AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL



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FRONTISPIECE

On 7 December 1941 the Japanese, without any declaration of war, launched a carrier-borne air attack on Pearl Harbour which crippled the American Pacific Fleet. Simultaneously they landed in northern Malaya and moved against the Philippines, Guam and other American bases in the Pacific. With astonishing speed they captured Singapore, the Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia), and proceeded to establish a defensive perimeter around their conquests, stretching from the Kuriles through the Marianas, the Marshalls and the Carolines to Rabaul. Then, in order to sever American communications with Australia, they attempted to extend the southern end of their perimeter by occupying the Solomons, Port Moresby and Milne Bay. This attempt was defeated by Australian and American forces.

In the following months the Allies built up their strength, and in June 1943 launched the counter-offensive which eventually carried them eastwards through the central Pacific and northwards through New Guinea and the Philippines to the islands immediately south of Japan. By mid-1945 they had built up sufficient strength to mount an invasion. However, this venture was rendered unnecessary when Japan agreed to surrender on 10 August after the Americans dropped the first two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The formal instrument of capitulation was signed on board USS *Missouri* in Tokyo Bay.

The picture shows the late Field Marshal Sir Thomas Blamey signing the document on behalf of Australia.



Photo Australian War Memorial, Canberra.

USS "Missouri"

AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

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S A S
RECONDO TRAINING

Major L. G. Clark, MC,
Royal Australian Infantry

1 SPECIAL Air Service Company, Royal Australian Regiment, conducts regularly a three weeks unit course, known as Recondo, which employs a new approach to satisfactorily training an infantryman in time of peace.

One tried and known way of training a soldier is to methodically instruct him in all aspects of the subject, and then take him on an exercise where he can put into practice all he has learnt. On a Recondo course, instruction is cut to the barest minimum, and the soldier is thrown into a rough combat simulated series of patrols where he is challenged to show that, through applying common sense, and by learning from his own and other's mistakes, he has the ability to master any situation, no matter how tough, dangerous or exhausting. In the process, unknowingly, he absorbs, in a short time, knowledge and experience which otherwise may take months to acquire. Recondo implies a challenge.

The principle of Recondo is used in 1 SAS Coy RAR to train patrol leaders, although it could be used for many other types of training. A hybrid word formed by amalgamating Reconnaissance and Commando, and intended to conjure up in the mind some of the glamour that may be associated with these words, Recondo adequately describes the period students spend on this non-stop unit course, during which all of the lessons and techniques required on a patrol behind enemy lines are absorbed.

The Recondo course is realistic, tough, and to a degree hazardous. It is the closest approach to combat conditions that can be achieved in peacetime. The number and variety of situations faced by a student equal those which a soldier would gain in two or three campaigns. Fatigue, thirst, hunger, the necessity for quick, sound decisions and the requirement for demonstrating calm, forceful leadership under conditions of stress are all encountered. Here an individual student, selected with no notice and at any time, must impose his personality and will on others to achieve the patrol mission. He operates mostly at night, every night, under adverse conditions of weather and ground when the physical condition of his men at times approaches exhaustion. They are constantly harassed by an active "enemy" which forces them into unexpected situations calling for prompt valid decisions.

To emphasize the real lessons that are gained, statements of various impressions by young potential

patrol leaders are recorded after the course. Some quotations follow:—

One student doubted the need for revision: "The first four days were spent in recapitulation of all the patrol tcehniques, which most students usually consider they knew anyhow. Instruction is from first light to usually after midnight. Every word is of value on the subsequent patrols, but the student is required to force himself to be attentive, otherwise he may miss a point vital to his subsequent patrol leading. On the last of the four nights, students do an actual fighting patrol, and on return at 0200 hours are raced by vehicle one hundred and thirty miles to the middle of a "Combat Area" in the Collie forests, and straightaway briefed for a night of patrol."

Endurance was the main impression of another:—"The first four patrols were arranged so that it was almost an impossibility for us to get any sleep whatsoever. As soon as we came back from one patrol action we were briefed, passed warning orders, presented patrol orders, issued equipment, rehearsed, and sent back out on a patrol. During the period covered by these four patrols, most of us went approximately 90 hours without sleep. In subsequent operations we averaged about four hours sleep per twenty-four hours. Moreover, we were usually hungry.

"The fatigue was so great that we were always concerned about falling asleep and being left behind by the patrol. Since all the patrols were tactical, no lights of any kind were permitted; we all wore small luminescent discs on the back of our caps in order to be readily seen by the man directly behind. The main goal of every man was to keep the dancing bluish white glow in sight—the closer the better. The dread of spending a night alone in the wilderness kept us bunched up in patrol file; when the patrol would suddenly halt, we would bump into the individual in front.

"Since the patrols were conducted under combat restrictions, complete silence was observed. Many of us felt that if we could have talked to the other patrol members while out on patrol the loss of sleep wouldn't have bothered us as much as it did, but as it was, we were forced to maintain silence, and this restriction enhanced the difficulty of keeping awake."

Altogether seven patrols were undertaken, each emphasizing a different technique, e.g.:

(a) Problems of rallying after a night parachute jump by a patrol.
(b) Problem of command and movement when the patrol is acutely seasick.
(c) Method of dealing with a clandestine agent who turns unco-operative.
(d) How to organize a night parachute resupply, when the patrol is out of food and water.
(e) Combat river crossings without boats, and when the enemy is waiting for you on the other side.
(f) Resection by night when dropped on the wrong DZ by helicopter.
(g) Capture of an enemy general at his own heavily guarded headquarters.
(h) Problem of resisting interrogation as a PW, how to escape, and then how to survive and navigate back to our FDL's.

(j) Pitfalls of night amphibious operations.

With the discomforts of lack of rest, the cold, the heat, the mosquitoes, the lack of water and food, the constant movement, the harassing enemy, a student was still required to command his fellows at any time, but usually change in command occurred when the patrol's morale was at the lowest.

But *the problems of command* were not the only ones:—"Many men reported 'sightings' (hallucinations) while out on patrol in the swamps. Merry-go-rounds, sports cars, tanks, and parades were reported at *various times.* (*I had* three different hallucinatory experiences. I once saw my wife sitting in a tree, another time a white trellis covered with red roses, and once returning to the beach after a four-day problem *saw people running* across the waves.)

Each phenomenon would last but a few seconds, but when it occurred the 'seer' would halt the patrol and point out his sighting to the others."

Many of the men associated the unusual behaviour with the possibility of breakdown. Such comments as: "If I get through tonight I'll be OK," or "Tonight's it; I know I'm going to flip" are illustrative. Yet there was no anxiety about having a breakdown or a hallucination; it was felt that such occurrences were beyond personal control. In fact, some men looked forward to having an hallucination or some strange psychological experience, because it would give them something to talk about and enable them to become the centre of attention for a short period of time. A few exhibited the need to talk about how miserable they felt. They constantly cornered other men and asked them how they felt, apparently wanting confirmation that they weren't the only ones who were experiencing d i s c o m f o r t. The chronic complainers felt the treatment received in the course was inhumane and unnecessary in a training situation, and managed to alienate themselves from the others, who were undergoing the same discomforts and weren't complaining.

Under these conditions, some men misunderstood flare signals, some became separated from their teams, and some became excited and fired upon the enemy prematurely, thereby *jeopardizing the security* of the patrol. On these raids we were to act in as tactical a manner as possible. While most men did assume the proper firing position, some men merely discharged their weapons in *the air without any regard for the* enemy or the objective. Some men didn't fire at all. At times confusion was so great that men even had to be ordered to take their assigned positions.

At another time the lesson to be learnt didn't require any teaching:—

"The patrol was required early that night to hold for several hours a feature overlooking a road junction. We had been on the move for four days, and I had had no more than a total of five hours sleep. I finished my reserve water bottle that morning and I was limping badly from a large raw blister on my left heel. The enemy attacked our feature as we were ready to withdraw over the eight miles of sand dunes to the sea, for exfiltration at 0300 hours by DUKW. During the attack one of the patrol 'broke' his leg, and the fourteen of us made a stretcher from bush

timber, and, four or six at a time, started to carry him back. My own rucksack and rifle weighed over sixty pounds, and I doubted I would ever reach the DUKW on my own, let alone sharing the carrying of a casualty—and still remaining alert for the enemy. My first turn at carrying was agony, and I doubted I would ever last until 0300. By 0200 it was obvious we would not reach the DUKWs in time, and we would be faced with a day of harassment by the enemy, and a twenty-mile walk back through the FDLs next night. The pain in my foot, the thirst and the agony of the heavy loads made me decide that by 0300 I would be able to go no farther.

"At 0400 I realized that my problems were probably no worse than those of my fellows, and we had developed a camaraderie to see the thing through. At 0630 dawn broke, and we could see ourselves one mile from the beach-head, and the DUKWs had gone. But I knew I could go on carrying that casualty forever, for I had already passed through all the physical and mental barriers in my mind I could foresee. I realized that obstacles are there to be negotiated, and, having crossed one, got less and less in stature . . ."

The last patrol, an amphibious raid on an island off the coast, across usually heavy seas, and against actual six-inch gun positions, finally tests the stamina of all students, for two days later they arrive back at Swanbourne—exhausted, seasick, dishevelled, and often in "rags."

With what result?

"Even before the end of the course we started to evaluate our experiences. They boiled down to this. The training had been tough, but we had learned much. We had been frightened, harassed, fatigued to the point of irrationality, but we could lead small units in the attainment of a tactical objective. We had new appreciation for the basics of everyday living that earlier we had taken for granted—sleeping on a bed, eating when we were hungry, having dry socks and underwear to put on. Finally, we had gained much insight into our strengths and weaknesses, and we were much more self-confident than before training."

Another student said:

"The course offers the opportunity for every man, private soldier and officer, to know himself, his capabilities and his failings should he be called upon to be a patrol member of a patrol commander. A student can throw in the towel or accept adverse conditions for three weeks, similar to those of war, to establish what value as a soldier he is, learn by mistakes and improve his individual soldiering to become a man able to fight and not a glorified person.

"Those who qualify at the course are undoubtedly suitable as combat patrol leaders, for although the time has been short, the experience has been great."

Previous Recondo courses have brought to light the possibility that the actual combat effectiveness of a soldier can be predetermined by the results of his participation in a Recondo type course. Even after three weeks of such training, it is obvious, through instructors' observations and marks and "buddy rating," that there is a distinctive dividing line between those who will be valuable

Commodity	Total Production	Exports to Britain
Meat	£64,000,000	£24,000,000
Butter	£29,000,000	£22,000,000
Wheat	£62,000,000	£14,000,000
Flour	£15,000,000	£1,000,000
Sugar	£27,000,000	£16,000,000

Australian Exports to Britain, 1959-60
Table 1

tion. The negotiations culminated in the signing of a treaty in Rome on 25 March 1957.

The object of this treaty is to integrate totally the economics of its members. Its two main features are:—

(a) The abolition of all customs barriers between members.

(b) A single system of tariffs and quotas for all members to cover all imports from outside the area.

(c) Common policies on commercial practices, agriculture, the free movement of capital and labour, subsidies, dumping, transport and social services.

Policy decisions are taken by a Council of Ministers appointed by the member countries, while day-to-day administration is controlled by a Commission with its headquarters in Brussels. Disputes are settled by a Court of Justice of seven judges appointed by the member countries.

Since in today's world economics cannot be separated from politics, the treaty, if it succeeds in achieving its stated aims, must in the long run have important effects on European political life. While political integration has not been written in to the treaty, its authors make no secret of their hope that it will lead ultimately to a European federation. In fact, if an economic arrangement of this nature is to endure, the process of political unity must move towards its completion. Some measure of political unity is essential to ensure that at a time of economic difficulty one member will not be able to take unilateral action in an effort to save itself at the expense of the Community as a whole. For the time being member countries retain full control over their own defence and foreign affairs, but as economic integration alters outlooks and interests, these too will tend to become the subject of common policies.

The experiment has been an immense success. Already the Community is more than 80 per cent. self-sufficient in primary production. while its secondary production continues to expand at a spectacular rate. The Community is steadily building a new European politico-economic system which when completed will match anything now existing in the world.

Because of her economic and other interests in the British Commonwealth system, the United Kingdom at first held aloof from the Community. When it became clear that the scheme was going to achieve

a fair measure of success, Britain formed the European Free Trade Association, comprising the United Kingdom, Austria, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Portugal and Switzerland. The Association has not been nearly so successful as Britain hoped. In fact, it has merely added to the commitments she already had.

The position now facing Britain is that her exporters no longer have the assurance of a steady market within the Commonwealth. Some of the newer members have made it quite clear that they prefer economic liberty of action to participation in Commonwealth preferences. Others, like Australia and Canada, are developing their own secondary industries, and thus offer fewer opportunities for the British manufacturers. Pulling against these dwindling interests is the powerful magnet of the Common Market, a community of 168,000,000 people with a booming economy.

Apparently the British Government has decided that unless Britain joins the Community she will lose her position of leadership, and will in time find herself practically excluded from the European market. At the same time she is loath to forgo her Commonwealth preferences or to jeopardise her own agricultural industry by opening it to competition from European farmers.

Reports from London suggest that Britain is going to attempt to negotiate modifications to Commonwealth preferences as a first step. Next, she will attempt to negotiate her way into the Community while retaining what is left of her Commonwealth arrangements "as a special case." However, it is not going to be at all easy to get the best of both worlds in this way, no matter how skilled the negotiators are. The European Economic Community is getting on very well without Britain, and will most likely insist that if she is admitted at all she must come in alone without any Commonwealth commitments tacked on.

Although wrapped up in many cautious provisos, authoritative opinion in London seems to be hardening to the conviction that if Britain is to hold her position in world affairs she simply must seek admission to the Community. The negotiations, no doubt, will be protracted, and much hard-bargaining will take place. In the end we may expect to see Commonwealth preferences severely modified, if not entirely abandoned. In either case extensive alterations to the pattern of our overseas trade will take place, with consequential modifications to our national interests.

—E.G.K.

27 June 1961.

COMPARATIVE FIRE POWER

TROPIC AND PENTROPIC DIVISIONS

Brigadier M. F. Brogan, OBE
Australian Staff Corps

THE sketch on page 25 shows the maximum firepower which can be developed in the new (Pentropic) division compared with the superseded (Tropical) division.

The potential firepower is indicated at maximum ranges and expressed in terms of maximum rounds per minute for rifles and machine guns and as maximum pounds weight of shot per minute in the case of bombs (mortar) and shells.

Of course, circumstances never arise when all weapons of a division can effectively blaze away simultaneously or for prolonged periods at their maximum rates of fire, and no system of ammunition resupply could cope with such a postulation. The chart does not therefore purport to show the total sustained firepower on which operational planning can be based, e.g., artillery planning ranges must be reduced, but a special effort could be sustained for a short period at the maximum ranges shown. Nor is the comparison really valid from the lethality point of view unless considerations of radius of burst, fragmentation, beaten zones, crest clearances at different ranges and other factors are taken into account. Nevertheless, as a first approximation the general conclusion can be drawn that a harder-hitting formation has been evolved. Considerations outside the scope of this article demonstrate that this has been done with less manpower and greater mobility.

Some of the more noteworthy features of the new division's firepower are:—

(a) The hitting power of divisional artillery has been increased by more than 50%, but the maximum ranges of the 105mm howitzer and the 105mm pack howitzer fall short of that of the old 25-pounder equipment by 1100 yards and 2300 yards respectively.

(b) The increase of 8 tanks in the division has brought about an increased 25% in firepower.

(c) A dramatic increase in medium mortar fire is apparent with the replacement of the 3-inch weapon with the American 81mm, which projects a HE bomb (9½ lb) 1200 yards farther than the 3-inch could deliver its 10 lb missile.

(d) In the medium machine gun field the "Old Faithful" Vickers has gone after many previous abortive attempts to dispense with this weighty, water-bearing but worthy weapon. With its demise, however, we have lost 800 yards of range and 1500 rounds per minute in divisional medium machine-gun fire together with a significant loss in crest clearance capacity.

(e) From an organic anti-tank weapon table of nil in the old division we have increased to 20 heavy assault weapons of 106mm calibre in the new. In the (unlikely) case of 100% effectiveness these weapons would immobilize 80 to 120 enemy tanks per minute at ranges up to 1200 yards.

(f) An increase of 200 yards effective range in light machine-gun capability is welcomed, as is the increase of 8000 rounds per minute within the divisional brought about by the replacement of the Bren (600 yards maximum effective range) by the American M60 (800 yards maximum effective range).

(g) Probably the most important outcome of the divisional revamping is the addition of 76 infantry assault sections to the original 324, resulting in more than doubling the rifle fire of the division.

It is possible that the artillery, tank and small arms weapons of foreign formations may still, as in the past, outrange our own, but in terms of effective density of firepower per capita the Pentropic Division is probably amongst the most lethal organizations at present feasible.



-MAXIMUM FIRE POWER-TROPIC AND PENTROPIC DIVISIONS-

Australian Staff College Illustration.

SLATERS KNOLL

Captain H. B. Chamberlain

Royal Australian Infantry

IN the great orchestra of war that played in 1944 and 45, the campaign on Bougainville scarcely rated a wave of the conductor's baton. In Europe and South-East Asia armoured and artillery formations produced their fire in massive concentrations. Air and sea armadas carried divisions into the enemy's heart. On Bougainville it was occasionally possible to muster a couple of small landing craft to place a company in a favourable position. Toward war's end in August 1945 almost two divisions were deployed. Although great progress was made in making roads and bridges and air supply became well established, objectives were mainly won at the cost of riflemen's lives.

The island is 110 miles long and some 35 miles wide. A spine of steep mountains runs roughly north and south, the average height being 6000 feet. Towards the south-west there are rich jungle plains some twenty miles wide. Through these plains runs the Buin Road, cut by fast-flowing rivers, principal among which are the Puriata, Hongorai, Hani and Mivo. This southern sector contained the main concentrations of the Japanese force. They maintained considerable dumps of supplies and equipment. The main Australian thrust developed along the axis of the Buin Road. 7th Brigade, comprising 9, 25 and 61 Battalions, assumed the advance during February, 1945.

As the Brigade advanced along the Buin Road and crossed the Puriata River small pockets of enemy were located and destroyed. The heartbreaking sameness of these actions conformed to a pattern. Scouts almost invariably became casualties in situations where an ambush was encountered. Here and there a platoon commander would go forward to reconnoitre and become a casualty. The prize of an assault was seldom greater than a couple of enemy dead and a batch of insanitary foxholes. Opposition stiffened suddenly. Larger groups of enemy were encountered. Dead were found to be wearing newly-issued uniforms and carrying weapons fresh from packing cases. Marines were identified. As the enemy tried to gain the initiative, a series of savage company and battalion actions reminiscent of the days of Buna and Sanananda took place. In one of these Sergeant R. R. Rattey, VC, won his decoration. Intelligence reports revealed that a further enemy force was advancing north from Buin. The strength was not known, but it was reckoned possibly as a few hundred. The Australian advance ceased and 25 Battalion deployed for defence. Wire was brought forward. Particular attention was paid to the Slaters Knoll area, a small



rise just south of the Puriata. DF tasks were registered, arcs of fire co-ordinated and weapon pits improved. The troops in this locality comprised headquarters and support elements. B Company, which now stood at only 2 officers and 34 other ranks, was withdrawn into the perimeter. The defenders numbered about one hundred and twenty. The remaining companies were deployed in localities several hundred yards apart. A echelon was a similar distance in rear. The defences were almost complete when the blow fell.

On 5 April a Japanese force comprising the main elements of 13 and 23 Infantry Regiments approached the Australian position. About 0430 hours they deployed into battle formations in silence some three hundred yards from our localities. At this point a Japanese soldier either on his own initiative or under orders performed an action which was to swing the balance of the forthcoming battle. He severed a signal cable leading into the objective. This act in itself may have seemed harmless enough, but among the coincidences which occur in war it helped seal the fate of hundreds of his comrades and probably his own. The troops they were about to attack were the 25 Battalion, most of them experienced troops and veterans of Milne Bay. They had already seen action in Central Bougainville and for some weeks now they had been fighting along the Buin Road.

At the time the assault troops crossed the start line an Australian signal clerk was receiving a message from a forward company. As the line went dead he knew instinctively what to do. The Command Post was notified and the troops around Slaters Knoll stood to. Almost at once a scream rent the damp air. It was assumed a sentry had been bayoneted. Any doubt of a pending raid was dispelled. The action that in fact then followed lasted twelve hours. From the time the signal clerk gave the warning to the rush of the first wave scarcely three minutes passed.

As the enemy came in they gave a tremendous shout. The call for the S O S target went out by flare and wireless. Within seconds a regimental concentration fell on their heads and the shouting ceased. For some time an intense fire fight ensued. The deadly medium and light machine gun arcs sliced in front of the perimeter. By skilfully avoiding the flanking companies he had struck at the vital point. Both sides settled down to a fire fight with the opposing troops yards apart.

At first light it was obvious that the Japanese had attacked in great strength. A casual glance could detect hundreds still in the immediate vicinity. Some had penetrated the wire and contested the occupancy of the forward pits. The fire fight continued during the day with the enemy digging in around the Knoll. They intended to stay. Casualties mounted on both sides. Not until 1400 hours was the counter-attack ready to be launched. At great risk tanks had been brought forward. There was no support from the adjoining companies. These had been effectively isolated.

A platoon from 61 Battalion held the start line while every available soldier from the perimeter deployed for the attack. Two tanks of 2/4 Armoured Regiment gave close fire support. Two-pounder anti-tank guns firing cannister added their weight. As the attack went in the scene became a heaving cauldron of noise and pain. In an area barely one hundred yards square both sides struggled for supremacy in a tumbling mass of individual fights. Within half an hour the Japanese had lost. Quiet descended. Exhausted men dragged their wounded to safety. They were quickly evacuated.

That night heavy rain fell. An occasional grenade burst as move-

ment was detected. Here and there a young soldier cried softly for a dead comrade. At times an exhausted man called out in his sleep. Soon after first light the clearing patrols met. Large numbers of dead lay concentrated in front of the position. Nothing stirred among the dismal mounds. Those who survived had withdrawn overnight.

Over three hundred were buried in three large graves. The badges of a Japanese colonel were removed, indicating that at least one regimental commander had taken part. Scores of automatic weapons were taken. An officer prisoner who spoke good English was found. Although wounded he expressed a dislike of war and said that he was a paymaster. He alone escaped burial. The Australians who died during the action were buried on the reverse slope of the Knoll.

Outstanding deeds were performed by men of both sides. A Japanese warrant officer manning a light machine gun accounted for a number of Australians while under continuous and well-directed fire. He was eventually shot from a flank. A rifleman among the defenders repeatedly stood up, taking careful aim with each shot before finally being killed. The support by tanks was a decisive factor in the counter-attack. Officer casualties among the defenders were relatively heavy. This was an unfortunate characteristic of most actions in this area.

Many more actions took place

Bougainville, 1945

along the Buin Road. Further enemy attempts were made to capture Slaters Knoll. Although Australians won some singular military successes on Bougainville the odds against them were high. The enemy knew the country he fought in and he was well led. Although brave, he behaved with characteristic barbarity. He gave no quarter, but was often shown mercy, for which he was generally grateful. Some 2,000-odd Australians were killed or wounded in the campaign. Although the Japanese casualties were considerable compared to this figure, a further 30,000 surrendered at the end. The task of destroying such a force would have been great indeed.

Along with New Guinea and New Britain, the Australian soldier was given the task of destroying a bypassed enemy. He knew this, but fought well, and was prepared to sacrifice his life. A few weeks spell at a stretch of beach was the only reward that awaited them. Under the circumstances their devotion to the task was of a high order.

Very often the task may have seemed one which could have been avoided. The necessity of freeing the native population from enemy domination was, however, both politically and humanely necessary. The Japanese attitude was somewhat different. An enemy advancing on captured ground was a challenge to his honour, which could end only in death or success.

Slaters Knoll appears on the list of Battle Honours, and embraces a series of actions which took place between 28 March and 6 April 1945. The action described was the culminating one in which an estimated 1,100 enemy assaulted the feature. Some interesting characteristics are worth mention. The position stood with one flank against the fast-flowing Puriata some 100 yards wide. It could not be outflanked on that side, but this also made withdrawal impracticable. Isolation by enemy road blocks was common. This made resupply a constant problem. Medical evacuation at all times was not possible, and this necessitated surgery at the regimental aid post. It also meant that many men could not reach the facilities of near medical units in time. The allocation of troops to guarding supply and casualty trains was a constant drain.

The action on 5 April was perhaps of great significance. It demonstrated conclusively that here was an enemy which still retained his vigour and fighting spirit. Any attempt to dislodge him with less than the maximum effort was a futile and costly waste of life. A large force had been marched forty miles complete with supplies and ammunition and directed accurately at the Australian strongpoint. The time and place of attack had been concealed until the last few minutes and almost achieved success. It was a demonstration of Japanese military skill reflecting capable leadership and resourcefulness. Fortune attended the Australians in that the enemy did not concentrate his force against any of the less-prepared positions.

AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE ENIGMA

Henry S. Albinski
Reprinted from the Winter 1961 issue of OBIS, Foreign Affairs Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania, USA

* The author wishes to express his thanks to the Council for Research and to the Social Science Research Center of The Pennsylvania State University, with whose support this article was prepared.

IN the calculations of the great world powers, Malaya and Singapore are not focal points of diplomatic and military concern. As seen from Australia, however, they are pivotal factors in the security of the broad Southeast Asian region and, therefore, in the security of the Australian Commonwealth itself. Australia, by dint of her Western origin and her geographical location on the fringe of Asia, is in a unique position among nations in the Free World's alliance systems. Still, her relations with and defence policies toward Malaya and Singapore bear elements whose significance transcends the immediate compass of Australia's security. More broadly, they symptomize the deepening dilemma of Free World strategy in an era when incipient nationalist forces, whiplashed by communism's conflict managers, are threatening to engulf the West's vital forward positions along the periphery of the Sino-Soviet land mass.

I

Australia, in her search for security, has long kept a watchful eye on developments in Asia. The events of the Second World War convinced Australians that the key to their security lay in Southeast Asia, the logical base of operations for enemies who might wish to imperil Australia's lines of transport and communications or to invade her. The Japanese struck down through the Malay Peninsula and inflicted a heavy toll upon its British Commonwealth defenders, among them thousands of Australians. They overran Indonesia, and were not halted until they had reached Milne Bay on the island of New Guinea, the northern gateway to Australia. In the postwar era new complications arose. In Southeast Asia the surging tide of nationalism battered the ramparts of the old colonial regimes. In its wake came communism, endeavouring to exploit the prevalent tensions and weaknesses of the area by both direct and surreptitious methods.

Although they may argue over the method to be used, Australians are agreed that order and stability in Southeast Asia are indispensable to their own security. The task of fashioning security policies in line with this objective has fallen to the Liberal-Country Party coalition of Robert G. Menzies, whose Government has held office continuously since December 1949. In essence,

the defence formula adopted has been that so long as Southeast Asia remains in friendly hands, defence in depth is provided for Australia, precluding any direct threat to her security except that of submarine attacks and mine-laying operations.

In order to meet this defence need, Australia in concert with her allies must protect her Southeast Asian outer defence perimeter.[1] The Liberal Government has concluded that, although the nuclear deterrent has made total war unlikely as a deliberate act of policy, "limited" and brushfire wars on the order of Korea, Indochina and the recent flare-up in Laos—conflicts fought by conventional weapons—are an ever-present danger in unstable regions such as Southeast Asia. Australia, argue her defence experts, must thwart all new intrusions of communism in Southeast Asia: "World peace will not be achieved by a series of retreats," contended External Affairs Minister Richard G. Casey. "Withdrawal at one point does not even buy time. Another crisis will follow at another point of tension. Communism is essentially an offensive and militant movement. It is always probing and attacking. There is no hope of satisfying communist aims by anything short of complete surrender on our part."[2]

The Menzies Government has cast its policies with the realization that Australia cannot undertake the defence of Southeast Asia alone—that help and pledges for concerted action from other sources, especially the United States, were a *sine qua non*. Since coming to power, the Liberals have steered Australia into two Asian-Pacific security pacts, both of which include American membership.[3] But the first of these, ANZUS, includes neither European powers with Eastern interests nor any Asian states; it is essentially a Pacific rather than a Southeast Asian mutual assistance treaty. Then, on the heels of the Indochinese crisis in 1954, the Manila Pact (SEATO) was signed. Yet, after half a dozen years of existence, SEATO still rests on somewhat uncertain foundations. The pact's *raison d'être* is the preservation of Southeast Asian security; yet, only three Asian states—Thailand, Pakistan, and the Philippines—belong to it. Pakistan is not, properly speaking, within Southeast Asia, and may have joined the pact more with a view toward improving her position vis-à-vis India than for reasons of Free World solidarity in Asia. The Philippines are at the opposite, eastern extremity of Southeast Asia, and are not geographically linked to the Asian mainland. Most of the key nations of South and Southeast Asia either have refused to associate themselves with the pact or, as in the case of the three Indochinese states, are barred from doing so

1. Philip McBride, *Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (CPD)*, House of Representatives, Vol 1, New Series, October 1, 1953, pp 915-16, and *CPD*, HR 4, NS, September 28, 1954, p 1630; A. G. Townley, *CPD*, HR 4, NS, March 29, 1960, p 648.
2. Statement of December 31, 1958, cited in *Current Notes on International Affairs (CNIA)*, XXIX (December 1958), p 808.
3. The literature on Australia's efforts to create Asian security pacts is extensive. Representative samples are Werner Levi, *Australia's Outlook on Asia* (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1958), pp 81-110; Norman Harper, "Australia and the United States," in Gordon Greenwood and Norman Harper, eds., *Australia in World Affairs, 1950-1955* (Melbourne: F. W. Cheshire, 1957), pp 157-94; Leicester Webb, "The South-East Asia Collective Defense Treaty," mimeo., paper presented before the Australian and New Zealand Association for the Advancement of Science, Melbourne, August 1955; Henry S. Albinski, *Australia's Search for Regional Security in South-East Asia*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1959, pp 248-307; 328-91.

under the terms of the Geneva Agreement.

Those governments which have subscribed to SEATO have failed signally in the task of constructing a standing military force on NATO's pattern. The United States opposed a standing force at SEATO's inception; it reaffirmed this stand at the SEATO Council meetings in Wellington in April 1959. Washington apparently considers the Seventh Fleet and American forces in Japan and Okinawa sufficient deterrents against aggression in Southeast Asia.[4] Consequently, the military side of SEATO—the basic multilateral defence system for the area —consists of little more than a set of conferences, exchanges of plans and ideas, and occasional, poorly attended naval exercises.[5] The net effect of this situation has been that, while Australia has sought an anti-communist 'defence line in Southeast Asia, there has been almost no place where such a line could be formed, and few nations interested in manning it.

II

The exceptions to this rule are Malaya and Singapore. Australians consider the internal stability and military security of Malaya and Singapore as prerequisites to the "forward" defence policy to which the Commonwealth has committed itself. They recall the pattern of Japanese military operations in Southeast Asia, and fear that a new aggressor may take the same path. The Kra Isthmus, a narrow strip on the Malayan Peninsula where Malaya and Thailand meet, seems to offer a natural defence line against any sweep from the north. Britain maintains naval and air bases in Singapore which complement and support Malaya's own defence — bases which are deemed particularly crucial in view of the erosion of British power in the Indian Ocean area. From an economic standpoint, Malaya's rubber and tin resources are of inestimable value to the Free World's strength. Singapore, moreover, is the hub of trade and communication ties with Britain, Western Europe and Southeast Asia itself.[6] For these and other reasons, Australia has undertaken a heavy commitment to protect these territories.

Concern for the area's safety was heightened in the late 1940s by the activities of Malayan communist guerrillas, most of them of Chinese extraction. It was accentuated even more by the consolidation of communism in China, by the communist attack in Korea, and then by the Indochinese emergency, which seemed to signal the crest of the communist tide in Southeast Asia. Before its fall from office late in 1949, the Australian Labor Government had met certain British requests for arm and munitions and, together with British and New Zealand authorities, had begun syste-

4. See Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' statement at the Bangkok SEATO organizational conference, February 23, 1955, cited in *CNIA*, XXVI (February 1955), p 118; Guy Harriott's report on the Wellington meetings in *Sydney Morning Herald*, April 8, 1959.
5. Regarding SEATO's military aspects and organization, see J. A. Modelski, "The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization," *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Vol V (May 1959), pp 24-40. With respect to SEATO's anti-subversion and economic activities, see M. Margaret Ball, "SEATO and Subversion," *Political Science*, Vol XI (March 1959), pp 25-39. Australia's part in the Pact is reviewed in George (J. A.) Modelski, "Australia and SEATO," *International Organization*, XIV (Summer 1960), pp 429-37.
6. See, for instance, *Melbourne Herald*, May 2, 1959; *Melbourne Age*, May 26, 1959; *Sydney Morning Herald*, June 6 and December 7, 1959.

matic defence planning for the region. In 1950 the Liberals committed several squadrons of Australian aircraft for service against the terrorists, and in the succeeding years tightened military liaison with British Commonwealth allies. Following the turbulence in Indochina and on the eve of SEATO's creation, Prime Minister Menzies declared his Government's intention to accept direct military obligations in Southeast Asia.[7] On April 1 of 1955, he announced that Australian troops were to be assigned to Malaya. Ground forces consisting of an infantry battalion and supporting units were to be supplemented by several warships and two fighter squadrons, a bomber squadron, and an airfield construction squadron.[8]

The troops were to serve a double function. The first was to help conduct anti-terrorist operations and thereby guarantee the orderly political and economic development of Malaya. In the long run, however, these operations were considered secondary to the task of contributing to a British Commonwealth Strategic Reserve for the defence of Malaya and Singapore, and for action wherever else required in the general Southeast Asian region.[9] Although Canberra's contribution to a joint Australian - New Zealand - British force in Malaya was not a formal act under the Manila Pact, it was approved warmly by both Washington and the SEATO Council as an important move toward the shoring up of Southeast Asian defences. Indeed, the Australian Government deemed its decision an integral contribution to both Malaya as such and to the Manila Pact as a whole: "They are not to be regarded as exclusive matters. They are not to be treated as some evidence that the defence of Malaya is important, but that the defence of a country like Thailand is not. But unless we (the anti-communist powers) achieve strength somewhere while we can, we may end up having inadequate strength everywhere."[10]

III

When Australia's decision was made, Malaya was not an independent nation, and her foreign and defence policies were under British management. But since August of 1957, Malaya has enjoyed formal nationhood. This fact has already restricted the potential mobility of the British Commonwealth forces stationed there, and may lead to even more drastic changes in the near future. In short, Australia must review her military commitment in Malaya; she cannot but face the possibility that her defence-in-depth doctrine may be rendered untenable.

Malaya's accession to independence meant that special understandings had to be reached regarding the continued deployment of the Strategic Reserve in the Malayan Peninsula. To this end, the terms of an Anglo-Malayan treaty of mutual defence were published in September 1957. Although Australia and New Zealand were not direct parties to the agreement, they

7. *CPD*, HR 4, NS, August 5, 1954, p 66; statement of August 6, 1954, cited in *Sydney Morning Herald*, August 7, 1959. For background and elaboration see *Round Table*, Vol XLV (December 1954), pp 62-3; Harper, *op cit*, p 180; Webb, *op cit*, pp 16-7.
8. Cited in *CNIA*, XXVI (April 1955), pp 278-9.
9. Josiah Francis, *CPD*, HR 8, NS, September 7, 1955, p 478; McBride, *CPD*, HR 8, NS, October 19, 1955, p 1659.
10. Menzies, *CPD*, HR 6, NS, April 20, 1955, p 51.

could, and in fact did, adhere to its terms. Britain and Malaya promised to co-operate in matters of Malayan external defence and in meeting an attack or the threat of an attack on Malaya. The British Commonwealth Strategic Reserve was to be maintained in Malaya and, subject to conditions laid down by the Federation Government, these troops were to conduct anti-terrorist operations. The Strategic Reserve forces could operate from Malayan bases to protect Singapore, British Borneo and Hong Kong. However, the Reserve could not employ its Malayan bases for activities in non-British sections of Southeast Asia without explicit consent from Malayan authorities. The size of the Reserve's forces as well as their disposition and location were to be determined by joint consultation. Britain pledged herself to assist in developing native Malayan forces in the form of money, materials, staffing and administration. The entire treaty was made subject to review and/or termination at the instance of either party.[11] Malaya herself chose not to affiliate with SEATO.

Australia and her partners in the Strategic Reserve enterprise can draw a large measure of comfort from this treaty and the attitude adopted toward it by the Malayan Government. The Alliance Government of Prime Minister Tengku Abdul Rahman, which has been in power at Kuala Lumpur since 1955, has taken a firmly anti-communist position, and has been on extremely friendly terms with Britain, Australia and the West generally. It has openly expressed its opposition to the "new colonialism" which it feels animates communist policies. "It is impossible . . . to be neutral when we are at the moment at war with international communism in this country," Abdul Rahman has insisted.[12] He has defended the treaty in forceful terms, describing it as requisite for his country's safety; " . . . while I am head of the Party in power, I am prepared to stand or fall by the Agreement."[13]

While the Alliance Government's attitude is reassuring to Australia, there are ominous strains within the Alliance itself and within the political matrix of Malaya as a whole which could easily undermine the position of the Strategic Reserve forces. These strains have not gone unnoticed in the Commonwealth; indeed, the volume of editorial opinion on the subject is in its own right an index of Australia's growing anxiety.[14]

Malayan society is composed of a number of racial elements which historically have failed to bring a meaningful degree of co-operation, let alone unity, to bear on the area's social, economic and other endeavours. The native Malays enjoy an absolute majority in the country by a very slight margin. Their chief antagonist has long been a sizeable Chinese community which has re-

11. See official elaborations by Tengku Abdul Rahman, Malayan Prime Minister, *Malayan Legislative Council Debates (MLCD)*, 3rd Session, 2nd LC, October 2, 1957, colms 3277-81, and by Prime Minister Menzies, *CPD*, HR 16, NS, September 19, 1957, pp 800-01.
12. *MLCD*, 4th Session, 2nd LC, December 11, 1958, colm 6028.
13. *MLCD*, 3rd Session, 2nd LC, October 2, 1957, colm 3275.
14. See, for instance, *Sydney Morning Herald*, May 7, July 15, and August 21, 1959; *Melbourne Herald*, June 13 and July 25, 1959; *Melbourne Sun News-Pictorial*, August 19, 1959; *Hobart Mercury*, August 2, 1959; *Adelaide Advertiser*, August 21, 1959; Perth *West Australian*, August 30, 1959; Bruce Grant in *Melbourne Age*, June 2, 1960.

sisted assimilation and has grasped control over much of the country's economic life. The Indo-Pakistanis represent still another distinct ethnic group. The ruling Alliance of Abdul Rahman represents a bold attempt to forge a single, supra-racial national Malayan community: in essence, it is a coalition of the United Malays National Organization, the Malayan Chinese Association and the Malayan Indian Congress. The Alliance has managed to cohere, but only barely so; already internal dissension and quarrels over the relative influence and degree of representation by the three groups have come to the fore. These differences became so acute early in 1959, when preparations for the forthcoming State and Federal elections were getting under way, that Abdul Rahman temporarily resigned his post of Prime Minister to devote all his energies to settling intra-Alliance disputes and presenting a strong case before the electorate.[15]

Australia has cause for concern over the general pattern of Malayan politics. Should the centrifugal forces within the Alliance win out, Malaya seems destined to be plunged into political confusion; and any succeeding government is likely to regard the Anglo-Malayan treaty with less enthusiasm than does the Alliance. One of the major opposition groups is the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP), whose encouragement of Malay supremacy fans the fires of communal hatred. Another party, the Socialist Front, outwardly favours communal harmony, but it, as well as the PMIP, has advocated abrogation of the existing defence treaty. During 1959 the Alliance lost control over two of the eleven Malayan states to the PMIP; and the Socialist Front made gains in other states which remained in the Alliance's hands.[16] In the federal elections of August 1959, the Opposition parties captured only 29 of the 103 contested parliamentary seats. Yet, the mandate gained by the Alliance was far from decisive: its candidates obtained only slightly more than 50 per cent of the ballots cast, most of the remaining votes going to the PMIP and Socialist Front.[17]

Its warm support of the defence treaty and the British Commonwealth troop presence in Malaya notwithstanding, the Alliance Government has not been impervious to shrill voices which have denounced foreign soldiers as an abridgment of Malayan independence, the nation's alleged estrangement from neutralist Asia, and the security treaty as ". . . a device to bind us indirectly to support colonial expansion, at any rate in South-east Asia."[18] Whether by way of concession to these sentiments, because of its own convictions, or as a mixture of the two, Abdul Rahman's Government decided not to associate Malaya with SEATO.[19] The official explanation was that "We are young and cannot afford to be associated uncritically with a Western military pact, surrounded as we are by Afro-Asians."[20]

15. *Straits Times* (Singapore), February 12 and July 21, 1959, ff.
16. For an examination of the 1959 Malayan State and Federal elections, see "Elections in Malaya," *CNIA*, XXX (September 1959), pp 475-81.
17. *Straits Times*, August 21, 1959.
18. Tuan Haji Ahmad, *MLCD*, 3rd Session, 2nd LC, October 2, 1957, colm 3319.
19. See Vernon Bartlett, "Why Malaya Does Not Want to Join SEATO," *Straits Times*, January 8, 1959.
20. Abdul Razak, Acting Prime Minister, in an interview with James Mossman, cited in *Sydney Morning Herald*, April 8, 1959.

In the meantime, Australian and other British Commonwealth troops remain in Malaya. Except for several hundred diehards still hiding in the northern part of the country, the internal communist terrorist threat has been crushed. As a result, Australian forces in Malaya are turning more and more to the task of countering external communist actions, whether they be directed against Malaya or against neighbouring territories. The infantry battalion is in constant training for jungle warfare. The air force contingents operate out of the large, fully equipped and costly Butterworth base in north-west Malaya, which places its operational units within striking range of airfields in North Vietnam and the Chinese Air Force concentrations north of Hong Kong.[21]

The fundamental question which must be asked in Australia is whether the Malayan political climate will continue to favour Commonwealth military objectives. Now that the terrorist problem is almost solved, the need for foreign soldiers in Malaya no longer seems as dramatic as before. An Asian nation is obviously more hard-put politically to tolerate Western troops which claim to be guarding against a potential threat from an undefined source abroad than to sanction the presence of such troops if they are fighting against a determined band of domestic insurgents who burn, kill, pillage and terrorize the population. Significantly, Abdul Rahman stated during his campaign tour of 1959 that his Government would consider abrogating the treaty only if the internal communist danger disappeared.[22] This condition has virtually been met; the nearly twelve year "state of emergency" officially expired on July 31, 1960. Thus, the incentive for keeping Australian and other troops in Malaya is likely to become less compelling in the thinking of the Alliance Government. Should a non-Alliance, neutralist government come to power, the incentive would vanish completely. The forced evacuation of the Strategic Reserve from Malaya would then reduce Canberra's defence-in-depth doctrine to little more than a plan on paper.

Moreover, even if Australian troops were allowed to remain in Malaya, the provisions of the Anglo-Malayan treaty could be interpreted in such a way that the Strategic Reserve could be prevented from pursuing its intended objectives. As has been seen, the Australian Government construes its troop contribution to be a responsibility incurred through SEATO membership, Malaya serving as a base for operations elsewhere in Southeast Asia. But, under the security agreement, Malaya has discretion to deny such rights to the Reserve, and the Alliance Government has insisted on retaining this discretionary power.[23] Early in 1960 the Malayan Prime Minister, in a public statement in New Zealand, promised a continuing welcome for the Commonwealth troops stationed in his country, explaining that if Malaya were attacked the bases would be used for her defence. Notable by its absence from Abdul Rahman's

21. See James Mossman in *Sydney Morning Herald*, April 8, 1959, and Guy Harriott, ibid, November 19, 1959.
22. Statement of March 6, 1959, cited in *Straits Times*, March 7, 1959.
23. See statement of Abdul Razak, April 12, 1959, cited in *Sydney Morning Herald*, April 13, 1959. Also see *Straits Times*, April 10, 1959.

remark was any mention of Malayan facilities being employed in the defence of Southeast Asia generally.[24] If Laos, Thailand, or other portions of Southeast Asia fell under communist attack, the Reserve, despite its presence in the vicinity, might not be able to help at all. If it did help, it might first need to relinquish its established Malayan bases, and in so doing render itself less useful.[25]

IV

The precariousness of Australia's "forward" defence policy in Southeast Asia is brought out even more sharply when the situation in Singapore is taken into account. The Singapore elections of May 1959 were held under a new constitution which granted that overcrowded, overwhelmingly Chinese country a wide measure of autonomy. The clear victor in this election was the People's Action Party (PAP), which won 43 of the 51 Legislative Assembly seats.[26] The PAP is not oriented toward communism. Nevertheless, unlike the Alliance in Malaya, it characterizes itself as "non"-rather than "anti"-communist. The campaign oratory of PAP's leader and now Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, and his colleagues bore strong anti-Western, anti-European overtones, and they have not muted these themes appreciably since entering office. For instance, the PAP Government's policy statement at the opening of the new Legislative Assembly proclaimed that all subversion would be rooted out. But it defined "subversion" as "any political activity designed to further the aims and interests not of our own people but of foreign powers. By foreign powers this Government means not just Russia and China, but also America and Formosa, and the Western bloc."[27] Some months later, Ton Chin Chye, the Deputy Prime Minister, announced that the Singapore Government would not hesitate to accept aid from either the Soviet Union or Communist China.[28]

The general political tone of the PAP is not the only disturbing feature of the Singapore scene. Given the status of the British defence establishment there and the nature of Singapore-Malayan relations, Australia has cause to look to the future with considerable trepidation.[29] Under the present constitution, Singapore is self-governing in all realms except those of foreign policy and external defence, areas which remain under British jurisdiction. Singapore's internal security has been provided for through a rather elaborate compromise. It is administered by a council on which Britain and Singapore are equally represented, the casting vote resting with a chairman appointed by the Federation of Malaya.

For the present time, Britain's control over Singapore's foreign and defence policies enables Australia to rely on Singapore as a naval and

24. Statement of January 26, 1960, cited in *Sydney Morning Herald*, January 27, 1960.
25. See *Sydney Morning Herald*, October 7, 1957, and April 9, 1958; *Melbourne Age*, January 20, 1958; Lennox A. Mills, *Malaya: A Political and Economic Appraisal* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958), p 149.
26. For a full discussion, see "Singapore: General Elections," *CNIA*, XXX (July 1959), pp 377-82, and Geoffrey Fairbairn, "The Singapore Elections: Some Background Factors," *Australia's Neighbours*, 3rd Series, No. 98 (July 1959), pp 2-4.
27. *Singapore Legislative Assembly Debates*, XI, July 1, 1959, colms 14-15.
28. Statement of November 19, 1959, cited in *Straits Times*, November 20, 1959.
29. See, for instance, *Melbourne Age*, May 26, 1959; Perth *West Australian*, May 29, 1959; *Sydney Morning Herald* and *Hobart Mercury*, June 1, 1959; *Observer* (Sydney Fortnightly), June 13, 1959.

air stronghold for herself and Britain, and as a staging base for the British Commonwealth Strategic Reserve in Malaya. As might have been predicted, however, the Lee Government has approached the question of co-operating with Britain in her defences with a conspicuous lack of enthusiasm. Britain already pays for the various installations in Singapore and thus provides productive labour for tens of thousands of Singapore residents. Still, the PAP Government has argued that, since Britain handles foreign and external defence policy, even the minor cost of supporting the small, locally raised Singapore military force should be borne by London.[30]

More importantly, Lee and the PAP have not embraced the concept that the vast military installations are designed as much for Singapore's benefit and defence as they are for Britain's or Australia's. The PAP recognizes that Singapore cannot stand as a viable, fully independent state, and sees the country's future best safeguarded by unification with Malaya, a recurrent theme voiced by Lee and his Government. But Lee regards union with Malaya not only as the best hope for his country's economic and political survival, but also as an opportunity to jettison the British military and naval complex in Singapore.[31]

Fortunately for Australia and Britain, the PAP's desire for union has not been shared by Malaya. Prime Minister Abdul Rahman has given an unequivocal "no" to merger proposals.[32] His attitude is governed by several factors. First of all, the addition of Singapore to Malaya would produce a Chinese majority in the new state. Even though the PAP Government has striven diligently to demonstrate its rejection of a pro-Chinese communal mentality, Malaya feels she cannot afford to add to her ethnic complex a bloc of Chinese, who as a people have earned a reputation for unassimilability throughout Southeast Asia. Then, too, the pro-Western Alliance Government in Malaya looks askance at some of the extremist overtones in Singapore's political life, at communist influence in her trade unions, and at the PAP's equivocal attitude toward the issue of communism and Britain's defensive arrangements with Singapore. It fears, with good reason, that the inclusion of Singapore in the Federation of Malaya would serve to strengthen those Malayan political forces which are agitating to suspend the Anglo-Malayan treaty.

Whether or not Malaya consents to a political amalgamation with Singapore, Australia's prospects in Singapore do not appear particularly bright. Should unification occur, the PAP would strive not only to dismantle British bases in Singapore, but also to weaken the pro-Western outlook in Kuala Lumpur and to eject the Strategic Reserve from Malayan territory. If by chance Singapore achieved full independence of her own, there is little likelihood that the British bases there would long survive.

It may well be that the PAP is currently muting its opposition to

30. Statement of Goh Keng Swie, Finance Minister, September 16, 1959, cited in *Straits Times*, September 17, 1959.
31. See *ibid*, May 19, 1959.
32. Interview with Bruce Grant, cited in *Sydney Morning Herald*, October 29, 1959. See discussions of related problems in D. W. Fryer, "Singapore and Malaya. Economic Competition or Co-operation?" *Australia's Neighbours*, 3rd Series, No. 101 (October 1959), pp 1-2; T. E. Silcock, "Singapore in Malaya," *Far Eastern Survey*, XXIX (March 1960), pp 33-39.

the bases in order to impress the Malayan Government with its moderation. Yet, there is every reason to believe that this moderation will wane to the extent that Malaya continues to turn a deaf ear to unity proposals. In the words of a 1958 *Sydney Morning Herald* editorial, "A turn of the political wheel which produced a hostile (PAP) local Government could quite obviously make the operation of Singapore very difficult, if not practically impossible," despite the constitutional "safeguards" now imposed.[33]

V

The Labor Party opposition has voiced strong reservations about the validity of the premises on which the Australian Liberal Government's Malaya-Singapore defence policy rests. These misgivings are plausible enough. Only three brigade groups of British, Australian, and New Zealand troops guard the vast distance between Hong Kong and Borneo. Air defences are even weaker; the Strategic Reserve in Malaya commands a total of six operational combat squadrons, none of which flies the most modern aircraft.[34] In the opinion of a sizeable section of the Labor Party, a Chinese attack in strength would either quickly engulf Malaya and her defenders, as the Japanese did in 1942, or circumvent, isolate and render militarily impotent the Strategic Reserve. In any event, these critics contend, with no place to which Australian troops could fall back, it would be of small value to Malaya or Australia "if our crack troops are behind bamboo or barbed wire without firing an effective shot."[35] As for Singapore, its congested facilities are regarded as an inviting target for atomic attack. In the judgment of former Labor Opposition leader Herbert V. Evatt: "The argument that Malaya is the area in which Australia must be engaged militarily in the event of a third world war is unconvincing. It begs the whole question. It would be far preferable for Australia's basic forces to be trained in Australia, or in Australian territories, which extend to the equator. Under modern conditions, they should be capable of being airborne to the area that matters most. In Malaya, similar mobility may become difficult or impossible. From a strategic point of view, the commitment of Australian forces to Malaya may put them out on a limb, and such vulnerability could turn out to be disastrous."[36]

To be sure, Evatt's objections relate to the contingency of a world war, while the Liberals conceive the main function of troops in Malaya to be the fighting of a localized Southeast Asian conflict. Regardless of the scope and type of war the troops would be called upon to fight, however, they are few in number, far removed from home supply bases in Australia or Britain, and vulnerable to an enemy who can choose his own time, place and manner of fighting.

Convinced of the correctness of its position, the Menzies Government has preferred to proceed along the lines of its defence doctrine. Australian opinion tends to be in accord with the official policy, although it cannot help notice how fragile are the foundations on which Malaya and Singapore sustain Brit-

33. *Sydney Morning Herald*, May 23, 1958.
34. Guy Harriott in *Sydney Morning Herald*, November 19, 1959.
35. Donald Willesee, *CPD*, Senate 10, NS, May 8, 1957, p 620.
36. *CPD*, HR 6, NS, April 27, 1955, pp. 200-01.

ish Commonwealth armed forces. Indeed, Australians have begun to ask themselves if some alternative to Malaya and Singapore may not be available. One such alternative is a military base in British North Borneo—a territory, however, which is deficient in dock facilities, roads, railways and an abundant supply of native labour. Some military construction has been undertaken there, but British sources have denied that North Borneo is being planned as a substitute for Malaya, Singapore, or both.[37] According to some reports, the development of an elaborate air and possibly naval base at Darwin in northern Australia has been broached in both governmental and military circles.[38] A possible base site mentioned most frequently is Cockburn Sound, located near Perth in West Australia. Millions of pounds would be required to fit out such an establishment, but at least it would not be dependent upon the whims of foreign countries, and could not be scored by Asian nations as a Western military outpost on Asian soil.

The strategic implications of such a project are enormous. As one newspaper commentator put it, Australia, by building a Cockburn Sound base, would be modifying drastically her entrenched ideas on defence in depth, "based hitherto on the happy prospect of fighting a future war in someone else's country. It will have to face up to the possibility that northern Australia and its sea approaches will be our forward area, as in 1942."[39] To date, the position of the Liberal Government has been that, while there are strategic advantages to a base of this type on Australian soil and the matter is being kept under close review, such facilities are of insufficient priority to be included in present defence appropriations.[40]

Nevertheless, with Malaya and Singapore rapidly becoming uncertain factors in Southeast Asia's security equation, Australia may soon find herself taking measures which would entail constricting her lines of defence. In her own way, she will have to come to terms with the currents of nationalism which are sweeping emergent and newly-independent states. These states are not necessarily indifferent to the threat of communism; nor are they necessarily anti-Western. They may, like Malaya, have strong bonds of affection with their erstwhile masters and present associates. But their very youth and instability force them to concentrate on internal socio-economic development and political stabilization and make them reluctant to invest their limited resources in heavy military preparations, to bind themselves through defence treaty commitments, or to risk involvement in conflicts from which, they feel, they stand to gain little. It is within this perplexing context that Australia and her allies must cast the guidelines for long-range, strategic planning in an increasingly vital area of the globe.

37. See *Straits Times*, June 16, 1959, *Sydney Morning Herald*, July 1, 1959 and May 19, 1960, Bruce Grant in *Melbourne Age*, May 17, 1960.
38. *Sydney Morning Herald*, June 3, 1959, and Guy Harriott in *ibid*, November 20, 1959.
39. Douglas Wilkie in *Melbourne Sun News-Pictorial*, June 22, 1956. See general discussions of the problem in Levi, *op cit*, pp 195-96; D. C. S. Sissons, "Malaya and Singapore," *Australia's Neighbours*, 3rd Series, No. 63 (June 1956), p 4; Norman Harper, "Problems of Australian Foreign Policy, January-June 1956," *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, II (November 1956), pp 11-12.
40. Frederick Osborne, *CPD*, HR 20, NS, August 26, 1958, pp 771-2, and *CPD*, HR 10, NS, May 9, 1956, p 1921; McBride, *CPD*, HR 11, NS, June 12, 1956, p 3044; John Gorton, *CPD*, Senate 20, NS, October 27, 1959, p 1159.

DEPARTURE FOR GALLIPOLI

SHIP after ship, crammed with soldiers, moved slowly out of harbour in the lovely day, and felt again the heave of the sea. No such gathering of fine ships has ever been seen upon this earth, and the beauty and exultation of the youth upon them made them like sacred things as they moved away. All the thousands of men aboard them gathered on deck to see, till each rail was thronged. These men had come from all parts of the British world, from Africa, Australia, Canada, India, the Mother Country, New Zealand and remote islands in the sea. They had said good-bye to home that they might offer their lives in the cause we stand for. In a few hours at most, as they well knew, perhaps a tenth of them would have looked their last on the sun, and be a part of foreign earth, or dumb things that the tides push. Many of them would have disappeared for ever from the knowledge of man, blotted out from the book of life, none would know how—by a fall or chance shot in the darkness, in the blast of a shell, or alone, like a hurt beast, in some scrub or gully, far from comrades and the English speech and the English singing. And perhaps a third of them would be mangled, blinded, or broken, lamed, made imbecile or disfigured, with the colour and taste of life taken from them, so that they would never more move with comrades or exult in the sun. And those not taken thus would be under the ground, sweating in the trench, carrying sandbags up the sap, dodging death and danger, without rest or food or drink, in the blazing sun or the frost of the Gallipoli night, till death seemed relaxation and a wound a luxury. But as they moved out these things were but the end they asked, the reward they had come for, the unseen cross upon the breast. All that they felt was a gladness of exultation that their young courage was to be used. They went like kings in a pageant to imminent death. As they passed from moorings to the man-of-war anchorage on their way to the sea, the feeling that they had done with life and were going out to something new welled up in those battalions; they cheered and cheered till the harbour rang with cheering. As each ship crammed with soldiers drew near the battleships, the men swung their caps and cheered again, and the sailors answered, and the noise of cheering swelled, and the men in the ships not yet moving joined in, and the men ashore, till all the life in the harbour was giving thanks that it could go to death rejoicing. All was beautiful in that gladness of men about to die, but the most moving thing was the greatness of their generous hearts. As they passed the French ships, the memory of old quarrels healed, the sense of what sacred France has done and endured in this great war, and the pride of having such men as the French for comrades, rose up in their warm souls, and they cheered the French ships more, even, than their own.

They left the harbour very, very slowly; this tumult of cheering lasted a long time; no one who heard it will ever forget it, or think of it unshaken. It broke the hearts of all there with pity and pride; it went beyond the guard of the English heart. Presently all were out; and the fleet stood across for Tenedos, and the sun went down with marvellous colour, lighting island after island, and the Asian peaks; and those left behind in Mudros trimmed their lamps knowing that they had been for a little brought near to the heart of things.

—John Masefield, "Gallipoli," 1916.

THE NEW GUINEA OFFENSIVES, by David Dexter, Australia in the War of 1939-1945, Series 1 (Army), Vol VI (Australian War Memorial, Canberra, A.C.T.).

Earlier volumes in Series 1 of the official history of Australia in the War of 1939-1945 brought the story of the Australian Army to the point where the Japanese offensive against Port Moresby had been defeated and their base at Buna captured. This volume, which covers operations in the South-West Pacific Area from April 1943 to September 1944, carries the story forward to the capture of Madang and the occupation of Morotai.

After the reduction of the Japanese base at Buna in January 1943 most of the Australian and American formations which had participated in the arduous campaign were withdrawn to the mainland for rest and reorganization. The only allied formation remaining in contact with the enemy was the incomplete 3 Australian Division in the tangle of mountains between Wau and Salamaua.

Soon after the capture of Buna the Allied Joint Chiefs of Staff assigned General MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief, South-West Pacific Area, the following objectives for the next phase of his operations:—

(a) Establish airfields on Kiriwina and Woodlark Islands.
(b) Seize and occupy the Solomon Islands to include the southern portion of Bougainville.
(c) Seize the Lae-Salamaua-Finschhafen-Madang area and occupy western New Britain.

In pursuance of this directive, General MacArthur allotted the following tasks to the ground forces under his command:—

Sixth US Army—Occupation of the Solomons, Woodlark and Kiriwini Islands and western New Britain.

Australian Army—(a) Occupy Salamaua and Lae, and secure in the Huon Peninsula-Markham Valley area aerodromes required for subsequent operations; (b) seize the north coast of New Guinea to include Madang; (c) defend Madang in order to protect the north-west flank of subsequent operations to the eastward.

Although he is primarily concerned with the Australian operations, the author traces the parallel American operations in sufficient detail to enable the development of MacArthur's plans to be seen in their entirety, a characteristic which is not always present in histories of this kind. Too often we are left with the impression that our own

troops did all the fighting while those of our allies scouted about on the sidelines.

In attaining its objectives, the Australian Army undertook some of the hardest fighting it experienced in two world wars, and at the same time performed a feat of outstanding physical endurance.

Actually no definite starting point for the Australian operations can be named, for during the planning and preparation of the major assaults, 3 Division advanced steadily towards Salamaua and northward down the Bulolo valley towards the Markham. The main operation began when 9 Division landed from the sea east of Lae, while 7 Division landed from the air on an airfield in the Markham Valley captured by the US 503 Parachute Regiment. After the capture of Lae, 9 Division was moved by sea for another amphibious landing at Finschhafen, while 7 Division moved to the Ramu Valley to open the way across the Finisterres to Madang. Later, other formations were drawn into the battle.

The manner in which the troops set about their tasks in these operations shows that the lessons of the earlier fighting on the Kokoda Trail and at Milne Bay had been thoroughly absorbed. In the interval between the two campaigns the Army had mastered the art of jungle warfare, organization had been adapted to tropical conditions and equipment had been improved. The troops were fit, confident and well led, and, while they held the enemy's fighting capacity in respect, they had no doubts about their ability to overthrow him. That their confidence was not misplaced is shown by their exploits at Shaggy Ridge, Satelberg and other places whose names they wrote into our battle honours, to serve as an inspiration for future generations of soldiers.

David Dexter's story of these campaigns is told with the authority of a fighting soldier. After ten months of guerrilla fighting on Timor with 2/2 Independent Company, and later with 2/2 Commando Squadron in the Ramu Valley and New Britain, he finished the war in command of 2/4 Commando Squadron at Tarakan. His experience, combined with a fine literary skill, gives to his story a vividness and authenticity not always found in official histories.

In his treatment of the higher direction of the war in the South-West Pacific, David Dexter reveals the many difficulties that abound when allied forces, different in doctrine, organization and national characteristics, are operating in close conjunction with each other. Misunderstandings are bound to arise about many things, with consequential unfortunate repercussions on the conduct of operations. Careful study of his narrative will show how some of them at any rate may be avoided in the future.

From all points of view this volume holds many cogent lessons for the Australian Army. Since we may well have to fight in similar terrain, the experiences of tropical warfare set forth constitute a most valuable guide for training and leadership, particularly for younger officers. On the command and staff level it shows clearly the pitfalls that must be avoided when serving alongside allies or under command of an allied headquarters.

The author, the Editor-in-Chief and the Australian War Memorial are to be congratulated on the production of this most useful and inspiring addition to our military literature. It should be carefully studied by every officer.

—E.G.K.

THE CONTROL OF THE ARMS RACE, by Hedley Bull. (Published for the Institute for Strategic Studies, 18 Adam Street, London, WC2 by Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 20 New Bond Street, London, W1).

In the interval between the two World Wars several attempts were made to check the mounting level of armaments by means of agreement between the great powers to limit their military potential. The modest measure of success achieved was nullified by German and Japanese rearmament and the outbreak of World War 2. Since the war the development of nuclear weapons and the fact that two great power blocs of diametrically opposed ideologies and interests face each other with little room for manoeuvre, have made armament control one of the most important problems facing mankind.

For a long time now the great powers have been discussing the problem off and on at what appears to be an endless series of conferences that get nowhere. Press reports of these conferences have become so stereotyped and drawn out over such a long period that it is highly probable that only a very few people read them any more. Besides, the accusations and counter-accusations hurled at each other by the great powers have tended, like all propaganda, to obscure the real issues. It is doubtful if many people have any clear, logical ideas on the subject at all.

But do the experts know any better? Do the statesmen, the diplomats and the military men whose business is the security of the national interest, base their knowledge of the subject on a logical, well-founded system of ideas, or merely on superficial considerations? This is a question that soldiers ought to ask themselves, for not only do they have a direct interest in the subject but some of them have to advise their governments on the practicability, from the national point of view, of the proposals put forward from time to time.

So much has been written on the subject by so many people that one is in danger of drowning in an ocean of words. At any rate, the sheer massiveness of some of the tomes is apt to frighten the man with other pressing problems on his mind. Now at last we have a clear exposition of the main aspects of the subject in the short space of 215 pages.

Mr. Bull's book is an inquiry into the modern arms race and the measures by which it might be controlled. It is not a plea for disarmament, or for any particular military policy. His main concern is with controlling the arms which do exist and may exist, either by specific agreement, or tacitly, or through chosen avenues of military development. Mr. Bull has not clouded his theme by wandering off into discussion of side-issues as so many authors do. His book is in fact a study of international stability intended to provide the serious reader with a realistic background against which he may discuss disarmament, or follow intelli-

gently the twists and turns of the debate on one of the most serious and tricky problems of our times.

This book is recommended for close study by everyone concerned with national security in the nuclear age.

—E.G.K.

THE NECESSITY FOR CHOICE. Prospects of American Foreign Policy. By Henry A. Kissinger. 370 pages. Harper & Bros., New York, 1960. $6.50.

Reviewed by Major De Bow Freed, Infantry, in the April 1961 issue of MILITARY REVIEW, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, USA.

Kissinger argues that the United States has been evading difficult choices for 15 years, and that during this time our world position has deteriorated steadily. He cites the need for new departures in national policy, the necessity for choice.

The book covers four general subject areas—deterrence as a cornerstone of national policy; the nature and potential of limited war capability as an element of policy; the changing relationship of the United States to Western European nations, particularly NATO; and the political evolution of communism as it affects the US.

These apparently diverse subjects are treated as integral parts of a total study of the US position in the world today.

Kissinger is unsparing in his criticism of massive deterrence. He points out that "in every crisis it furnishes arguments for a policy of minimum risk"—that is, retreat—and in no case has it led to a position of strength. The alternatives have seemed more palatable than the use of massive force, thus the threat of its use has lost real meaning. The author contends that deterrence as an element of policy, when we have demonstrated the lack of will to use the retaliatory threat on which it is based, has lost both credibility and utility. Consequently, the gap between policy and the ability to fight a war, should the policy fail, has been progressive.

Kissinger develops the theory that the greatest danger today is the aggressive and systematic communist expansion efforts. He feels these local aggressions require a flexible military force capable of fighting wars of varying size and intensity.

Under this thesis the limited war capability would become the primary military component of a total policy designed to seize the initiative from the communists.

He argues that the tailored response is the most effective means of preventing "escalation" of a small conflict into a much larger one. The use of a massive retaliatory force would become a last, rather than a first, resort under a defence policy which emphasized response according to need.

The portion of the book on political evolution could well be the lecture notes of a professor of government (which Kissinger is, at Harvard). He analyzes the evolutionary nature of communism, its long-standing aims, and means of combating its undesirable features. His stated objective is to further understanding of the subject.

A great virtue of The Necessity For Choice lies in its treatment of military and foreign policy as com-

ponents of a total national effort, rather than as fragmented subjects to be considered separately.

THE SOVIET DESIGN FOR A WORLD STATE. By Elliot R. Goodman. 512 pages. Columbia University Press, New York. $6.75.

Reviewed by Major Robert C. Burgess, Artillery, in the April 1960 issue of MILITARY REVIEW, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, USA.

Mr. Goodman, a Professor of Political Science at Brown University, clearly proves in this well-documented and detailed analysis that Soviet policy is still headed unfailingly toward a communist-controlled world state. Although there have been many periods in which this goal has been outwardly mitigated, if not completely altered, Mr. Goodman traces the continuing threads of Lenin-Stalinism which always return Soviet policy to its primary objective.

Now that the period of sweetness and light has ended, the thesis of this work is much more readily evident than in the recent past.

Mr. Khrushchev today gives little room for rational belief that Soviet leaders desire any other destiny for the USSR than that of eventual world domination.

Mr. Goodman makes it clear that Soviet policy, regardless of its pronouncements to the contrary, has never strayed, indeed, can never stray, from its original goal—that of a united communist world complete with Russian language, culture and leadership.

The author concludes his work with a "foray into the realm of personal conviction," in which he states his belief that in order to defend themselves against dynamic Soviet aims, Western Nations must form a "supranational" community, even at the cost of foregoing some measure of individual sovereignties. Such organization, he believes, is "the best hope both for an enduring world peace and for building a future democratic community of mankind."

STREET WITHOUT JOY. Indochina at War, 1946-54. By Bernard B. Fall. 322 pages. The Stackpole Co., Harrisburg, Pa., 1961. $4.95.

Reviewed in MILITARY REVIEW, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, USA, by Lieutenant-Colonel Frank A. Gleason, Jr., CE.

This is the gripping story of the French War in Indochina—a war different from any engaged in by modern armies. This is a war fought by brave and dedicated Frenchmen and Vietnamese against the well-trained, well-indoctrinated, communist revolutionary army of Vietminh. The situations and vivid actions presented by Dr. Fall have important lessons which the political and military planners must digest and employ, if they would avoid the serious pitfalls the French incurred in their attempt to prevent Indochina from falling within the communist orbit.

Dr. Fall is particularly qualified for this important work. A Frenchman, he served in the French resistance movement from 1942 until the liberation of France. He grew up in an environment of guerrilla warfare and ended his military career in 1946 as a platoon commander in a Moroccan division. Returning to

civilian life, he worked with the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal and the United Nations prior to coming to the United States as a Fulbright Scholar. At his own expense, he went to Indochina in 1953 to gather first-hand material for his doctorate thesis. He returned to the Far East in 1957, and in 1959 spent several months in Southeast Asia on a project on communist infiltration.

This is a keen historical account of the loss of Indochina by a modern French Army to the revolutionary forces of Ho-Chi-Minh. Dr. Fall quite clearly and concisely shows at the very beginning of his book how war came to this part of Southeast Asia. He points up how lack of political foresight gave the Vietminh a head start on developing a revolutionary army from guerrillas.

The author shows in detail how the Communists controlled and used the native population, how they made the best use of the terrain and exploited the organizational and doctrinal weaknesses of the French military. In the terrain of Southeast Asia the mobility of the individual soldier was overwhelmingly superior to that provided by trucks or armoured vehicles. This was a lesson the French learned much too late, and as a result thousands of brave men fought, bled, and died in the many ambushes along the few treacherous roads.

The French fought against the jungle and the Vietminh. The "Viets," as the French called Ho-Chi-Minh's forces, made use of the jungle. As the war progressed, the French attempted to hold the barrier which they had built in North Vietnam. The enemy-controlled jungle was effectively used to stage surprise attacks against these forts, which easily fell into communist control. Later the French attempted to outmanoeuvre the Vietminh by superior mechanized mobility, only to be disintegrated by frequent ambushes.

This book will be of keen interest to all who will be associated with activities in Southeast Asia, or with anti-communist efforts elsewhere in the world. It is more than opportune at a time when this country is faced with the grim situation in Laos and the rumbling overtones in Vietnam. This book should alert students of military organization and doctrine to the danger that training and equipment for guerrilla warfare may have been neglected due to the fascination of modern weapons systems.

COMPETITION FOR AUTHORS

The Board of Review has awarded first place and the prize of £5 for the best original article published in the June issue to "The Ubiquitous Infantry—3" by Colonel M. Austin, DSO.