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FRONTISPIECE

In World War I the Western Front in France and Flanders became locked in trench warfare, with one flank resting on the coast and the other in neutral Switzerland. The British and French Armies mounted several great offensives aimed at punching a gap in the German defence system, through which they intended to pass a large body of cavalry held in readiness. Unfortunately the offensives never succeeded in creating the conditions necessary for successful cavalry action.

The picture shows members of an Australian Light Horse Regiment waiting behind the lines during one of these offensives.

AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

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Number 146

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Photo Australian War Memorial, Canberra.

Cavalry at Messines.

AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

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The article "Anti Guerrilla Operations" published in AAJ Number 144, May 1961, was wrongly preceded by the explanatory note: "This article has been prepared by an officer of Army Headquarters. The views expressed do not necessarily represent official doctrine."

This article was originally prepared for publication in the AAJ early in 1960. However, for policy reasons it was not published at that time.

The matter in the article has since appeared in an Australian Army training manual, and so it does in fact represent official doctrine.

The content of the article is closely based on a paper prepared at the United States Command and General Staff College, and was adopted and printed into Australian training doctrine with the kind permission of the United States Army.

The error in publishing this material in the AAJ is regretted.



Lieutenant-Colonel H. L. Sabin
Royal Australian Infantry

**ACTION, OPPORTUNITY
AND ADVENTURE!
BE IN A TOP TEAM.
TAKE YOUR PLACE IN
AUSTRALIA'S NEW ARMY
MODERN! MOBILE!
MECHANIZED!**

TH**ERE** is no doubt that these and other recruiting slogans are catching to the eye and attractive to the imagination. They are the selling points to the youth of this country to join the *New Army* with all its adventure, comradeship, interest and, for good measure, some remuneration. A man's life! Are you good enough to accept the challenge?

Of course the youth are good enough, and they are keen for adventure, comradeship, an interest beyond their daily vocation and, I am certain, extra funds. Their re-

sponse, however, is not good. Why is this so and how can the situation be changed?

An examination of present strengths of CMF units shows a marked difference between units and sub-units but there does not appear to be any pattern. Some sub-units of the same arm are up, some down, and likewise other arms and services. Recruiting figures for infantry, for example, do not appear to be better in the country areas than in the city, in fact there are marked differences between similar sub-units of the same unit all located in country or metropolitan areas.

A lot of these variations in strengths are clearly the direct result of the numbers of National Service men who elected to serve on. Some are the result of successful (or otherwise) recruiting efforts.

The questions to be answered are:

- (a) Why did a higher percentage of National Servicemen elect to serve on as volunteers in this unit but not in that unit?
- (b) Why is this unit attracting more recruits than that unit?

I believe that some of the answers to these questions are to be found in the quality of junior leadership and man-management which prevail in *this* and *that* unit or sub-unit.

It has been said that the standard of junior leadership and man-management reached its lowest level in the CMF at the peak of National Service training, and it could well be that the necessary corrective action still has to be taken to ensure a good standard today. Assuming that this statement is based on fact, there is no doubt that the word has been passed around among the young men we are seeking as recruits and their resistance to our selling programme has hardened.

The young man of today spends a lot of his time in discussion and he places a great deal of reliance on what he hears from his fellows, particularly where such persons have had personal experience. Our aim therefore should be to ensure that, in the main, our prospective recruits hear of good things when the Army is discussed. Such publicity is worth a great deal more than an attractive press advertisement or recruiting poster.

Our first step therefore is to have a good critical look at the present standards of leadership and man-management and see if we are up-to-scratch.

What evidence do we have to support or refute an assumption that the standard of junior leadership and man-management is at a low

ebb? Where should we cast the "penetrating eye"?

There are three venues for CMF activities; viz, those in the training depot, those in the field, such as bivouacs, range practices and, thirdly, annual camp. All three must be examined carefully together with the make-up of the young officer and his NCOs.

These young leaders have, in my opinion, missed out on a great deal of basic training particularly in relation to man-management. It was not entirely their fault, but also the neglect by their seniors to pass on their own experiences and give proper guidance. Most of our young CMF leaders have achieved their experience during the National Service training scheme when there was a constant flow of National Service men in and out of units. These troops were there for a set period and that was it. They had little choice. Their junior leaders had little real responsibility as regards man-management and leadership and regrettably "grew up" accepting a much lower standard than is necessary. In some instances the neglect of troops was shameful.

In this pentropic age there are very few young officers who cannot talk at length, often in a critical vein, on army policy relating to weapons, training, etc., and lamentably few who know how to apply mosquito repellent or test water or inspect their men and their equipment. The two requirements of knowledge of things to be done and moral courage to see that they are done are not strong characteristics of our young leaders. This situation must be corrected, and young officers must know and practice the detail of man-management almost

as a drill such as applies in the handling of weapons, for deployment, on parade and so on.

Theoretical knowledge is one thing but the development of sound habits through practice is another, and the scope here is tremendous. The task is to tell them, show them and see that it is done. The questions may well be asked—how? When? Where? How will this affect recruiting?

As mentioned above there are three venues for CMF training all equally suitable for making a good impression on a young soldier or a prospective recruit. Let us deal with them in turn.

The Training Depot

This should be clean, tidy, comfortable and attractive, and junior leaders should have a definite responsibility in this matter. Ten minutes of planned activity before each evening parade by sections and platoons under their officers and NCOs will pay handsome dividends. Young officers should be encouraged to think in terms of "my area" and "my men" and "our job". The development of an "attention to detail" outlook which will result after this habit of simple responsibility is formed will have great military value for the young leader of the CMF.

The training depot should become the youth centre of the area where, —in addition to military training, there are indoor sports such as basketball, badminton, table tennis and social functions plus an occasional film evening for parents. Attract the youth, both sexes, to these functions and activities which should be primarily the responsibil-

ity of the young leaders to organize and control. This is good training for the junior leaders and good publicity for the unit and the sub-unit. Activities must be well arranged and properly conducted and approved by the appropriate senior officer.

The interest of prospective recruits must be captured at the outset, not promises made that interesting things will happen "later on". Prior to interview with the recruiting officer, prospective recruits should be shown interesting equipment, allowed to handle it immediately they arrive rather than be kept waiting and wondering before being interviewed. A couple of wireless sets, an SLR and the like with some encouragement, such as, "Try this out—this is how it works", etc., will give them an immediate interest and create a good impression. They should be given a "look around", invited to watch training and have it explained, and asked to stay on and have a cup of coffee with the troops. All these things and more can be handled by young officers and NCOs with beneficial results to all.

Training and administration of soldiers in the depot must be efficient and sensible. This demands of young leaders far more knowledge and common sense than is generally appreciated. A really good lecture can be wasted if men are cold, and during winter most depots are freezing. If you can't warm the depot warm the men, and a few minutes sport spent on a game of tunnelball or something similar will do just this. Moreover this pre-lecture activity will "brighten them up".

Administratively and man-management wise there are dozens of

opportunities to develop young leaders during training depot activities. They must be taught and encouraged and the results in terms of alertness, moral courage and confidence will be amazing.

Field Activities

Included here are week-end bivouacs, range practices and whole-day parades. The aim must be to create a lasting impression of the whole or at least part of the activity. It is vital that this impression be a good one calculated to increase enthusiasm. This will require young leader effort in advance, during and healthy discussion after the activity. He must know in detail all timings, movement arrangements, assembly details, dress and equipment, and other relevant matters well in advance, and brief his troops accordingly.

Before the activity he must talk to his troops about the programme of work and give them a good, realistic picture of the plan, the aim of the activity and so on. There must be no doubt in anyone's mind as to the place of RV, the time, the order of dress, and he must satisfy himself that all his troops can meet these requirements. He must be prepared if necessary to make special efforts to assist some men, such as speaking to an employer or co-ordinating private transport, if used, and generally to "buzz about". He must get the reputation of being an enthusiast and at the same time of "knowing the score". Above all he must not give out incorrect or vague information regarding timings, dress, RV, etc. During this preparatory period the troops should be encouraged to discuss the activity and ask questions. This will promote interest

among the troops and their comments are likely to be along the lines that it should be a "pretty good" day or week end.

Having achieved this favourable situation the next problem is to ensure that realisation is equal to anticipation as far as possible. There is no magical formula here but a need for good man-management and sensible control. Three things during the activity are most likely to arouse enthusiasm among young soldiers:—

- (a) Some personal achievement or group achievement such as a good range shoot, a successful patrol and the like.
- (b) Sound administrative arrangements especially food—young men have a great interest in food and some lads could eat a 24 hour ration pack for one meal.
- (c) An unexpected "pleasant surprise" such as time off for a swim on a hot day, a really good film at night, a special meal, are all highlights which will create a good impression and result in favourable publicity when the activity is discussed later.

Too often I have heard young soldiers express themselves along these lines after a bivouac or exercise, "I think we won the war but I nearly starved to death", "Half the time we didn't know what was going on" and so on.

Change these expressions into, "I got the possible in the last shoot and then had the best meal ever" or "We've never enjoyed a swim more than after that patrol", and the aim has been very largely achieved as regards creating a lasting, favourable impression which will mean good

publicity among those who can best influence the right age group for service in the CMF.

With proper guidance and prior arrangement the young leaders can be left to implement the necessary action best suited to create enthusiasm among their troops for they are not far removed as an age group and are, or should be, closest to the men. They must be allowed to lead, manage and command their troops in every sphere of activity as much as possible; and bivouacs, range shoots, etc., should be arranged to permit this to happen. This is the training they need and the responsibility they must accept as junior leaders.

After the activity there must be frank discussion between the junior leaders and their men on all aspects, and an honest endeavour made to "iron out" any problems which may have arisen. Encourage suggestions which may lead to, "better arrangements next time" and don't be afraid of admitting faults if they did exist. A good healthy discussion on these matters is an important facet of man-management and enhances the status of the junior leader in the eyes of his men as well it should.

Annual Camp

This is the big opportunity for good recruiting publicity for developing team and "family" spirit and for sustained, good man-management and leadership at all levels. If, by the end of camp, the general feeling is that the fortnight has passed quickly and the men are almost sorry that it is over you can rest assured it has been a good camp. If, however, the general comment is along the lines that the fortnight "seemed like a month" and

there is a general feeling of relief that the end is in sight you can expect poor publicity.

In my opinion, the training and administrative plans made for annual camps are, generally, very good, but too often on implementation the effects are very bad, due to poor interpretation and bad control. The results of poor administration, man-management and leadership show up very clearly by about the end of the first week and by the end of the second week there can be chaos, or at the best, merely some semblance of administrative order. This kind of situation will not produce recruits for the CMF no matter how good our posters are.

If junior leaders know their job and practise it during annual camp very little can go wrong which would lead to bad publicity for the CMF by the men in discussion with their friends. For example, if a meal is late, which is bad enough, it is infinitely worse if its distribution to the troops is not equitable and a real cause for grumbling if some men miss out because they were forgotten. The junior leader can control the latter two causes for complaint, and can largely offset the effect of the lateness of the meal by telling his men why it will be late.

Most of the instances which lead to discontent among troops can be eliminated by good man-management by junior leaders and at times some moral courage is necessary. I recall a certain unit camp where it was considered a "good idea" for the whole unit to live on 24 hour ration packs for several days during a field training exercise. Naturally, the 'Q' staff and cooks were delighted at the prospect and generally everyone was intrigued with the idea.

By the third day most of the soldiers were ravenously hungry and were cooking mushrooms, rabbits and anything else they could "scrounge". I spoke to many young leaders and they were unanimous that everyone felt hungry but not one had taken any action. In addition the men were dirty and tired, some obviously in need of RAP treatment for infected scratches, colds and so on. This was management at a very low ebb and the bulk of the troops just itching to get out of that camp. Fortunately, by a little liaison, another unit (not living on 24 hour ration packs) handed over a very generous quantity of food to the hungry unit. If the junior leaders had acted to the extent of telling their superiors of the situation quite rationally, but firmly, I believe their many voices would have been heeded. In war they must advise casualties, ammunition holdings and many other things connected with their fighting fitness as a section or platoon/troop so why not develop the habit of reporting during training?

So much for one example, there are many others. If all of these simple matters were given proper thought and sensible action taken the many unnecessary irritations would disappear. It must become habit for young leaders to look after their men and equipment and make certain that nothing is left to chance.

Annual camp is the testing time and if your troops do not complete the camp feeling more fit, more confident, a real member of the team and enthusiastic about you and their sub-unit and their training then you, the junior leader, have not met the challenge to the full.

Things do not just happen in our, or any other Army, they are made to happen by those in command, and at section and platoon/troop level there is tremendous scope for "doing". Develop the proper "doing" habits now and your best recruiting agents will be your own men.

Try it and see—both you and our Army will be the stronger for it.

ARMoured CONCEPTS AND TRENDS

Richard M. Ogorkiewicz

Reprinted from the March 1961 issue of "Military Review,"
Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas, USA.

CURRENT and future development of armour stares the Army squarely in the face today. If armour is to remain an important component of the ground forces and retain its effectiveness in warfare, its developmental path must be clearly charted. The problem already has generated considerable discussion and a number of new ideas, but neither has led to a single generally agreed answer.

The current state of armour stems largely from World War II. Until then, and even for some time after World War II, the development of armour was governed by the traditional concepts of the division of combat forces into infantry and cavalry. In consequence, two separate roles were generally defined for armour: one was the support of infantry in battle and the other was the mobile but limited cavalry role of exploitation. The result was two separate types of armoured units and, in the extreme British Army view that obtained up to the end of World War II, two specialized categories of tanks: the slow-moving "in-

fantry" tanks that emphasized armour protection and the fast but undergunned "cavalry" tanks.

These traditional concepts, which divided tanks between limited roles, failed to recognize the full potentialities of armour. They ignored the possibility of combining tanks, infantry, and other arms into integrated mechanized forces based on automotive vehicles that would be superior to other contemporary formations, both in fire-power and mobility. This possibility first was explored by the German Panzer divisions. They demonstrated that armoured formations represented a new, versatile, and decisive element in ground warfare. Their successful performance in a wide variety of offensive and defensive operations was substantiated by other armoured divisions during the latter part of World War II.

The success of the armoured formations during World War II did not lead to the use of all tanks within the framework of fully mechanized forces. Far from it: the faith in armoured formations was still so

limited that a large proportion, or even a majority, of tanks were assigned to the support of infantry units where their mobility could not be fully exploited and where their performance inevitably was below the optimum. Moreover, so far as armoured divisions were concerned, such was the hold of the traditional ideas that in spite of their proved versatility armoured formations were still wrongly held in many quarters to be fit only for a limited mobile role.

The success of armoured formations during World War II established the importance of countering them and this, in turn, stressed the importance of counter-action by other armoured formations. Since World War II the problem of combating hostile armour and the consequent desire to achieve superiority over hostile tanks in gun-power, irrespective of whether they were used in armoured divisions or in support of infantry units, has dominated armour's development.

The way in which the planners have satisfied the requirement of destroying enemy armour is of considerable interest and importance. Basically, it amounts to a technique of marginal improvement on the tank designs evolved toward the end of World War II, mainly in the direction of larger calibre guns of higher muzzle velocities. The latest tank guns range in calibre from 100 to 120-mm and fire armour-piercing discarding-sabot ammunition with muzzle velocities of as much as 4,800 feet per second.

The emphasis on gunpower ended the concept of "infantry" and "cavalry" tanks and has stressed that all tanks are fundamentally the same. It revived the concept of a single

battle tank, which had already found some proponents during the twenties. Thus when the French Army restarted the development of its armour in 1946, it adopted the policy of a single battle tank, the 100-mm (later 120-mm) AMX. The British Army adopted a similar course. After its disastrous experience with the two categories of specialized tanks, it concentrated after World War II on the 83.9-mm gun Centurion, which Field Marshal Montgomery dubbed a "capital tank."

The Soviet Army adhered to the policy, which it shared during the latter part of World War II with the German Army, of supporting the basic medium tank with a heavy tank. However, the latter was no longer regarded as a break-through tank, as were the heavy tanks of pre-World War II days, but was essentially a long-range tank destroyer. As a result, the 122-mm. gun Stalin backed the T34/85. Now the T10 development of the Stalin backs the 100-mm gun T54. The United States Army supported a similar policy in developing the T43 heavy tank as well as the T42 medium, but implemented it only partially by procuring a small number of the former as the 120-mm gun tank, the M103. Since 1950 the British Army also has developed a 120-mm gun tank, the Conqueror, to back its Centurions, but, like the US Army, it now has reverted to the policy of a single main battle tank armed with a 105-mm gun.

Inadequate Mobility

Progressive upgunning of basic tank designs evolved toward the end of World War II enabled armour to destroy hostile armour. But this has been achieved at the cost of

mobility. As the size and power of their guns increased, the tanks have become heavier and clumsier. Their logistical difficulties have multiplied and have affected adversely the mobility of armoured formations. Heavy tanks such as the 73-ton Conqueror are a severe handicap to tactical manoeuvre. The strategic mobility of armoured formations is such that the chances for successful employment are virtually dependent on prior deployment in critical areas.

In general, the limitations imposed by the inadequate mobility of equipment prevent armour from realizing its full potentialities in mobile ground operations. Tanks are inherently suited to operate rapidly in the widely dispersed formations demanded by modern weapons, while giving optimum protection from radiological effects. Unless they can move long distances quickly, under their own power or by other means of transportation, they may not be usable where and when the need arises. They also require greater tactical mobility to be able to manoeuvre rapidly, to disperse quickly for protection, and to concentrate momentarily for action. They should be less dependent on lengthy and vulnerable lines of supply, which are much more likely to be broken by enemy action and thus interfere with their freedom of action or halt them.

The inadequate mobility of tanks also nullifies in part the progress made since World War II toward still closer integration of more effective combined-arms teams. One can dismiss as a temporary aberration the British Army's attempt in 1955 to confine armoured divisions largely to tanks and to limit their role. Elsewhere, armoured formations have de-

veloped further as a versatile and well-balanced team of all arms capable of decisive action on their own.

The Soviet Army believes that ground operations will be fought largely or even entirely by armoured formations. Soviet infantry divisions, as the infantry elements of the US armoured divisions, have acquired armoured cross-country vehicles, making possible a closer integration with tanks and the creation of combined arms teams at subdivisional level. Such teamwork approached the ideal of small self-contained battle groups that could make up for low troop density on the battlefield by their mobility and firepower. They also could evade destruction by keeping the situation fluid. But before they can achieve this ideal armoured formations need to acquire greater and more sustained mobility.

Lighter Tanks

The obvious and urgent need for more mobile armoured equipment means lighter and smaller tanks. Such tanks could more economically exploit the existing transport and thus increase the strategic mobility of armoured units. Lighter weight also would substantially reduce unit fuel requirements, thus compounding the saving in over-all logistical requirements further increasing the mobility of armoured formations.

Lighter weight and greater mobility cannot be accomplished, however, at the expense of the ability to destroy hostile armour. World War II discredited the concept of the mobile but undergunned light tanks, which found much favour in the thirties. Use of such a tank would be suicidal in the face of the Soviet

Union's powerful and well-equipped armoured forces.

Even within the limits imposed by current high velocity tank guns we could save some weight, reducing the basic tank from 50 to about 30 tons. This possibility has already generated considerable discussion in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and a recent Franco-German specification called for a 30-ton tank. The Soviet T54 already approaches this weight target. The new Swiss and Japanese 90-mm gun tanks also approach this figure.

Saving 10 to 20 tons in the basic medium tank's weight would significantly contribute toward increasing the mobility of the armoured units. But all the aforementioned tanks differ from the heavier current models only in degree of armour protection and not in principle. Any further major increase in tank mobility would demand a more radical step forward; a departure from the current type of high velocity gun. It also may demand major changes in other respects, including the possible adoption of multi-wheel drive in place of the tracked configuration.

Impact of Guided Missiles

One alternative to the conventional high velocity tank guns is the guided missile. Its appearance has had a disturbing effect on armoured warfare, for some persons jumped to the erroneous conclusion that tanks were finished—just because their armour plate could be pierced. Armour penetration by anti-tank guided missiles certainly ended any lingering ideas about the "infantry" tank, a thick-skinned, slow-moving auxiliary. But beyond this category armour protection was never the

tank's sole or even principal attribute. Moreover, as the limitations of anti-tank guided missiles were recognized, the initial enthusiasm for them gave way to less sweeping claims.

Although guided missiles do not spell the doom of the tank, they might lead to lighter weight armoured vehicles which would, partly at least, supersede the current types of tanks. Such vehicles would combine a high degree of mobility with anti-tank capability. At this stage they are particularly attractive as a replacement for the heavy gun tanks in their specialized role of long-range tank destroyers. The British already have announced the development of a guided missile vehicle of this type. They see it as a replacement for the Conqueror heavy gun tank, as well as being air transportable.

Besides making possible at least one class of lightweight armoured vehicles, which can replace the heaviest tanks, guided missiles have influenced armour in another and more general way. They have reduced still further the relative value of armour protection. In the long run this should increase the mobility of armoured units but the more immediate effect is to cast serious doubts on further development of the thick-skinned tank. The latter should now be replaced by lightly armoured and more mobile vehicles. The French, who since World War II have excelled in the development of anti-tank guided missiles, already have abandoned further development of the 30- to 50-ton class of tanks.

The policy that favours lightly armoured tanks raises one major issue. The 30- to 50-ton type of tank may offer no more protection against

guided missiles than the much more lightly armoured tank, but the latter is more vulnerable to many other weapons. It must, therefore, capitalize on its superior mobility and do so consistently, which calls for a much higher degree of operational skill on the part of the armoured units. There is no doubt that the past demand for heavy armour protection partially arose from inept operational methods, under which tanks advanced at the foot soldier's pace and exposed them unnecessarily to the fire of enemy weapons. Conversely, tanks with minimum armour protection must be more mobile and skilfully operated so that they expose themselves as little as possible to enemy fire.

It would be futile to apply the tactics permissible with today's 50-ton battle tanks to a mobile but lightly armoured 15 tonner. Highly mobile armoured units will require a much higher degree of tactical skill than those of the past that relied on slogging methods. Thus if the development of guided missiles results in lighter tanks and more mobile armoured units, it also will create a new set of problems. In particular, it will demand that armoured units take the fullest advantage of their increased mobility.

Light Combat Vehicle Concept

Guided missiles and various short-range anti-tank weapons also have given rise to the concept of light combat vehicles supplementing tanks. It originated and has been advocated principally in France, where a new series of light armoured vehicles under the generic name of *Engins Legers de Combat* (ELC) has been under development for several years.

The concept of light combat vehicles springs from the relative vulnerability of tanks, however well armoured, to infantry short-range anti-tank weapons. To combat these, tanks need the assistance of other arms, but infantry on foot, which has in the past provided the necessary support, penalizes mobility. Hence the light combat vehicle is basically a mechanized infantry weapon. Its armament consists of recoilless guns or automatic cannon as well as machine guns. It is intended to proceed or accompany tanks, playing the role hitherto performed by riflemen, but at a greater speed. The light combat vehicles would constitute essentially a force of armoured skirmishers to the heavier armour. They would rely chiefly on their small size and speed for protection.

To some extent, existing armoured infantry carriers can operate in the role of the light combat vehicles, but being more specialized and inherently smaller the light combat vehicles should perform better. It is not intended that the light combat vehicles supersede armoured personnel carriers, which alone can provide the essential infantry element for dismounted action. They would merely take over the role of infantry on foot when the latter was insufficiently mobile or could not operate at all, as in crossing areas of induced radiation.

The light combat vehicles re-emphasize the problem of supporting tanks with other arms and underline the fact that if infantry is to take part in mobile warfare nuclear conditions, it must be mounted in armoured vehicles that will protect it from blast and radiation. Thus armoured personnel carriers, origin-

ally devised to enable infantry to keep up with tanks, are now essential for the sake of the infantry itself.

A further consequence is that infantry faces a diverging course of development; either in the direction of light units, with a minimum of vehicles and heavy equipment for operation under primitive conditions, or toward full mechanization. The latter would find infantry divisions equipped with armoured vehicles and would pave the way for an eventual merger with armoured divisions into a single type of integrated mechanized formation. The light infantry units would remain for airborne, mountain, policing and other special operations.

In the long run, the light combat vehicle concept may result mainly in a diversification of armoured equipment, nothing more than the development of an intermediate vehicle between the tank and the armoured infantry carrier. More immediately, it might enable armour to achieve greater over-all mobility and usefulness. It certainly opens the possibility for armour to participate in airborne or cold war operations, where its chances so far have been very small.

Light combat vehicles when employed independently are open to unfavourable comparisons with the more powerful tanks and could not normally be expected to compete with them. When tanks cannot be employed, however, the light vehicles would offer a far superior solution than the perfectionist extreme of using no armoured vehicles at all. It is hardly necessary to point out that a less perfect combat vehicle immediately available often is far better than the superior model which

is confined to base areas, like the M6 heavy tanks of World War II.

Nuclear Battle Groups

Light combat vehicles also appear in another context. They are envisaged as the only tanklike vehicles available to those who believe that future ground forces will be organized into relatively small battle groups, each built around a battery of nuclear missile launchers. This concept restricts armour to a company or so of light vehicles per group to be employed for little more than local security.

While this concept aims to exploit the power of nuclear weapons, and has certain theoretical attractions, it would deprive ground forces of their essential dual capability. Battle groups organized around batteries of nuclear launchers would be capable of fighting only with nuclear weapons. Even when nuclear weapons were used they could not cope with close targets or destroy individual elements of hostile armour which might infiltrate between the nuclear fires. Thus a strong armoured element—not merely a company or two of light armoured vehicles per group—is necessary to protect the nuclear launchers and exploit the effect of their fires, in addition to being essential for non-nuclear operations. Light combat vehicles would not be adequate outside the area of special limited operations; they could only supplement more powerful tanks but not replace them.

Armoured Assault Artillery

Another recent concept takes an entirely different and much more realistic view of armour than that

embodied in the nuclear battle concept. It visualizes the future tank armed with a relatively large calibre, medium velocity gun capable of artillery-type missions firing nuclear and high-explosive shells, as well as direct fire against hostile armour. Such a combination tank/self-propelled gun is not invariably regarded as being lighter than the current tank with its high velocity gun, but it could be so. Some of its proponents still favour relatively heavy armour protection on vehicles weighing as much as 70 tons. But its versatility would greatly simplify armoured formations. It would reduce the number of different types of vehicles, thus making armoured units more compact and less vulnerable. Armoured units would consist of gun vehicles and armoured infantry. They would be more flexible and better able to fight under different conditions.

This concept implies the merger of tanks and field artillery into a single arm that might be called armoured assault artillery. It was

foreshadowed as early as 1917, when the first French tank units were designated and used as *artillerie d'assaut*. It would return the tank to its true role of a general source of mobile firepower. It would also mean a final break with the narrower and more unjustifiable concept of the tank as a specialized assault vehicle, which started with the British tanks of 1916 and has survived to this day.

In many ways the armoured assault artillery concept marks a far greater departure from hitherto accepted practice than the replacement of the current relatively heavy high velocity gun tanks by lighter models armed with guided missiles. By comparison the versatile gun vehicle offers the advantage of greater simplicity and flexibility. It is worth considering because some radical departure is necessary if armoured units are to gain greater tactical and strategic mobility and the organizational flexibility required by the nuclear battlefield.

STAFF LEADERSHIP

Major L. G. Clark, MC
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SO much has already been written on the subject of the leadership of soldiers that very few new ideas remain to be expressed. Indeed, today's serving officer is so well versed on the techniques of handling his men that, academically, our soldiers are surely among the best led in the world. However, in the field of command and staff relationships at a headquarters, it is presumed that, when officers are to deal with each other, the key word is "performance." All their effort is directed to ensuring that those units subordinate to the Headquarters are implementing the commander's policy. Consideration is rarely given to the principle that imaginative leadership of the members of a staff is equally as important as leadership in the field, even though different activities are involved. Many are unaware that such a requirement exists. The following general cases of possible defective staff leadership may emphasize or bring to light some present or previous experience of the reader, and should emphasize that a problem often exists and requires attention.

Situations

The undesirable staff situations following are not attributable to

your superiors, or to the next higher headquarters, or some other organization. They may well exist in your own headquarters, under your own roof, whether it be at company or Army level. You may have commenced these situations, you may have inherited them and have allowed them to exist or even worsen. You may not even know they exist. The responsibility cannot be placed elsewhere, nor can the situations be blamed on compassionate problems, personality clashes or plain inefficiency. These situations are categorised as follows:—

- (a) Leadership by crisis.
- (b) Absolute leadership.
- (c) Biased leadership.
- (d) Leadership by default.
- (e) Leadership by suggestion.
- (f) Leadership by mutual agreement.

Leadership by Crisis

This is well known under the term of "panicking." One of the symptoms is stated over-politely as—"The boss sneezes and everybody springs to attention." Both the importance and urgency of a requirement are over-emphasized. It must receive Number One priority. The trouble is that most requirements receive this same priority. Tension is rampant; the staff are always put-

ing out brush fires but the smouldering forest fire goes unnoticed. There is no time for calm, considered action. Deadlines never cease and the man on the end never stops running. Fatigue and animosity breed easily. Nothing receives attention unless it is involved in a crisis. The staff are prevented from doing first things first, and from devoting varying time and effort proportionate to each task.

Absolute Leadership

In this set-up the commander must approve everything first, and you get a blast if you use initiative and act for him. The commander changes every paper you send him or you would think he was not competent to handle it. The staff soon learn this and see no need to make sound recommendations. Incomplete staff work is thus encouraged. The commander's desk is a bottleneck and the wheels completely stop when he is away, even for a short time. It is apparent trained staff officers are not required.

Biased Leadership

This is the man who "does not see the big picture," that is, the commander who previously was a DAQMG, and now over-emphasizes "Q" business, or was a GSO2 and had never left "G" Branch, or a DAAG and had never done a tactics course. If this bias is evident in the commander, it will occur with the staff in their own branches. The commander does not have one headquarters composed of parts, he has a collection of individual players. This unfortunately is partially encouraged by the present vertical chains of command, which often prevent lateral or horizontal channels from functioning.

Also under the "biased leadership" types are the following:—

- (a) The "Death or Glory" commander who places all his emphasis on operations and training. These must go on at full speed; the "A" and "Q" are left to themselves, somehow to catch up. Their advice and protests go unheeded until eventually the whole headquarters grinds to a halt when administration breaks down.
- (b) The "Peace at any Price" commander who ensures his headquarters and Command has a brilliant administration record. Every administrative regulation is ruthlessly enforced, staff duties are impeccable. No operation or training activity can take place without an AQ over-insurance. Soon "G" branch loses its initiative, and training becomes unimaginative and commonplace.

Leadership by Default

This sorry category of staff leadership is one which takes place by itself, with no conscious decision having been made, or if a decision is made it was at too low or too high a level. Or, alternatively, a decision is delayed so long that the problem disappears or is absorbed by a bigger one. This type of leadership is evidenced by such examples as the "Write me a summary" commander. Nothing is acceptable that has not been reduced to one sheet of paper. What he does not realize is that the major decisions are being made by the staff officer who decides what to omit from one sheet of paper.

We all know that type of report

which indicates the percentage of effectiveness which a unit has achieved. Direction by a commander that the percentage be raised higher—even to 100 per cent—can often be realized and the commander will be pleased. What he is blissfully unaware of is the countless hours spent by the staff changing figures to make everything come out 100 per cent, making the system of comparison quite ineffective.

Leadership By Suggestion

The following three examples of suggestion have been experienced. One of the most valuable tools of leadership anywhere is a suggestion programme which is a channel for new ideas to be encouraged and advanced. Many suggestions are killed by delegating far too low the power to disapprove a suggestion. The successful commander places the power of disapproval of suggestions at the same level as the power of approval. Then there is the staff conference, chairmanned by the commander, called for the purpose of solving a problem and/or selecting the best of several alternative solutions. How many times have you seen the chairman making his views known at the start of, or early in, the conference. You will agree that there was really no real purpose in having the conference. How many times have you been given the job of conducting a survey or writing an appreciation, and the commander who gave you the job

helped you by speaking the conclusions and recommendations paragraphs when he gave you the job?

Leadership By Mutual Agreement

Some commanders will not receive a paper from their staffs which contains differing opinions of staff members. The staff are required to solve their disagreements prior to the paper being presented. This has merit, but if the commander is not very careful he will have a system which produces watered-down compromises, which are easily approved by him or, since everyone agrees, the paper goes directly to the most junior staff officer for signature. If the commander is not very careful his decision-making days are over, because he never gets a chance to make one.

Conclusion

It is not proposed to offer any remedy to the above undesirable situations, but if the reader recognizes only one of them as a characteristic of his own headquarters, or as similar to the way he himself employs his own staff, and remedies it according to his own judgment, then staff leadership cannot fail to raise itself to a higher plane. Or, if the defect is recognized and understood, and still accepted as a method of staff leadership, at least the disadvantages can be faced. Alternatively, if none of the above problems are recognized, then the reader may well be on a happy staff.

Strategic Review

ASIA IN THE BALANCE

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IN the Korean War, General MacArthur was sacked for fear of his provoking a world war. Instead, Korea was partitioned. And the "bomb" was not dropped on Indo-China. Instead, a peace was signed at Geneva which was a tacit admission of Communist victory.

Then SEATO was hastily thrown together as a show of resistance against further Communist military advance southwards, and as a political instrument to salvage for anti-Communism such scraps of Indo-China as were not already lost. There was never any effective military strength in SEATO except that of the American striking power which had been withheld in North Korea and at Dien Bien Phu.

Today, some seven years after the Manila conference at which SEATO was born, we are back where we started from. The only difference is that massive American aid has failed to establish a stable economic or social basis for pro-Western regimes in Laos, South Vietnam, or South Korea.

Mainland China dominates the

thinking of Asia, whether the thoughts are favourable to it or opposed. It is the greatest land mass in Asia, with the biggest population in the world. Its culture is legendary, with derivatives all over Asia. On top of this, it is Communist—a gigantic experiment to be approached with fear or curiosity, but impossible to ignore.

The Communist Challenge in Asia

There is now increasing evidence that we can expect another big Communist challenge, that this challenge will come from China, and that it will be in South-East Asia.

Most of us seem to prefer to close our eyes to the fact, that, at our own front door, most of South-East Asia is falling into dismal, economic disarray, wide open to Communist conquest.

There are four areas where China can create the kind of crisis its leaders seek—Korea, Formosa, The Indian border and SE Asia.

In Korea and the Formosa Strait it is opposed by massive American power. The India frontier has al-

ready been probed at much cost to its prestige and to little avail. But South-East Asia, divided and vulnerable, with a heavily armed Chinese satellite in North Vietnam poised above its weakest States (Laos and South Vietnam), is wide open.

Recent news from North Vietnam has been ominous. Propaganda for the "liberation and unification of all Vietnam" is mounting in volume and recklessness. And the recruitment and training of a big militia to support a large, very efficient standing army, is proceeding apace on the model of China itself.

The SEATO Answer

The renewal of the SEATO pledge to meet all forms of Communist aggression in the area is a necessary warning to China of what it can expect if it persists with its plans. But much more is needed than a pledge. It must be backed by military preparedness. As yet this hardly begins to exist in the form and strength needed to deter the ever-increasing might of China.

Fortunately, however, America is planning practical steps to build up this strength.

No less urgent is the need for decisive political action—outright interference if necessary—and more economic aid, more effectively disposed, to end the popular grievances, the corruption and tyranny in government, and the poverty which makes Laos and South Vietnam such easy targets for subversion.

Far Eastern Military Strength

Whilst SEATO is faced with a multitude of problems—economic,

military, and political—with very few ready answers, it is well to bear in mind that the nations of the Far East are concentrating on building up their military strength.

There are six areas where forces are concentrated—the Soviet Union's Eastern Provinces, Korea, Japan, Okinawa, Formosa, and Red China. Official statistics and intelligence estimate that the armies in the area number more than 4½ million men.

Mainland China has by far the largest army, Japan, once the mightiest nation in the Far East, is today the weakest, but is safeguarded by her former enemy, the USA, under a renewed security treaty.

The United States' greatest force in the area, the 7th Fleet, although numerically weaker, possesses tremendous firepower.

The Director of the Japanese Defence Agency, Mr. Munenori Akagi, recently outlined the military strength of nations in the Far East as:—

The Soviet Union: 34 army divisions of about 450,000 men, 600 naval vessels, including 110 submarines, totalling 500,000 tons, and 4200 aircraft.

North Korea: 18 divisions and 5 brigades of 540,000 men, 100 naval vessels of 17,000 tons, and 850 aircraft.

South Korea: 19 divisions of 600,000 men, a 38,000-ton navy, and 200 aircraft.

Japan: 170,000 men, a 136,000-ton navy, and 1100 aircraft.

Nationalist China: 24 divisions of 425,000 men, a 120,000-ton navy, and 500 aircraft.

Mainland China: 160 divisions of

2½ million men, a navy of 250 vessels totalling 150,000 tons, and 2000 aircraft.

Mr. Akagi said, in addition, that the United States' forces in the Far East consisted of three army divisions totalling 90,000 men, including marines; the 500,000 tons 7th Fleet, which had 125 vessels, including 4 aircraft carriers, and 1600 aircraft.

Western Policy in Asia

One of the most depressing aspects of the Far Eastern situation is the readiness with which the West has compromised its own moral principles by allying itself with regimes whose dedicated anti-Communism is far too often a cover for other tyrannies.

For years we have stood by, without protest, while regime after regime, closely identified with us in the "free" world, has used our own democratic forms to destroy the meaning of democracy and to create thereby the tragic impression among the uncommitted that the difference in police controls between the West and the Communist bloc is only a matter of degree.

This was true of the Rhee regime in South Korea; and it is also true of a number of other countries.

Everyone recognizes a failure when a policy is no longer believed. That is what has happened to Western policy in South-East Asia. It failed to be convincing, and it can now be seen that the main weaknesses were the aid programme and the China policy.

America's China policy has involved her in a game of make-believe. The spell did not bind together those nations who followed

her example and it antagonized those who did not. It was believed at the beginning of the game that the Chiang Kai-Shek regime would resume its reign on the mainland, but the belief did not last. Today it is found only in Formosa, where tough men speak fervently of "returning home."

But nobody in Asia wants them to succeed in recapturing the seat of the government of China. No Asian government wants this because they know it could be accomplished, if at all, only with a great war.

The Nations of Asia Today

In Asia today the adverse terms of trade are growing more adverse. Chaotic Indonesia faces new difficulties with the expulsion from her rural trade of Chinese merchants. (Everywhere in Asia the local Chinese are in varying degrees politically embarrassing and commercially indispensable.) Indonesia is also troubled with rebels at home, and the problem of wresting West Irian from the Dutch.

The Philippines are making small economic progress and less social progress in return for massive American subsidies.

Thailand and Burma live by exports of rice, which seldom reach their hungry neighbours at a fair price by the time speculators have taken their profit.

Singapore, severed from Malaya, is headed for mass unemployment and a population explosion, long before Chinese bombers are likely to appear overhead.

Even prosperous Malaya is haunted by fluctuations in the world price for its export commodities—

such as rubber—which make havoc of development plans.

Today Laos is swinging over to neutralism because the misspending of 500 million US dollars has caused inflation and poverty among villagers, and won few converts to democracy among the rival feudal leaders of the country.

Laos is wide open because the Laotians are neither pro-Communist nor anti-Communist. They want not so much to be left alone as left free and neutral, to get all the economic aid they can from anyone who will give it to them. Not a year has passed, since the end of World War 2, when Laos has not experienced internal insurrection and strife.

In military terms, SEATO could retrieve the Laotian situation by landing troops at Saigon, by pushing forward an American-equipped Thai army, and by the massive bombing of Hanoi, main supply base for the Soviet airlift to the pro-Communist forces. But what then?

At best, Russia would not take up the challenge at the price of losing face to the Chinese, with Khrushchev being kicked overboard by his Stalinist rivals at the Kremlin. At the best, the Chinese Red Army would not intervene as it did in Korea, with the fear that this time it would be a nuclear war which it could not win, opposed to a conventional war which the Americans could not win. At the best the West would saddle itself with another slice of Asia to feed, clothe, pacify and defend at the cost of a new Afro-Asian wave of racial hostility.

Next door Cambodia has already adopted a form of neutralism—receiving aid from both Communist

and non-Communist parties. Should Cambodia (and Laos) be allowed to "get away with it" as an open invitation to other countries to follow suit?

If the US goes on subsidizing the "bad boys" of Asia, can she afford to deny the good boys still more dollars for remaining good? At the back of this quandary—and often apparently forgotten—is the fact that probably 95 per cent of the people in Asia are not very interested in democracy or Communism as rival political theories. But they are interested in economic planning and nationalism.

The impact of Western military aid, and a simultaneous Western refusal to stabilize the prices of export commodities have undermined the economic foundation of the bamboo skyscrapers it erected in the name of anti-Communism.

The ultra-nationalistic Vietnamese, like the Koreans, are more interested in the re-unification of their country than in the exact colour of the central government likely to take over. It is only by establishing his own police force and faking his elections that Diem can prevent Ho Chi Minh's North Vietnamese troops walking in. The fact that they would walk in under the banners of Communism is secondary, in the minds of most Vietnamese, to the fact that they would abolish the artificial frontier dividing their country.

South Vietnam is being prised open—not because the South Vietnamese want Communism—but because Diem's Right Wing pro-Western regime is being rapidly undermined by economic failure and Communist terrorism.

South Korea is no immediate military problem because most South Koreans are anti-Chinese, if not anti-Communist, and South Korea can be sealed against Communist infiltration and is strategically defensible from bases in Japan.

Western Aid to Asia

One of the most disturbing features of all Western aid to Asia is the insignificant proportion devoted to technical co-operation. Armies, roads, bridges, capital equipment and consumer goods supplied through the American counterpart programme abound; but evidence of self-generating aid that will help towards rapid administrative and economic development—the only really worthwhile aid—is hard to find.

While much defence support can reasonably be described as helping economically—in opening up new areas, in rehabilitating railways and roads—the security significance of a project usually tends to outweigh its economic potentialities.

The new highway built to connect Phnom Penh, the Cambodian capital, with the new port of Sihanoukville comes within this category. It cost 25 million dollars, and in theory will carry Cambodia's export crop of rice to the sea; but in Asia, for sound economic reasons, it is impracticable to carry rice for long distances by road. In impact, the road does not compare with the new 500-bed hospital the Russians are building outside Phnom Penh. Nor is it as useful as the factories which the Chinese Communists are building. To a country without industry, the Chinese cement, textile and plywood fac-

ories all have rich potential for Cambodia, firstly in saving foreign exchange, and secondly in generating economic growth.

Perhaps nothing less than a united effort by the two biggest trading partners east of Suez, Australia and Japan, can check the rot.

The shape of things to come appears in tiny transistor radio sets, with thermal generators run on kerosene, now flooding the Asian market. These ingenious gadgets, serving the needs of Asian villagers, are very simple and cheap—so cheap they are obviously being marketed far below cost price. Their country of origin? Red China!

They are part of a massive Communist export drive—an economic blitzkrieg—which could be more decisive in the cold war than any brave posturing in SEATO or rigid moral attitude towards Peking.

Estimates of China's industrial export potential, five years hence, are much more meaningful than abstract speculation on whether the Singapore base will be of any use in 1965, when it comes within range of Chinese nuclear bombers.

The American Aid Programme

American aid in Asia is regarded with widespread scepticism. It is accepted with a singular lack of good spirits. The appetite for it seems insatiable, but no one appears to get pleasure from taking it. This is possibly the same complex which developed in Europe during the Marshall Plan.

Asian nations would prefer trade to aid. Sometimes they resent aid because they feel that if trade were fair, if they were not in a weak trad-

ing, position, they would not need aid.

By trying to make "neutrality" seem discreditable, America made it apparent that, however much her leaders said they cared for the welfare of the people of Asia, it was anti-Communist welfare they meant. Asians suspected that aid was not given to help a friend to find his way, but to buffer what America regarded as the Communist threat.

This policy has been slowly discarded. Neutrality in Asia has become respectable in Washington. (Old-established neutrality, that is.)

Countries still striving for neutrality, however, still find it hard to get Western approval.

In looking at the Asian scene, one can only wonder what might have been achieved if the accent had been less on raising second and third class armies, and more on raising the standards of living.

Conclusion

It is not enough for SEATO to remain an organisation for planning armed defence in time of war, if the Communist threat is constantly working through subversion, infiltration, and persuasive propaganda. In this phase of the cold war, more direct contacts with the Peking Government would be an advantage. The admission of Red China to the

UN would bring the issue of Communism in Asia into an international forum.

It may be difficult to get endorsement of this by SEATO because of the firm commitment of the USA and some other members to recognize the Nationalists on Formosa as the Government of China. But even if the policy of aloofness towards Peking goes on, it must be accompanied by the greatest efforts to raise living standards in Asia. That would be the most practical step toward the stronger community spirit.

The West is faced with military frustration as a legacy of political and economic failure. It only remains, it seems, for bargaining to replace brinkmanship—based on the hope that Russia would prefer a bargain even if China would not. But, again, there will be a price—yet another payment for our past mistakes and lack of firm policy—and as Confucius might have said, "He who can't buy good friends must pay bad enemies."

Australia in particular, looking for its own national survival in the survival of a non-Communist South-East Asia, might find it profitable to lay greater emphasis on what non-Communists should do—and less superfluous emphasis on what everybody knows the Communists are already doing.

DAVID AND GOLIATH

A Study in Australian Strategic Defence Planning

Lieutenant K. Collins
Royal Australian Infantry

"Cabinet takes into account all the wide range of complex considerations in the formulation of defence policy — military and strategic, external affairs, financial and economic."

—Defence Review—Statement by the Minister for Defence — Hansard, 26 Nov 59.

"Nowadays a new set of circumstances is apt to catch up with the planners before the arrangements they have made to meet the previous set have become effective. This is not to say that our planners are bad or lazy forecasters. Planners serving a real democracy cannot get very far ahead of public opinion, at any rate so far as public opinion is represented by the freely elected representatives of the people. It is this opinion which lags behind events, chiefly because it is naturally more concerned with domestic issues than with international affairs, and with the present rather than the future."

—Strategic Review — AAJ Jan 61.

THE above extracts highlight the difficulties in reconciling the economic as opposed to the operational aspects of defence planning. In the case of Australia these difficulties are increased considerably by the large area to be defended as compared to the earning and productive capacity of a small population.

Current Concepts

As a result of these factors current Australian defence planning is based on a programme due to be completed in June 1962. This programme provides for our forces being engaged in support of, and in

conjunction with, our allies to meet limited war situations likely to be encountered in the SE Asia area during the period concerned.

The encouragement and assistance we are giving to anti-communist governments in SE Asia are helping to provide us, for the present, with defence in depth against the only enemy we need fear—the creeping menace of international communism. Our plans appear, therefore, to be reasonably effective having regard to the present situation in SE Asia and to our manpower and economic resources.

Likely Developments in SE Asia

We should, however, be allowing for the possibility of a gradual deterioration in the overseas situation which over a period could result in us having to face alone a hostile Asian power intent on dominating Australia and occupying its vast under-developed area. In these circumstances the ultimate requirement would be for our defence system to provide for the complete protection of the Australian mainland.

It is by no means intended to indicate that we should as a matter of policy consider that all or any of our neighbours and allies will be overrun by communism tomorrow or the next day. In view of the events of the last six or eight years, however, and in view of the subtle methods and avowed aims of international communism, it would be unrealistic to ignore the possibility of a considerable change in the East-West alignment of power in SE Asia over, say, the next ten years.

The statement of the Minister for Defence (Hansard, 26 Nov 59) that due to changing world conditions our defence planning will be subject to constant review is a welcome sign that we do not again intend to be caught as unprepared as we were at the beginning of the 1939-45 war. Is this rather passive attitude sufficient, however, in times when delay is synonymous with defeat? In view of the speed with which circumstances alter we should be anticipating rather than reacting to changes in circumstances overseas.

If we plan now for providing for a defence system which in ten years' time will be fully capable of physi-

cally defending Australia we will only be acting prudently on the teachings of history.

If the direct threat to Australia does not eventuate we will not have wasted our resources, because the type of defences planned can be such that in the meantime they would have provided great encouragement to our allies and acted as a deterrent, possibly for all time, against aggression in SE Asia.

Development of Major Equipments

Another aspect of the Minister's statement concerned "the almost bewildering rapidity with which new weapons and techniques are now developed." It is considered that in this approach a fundamental error has occurred in the scope of our present defence planning.

The time taken to express the initial requirement, carry out design and development work and put into production a modern aircraft, a weapons system or a major item of equipment is in the order of five years. The items concerned do not just appear "out of the blue."

By the time a change in circumstances overseas necessitates a change in our military organization and equipment the "design gap" will have resulted in us having outdated equipment and being unable to produce new equipment in time. We will then again be faced with the oft-repeated situation of having "too little, too late."

In planning our defence, therefore, we should right now be making an intelligent anticipation of what our requirements will be in 10 years' time instead of taking the shortsighted course of embarking on a series of costly reorganizations at 3-year intervals.

In using this figure of ten years we will need to select weapons and equipment which will be the best of those completely developed in five years' time and which will be readily available in, say, eight years' time. This allows a period of two years to cover unexpected delays and to finalize the introduction of the equipments concerned into service. It also allows a considerable amount of flexibility in timing so that if necessary our programme can be speeded up by advancing delivery dates for imported equipment and production dates for equipment manufactured locally.

By laying the foundations now the defence system can be built up gradually so that at the end of our programme period we will be provided with the ultimate guarantee against outside aggression. The fact that the suggested ten-year period for putting new equipment into service corresponds with the time when it is likely we will be in danger makes it all the more important that we should be making our long-term plans now and not at some vague, indefinite time in the future.

Total Defence — The Problem and a Possible Solution

All Round Defence

In examining the methods we could use to defend Australia it becomes readily apparent that one of the principal considerations is to provide for the maximum amount of mobility and flexibility in the deployment of both our forces and our fire-power. We have neither the manpower nor the financial resources to place fixed defences around our entire coastline, and, even then, if we did so, our forces would be so scattered that a land-

ing could be made at any point against only very weak opposition.

Missiles for Total Defence

The ranges attainable by intermediate-range and inter-continental ballistic missiles could, however, considerably simplify the provision of all-round defence for our whole continent. With a defence system based on missile weapons, protection could be provided to an extent previously obtainable only by the employment of large naval, military and air forces.

Our solution, then, is to have long-range missiles dispersed throughout the country in such a manner that they will provide fire onto any approach. The ideal system would allow for an overlap of fire so that increased firepower can be brought to bear at one point by using missiles launched from another area.

Deployment of the missiles could be arranged in areas similar to the existing Army Commands, with centralised control in each Command and with an over-all control organization, together with a reserve of weapons, being located in a suitably isolated inland area.

In the United States, development of a relatively cheap and simple missile system (by US standards) is nearing completion. This system, the Minuteman, uses a solid-fuel weapon, which can be launched immediately it is required and, as it does not require large storage facilities for liquid fuel, it offers the further immense advantage of complete mobility. This allows its position to be changed continuously, thereby escaping neutralizing fire which an enemy would naturally bring to bear against fixed installations.

Other Requirements

The larger types of missiles would, of course, be supplemented by short-range tactical weapons organic to the land forces and also by medium-range strategic weapons. A weapon similar to the US Pershing with a range of up to 600 miles, would satisfy this latter requirement. This type would be available, if required, for strategic and tactical deployment overseas. It would in addition provide most of the Command defensive fire because due to its lower cost, lower yield and increased mobility it would be available for relatively rapid and sustained fire in the Command's area of responsibility. As there have been suggestions that the Pershing missile is effective up to 800 miles and can be modified for use up to 1200 miles, it is possible that one type of weapon could cater for both the medium-range and intermediate-range requirements. If this is so, both the number and variety of missile batteries could be reduced, thereby reducing the problems of finance, logistics and training.

In order to provide the over-all system with increased depth and flexibility a necessary adjunct to the land-based missiles would be a small number of Polaris and other types of sea-launched weapons and air-launched weapons such as the Skybolt (and smaller types) carried by patrol, attack and other aircraft. Owing to their capacity for detecting and attacking surface vessels and submarines over a wide area, the patrol aircraft are a vital necessity, particularly for the interim period when the land-based missile system is being built up.

The system would require to be backed up by a widespread recon-

naissance and reporting organization and by a highly mobile ground force organized preferably as a number of independent "All-Arms Battle Groups." If required, these battle groups could be re-grouped to form brigades and divisions, but they would normally remain independent in order to carry out a highly mobile reconnaissance and local defence role.

Will the Use of Missiles Limit the Effectiveness of Our Defence System?

General Maxwell D. Taylor is quoted in the April 1960 AAJ as commenting that the West has too often been faced with the alternative of retreating or being responsible for starting all-out nuclear war. This has been explained as being due to the US placing too great an emphasis in its military planning on all-out general war and on the doctrine of massive retaliation instead of recognizing the fact that a force "cannot take ground without being there."

In our case, however, I would suggest that apart from the normal tactical employment of our troops we will not be vitally concerned in taking ground. We will, however, be vitally concerned strategically in holding ground.

If war does come to Australia's shores, therefore, it will be all-out war as far as we are concerned, and there would be no real reason to avoid the use of the weapons which develop the greatest fire-power. The use of these weapons against large invasion forces and hostile areas with high population densities would adequately compensate for the use of similar weapons against us.

Decentralization

We can expect that even without the use by us of nuclear weapons the "other side" will be completely ruthless, and attacks on our industrial and population centres will follow any protracted resistance by us.

Decentralization is therefore an essential and vital aspect of our defence planning, which can only be avoided by a 100 per cent. foolproof anti-aircraft and anti-missile defence system. In view of the immense cost involved in decentralising existing population and industrial centres we would have no alternative to providing such defences for the major cities initially and later for other important areas. In this regard Australia with its relatively few centres of dense population has a much easier task of providing defence for a sizeable portion of its population than other countries which have either a large number of big cities or a more evenly spread but denser population.

Despite this rather dubious advantage, however, early consideration should be given to planning at least for the decentralization of future development into "atomic-age" satellite towns. These towns should have the factories and key installations located underground and adequate shelter facilities for the inhabitants. Only if we are fully confident of the ability of our anti-aircraft and anti-missile defences to stop all attacks can this requirement for constructing decentralized satellite towns be omitted.

Distribution of Responsibilities

With a defence system using such a variety of "exotic" weapons as those set out above there would, of course, be some dissension as to

which of the Services would be responsible for their use. The suggested distribution of responsibility with respect to both missiles and other forms of defence is as follows:

Army—

Land defence forces, including highly mobile reconnaissance patrols ("All Arms Battle Groups").

Paratroop or air-landed strategic reserve counter-attack force.

Joint Services communications and reporting systems.

Radar warning network.

Commando long-range penetration force which will include a reconnaissance and reporting role.

Mainland anti-aircraft and anti-missile defences.

Co-ordination and control of the training and employment of civil defence (home guard) personnel.

Navy—

Detection and destruction of enemy surface vessels, submarines, aircraft and missiles. (Hunter-killer groups equipped with helicopter carriers capable of carrying part of the Army strategic reserve counter-attack force.)

Reconnaissance of targets for Joint Service Missile Command.

Polaris-type submarines integrated into the over-all missile system.

Laying of defensive and offensive minefields.

Protection of shipping.

Re-supply from overseas of commodities not available locally.

Air Force—

Detection and destruction of enemy surface vessels, submarines, and aircraft. (Patrol and attack aircraft equipped mainly with short-range missiles.)




Fig 1—The Defence of Australia—1971

Reconnaissance of targets for Joint Services Missile Command.

Air-launched missiles integrated into over-all missile system. (Heavy bomber or converted transport aircraft.)

Transportation of mobile land forces (strategic reserve counter-attack force particularly) beyond the distances practicable with their own organic air transport.

Tactical close support of ground forces (attack aircraft).

Transportation of complete missile systems to give them greater mobility and flexibility.

Re-supply of missile sites from reserve stocks.

Transportation of other urgently required personnel and equipment for all services.

Joint Services Missile Command (Includes Joint Chiefs-of-Staff)—

Co-ordination of all defensive and offensive missile firings other than those made by other services in purely tactical or limited circumstances.

The firing of all land-based strategic missiles, including those used against landing forces.

Outline Order-of-Battle

Figures 1 and 2 show the possible deployment of our forces based on the above outline plan and applicable 10 years from now. The details concerned, together with additional information, are also set out in tabular form. Citizen Forces are included in the total requirements shown.

It will be readily appreciated that all figures and types of equipment shown are indicative only of the general system and therefore should

not be interpreted too literally. Each item and many others require to be the subject of detailed staff assessment after the general outline plan has been agreed upon. This remark applies particularly to the suggested programme periods. With the initial plan under way the build-up of the complete system could be either accelerated or retarded depending on the situation overseas.

Existing political boundaries have been ignored in the preparation of Figure 1 and similarly the potential invader has not been identified.

Financial Considerations

The defence system outlined above would obviously be a very expensive undertaking. Can we afford to account the cost, however, when a little economic hardship will immeasurably supplement our meagre manpower resources? The choice is simple. If we are to remain free to follow our own way of life we will have to pay, either in money now, or in casualties later.

The cost, however, might prove to be not as great as one would at first think. Within the existing Defence budget the Air Force has built up an operational force of aircraft almost as large as the suggested figure for the end of the 10-year period. Although the Navy does not have submarines or missiles, it does have enough ships either in service or in reserve to carry out most of the tasks shown above. With the exception of the large radar and communications requirements the Army's tasks similarly could be catered for to a large extent by a reorganization of our existing facilities.

As a wholly uninformed estimate I would suggest, therefore, that the provision of say an additional £10-15 million per annum, if accompanied by a recasting of our existing expenditure, would at the end

Item	10-year Period		20-year Period	
	Peace	War	Peace	War

ARMY

All-Arms Battle Groups:				
(a) Reconnaissance and Local Defence	12	15	15	18
(b) Strategic Reserve Counter-attack Force	3	5	5	7
SAGW Batteries	3	6	6	12
Anti-Missile Batteries	3	6	6	12
Early-Warning Radars	3	9	6	20
Joint-Service and Command Communications Centres	5	5	5	5
Civil Defence Training Companies	9	12	15	20

NAVY

IRBM Submarines	1	1	2	2
Missile Patrol and Picquet Destroyers	5	6	6	8
Missile-Helicopter-Attack Carriers	2	2	2	2
Anti-Submarine Detection Vessels	4	6	8	12
Minelayers	5	6	6	8
Submarine Transport Vessels	3	4	8	10

AIR FORCE

Patrol Aircraft	48	48	60	60
Attack Aircraft	96	96	120	120
Heavy Transport Aircraft*	24	48	36	60
Medium and Assault Transport Aircraft	24	48	36	60

JOINT SERVICES MISSILE COMMAND

Joint Services Command Centres	5	5	5	5
ICBM Batteries (5-6000-mile range)	1	2	2	4
IRBM Batteries (1500-mile range)	1	2	2	4
Medium Range (600-mile) Missile Batteries	4	6	8	12
Computer Centres	5	5	5	5

*Includes 6 Heavy Bombers or converted transports equipped for launching of Skybolt-type missiles.




Fig 2—Typical Command Deployment of Forces

of 10 years give us the defence system we require.

Conclusions

The suggested plan would not in any way alter either the principle or the practice of having a proportion of our effort available for our SEATO commitments. Our ground forces would still be available for rapid movement overseas, and due to the range of the missile weapons concerned we would be able to provide immediate and effective close support for any of our Asian allies. The defences concerned would offer the further advantage that we would be assured of retaining the Australian mainland as a more reliable firm base than is possible with the current plan.

It has not been my intention to argue that our military planners and Defence Ministers have had absolutely no regard for our long-term requirements, as I am confident that due regard has been had in military circles to more than just our day-to-day requirements. It is apparent, however, that in the absence of a direct threat local considerations and political expediency have dictated a series of short-term plans which, while possibly being sufficient in themselves for the period concerned, have not been

geared to our ultimate requirement of defending Australia.

What is required is a national awareness of the precarious position we occupy, and without this awareness our defence planning will always be tied down to relatively ineffective short-term programmes.

Whether or not we adopt such far-reaching measures as I have outlined is therefore a matter of considerable political as well as economic and military importance, and it is certain that the Government which implemented them under the present conditions would be subjected to strong local and overseas pressures to change its plans.

Time for complete and detailed planning is at present on our side, so we do not have to rush in and make a panic decision on the exact form our long-term defence plan should take.

How long can we wait, however, before we have the decision thrust upon us by a direct threat of invasion? Will it be 10 years, or 20 years, or will it be only five? This is the first and most vital assessment that needs to be made with respect to weapons that offer us the slingshot with which to cut the communist Goliath down to our size.

FOLLOWING THE LEADER

Major J. C. F. Moloney
Royal Australian Infantry

So much has been written on the subject of leadership that the addition of a few more words can be neither here nor there. Any writer who ventures into this subject also faces the problems of his own experience, which may lead him to false conclusions, or even worse, to the disclosure of his own ignorance of what he is talking about.

In spite of these handicaps the writer hopes to make some contribution, positive or negative, to better understanding of this subject.

From the outset, we must try to relate the subject to its practice. The idea of leaders without followers verges on the ridiculous, as the essence of the desirable result of leadership is that someone should be following the leader.

As children we probably played "Follow the Leader", practising leadership in our turn, and by the rules of the game receiving the full support of our followers. By tacit consent, as after all each was to have his turn, the leader was able to lead the followers to perform a variety of antics. The concentration of children, in their attempts to imitate precisely what their leader

does or says, is worthy of note, as it is a voluntary effort and deflects the qualities of self restraint and co-ordination with others. Surely these very qualities are those that we as military leaders, so ardently wish our followers to display? The rules of our game certainly provide for imitation of the leaders by the followers in what is done and said, so that should our results fall short of what we desire, there may be a case for examination of the examples that have been set.

Another game we probably played is "Simon Says". We had advanced somewhat, and the element of higher authority entered into our thinking. There, in front of us, was the leader. Ever so often the mystical "Simon" directed through him that some action or another should or should not take place. On no account were we to "follow the leader" without the authority of "Simon", at the risk of penalty. Here we have the elements of junior leadership and higher authority, and the most striking example of followers responding to their leader in authorized situations only. This again is a vivid reflection of the military ideal. Our junior

leaders are appointed because of their loyalty and reliability, and we expect them to lead their followers in the directions indicated to them by their superiors. Whilst we certainly appreciate displays of initiative, we are normally somewhat dismayed should either the followers or the junior leaders depart from what "Simon Says" and cause "Simon" trouble.

By some process of reasoning, we seem to have arrived at three elements of leadership which bear examination:—

1. Leaders may expect the examples they set in doing and saying to be followed.
2. Leaders should be careful to act in accordance with the wishes of their superior authorities.
3. Junior leadership is dependent upon senior leadership.

The military need for leaders at all levels to set good examples, in all fields of activity, is so basic that we shall not discuss it further. One point we should stress, however, is that the junior leader, as both a follower and a leader, is closest to the ultimate followers, the troops. The junior leader to them is the representative of all authority. The training and preparation of the junior leader for this reason is vital to the interests of senior leaders. Should the junior leader fall short in the eyes of his troops, those that placed him in his position share their criticism.

Soldiers, in their position as followers, are in the happy position of being able to develop their critical faculties to the full. Most are expert in their knowledge of what they expect of a leader, and what is more to the point, are also well

informed as to what higher authorities expect of their immediate superiors. A new leader, especially an officer, is probably subjected to the closest and most expert scrutiny a human being can receive, by the troops placed under his command. He will be judged mostly by what he does and what he says. Like most people, troops are not particularly interested in what he thinks or feels. At some time he will be accepted or rejected by them, and the degree of his acceptance or rejection will be well defined in easily understandable terms. The measure of his success or otherwise will probably be shown by how far he can lead his men to do what should be done. What one does, and what one should do are very different things. Most of us have a fairly good idea of what we should do, and prefer to serve a leader who keeps us on the straight and narrow path, if for no other reason than to preserve our own peace of mind.

These happy citizens, the soldiers, will of course take the maximum advantage of weakness or lack of zeal, which under the circumstances is fair enough. If such manifestations appear in junior leaders, the important thing to discover is their cause. If they are clearly a matter for the individual, many solutions may be found. On the other hand, if the junior leader has unwittingly demonstrated some weakness in the system, we have a different kettle of fish and normally a problem of some magnitude. The more so because such a breakdown in junior leadership casts a reflection on the leadership of "Simon", who after all should set the pace.

The exercise of authority is an important factor in leadership, and

is worthy of some attention. Let us turn to the citizen who enlists and undertakes to serve his Queen and Country, which are pretty broad terms of reference. We will assume that he has a reasonable grasp of the financial and material returns he will get for his service, and will try to picture his first contact with the system.

He will undoubtedly learn that Her Majesty, and Her Majesty's Government have taken full advantage of their powers of delegation, and that there are only too many officers and NCOs anxious to instruct him in his duties and to guide him along the paths of military virtue. The exact mechanics of these delegations will probably remain somewhat mysterious, until our man acquires sufficient knowledge to stand to some degree on his own military feet. At this stage he has become aware of martial right and wrong, softness and toughness, and fairness and injustice. He also has access to old sweats, who probably assail his innocent ears with elements of bush law. In short, we have on our roll book the name of a trained and critical soldier.

As previously discussed, this individual will join with his comrades in personal and unofficial assessment of his leaders. He will judge them as men, and in their performance of their duties. He will know what they should be doing, and woe betide the leadership rating of the Officer or NCO who fails to live up

to, reasonably, the requirements of his rank.

On the other hand, he is quick to notice when his leader is put in a spot by some neglect of higher authority, and equally quick to place blame for the omission on to "them". Alas, poor "Simon"!

"Simon", poor fellow, is a man of many parts. Multitudes of people, staff officers, public servants, senior officers, politicians, and the public themselves, all contribute to his being. Countless text books, orders, regulations, instructions, minutes, letters, and telephone calls give voice to his desires and needs. "Simon", we regret to say, sometimes appears to be confused. Sometimes he is unreasonable, and his various desires come flooding forth in a spate of orders and instructions requiring concurrent action to be completed yesterday!

Let us spare a thought for our junior leaders. Our ultimate success rests with them, and they must face the troops in representing superior authority in all its aspects. Often they bear responsibility, with inadequate authority to implement their plans. Sometimes they become the scape-goats for faults mysteriously hidden elsewhere.

Junior leadership is after all a manifestation of senior leadership. Both can only be as good as the system permits them to be, and this is really a system of following the leader.



THE LAST OF THE JUST, by Andre Schwarz-Bart (Secker and Warburg, London, and William Heinemann Ltd., 317 Collins Street, Melbourne).

There is an age old Jewish belief, that in every generation there are born among the Jews, thirty-six men whom God has chosen to bear the burden of the world's suffering, and to whom he has granted the privilege of martyrdom.

This is the underlying theme of this novel, which is really two stories in one. The first, a chronicle of Jewish suffering covering 800 years; the second, the story of a young Jew whose life span coincides with that of Nazism in Germany.

The first story opens in the year 1185 and tells how the citizens of York at the behest of their bishop wiped out the Jews of their city.

A last stand was made in a tower by a group of Jews under their rabbi, who, when he saw there was no hope, consigned his flock to God, and cut their throats before taking his own life. According to legend God was so pleased with this martyrdom that He told Rabbi Levy that one man of his family in every generation would be one of the 36 Just Men.

The sole survivor of the massacre

was Solomon Levy, the youngest son of the Rabbi. On him and his descendants falls the mantle of the just men, which is only lifted with the death of the last, Ernie Levy, who died in the arms of his girl in an Auschwitz gas chamber.

A chronicle of all the just Levys from the Rabbi to Ernie's grandfather is given in this first story and takes the reader through a wide sweep of history.

The second story begins with Ernie Levy's grandfather and covers the period from the post World War I pogroms in Poland to the destruction of millions of Jews in Hitler's Germany.

It is when the mantle of the "Just" falls on Ernie that the real force and direction of the theme of the book shows up. Ernie is presented, not as a patriarchal figure, but as a very ordinary person, full of fears and failings, who suffers as a school boy in Germany from the Nazi persecution of the Jews. At the outbreak of the Second World War, Ernie is in France where his family have earlier taken refuge. He voluntarily joins the Army in an attempt to give his family some claim to French nationality and protection.

After the debacle in France, Ernie finds himself in the Unoccupied

Zone, and for a while yields to the temptation to forget that he is a Jew. In the end he submits to his destiny and voluntarily returns to Paris; voluntarily pins on the six-pointed star; voluntarily follows the girl he loves to the concentration camp and finally into the gas chamber; thus completing the circle and shape of the legend of the just men. One man escaped the massacre at York; his descendant returns of his own will to share the fate of his people at the hands of the Nazis.

This is a haunting and powerful

book throughout, and is beautifully translated from the French.

The last phase, when Ernie is in the concentration camp, is particularly moving and raises once again the disturbing question of Nazi guilt; at a time when this subject is so much under discussion in connection with the current trial of Eichmann in Israel.

This book has already sold over half a million copies and has the distinction of having won the coveted Prix Goncourt.

—Major W. C. Newman.

COMPETITION FOR AUTHORS

The Board of Review has awarded first place and the prize of £5 for the best original article published in the May issue to "The Queen's Shilling" by Major J. C. F. Moloney, Royal Australian Infantry.