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FRONTISPIECE

Throughout 1916 and 1917 powerful offensives by both sides failed to break the stalemate on the Western Front. Early in 1918 the German armies in France were strongly reinforced by the arrival of formations from the Eastern Front, where Russian resistance had collapsed after the Bolshevik revolution. Selected formations of the reinforced armies were withdrawn from the front and intensively trained in the newly-devised infiltration tactics. With these formations the Germans launched a powerful offensive in March 1918, broke through the Allies' line, achieved a spectacular advance, and very nearly succeeded in driving a wedge between the French and British armies.

The Germans continued their thrusts until July-August, when the Allied counter-offensive got under way. By September the Allies had reached the Hindenburg Line, a very strong belt of fortifications built by the Germans in 1916-17.

On the front of the British Fourth Army the Australian Corps closed up to the Hindenburg Line towards the end of September. In six days of bitter fighting, from 29 September to 5 October, the Corps, supported by British tanks, forced a passage through the deep defences. The picture, which is from a painting by Will Longstaff in the possession of the Australian War Memorial, shows infantry and tanks penetrating the German defences.

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CONTENTS

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"Breaking the Hindenburg Line"

From the painting by Will Longstaff in the Australian War Memorial, Canberra.

AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

Editor:
COLONEL E. G. KEOGH, MBE, ED (RL)
Assistant Editor:
MAJOR W. C. NEWMAN, ED.
Staff Artist:
MR. G. M. CAPPER

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ANTI-GUERILLA OPERATIONS

This article has been prepared by an officer of Army Headquarters. The views expressed do not necessarily represent official doctrine.

Introduction

IT was inevitable that the recent introduction of the pentropic organization into the Australian Military Forces should arouse comparative criticism, the new Pentropic Division being compared with the old. The setting for such criticism is usually restricted to the familiar phases of war.

In the past there has been a tendency to ignore the employment of AMF field formations in the counter-insurgency role in South East Asia. It is hoped that the introduction of a new divisional organization, specifically designed for operations in South East Asia, will stimulate interest in this aspect of cold war. It seems timely to provide a broad outline of anti-guerilla operations to facilitate evaluation of the Pentropic Division in this setting.

General

Insurgency forms an integral part of Communist revolutionary warfare, which, if unchecked, can lead to seizure of power by the Communists. Communist insurgency starts with a period of political and economic subversion which is later extended to include military action. Given suitable conditions the military action may develop on the following lines:—

(a) Unco-ordinated armed activity.

(b) Co-ordination of armed activity into organized guerilla warfare.

(c) Development of guerilla warfare into offensive action by a formed army.

Countering insurgency is primarily a political, economic and cultural problem. The army task is to counter the Communist military activity and thus to assist the friendly government to maintain or resume control of cities, villages, communications, key points and country areas. To achieve this the army conducts anti-guerilla operations. As special anti-guerilla forces are seldom available, this task will normally be undertaken by conventional forces.

This article deals only with the situation where the Pentropic Division is employed solely in an anti-guerilla role and the commander can devote his entire energy and combat effort to the task. However, many of the principles apply when the division is fighting a conventional enemy and is forced simultaneously to fight guerillas.

Commanders and staff officers must have a full understanding of the political and psychological history of the insurgent movement and of the policies of their own and allied governments. A sound political sense will help commanders to ensure that their military actions and the behaviour of their troops gain the goodwill and avoid the hostility of the local population.

Guerilla Forces

Guerillas are normally members of the indigenous population formed into some semblance of military organization. They employ tactics such as passive resistance, espionage, subversion, sabotage, diversion, reprisal, terrorism and propaganda to achieve their aim. They attack, harass and delay any conventional forces opposing them. They attempt to gain control gradually of the whole country and are most effective when they have the approval of the majority of the population in the area.

Guerillas must see some chance for the eventual success of their movement before they will give up everything and risk their lives in the movement. However, once committed, their motivation, whether political or sociological, is very real and they are prepared to sacrifice their lives for their beliefs and ideals.

The mobility of guerillas is normally limited to foot movement, and their weapons are usually small arms. In order to operate against conventional forces they endeavour to fight in terrain which allows them to move with equal or greater ease than the conventional soldier, and to employ tactics which prevent the conventional forces from bringing effective fire power against them. Mountains, forests, jungles and swamps are the most favourable types of terrain for their operations. Guerillas normally make use of villages in these areas. Large cities are often used by guerillas especially when civilian control is weak.

Guerilla tactics are based on rapid concentration against specific targets followed by rapid dispersal. A feature of these tactics is patient waiting for the most favourable time to attack. In order to conduct their major operations in strength at a time and place of their own choosing, guerillas create diversions to ensure that the conventional force operating against them is dispersed so that it cannot concentrate its full power against them.

Guerilla forces depend on supplies from within the area of operations and sometimes from outside sources. They can get food, clothing and medical supplies from the people. They can capture and steal supplies, arms, ammunition and equipment from the conventional force opposing them. As a general rule, however, a guerilla movement does not flourish until it receives outside support.

Principles of Anti-Guerilla Operations

Preventing the formation of an insurgency movement is normally much easier than eliminating one after it is formed. When a resistance movement cannot be prevented, elimination is easier during its early stages than after it has reached full development.

Guerilla units cannot exist very long without the support of the majority of the civilian population,

whether such support is given willingly or is gained through coercion are fighting. Anti-guerilla plans tions therefore must include appropriate measures against civilian supporters of the guerillas. Any anti-guerilla measures taken against the civilian population, however, must be carefully weighed against the national objectives for which we are fighting. Anti-guerilla plans and actions must be guided by the fact that the enemy guerillas will commit criminal acts against the population, then blame them on our forces or on guerilla units friendly to us. Likewise, enemy guerillas will disguise themselves as civilians (political action committees) to provoke our retaliation against the local population. Actions to counter these activities must be designed to prevent unnecessary alienation of the population.

An area confronted with a serious guerilla menace is similar in many ways to a combat area. Commanders and troops in such an area must maintain the same alert and aggressive attitude as troops in contact with the enemy conventional force. A "rear area" psychology makes it easy for guerillas to employ one of their more effective principles — surprise.

Purely defensive measures allow a guerilla movement to grow and become strong. The use of defensive measures alone is justified only when the lack of adequate forces prohibits offensive operations. *Limited offensive* operations are preferable to a passive attitude. Offensive action should be continuous and not be interrupted by periods of inactivity except as a deceptive measure.

Anti-guerilla action should be directed against all aspects of guerilla activity, especially against those aspects upon which the guerillas are most dependent. They are:—

(a) Support of the civilian population.
(b) Source of food supply.
(c) Leadership and morale.
(d) Communications and organization.
(e) Arms and ammunition supply.
(f) Medical supplies.

Guerilla security against ground attack is apt to be less effective during darkness and inclement weather, hence attacks during these periods should be considered normal. Secrecy of movement and surprise are usually essential for a successful attack. Enemy guerillas may also be fought effectively by use of guerilla tactics against them. Forces for this purpose may be raised from the indigenous population, and may include enemy defectors and informers.

Planning for Anti-guerilla Operations

Plans for anti-guerilla operations are based primarily on a detailed analysis of the country and its population. The political, administrative, economic, sociological, and military aspects of the plans are closely correlated with the overall military plan. Plans must provide co-ordination between adjacent commands. It is normally of little use for a command in one area to carry out vigorous anti-guerilla operations if a nearby command is passive. The guerillas will move into the quiet area until danger has passed and then return. The boundaries between major anti-guerilla commands should not bisect

swamps, forests, mountain ridges, or other difficult terrain. Such areas are ideal from the guerilla standpoint for camps, headquarters, and safe areas. Responsibility for such an area should be given to one anti-guerilla commander.

In assessing the guerilla menace in an area and for planning anti-guerilla operations, the following factors must be considered:

(a) Terrain and weather.
  (i) Suitability of terrain, roads and tracks, for guerilla operations.
  (ii) Existence of possible hide-out areas.
  (iii) Effect of weather and season of year on guerilla operations.

(b) Inhabitants. The motivation and loyalties of various segments of the population, identification of hostile and friendly elements, and vulnerability of friendly or potentially friendly elements to guerilla terror tactics. Particular attention is given to:
  (i) Farmers and other rural dwellers.
  (ii) Criminal and lawless elements of urban areas.
  (iii) Adherents to the political philosophy of the enemy government or to similar philosophies.
  (iv) Former members of the enemy armed forces.
  (v) Location and proportion of population likely to engage in guerilla activities.
  (vi) Location and proportion of the population likely to assist friendly forces.
  (vii) Existence of strong personalities capable of organizing resistance movements, and their activities.
  (viii) Susceptibility of various segments of population to both enemy and friendly propaganda.

(c) Resources:
  (i) Capability of the area to furnish food for guerilla forces.
  (ii) Capability of friendly forces to control the harvest, storage, and distribution of food.
  (iii) Availability of water and other necessities for existence in, or movement through, certain areas.
  (iv) Availability of arms, ammunition, demolition materials, and other supplies necessary for guerilla forces.

(d) Relations with regular enemy forces:
  (i) Enemy co-ordination of resistance activities in the area.
  (ii) Enemy communication with the area.
  (iii) Capability of the enemy to deliver organizers and supplies into the area.

(e) Existing insurgent forces:
  (i) The origin and development of guerilla units.
  (ii) Strength.
  (iii) Morale.
  (iv) Personality of leaders.
  (v) Relations with the civilian population.
  (vi) Effectiveness of organization and unity of command.
  (vii) State of equipment and supplies.
  (viii) Training.
  (ix) Effectiveness of communications.
  (x) Effectiveness of intelligence.

(f) Size and composition of forces available for anti-guerilla operations:
  (i) Own forces.
  (ii) Forces available from higher headquarters.
  (iii) Other units within the area.
  (iv) Local police and special anti-guerilla units organized from the local population.

(g) Existing policies and directives on the treatment of the civilian population and resistance movements.

(h) Importance of the area to overall objectives of friendly forces and the effect on other areas if it becomes a base for hostile guerilla operations.

(j) Suitability of the following courses of action, singly or combined, for dealing with guerilla forces:
  (i) Passive defence of installations and lines of communications.
  (ii) Limited offensive activities against guerillas.
  (iii) All-out offensive operations to destroy guerillas.
  (iv) Propaganda campaigns addressed to neutral and friendly elements of the civilian population, civilian to the guerillas.
  supporters of guerillas, and
  (v) Operations against civilian supporters of guerillas and other sources of aid and comfort.
  (vi) Organization of special anti-guerilla units.
  (vii) Promotion of conflict between rival guerilla units.

Tasks in Anti-Guerilla Operations

The main tasks in anti-guerilla operations are:

(a) To prevent guerilla interference with friendly combat and support operations.

(b) To destroy the hostile guerilla force by—
  (i) Conducting a continuous, aggressive offense.
  (ii) Isolating it from the civil population and from other guerilla forces.
  (iii) Hampering its contact with and support from a sponsoring power.
  (iv) Food denial.

Conduct of Anti-Guerilla Operations

Operations against guerilla forces generally follow a regular sequence. A commander, charged with combating guerillas and extending control over an area, must move his forces into the area and establish local bases of operations with appropriate security and administrative measures.

Control over the civilian population must then be established by the forces, implementing current policy. Allied war aims, together with the measures governing political, economic, financial, social, and industrial functions must be clearly publicized. Information and propaganda must stress that the people's co-operation and acceptance of the announced policies will determine the amount of assistance and freedom of action given them. Offering amnesty to hostile guerillas for a limited period should be considered. If offered, the terms of amnesty must be widely publicized and scrupulously observed. In establishing control of an area infested with guerillas the support of the civilian population must be gained and maintained.

Next, offensive operations characterized by bold aggressive action against guerilla units, their communications, and supply, must be launched against areas controlled by the guerillas. Offensive action must be continued to prevent reorganization and re-supply and to destroy dispersed guerilla groups. Emphasis must be placed on capturing or destroying guerilla leaders and staffs and their civilian supporters, and propaganda should be used to undermine guerilla morale and to induce surrender. After successful operations in one or more areas, an offer of amnesty to guerillas in areas not yet seriously attacked may be effective.

Once a populated area is brought under control by military operations it must not be exposed to guerilla reprisals. This may be achieved initially by the garrisoning of the area by military units, and later by arming friendly elements of the population once civil authority is established. Before these friendly elements are armed, their reliability should be certain.

Operations must be continued until the guerilla forces have been destroyed and control is extended throughout the area. Lulls in guerilla operations, or failure to establish contact with guerilla forces, should be regarded with suspicion for lack of contact may well indicate inadequate measures rather than complete success. Stopping anti-guerilla operations too soon can nullify months of rugged fighting. Consequently continuous pressure must be maintained even when the guerillas are reduced to very small numbers, and continued until the guerilla menace ceases to exist.

Forces Employed in Anti-guerilla Operations

The initial force allotted to combat guerilla forces must be adequate to complete their destruction, for to allot insufficient forces initially may later require using many times the original number. The size and composition of the force allotted depend on the size of the area, the topography, the civilian attitude, and the hostile guerilla force. The quality of the troops is also important, not only from a military standpoint, but also from a political and administrative standpoint.

Infantry normally is the principal arm in offensive anti-guerilla operations. Available supporting arms and services will be used in accordance with the situation. Troops air landed by helicopter and dropped by parachute may be used effectively in most situations. All troops, both combat and service, committed to threatened areas must be trained to appreciate the effectiveness of guerilla warfare and the active and passive counter-measures to be employed. It is important that troops are taught never to underrate guerillas because to consider guerilla forces as inferior, poorly-equipped opponents usually results in severe losses. Elements of the division must not be so dispersed as to subject them to defeat in detail and the commander must retain reserves having maximum possible mobility.

Continuity of command and continuity of units within an affected area are extremely desirable. Commanders and troops need time to become acquainted with the area, the civilian population, and the organization and operations of the hostile guerilla forces. Special skill and

teamwork are acquired through actual operations against the guerillas and in dealing with the civilian population. This knowledge and skill take time to impart to new commanders, staffs, and troops.

Whenever possible, troops native to the area should operate against hostile resistance elements. Their familiarity with the country, people, language, and customs makes them invaluable. Total responsibility for control over liberated areas should be transferred rapidly to the local government. Premature transfer, however, may threaten the stability of the re-established control. Close liaison and ample support should be provided for the friendly government and its organized forces. This may be administered through advisory and liaison teams.

Intelligence

Detailed intelligence and effective counter-intelligence are essential in combating guerilla forces. The intangible aspects of guerilla warfare, together with the sympathetic or forced support given the guerillas by the local populace, create intelligence obstacles that can only be overcome by patient determination and resourcefulness. A larger number of intelligence and counter-intelligence personnel are required for anti-guerilla operations than for normal operations. Special attention must be given to obtaining trained interpreters.

An intimate knowledge of the terrain is necessary, for only when the anti-guerilla forces' knowledge of the terrain begins to approach that of the guerillas can they meet on anything like equal terms. Terrain intelligence must be continuously collected, recorded, and disseminated. Up-to-date photo maps must be prepared and terrain models constructed and used to brief subordinate commanders. Particular effort must be made to collect information of—

(a) areas likely to serve as guerilla hideouts. Such areas usually have the following characteristics:
  (i) Difficulty of access, as in mountains, jungles, or marshes.
  (ii) Concealment from air reconnaissance.
  (iii) Terrain which favours defence and covered withdrawal.
  (iv) Location usually within one day's foot journey of small civilian settlements that provide food, information, and warning.
  (v) Adequate water supply.
  (vi) Nearby lucrative targets.

(b) Roads and tracks approaching suspected or known guerilla areas.

(c) Principal tracks traversing and passing along the circumference of suspected guerilla areas.

(d) Principal routes connecting separate guerilla areas.

(e) Roads and tracks near friendly installations and line of communications.

(f) Location of fords, bridges, and ferries across otherwise impassable rivers.

(g) Areas where drinking water is not available or where foot travel is difficult or impossible.

(h) Location of all small settlements

and farms in or near suspected insurgent areas.

(j) When guerillas are known or suspected to have contact with the enemy, location of areas suitable for air-drops or boat or submarine rendezvous and roads and tracks leading into enemy-held or neutral countries friendly to the guerillas.

(k) Courier routes and timings.

Dossiers on guerilla commanders and other key members of the guerilla organization should be maintained and carefully studied. Frequently the operations of certain of these individuals develop a pattern which, if recognized, may materially aid in effective operations against them. Efforts are made to obtain rosters and organization data of guerilla units. The names and locations of families, relatives, and friends of known guerillas are required as these persons are valuable as sources of information, and traps can be laid for guerillas contacting them. In communities friendly to the guerillas, some persons are usually engaged in collecting food and providing other aid for the guerillas and furnishing message posts and safe houses for guerilla couriers. Every effort should be made to discover such persons. It may be preferable to delay their arrest to watch their activities and contacts. Interrogation of the local population should be conducted in such a manner that the identity of an informant is not known to any other persons.

Control and co-ordination within organized enemy guerilla units, and logistic support by a sponsoring power, depend upon signal communications. Wireless is normally the fastest and most dependable means of communication in guerilla organizations. Special consideration, therefore, is given to monitoring and locating enemy guerilla wireless stations. Intelligence efforts should include the operation of special wireless stations that enter the guerilla net, using its call signs and procedures. If cleverly operated, such stations may obtain valuable information or transmit messages to mislead the guerilla forces. Electronic devices can also be used to jam guerilla radio frequencies.

Special effort must be made to collect information that will lead to the capture or destruction of guerilla leaders because the overall leader and the major subordinate leaders play a vital part in maintaining guerilla morale. An insurgency movement may never recover from the loss of its leaders.

Clandestine intelligence collection means should be established. Special agents may be infiltrated into guerilla forces by a wide variety of methods. Such activities are normally arranged at a higher headquarters.

Reconnaissance and surveillance are indispensable in operations against guerillas. Great care must be exercised, however, not to alert the guerillas and warn them of planned operations. It is generally preferable to use specially trained anti-guerilla units, if available, rather than regular units, on sensitive reconnaissance tasks. Special air service troops are particularly valuable for reconnaissance on the fringes of the area of operations. Whenever possible, these should be allotted to units who normally

operate in the area so that they can continue their normal tasks at the same time, to avoid arousing the suspicions of the guerillas. Reconnaissance using stealth is usually more effective than trying to obtain information by fighting.

Installation Security

All types of installations should be protected from guerilla attacks and sabotage. Special attention must be given to the security of food supplies, arms, ammunition, and other equipment of value to the guerillas. To economize on manpower, it is important to select sites for installations that readily lend themselves to defence and maximum use should be made of obstacles, wire, mines, alarms, illumination, electronic surveillance devices, and restricted areas. Fields of fire must be cleared and field defences constructed for guards and security forces. The guard or security system should be supplemented by a vigorous patrol system using varying schedules and routes. All soldiers, including headquarters and service personnel, should be trained in anti-guerilla tactics. Specially trained dogs may be used with guards and patrols. As a defence against espionage and sabotage within installations, rigid security measures should be enforced on native labour, to include screening, identification, and supervision. All security measures should be maintained on a combat basis, and all soldiers must keep their weapons available for immediate use. The routine means of securing an installation are altered frequently to prevent guerilla forces from obtaining detailed accurate information about the composition and habits of the defence.

The size, organization and equipment of security detachments are dictated by their task, the size of the hostile guerilla forces, and the attitude of the civilian population. Security detachments in remote areas must be larger than those closer to supporting forces. Patrol requirements also influence the size of security detachments. Remote detachments must keep a stock of supplies to permit long isolation from their base, and all security detachments should be independent of the local population for supply. Reliable communication is essential between the responsible headquarters and security detachments.

Positions must be organized and prepared for all-round defence, and precautions taken to prevent guards from being surprised and overpowered before they can give the alarm. Concealed approaches to the position should be mined and booby trapped. Areas from which short-range fire can be placed on the position must be cleared and mined. Troops should be provided with auxiliary exits and covered routes from their shelters to battle positions, and buildings used for shelters need to be selected with care. Generally, wooden or other light structures should be avoided, but if they must be used, the walls must be reinforced for protection against small-arms fire. Supplies must be dispersed and stored in protected caches, and adequate protection is required for communication installations and equipment. Proficiency is maintained by training and alert drills. Civilians must not be permitted to enter the defensive positions. Civilian informers and silent warning posts may be established along routes of approach to the installation.

Securing Lines of Communications

Lines of communications are difficult to secure in guerilla infested areas, especially long lines of communication. However, roads and railways should be secured within the areas threatened by guerillas. Security measures must be taken to protect traffic and inspection, repair and maintenance crews. Important installations such as bridges and underpasses must be secured. If possible, the road and railway track and an area within 300 yards of it should be declared and posted as a restricted zone. Civilian inhabitants living within this zone should be evacuated. Block houses and security units may be established along the route. Frequent patrols should be made along the route and to the flanks to discourage trespassing in the restricted zone, to detect mines and sabotage and to warn of guerilla operations. Organic aircraft may be used to supplement patrolling. Token automatic fire by security detachments escorting road convoys through areas of likely ambush (ravines, defiles, forests, or areas overgrown with heavy underbrush), may adversely affect the morale of the guerillas. Such fire, however, should be opened only as directed by the convoy commander. Any security detachments guarding the road should have their own communications system which parallels the civil communication system.

Offensive Action

A guerilla threat should be countered at the earliest practicable time by aggressive offensive action. Continued reliance on passive security measures against insurgent forces results in an ever-increasing commitment and dissipation of forces, and gives the guerillas an opportunity to unify, train, and develop communications and logistic support. It also leaves the initiative in the hands of the guerillas, who can concentrate superior forces against security forces, inflict severe casualties, and lower morale. Successful offensive action, on the other hand, forces the guerillas to devote most of their efforts to self-preservation. It lessens civilian support of the guerillas. Offensive anti-guerilla action is governed by the principles and methods of normal offensive operations, but their application is modified to meet the peculiarities of guerilla warfare.

The purpose of offensive action is the destruction of the guerilla forces and their will to resist, as well as the will of the populace to support them. The commander must select objectives such as guerilla concentrations, headquarters, communications centres, and food and other supply sources. Specific objectives must be sought that will facilitate concentration of forces, co-ordination of effort, surprise, and the capture or destruction of the maximum number of guerillas. Unlike normal operations, the capture of ground will contribute little to the attainment of the objective.

Constant pressure must be maintained against the guerillas by continuous operations until they are brought to decisive battle. This will keep the guerillas on the move, disrupt their security and organization, separate them from their bases of supply, weaken them physically, destroy their morale, and deny them the opportunity to conduct operations. Once contact is made, it must be maintained until the guerillas are destroyed.

Surprise is sought in all operations, but against well-organized guerillas it is difficult to achieve. Attacking at night, in bad weather, through difficult terrain, and employing small specially-organized units are ways of gaining surprise. Surprise may also be gained by conducting operations that differ from past operations in some important particular, and are unorthodox or unusual. Caution must be exercised throughout planning, preparation, and execution of operations to prevent the guerillas from learning their nature and scope in advance. Special security measures must be applied to the movements of commanders, communications, reconnaissance, movement of troops, and concentration of supplies. Lower echelons, upon receiving orders, must be careful not to alter their dispositions and daily habits too suddenly. Tactical cover and deception plans, properly exposed to guerilla information-gathering means, may deceive the guerillas as to the purpose of necessary preparations and movements.

Superior mobility is essential in anti-guerilla operations to achieve surprise. This may be attained by attention to the type and size of units employed, the selection, training, and equipping of individuals and units, communications, and administration. These variable factors may then be developed in relation to the hostile guerilla forces, the tasks at various levels, and the topography, weather, and climatic conditions. A commander must maintain the desired mobility through initiative, improvisation, and aggressiveness, as well as by choice of transportation.

The most effective forms of offensive action against guerillas may be broadly classified as encirclement, attack, and pursuit.

Encirclement

Occupation of encircling positions. Surrounding guerilla forces, whether they are large or small, is usually the most effective way to destroy them completely. The encirclement must be made in depth with adequate reserves and firepower to meet possible attack in force and to block all avenues of escape. Effective encirclement will require a great numerical superiority. If terrain or inadequate forces preclude the effective encirclement of the entire guerilla area, then only the most important part of the area should be encircled. The planning, preparation, and execution of the operation must be aimed at sudden, complete encirclement to surprise the guerillas. Support and reserve units may be committed to ensure sufficient density and depth of troops and to establish and maintain lateral contact between units. Throughout the early phases of the advance to the encirclement, speed must be emphasized. Upon arriving on the line of encirclement, units should occupy defensive positions. The critical periods in the operation occur when occupying the line of encirclement and at night. Large guerilla formations may be expected to react violently upon discovering that they have been encircled. The guerillas may be expected to probe for gaps and to attack weak points to force a gap. Units organizing the line of encirclement must push strong patrols out to their front to warn of approaching guerilla formations. Air reconnaissance should be used to supplement ground reconnaissance. Support and reserve units should be

located in depth to cover likely guerilla escape routes. Escape routes deliberately established as ambushes or killing areas can be effective.

Offensive drive. The encircled area may be narrowed by all forces advancing simultaneously to successive designated lines in the centre. This method can be used when the area of encirclement is small and the guerilla forces are comparatively weak. When large areas are involved or the hostile forces are strong, encircling forces may hold their position while other forces drive spearheads into the area and cut it into smaller parts which are then cleared of guerillas. Units driving spearheads into the circle must be particularly vigilant against ambush. Once the encirclement is firmly established, the destruction of the guerilla forces should be conducted methodically, thoroughly, and without haste. The units that advance from the initial line of encirclement must thoroughly comb every possible hiding place for guerillas and their equipment. Successive echelons must comb the ground again. Areas that appear totally inaccessible, such as swamps or marshes, must be penetrated by using special equipment or improvised means. Guerilla ruses discovered during the operations must be reported promptly to all interested units and agencies. All civilians—men, women and children—found in the area should be held in custody and released only after identification and on orders from proper authority.

Attack. Lack of time, inadequate forces, or the terrain may prevent encirclement operations. Surprise attacks followed by aggressive pursuit may prove successful in these cases. The position and strength of the guerilla forces must be ascertained before launching the operation. Reconnaissance must be disguised so that the guerillas will not be alerted. The operation should aim to achieve maximum surprise and the destruction of the guerilla forces. The chances of completely surprising an insurgent installation or unit by ground attack, even with forces as small as a company, are rare. Means of achieving surprise are by using helicopters or by inducing native guides who are thoroughly familiar with the terrain and guerilla dispositions to collaborate and guide the attacking forces over concealed routes that bypass guerilla outposts. To bring maximum firepower against the guerillas as soon after contact as possible, distances between elements must be kept at a minimum and automatic weapons kept well forward.

Pursuit and mopping up. Combat groups must be organized and held in readiness to pursue guerillas who succeed in withdrawing or who are dispersed during the operation. To match the mobility of small guerilla groups, the combat groups allotted to the pursuit should be specially equipped and supplied. Airmobile units and tactical air support should be used when the situation permits. During these relatively small-scale operations, the situation will often change rapidly. Adequate forces must be held in reserve to assist units threatened by superior guerilla forces. Their effectiveness depends on mobility and adequate communications.

After a successful attack on a guerilla-held area, the area should

not be relinquished immediately, for intelligence analysis. Traps and ambushes should be established along tracks in the area, and should be manned day and night. These may catch many guerillas who escape the main attack and are confused about the situation. The period after guerilla forces have been badly mauled and broken up into small groups is an excellent time to use loudspeaker and leaflet messages calling upon them to surrender.

Special Anti-guerilla Units

When feasible, the higher command may organize, equip and train special anti-guerilla units to combat guerilla forces by using guerilla methods. These may be local forces or conventional units, and may range in size from section to company. They are given special training and equipment, and become specialists at tracking down and destroying guerilla units. They are an effective means of carrying on offensive action with relatively small forces. Under many conditions, they are more effective than larger conventional troop units. To prevent detection, they should avoid contact with the local population, remain in concealed camps during the day and conduct most of their operations at night. At frequent intervals, especially after an encounter or upon detection, they should move to new concealed camps. The chief value of these units is not their numerical strength, but the abilities of the commander and the individuals to develop special skills and teamwork. The effectiveness of a special anti-guerilla unit increases as it becomes thoroughly familiar with the terrain and the habits of the hostile guerillas and the supporting population.

Special Considerations

Morale of forces in anti-guerilla operations presents problems quite different from those encountered in other types of combat. Operating against an elusive, violent, destructive force that seldom offers a target, that disintegrates before opposition and then re-forms and strikes again, is quite different from operating against the more tangible forces encountered in normal combat. The comforts of remaining passive in garrison often seem preferable to tramping the hills in search of an evasive enemy.

The anti-guerilla task may include political and administrative aspects seldom encountered in normal operations. The methods and techniques of combat in which commanders have been trained may have to be modified or even disregarded.

The dispositions and tactics of the guerilla force and the terrain usually limit the need for and effectiveness of artillery fire provided in the conventional manner. However, the demoralizing effect of artillery fire on guerillas often justifies its use even though there is little possibility of inflicting material damage. Before use of conventional artillery is ruled out, all limitations must be carefully studied and analyzed. Flexibility and ingenuity often make artillery support possible under what seems to be the most adverse circumstances. Range and trajectory capabilities, the cross-country mobility of prime movers, and the capabilities of aircraft must be fully exploited. Unnecessary damage to civilians and civilian property must be avoided.

Security forces or anti-guerilla forces can sometimes use armour effectively and sometimes the mere

presence of armour is demoralizing to guerilla forces. The terrain normally occupied by guerilla forces, however, often limits its use. Armour offers protected communications, effective mobile road-blocks, and convoy escort. Armour used against guerillas, however, must be closely supported by infantry, for guerillas are quite skilled at improvising means to destroy or cripple tanks, while recoilless weapons and light rockets have greatly improved their ability to combat armour.

Air mobile units are of great value in anti-guerilla operations because their mobility assists in achieving surprise. They may be dropped or air landed inside the security perimeters of the guerillas, thus increasing surprise. Their use permits encircling movements that terrain would otherwise prevent. They also may be used to cut off guerillas being pursued after an attack or to relieve distant detachments besieged by guerillas.

The principles governing the use of reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft are applicable in anti-guerilla operations. In areas where hostile air and air defence weapons are ineffective, slow-flying army aircraft are better suited to observe scattered guerilla installations and small, slow-moving formations than are the tactical air reconnaissance aircraft. Close air support may be highly effective in anti-guerilla operations, but to provide it, special consideration must be given to communications.

It is most important to establish goodwill between troops and the local population. Troops should be indoctrinated in the local government, cultures, language, customs, religion and civil authority organizations in the likely area of operations.

COMPETITION FOR AUTHORS

The Board of Review has awarded first place and the prize of £5 for the best original article published in the March issue to "Shoot to Kill," by Lieutenant-Colonel C. L. Thompson, Royal Australian Infantry.

Strategic Review

NEW GUINEA

WHILE the international news services have been highlighting events in the trouble spots of Asia and Africa, developments of much greater immediate significance to Australia have been taking place closer to home. In both the Australian trust territory of Papua-New Guinea and Netherlands New Guinea, political steps have been taken which are bound ultimately to affect our defence organization for better or for worse.

On 19 March delegates representing 500,000 Papua-New Guinea natives elected six members from the 108 candidates to sit in the reconstituted Legislative Council. The new members include the presidents of four local government councils, a mixed-race clerk, and a village gardener. Five members to represent another 1,300,000 natives in more backward areas have since been appointed.

The first session of the 37-member Legislative Council, which includes 15 Government members, will be opened on 5 April.

About a month earlier—from 18 to 25 February—elections for the Netherlands New Guinea Council were held. This Council is composed of 28 members, 16 of whom are elected by the people and 12 appointed by the Governor. Ten of the appointed members represent extremely primitive areas, where the holding of elections is not feasible; nevertheless, as far as possible the inhabitants were consulted in the choice of representatives. The inaugural meeting of the new Council will take place on 5 April, and will thus coincide with the opening of the first session of Papua-New Guinea Legislative Council.

On neither side of the border have these developments resulted from any local pressure, or even mildly expressed desire, for political representation. The pressure towards self-government has not come from the natives of the Island, but has been generated by the march of world events and by well-meaning but often ill-informed criticism in the United Nations. The problem of the Australian and Dutch Administrations has not been to stall off local political leaders. On the contrary they have had to work hard to bring some sense of political awareness, some concept of wider interests and higher organization, to people who have hitherto lived entirely by tribal law. Both Administrations express satisfaction with the manner in which the natives cooperated in what was to them an entirely novel experiment.

To anyone acquainted with New Guinea these developments represent a big step forward indeed. They know that for the New Guinea people it is a very shaky, tentative step in

the dark, a step from the age-old security of tribal organization into the unknown. Time is now required for consolidation of the ground gained, time for the people to become accustomed to the new system of government before the next step is taken. If they are forced to take the next step prematurely, much evil will certainly befall them, and perhaps befall Australia too. All of our enemies and some of our friends are likely to attempt to force the pace from widely different motives. In the interests of the New Guinea people, no less than in our own, those efforts must be resisted. At the same time, preparations for the next step must be energetically pursued by the further political education of the people and the economic measures necessary to raise production and living standards. That is the only way to keep ahead of the march of events.

The Dutch at any rate do not seem to be going to wait for events to tread upon their heels. The Netherlands Government has published details of its Ten Year Plan for the accelerated development of Netherlands New Guinea. Some of the projects to be undertaken and completed in the first three years are:—

Political

The last remaining areas are to be brought under effective administrative control, and general political education fostered in every possible way.

Education

Six new Post Primary Schools, an Adapted High School and a School for Senior Technical Training will be established. The number of training schools for village school teachers will be doubled from five to ten and the course extended from three to four years.

Agriculture

Plans aim at increasing the production of coconut by 20%, nutmeg by 300% and cocoa by 250%. The growing of rubber and coffee as cash crops will be initiated. A beginning will be made in opening up the Grime Sekoli and Ransiki valleys, both of which are suitable for cocoa growing.

Communications

The airfields at Biak and Sentani will be improved and 30 new airstrips will be built. New or improved docking facilities will be provided at Hollandia, Biak, Meranke and Fak-Fak. £A2.25 millions is to be spent on roads.

Health

It is hoped to continue the extension of health services after 1963 without engaging Europeans. The anti-malaria injection campaign will be finalized by the end of 1963. In addition, it is hoped that by that time 300,000 persons will have been subjected to TB control, and 100,000 brought under regular health supervision by village nurses.

If these plans are pushed forward in accordance with the time-table, the Dutch at any rate will be armed with very powerful answers with which to reply to their critics.

28 Mar 61. E.G.K.

SOLDIERING IN THE 'SIXTIES

J.G.R.A.

Reprinted from Blackwood's Magazine for October 1960

The questions asked and the statements made in the first paragraph of the following article represent opinions commonly held by the Australian public. Careful perusal of the article should provide officers with sound information which may be used on suitable occasions to rebut these fallacious arguments.

—Editor.

NOT long ago, I was dining at a country house in the north of England and found myself sitting next to a well-known local industrialist. He is in his late fifties, has travelled widely and obviously takes a keen interest in public affairs. "So you're a soldier," he said. "I see that the Army Estimates are up again this year; what do we taxpayers get from all this money? What does the Army do now? Do we really need an army at all in these days of H bombers and inter-continental rockets? Surely, all we want is a sort of armed gendarmerie to reinforce our colonial police forces if things look like getting out of hand; just think of how much money this would save! I think the trouble with you chaps is that you are living in the past, absorbed in your own little customs and traditions, and right out of touch with the real problems of today."

Many thinking people are asking questions of this sort. It is only possible to find reasonable answers if we understand the main factors affecting the place of the Army in our present society. We must therefore consider what tasks the Army has been given within the framework of the Government's Defence Policy, how the Army has organized itself to carry out these tasks, and what are the main problems that it faces now and in the future.

The Government's Defence Policy has four main aims. Briefly and in order of priority, these are: Firstly, to deter global war; secondly, to maintain and improve our position in the Cold War; thirdly, to win a limited war if one should break out; and, lastly, to survive global war if this should come. Note the priorities here and, especially, the distinction drawn between deterring global war, which is first priority, and fighting it, which comes last. In pursuit of these aims, we have entered into a number of regional defence treaties, each involving us in various political, financial and military obligations. The most important of these are with the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization (NATO), the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO—formerly the Baghdad Pact) and the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). In addition, we have treaties with Malaya, Libya and a number of independent rulers in the Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf. Finally, and not least important, we have responsibilities for the external and internal defence of our remaining colonial territories and various moral and other imprecisely defined obligations towards our fellow members of the Commonwealth.

What, then, are the Army's tasks in helping to carry out this policy? Probably the least understood of these tasks is the Army's role in deterring global war. The basis of the Western Deterrent is the United States Strategic Air Command and Royal Air Force Bomber Command, both equipped to deliver thermo-nuclear weapons by manned aircraft and by rocket. The validity of this deterrent depends entirely on its credibility to a potential enemy; in other words, the potential enemy must believe that the weapons would be effective if we decided to use them, despite any action he could take; and he must also believe that, in certain circumstances, we would, in fact, use them, despite the consequences to ourselves. It is on this last point that the Army's role becomes apparent. The "certain circumstances" under which we would use the strategic nuclear weapon must be credibly defined. From every point of view, moral, political and military, these circumstances can only be those in which the really vital interests of the powers actually possessing strategic nuclear weapons are subjected to full-scale attack by Russian or Chinese armed forces. We would not be justified in using these weapons to stop attacks by purely satellite forces, nor would we wish to do so. What then are our "really vital interests"? More important, how does the potential enemy assess them? Self-interest being what it is, it would be surprising if he did not feel that our opinion of what constitutes our "really vital interests" had been considerably narrowed down since he became able to deliver thermo-nuclear weapons against targets in the United States and Great Britain. He will expect our definition of these interests to continue to narrow as his strategic nuclear capability grows towards what he regards as sufficiency.

The dangers for us in this situation are threefold: Firstly, that we may be faced with a threat of aggression which does not justify the use of strategic thermo-nuclear weapons, in the light of the consequences to our homelands, but which we cannot deal with by other means; secondly, that we may be presented with a sudden fait accompli in the form of a portion of allied territory taken over by Soviet or satellite forces before we can act at all; and thirdly, that the Soviet or Chinese leaders may misinterpret our own view of what constitutes our "really vital interests." To meet these dangers, we must raise the stakes by ensuring that our vital interests can only be threatened by open, full-scale attack by Soviet or Chinese armed forces in circumstances that their leaders believe will lead inevitably to our use of strategic thermo-nuclear weapons. To do this we need strong land forces in allied territory on the frontiers of the Soviet bloc, able to

halt any satellite attack, prevent any fait accompli takeover of allied territory, and define the start of any full-scale Soviet or Chinese attack. In areas especially vital to the West, as in Western Europe, these land forces must be organized and equipped to contain the advance of Soviet forces, using conventional and tactical nuclear weapons, for sufficiently long for our strategic air forces to be launched and for their attacks to take effect. More important, these "shield forces," as they are called, must include substantial numbers of United States and British troops. It will thus be clear to our Continental allies that their frontiers will be defended, and clear to the Soviet Union that any full-scale attack by them will involve us, and our strategic nuclear weapons, from the word "go."

We can now see that the Army plays an essential part in deterring global war. Our force of seven brigade groups in Western Germany is, of course, our most important contribution in this field and will absorb a high proportion of our small all-Regular Army. Other important contributions to the deterrent are made by smaller forces in Berlin and Hong Kong.

The Army's main task within the framework of our defence policy is to help maintain and improve our position in the Cold War. We may here be faced with every sort of subversive activity, ranging from demonstrations to ventilate local grievances to full-scale armed rebellion aimed at overthrowing the established government. The troubles may arise in one of our colonies or in a friendly independent territory with which we have treaty obligations to support the local ruler. The rioters or insurgents may often be communist-inspired and supplied; if not, communists will certainly attempt to exploit the situation in any way they can. As far as the Army is concerned, a number of principles are common to all situations of this type. The first is that the mere presence of British troops in the area may have a sufficiently steadying effect to prevent any trouble breaking out at all. There is no substitute for the soldier on the spot, who is seen by the local population and who knows the situation at first hand. The second is that, if troops are required, they will be needed very quickly; unless the situation is very serious and foreign troops are likely to support the rebels, our own troops need only be lightly equipped. The third principle is that the closest co-operation and trust are necessary between the civil authorities, the police and the soldiers, particularly in the intelligence field. These operations are, in fact, controlled by committees of civil administrators, soldiers and policemen at each level, an unusual way of conducting military business, but one that experience has shown us to be the best. Most of our overseas garrisons are deployed primarily in this Cold War role. They are in such places as Singapore, Kenya, the Arabian Peninsula, Cyprus, Malta, Libya, Gibraltar and the Caribbean. In addition, a portion of our troops in Malaya is still assisting the Federation Army in the closing stages of the jungle campaign against the communist terrorists. The main weapons of the Cold War are the radio stations, the pamphlets and the soap-boxes, but it is the soldier and his colleagues in the local police

forces who must bear the burden when trouble begins.[1]

The Army's third task is to fight, and win, a limited war if one should break out. This could range from actions to protect British lives and property against the armed forces of independent tribal rulers to a near full-scale war against Soviet or Chinese satellites, lavishly equipped with Soviet weapons and possibly stiffened by Soviet or Chinese "volunteers." Such wars might include the use, or threatened use, of tactical nuclear weapons and, except for very small actions, would probably be fought in co-operation with United States' forces. Whatever form such a war might take, we are almost certain to have to move the forces involved to the field of battle very quickly, and the longer this takes the more forces we are likely to need. Moreover, these forces will need more than the light equipment required in the Cold War role; for the enemy may well have large numbers of tanks and other heavy equipment. We therefore maintain in the Middle and Far East small Theatre Reserves acclimatized and ready to move within their Command at short notice. They are backed up by the main Strategic Reserve held centrally in the United Kingdom. Both local and central reserves are, of course, also available for Cold War tasks if necessary. Both require the means to get themselves and their essential equipment quickly to the scene of action.[2]

The Army's fourth task is to help the nation to survive global war, should it come. We hope it will not, but we cannot ignore the possibility; for to do so would be to provide, by our unpreparedness, unnecessary temptation to our enemies. Clearly our forces in Germany and in the United Kingdom would be in the forefront of the battle. The former would have to resist the Soviet advance into Western Europe until our strategic and tactical air forces had done their work and our enemies had been halted by the destruction of their communications and administrative resources. To do this, our own forces must have ready before the outbreak of war sufficient and suitably dispersed stocks of ammunition, petrol and other supplies needed for the estimated duration of the battle. The bulk of our forces in the United Kingdom, including the Territorial Army, would be fully committed to civil-defence work on a gigantic scale. However remote this possibility may be, it must be faced; certainly in no other situation would bodies of organized and disciplined men be so badly needed.

We have now seen that the Army has a vital and little understood task in helping to deter global war; that it plays a major role in the Cold War; that it must be prepared to fight a limited war, large or small, with or without tactical nuclear weapons, anywhere in the world; and finally

1. Our cold war tasks are different from those of the UK, in that we have no colonial internal security problem, nor have we treaty obligations to support local rulers such as the UK has in the Middle East. We do have, of course, the same aim of maintaining and improving our position in the cold war, hence our membership of SEATO and our participation in the British Commonwealth Strategic Reserve with the obligations that go with these commitments.—Editor.

2. Our task in limited war is similar to that of the UK, except that our eyes are turned to SE Asia, while the UK is concerned also with obligations to tribal rulers, and other matters in the Middle East. We take part with the UK in the "Theatre Reserve" referred to in the Far East by our contribution to the British Commonwealth Strategic Reserve in Malaya. There is no question but that it will be vital to move forces involved to the field of battle very quickly.—Editor.

that it must be prepared to help the nation to survive a global war if this should come. In these tasks the Army works in close co-operation with our allies, particularly with our fellow members of NATO, CENTO and SEATO, and with our friends in the Commonwealth. Let us now examine some of the problems which face the Army in carrying out these tasks.

The basic organizational problem facing any Army is what the soldier calls the balance of arms—that is, the achievement at each level of the right proportion of tanks, armoured cars, artillery (conventional and nuclear), engineers, signals, infantry and the various administrative services. Probably the most important and most difficult balance to get right is that between tanks and infantry. This depends on three main factors. The first is the type of country over which the battle is to be fought. If the country is very "close" and the manoeuvre and movement of tanks much restricted, as in mountains or jungle, we need proportionately fewer tanks and more infantry; whereas in open desert country we need more tanks and fewer infantry. The second factor is the nature of the enemy, for this will strongly influence the type of battle to be fought. The third factor is the type of battle—offensive or defensive, mobile or static, nuclear or conventional. Broadly speaking, because tanks can fight more effectively in a fluid battle and have a considerable measure of protection against nuclear attack, we need a higher proportion of tanks in a mobile, nuclear battle than we do in a static conventional one. Conversely, in a static, conventional battle, we need more infantry. Similarly, in a mobile nuclear battle we need, relatively speaking, a lot of nuclear artillery but few conventional pieces, whereas in a static conventional battle we need a great deal of conventional artillery and no nuclear weapons, unless in self-defence we need to threaten to use them.

We have attempted to solve this problem by organizing the bulk of the Army into one standard type of formation which is considered to be reasonably suitable for most of its tasks. This solution has the great merit of simplicity at a time when the Army is undergoing a major reorganization into a small all-regular force, and, in any case, for most limited war tasks, the proportion of arms is about right. Nevertheless, there are weaknesses. In Western Germany, our shield forces are relatively weak in tanks compared with the Soviet forces in Eastern Germany. Yet for Cold War tasks outside Europe the standard formation tends to have too much heavy equipment seldom required in this role and which is, above all, very difficult to move to the scene of trouble.[3]

It is no good having forces, however well-organized they may be, unless they can get to the battlefield in time and outmanoeuvre the enemy. Let us now consider these two aspects of mobility. The first is governed by three factors, the need for speed, the problem of heavy equipment, and the air/sea barrier across the Middle East. Obviously, as much as possible of our strategic reserve forces and their equipment

3. We haven't the same organization problems as those imposed on the UK by the variety of their tasks and theatres. We look towards SE Asia and have organized the Army accordingly for likely tasks in that theatre.—Editor.

must be air-portable, and we must have sufficient suitable aircraft to move them across the world in a reasonable time. We also need at or near the destination suitable airfields that are either in friendly hands or can be seized by parachutists or by Royal Marines landed by helicopter from the Commando Carrier. The recent and continuing expansion of Royal Air Force Transport Command has been enthusiastically welcomed by all soldiers and has enormously increased the value of our strategic reserve forces. Unfortunately this does not entirely solve the problem. It would be unreasonable to expect to have sufficient aircraft to move a substantial part of the Strategic Reserve's equipment and vehicles from, say, the United Kingdom to the Far East. We therefore have to stockpile certain heavy equipment, especially vehicles, at strategic places and, because we cannot now guarantee the use of the Suez Canal and the adjacent air routes during all emergencies, we must have such stockpiles on each side of this possible barrier. These are very expensive from the point of view of the storage accommodation they need and the men required to maintain the equipment in them, so the number we can afford to keep is strictly limited. This means that we must assume that if it becomes necessary to use equipment from a stockpile it will have to be moved some distance across the sea to the place where it is needed. Furthermore, some equipment, notably medium and heavy tanks, cannot be made air-portable and so must be moved by sea, either from the United Kingdom or from garrisons or stockpiles abroad. There are very few ports in the Middle and Far East that have cranes large enough to lift a tank from a ship's hold and even fewer where such ships can be discharged without the use of lighters.[4] Very few British merchant ships have derricks that can lift a tank. We therefore need a few fast assault ships to operate with the Commando Carrier and discharge tanks and other urgently-needed heavy vehicles directly on to a beach or the quay-side of a small fishing-harbour, and link up with troops landed by transport aircraft or by helicopters from the Carrier. Such an arrangement is essential in the early stages of an operation until we have the use of a port where ordinary cargo-ships can discharge the follow-up forces and their equipment. We have no suitable assault ships at present; for the few survivors of our wartime fleet of assault ships are all obsolete and have a speed of only eight knots. We can thus say that, while we are very well equipped to intervene swiftly with light forces landing by parachute, directly from aircraft or by helicopter from the Commando Carrier, we lack the ability to do so effectively and quickly against an enemy equipped with numbers of tanks and other heavy equipment. Sea transport is, in fact, complementary to air trans-

4. We have the same strategic mobility problem as the UK—that of getting forces over and above the Strategic Reserve from the homeland to the theatre of operations in time. As with the UK, the root of our problem is the movement of vehicles and heavy equipment. Only a limited amount of our equipment is air portable. Like the UK, we have examined the question of stockpiling, or pre-positioning in or near the likely theatre of operations of such equipment and vehicles that cannot be air transported. We are just as conscious as the UK of the expense and deterioration in tropical conditions, as well as the problem of providing stockpiled material from our limited resources without adversely affecting training in Australia.—Editor.

port, and it is in the former that we are now deficient.[5]

On the battlefield, armies are tending to become smaller, more dispersed and more mobile, both on and off the ground. For nuclear war in Europe, every infantryman now needs the protection and mobility of an armoured personnel carrier; without it, he can either be protected in a hole in the ground or mobile (on his feet), but not both; he certainly cannot keep up with the tanks with which he must be if both are to fight effectively. All infantrymen of the Soviet forces in Germany have vehicles of this type, but only a small number of our own have them. They are expensive, but, in due course, we hope to have sufficient; we certainly need them. More and more soldiers are now taking to the air in a variety of short-range aircraft, which can operate from small fields or unprepared strips right in the battle area. The United States' Army has thousands of its own "battlefield" aircraft, both fixed-wing and helicopters, for reconnaissance, liaison and the movement of troops and supplies about the battle area. The French Army also uses large numbers of such aircraft, particularly helicopters, in Algeria. We now have our own light aircraft and helicopters, but on a much smaller scale. Broadly speaking, they are restricted to those carrying up to two or three passengers and needed for reconnaissance and light liaison duties. Heavier battlefield aircraft and helicopters for the movement of troops and supplies are to be provided by the Royal Air Force, and one of the tasks of the recently re-formed No. 38 Group is to study and evolve new techniques for their use. But as this decision has only fairly recently been made, few of these heavier battlefield aircraft are, as yet, available, and we are certainly behind both the Americans and French in this respect.[6]

Having considered some of the problems of organization and mobility, let us now discuss some of the problems of equipping our Army with suitable weapons. This is not a subject about which we can be in any way complacent or parsimonious. Soviet Russia devotes enormous resources to developing and producing weapons of war, most of which are highly efficient equipments of the very latest design. As new equipment replaces obsolescent in the Soviet Army, the old equipment is passed over to satellite and friendly "neutral" nations. Such equipment is now found in many parts of the world and, although it may not be a match for the best of ours, it is not to be despised. Moreover, if it suited her ends, there is no reason why Soviet Russia should not hand over the latest versions of some equipment to a friendly "neutral" state, with or without "volunteers" to operate it. It is therefore imperative that we should not lag behind in this development race.

5. We too have a deficiency in sea transport as well as air transport. None of the available Australian shipping has the heavy lift capacity for much of our heavy equipment, and as the tendency to use bulk handling ships increases on the Australian coast, our strategic sea lift position will inevitably become worse unless special provision is made for the right type of ship.—Editor.

6. We lag very badly in Australia on the question of battlefield mobility provided by aircraft, as compared with the US Army, for example. True, we have formed our Army Light Aircraft Squadron, but its capacity for the movement of troops and supplies about the battle area is non-existent beyond reconnaissance and light liaison duties. We need tactical mobility and we need it badly and we need it now.—Editor.

We are living in an age of tremendous technological progress. An important policy decision made now in the present state of human knowledge may be completely outdated in two years' time by some unexpected technical break-through; Blue Streak is an example of this. It takes about ten years from the time a completely new and complicated equipment is envisaged to the time it is issued to the troops in quantity. We must therefore try and foresee the conditions of warfare ten years ahead. This crystal-gazing is complicated by the increasing extent to which, in all walks of life, the technician and scientist are becoming incomprehensible to the layman owing to the intense and continuous specialization now required in scientific development. This barrier must somehow be broken down if the general staff officer, representing the user, is to be able to frame the requirements for a new equipment in the full light of what may be technically feasible by the time it is produced. This, in turn, must be related to the development of organization and tactics, so that, by the time the new equipment arrives, the Army has developed suitable techniques to make the best possible use of it. The whole problem of development is further complicated by the variety of tasks facing the Army. For example, there is the need for as much as possible of our equipment to be air-portable. An armoured personnel carrier is required primarily for nuclear war in Europe, for which role it clearly need not be air-portable; but we may want some of these vehicles for limited war outside Europe and we may wish to fly them to the scene of action. Do we ask for the vehicle to be air-portable and accept the serious limitations in size, weight and armour protection this will involve?

Another example is the need to develop nuclear and conventional weapons side by side, which greatly adds to the expense of equipping the Army. The burden of all this development on a country such as ours is enormous, and considerable efforts are being made towards achieving greater interdependence among our allies in this field. As an example, we are getting the new Italian 105-mm howitzer and the Americans have adopted our 105-mm tank gun. It should, nevertheless, be realized that interdependence, to be of any real value, must be complete; for to produce in this country a complicated equipment such as a vehicle designed abroad would involve an almost complete redesign of the whole equipment, and would thus save very little time and expense. At present, not even screw-threads are internationally standardized!

Still far more important than weapons and equipment are the men behind them. How is the Army facing up to its new recruiting and training problems after over twenty years' conscription? Publicity and pay are rather outside our control; for they are largely dependent on the amount of public money we are allowed to spend on them. Nevertheless, much valuable work has been done in building up a sound recruiting organization throughout the country. We have done and are still doing a very great deal to make the soldier's conditions of service more attractive. Big strides are at last being made in rebuilding the obsolete barrack accommodation in this country and in meeting the

extra demand for married quarters required for an increasing number of married regular soldiers (soldiers tend to marry younger these days, in common with most civilians!). The standard of this new accommodation is such as would have seemed inconceivable even ten years ago. Abroad the problem is not so easy, because it is difficult to forecast in these changing times how big a garrison will be required and for how long. Clearly it would be a disgraceful waste of public money to build permanent accommodation unless there was a reasonable assurance that it would be needed for a period sufficient to justify the expense. In several places where such an assurance cannot be given and where troops are still required to remain, good-quality hutted accommodation, very different from the Nissen hut of World War II, is being used, which can be dismantled for re-use elsewhere when no longer required.

With the closing down of the large training units needed during National Service, much more time can be spent on the training of the regular soldier not only in the skills of his Army trade but also in his basic character-training as a soldier. Much more emphasis is now given to developing his qualities of initiative and self-reliance by various forms of adventure training. Soldiers in small parties from one unit alone in Germany have travelled through most of Western Europe from Austria to Scandinavia in recent months on training of this kind. With the ending of National Service there is a new attitude to manpower economy and, whenever possible, soldiers in routine administrative and house-keeping jobs in this country are being replaced by civilians and returned to far more useful and interesting work with their regiments.

There are undoubtedly still some problems to be solved in training units of the Strategic Reserve in this country, where training areas are inevitably so restricted. But the build-up of Royal Air Force Transport Command opens the way to much more training abroad. Exercises of the type recently held in which a whole brigade was flown to Libya are of the greatest value and, naturally, extremely popular.

In spite of all these measures, recruiting for all three Services has recently fallen off. This is a most serious matter, and we must redouble our efforts if we are to get sufficient suitable men to enable us to discharge our responsibilities effectively. The reasons for this setback are difficult to assess; some, such as the very high level of civilian employment, are outside our control. Whatever they are, the problem is a national one and deserves the support of all sections of the community. No one wants a return of National Service in any form, least of all the professional soldier.

Officer recruiting and training of course present their own special problems. During the period immediately after the "Sandys Axe" recruiting suffered a serious setback, as was only to be expected. But the new terms of service whereby we can leave with a small pension at 37 when still young enough to get another job, or stay on until 55, have made a tremendous difference to our prospects. The Sandhurst Scholarship Scheme is encouraging keen competition and is attracting

boys of the highest calibre; many serving officers are now again encouraging their sons to follow their footsteps; and Sandhurst itself is filling up fast. Many of us hope that it will soon be possible to raise the academic standard required for entry and thus appeal more to the best brains we need to face our very complicated and fascinating problems in the future.

What does the future look like? Perhaps, with growing strategic nuclear parity between the great powers, the danger of global war may decrease, but, as it does so, limited war, with or without tactical nuclear weapons, may become more likely. Cold War is very likely to continue. A small, semi-permanent battle group of all arms, tailored to the task in hand, may become the basic unit in the Army; if this happens, it may be necessary to make some quite drastic changes in our present regimental system. We certainly hope for increased mobility on the ground, by air and by sea, and some of our vehicles may even be able to fly short distances over woods, rivers or other obstacles. Equipment generally will be lighter and more of it will be air-portable. Nuclear weapons are likely to become smaller and more selective, and we shall have more of them and more means of delivering them, both by gun and rocket. Facilities for reconnaissance and night-fighting will be much improved and much more use will be made of radar and infra-red devices for this work. And, finally, lighter, more efficient and more secure signals-equipment will lead to new and more efficient methods of staff work. Altogether this is a fascinating but rather awe-inspiring prospect; we shall certainly need high-grade soldiers to make the best use of all these developments. We live in an Age of Change. The Army has clear and widely-differing tasks and responsibilities in many parts of the world, including an essential contribution to the maintenance of the deterrent to global war which is the first aim of our defence policy. Some of these responsibilities may grow if, as seems possible, the threat of limited war increases. There are many interesting problems to be solved and we are at the threshold of enormous technical progress, which we must direct wisely if we are not to be left at the post. I must say I find it all most stimulating!

The AMF Gold Medal and AACS Prize Essay

RULES

Title

The competition is titled the "AMF Gold Medal and AACS Prize Essay."

Eligibility to Compete

All ranks on the Active and Reserve Lists of the Australian Military Forces.

Subject

A separate subject shall be set annually for each section by the Chief of the General Staff, and promulgated in AAOs.

Sections

There shall be two sections—

(a) Junior—Members up to and including substantive captains.

(b) Senior — Substantive majors and above.

Prizes

(a) For the best essay in each section—£25. In the case of two or more essays of equal merit this prize money may be shared.

(b) For the better of the two section winning essays—provided it is of a sufficiently high standard—the AMF Gold Medal and a further £50, making in all the AMF Gold Medal and £75.

Submission of Essays

(a) Essays will be typewritten and submitted in quadruplicate. Units will co-operate with competitors and arrange for essays to be typed, if this assistance is requested.

(b) Essays may be of any length. It is not desired to define the length limits, but as an indication they should be between 3000-5000 words.

(c) Authorship will be strictly anonymous. Each competitor will adopt a motto and enclose with his essay a sealed envelope, with the motto and section identification typewritten on the outside, and his name and address inside.

(d) The title and page number of any published or unpublished work to which reference is made in the essay, or from which extracts are made, must be quoted.

(e) The essays will be addressed to the Secretary, Military Board, Victoria Barracks, Melbourne, S.C.1, the envelope being marked "AMF Gold Medal and AACS Prize Essay."

Judging

(a) Essays will be judged by at least three referees appointed by the Chief of the General Staff.

(b) The decision of the referees will be final. They are empowered not to award the AMF Gold Medal and the AACS Prize of £50 if, in their opinion, no essay submitted comes up to a sufficiently high standard of excellence.

Promulgation of Results

The results of the competition will be promulgated in AAOs. Additionally, the AMF Gold Medal and AACS Prize Essay will be published and distributed.

SUBJECTS FOR 1961

The subjects set for 1961 are as follows:—

Senior Section

In World War II fifteen months elapsed between the outbreak of hostilities and the first occasion an Australian division went into action.

(i) Analyze the factors which had a bearing on this timing.

(ii) Discuss means by which, in the event of limited war in South-East Asia, an ARA/CMF division could be speedily deployed for action. (NOTE: The term "division" means a Pentropic Division with appropriate combat and logistic support troops.)

Junior Section

In any future operations undertaken by the Australian Military Forces in SE ASIA, large sections of the local population may not be as sympathetic or apathetic as was the case in previous wars. In addition, a covert organization antagonistic to our forces is likely to exist and could interfere with many of our activities. Discuss the problems likely to arise in dealing with insurgents, with particular reference to the operation of maintenance facilities in rear areas.

CLOSING DATE

Essays must reach the Secretary, Military Board, Department of the Army, Canberra, ACT, by 1 November 1961.

The Queen's Shilling

Major J. C. F. Moloney
Royal Australian Infantry



THE problem of recruiting volunteers for the Army of a democracy, under present conditions, has exercised the minds of many administrators. The fact that volunteers for such armies come forward may result from the recruiting schemes evolved in solution to the problem by such administrators, or from many other causes which are difficult to define.

Needless to say, the need for volunteer recruits is a pressing one, and is normally continuous in order to replace wastage and to meet increases in establishments.

One often wonders if the general approach to recruiting, in the Australian Army in particular, is based on firm principles and if its administrators achieve results commensurate with their efforts.

An examination of the problem discloses some basic, and possible self-evident, ideas which presumably form the basis of our recruiting efforts.

The first of these is the national need which, expressed in simple terms, is for a loyal, well maintained and well trained Army of sufficient size to meet external and internal requirements. The Government of the day decides the size of the Army, and governs its standards of maintenance. The Army itself is responsible for its loyalty, discipline and training. It is evident that the standards reached in these various fields at unit level will determine the tone of the unit in particular and the Army in general. It follows that the tone of the Army itself will exercise a great influence upon its standing in the community. If the Army's standing is high, and the community at large is well informed of the national need, one could reasonably

expect to attract the desirable types of recruits, and in sufficient numbers to maintain the Army's strength through selective processes.

This ideal situation may not exist, which leads to the conclusions that:
1. The Army needs to improve itself.
2. The Public needs education in the role of its Army.

The second idea that springs to mind is equally basic, and is concerned with the attitude of the serving soldier. He is the man who may make or break the best of recruiting schemes. His opinion of the Army is the major factor in the determination of the tone of the Army, and the attitude of the public. If he has been encouraged in loyalty, instructed in discipline, trained in his role, and understands the Army's purpose, he will be a good soldier. He will be making a positive contribution to his nation's cause, and will be proud to acknowledge his personal efforts to his civilian friends. If our soldiers lag far behind these ideal standards, they will unwittingly undermine all else that can be done to attract newcomers. Recruiting administrators would therefore be wise to keep in touch with the opinions of soldiers in preparing their recruiting schemes. For example, the production of advertisements in the public Press which arouse derision, scorn or pity in the minds of the serving soldier, will probably lead to some confusion. One has no difficulty in imagining the reaction of the innocent potential recruit who has seen such an advertisement, and has first addressed his enquiry to a serving soldier who may still be deriding the Service for permitting such an advertisement to appear. Honesty in recruiting advertising is really of paramount importance, as after all the product advertised, as distinct from a tin of pineapple, has a number of independent voices.

The third idea is not new, but may perhaps have been overlooked. It concerns the matter of inducements. Modern advertising practice in the commercial world appears to be devoted to selling something to the consumer. Presumably, from the vast amounts spent on such advertising, these practices are successful. Something most attractive is offered, and is accepted. However, as we have already noted, the product concerned cannot speak for itself. Perhaps the customers concerned have regretted their purchases, which may have fallen short of expectations. They may dissuade other potential customers from purchasing similar items, and perhaps the advertisers concerned are spurred to even more imaginative efforts to maintain a dwindling sales record. An Army is probably better advised to indicate to its potential recruits what they themselves can put into the organization. In short, the Army needs recruits to contribute to making a better Army. This approach probably reaches deep into the basic needs of man, the most important of which, from this point of view, is the need to be useful and to have some importance in the eyes of his fellows. There are many young men in this country who feel this need quite strongly. It only remains for someone of sincerity and honest purpose to strike the right note, and the results should follow.

The final idea is closely related to the first. Let us say that it is another approach to the same subject. When one questions people who

have no experience of Army life upon that very subject, the answers given often surprise the initiated. Some are admittedly so far from the truth that serious doubts as to the integrity or commonsense of the person in question may arise. Most answers, however, show that people, in general, expect the Army to be well disciplined, well trained, and proud of itself. The older generation, perhaps with their own experience behind them, may tend to be critical of the Army of today, and compare it unfavourably with the Army of their own time. This is to be expected, and is a challenge to the present Army and its Public Relations organization if the support of the older generation is to be gained.

On the other hand, members of the younger generation, whilst still entertaining the same basic ideas of discipline and training, are often found to have most distorted ideas of some aspects of Army life. This may be due, in part, to some of the more sensational war books, or to some of the highly intense war pictures, which have developed conceptions of Army life in a false perspective. Whatever these may be, they constitute a factor to be overcome. Possibly the best approach to members of the younger generation is to attempt to steady their imaginations, and to lead them to accept the fact that a soldier leads a rational and well ordered life. The influence of certain overseas comic strips is probably greater than many administrators realise. It is wise to avoid in advertising, any suggestion that life in a well ordered Army can ever produce the peaks of excitement suggested by the comic books.

These few thoughts have stated nothing new, and are probably superfluous. However, we have come a long way since the day of the Queen's Shilling, and the excitement of the military band. Today even the most elaborate military display will find it difficult to compete with a non-committal attitude in the serving soldier.

If we serve the soldier well, and show him loyalty, teach him discipline, train him, and allow him to develop his very best; if we permit his sense of purpose to develop and become a vital force, and if we allow him and his comrades in arms to become living advertisements for our small but potentially excellent Army, we will have the support of a positive force.

With the soldier on side, the team will make the grade, and the recruiting staffs may relax. Without him, we may find these staffs descending to the depths of imaginative falsehood, enlisting only those who permit themselves to be convinced, and sowing the seeds of a dismal future for the Army as a whole.

ORGANIZATION FOR GUERILLA WARFARE

Major L. G. Clark, MC
Royal Australian Infantry

ONE of the many lessons gained from the Second World War was the value of guerilla warfare when waged in support of operations of the field forces. Strangely, there has been a reluctance by many of us to recognize this fact, and in the Australian Army no provision exists for the exploitation of guerilla potentials which do exist in all South-East Asian countries where Australian forces are likely to be committed. This article outlines a method by which the numerically limited Australian peace-time Army could prepare for the exploitation of this potential with the very minimum of effort, both in peace and war.

Between 1941 and 1945 the forces of Germany and Japan were harassed by guerilla fighters in Russia, Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece, France, Italy, Belgium, Norway, China, Malaya and the Philippines. Main guerilla achievements were: Inflicting casualties, destroying supply dumps, wrecking rail and road transportation systems, gathering intelligence, espionage, assisting allied servicemen to escape and in evasion, and, by their activities, encouraging other resistance amongst their countrymen. Later, in the Korean War, native resistance was effectively organized when a comparatively small number of South Korean guerillas, under the direction of US Army officers, tied down thousands of Chinese and North Korean troops in rear areas and in coastal defences.

With the possibility of nuclear warfare, the future lends itself to an even wider application of guerilla warfare techniques. The probability of fluid battlefields, lengthened lines of communications and wide dispersal of field units offers many more opportunities for guerilla activities, which could result in major disruptions of communications, headquarters and supply organizations.

The new Pentropic Division in Battle, Part 1 (Organization and Tactics) manual recognizes anti-guerilla operations as a possible Divisional task, and offers the following definition of Guerilla Forces:

"Guerillas are normally members of the indigenous population formed into some semblance of military organization. They employ tactics such as passive resistance, espionage, subversion, sabotage, reprisal, terrorism and propaganda to achieve their aim. They attack, harass and delay any conventional forces opposing them. They attempt to gain control gradually of the whole country."

This definition is equally applic-

able when considered from the organization side of guerilla warfare.

When an operational area is allotted to an Australian Pentropic Force in a South-East Asian country, there will always be a guerilla potential in that area which could be exploited by a small special Australian force prepared and trained for the organization of guerilla warfare. Resistance, in some degree, is found in the mind of any man who subconsciously desires to rid himself of his conquerors, or oppressors, or his Government which pursues a policy contrary to his concept of fair play. How readily this desire can be brought into the open and put to use in the form of guerilla warfare depends on the adequacy of the military, political and psychological control measures employed by the present unfriendly government or by the enemy who is in control of that country, together with the characteristics of the people. A guerilla movement must have the moral and material support of important elements of the local population. It is the responsibility of Intelligence, initially, to spot such areas of potential resistance and to ascertain who the local leaders are, or those expressing most discontent or opposition to the current regime. Once such contact is made the special Army organization for guerilla forces is ready to go into action.

The first task is to infiltrate some Army personnel into the selected area to assess the strength and reliability of the guerilla movement, and to ascertain the equipment requirement for effective operations. Of the four methods of infiltration, namely, air, sea, on foot or in stay-behind parties, parachuting is probably the most easily arranged. Once the initial party, consisting at least of a Commander, Interpreter and Radio Operator, have landed and made contact with a potential guerilla leader, they should ascertain:

(a) The number prepared to offer resistance and their degree of reliability, together with the availability of commanders with leadership qualities and/or military experience.
(b) The quantity of weapons, ammunition and equipment that can be raised locally and, from it, the quantity of re-supply required and a time/space schedule for this re-supply.
(c) The amount of training that will be required by potential guerillas.
(d) The likely missions that could be allotted these guerilla groups.
(e) The degree of enemy activity in the area.
(f) The attitude of the existing governing authority.

Once this assessment has been made, the Commander's tasks are firstly to train the guerilla force and equip it with effective weapons, relying mainly on parachute air supply. He must ensure that the activities of the guerilla forces are co-ordinated with the military objectives of the field army and, most important, that the guerillas are not prematurely committed when not specifically required. The task of the Commander of the infiltrated force is not to command the guerilla force, but to provide an organization which would be responsible for tactical advice and training, organization of the re-supply system using secure radio communications, and ensuring that the guerilla tasks are appro-

priate. It is essential that no attempt is made to impose Australian concepts of justice, living, politics or war aims on the indigenous force. They must be left to their own devices, customs, ideals and hopes, with the Army effort confined solely to military organization. It is even possible that the opinions of the guerilla force are quite anti-Western. The overriding consideration is that the guerillas are prepared to support the Australian Field Force. Post-war aims should not affect field operations. In this way it is possible for Australians with their typical and obvious European facial appearance to remain hidden in the forests and mountains away from the indigenous population whose loyalty had not been proven. Recognition by other than known guerillas could thus be avoided, and the background organization remain intact.

Obviously, then, teams of a Special Army Force must consist of firstly a Commander who has the personality to inspire major efforts from a foreign race, the tact to handle the inevitable conflicts of opinions, and the military ability to organize and train others. Then, secondly, a highly trained signalman who could operate under intolerable conditions a clandestine radio net to a base hundreds of miles away. The transmissions would be subject to intense enemy direction-finding activity and radio harassment. A skilled interpreter of proven military ability is also essential, as is a highly trained medical orderly. Instructors in demolitions, minor tactics and weapon training are also required. The ideal is for all members of the team to be accomplished in each other's tasks. The committed team must be in radio contact with a base agency, which will attend immediately to re-supply requests and will advise the timings for priority targets. The number of guerilla forces that can be raised will depend largely on the number of teams which can be committed.

Accordingly it is advocated that the Australian Army consider one of the following three alternatives so that advantage can be taken of the known guerilla potential:—

(a) Organize in peace-time a small, special unit, trained in the organization for guerilla warfare and capable of being committed immediately on the outbreak of war in any of the trouble countries of South-East Asia, where any Australian ground force might be committed.

(b) Include the role of organizing guerilla warfare in the tasks of the already existing specialist units, such as Special Air Service or Commando.

(c) If it is not possible to have either of the above, set up a special warfare centre where the tactics and techniques of guerilla warfare and behind enemy lines activities employed by other Armies can be studied and taught. At the very least the Australian Army will then have the potential for organizing guerilla operations.

Results obtained by guerilla warfare were out of all proportion to the allied military resources expended during the Second World War. Even so, the maximum use of guerilla forces was not made because the Allied countries were ill-prepared for it. Today the world is divided into two armed camps each holding

strongly to widely opposed political and social ideologies. Within each camp there are dissident elements who strongly believe in the teachings of the opposite camp; these elements are valuable in war to form resistance forces, provided an organization exists to cater for them. Particularly in South-East Asia the Australian Army could gain great value from such people for very little military expenditure of effort, provided preparation for it is made now.

Except in certain well-defined cases of direct self-defence, atomic weapons should be introduced into battle only after a particular decision to do so has resulted from the operation of an established decision-making process. This process will ensure that such a decision would, in all cases, be taken by an authority at a level higher than that of the basic combat unit, and that the level of combat would have been raised above that which could be dealt with by conventional weapons.

—General Lauris Norstad.

AUSTRALIA, ASIA AND IGNORANCE

Staff Sergeant P. G. Gittins
Royal Australian Engineers

"What happened in Asia was of sovereign importance to my country . . . but in Asia most of what occurs we do not even vaguely understand, and what happens in Asia is vital . . ."

—James Michener.

FEW people today understand the social and economic factors underlying national and international issues; indeed, so few people, that free countries are in danger of being taken over by an ideology based on class warfare and hatred. The advances made by the Western and Eastern brands of Marxism testify to the confusion and complacency so prevalent in non-communist countries.

Nowhere in school and rarely in the universities is the full nature of contemporary problems considered. How, for instance, can we expect to gain insight into the question of trade with Red China with hardly any knowledge of the real factors involved? One might as well expect a car to run without petrol.

We cannot ignore the ideologies that are at war. Education is responsible for ensuring that we are in a position to evaluate the significance of the spate of conflicting faiths, philosophies and ideologies that are flung at our heads these days. Supplementing and complementary to education are the thousands of articles and features in our daily press together with a spate of talks, lectures and news bulletins through the mediums of radio and television.

Yet in spite of the flood of books, lectures, films, conferences and eyewitness press reports that have inundated Australia since World War 2, it is not untrue or unfair to say that not one in a thousand of our people could give a clear, point by point account of the people of Japan, China Indo-China, or India. There are hardly two groups in Australia which would agree on any summary of the effect, say, of the partition of the sub-continent of India, or to be able to give a fair, full factual statement about it. We have listened to both Indian and Pakistani national groups, but contradictions and disputes make chaos of our conclusions.

There are not a thousand people who could give a consistent account of the phenomenon that is China, notwithstanding the thousands of pounds worth of enlightenment that is available on the subject.

Why is it then, that we, well educated, perhaps the most radioed people in the world, with a free and prolific press, understand so very little about Asia and Asian problems?

The answer is obvious — indeed, painfully obvious. Instead of knowing these people as people, with all

their human qualities, we know them mainly as inaccurate generalisations, for example, Chinese and Japanese look alike because they both have black hair and slanting eyes.

We have discussed "social, economic and political forces," we have boldly talked about the "status quo," we have swallowed reams of treaties and documents, and our press has dished out a subhash of titbits and banalities with incomplete quotations from learned advocates, the essence of which is one empty re-statement of an accepted generality after another. Our phrases about peace and understanding in Asia are not even as specific as the Buddhist prayer wheel. There is little consistent building up of people as people. There is little substance of human character upon which our people can hang their understandings. If we are to have "international understanding" we must have something firm to stand on or under.

We are a newspaper reading nation. But only when a current crisis runs up a fever in Australia do we rush to "read up" on the question. Yesterday for example, Africa and the Congo was a continent and land unknown. A year ago one could not get anyone to publish or read anything on Africa or the Congo. Today we are being flooded with press reports, booklets, appeals and lectures on the question.

Even our servicemen, when bound for Malaya, were handed little books containing a brief pen-picture of the country and how to behave there; for example, not to make passes at Malayan women! What a tragic reflection on our education!

It is not out of abstractions that solutions to world problems are made. It is out of specific flesh and blood and passion that wars are made. Erudition has never cured a prejudice, nor sanctioned an international love match. It is not enough to know now that Indonesia wants Western New Guinea and is eventually prepared to take it. It is not enough to know now that China constitutes a grave menace in Asia, and that she will soon (if she has not already done so) develop and produce an atomic bomb. We should have known that before had we known the right things about Chinese character. Yet we believed for generations that China was an uncivilized nation where everybody wore pigtails, a nation whose progress had remained static for centuries.

Today that knowledge is of little value to us — we have learnt it through bitter disillusionment. The character of the peoples has not changed with the expulsion of Chiang Kai-shek from the Chinese mainland — but our versions of that character have undergone startling transformation. And why? Because we have dealt with documents, not people, "issues," not desires and despairs.

We talk broadly and blandly of freedom. We talk of it as if the teeming billions of the world are beating their breasts because they are denied it. We like to forget that the human horse may be led to the trough of ideals, but that you can't make him drink. How make our freedom acceptable when so much of the world is fighting freedom? How make our freedom acceptable when so much of the world remains passively indifferent or even antagonistic towards our way of life? Here

is the crux of the problem. If only a fraction of the Europeans (among whom was born the idea of freedom for man as a person) understand it, how can we hope that the teeming millions of Asia will share our enthusiasm and give of themselves sacrificially for our conceptions of freedom?

What does liberty stand for in the minds of these people? And more important, what do we, as Australians and their Pacific neighbours, know of the private, personal or collective ideas, attitudes and beliefs of these masses?

It is only out of definite portrayal of people as people that the personality of peace and freedom as we know and enjoy can be shaped. If freedom is to prevail in Asia, it must dress the nations of Asia according to their own tastes and requirements. Therefore these tastes and requirements must be clearly visualised.

Clearly then, we must study and learn more of our Asian neighbours. Gone are the days when Australia was a piece of Europe in exile or isolation. Australia is a part of Asia, therefore we must take a more active interest in the peoples of the Asian continent. We must be realistic and adopt immediate positive measures throughout our schools and universities, and particularly in our Defence Forces, to eliminate the truly abysmal ignorance that prevails over our neighbouring fellow men and their problems. Perhaps for a start the Army could introduce "Asian Affairs" as a necessary military training subject in every unit. An outlay of two hours per week could realise an immeasurable dividend.