loads. This, we gathered, was the storeman, who, I learnt later was a power in the land, and a man with whom it was always well to be on good terms, if you at any

time required some "Buckshee" kit.

"Come this way", said the storeman, and we followed him into the store where every article of kit was on display, neatly laid out in pigeon-holes. Never had I seen such a display of boots, shirts, braces, laces, socks, etc., as I stood agape. The Storeman brought me back to reality by a raucous reminder to "wake up my ideas and get ready to receive kit", or some such words of the same import.

My first issue was a kit bag, or to put it in the jargon of Quarterblokey Bags-Kit-One. I then received boots, shirts, laces, under-pants, razor, cap, greatcoat — the lot. The boots, ankle-soldiers appeared to me to be a formidable obstacle to any movement of the feet, or legs and no great asset to the achievement of that smartness of movement which is the hallmark of the good soldier. A trial fitting showed that they were obviously made for a warrior of the Calibre 9 Finn McCool, but the storeman informed me with a wealth of detail that marching makes your feet swell and that boots are always issued a size too big, adding that I would get plenty of so and so marching in this outfit. I doubted the veracity of the Storeman's statement, and my doubts were confirmed the following day when I literally fell out of my boots on parade, and a disgruntled Storeman was compelled to issue me with a pair which approximated more nearly to my size.

Get a Signature and You're Safe

I could, to perpetrate a bull, make no fist of the cap. I tried hard, but could not prevent it from resting squarely on my ears. The Storeman informed me with much acerbity that this wasn't a fashion parade, and that with a judicious lining of newspapers the so and so cap could be made to fit, and so on and so forth. But all the padding in the world wouldn't make that cap fit. I eventually effected a "swap" which proved satisfactory to both parties.

All articles having been issued I signed for them. I learned, later, that the Quartermaster's slogan is "Always get a signature and you're safe".

After I had signed, I was adjudged by the QMS in picturesque language to keep a good eye on my kit, that I was now solely responsible for it, and that if I was found deficient of any article I would have to pay for it. Indeed, I concluded after the homily was finished that the kit was more valuable to the State than I was.

In several weeks I was the victim of "borrowers", jokers who stated that they found the kit "lying around" and hooks who just "bought it". The net result was that my pay was like a "yo-yo" and I never knew from week to week whether I had an adverse or a favourable balance. But I got wise — and how.

I will draw a veil over the period of my enlargement into a soldier. A painful period, indeed, when, at intervals, I was told, ever so politely by my

Sergeant Instructor that I was eating rations under false pretences, that I should never have left home and that it might be better if I returned there, because there was no hope in the foreseeable future of my becoming anything which remotely resembled a soldier and so on and so on. I must admit that he had grounds for his criticisms, because I reacted so slowly to a word of command, that when we got the command "About Turn" I turned just in time to meet the rest of the squad on the way back.

I weathered the storm, however, learned the basic elements of my profession and was passed out as a trained soldier.

When, some years later, I discarded the web for the Sam Browne belt, I decided that I would probe more deeply into the mysteries of Quarterblokey to see if I could understand them. My first brush with a Quartermaster disillusioned me. I was allotted an office and a Corporal to carry out a certain job of work and the Corporal and I decided in solemn conclave that the bare necessities for furnishing the office were: two tables, two chairs, some correspondence trays, pens, pencils, ink and stationery.

Vocabulary of Stores

I filled in a requisition for these articles in clear. Back came a peremptory note from the QM directing me to requisition in accordance with the vocabulary of Army Stores. After some difficulty I procured a copy of the said vocabulary and found to my dismay that the

types of tables and chairs were legion. I, therefore, decided to go to the stores, see the tables and chairs and choose for myself. The QM received me coldly, and was even more aloof when he discovered that I didn't know the difference between chairs Windsor and chairs kitchen. Eventually, he let me see the various types and I settled for two chairs Windsor, two six-foot tables with trestles, and a couple of grey blankets to take the bare look off the tables.

The QM became very affable when he discovered I was a veritable "Rookie" at the Quarterblokey business, and he gave me four trays wire, several pens writing, pencils, inks, erasers and a veritable avalanche of stationery, which I suspected, he was anxious to get rid of to ease the congestion in his office.

I took to reading the Vocabulary of Stores and gleaned some useful information from it, and not a little fun. Apart from the number of classes of chairs and tables I found a reference to pokers-soldiers whatever that may mean, and a reference to boxes-cod and pots and chambers which is equally recondite. I came upon one item which really got me rattled. This was a reference to a simple tool — an awl. The awl is an inanimate object, inoffensive and very useful for particular jobs. You would imagine that the awl would be described simply as an awl and no more and no less. But the Quarterblokey pundits know better. The vocabulary lists the awl but questions its whole genealogical tree. The

purity of its stock is declared suspect, in fact it is definitely stated that it has a Bar Sinister on its escutcheon. This is the type of double talk to which my friend referred when he said that QM's talked backwards. How right he was.

The power of the Quarterbloke in the matter of convertibility is amazing. The system is simple, a QM can convert an article of higher value into an article of lower value but not vice versa. The thing to remember, however, is that the corpus of the article does not change. Let me illustrate. When I was stationed in Cork's fair city in Quarters-Officers Single, I had in my room and included on my inventory board two soap-trays — officers and one mug-shaving — officers. I accidentally broke the mug-shaving — officers and replaced it by a mug-enamel — soldiers which served me just as well as the mug-shaving — officers. On the next check of the inventory by the Quarterbloke I informed him of the catastrophe which befell the mug-shaving. He pondered awhile, and then said, "Let me see. I'll convert one of the soap-trays — officers to a mug-shaving — officers and your inventory will be correct". "But", I said, "I still have no mug-shaving", to which he blandly replied, "You have it on the Inventory, that's good enough for me". I continued to use my mug-enamel — soldiers until I left Cork, but I wonder what the next occupant of the room thought when he found himself saddled with an inexplicable mug-shaving — officers. I

sincerely hope there were no mental repercussions.

Feeding the soldiery is one of the many headaches of the Quarterbloke, but by and large he does the job efficiently. If only he could persuade Army cooks to drop the idea that grease was created for their sole use, when cooking.

Tapioca or Rize

In the early days of the Army the Q side was not as well organised as it is today. There is a story, apocryphal, I presume, of a certain CQMS who, with the assistance of the Storeman was drawing up the weekly menu. Arriving at Thursday he called out the joint for dinner, and then paused, "What'll we give them for Sweet, Quarter", says the Storeman. "Give them Tapioca", says the QMS. "How'd ya spell that", says the Storeman. "T-a-p — T-a-p — to Hell with them, give them rice — R-I-Z-E", says the CQMS.

It is not difficult to envisage the Quarterbloke in his Private life. Knowing, as he does, the quality and prices of all domestic articles, the little woman must be on her toes to make a correct return of the weekly expenditure. One can imagine his scrutiny of all the accounts on a Saturday night, with comments such as these: "I see you have used ten sods — turf in excess of the authorised ration. Your requisition for next week will be cut by ten and you can requisition some coal-slack in lieu"; or, "I see that you've had soles — leather fitted on Johnny's boots at a cost greater than that

specified in the Schedule. You will suffer a reduction in your allowance next week of the difference between the Scheduled cost and the actual cost of the repairs"; and so on.

But the days of the rotund Quarterbloke are over. The Quarterbloke of the present day has a lean and hungry look and ten chances to one he has a stomach ulcer from trying to keep abreast of the changes in armament, transport, equipment, etc., and the various forms which arise in their wake. The days when the surpluses were kept in one store and the deficiencies in another are, alas, gone forever.

To return to our original query. Was my friend's definition of a Quartermaster correct? I think it was, but at the same time, I feel that we must give

the Quarterbloke a certain amount of credit. He feeds, clothes, equips and transports the troops and like a conjuror, he can produce most things, at the drop of a hat, provided always that they are properly requisitioned. I virtually believe that if one requisitioned an elephant, given time, the Quarterbloke would produce it.

Despite all our clashes with the Quarterbloke we shall always remember him with affection when we recall that in our moments of tribulation he was always on hands to provide "an aul pinch of tea", "a bit of an aul box", or an "aul pair of laces".

Verily, the Quarterbloke is a universal provider, and a man who is always prepared to transport you across the street or across the world.

It is possible that the attacking missile might carry a small missile to shoot down the anti-missile missile. This then would be an anti-anti missile missile missile.

—Boeing Magazine

THE INSTRUCTOR AND HIS STUDENTS

Captain J. A. Shimeld,
Royal Australian Infantry

MAN is a most interesting study. This paper has been written as a result of much study of him in the form of a soldier. As such, he almost invariably proves eager to learn and to improve himself.

One must apply the principles of psychology when teaching, and an appreciation of the mental processes of man is necessary in order to be able to teach in accordance with these processes. In adhering to the sequence given below, the squad is assisted in the learning of each lesson; the lesson is taught in progressive stages—one stage leading to another. Thus each phase is grafted on the next, to develop ultimately into an intelligible and clean-cut whole.

1 — Sequence of a Lesson

Preliminaries

Equipment or kit required.
Class arrangements.
Inspection of arms, pouches and dummies.

Explanation

Statement of scope and object of lesson and when used on service.

Demonstration

Complete lesson.
Stage or part of lesson with detailed explanation.
Essential points.

Execution

Collectively — imitating instructor.
Individually — instructor checking faults.

Interrogation

At commencement to connect up with previous lesson.
During intervals in lesson.
Of those not actually being exercised, eg, LMG.

Repetition

Practice to gain proficiency.
Collectively as a drill.
Instinctive action. Sense of touch.
Standard to be reached—

TOET.

Final Five Minutes

Quickening-up on previous lessons.
Appropriate muscular exercises.
Fast thinking.

2 — Preliminaries

An instructor who is very familiar with his syllabus is not necessarily proof against error, as it is so easy to suffer a momentary lapse of memory in some detail during a lesson. So read over each lesson prior to teaching it. Also refresh your memory on the method of teaching, doing this either mentally or in actual fact, preferably the latter.

Practise demonstrations until you are able to deliver them perfectly. This sets a worthy example not only in soldierliness but in general standard.

By taking this care every lesson should be a model of verbal and manual precision and such work on the part of an instructor is highly conducive to rapid absorption of the squad.

Each lesson in the textbooks has its "Notes for Instructors". Read these carefully and adhere to them whenever practicable. Bear in mind that these books have been compiled after intensive thought and practical experience over a period of many years. As a result of this research, in order to improve sequences of instruction, methods of teaching and modes of execution, they have been written and rewritten — have been subjected to amendment and re-amendment continuously.

Consider atmospheric elements, eg, place the squad so that you are upwind from them and your voice is carried in their direction by the breeze. Avoid having them stand with the sun glaring into their eyes or with

its rays trained directly on their backs. An oblique position is the most satisfactory in this respect.

Draw them up on the side of the weapon most suitable for the carrying out of the particular instruction. For instance, when demonstrating the mechanism of a machine gun, have the squad in a fairly open semi-circle at the side of the weapon and a reasonable distance from it. Such a formation allows of comfortable breathing - space and good view for all.

Reconnoitre all training areas available and select the most suitable ground, or ground and landscape, for your lessons.

Pre-arrange wet-weather stations so that these may be occupied without waste of time in the event of sudden rain.

An ideal syllabus is one that provides for a variety of subjects throughout the day. A balance of mental and physical effort and of theoretical and practical work sustains interest.

Preliminaries must always be carried out as an important part of the instructional period for the following reasons:

- (i) *Safety.* When arms and dummy ammunition are to be used the instructor must be certain that danger is not present. Therefore he must inspect personally such materials. Personnel have been injured and killed through such neglect and, should an accident occur (however slight), time and money are wasted, remorse is suffered, and the squad will lose con-

fidence in their instructor. With the recruit, nervousness may develop when handling the weapon, which will prove detrimental to his early mastering of it.

- (ii) *Control*. Control is a very important factor at all times. Therefore the period should commence with this military condition; thus the squad are at once directed into an active and re-active state of mind consistent with the assimilation of their work. This subject of control will be dealt with in detail later.
- (iii) *Continuity*. When full preparations for the lesson have been made, an unbroken period is catered for. This preparation includes such items as giving fatiguemen written and sufficiently complete details of their duties, positioning targets with forethought, suitable laying out of stores and all accessories, and having required spare parts at hand.

When these preliminaries are properly attended to, such annoying distractions as arise when some omission must be rectified are obviated. Distractions may possibly be subconscious only, but they are harmful to results. By such considerations, the students are given very desirable assistance in their endeavour to concentrate deeply upon their instruction.

3 — Explanation

Before each lesson commences all explanations should be sufficiently complete to give the student a broad picture background of the subject. Nothing retards an intelligent man's progress more than having the irritating thought at the back of his mind, "Why does one carry out this action?" when by a short, carefully worded preliminary talk he would have been given a reason.

"Objects of lessons" are for this purpose and should always be brought out by the instructor or by interrogation. Again when a subsequent lesson of a section of the book is to be taught, the relation between it and the previous lessons is explained and linked up with those earlier lessons. This should always be done, since only thus can the student correlate the lessons, seeing each as part of the whole.

Should there be a Test of Elementary Training (TOET) for a drill action, for example, give the squad the conditions of the test, to let them know the standard they must reach.

4 — Demonstration

Of necessity demonstrations must exemplify precision. Never bluff or try to cover up a mistake made in a demonstration. The average man is an intelligent being, and that intelligence should not be under-estimated. Should a faulty demonstration be given, it should be repeated. Tell the squad candidly, "That was not quite correct, I will do it again". Then do it as it should be done. Appreciation,

confidence and progress will be the result. The students look to their leader for authenticity, and if he loses their confidence he may never regain it. Cohesion suffers, progress slows.

It is incorrect to talk and demonstrate at the same time. Give two distinct pictures, one auditory, one visual. To use a parallel case — if a photographer took two photographs without turning the film after the first, the result would be that each photograph would have some points obliterated by the other and neither would be of full value. But were he to turn the film before the second exposure he would produce two clear, vivid and valuable pictures. Applying this to the instructor and squad, stand still and talk, looking at the squad and NOT at the weapon, so giving one picture — a verbal one. Then demonstrate, without saying anything, NOW looking at the weapon (if correct to do so) giving the other picture — the visible, thus presenting the squad with two perfectly clear impressions of one action. These are combined in the men's minds by an automatic and perfectly natural mental function and the best instructional value is attained. Remember that the average man is capable of copying, even though he may fail to follow a verbal explanation. Teaching by eye is much the best way, a short clear explanation serving to draw attention to the main points to be shown in the demonstration.

When it is not practicable to demonstrate a lesson, consider

the use of diagrams. These can be very interesting and are a forceful medium of illustrating an explanation. They should be simple, just bringing out the salient points of the text and eliminating all superfluous detail.

Walking up and down in front of the squad while talking to them may be distracting to some and irritating to others. Consider these individuals and remain steady — this, of course, within reason.

When carrying a cane use it correctly. Slapping the leg and twirling it in the fingers are only glaring exhibitions of unsoldierliness. Do not on any account demonstrate rifle exercises etc, with such an object.

5 — Interrogation

When it is required to ascertain whether the squad understands what is being taught, do not say "Are there any questions?" Interrogate or exercise them to find out the extent of their knowledge. The method of interrogation used is vitally important. The correct procedure is to frame the question carefully, then ask one of the squad for the answer. If his answer is incorrect ask another. By questioning in this way each man is made to think for himself and thus the matter recently taught will be planted more deeply in his mind. Personal pride will inspire an effort to answer correctly.

Frame appropriate questions, questions suitable to the immediate issue and of express value; as an example, interrogation upon a previous lesson when the

latter is to be incorporated in the next phase of instruction. This links up the two lessons and leads to the appreciation of the correlation of these succeeding stages, thus creating a firm foundation for what is to come.

There is a time for asking questions and that time is not while the squad is concentrating on an exercise. It is during intervals, such as when dummies are being picked up, or whilst the students are having a short physical rest during the lesson. This allows them to devote all their powers of concentration to the question and answer; and so they obtain the maximum value from it. It is wise to ask occasionally for the "object" of the lesson, in order to stress its meaning and what it aims to teach.

During practice, while one man is engaged in machine-gun work, the onlookers should be questioned on the way he is carrying it out and asked to give details on the correct procedure. Thus they are able to practise movements mentally until their turns to do it practically.

When asked a question always give a clear and concise answer and, if necessary, illustrate that answer with a demonstration. Be flexible of mind. Do not allow questions to cause you to digress for more than a few moments from the subject being taught. It is very easy for an instructor to be led off his subject by interesting questions. If the student's query is irrelevant, tell him to come and see you at the conclusion of the period and

answer him then, or, if you know the matter will be brought out in a later lesson, advise the man accordingly.

6— Fault Checking

The instructor must start checking faults at the very instant the squad begins to imitate his demonstrations. Therefore, having arrived at the explanation, demonstration, with squad imitating part of the sequence of the lesson, a suggested procedure is as follows:

- (i) Looking at the squad, explain the detail of the movement or part thereof.
- (ii) Giving yourself a word of command or saying something appropriate such as "Like this", look at the weapon if necessary and if it is correct to do so, and execute the movement.
- (iii) Looking at the squad, give the necessary work of command, or say, for example, "Do that!" Watch them do it and instantly check any errors that are made.

If this is not carried out the squad will have a tendency to imitate the instructor while he is giving the demonstration and the instructor will fail to notice mistakes. By checking faults at this early stage, the forming of bad habits is eliminated as much as possible and the way paved for the more advanced work. Bad habits are extremely difficult to break.

Individualise faults. If one man makes a mistake, check him but do not penalise the remainder by making them repeat a movement a number of

times when they are doing it satisfactorily. This is unnecessarily fatiguing when their energies are required for subsequent efforts. Furthermore, such a trial is most exasperating for them.

However, in the case of most or all of the squad making an identical error, order them to rest and then repeat the demonstration and explanation of the point at issue, as in this case you, yourself, have obviously been at fault.

Speak up when individualising faults, as by so doing the point that is being checked will be driven home more forcibly to those who have already understood it.

When a man makes a mistake do not say, "That is wrong. Do it . . .". Ask him, "How did I tell you to do it?" This will make him think and having thought for a few moments, he will very likely remember what is required. The mental effort will leave its impression upon him and he will no doubt remember it in future.

Should any member of the squad give evidence of some unfortunate personal characteristic, tactfully tell him of it. He may not have realised his shortcoming and will be grateful for such advice.

7 — Discipline

Control of a unit must be exercised thoughtfully and firmly from the moment of taking command. The instructor should insist upon such matters as eyes being maintained unwaveringly to the front while standing at ease; precision in

movements such as head and eyes front in succession from the right on dressing after falling in; correct pauses between movements; quick precise actions on every occasion; constant alertness. Slackness must not be tolerated even momentarily.

The unit, on discovering the standard demanded of them by their leader, will produce that standard, provided they feel that he really does know what he wants.

The instructor, having led his men to this state of mental and physical alacrity, will receive whole-hearted and instant reaction to his instruction. There will be cohesion in the unit, and splendid teamwork. The object of all these aspects of soldiering is to obtain obedience — rapid, accurate and intelligent obedience to all orders whether they be given on the parade ground or in the front line.

8 — Knowledge

It is not wise to try to impress people with your superior knowledge. The students are there to gain information. They do not like to feel they are being talked down to. Further, teachings that do not apply to the particular lesson only add to general difficulties.

Should an instructor display naturally a sound military knowledge, he will automatically receive the sincere and whole-hearted appreciation of the students and have their complete confidence and attention.

In order to attain the greatest efficiency as an instructor it is

always advisable to know a little more than is in the textbook. This additional information is quite often gained only by traversing the rocky road of experience. But a great deal of knowledge is to be obtained by watching other instructors at work, and also conversing with them on the main points of a lesson and exchanging ideas on how to study. The veteran as well as the young instructor must be alert to increase his efficiency, because of rapidly changing military conditions, with their consequent influx of new weapons and modified ideas.

Then, by thinking, and reading between the lines of the lesson that appear in print, a deeper appreciation of subjects is realised.

A young soldier will always be glad to know of a good method of studying. An instructor can help here by suggesting the method he has found most satisfactory himself during private study and practice.

Bear with the mental capacity of each man. You should not demand too much by expecting members of the squad to learn in minutes lessons that have taken you some hours of careful study. Some people require sympathy, others driving, to get the best out of them. Nagging is belittling to both parties and sarcasm only builds up an antagonism in the man towards his instructor. Such a state is likely to be detrimental to the general standard of work within the squad.

Weigh up each man in your squad and deal with him as an individual.

Be tolerant and practise patience, and imbue the men with the spirit of ambition. Beware of favouritism and see that every man has an equal chance. Watch for the diffident type of man and seek to promote self-confidence in him. Modern war calls for initiative in all ranks. Be careful to encourage and develop this in your men. Every sub-unit in the army is a team in which the intelligent co-operation of all members is essential for success and an error of one member may let the whole team down.

9—The Voice

Whether used conversationally or for words of command the voice is perhaps the most powerful possession the instructor has as his medium of training. But avoid talking too much. Unnecessary words also cause the point to become blurred — and perhaps lost. Also do not drift into a monotonous tone. Even an active mind may become lulled and boredom may creep in.

The vocal powers must be given the thought and consideration they deserve. In some people the voice is a near dormant possession. Others do make some use of it; but how many of us study the sense and use it to its warranted advantage? Dictators do. Politicians do. Actors do. Why? Because they know it has the power of producing laughter and tears, love and hate, friendship and enmity, calm and hysteria! And how do they

achieve these moods? Simply by thoughtful inflections and modulations, good articulation, tones suitable to their subject, sometimes soft and easy flowing, sometimes hard and firmly emphatic, but always stressing deliberately the salient words of the thoughts they are uttering. Apply the power of the voice.

For words of command give a long even-toned cautionary word. Then allow a good pause, followed by the executive word which should be in a tone slightly higher in pitch than the cautionary, also louder and sharper. A good word of command is answered by a smart soldierly movement. Watch a leader with a poor command and see for yourself the indifferent reaction of his men.

10 — The Instructor's Responsibilities

It will be realised that the studies of an instructor are not

confined to his textbooks. His scope is wide and his task great, and so his qualifications must be of a versatile nature. To succeed in his particular military sphere he should have a knowledge of man's nervous make-up, of human nature, and of morals. He must appreciate physical capabilities and limitations and be something of a psychologist to understand the sensitivity of the mind, its reactions and processes. He should be highly trained and skilled in his own arm of the service and also have an intelligent knowledge of other arms; be tolerant and understanding; have a keen sense of humour and a high code of honour; be sincere in thought, word and deed, enthusiastic and cheerful. His deportment and cleanliness, dress and vocabulary — all these things — should at all times make him an inspiration to every soldier with whom he comes in contact.

INTER SERVICE FRICTION

on

KANGA

"Yumbana"

(With apologies to the Army Air Corps Association Journal, Spring 1960)

THE discovery of a new planet had, by 1995, long ceased to be news. There were, however, a number of points of interest about the planet Kanga which was discovered in that year. It was in the system of Zot, a considerable quantity of light years away from the Solar System, and in size, geography and climatic conditions it bore a quite remarkable resemblance to the planet Earth. Its inhabitants were similar to the latter, having limbs arranged in roughly similar pairs, languages susceptible to translation, and in many parts even a rudimentary civil service.

Australia was particularly interested in the Commonwealth of Dig, a continent state in the temperate latitudes of Kanga, which appeared to have developed similarly to, and to have problems akin to those of our own country. It was not very long before the first accredited Australian Military Mission visited Dig, and remained one earth-year in that country. The head of the Mission, Colonel A. R. Able, DSO, with his compatriots on the Mission, was kindly

and hospitably treated by the Digs, and spent an instructive year in their country. He found it remarkably similar to his own country, the resemblance extending to the organisation, principles of war, and many of the tactical methods of the Dig Army. In preparing his report, Able found it easier to comment on the few differences between the Australian and Dig armies rather than upon the similarities. A keen student of history, he spared no pains to trace the cause of the various divergencies from Australian Army practice; in his opinion they all stemmed from the grass.

In appearance, the Kanga grass differed little from its earthly counterpart; in behaviour it was very different. It grew freely throughout the planet — too freely. In hotter climates than Dig's the grass frequently grew to such proportions as to constitute impenetrable jungle. In Dig it grew to some nine inches. It grew everywhere, however, making nonsense of roads as we know them in this planet, or of any land-transport unprovided with large

diameter wheels. It was provided moreover, with strong octopus-like tendrils which gripped the human foot and leg and made walking a very slow and arduous process.

What walking there was took place with aid of large flat foot-plates like square skis, but for at least two centuries the main means of human movement had been the air.

Dig flying machines (as throughout Kanga) were, and had always been, of the ducted fan type, using as fuel the cheap and plentiful natural gas Sputane. They were extremely simple to fly; indeed every child had naturally to learn to fly before it could venture abroad, and every individual owned a "platform" as a matter of course. Able was issued with one on first arrival, learnt to operate it in a few minutes, and used it throughout his stay. The normal platform could accommodate two persons, but there were larger varieties, the Army having a range of platforms to allow personnel and supplies to be moved over the battlefield. The largest of these, however, was restricted to a load of some three tons, while all platforms were inherently slow vehicles of some 5 to 20 mph. No one on Kanga appeared to have invented the helicopter, while the grass had always been an effective bar to any fixed-wing aircraft. There was no Air Force in Dig.

Prior to 1960, Able deduced from the Dig histories, land battles had consisted either of shock actions in the air space just above the battlefield or else

fire fights between two more or less stationary contestants. In 1960 a revolution had occurred in warfare with the discovery of the horse.

The first Kanga horses were discovered on an island which had been closed to human occupation for over a century as a result of experiments there with radio-active materials. How the horses got there would always be a mystery; suffice that they multiplied and within ten years were an indigenous feature of most countries. Alone of Kanga creatures they appeared to be untrammelled by the grass, and moved over it with similar facility to that displayed by their equine cousins on Earth.

In Dig, as elsewhere, the strategic implication of such mobility was swiftly appreciated, and the Dig Horse Corps (DHC) was formed to breed, train and ride these creatures in support of the more conventional arms of the service. Reconnaissance was their main use to start with. They could move swiftly across country, in marked contrast to the foot soldier, and both silently and inconspicuously, in marked contrast to the platforms. In the Great War of 1980-85, however, the DHC considerably extended its scope; reconnaissance patrols began to be armed in order to deal with hostile patrols, and later to carry light armour.

Chariots were designed which heavier draught horses could drag through the grass, thus enabling troops or weapons to move with the speed and silence of a horsed reconnaissance patrol.

Because of this great expansion in the roles and responsibilities of the DHC, because of its promise as an independent war-winning force, and because of the highly-specialist nature of all horse-factors, it was decided in 1984 to expand the DHC into a separate service, in every way on equality with the Royal Dig Navy and the Army, and with the title of the Royal Dig Horse Force.

There was a ten-year gap between the end of this Great War and the beginning of the next, and during it the Royal Dig Horse Force, or RDHF, expanded rapidly. The Dig Army had supposed that even under the new regime horses would be available to assist the mobility of army formations and units, but the RDHF had different ideas. They intended that their horses should be kept concentrated in large groups and used in roles independent of the other two services. They enunciated in their support a number of principles and catch-phrases which are, without very detailed examination, pretty widely accepted. Two of the best-known of these might be freely translated as follows:—

“Horse-superiority is vital, and until this is won there can be no horse support for the other services”.

“Horses must not be used in penny packets”.

Horsecraft (as the chariots were called) became faster and larger, and the doctrine began to be preached that future wars would be won by Horse-Forces

alone, the Army's role being confined to flying-in and occupying the hostile territory at the end.

Although this doctrine was never accepted by the Army and although (as Able judged) considerable bitterness was engendered between the services on the subject, it would seem that the Dig Army resigned itself for the most part to a horseless future, remarking that horses did require a great deal of technical know-how which only the RDHF possessed.

The Royal Dig Navy, whose requirement for horses seemed, to the perhaps not entirely un-biassed Able, hardly greater and perhaps even less than that of the Army, took a very much stronger line with the RDHF. Horses were needed, the Navy Office claimed, for landing parties and for the victualling organisation, and such horses must be an organic part of the Royal Dig Navy. A fierce and prolonged struggle took place between the Navy Office and Department of Horses before in 1993 the former won the day. A brilliant little case in favour of the horse as a stand-by capstan-turner, with consequent saving of manpower, was the decisive factor in the emergence of the Fleet Horse Arm.

The ensuing Second Great War gave the RDHF the opportunity of trying-out its theories of independent operation, but Able found it difficult to judge the results. Army historians claimed that the RDHF effort to win the war on their own had proved a mammoth failure;

RDHF writers complained that their horses were constantly being diverted to secondary tasks in support of the Army, and that only because of this had they needed some assistance from the other services in winning the war.

In the press of wartime necessity the Army succeeded in acquiring a few ponies for use as load-carriers within their own formations. Their drivers were soldiers, but their grooms and veterinary staff were of the RDHF who retained the ultimate control of the animals and the units into which they were organised. After the war, however, strong pressure began to be felt within the Army towards the acquisition of full control of these ponies, not only for load-carrying but also for short-range reconnaissance (ironically enough the original use of the animals). The Army was now more horse-minded than before; senior officers had had horses under their operational control during the war; more junior officers had ridden in horse-clubs, and in a few cases had actually owned horses. The Army HQ was therefore better-equipped to fight the case. A few years before Able's arrival on Kanga, the Dig Army had been authorised to form its own Army Light Horse Squadron.

The horses which, under the terms of the agreement, the Light Horse Squadron was permitted to operate were restricted to a height limit of 14 hands; this rather took the gilt off the gingerbread, and in the opinion of many made it out of the

question to obtain a satisfactory reconnaissance-horse at all. The Army's efforts, however, were presently rewarded by the successful breeding of the Mule. As we had discovered before them, the Digs found here a stronger version of the horse, and one with a sideways and backwards performance which greatly added to its flexibility on the battlefield. The Army promptly proposed to introduce the Mule into service, claiming that, not being a horse, the 14 hand height-limit was irrelevant.

When the time came for Able to leave Kanga on his return trip to Earth, Army HQ and Department of Horses were locked in combat on this question, with the Department of Defence siding with the Department of Horses. No one could forecast the outcome.

On his last evening in Kanga, Able dined in the Army Light Horse Squadron Mess; a fellow guest was a famous RDHF character, Commandant of the Central Riding School, Horse-Commodore Bigglesworth.

"Mules?" said he to Able over the third brandy. "I've never had much to do with mules myself — give me a horse everytime. All the same, we can't have the Army operating mules—wouldn't do at all.

"Why not? Well its against all principles, to start with. Horse power — Horse supremacy — you don't get that by using your horses in penny-packets, giving one to every Tom, Dick and Harry all over the battlefield. Keep 'em concentrated.

"I suppose it doesn't matter much if the Army had a few pack-ponies of their own to play with, though I must say I've never really seen the point of it. When it comes to a large, complicated, sophisticated creature like a warhorse, however, the Army would be lost".

"Same with mules", said the


Horse Commodore as he moved off to replenish his glass.

These words were still ringing in Able's ears an hour later as he watched the great man depart, driving his own streamlined twin-headed "Communication" horsecraft.

Somewhere, he felt, he had heard it all before.

COMPETITION FOR AUTHORS

The Board of Review has awarded first place and the prize of £5 for the best original article published in the October issue to "The Employment of the Mortar Section" by Lieutenant K. H. Jackson, Royal Australian Infantry.



BRASSHAT by Basil Collier.
(Secker and Warburg Ltd., 7
John Street, London, W.C.I, and
William Heinemann Ltd., 317
Collins Street, Melbourne.)

Basil Collier has already established himself as a military biographer and historian who is careful to get his facts right and to present them attractively. In his latest work, a biography of Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, he enhances his reputation and makes a notable contribution to the literature of World War I.

Henry Wilson was always something of a controversial figure. In an age when most senior officers set much store on the niceties of protocol, very little on intellectual attainments and none at all on anything that was remotely unorthodox, Wilson's pungent wit and irrepresible bouyancy were bound to be regarded with some suspicion. Since he spent most of the war as a very senior liaison officer between the British and French Governments and between various commanders, staff officers and statesmen, always in an atmosphere of mutual distrust and recrimination, it is not surprising that he earned a reputation for intrigue and self-interest. And he did himself very little good by the numerous

forthright and cutting comments on men and events he made in his diary. Major General Sir C. E. Callwell drew heavily on these diaries when writing his *Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: His Life and Diaries*, which was published in 1927. Callwell's book gave the impression that Wilson was the arch-intriguer of them all.

In this latest biography, Basil Collier sets out to correct the impression created by the inexperienced Callwell, and he certainly succeeds in giving us a very different picture of the field marshal. He also gives us an astonishing picture of the manner in which soldiers and statesmen conducted World War I.

In the years immediately before the war Wilson was Director of Military Operations at the War Office, where he worked hard on the plans for sending a British Expeditionary Force to the continent should Britain and France become involved in war with Germany. He seems to have spared no effort to make sound plans for he spent most of his holidays cycling over the ground on which he expected the operations to take place. The surprising thing about this period of his life is the way in which he, a relatively junior member

of the hierarchy, discussed military affairs and personalities with various politicians, including members of the Opposition.

Wilson went to France as Sub-Chief of the General Staff of the Expeditionary Force. Later he commanded a corps without distinction and then became the principle military liaison officer between the British and French Governments and, by force of circumstance, between the British and French Commanders-in-Chief. Towards the end of the war he succeeded Sir William Robertson as Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

The story of World War I on Wilson's level is not a pretty one. Most of the statesmen and senior soldiers seem to have spent a good deal of their time intriguing against each other. The rest of it they spent devising more hopeless, narrow-fronted, head-on attacks on the strongly and deeply fortified German lines. Anyone who had the temerity to suggest an alternative strategy was damned as a heretic.

Recently it has become fashionable for British military biographers and autobiographers to be critical of Winston Churchill's "interference" in military affairs. Sometimes it is made to appear that they won the war in spite of him. After reading this book you will understand why Churchill felt compelled to ride his generals hard. Churchill, who had seen the most promising strategic stroke of World War I botched by professional ineptitude, had no intention of committing his countrymen to another "Western Front".

If Basil Collier has not altogether succeeded in fully retrieving Wilson's reputation, he has given us a most instructive account of the manner in which World War I was conducted. His book can be confidently recommended to any soldier or statesman who wants to find out how NOT to conduct a war.

— E.G.K.

MEETING AT A FAR MERIDIAN, by Mitchell Wilson (Martin Secker and Warburg Ltd., London, and William Heinemann Ltd., London, and 317 Collins Street, Melbourne).

This novel is certainly topical for its theme is the competition between American and Russian scientists to unlock the secrets of nature. Most of the action takes place in Moscow, and the background must be considered authentic because the author, himself a physicist, lived and worked in Russia in order to find out how Soviet science operates and how Soviet scientists live.

Nicholas Rennet, an American scientist who worked on the development of the first atomic bomb, is engaged in the investigation of some properties of outer space. He is, however, obsessed with a feeling of guilt for the consequences of his earlier work, a feeling which deprives him of his zest for research and is gradually taking possession of his mind. Then Dmitri Goncharoff, a Soviet physicist who has developed a somewhat different theory about these particular properties of outer space, pays him a brief visit. Rennet is seized with another obsession —

that relief from the first one is somehow bound up with resolving his difference of opinion with Goncharoff. So he goes off to Moscow to work with his opposite number, but not before he has lost his wife and had an affair with his secretary.

If the scenes in Moscow are faithfully drawn, and we may suppose that they are, they give us an insight into the advantages enjoyed by Soviet scientists. Not only do the scientists enjoy a very privileged position in society, but the provision of funds for their work is the least of their worries. Resources of all sorts are made available to them on a scale which amazes the American, and which perhaps explains their lead in rocketry. The picture of a fairly narrow segment of Russian society is rather more credible than the stuff so often served up to us. Its members are entirely human in their relationships, though the

pervading atmosphere of suspicion and distrust is not calculated to make one yearn for the reconstruction of our own society on similar lines. Even so, replicas of the more objectionable characters are not unknown in practically any society.

In the end Rennet rediscovers his zest for work, though one is left in some doubt as to who gave him the most assistance — Goncharoff, a Russian girl with whom he had an affair, or an American woman in whom he appears to have at last found his soul mate.

The book is a serious attempt to deal in novel form with one of the most far-reaching fields of human endeavour, and with the personal problems which probably beset some of the people engaged in the development of weapons of mass destruction.

—E.G.K.

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