


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FRONTISPIECE

In World War II the Japanese offensive on the north-eastern approaches to Australia was brought to a halt in August-September, 1942, when the eastern prong of their advance on Port Moresby was defeated at Milne Bay and the western prong held at Eoribaiwa Ridge. Passing to the offensive, Australian troops fought their way back over the Kokoda Trail and, in conjunction with an American division, recaptured the Japanese base at Buna-Sanananda in January, 1943.

While Australian troops pushed back another Japanese force from Wau towards Salamaua, the formations from Buna and Milne Bay were re-organised and prepared for the next offensive. This began in September, 1943 when 7 and 9 Divisions captured Lae. 7 Division then turned north-westward to operate against the Japanese in the Markham and Ramu Valleys while 9 Division captured Finschafen and advanced northward along the New Guinea coast.

On completion of these operations 7 and 9 Divisions were rested and re-organised for what was to be the last major Australian action in the war — the recapture of Borneo. In amphibious operations 7 Division took Balikpapan, while 9 Division took Tarakan, Brunei and Labuan.

The picture shows one of the assault waves of 9 Division going ashore at Tarakan.

AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

A Periodical Review of Military Literature

Number 149

October, 1961

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US Navy Photograph

Tarakan, 1945

AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

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THORN IN THE FLESH

Major Reginald Hargreaves,
British Army, Retired

Reprinted from the June 1961 issue of
MILITARY REVIEW, Command and General Staff College,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, USA.

ANY future conflict that includes the employment of tactical nuclear weapons is bound to demand considerable room for manoeuvre. In depth, the battle zone will extend as far as the limit to which armoured fighting vehicles can progress without refueling. Thereafter, field tankers will carry gasoline forward from the scattered supply dumps to the furthestmost point of penetration. Such field depots as are formed will be dispersed widely and far enough back to be out of range of the foremost enemy nuclear weapons. A zone of operations up to about 500 kilometers in depth speedily could come to be regarded as a commonplace. This clearly puts a premium on our use of guerrilla forces throughout the entire area in rear of the enemy's forward and immediate support echelons.

The irregular - partisan - guerrilla has interposed in every kind of warfare, in every country, from ancient Rome to modern Vietminh. In many instances he has been enrolled formally in the standing forces of a duly constituted government. More frequently, the

guerrilla has been an individual who has resorted to arms on his own initiative, and whose somewhat equivocal legal status endowed him with no more than a shadowy claim on the belligerent rights and exemptions that regularised enlistment carries with it. Under this extremely elastic heading may be included every informal fighting force from Simon Bolivar's Libertadores to the Gallic franc-tireurs of the Franco-Prussian War and the desert riders who served under Lawrence of Arabia. In the more formal category may be classed the British Long-Range Desert Group in the Western Desert, Orde Wingate's Chindits in Burma, certain elements of the US Rangers, and Otto Skorzeny's Special Service Group in Italy and on the Western Front.

In whatever category he may fall, the guerrilla wages a stark, primitive kind of warfare devoid of all formal pattern. His aim is to destroy, to harass, and to confuse. He strikes suddenly and with the maximum of violence, and then fades once more into his background. Of all fighting men, his greatest asset is the element of surprise. Any en-

gement in which enemy losses do not greatly outnumber his own must be regarded as no more than partially successful.

In Timor, for example, during the midperiod of the war in the Pacific, some 300 Australians of the 2/2nd Independent Company, aided by a handful of gallant Dutchmen, held up and exacted a terrible toll from 30,000 Japanese. After a few months' experience of this deadly hit-and-run type of fighting, a Japanese colonel put it on record that it took 10 trained Nipponese soldiers to kill or immobilise a single guerrilla.

The Importance of Bases

However informal the guerrillas' methods of conducting operations, there are, nonetheless, one or two fundamental principles from which they should never depart. To begin with, they must have a base. Without it, they are no more than armed stragglers, lacking the means for the control and co-ordination of their activities. In such circumstances these are liable to be as curtailed as they are apt to be extremely unfortunate in their termination. Such a base, however, must not be static. Guerrillas must sternly resist the temptation to forego mobility for the sake of the conveniences associated with a stationary habitat.

Tito's Lesson

In 1944, for example, Tito's guerrillas numbered approximately 150,000, distributed over an extensive terrain that stretched from Macedonia to Croatia. Headquarters — hither-

to commendably migratory — had been established near the village of Drvar, in western Bosnia. From here a wireless network had been developed to communicate with the brigades distributed throughout the countryside — irregular formations which had more than justified their existence. For in all, no less than 10 enemy divisions, with supporting arms, had been bogged down in Yugoslavia at a time when they could have been employed to great advantage elsewhere.

Six full-scale offensives, designed to destroy the partisans, had completely failed in their purpose. The seventh attempt, however, was planned to take full advantage of the fact that the guerrilla headquarters had become too well dug-in in one spot. And it was within an ace of proving successful. An air-drop caught the headquarters' guard by surprise. Simultaneously, a powerful aerial assault pinned down the defence, while a strong force of all arms closed in to cut off all avenues of retreat. With rare good fortune Tito contrived to get news of his plight to Allied Headquarters in Italy; and a long-range US and British Air Fleet intervened to break up the cordon closing in on Drvar. But this means the guerrilla leader and his staff were enabled to slip away to safety, to "fight again another day".

There were difficulties, naturally enough, in re-establishing communications, but in due course they were overcome. Thereafter, no more was heard

of Tito's long-cherished but entirely impractical plan to turn his headquarters into "a fixed position and an impregnable fortress" — the one thing to which the partisan should never permit himself to be committed. For his purpose is not to come out on top in a stand-up fight, but to act as a perpetual thorn in the enemy's flesh. Such activities can best be directed by a headquarters organisation that keeps itself both small and fluid.

The Emir of Oran — 1830

It was the capture of his unwieldy smala — a combination of civil and military headquarters, travelling harim, depository for booty, and central pool of horses and cattle — that brought about the ultimate submission of one of the most notorious guerrilla leaders of all time — Abd-el-Kader, the Emir of Oran.

The French conquest of Algiers in 1830 might well have brought about the pacification of the whole territory had Abd-el-Kader been handled with a little more consideration and dexterity. As it was this descendant of the caliphs proclaimed a Jihad, or holy war, on the kelb roumis, unbelievers, which he managed to keep going for just on 16 years.

With the born guerrilla's sure instinct, the Emir swiftly realised that his followers, according to Colonel C. E. Calwell in *Small Wars*, "could not safely be trained to meet the soldiers of France in open battle". But he apprehended with an equal clarity that with good intelligence — a must for all worthwhile guerrilla opera-

tions — he could goad his enemies into profitless activities that would wear them down to the point of exhaustion. Calwell says further: "His personal ascendancy over the warlike nomads of the South and the wild Berber hillmen, enabled him to play the strategist from wherever his wandering abode might be, over a vast extent of country". Time and time again his bold and sudden strokes bewildered the French leaders and caught them off balance, since the Emir's attacks were always based on full and accurate information regarding his opponents' projected movements.

The French Change Tactics

At last General Clausel, in charge of French operations, made up his mind to try the device best described as "turning the poachers into game-keepers". In other words, he set to work to recruit regiments of native troops as knowledgeable about the local terrain and as skilled in its use as the men they were destined to fight. Given the name of Zouaves, they were led by the pick of contemporary French officers; and from the moment they went into action Abd-el-Kader realised that it would call for all his skill to hold his own.

For three successive campaigns the struggle swayed to-and-fro, with honours almost equally divided — thanks very largely to the Zouaves, who could play the Emir's own game almost as well as he could himself.

Then Abd-el-Kader deserted his own principles to the point where he allowed himself to be

besieged in the "fixed position" represented by the city of Constantine. The subsequent stalemate was resolved by an uneasy truce. While the French employed the ensuing interval of queasy tranquility in seeking to civilise a people to whom the whole Western way of life was anathema, the Emir utilised it to entice the best men among the Zouaves into his own service. The French riposte was to organise highly mobile flying columns in a determined attempt to hunt down their enemy. It was to one of these formations, commanded by the Duc d'Aumale, and made up of a mere 600 cavalry and 300 infantry, that news was brought of the smala's whereabouts. D'Aumale's troops already had been long in the saddle, but there was not a moment's hesitation. The chance was altogether too good to be missed. Pushing their mounts for all they were worth, the re-activated troopers thrust on ahead, leaving the infantrymen to follow at the best pace they could contrive.

A few hours' hard riding and the smala was sighted — a huge concourse of over 50,000 men, women, and children, with hundreds of horses, camels, and sheep; a nomad settlement on the move, guarded by some 5,000 partisans. D'Aumale had only one asset — the element of surprise, and he used it to the very best advantage. Barely checking to form line of squadrons, the troopers swung into a tearing charge that threw both the swarm of camp followers and their escort into the wildest confusion.

Success was instant and complete, with thousands of prisoners and immense booty; although the Emir himself, being elsewhere at the time, escaped capture. Indeed, Abd-el-Kader, employing every ruse known to irregular warfare, lived on to offer a slowly diminishing resistance for a further three years. But with the humiliating capture of his smala he had irretrievably lost face, and his influence progressively declined. In the end he was glad to surrender to the French and live out the balance of his days as a pensioner of the power he had so long and so vigorously defied.

The Logistics Problem

Logistics constitute probably the most intransigent problem with which the partisan has to cope. The difficulty of getting supplies must always be considerable, although the airlift has gone a good way toward overcoming the worst handicaps. But even if a steady inflow of materiel can be assured, the question of storing it still poses some knotty points. Since he can have no fixed axis of supply, a sudden move by his opponents may cut the guerrilla off from his reserves of stores. In any case, dumps must be well-hidden, a consideration which tends to limit their size and increase their inaccessibility.

The problem of rations presents fewer difficulties. It can be taken as axiomatic that guerrilla activities on any worthwhile scale can be put into operation only if they are carried out in a terrain inhabited by a friendly

population, with a reasonable surplus of food, prepared not only to furnish intelligence, but to make themselves responsible for a certain minimum of subsistence.

It was the support of their own compatriots, plus the ability of the British to meet their requirements in the way of armaments — owing to their command of the sea — which rendered the Spanish guerrillas so formidable a factor throughout Wellington's campaigns in the Iberian Peninsula. Spain is a bare, arid land, and it did not lend itself to Napoleon's standard procedure of living largely off any foreign territory he invaded. In the outcome, his need to maintain his troops with food and material, transported from depots on the French side of the Pyrenees, committed him to an enormously extended line of communications. These ran, moreover, through wild and broken country that offered illimitable opportunities for ambushade or the darting, whirlwind surprise assault. Even with strongly garrisoned rallying posts distributed at short intervals along the turnpikes, and heavy escorts of horse and foot troops for every supply column, the partisans, under such enterprising and resourceful leaders as Minha and Empecinado, struck with terrible effect again and again.

A single courier had to be assigned an escort of a minimum of 40 Dragoons, and even then failed, as often as not, to reach his journey's end. Marshal Berthier's aide-de-camp, the Comte la Jeune, for example, while on his way back to Im-

perial Headquarters with return dispatches for Napoleon, was captured and all his escort put out of action. Despite the fact that he had taken the precaution to conceal his Top Secret documents by having them sewn into the clothing of his body servant, they were discovered — but not before la Jeune and his faithful soldier-valet had undergone some remarkably rough handling.

Guerrillas Take Their Toll

The outcome of these partisan activities was to drain off a disproportionate number of frontline troops from the battle zone. Thus with 300,000 Gallic soldiers in Portugal and Spain, there was rarely more than 70,000 free to take the field against Wellington's redcoats; a state of affairs that had a very definite bearing on the ultimate triumph of British arms. Moreover, in the four years that partisans were active, the enemy casualties directly attributable to the guerrillas averaged 100 a day — a total of 146,000 over the period in question.

Napoleon's starving, frost-bitten army stumbling back along the interminable road from Moscow also was harried from the very outset by Cossack bands and hastily organised partisan contingents. As the official issue of rations grew more and more infrequent, a rising flood of stragglers stole away from the floundering columns to forage for food and drink. This was the opportunity for which the guerrillas had been waiting. Approaching silently through the sound-

deadening snow, they would fall on any small party of foragers, often armed with the weapons they had taken from their earlier victims. By the time the tattered remnants of the Grande Armee reached the shelter of the Walls of Kaunas, the partisans had accounted for many thousands of their enemies.

The Soviet Partisan

Russia always has been a country noted for the number of partisans ready to take the field in time of conflict. Stalin employed them on a tremendous scale as a corollary to his "scorched earth" policy. With their leaders already nominated and their structure previously determined, guerrilla bands sprang into being behind the German advance soon after the Nazi advance guard crossed the frontier. Organised into "extermination battalions" consisting of two companies of 200 to 220 men, they were armed with every type of infantry weapon available. They had all been rigorously trained, and were in touch with Red Army Headquarters by direct telephone, which had been laid and camouflaged prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Their supplies had been hidden away with equal care in the depths of woods or in remotely accessible villages.

Apart from the usual raids to disrupt the enemy line of communications, their tasks included the massacre of fellow Russians who failed to join in the resistance movement against the Germans; the destruction of plants and factories of economic

value to the Nazis; the firing of barracks and billets, and the poisoning of wells in villages occupied by the Germans.

Pinning the Nazis

Their organisations were just as active in the cities, where they maintained a network of agents who reported every enemy move. Where a town was lightly held, they infiltrated it and raised rebellion, since their prime function was to maintain a continuous state of anarchy behind the German lines. H. T. Paget in his book about General Manstein said:

"Their effectiveness depended upon their ignoring the recognised rules of war. It was their job to remain concealed among the civil population. They fought either in civilian clothes or in the uniform of the enemy. They took no prisoners. Death was the fate of the careless German soldier and of every Soviet mayor or official the Germans might appoint. In the Crimea alone they operated over thirty 'extermination battalions' in addition to 'the resistance movements in the towns'".

According to a Russian account, in the Crimea alone the partisans killed 18,910 officers and men; blew up 64 troop trains; destroyed 1,621 lorries; exterminated more than 300 "traitors", and captured one tank, 52 machine guns, and 500 horses. In large sections of the area they made it impossible for the Germans to move at night; and for long periods Manstein was compelled to deploy an entire corps against

them. General Siegfried Westphal records, indeed, that the Soviets claimed that in two years more than 300,000 Germans were killed by partisans on a single front, and while insinuating that the figure may well be exaggerated, he, nevertheless, adds that "it contains enough truth to illustrate the pitiless severity of the war in the East".

Room to Operate

Russia's enormous size particularly lends itself to the activities of the partisan, for of all fighting men he must have ample room for manoeuvre. This was the salient fact that the Boer War of 1899-1902—almost exclusively a guerrilla campaign so far as the voortrekkers were concerned—had demonstrated with remarkable clarity. It was, indeed, because the Western Desert gave them plenty of elbow room in which to turn around that the Long-Range Desert Group (LRDG) could operate so long and so successfully against Italo-German airfields, while maintaining a stream of vital information about enemy troop movements. It was all work in the true guerrilla tradition, despite the fact that the personnel of the LRDG were all serving members of the regular forces.

The same may be said of Orde Wingate's Chindits, operating behind the Japanese lines in Burma. With two broad rivers and many miles of jungle between them and their source of supplies, for months at a time they were maintained as an effective fighting force by airdrops, which attained a remarkable degree of reliability. If they proved noth-

ing else, the Chindits' activities made it abundantly clear that by transferring supply from the ground to the air the two main difficulties encountered in jungle fighting—lack of roads and the need for an excessive number of lines of communication troops to guard such supply lines as it was possible to establish—could successfully be short circuited.

It is extremely doubtful, on the other hand, if the plan for guerrilla operations, conceived during the period in 1940 when Britain was confronted with the lively possibility of invasion, would have achieved anything but a very limited period of prosperity. It would have been perfectly feasible to establish partisan groups in any lodgment areas occupied by the invaders, and by frequently changing the location of headquarters and command posts to have kept their whereabouts temporarily from the knowledge of the enemy. But with so small and densely populated an island as Britain, regular combined air-ground reconnaissance sweeps would so thoroughly have combed the countryside that prolonged concealment, even of the most finely pared-down control organisation, would have been out of the question. There was just not enough elbow room to ensure the necessary background for the guerrilla to fade into when his strike was over and the inevitable need for concealment arose.

Avoiding Major Forces

Furthermore, in so delimited a combat zone, the guerrilla would have been certain to "get

under the feet" of the troops charged with prosecuting major operations against the enemy; and that would have been fatal. For in all partisan activities it is of vital importance to ensure that the execution of a minor operation does not bring down the enemy in force on a district where a major enterprise is in course of preparation.

Lawrence of Arabia proved one of the most successful of guerilla leaders simply and solely because, where this consideration was concerned, he never exceeded his brief. Nothing would induce him to stage an operation in a zone where the British were organising the buildup for their major drive against the Turks. Neither would he provoke a full-scale battle with troops more heavily armed than his own Arab followers.

An Exception to the Rule

But there is no rule to which there is not an exception; and the "liberation" campaign against the Greeks in 1920, conducted with such brilliance by the "Grey Wolf" — Mustafa Kemal Pasha — certainly departed widely from the accepted formula.

As a red herring to distract attention from the unsettled state of affairs elsewhere, consequent upon his own muddled peace-making procedure, the British Premier, David Lloyd George, had encouraged the Greeks to try and substantiate their claims to the hinterland of Asiatic Turkey by force of arms.

To meet the numerically powerful Greek Army that

landed at Smyrna, Mustafa Kemal had to rely upon a hastily improvised Nationalist force that he found far easier to recruit than to equip. Fitted with an amazing variety of rifles and support arms, as often as not with belts and slings made of lampwick, the Turkish regulars somehow contrived to slow down their opponents' advance toward the Sakarya River. In due course, a further Turkish withdrawal dangerously extended the Greek lines of communication, adding another 70 miles to a supply route that by this time had become subject to savage raids by scores of guerrilla bands.

Political changes both in Greece and Britain led to the enforced withdrawal of Lloyd George's support for Greek flibustering in the Levant. Mustafa Kemal chose the psychological moment to strike with all the force at his command. War material had been slowly but steadily accumulating; a length of the Eskisehir railway having been torn up to be beaten into bayonets, while the missing breech-blocks of many looted field guns had been replaced by substitutes forged out of the same stock of metal. Above all, the swarm of guerrillas had been organised and brought under control, so that they could be launched in formed bodies, to supplement the efforts of the Nationalist regulars.

For the first two or three days of the Turkish counter-stroke the Greeks fought desperately to hold on to what they had won. But with the hammer blows on their front increasing in inten-

sity, and their lines of communication disrupted at a dozen points by the partisans, their resistance crumpled and they fled in headlong retreat. It was an outcome that would never have been brought about without the sterling service rendered by the guerrillas, both in partisan bands and side by side with the regulars fighting under the Ghazi's banner.

Guerrilla Movements Bring Risks

There are always grave risks attached to the encouragement of a "popular" guerrilla movement, subject to no more than quasi-official control — particularly in these days when any spontaneous resistance movement seems predestined to capture by the Communists. Of Tito's partisans it can at least be said that, until the downfall of the Nazis had been consummated, they put patriotism before their particular political creed, even if they were fighting, fundamentally, for a future Communist Yugoslavia. Equally, the Gallic Fifts of the maquis, although also eventually dominated by the Communists, fought and died for France rather than for a particular method of governing it.

But the same can never be said of the Greek guerrilla movement that was known by the initials ELAS. As John Lodwick, an Allied officer, who personally had dealings with them, has put it on record:

"The obstructionist tactics of ELAS during the German occupation of Greece, their reluctance to attack the enemy

themselves, their known hoarding against civil war of arms given to them for quite another purpose, their massacres without trial of men who may or may not have been collaborators, their wholesale requisitioning of food from a starving countryside, their gagging of all criticism, and their fanatical belief in a single party system which resembled only too closely that which they professed to abhor, were not such as to recommend them".

In the outcome, during the immediate aftermath of the war, when British intervention prevented the submergence of the democratically elected Greek Government under a vengeful tide of Communism, the British soldier experienced the dubious pleasure of being shot down by weapons which had been paid for in the Allies' gold.

Communist Guerrilla a Factor

Yet the grim and unyielding fact cannot be denied that the Communist guerrilla is a factor in present-day brush fire operations whose deadly efficiency has repeatedly been demonstrated. Inspired by a fanatical faith in the hateful cause to which he has given his allegiance, his discipline is as firm and automatic as his powers of endurance are formidable.

As the Huks in the Philippines and the jungle fighters of Vietminh and Malaya have grimly demonstrated, the Communist partisan can live and fight under conditions that would ruin the health and undermine the morale of any

troops lacking the especial training needed to encounter and get the better of him. It was not, for instance, until the paratroopers in Malaya learned to make routine drops into the tops of trees some 50 to 60 meters high reaching the ground by means of a webbing line — that they began to gain ascendancy over their wily and resourceful opponents. Guerrilla fighting, in short, is a continual battle of wits between the born fighter and the trained fighter; a contest in which the side that is content to rest upon its laurels, however briefly, is not only asking for trouble but can be sure of getting it.

Organise Now

Taking all things into consideration, it would appear far wiser not to postpone the organisation of guerrilla units until after the outbreak of hostilities, when it becomes virtually impossible to verify the character qualifications and political integrity of such leaders as may be spontaneously produced by events. Far better to anticipate possible eventualities and get your partisan forces organised in all likely areas well-ahead of the days when their services may be desperately needed. Far wiser to recruit them when the technical suitability and personal reliability of both leaders and rank and file can be investigated fully, and those selected for the work can be trained and disciplined and welded into a fully integrated fighting whole. Discipline is essential — although it differs in kind if not in quality from the more formal discipline

of conventional troops. And to blend discipline with the equally essential faculty of initiative calls for time and the most careful — and tactful — training.

In anything like suitable terrain the activities of the guerrilla can prove of the utmost value, despite the prejudice that sometimes exists against anything resembling irregulars. In all conflicts on a national scale, in which the entire resources of a people have been harnessed to the prosecution of the struggle, the guerilla has invariably emerged, and often played a decisive part in determining the issue. From Gideon by way of Robert Rogers and Francis Marion to Morgan, Bedford Forrest and Garibaldi: from Hengist and Horsa by way of Hereward the Wake to Simon Bolivar, Christian de Wet, and Vladimir Peniakoff of Popski's Private Army, the chronicle of warfare has been enlivened and enriched by the exploits of the partisan. And he has come to stay.

The Guerrilla and the Future

The armed forces of the Western allies have to take into account four possibilities: brush fire war, conventional war, nuclear war, and the broken back war that would be waged by the survivors of nuclear war. With the particular opponents with whom the West would find themselves confronted, either in a brush fire, conventional, or broken back conflict, it is a moral certainty that guerrilla activity would play a leading, and, in some instances, a predominant, part.

Otto Skorzeny has written:

"Another world war will bring the strategy of wide spaces to the fore. Long connected fronts will not exist; we shall have to think and talk of everyone being in the front line. The general will share the dangers of the private in the foxhole; battle will swirl round them both alike . . . Again, between the major war theatres there will be a wide space for lightning raids which may overturn a slow-moving enemy. By bringing into play methods which have yet to be fully tried out, another war may be ended almost before it has begun; for there is one instrument that will always be incalculable, the secret weapon — man".

This concept — which it is difficult to fault — clearly envisages partisan activities on a scale hitherto unknown.

Positive Action

Preparations for defensive measures against extremely fluid guerrilla forces represent no more than the negative side of the problem. What is required is positive training for guerrilla warfare on the part of all branches of the service; with a doctrine governing this type of activity as comprehensive as that which applies to conventional operations. For the only answer to infiltration is counter-infiltration on an even more generous scale.

In any future world struggle the Western allies would be almost certain to find themselves

fighting on their opponents' home ground — terrain that particularly lends itself to partisan intervention. The enemy would be conducting their operations amidst a friendly, or at the very least an intimidated, population. It is because they have enjoyed this advantage so often that they have been able to resort on so large a scale to guerrilla strategy. All Mao Tse-tung's earlier successes were attributable to his extensive employment of armed partisans. The debacle which culminated at Dien Bien Phu was brought about by the skilled employment of guerrilla forces against troops lacking in proper training for this type of warfare.

The Slav and the Asiatic turn more naturally to guerrilla fighting. They are thoroughly attuned to the work, and they are already organised and well-schooled to undertake it.

Western man, on the other hand, has to be carefully trained to the role. But given the necessary tuition and indoctrination, his mental flexibility and superior resources combine to endow him with considerable advantages. In the prevailing state of affairs, guerrilla warfare is not something that can be left to a few specialists exclusively trained in its technique. It is a form of conflict that all troops should have mastered. So why not set about training them in it now, and on the most comprehensive scale?

We simply dare not leave proficiency in this particular aspect of the military art to our most probable opponents.

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

Colonel R. W. Swartz, MBE, ED, MP (RL)

In the next few months the "Common Market", a subject of great importance to Australia, will be actively discussed in the press and other media of public expression. This authoritative article by Colonel R. W. Swartz, who is Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Trade, will enable officers to follow the discussion with interest and understanding. — Editor.

THE origin of the idea is difficult to attribute to any particular person, institution or organisation. However, it is fair to say that the idea of planning for political and economic harmony in Western Europe featured prominently in the minds of many statesmen after World War II ended. Concepts of political and economic unity in Western Europe were fostered in a number of organisations created in early post-war years, broadly speaking 1945-50.

Those which probably had most influence towards the establishment of the European Economic Community (E.E.C.), in chronological order, were:—

- (a) Belgium - Luxembourg - Netherlands Economic Union (Benelux) 1948.
- (b) Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (O.E.E.C.) 1948.

- (c) Council of Europe 1949.
- (d) North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (N.A.T.O.) 1949.
- (e) European Coal and Steel Community (E.C.S.C.) 1951.

Of the above (a), (b) and (e) were the organisations most immediately concerned with economic factors involved. However, (c) and (d) contributed greatly towards creating a favourable political climate for the establishment of the E.E.C.

Benelux Economic Union

This Union was something of a small scale model for the E.E.C. It provided for:—

- (a) Customs Union (introduced 1948).
- (b) Common policies in regard to employment, social services, commercial and financial policies.

The customs union has worked satisfactorily, except in the agricultural field. The movement of primary produce between Belgium, Luxembourg, and Netherlands is still strictly under control, because different price levels are maintained in each country.

Progress on the economic side has been slower, although some progress has been made towards

uniformity of wages and working hours. The Benelux Union has now become merged in the E.E.C. and in future will have to accept E.E.C. standards instead of Benelux standards.

Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (O.E.E.C.)

This organisation was set up in 1948 to administer the Marshall Aid plan for Europe. Its main functions were administration of:—

- (a) Liberalisation of intra-European Trade.
- (b) Liberalisation of intra-European payments.
- (c) Distribution of Marshall Aid funds through the mechanism of the "European Payments Union".

Recipients of Marshall Aid were required to sign the OEEC Convention and observe agreed rules regarding these functions. The OEEC signatories were:—

- (a) The "Six" or what is now EEC — i.e., France, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and Netherlands. (West Germany became a member in 1950 after a representative Government was established.)
- (b) The "Seven" or EFTA — United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Austria — and Switzerland and Portugal which joined in later years.
- (c) Greece (now to be associated with EEC), Turkey, Iceland, Ireland.

(d) USA and Canada as associate members.

Countries which joined OEEC in recent years were Spain and Yugoslavia (associated).

OEEC's main purpose originally was to ensure that Marshall Aid Funds were spent in ways which would get Europe back on its feet as a trading entity as soon as possible. The main beneficiaries were originally "war disrupted" allied countries, but Austria and West Germany were soon included. The latter's recovery was indispensable to a general revival of European trade, but political factors were also important.

OEEC trade and payment liberalisation rules required members to free trade between themselves, from quantitative restrictions and exchange controls, but not from tariffs. The trade liberalisation rules as framed did not, however, in general apply to agricultural products, particularly basic foodstuffs such as grains, dairy produce and meat.

As European recovery progressed, the European Payments Union, underwritten by Marshall Aid, became the most important European mechanism for clearing international payments. Countries which were not "war disrupted" such as Switzerland and Portugal, found it convenient to join OEEC to take advantage of EPU facilities and also to strengthen their political ties with the West. In more recent years, Spain and Yugoslavia became associated with

OEEC from political as well as economic motives.

Most of OEEC's objectives had been attained by 1958/59, when convertibility was gradually being restored, and the Western European economy had reached a very healthy state. Thought then had to be given to the part the EEC was to play in world trade affairs in the future. In December, 1959, a meeting took place in Paris on United States initiative, between representatives of the Governments of USA, France, West Germany and the United Kingdom. At this meeting negotiations were initiated, which, continuing during 1960, led to the establishment of the "Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development" in December, 1960.

OEEC may be said to have contributed towards establishment of EEC in the following ways:—

- (a) It encouraged members to "think European" instead of nationally.
- (b) It obliged them to act in concert in intra-European trade measures.
- (c) It tended to produce a "common front" in international trade.
- (d) It encouraged a common approach towards international financial questions.
- (e) It made available the working capital to make European economic recovery possible.

Australia welcomed the establishment of OEEC as a measure to restore European prosperity

and enable our wool and raw materials to be purchased. We hoped also that greater European prosperity would lead to a greater demand for our food-stuffs. In the latter case, however, our hopes have not been fulfilled because of the protectionist policies which the Europeans have maintained in the agricultural field.

E.C.S.C. — European Coal and Steel Community

The Treaty establishing the ECSC was signed in 1951 and ratified by July 1952. The signatories were the "Six". The United Kingdom was invited to participate but elected not to do so as she did not favour acceptance of supra-national authority. The preamble to the Treaty uses such phrases as "to substitute for historic rivalries a fusion of essential interests" and "to establish the foundation of a broad and independent community among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts". Specifically the more important tasks of its institutions are:—

- (a) To see that the Common Market for iron and steel, coal and coke is regularly supplied.
- (b) To ensure that all consumers within the ECSC have equal access to sources of production.
- (c) Maintain the lowest prices possible — consistent with cost considerations.
- (d) Encourage the expansion of enterprises, and promote rational exploitation of natural resources.

- (e) Work towards improvement of living and working conditions for employees.
- (f) Promote international trade, and the regular expansion and modernisation of production.

Members of ECSC have delegated powers over their coal and steel resources for fifty years to the institutions established by the Treaty. The main institutions are:—

- (a) High Authority — the chief executive organ of ECSC.
- (b) Consultative Committee — Advisory to the High Authority.
- (c) Council of Ministers — To safeguard national interests, and to some extent act as a brake on the High Authority.
- (d) Court of Justice — Mainly to interpret or arbitrate over matters in dispute between members of the community and the High Authority.
- (e) Common Assembly with the main function to receive and publicly examine the High Authority's annual report. It may censure members of the High Authority and force their resignation.

Australia did not suffer any apparent adverse effects by the establishment of ECSC. It was recognised as a good thing economically for Europe and an important step towards the establishment of Western European political harmony.

Origin of European Economic Community (E.E.C.)

The "Six", encouraged by the successful working of ECSC during 1952/55 agreed at a meeting of Foreign Ministers at Messina in June, 1955, that:—

- (a) Joint action in the development of atomic energy was desirable.
- (b) The establishment of a general common market was desirable.

Negotiations in respect of the common market continued during 1955 and 1956 and led to the conclusion of the Rome Treaty in March, 1957. Negotiations in respect of the development of atomic energy led to the conclusion of the Euratom Treaty in March 1957.

E.E.C. — Rome Treaty

The Messina Conference had proposed a "general common market". What actually emerged in the Rome Treaty was a detailed set of rules for the establishment of a complete economic union between the Six.

The Rome Treaty provides for:—

- (a) A customs union between the Six.
- (b) A common agricultural policy calling for—
 1. Common external trade restrictions supplementary to the common tariff for imported agricultural products.

2. Uniform regulated price levels for agricultural products within the EEC.
 3. Common rules on internal competition.
- (c) A common commercial policy towards third countries.
 - (d) A common financial policy.
 - (e) Uniformity of wage levels, hours of work and social services.
 - (f) A common policy on internal transport.
 - (g) Free movement of persons, services and capital within the community.
 - (h) Supra-national institutions to administer these policies and other joint economic activities within the Community.
 - (i) Special arrangements for the association of dependent overseas territories of the Six with the Community.

The institutions bear an obvious resemblance to those of ECSC.

- (a) The Commission — Resembles in many ways the High Authority of ECSC. It is the chief executive authority of EEC but has a much wider range of interests as it is not confined to coal and steel, but all aspects of Community activity.
- (b) The Council — Consists of representatives of Governments of the member states and is the most important decision taking institution

of the Community. Practically all important policy steps taken must be approved by the Council. It is the policy making body whereas the Commission is the executive or administrative body.

- (c) Other institutions — Court of Justice, Assembly, Economic and Social Committee, European Investment Bank.

There is also, within the EEC institutional framework, a network of committees of experts on various economic activities, to advise both the Commission and Council on particular problems.

E.E.C. — Customs Union

This aspect of EEC is naturally the one which has attracted most attention from third countries but it is important to remember that it is only one aspect.

The formation of a Customs Union calls for:—

- (a) Removal of all internal customs duties between members.
- (b) Establishment of a common external tariff against third countries.

The Rome Treaty provides for both these steps to be taken.

The timetable for the removal of internal duties is set out in Article 14 of the Treaty. The timetable was, however, accelerated by a decision taken by the Council in May 1960. Table "A" shows the position as it would have been under the Treaty, and the actual position—

Rome Treaty		Actual	
1.1.59	10% reduction	1.1.59	10% reduction
30.6.60	" "	30.6.60	" "
1.1.62	" "	1.1.61	" "

Table "A"

Proposals for a further 10% reduction on 1st January, 1962 — to bring total reduction to 40% are under consideration.

Under Article 23 of the Treaty the first step towards establishment of the Common Tariff was to have been taken on 1st January, 1962. Following the decision on acceleration, it was in fact taken on 1st January, 1961. The Rome Treaty also provides for the elimination of quantitative restrictions between Member States. The position of QR's differs from that of the tariff in that —

- (a) Under the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, member States may not impose QR's against either other Member States, or third countries, unless they are in balance of payments difficulties. (This is the general GATT rule — there are a number of authorised exceptions to it.)
- (b) By stipulating that internal quantitative restrictions must be removed, the EEC is acting in accordance with GATT rules. If the Rome Treaty had stipulated that a common range of quantitative restrictions were to be applied to third countries without defining the circumstances, the EEC might on the face of it be

acting inconsistently with GATT.

The Rome Treaty accordingly does not make provision for the application of QRs in a common form, against third countries. The circumstances in which the EEC might validly (under GATT) apply common QRs against third countries has been considered in GATT but no ruling has been obtained.

E.E.C. — Common Agricultural Policy

This policy has not yet been decided. The Commission has proposed to the Council that for a wide range of agricultural products the internal market is to be regulated by —

- (1) Uniform guaranteed price levels throughout the Community, which are likely to be well above world prices.
- (2) Levies imposed on imports, which will bring their price up to internal level.
- (3) Emergency use of quantitative restrictions against imports, if they reach a volume likely to upset the internal price level.
- (4) Overall control of internal trading arrangements, by State trading instrumentalities to be set up by the Community.

For two items protection other than by the tariff will be avoided,

and quantitative restrictions are likely to be used only in emergency.

The effect of the above could mean the continued exclusion of any large volume of Australian foodstuff exports from the EEC market.

European Free Trade Association (E.F.T.A.)

The European Free Trade Association was established by the Stockholm Convention of 20th November, 1959. The signatories were United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, Austria and Portugal.

The establishment of EFTA followed unsuccessful attempts by the United Kingdom and other non-EEC members of OEEC to establish a free trade area, which would apply to all OEEC members including the "Six" and would cover industrial goods only.

The main differences between EFTA and EEC are —

1. Membership.
2. EFTA is a free trade area, not a customs union, and certainly not an economic union.
3. In a free trade area Members remove internal duties, but maintain their own tariffs against third countries.
4. EFTA covers industrial goods only and agriculture and fishery products are excluded. No common policy is proposed for them.
5. EFTA makes no provision for common rules on wages, hours

of work, social services, competition, commercial policy and transport.

6. Control of such activities is not, under the Stockholm Convention, ceded to supra-national authorities.
7. There is provision in the Convention for consultation on matters of general policy and reference to common objectives in certain fields, but each member is free to adopt its own approach.

The plan for internal tariff elimination between EFTA members is as follows:—

1.1.60	20%	reduction	
1.1.62	10%	"	(Changed on 1.7.61 to keep up with the EEC)
1.7.63	10%	"	
1.1.65	10%	"	
1.1.66	10%	"	
1.1.67	10%	"	
1.1.68	10%	"	
1.1.69	10%	"	

The Convention also provides for removal of quantitative restrictions between Member States.

Australia — United Kingdom E.E.C.

The main problem concerns the basis on which the United Kingdom could become a Member State of the EEC.

Full membership would entail acceptance of all the Rome Treaty obligations such as, common tariff, common agricultural policy and supra-national institutions. The question is whether a basis exists for the United

Kingdom to negotiate an arrangement with the "Six" which would preserve Commonwealth interests. The Australian Government has always received explicit assurances from the United Kingdom that Australia would be fully consulted before any negotiation calculated to lead to an offer or "agreement in principle" took place between the United Kingdom and the Six.

Organisation for European Co-operation and Development (O.E.C.D.)

The OECD Convention was signed in Paris on 14th December, 1960, by all the former OEEC members. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development is the organisation which replaces OEEC and has the following aims —

- (a) To achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and employment in member countries, while maintaining financial stability, and thus contribute to development of the world economy.
- (b) To contribute to sound economic expansion in member, as well as non-member, countries, in the process of economic development.
- (c) To contribute to the expansion of world trade on a multilateral non-discriminatory basis, in accordance with international obligations.

OECD, although Europe-based, is not a "European" organisation in the sense that OEEC was.

("European" was dropped from the title to avoid giving this impression.) Its theme is rather to emphasise the role that Europe should play in world trade and development, by way of assistance to the less-developed countries.

Unlike OEEC, it provides no specific rules for conduct of international trade, and by implication recognises the jurisdiction of other bodies, such as the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade and the International Monetary Fund in this field.

The activities of the Organisation will be kept under notice with the object of ensuring that they do not impinge on Australia's legitimate trade and economic interests.

Conclusion

It is very clear that the issues arising from European Economic Integration are vitally important to Australia. The issue of major concern is whether the United Kingdom will join the European Economic Community.

Whilst we realise that such an association could on the one hand be of some advantage to the United Kingdom and would contribute greatly to the political cohesion of Western Europe, nevertheless the trading and economic interests of the British Commonwealth countries, interests which are rightfully acknowledged, should be accorded every possible protection.

The interests of the Commonwealth and the interests of Europe must somehow be combined for the advantage of humanity and of world peace.

Strategic Review

SINKIANG

BETWEEN HAMMER AND TONG

Reprinted from the February 1961 issue
of An Cosantoir, Eire

THE moderate Russian support for China in the latter's frontier dispute with India has given fresh hope to those perhaps wishful thinkers who expect friction between the two Communist principals. If there is to be friction a likely place for the rub may be the Sinkiang Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China.

Sinkiang is in High Asia, that remote and lofty region which extends from the Pamir Plateau in the west to the Chinese province of Szechuan in the east and from the Himalaya in the south to the mountains of Siberia in the north. Across High Asia were once flourishing trade routes which linked China with Europe but the discovery of the eastern sea route by De Gama in 1498 diverted traffic to the seas and High Asia decayed. For centuries "the dead heart of Asia" was an apt name for the region.

Today there are four main political divisions in High Asia, the Mongolian People's Republic (Outer Mongolia), Inner Mongolia, Tibet and Sinkiang. The first is an independent state

closely tied to the Soviet Union, the others are autonomous regions of the Chinese People's Republic. As the controversy over the McMahon Line showed, very little of this part of Asia has been accurately surveyed. Steppes and deserts give few well defined physical features on which to base a frontier and political boundaries often separate peoples who are really one in language, traditions and history.

Strategic Minerals

In Sinkiang the border with the USSR extends for more than 1,000 miles. The province is larger than France, Germany and Britain combined and is rich in strategic minerals, including oil and tungsten. Full use of available resources would enable a much larger population than the present five and one-half millions to be supported. The Trans Siberian Railway and connecting lines form an arc right round the province's northern and north western frontiers and the scanty transport facilities have been systematically oriented in this direction. The

INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES ———
PROVINCIAL BOUNDARIES - - - - -
NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES SHADED



CHINA

SCALE MILES
0 200 400 600

Calcutta

Bay of Bengal

THAILAND

VIETNAM

HAINAN

HONG KONG

FORMOSA

JAPAN

East China Sea

Yellow Sea

Sea of Japan

U.S.S.R.

(Chinese Turkestan)

SINKIANG

AFGHANISTAN

PAKISTAN

NEPAL

SIKKIM

INDIA

PAKISTAN

BURMA

YUNNAN

KWEICHOW

HUNAN

CHEKIANG

KIANGSI

FUKIEN

KWANGTUNG

South China Sea

U.S.S.R.

MANCHURIA

U.S.S.R.

MONGOLIA

90°

100°

110°

120°

40°

30°

CHAHAR

JEHOL

Peking

NINGZIA

SUIYUAN

SHANSI

HOPEI

SHANTUNG

CHINGHAI

KANSU

SHENSI

HONAN

SZECHWAN

HUPEH

ANHUI

KANGSU

SIKANG

Chungking

Yangtze

Hankow

Wuchang

Shanghai

Hangchow

Yangtze

YUNNAN

KWANGSI

KIANGSI

FUKIEN

KWANGTUNG

South China Sea

HONG KONG

FORMOSA

JAPAN

East China Sea

Yellow Sea

Sea of Japan

U.S.S.R.

(Chinese Turkestan)

SINKIANG

AFGHANISTAN

PAKISTAN

NEPAL

SIKKIM

INDIA

PAKISTAN

BURMA

YUNNAN

KWEICHOW

HUNAN

CHEKIANG

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Peking

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SUIYUAN

SHANSI

HOPEI

SHANTUNG

CHINGHAI

KANSU

SHENSI

HONAN

SZECHWAN

HUPEH

ANHUI

KANGSU

SIKANG

Chungking

Yangtze

Hankow

Wuchang

Shanghai

Hangchow

Yangtze

YUNNAN

KWANGSI

KIANGSI

FUKIEN

KWANGTUNG

South China Sea

HONG KONG

FORMOSA

JAPAN

East China Sea

Yellow Sea

Sea of Japan

U.S.S.R.

(Chinese Turkestan)

SINKIANG

AFGHANISTAN

PAKISTAN

NEPAL

SIKKIM

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PAKISTAN

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YUNNAN

KWEICHOW

HUNAN

CHEKIANG

KIANGSI

FUKIEN

KWANGTUNG

South China Sea

U.S.S.R.

MANCHURIA

U.S.S.R.

MONGOLIA

90°

100°

110°

120°

40°

30°

CHAHAR

JEHOL

Peking

NINGZIA

SUIYUAN

SHANSI

HOPEI

SHANTUNG

CHINGHAI

KANSU

SHENSI

HONAN

SZECHWAN

HUPEH

ANHUI

KANGSU

SIKANG

Chungking

Yangtze

Hankow

Wuchang

Shanghai

Hangchow

Yangtze

YUNNAN

KWANGSI

KIANGSI

FUKIEN

KWANGTUNG

South China Sea

HONG KONG

FORMOSA

JAPAN

East China Sea

Yellow Sea

Sea of Japan

nearest Chinese railhead is over 1,000 miles away. Seventy-five per cent. of the population are Muslims who have always opposed Chinese rule. Finally, geography gives this "pivot of Asia" great strategic importance.

In controlling Sinkiang, Russia's difficulty has been China's opportunity and vice versa. The province has been a Chinese dependency since the middle of the 18th century. Russian influence first became paramount about 1870. Since then it has been weakest about 1905, 1914 and 1941 when Russia was heavily committed elsewhere and strongest in 1928-41 and again for a period after 1945 when China was notoriously weak and divided.

Soviet Monopolies

Soviet penetration of Sinkiang has taken place behind a facade of non-intervention and respect for Chinese sovereignty. Joint Sino-Soviet industrial and commercial agencies were set up to develop mineral resources. These soon became Soviet monopolies and springboards for the introduction of hordes of technicians and "advisers". By 1943, a second prong was added to this economic penetration. Revolts against the Chinese administration were fomented among the nationalist minorities along the Sino-Soviet border.

The advent of the Chinese Communist Government took the edge off Soviet pressure in Sinkiang. Mao-Tse-Tung and Chou-En-Lei have had notable success in having certain

arrangements which seemed to bode ill for Chinese hegemony adjusted in their favour. Some years ago a revolt by the Moslem Uighurs was easily put down, and for the moment the balance of power in Sinkiang has tipped definitely in China's favour.

Although Sinkiang's mineral resources and living space are valuable it is fairly obvious that there is something more behind this determined Russo-Chinese tug-o-war. This something is strategic importance. In Russian hands Sinkiang gives direct access to India and Pakistan and buttresses the new republic — long a Chinese possession — of Outer Mongolia. It also covers the tenuous communications to the Soviet Pacific and the important Karaganda industrial complex of West Siberia. This last was specially sited so as to be remote from centres of tension in Europe. It cannot now be pleasing to the Soviets to have it overlooked, as it were, from the backyard.

To China, the strategic importance of Sinkiang is even greater and motivated its original conquest in the 18th century. Who holds Sinkiang commands Mongolia and who holds Mongolia commands the industrial north and Peking itself, the traditional heartland of China since the time of the Great Wall. Incidentally, the real importance of Ladakh to China may be in the fact that through it run some of the most convenient routes to Sinkiang. Chinese communications to the province are very undeveloped by comparison with those to Russia.

The stakes in Sinkiang are high and the odds against Russia not as great as they appear at present. Here, between China and Russia are various non-Chinese Asian peoples chiefly Mongols and Uighurs. In neighbouring Soviet Asia, the Russians, although as insistent on paramount power as the Chinese, have allowed minority races to keep some semblance of their language, culture and local government. The Chinese, by contrast, have a history of oppression of minorities, especially Muslim minorities. Life is tough in Sinkiang and democracy has little meaning, but the economic achievements of the Soviet Union all over Central Asia are clearly evident. The accompanying loss of freedom has not unduly shaken a people inured to hard-

ship. In appropriate circumstances the pro-Russian party in Sinkiang could be assured of considerably more effective support than that given to the Dalai Lama by his Indian friends.

Such support may never be given. Nevertheless, Sinkiang exists as an ill-defined region caught between expanding Russian Communism and exploding Chinese Communism where the backward inhabitants thinly inhabit a huge area that is strategically important and has valuable mineral resources that they cannot develop themselves. Such a vacuum invites an explosion and the real nature of the Soviet-Chinese partnership is such a mystery that the explosion may be nearer than anyone thinks. R.A.H.

The spirit of team work may be kept in being if you give every man enough responsibility to make him feel his own importance. The ability to delegate work so as to get the job done in the most efficient way and at the same time to enhance the soldier's ego: this is an ability to be developed by every ambitious leader.

CIVIL DEFENCE

IN

N.S.W.

Major General I. N. Dougherty, CBE, DSO, ED,
Director of Civil Defence, NSW

IN the conduct of hostilities a major role of the civilian population is to ensure that the armed services are fully provided and equipped for their task. In an endeavour to cut off or throttle the flow of life-blood to the armed services, an enemy may devote considerable attention to those who provide it — the non-combatants — the civilians.

It is therefore essential for the maintenance of the nation's first line of defence — the armed services — and for the survival of the nation that the civilian population be organised to meet attacks in such a manner, that with high morale, it may withstand onslaughts, repair damage to production and to the economy, and carry on.

From the point of view of those members of the armed services who may be far afield, the knowledge that an organised community is protecting their families on the home front allows them more readily to give their undivided attention to the task at hand; they would not, as

it were, be looking over their shoulders. In short, all this adds up to Civil Defence.

The term "Civil Defence" may at times create some mis-understanding. The word "Defence" may conjure up in the minds of some people a picture of Civil Defence being concerned with destroying an enemy, but defence in this sense is the responsibility of the Navy, Army and Air Force. Much thought has been given to the term here and overseas, but the term "Civil Defence" is widely used.

What is Civil Defence? Leo. O. Hoegh, former Director of the Office of Civil and Defence Mobilisation in the USA has epitomised it as follows:—

"Civil Defence properly defined is a combination of all non-military actions that can be taken on the home front to protect our nation and our people. In a time of crisis, however, everyone not in the military would automatically be part of the unarmed services, or the Civil Defence of this land".

In other words, Civil Defence is concerned with the saving of life and all those other things that can be done on the home front in times of emergency and we would all be in it, i.e., all of us who would not be in the armed services. Of course the armed services, when not actually engaged in combating an enemy, would render such assistance as may be possible in an emergency. They do so now in civil emergencies when called upon.

The Civil Defence Organisation in New South Wales is a co-ordinating authority for that State. Its aim is to co-ordinate the services of the people individually and in groups, together with the facilities existing in the State, to minimise the effects of disasters, whether man-made or caused by the forces of nature, so that public morale will be maintained, our form of Government continued and the economy of the State sustained with a minimum of setbacks and interruptions. Civil Defence is basically the voluntary efforts of people, individually and in groups, together with Local, State and Commonwealth Governments, to protect themselves, their families and homes as well as commercial and industrial establishments and other community facilities, against the effects of warfare and natural disasters.

Planning in New South Wales is based on the assumption of the use of weapons of maximum power. Preparations to meet the worst possible situation would cover those necessary to meet

any lesser catastrophe which may arise.

The Organisation is based on the following principles:—

- (a) The utilisation of existing facilities.
- (b) Departments and utilities retaining in time of war the functions which they normally have in peacetime.
- (c) The responsibility of Civil Defence to be shared by each level of Government.
- (d) Each individual to be responsible for his own self preservation.

Practically all the things which should be done may be grouped conveniently under nine headings. These are as follows:—

1 — Education of the Individual

Basically, Civil Defence is the survival of the nation. It therefore falls to every individual to acquaint himself with the effects of nuclear weapons and the measures he can take to protect himself, his family, and his property against such effects. This is considered most important. If the man in the street would learn to prepare now it could well mean, at a later stage, his survival and that of his family. There are many things which he can learn now and preparations he can make in readiness for the worst, if it should ever happen. It follows that the more individuals, who, by their own efforts, manage to survive such an attack, the more people there

will be to render collective aid to others, where this is possible.

2—Mutual Aid

In view of the extent of immediate devastation which could be caused by a nuclear attack, the far-flung effects of radioactive fallout, the disruption of essential and other services, the large number of casualties that would occur, and the sudden impact of all this on the population, it is obvious that a central authority would not itself be capable of carrying out all measures necessary in Civil Defence.

Individual knowledge, preparations and action would be of great assistance, but there would come a stage when individuals or groups would require help from outside their particular area. So the Civil Defence plan includes organisation for mutual aid as one of its basic principles. Included in the mutual aid portion of the plan are:—

- (a) Organisations within each municipality or shire under a Local Civil Defence Controller. These are being organised to function as teams comprised of a number of sections with clear-cut functions.
- (b) Mobile columns formed in country centres, or made up of contributions from smaller municipalities or shires in the form of rescue, ambulance, and other assistance parties to come to the aid of a stricken area.
- (c) Mobile columns or groups of trained people from within more likely target

areas. If warning is received these would be concentrated at a rendezvous outside a more likely target area. They could then move back into the devastated area after the attack to render succour and assistance.

- (d) Such support as can be afforded by the armed forces without hindering their primary role of seeking out and destroying the enemy.
- (e) Support as between the States.

3—Evacuation and Reception

The impulsive exodus of the city populations in times of international tension, or following an attack, will create many difficulties. It is a complex study in itself.

One great problem is that it is unlikely that we will know how much time we have for evacuation. It may take the form of strategic evacuations from target areas (i.e., evacuation of non-essential people), pre-attack evacuation, if sufficient warning is received, and post-attack evacuation. It could also include evacuation from the path of radioactive fallout. Reception and welfare are the corollaries of evacuation and careful planning is necessary for this.

4—Preventive or Preparatory Measures, Including Shelters

These are the things which can be done before disaster strikes, such as dispersal of industry and public utilities;

decentralisation; structural design of buildings; preparation of family shelters; steps to safeguard water supplies and the stockpiling of food, medical equipment and other essential supplies.

5 — Legislation

Statutory provisions will be necessary to vest relevant authority in appropriate Departments. Very careful consideration must be given to this aspect as control of the individual will be involved to some extent. Continuity of Government must also be considered under this heading. This is most important. Lawful government must continue to function under all circumstances.

6 — The Police Plan

The Police play a most important part in any major disaster in normal times. Their task will be infinitely greater in an enemy attack. Preserving law and order, preventing panic, traffic control, anti-looting measures — these are just a few of the problems. But they only represent an extension of their normal peacetime duties and all their statutory powers would be preserved. There is no doubt that it will be necessary to augment the peacetime Force with an auxiliary Force.

7 — The Fire Plan

This service may be considered in the same manner as the Police Force.

8 — The Medical Plan

As the ultimate aim of Civil Defence is the saving of life, the

medical plan is most important. The disposition and control of hospitals, the provision of adequate medical supplies and trained personnel for the treatment of casualties is a complex problem. A vast amount of work has to be done for the preparation of the medical plan.

9 — Industrial and Commercial Civil Defence

It is essential that disruptions to commerce and industry caused by an emergency be kept to a minimum, so that the economy of the State may be continued. Accordingly, plans include Civil Defence preparations in commercial and industrial undertakings to protect company personnel and assets and visiting members of the public, so that, as far as possible, business may be carried on as usual.

Civil Defence Organisations in commerce and industry, under a Chief Civil Defence Officer appointed by the company, will effect liaison with the Local Civil Defence Controller, to ensure co-ordination of activities with overall plans for the area.

In all State Government Departments, Civil Defence Officers have been appointed and appropriate plans devised for most of them.

Planning on a Local Government Basis

In the organisation of Civil Defence in New South Wales, the work previously carried out by Government officials between the cessation of hostilities in 1945 and the appointment of a Direc-

tor of Civil Defence in 1955 was of considerable value in the commencement of Civil Defence planning.

Following the appointment of a Director, it was decided that the development of Civil Defence would be based largely on local government. The Municipal or Shire Council was considered the most suitable medium for giving effect to the principles conceived. In New South Wales there are 225 shires and municipalities. Each Council was requested to appoint a Local Civil Defence Controller to develop to a pre-determined plan a voluntary organisation within its area. The Local Controller appointed by the Council acts in a voluntary and honorary capacity. It is realised that the plan will have to be adjusted to meet the varying situations of different local government areas and the roles which they will be required to play. However, the basic principles remain common to all. Thus, the local government area — the shire and the municipality — is the basic geographic unit.

Whilst as mentioned above it would not be possible for a central authority to conduct all active measures in Civil Defence, it would also be undesirable — indeed it would be impracticable — for such an authority to deal directly with 225 shires and municipalities, in addition to numerous other bodies. Because of this the shires and municipalities have been grouped for operational control, so that there is a chain of command or control.

Chain of Command

State Civil Defence Headquarters will deal direct with the Headquarters of three Zones and six Areas. The Zones are those of Sydney, Wollongong, and Newcastle, which are regarded as the most likely target areas. They contain the majority of the State's population, practically all the heavy industry, and most of the nerve centres of the State's commerce. The Civil Defence Areas comprise the remainder of the State.

In the Sydney Zone there are 47 shires and municipalities. For purposes of operational control the Zone is divided into five Sub-Zones. Three of the Sub-Zones are sub-divided each into three groups, and each of these groups is comprised of four to seven shires or municipalities. So within the Sydney Zone the chain of command or control for these three Sub-Zones goes from Zone Headquarters to Sub-Zone Headquarters, to Group Headquarters, to Shire or Municipal Headquarters. In the other two Sub-Zones the Group Headquarters is omitted.

The Newcastle and Wollongong Zones contain only five and four local government areas respectively, and here control will be exercised direct from Zone Headquarters to Shire or Municipal Headquarters.

The six Areas are sub-divided into Regions — five of them contain three Regions each, and the sixth contains two Regions. The Regions accord with the Regions delineated by the Regional Development Committee of the

New South Wales Premier's Department for the development of the State.

Because of the extensive area covered by most Regions they will have to be divided into Sub-Regions, and each Sub-Region will have in it several shires and municipalities. Thus in the six Areas the chain of command or control will go from Area Headquarters to Region Headquarters, to Sub-Region Headquarters, to Shire or Municipal Headquarters. The division of the Regions into Sub-Regions has not yet been completed.

We commenced setting up the Organisation by requesting each Shire and Municipal Council to appoint a Local Controller, who would develop the Civil Defence Organisation within the shire or municipality. It was suggested to each Council that having appointed its Controller it should regard him as a government regards a commissioner, allowing him freedom to develop his organisation in accordance with the principles of organisation being applied throughout the State.

Local Control

The Local Controller's Organisation will consist of:—

- (a) Staff to perform functions equivalent to the functions performed by staff officers in the armed forces.
- (b) The working sections of the Organisation, which are the Warden Section, the Rescue Section, the Signal Section, the Moni-

toring Section, the Engineering Section, the Supply and Transport Section, the Welfare Section, the Medical and Health Section, and the Intelligence Section. In addition there is a Headquarters Section which is responsible for local administration within the Headquarters.

In the more widely scattered shires and municipalities, the whole area is divided into sub-local control areas, each under the control of a Sub-Local Controller. The Sub-Local Controller establishes his Organisation on the same lines as does his Local Controller.

Civil Defence workers throughout the whole chain of Organisation from State Headquarters to Local Controllers' and Sub-Local Controllers' Headquarters, with a particular role, form a Service. For example there is a Warden Service, a Signal Service, a Monitoring Service and so on. The Civil Defence Services function in very much the same way as do the Arms and Services in the Army.

Each higher Headquarters will be organised on the same lines as the Local Controllers' Headquarters, with staff officers to serve their respective Controllers in the same way as staff officers in the Army serve their Commanders. In the higher Headquarters the Heads of the Civil Defence Services will be advisers to their respective Controllers, and as in the Army they will in some cases control such groups of their Services as are held in

reserve by their Controllers, or which are designated as special groups attached to the individual higher Headquarters.

Out of the 225 Councils in New South Wales, as on the 1st June, 1961, 218 had appointed Local Controllers. Some of these Controllers have progressed a long way with the development of their Organisations while others have not gone so far. Overall, the progress made with the Organisation in New South Wales has been highly satisfactory.

Regional Controllers have been appointed for five Regions. Two Sub-Regional Controllers have also been appointed to date.

Supporting Bodies

In addition to the Civil Defence Services themselves there will be organisations or bodies supporting them. These supporting bodies will include the New South Wales Police Force, the Fire Service, and the Armed Forces where made available to support the State Civil Forces. With regard to the armed forces the basis of our thought in New South Wales is that their primary role is to seek out and destroy the enemy wherever he is to be found. However, where parts of the armed forces are not engaged in their primary role, and are available, we assume that they will be ordered to support the Civil Forces in what can be regarded as their secondary role. But we consider that they must be regarded as a bonus, as far as Civil Defence is concerned. One thought here is that we must

realise that because of various factors, the relative weight we place on the primary and secondary roles (as indicated above) of the armed forces, may have to be very different in Australia from what it is in the United Kingdom, Canada or the United States.

The Police will play a most important part in Civil Defence, and since the appointment of a New South Wales Director of Civil Defence, our New South Wales Police Force has worked with the Civil Defence Organisation in the most friendly and co-operative way that one would wish for.

Although planning in New South Wales follows closely the pattern adopted for Civil Defence planning in the United Kingdom and elsewhere overseas, the factors to be considered in New South Wales are not identical with those in any other country. The United Kingdom, by reason of its geographic location, density of population, and particular form of local government, has problems which are different from those in New South Wales. This is one reason why there have been some minor divergencies from the United Kingdom Civil Defence. In the United Kingdom Civil Defence, the Headquarters Section includes, *inter alia*, Signal, Monitoring and Intelligence. Because of the importance of Signals we in New South Wales have made the Signal Section a separate section within the Local Controller's Organisation, and the Signal Service a separate service throughout the whole chain of

organisation. Because of the effects that radioactivity could have, not only on health but also on the disruption of transport, industry and the economy of the country, monitoring is considered to be of such importance that in our Organisation we have made the Monitoring Service a service in its own right, with a section in the Local Controller's Organisation. Another variation can be seen in the functioning of the Medical and Health Service in New South Wales.

In New South Wales the Civil Defence Organisation ranks as a Government Department. The Director has the status of Permanent Head of a Department and is responsible direct to a Minister of the Crown.

A Volunteer Organisation

Being a State Department, the New South Wales Organisation confines its activities to New South Wales. Members of the Organisation, with the exception

of the small State Headquarters Staff, act in a voluntary and honorary capacity out of public spiritedness and a sense of civic duty. The Organisation is being steadily developed and in those areas where emergency operations have to be conducted because of floods, Civil Defence becomes a matter of practical application.

The Civil Defence of this State, or of any State or country, will never be perfect. It must be accepted that in any area subject to attack by modern weapons, casualties will occur. However, if there has been proper pre-planning, and if preparations have been made, those people who are outside the areas immediately affected would have every chance of survival should they be prepared, and know what to do to help themselves and others. If the full co-operation of commerce, industry, public instrumentalities and the general public is received, Civil Defence will be translated from an ideal to an actuality.

THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE MORTAR SECTION

Lieutenant K. H. Jackson,
Royal Australian Infantry

**"The enquiring mind is never satisfied with things as they are.
It is always seeking ways to improve".**

THIS article is concerned with the Mortar Section of the weapons platoon, since it is this unit more than any other, with which the company commander must familiarise himself. Its tactical significance must be realised in siting and employment, and its capabilities and characteristics must be understood to enable it to be used to advantage. This article deals with the existing organisation of the mortar section in personnel, weapons and vehicles, special points applicable to the mortar section, and finally the wireless net with suggested amendments and the reasons for them.

Command and Control of Mortar Fire

It is perhaps in defence more than in any other role, that the problems of characteristics and employment are more involved and likely to produce more discussion; for instance, whether the mortars of the battalion should be sited so as to remain under command of their "parent" company or concentrated in:—

- (i) four platoons of four mortars;
- (ii) two platoons of six, and one of four;
- (iii) two platoons of eight.

The arguments for or against any of these solutions depend upon whether one is a rifle company commander, a mortar platoon commander, a commanding officer or an interested theorist. For simplicity, and on principle, I consider that since the section has been placed under command of the rifle company commander, there it should remain. Any change in command should remain the prerogative of the "owner" company commander, at least until the use of the weapons platoon in all phases of war is thoroughly tested, and the results reconciled by the people immediately concerned with them.

When considering the weapons platoon, the following problems will be dealt with; firstly, the deployment of personnel within the company, secondly fire plans, and finally the siting of the mortar section.




Figure 1 — Organisation of the Weapons Platoon

Personnel

The weapons platoon commander can become a "battle second-in-command" to the company commander. The need for this is emphasised by the larger size of the company command post, due to more attached personnel, and the fact that the company second-in-command will rarely be at the command post — his duties will require him elsewhere. The CSM, with a larger ammunition requirement due to the weapons platoon, will probably also be absent, particu-

larly now that the ammunition is supposed to be no longer the concern of the RSM.

This additional company officer at the command post can therefore provide an invaluable "aide" to the company commander.

It is suggested that, further to the idea of using the weapons platoon commander as a "battle second-in-command" to the company commander, the weapons platoon commander should be the senior Lieutenant

in the company. To him the company commander can delegate the command post duties in relation to:—

Marking of maps and preparation of reports.

Fire plans in co-operation with FOO and an Armour representative.

Siting of mortar section and normal weapons platoon responsibilities as its platoon commander.

Siting of all company anti-tank weapons in co-operation with the anti-tank platoon commander.

This releases the company commander for other important tasks.

The MFC is also in or near the command post. I place him here because any fire orders received from platoons must be checked for priority by the company commander before release to the mortar line. For speed, essential in calling for fire, the MFC should be within voice distance of the company commander to avoid relaying messages.

The OP will initially be responsible for assisting in the FC in registering the company DF and DF SOS tasks, allotted by the company commander, and then will act as relief for the NCO in charge of the mortar line, and perhaps as an MFC on special patrol tasks.

Fire Plans

These pose specific problems in defence and must be co-ordinated by:—

- (a) The CO laying down arcs of mortar fire responsibility to company commanders.
- (b) The mortar platoon commander's overall decisions regarding responsibility for engagement of targets, e.g., often the target of one company can well be given to another company on a priority basis, where two targets are sufficiently close to each other.
- (c) Stabilising the DF and DF SOS code names throughout the battalion to avoid possible confusion, due to the number of fire tasks possible. Each company therefore has fixed DF and DF SOS code names. The battalion commander has a regiment of field artillery under command and, in addition, the six mortars from the mortar platoon, which if the above points are followed, need only superimpose its fire on the rifle company's DF or DF SOS tasks. The battalion commander can allot other tasks to the mortar platoon secure in the knowledge that his company commanders have co-ordinated the mortar DF fire plan.

Siting

Infantrymen have a traditional dislike for being responsible for the protection of mortars and similar weapons, because of their characteristic of "drawing the crabs". However, all troops must be taught to appreciate mortars, and a most effective method already proved

is to illustrate its effect and results by fire-power demonstrations, and training as many soldiers as possible in the introductory handling of the mortars by a short mortar course.

Once the troops are taught to appreciate the usefulness of this weapon, they do not mind having to vary normal tactical considerations to comply with the requirements of siting the mortars within the company locality.

Integration

These points are considered necessary for the close integration of the weapon platoon within the rifle companies:—

(a) Rifle platoon commanders must be more aware of the characteristics of mortar fire and how to control it than has been the case in

the past. Since these weapons now "belong" to the company, all members of the company can rely on the fact that mortar fire is always available immediately on call. The request need go no further than the company commander. The mortar is now a more "personal" weapon than has previously been the case, so that, to use it to full advantage, platoon commanders must ensure that all ranks are aware of its value.

(b) All ranks must be trained in rates of advance when supported by mortar fire, and limitations of mortars due to weight and ammunition re-supply. This may affect the marching speed




FIGURE 2. WIRELESS NET

of the whole company when the mortars are man-handled.

An extra set is suggested to facilitate control of the 16 mortars of the battalion. A special net is required called a "Charlie Charlie" net, to which each of the weapons platoons are attuned, with control being the mortar platoon. This enables the co-ordination of all the battalion mortars which, if necessary, can engage a single target. It also makes possible closer co-ordination of company mortars because, once having established the authority of the MFC to use the mortars, fire orders can be given directly to the Base Plate positions of the companies concerned. When the need for such close co-ordination

is realised, extra sets will be required for this separate net.

The call signs have been amended because the Base Plate position acts as control, for the three sets total a complete and closed net, relieving the necessity for a call sign at the base plate position.

Conclusion

Although company commanders are perhaps faced with greater problems with the addition of the weapons platoon, the obvious advantages of increased fire-power and an additional officer at his command post, far outweigh the difficulties experienced in siting.

The company commander, with "personal" artillery, achieves the Pentropic aim of a





FIGURE 3 WEAPONS PLATOON WIRELESS NET.

FIGURE 4
BATTALION MORTAR NET



mobile, hard-hitting, independent company group, more truly than any other change the rifle company has undergone. All that is required is a thorough realisation of what is involved, to enable a close "mortar con-

sciousness" to permeate the personnel of this company.

"Above all let us not be afraid to try something new".


(F. M. Lord Wavell).

COMPETITION FOR AUTHORS

The Board of Review has awarded monthly prizes of £5 for the best original articles published in the July and August issues to:—

July: "CMF Recruiting" by Lieutenant Colonel H. L. Sabin, Royal Australian Infantry.

August: "The Ubiquitous Infantry" by Colonel M. Austin, Australian Staff Corps



**THE STORY OF THE
FRENCH FOREIGN LEGION,**
By Edgar O'Ballance. (Faber and
Faber, 24 Russell Square, London.)

Perhaps no military organisation in the world has been so romanticized in English fiction as the French Foreign Legion. Novels of the *Beau Geste* type have enjoyed immense popularity; some of them have attained "best seller" stature and have been adapted for stage and screen. These often highly-coloured accounts of endless marches across burning sands, heroic defences of desert forts, romance and intrigue, have tended to obscure the real character of the Legion, its work and its place in the French Army. Now Major O'Ballance, with the assistance of the Legion records office, has written a factual, down-to-earth regimental history, probably the first authentic and complete story of the Legion to appear in English.

The regimental history of the French Foreign Legion is the story of a world-famous corps of mercenary soldiers, the last of a long line of bands of free-lance troops fighting for a country other than their own. The Legion is a relic of the days when the employment of large numbers of foreign mercenaries was common

practice in Europe. In today's world of great national armies it is unique in that it is a mercenary corps in which all the other ranks and about one-third of the officers are foreigners.

The Legion was formed in 1831 soon after the last of the old foreign mercenary units serving with the French Army had been disbanded. Unskilled in any other trade, these unemployed soldiers constituted a needy and potentially dangerous element in Paris and other large cities. At the same time France had just begun her Algerian adventure, which was not at all popular and which was likely to lead to political trouble if French casualty lists got too big. It is believed that Marshal Solt, Wellington's old opponent in Spain, suggested that two birds might be killed with one stone by enlisting the unemployed soldiers, and any other foreigners who offered themselves, for service in Algeria.

The Legion got away to a bad start, for the enlistment and movement procedures were extremely casual, and it was a motley, ill-disciplined mob that concentrated in Algeria. Strong, able leadership eventually produced order out of chaos and raised the Legion to a reasonable

degree of efficiency. In the meantime, however, it has gained such an evil reputation for brawling, drunkenness and ill-discipline that the authorities hesitated for a long time before committing it to action. When they at last did so it proved its fighting ability in several engagements.

Besides being involved in most of France's colonial wars, from the early days in Algeria to the conflict raging there at the present time, the Legion fought in Spain, Mexico and the two World Wars.

One of the Legion's most colourful regimental customs originated in Mexico. A company commanded by a Captain Danjau was ambushed in rough, swampy terrain by a much larger Mexican force. Danjau managed to withdraw to a farmhouse named Camerone. Although surrounded and repeatedly assaulted by overwhelming numbers, the company firmly refused to surrender and fought it out to the bitter end, there being only three survivors. The next day a relieving force arrived, and when clearing the battlefield found the artificial hand of Captain Danjau. This relic of an heroic episode now rests in the Hall of Honour at the Legion's headquarters at Sidi Bel Abbes. Each year on "Camerone Day" the Legion parades ceremoniously, an account of the action is read out, and Captain Danjau's hand is paraded before the troops. The action as Camerone set a standard for the Legion — no surrender in any circumstances.

Why do men join the French Foreign Legion? While a few

may seek obscurity in its ranks for political or personal reasons, most join simply because they like soldiering. Since they are foreigners, the well-spring of their morale is in the Legion itself rather than in national loyalty. The Legion is their country and their home. They fight for the Legion rather than for France. In return, the Legion fiercely protects every member against all enquiries from outside. When the Legion accepts a recruit, it accepts the name and personal particulars he gives and firmly refuses to answer any enquiries about him.

Major O'Ballance shows that life in the Legion is mostly straight, hard soldiering, and that from the time of its establishment until the present day the Legion has had a very generous share of the "rough stuff" in France's wars. To anyone interested in soldiers and soldiering, his story is no less fascinating in its own way than any *Beau Geste* of fiction.

— E.G.K.

MEN IN UNIFORM — *Military Manpower in Modern Industrial Societies*, by M. R. D. Foot. (Published for the Institute for Strategic Studies by Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 20 New Bond Street, London W1.)

In this readable and useful book the author examines the various methods that modern industrial states adopt to man their armed forces. He discusses the basic military, economic, political and social problems of manpower planning, and shows

why the Western nations will probably need to keep more men under arms in the 'sixties than they did in the 'fifties.

This is the first time to my knowledge that an author has brought together in one volume a comparison of the relative merits of the recruiting systems open to modern nations — full scale conscription, voluntary regular service, universal service as we know it in Australia, citizen forces, selective service, or some combination of these. He discusses the strengths and weaknesses of each system, and shows what kinds of strategy each can serve.

In view of the changing strategic pattern in Asia and the Pacific, this subject is immensely important to the Australian soldier, and a study of this book will provide him with much useful information on which to base his ideas for the future development of our armed forces. Since the most successful commanders are those who "think ahead", and since our strategic needs are bound to change, perhaps sooner than we expect, we ought to be giving some thought to the kind of army we may need to meet the changes. In discussing this aspect of the Australian military problem, Mr. Foot asks:—

"An interesting concluding problem is this: are the existing Australian forces anything like large enough to meet the demands that changed political circumstances in south-east Asia may make on them? Should the British find it even harder to maintain air and naval forces in the south-west Pacific, which is

not improbable; and should Communist China or capitalist Japan embark on a frankly expansionist southward drive; would the current Australian manning system provide an adequate counter?"

A point made by Mr. Foot, and one that is often overlooked by many Australian officers, is that a nation's manning system derives from its past history and present social and economic structure, as well as from its military needs. More attention to this fact would, perhaps, save us from dreaming about the sort of army we are not likely to get.

In a table of comparative strengths, Mr. Foot gives us some interesting figures. For example, Israel, with a population of 2.1 millions, has 300,000 persons, or 14.15 per cent. in her armed services. With the exception of a very small regular staff, these are all citizen force personnel, all at twelve hours notice, whose worth was demonstrated in their recent victory over Egyptian forces in Sinai. Switzerland has the next highest percentage of her population — 7.63 — in her citizen forces which, over a long period, have achieved their object of persuading potential invaders that the game was not worth the candle. The table also gives some interesting figures about comparative rates of pay.

One of the chief characteristics which distinguishes modern armed forces from those of the past is the very high proportion of skilled tradesmen required to operate and maintain the complicated appliances with which

they are equipped. In securing the services of such tradesmen the armed services come into direct competition with private industry. Mr. Foot discusses this problem at some length, and shows us the methods with which some other countries are trying to cope with it.

It may be cold comfort to Australian officers to learn that other countries have military manpower problems similar to our own. However, a study of this book will, perhaps, suggest to us some new lines of attack on the problem in all its aspects. At the very least the information contained in the book constitutes most useful background knowledge for all those who are thinking, and who ought to be thinking, about our future defence problems and how we are going to raise the armed forces to cope with them. — E.G.K.

MEDICAL SERVICES OF THE RAN AND RAAF, Vol IV of Series 5 (Medical), Australia in the War of 1939-1945. (Australian War Memorial, Canberra, and Angus and Robertson Ltd., Sydney.)

Although this volume, which completes the Medical Series of the official history of Australia in the War of 1939-1945, is primarily concerned with the medical services of the RAN and RAAF, it contains much that is of great interest to the Army. One section is devoted to a very full account of women in the medical services, including chapters on the Australian Army Nursing Service and the Australian Army Medical Women's Service. Other chapters deal with

the work of Australian hospital ships and the rehabilitation of the sick and wounded.

In view of the emphasis placed today on the air evacuation of casualties, careful study of the sections dealing with the pioneering work in this field will, perhaps, help us to avoid some of the difficulties that can arise if proper arrangements have not been made to cope with them. Like most other things in war, successful air evacuation depends on forethought and sound planning.

The first Australian unit specially organised for air evacuation of casualties was No. 1 RAAF Air Ambulance Unit which arrived in the Middle East in July, 1941. Although hampered by the shortage of suitable aircraft, the unit evacuated some 9,000 casualties from forward areas and demonstrated the practicability of this method of evacuation.

In the New Guinea campaigns of 1942 evacuation by sea was impossible and evacuation by land along the Kokoda Trail on the shoulders of native bearers was too long and rigorous for wounded men. The sudden demand for large scale air evacuation thus created caught the Australian and American medical services unprepared. They had no organisation or medical personnel available for caring for patients in flight, nor any specially fitted aircraft. In many instances experienced medical personnel were not available to superintend the loading of casualties, and few medical attendants were available to

attend to them during the flight. The air crew had to do the best they could with their aircraft medical kits. In 70 days some 13,000 casualties were evacuated under these primitive conditions. The lessons learnt in this sudden emergency were successfully applied in the later New Guinea campaigns, and in the rapid evacuation of prisoners of war from south-east Asia and Indonesia at the termination of hostilities. It is important that these experiences should not be forgotten.

This volume is presented in the same excellent format of all the other volumes of the official history, and makes a welcome and informative addition to the story of Australia's effort in the War of 1939-1945. —E.G.K.

WE WERE ONLY HUMAN, by Peter Ustinov. (William Heinemann Ltd., London, and 317 Collins Street, Melbourne.)

This slim volume can be described as a most unusual book. Unusual because it is produced by a man who is better known as an actor and playwright rather than a graphic artist. Unusual in that it consists of 23 drawings (a round two dozen if one counts the cover) with a preface.

Over the last few years books of cartoons by famous artists, Fougasse, Pont, Charles Adams, Giles, Bentley and Emile Mercier, to name but a few, have proved very popular. Usually they are printed by kind permission of "Punch" or "New Yorker". As these drawings are printed with-

out any acknowledgement it is assumed that they have not previously been published. They are not cartoons — just drawings.

The book can be considered under three headings; Art, Message and Timing.

Art can be summed up in three words. It is not. The average person on looking at the drawings will say "my kid can draw better than that", which could and could not be true. One can see that Mr. Ustinov has studied certain Germanic or Aryan types and can even put a name to some of the portraits. In some of the drawings Mr. Ustinov has got an effect that no child could attain whilst others just don't convey anything. One salient technical point that emerges is that Mr. Ustinov is right-handed.

The Message. This phrase covers a multitude of sins. It can mean just that or the idea. These days one is presented with "messages" in many shapes and forms. The message in this book would appear to be a matter strictly between Mr. Ustinov and the reader. The character of the reader can make him view the "villains" portrayed as misguided, unfortunate, victims of circumstances, misunderstood, criminal or perhaps even heroes. As for the idea — if the book sells then the idea is without doubt good.

Timing is perhaps a big point. Glancing at the book the first impression is that it is out of date. It would have been an excellent idea fifteen or so years ago. The characters portrayed, the Nazis, were then known to

everyone. These days a large percentage have forgotten the Nuremberg trials whilst a possibly larger percentage have never heard of them. Israel is trying, (whether rightly or wrongly is not the issue here), to revive these memories. The timing could perhaps be considered in the light of the Eichmann pantomime.

Perhaps the most terrible part, and the book is designed to illustrate something terrible, is that one has merely to remove the signs of Nazism and apply the appurtenances of some other political or national faction and here we all are again.

The book is a personal matter in that you interpret it your own way. The only military aspect is the cover picture which, from a technical military and historical point of view, is wrong anyway. The whole matter can be summed up with the words of the title "we were only human" and the sad part is that people continue to insist on being human.

— G.M.C.

FOR A NOBLE CAUSE, by Pierre Boule. (Secker & Warburg, London, and William Heinemann Ltd., 317 Collins Street, Melbourne.)

M. Boule tells here a story every bit as powerful as that told in his best selling novel "The Bridge on the River Kwai". In that story he created in the British Colonel an unforgettable portrait of a man with an obsession.

He has done very much the same thing in "For a Noble Cause", but with a difference. The Colonel actually built his bridge, whilst the thirst for heroism which was the obsession of the young writer Cousin, was something that could be realised only in his own imagination.

Cousin was a dreamer, with a strong belief in himself as a brave man, but a coward at heart. His skill in transmuting fiction into reality was such that after his escape from France in 1940, he completely deceived the British Intelligence Service, and was accepted for service as a secret agent. Even after the disastrous failure of his first mission, he succeeded in partially deceiving the authorities again.

Five people saw him for what he was; Morvan, the Breton peasant who was his assistant — Morvan's sister and redoubtable old mother — Dr. Fog, the British psychiatrist who watched Cousin's performances from a distance — and Colonel Gleicher of the German Abwehr.

All these characters assist in painting a vivid picture of the man of shameful deeds and glorious imaginings. Only in the last chapter of the book does he achieve a kind of real heroism, and Dr. Fog knows why. He would betray anybody else, but in the end preferred death to the destruction of the image he had created for himself.

— Major W. C. Newman.