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FRONTISPIECE

Soon after their transfer to France from the Middle East in 1916, the divisions of the first Australian Imperial Force were equipped with trench mortars, weapons they had not previously used. Each division was provided with the following divisional mortar establishment:—

One battery of four heavy 240 mm mortars firing 152 lb bombs.

Three batteries of medium mortars firing 60 lb bombs.

These batteries formed part of the divisional artillery and were manned by gunners.

In addition, each brigade was provided with two 4 gun batteries equipped with the new "Stokes" mortar. These units, designated Light Trench Mortar Batteries, were manned by infantrymen.

The picture shows a medium mortar in action in the Australian trenches at Ploegstreet Wood. It was in this wood that the brigades of 3 Australian Division suffered heavy casualties from German gas shells during their deployment for the battle of Messines in 1917.

AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

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


Photo Australian War Memorial Canberra

Ploegstreet Wood, 1917

AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

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IMPROVED COMMUNICATIONS

SOME IDEAS FOR THE DESIGN OF THE SIGNAL SYSTEM

Major A. R. Grant, ED,
Royal Australian Signals

IT has recently been stated that the Army reorganization from "threes" to "fives" has been made possible because improved communications allow a wider span of control. Not only has this been said in relation to the Army but also in relation to the practice of management in governmental, industrial and commercial organizations.

In contemplation one wonders what these improved communications are that seem to have become prominent in the minds of management planners. Does the word "communications" mean that managers can now transmit and receive ideas more quickly and with more clarity, or does it mean that the field of electronics has given the managers better communicating facilities? It is suggested that it means there is an increasing awareness by managers of the importance of the need for the simple, clear and speedy intercommunication of ideas in complex, modern organizations to simplify operations and broaden the span of control.

This requirement for improved communications facilities, particu-

larly in the Pentropic Division, presents a challenge for Signals. The time has come for a critical re-examination of a number of principles and techniques which, over the last thirty-odd years, have remained practically unchanged. The availability of radically new field telecommunications equipment provides the hardware for the provision of improved communications. The problem now being faced is the method by which these equipments can be arranged into a system which will meet the modern demands.

Basic Communication

Orders, facts and ideas must be communicated between people. The only useful means of expression these people can employ is the spoken word or in writing. To transmit intelligence it must be of prime importance that the written or spoken words be clearly stated. The intelligence must then be conveyed over a distance and must finally be presented to the recipient in an acceptable form for assimilation. The procedure is then reversed so that the recipient can reply.

It is becoming increasingly evident that the spoken word has some major disadvantages in organizational communication. Spoken words are too easy to deliver, too hard to receive and they have no permanence. On the other hand, the written word requires the originator to be clear and precise, and the recipient has the thoughts expressed in a form which can be slowly absorbed and referred to again later.

The modern telephone system to which we are all accustomed is not the real answer for communicating in a complex organisation. Many of the thoughts, orders or decisions received over a telephone, to be effective, have ultimately to be written down by the recipient. Surely, then it would be better to have the originator write them in the first place and transmit them as written words to the recipient.

This does not mean that we can do away with the telephone. It has become so much a part of our modern way of life that without it an organization cannot function. It does mean, however, that we need two communicating systems to be generally available.

The basic requirements are therefore a means of speech communication and a message system. There is nothing new in this—the Army has always used both means. What is new is the methods and facilities that modern science has produced to enable conversations and messages to be quickly and economically transmitted over distances.

Facilities to meet these requirements have always been provided by Signals. Can they meet the challenge of providing improved com-

munications in the future without changing some basic ideas about how they do things? Moreover, can commanders and staffs be flexible enough to accept new ideas in communications and adapt themselves to new techniques?

Bearing in mind the need for improved communications in the Pen-tropic Division, let us examine some concepts which can meet this challenge.

Speech Communication

Mention has already been made of the telephone as a method of communication. In the field, as anywhere else, the user is going to demand a high grade telephone service and this must be provided. Larger numbers of telephones, adequate numbers of common user lines, good "talkability" and fast connections—from anywhere to anywhere.

The methods employed to provide a telephone service are fairly standard, using lines and manual switchboards. The advent of radio relay and multi-channelling equipment, whilst increasing the technical complexity, provides more and better quality telephone circuits between exchanges. In the past it has been the practice to limit the provision of lines between headquarters to the minimum number that would be accepted by the staff because of the enormous cost in time, material and manpower. Indeed, the situation became accepted that the staff would nominate how many lines would be laid by Signals.

The new approach to the provision of telephone facilities must surely be to design the system to carry the traffic offering and not because the user requires a line from one head-

quarters to another. The basis of provision of common user channels between any two exchanges must be to provide a standard grade of service. This is arrived at by providing sufficient circuits on a route so that users may be connected on demand. The non-connection of a call to a common user circuit on a route, when demanded, constitutes a non-effective or lost call. An acceptable grade of service in a field system would be one lost call per hundred calls.

The telephone system is, of course, provided basically for the user to exercise the function of command. If his requirements are such that he *must* have an exclusive circuit to another headquarters it can be provided along with other circuits on a route, but unless this circuit is being used all the time its provision is wasteful. For this reason users must be prepared to rely on the adequate provision of common user circuits so that they may be connected on demand. Observance of the procedure for precedences in telephone calls, properly exercised, can do much to make the demands for exclusive circuits the exception rather than the rule, particularly when facilities are scarce.

Signals should therefore develop a planning procedure for telephone systems based on providing sufficient common user circuits to give a standard grade of service. Experience in divisional exercises will quickly provide statistical data on which the numbers of routes and their capacities can be determined.

Let us now examine the only other method of speech communication available—voice radio and tactical nets. There is little difference

between telephone conversations and voice radio because the latter is only an alternate means to the same end.

Our ideas about using tactical radio haven't changed much since Marconi's invention was developed for use by ships at sea. We have built up more and more nets, each with more and more stations, until we have saturated the available frequency spectrum with a series of compartmented communication systems with no possible means of integration.

As a means of communication, single frequency press-to-talk radio has many disadvantages. It requires large numbers of skilled operators and the user can't quickly be trained to use it satisfactorily; its traffic capacity is very low and it is a bad security risk. Despite this the method continues to be employed because the user wants "communications." It is suggested that if the user wants communications he wants a telephone capable of being connected to anybody—not a radio station on a net similar to an isolated party line (without even the facilities which that lowly method can offer). Even if he has a station on a net he is still going to demand a telephone when he becomes static. With modern facilities he can have a connection to the telephone system from his radio set now—usable when he is static or mobile. Equipment exists that is expressly designed for this service.

It is suggested that most of the communication requirements for the Services can be met by this integrated line/radio facility, leaving the tactical nets for the "teeth" arms and commanders of fighting forma-

tions. Tactical voice radio nets should only be used where orders and instructions from one station must be heard and acted upon by others on the net. In general, this applies only to the forward units and command nets, particularly when on the move.

Let us therefore use voice radio in nets where it is essential and provide telephone facilities for all other users. To develop our speech communication system along these lines will result in happy users and economies for Signals.

Message Communication

The main problem to be overcome in providing a better message system is to bring the facilities closer to the user. In the past, the operation of telegraph circuits has always been carried out by highly trained Morse operators concentrated in a signal centre organized to serve a headquarters. This practice has been followed right up to the present time even though Morse telegraph has been superseded by the modern teletypewriter.

The use of signal centres for the transmission, reception and distribution of written messages has resulted in creating message delays which should and can be avoided. These delays occur at either end of the passage of a message between headquarters—the runner's time from originating office to the signal centre and the orderly's time from signal centre to addressee's office. In many cases these times can exceed the electrical transmission time of the message irrespective of the distance over which the transmission is made. Moreover, this manual handling time is approximately the same whether

the messages are franked "Deferred" or "Flash."

It is suggested that the location of a page printing teletypewriter in each major branch office of a headquarters can eliminate manual handling delays and bring the written communication method closer to the user, ie, the staff officer working in the branch office. The machine would, of course, be operated by one of the office clerks. Touchtyping is one of a clerk's skills—he needs little extra training to operate a teletypewriter.

All teletypewriter terminals in offices should be equipped with speech or telegraph facilities. When a message is to be sent to a branch of another headquarters the clerk calls the local telephone exchange, obtains the required connection and when the distant office answers (from his telephone/telegraph terminal) both parties switch over to telegraph and pass the message. When the transmission is complete they ring off on their telephones as with any other call.

This is office-to-office printed communication, direct, with no delays, no message registration, very simple procedure and—most important—instant acknowledgment of receipt. It also takes a large load off Signals which, with the present system, have to proceed through a long and complicated drill to accept, route, transmit, receive and deliver messages. And if the originator writes ACK on his message the whole system back from addressee via Signals to the originator must be traversed. Incidentally, security can be no real problem—it can be built into the system electronically.

The signal centre cannot be eliminated entirely of course. For economy reasons it would be impossible to equip every headquarters office with a teletypewriter. Moreover, the need will always exist for written communication to an addressee who does not have a telephone/telegraph terminal. In this case the originating office calls the local signal centre staff and sends his message to them. They will then send the message over whatever facilities they have available in the normal way. The same system will operate in reverse when Signals have a message for delivery. They will call the office and deliver the message electrically.

This "switched teletypewriter" system can be as large or small as desired. It can be intra-divisional or can be extended throughout the command structure. Its use will speed up the passage of written messages. There is one procedure, however, that the staff will have to streamline to gain the maximum advantage of the system. The internal office procedure must be organised so that, in larger headquarters, the receipt of a message does not require the time worn procedure of "calling for the file" in order that the matter can be dealt with. Signals can pass messages through their system in minutes only to have a delay imposed by office procedure and central registries that can delay them for hours.

The planning of the signal system to use this mode of operation presents no difficulties because the procedure for planning the provision of common user telephone circuits as discussed earlier encompasses the provision of switched teletypewriter

circuits. The direct circuit requirements for use between signal centres would be greatly reduced and could easily be accommodated in any multi-channel route.

Another attractive feature of a switched circuit, user-operated system is that of simplicity. If a force is to operate in tropical areas it is certain that Signals would have the utmost difficulty in maintaining and operating numerous items of heavy complex equipment. The elimination of most of the present telegraph channelling equipment as envisaged in this concept would do much to reduce complexity. The only type of circuit to be engineered would be the telephone channel, thus reducing the technical problem of setting up telegraph circuits with all the attendant testing that is entailed.

Likewise, user operated teletype-writers would reduce the need for large shifts of operators in each signal centre, leaving only sufficient to deal with the reduced amount of traffic that will be directed to the signal centre for transmission.

Conclusion

To summarize, the main points of the suggested system are:—

- (a) Provide an efficient telephone system with main and alternate routes of groups of channels between headquarters of sufficient quantity to give connections on demand for ninety-nine calls in every hundred.
- (b) Plan the provision of this telephone system on the basis of sufficient channels to meet the traffic demand at the busiest time.

- (c) Limit the use of tactical voice radio nets to those who can best use them.
- (d) Provide radio/line integration systems for all other users.
- (e) Provide all main branches of headquarters with user-operated, switched circuit teletype-writers interconnected via the normal telephone exchanges on telephone circuits.
- (f) Retain the usual signal centre with facilities for routing messages via switched circuits, direct circuits (if the traffic demands), WT links or SDS.

The old concept of providing communications with line, radio and SDS must be replaced with that of an integrated system of speech and telegraph, user-operated wherever possible. All modern signal equipments should be formed into a simple system designed for maximum utility and flexibility based on the telephone network.

By this method the users will have better facilities and Signals will have economies in manpower and equipment.

COMPETITION FOR AUTHORS

The Board of Review has awarded first place and the prize of £5 for the best original article published in the November issue to "One Man's Battle" by Corporal T. Fitzpatrick, 2/17 Battalion, AIF.

Strategic Review


AFRICA

STATESMEN and strategists of the present generation are not likely to die from ennui; they cannot complain about the simplicity of the problems which beset them. Many of them no doubt sigh for the good old days when world affairs moved at a slower tempo, when they had lots of time to think out the moves necessary to meet developments which might affect the balance in international relationships. Nowadays a new set of circumstances is apt to catch up with the planners before the arrangements they have made to meet the previous set have become effective. This is not to say that our planners are bad or lazy forecasters. Planners serving a real democracy cannot get very far ahead of public opinion, at any rate so far as public opinion is represented by the freely elected representatives of the people. It is this opinion which lags behind events, chiefly because it is naturally more concerned with domestic issues than with international affairs, and with the present rather than the future.

If current events in Africa have not taken Western statesmen and strategists by surprise, they have certainly failed to arouse a well-informed public opinion. Press and radio comment is chiefly concerned

with the short-range effects of day to day events and with reports of what is actually happening on the surface of affairs in Africa. Seldom indeed is the public given even a sketchy appreciation of what can happen in the broader sphere of the international balance of power as a result of those events.

Let us go back to the beginning. The years immediately following World War 2 found the two diametrically opposed civilizations, the Western democracies and the Communist bloc, facing each other along a wavy line drawn roughly through central Europe from the Baltic to the Aegean Sea. To meet the military threat posed by the immense array of Soviet forces in eastern Europe, the Western democracies, led by the United States, formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Although the balance of forces along the central European line has always been in favour of the Soviet, NATO succeeded in establishing an organization which could at least fight hard for the maintenance of the status quo. Very important elements in the defence of this front are the American bases in north Africa, Spain and the United Kingdom, and the lines of communication across the Atlantic. To provide security for the southern flank, Tur-



key and Greece were brought into NATO and an alliance between the United Kingdom, Pakistan, Persia, Iraq and Turkey—the Baghdad Pact—was organized.

At that stage the Western defence organization looked fairly secure on the map. But beneath these neatly drawn lines, which unduly impress a public opinion accustomed to the

older forms of warfare, Communist subversive operators were steadily at work. With their assistance Gamal Nasser staged his revolution in Egypt and flung the door wide open for the advance of the subversive army along the southern shores of the Mediterranean. Then the revolution in Iraq detached that country from the Baghdad Pact. The re-

maining members reconstituted the alliance as the Central Treaty Organisation, but with Iraqi connivance Soviet agents have an open road to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

Public opinion was fairly well prepared for the British withdrawal from the Indian sub-continent, and later from Malaya and Singapore. Few people gave any thought to Africa. And most of those who did carry their thoughts that far forward, felt rather vaguely that if a withdrawal from Africa occurred it would more or less conform to the general pattern of the withdrawal from Asia. They omitted to take into account the crucial fact that the peoples of the Indian peninsula and most of the peoples of Africa are at very different stages of social, political and economic development. The Indian peoples possessed sophisticated cultures, elaborate social organizations and educated classes strong enough to take over the business of government and public administration. Despite their economic difficulties, they have maintained stable governments whose voices carry weight in the councils of the world.

With the exception of the peoples along the northern fringe, Africa never has possessed indigenous communities with anything like the social organizations of Europe or Asia. When the Europeans arrived in Africa nearly all the native communities were in the simple tribal stage of social development. In some areas, notably in South Africa, the impact of the Europeans has destroyed tribal organization without replacing it with any other acceptable system of loyalties. In other


areas, the Congo for example, the colonial power failed to develop a sufficiently strong element of political and administrative skill before hastily withdrawing under the pressure of world opinion. In these areas political parties tend to develop along the lines of the old tribal loyalties, interests and antagonisms. The British, and to a somewhat lesser extent the French, made sincere and well-directed efforts towards creating a sufficiency of political and administrative capacity before handing over the reins of government to the native peoples. They have been successful to the extent that the take-overs have gone smoothly enough. But this is only the beginning. The "democratic" regimes thus established are artificial institutions in the mind of the average African. He has no real idea how they work, nor any interest in finding out. The very idea of democracy is foreign to his way of thinking, but the dictatorship of personal power, exercised by his tribal chiefs, he understands and appreciates.

Western efforts to win the peoples of the new states by ideological appeals are like seeds falling on barren ground. The African simply does not comprehend. To him democracy is just another white man's gimmick left behind by the receding tide of colonialism. If he had to choose between the Western and Communist ideologies, he would probably choose Communism as being more akin to the well-understood authoritarian rule of the tribal chief.

Operating from bases bought with assistance to Egypt and other Middle East countries, the Communists have

energetically entered the spiritual and economic vacuum left behind by the colonial powers. They have not wasted their time seeking converts to Communism, but have concentrated on buying their way in. For the time being all they want in Africa is trouble, any sort of trouble, anything that will tend to break up the frail structure of the new states. To this end they distributed arms indiscriminately in the Congo and

the French Camerons, and poured subsidies into the pockets of numerous frustrated and disgruntled native politicians. They are providing free travel, free living and free education for thousands of Africans in Moscow and Peking. Very many of these students will return to become politicians without any real prospect of election in the ordinary course of events. With a regular handsome pay cheque coming in



from Communist sources, and the prospect of even more lucrative emoluments if power should somehow fall into their hands, they are not likely to give the maintenance of Western type democracy their ardent support. With most of them it is purely a matter of money, with a few it is a matter of money and power. The idea of country, of patriotism, is completely beyond their range of thought. You can stir up much trouble with people like that in your pay.

The West is trying hard to maintain order and stability in Africa and at the same time win the goodwill of the Africans. These efforts are being opposed, overtly and covertly, by the enemy at all levels, including persistent attempts to sabotage United Nations action to bring order out of chaos in the Congo. The battle on this new front is now closely joined, while the issue on the older battlefield of Algeria is still undecided.

The stakes are immense. World War 2 demonstrated the value of Africa as a base for operations in Europe and its importance in any struggle waged for the mastery of the Atlantic Ocean. Failure to ap-

preciate this was perhaps the most serious flaw in German strategic thinking. Without north Africa they could not prevent the Allies' invasion of Europe; without north-west Africa they could not win the battle of the Atlantic. The Soviet bloc is showing that it has not made the same mistake. If they can firmly establish their influence along the north coast as far as the Strait of Gibraltar they will have gone a long way towards outflanking the NATO defences; if they can plant themselves on the west coast from Casablanca to Dakar they will have won a bastion that juts out into the middle of the Atlantic battlefield. In addition to the advantages conferred upon the operations of their submarines and aircraft, possession of the bastion would enable the Soviet to threaten almost any point in North America with intercontinental missiles.

In any armed conflict between the Soviet Union on the one hand and the Western democracies on the other, the battle of the Atlantic will be a vital issue. The outcome of the present struggle in Africa is therefore fraught with grave consequences for the West.

—E.G.K.

TRAINING IN FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Major J. M. da Costa
Australian Intelligence Corps

THE best and quickest means of understanding a foreigner is to speak his language. Apply this rule to the study of foreign armies and we arrive at the same conclusions as those of the US and Soviet Armed Forces.

We know that the Soviet Army regards the study of foreign languages so highly that officers' courses at their Army Schools include periods of foreign language expression. To quote a passage from one of their textbooks on the study of English: "A Soviet officer must be stronger in technique than his enemy. He must know especially mathematics, physics and foreign languages."

In 1957 the US Army started a programme aimed at giving volunteer career officers foreign language training. Unlike the regular influx of 2000 officers and enlisted men studying various languages at the US Army Language School at Monterey, the officers admitted under this new programme are not taught a language in preparation for a specific overseas appointment. Instead, the goal is to develop an officer corps rich in multi-lingual skills comparable to the language abilities which have characterized European armies for years.

What of the Australian Military Forces? During World War II the Army found itself sadly lacking in Japanese-speaking linguists. If it had not been for the enlistment of people who had lived in Japan (mainly businessmen, school-teachers, legation and consular officials) and the assistance provided by US Army linguists (mainly second generation Japanese), the position would have been desperate.

Realizing the value of employing and maintaining a nucleus of trained linguists in peace, the Army and the other Services have since 1951 been training linguists in various languages through the medium of the RAAF School of Languages.

The present need for trained linguists to meet Defence and other requirements is being examined, with particular reference to the languages of East and South-East Asia.

The RAAF School of Languages

Situated at Point Cook, Victoria, the School is staffed with civilian and service linguist instructors, including one from the Army. The civilians are natives of, or were long-term residents in, the countries of the languages being taught.

The present curriculum covers

courses in Chinese (Mandarin), Indonesian and a new course in Vietnamese, due to commence early in 1961. The length of each course extends from nine months for Indonesian to one year for Chinese and Vietnamese. Courses for other Asian languages are also being contemplated.

The number of students for each course averages ten, and it includes members from the three services, Department of External Affairs and Department of Defence.

Two main problems have emerged since the start of the language training programme. The first is associated with the selection of candidates for training, and the second with post-graduate training and employment of trained linguists.

Selection, which is open to all ranks, is based on the applicant's educational background, results of a psychological language aptitude test and a further special test set by the RAAF School of Languages. Under this barrage of tests, only about 50 per cent. of the very few who apply are found suitable, resulting in an under-quota of students or the selection of doubtful candidates.

There are indications that the scarcity of applicants is caused by ignorance of what lies ahead of the person who undertakes such a long course, coupled with a general lack of knowledge that these courses are available.

Employment of Linguists

A successful Army graduate from the RAAF School of Languages has three alternatives placed before him for his future employment.

Firstly, two or three are selected

for a further twelve months' advanced language training overseas, and then returned to Australia to fill a linguist appointment. Secondly, there is a chance of an immediate linguist position in one of the limited number of appointments available. Lastly, the graduate may be returned to normal regimental duties, but is encouraged to maintain his language proficiency in his own time by the grant of an annual bounty of £50.

The Language Bounty

A language bounty for successful graduates was introduced in 1956. It was designed as an incentive for the linguist to maintain his proficiency and to purchase foreign language textbooks, newspapers and periodicals. The bounty is payable only to linguists who successfully re-qualify at an annual test held at the RAAF School of Languages.

The bounty system has not been a complete success, as less than 50 per cent of the total graduates from the School of Languages are presenting themselves for the annual re-qualification tests.

The matter of an increased bounty, differing in amount to balance the difficulty of various languages, e.g., a Chinese linguist receives more than an Indonesian linguist, which is at present under consideration, may assist in attracting more graduates to re-qualify. It is considered, however, that an increased bounty will only partially lift the interest in post-graduate training, for although more graduates, attracted by the increased bounty, might attend re-qualification tests, the tests are such that only those who have constantly kept up their studies would have a chance of qualifying.

Post-graduate Training

Post-graduate training for linguists not employed on full or part time language duties requires urgent attention. Language skill can be lost as quickly as it is acquired and must be kept in constant use to be preserved. The Americans, recognizing this, are experimenting with a correspondence programme. They know that relying on the individual to keep his own talent alive only applies to the exceptional case. This, however, is the only system in force in the Australian Armed Services.

The success of a correspondence programme is doubtful. Although it does assist the individual to plan his training programme and to keep up his written knowledge, its main weakness lies in conversational practice, which is practically impossible to achieve except with the expensive and uneconomical use of language records and tapes.

It is suggested that a better and more economical system would be a co-ordinated programme of weekly instruction to classes consisting of Service linguists centred in a metropolitan area such as Sydney, Melbourne and perhaps Brisbane. Such a programme could be co-ordinated by the School of Languages, together with assistance in the loan of training material, including records and tapes. The actual arrangements for classrooms, gramophones, tape recorders, etc, could be handled by an Army establishment such as the Army Intelligence Centre in Sydney or the Southern Command Intelligence Training Depot in Melbourne.

No instructors would be required, as the lesson plans, etc, would be in enough detail for the linguists to follow.

Linguists in out-centres, unless there are enough of them to form a group, would have to rely on individual effort or a correspondence programme.

Conclusion

The problems of language training today can be solved only by a realistic examination of the best and most economical way to train and to keep up the proficiency of our linguists.

The learning of foreign languages is not confined to wartime needs. Apart from linguists' postings available in the Army, how much easier would be their appointments if all our Service Attaches and their staffs were able to understand the languages of the countries to which they are accredited.

In an article written for the Soviet Army's "Military Herald," a Major-General I. Demchuk stated that the way to keep abreast of new weapons and techniques was to step up language training for officers. "The knowledge of a foreign language," he wrote, "is especially important for officers stationed abroad."

If we are to regard the importance of language training as highly as the Russians and Americans, then perhaps we should also examine the possibility of teaching at least one Asian language to each RMC cadet during their four years at Duntroon.

THE BRIGADE OF GURKHAS

Major C. M. A. R. Roberts, MC, 10 GR.

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*"Yo dusro yudh ma ettikai bhovo
Tisro ma bhetunla"*

(Thus it happened in the second war
I'll meet you again in the third)

Gurkha Ballad

The Origin of The Brigade of Gurkhas

The Brigade of Gurkhas is young; it has only recently celebrated its tenth birthday. Its origin, however, lies in the past, and from this past it takes its present form. This article describes its origin, its present organization, and the life it offers to those who serve with it.

In 1815 the first Gurkhas were enlisted in the service of the British in India. As the years went by regiments were formed, numbered, renumbered, redesignated and reorganized until by 1918 there were ten Gurkha Rifle Regiments in the Indian Army; they were numbered serially from 1 to 10, each having two battalions. This organization has lasted with minor modifications until the present day, although during the First and Second World Wars considerable expansion took place, particularly during the second war, when each regiment expanded to four battalions. The ten regiments were known collectively, in the old Indian Army, as the "Gurkha Brigade."

In 1947 on the reorganization of

the old Indian Army on partition, the future of the ten Gurkha regiments was in doubt for many months. Eventually it was decided that four of them should be transferred to the British Army, although the men were to be given the choice as to whether they remained with their regiment or stayed in India, in which case they would be allowed to transfer to a regiment remaining with the Indian Army. It was not an easy decision. In those days serving overseas for a Gurkha was taboo, except in war time, when special dispensation was given. Men followed their Gurkha officers when they were unable to make up their minds, and though for a time loyalties were divided, in the end each went his own way in peace.

The four regiments transferred to the British Army were:—

2nd King Edward VII's Own Gurkha Rifles (The Sirmoor Rifles),

6th Gurkha Rifles (now Queen Elizabeth's Own),

7th Gurkha Rifles (now Duke of Edinburgh's Own),

10th Princess Mary's Own Gurkha Rifles.

These regiments each had two battalions, some sadly depleted by transfers to the Indian Army, and were originally collectively known in 1948 as "The Gurkha Regiment" to distinguish them from the "Gurkha Brigade," a title which, of course, remained with the regiments of the Indian Army. Later in the year, however, the title of "The Gurkha Regiment" was changed to that of "The Brigade of Gurkhas."

Since 1948 changes have taken place, and in addition to the four infantry regiments, the Gurkha Engineers and Signals, and the Gurkha Army Service Corps and Military Police have been raised. All these arms and services appear in the Army List under the heading of the "Brigade of Gurkhas," and are, in fact, all Corps of Infantry, for though they are affiliated to their parent corps in the British Army they are not actually part of them. The reason, of course, being that to have absorbed them into the Royal Engineers, Royal Army Service Corps, etc, would have raised complications of Record Office administration, which could well have resulted in considerable confusion.

The Gurkha Brigade of the Indian Army is still going strong and has retained under its Indian and Gurkha officers the *esprit de corps* of previous days. British officers, from time to time, still visit their old regiments in India, and are welcomed with the most generous hospitality whenever they go.

The original 17 Gurkha Infantry Division was formed at the beginning of the Second World War as 17 Indian Division with a "Black Cat" as the divisional sign. It fought

throughout the Burma Campaign from beginning to end. Its composition was largely Gurkha, and it consisted of 48, 63 and 99 Brigades.

When units of the Brigade of Gurkhas moved into Malaya they, with other units of the British Army already there, were formed into a division which, being largely Gurkha, was allotted the number 17 and designated 17 Gurkha Infantry Division. The divisional sign chosen, however, was white crossed Kukris on a green background. This was the sign carried by 43 Lorried Infantry Brigade in Italy. The Brigade was entirely Gurkha, consisting of the 2/6th Gurkha Rifles, 2/8th Gurkha Rifles and 2/10th Gurkha Rifles. The brigades of the new division were designated 48 Gurkha Infantry Brigade, 63 Gurkha Infantry Brigade and 99 Gurkha Infantry Brigade. There was at one time also a 26 Gurkha Infantry Brigade which was disbanded in 1958.

The Brigade of Gurkhas, 17 Gurkha Infantry Division and its Infantry Brigades have, therefore, their origins, some in the distant, some in the recent, past. Each name and each number has a meaning and a tradition behind it, and though changes in the future will inevitably take place, the link with the past will undoubtedly be retained. This is exemplified by the retention of the white crossed Kukris on the various coloured backgrounds of the divisional formations—eg, 48 Brigade—Red, 63 Brigade—Green, 99 Brigade—Brown, Divisional HQ and non-divisional troops—Black.

The General Officer Commanding 17 Gurkha Infantry Division is also automatically Major-General The



The Gurkha soldier

Brigade of Gurkhas, and, as such, has a special charter giving him authority over all Gurkhas serving in the Brigade, wherever they are.

Administration of the Brigade

The foregoing paragraphs give some idea of how 17 Gurkha Infantry Division and the Brigade of Gurkhas are inter-related. Keeping the Brigade and the Division up to strength and dealing with the many problems concerned with the Gurkhas in the Brigade is also a problem concerning both the Division and the Brigade of Gurkhas.

Gurkhas serve in the British Army by special treaty between the Governments of Nepal, India and the United Kingdom. This treaty states the numbers that may be recruited and defines, in broad terms, their conditions of service and pay. Much of the control and administration of Gurkhas goes through normal channels, but, in addition, there is a requirement for a small staff to deal with matters peculiar to Gurkhas. This staff, known as Headquarters, The Brigade of Gurkhas, consists of a colonel, a brigade major, and GSO 3. The headquarters is responsible directly to the Major-General for all matters specifically described in the Major-General's charter, and is also responsible for advising the staff in FARELF on all matters which are peculiar to Gurkhas. Their most important responsibility is for the welfare of the Gurkha soldier covering such items as his food, clothing, housing and leave; in addition special aspects of his training and unit establishment are dealt with. Working in very close conjunction with it is the Gurkha Records Office in GHQ FARELF at Singapore — which has functions

identical with those of records offices in the UK—and also the Brigade of Gurkhas Liaison Officer at the War Office, whose function is to look after the interests of Gurkhas in the UK, and act as the Major-General's representative in the War Office. In addition there is a static Headquarters in India commanded by a brigadier with an A/Q staff, Service representatives, and a Q Movements detachment (Royal Engineers). This HQ administers and controls the Recruiting Depot and the L of C to Nepal. These Headquarters and the Record Office, plus a large recruit training depot in Malaya, two transit camps and the recruiting depot in India, comprise the "non-divisional troops" of the Brigade of Gurkhas previously referred to.

The Gurkha Recruit

It is, to most, a source of astonishment that there is never a shortage of recruits for the many Gurkha regiments, Indian or British. Nepal is an Independent Kingdom tucked away in the north-east corner of the Indian sub-continent. It is some 600 miles long and 100 miles wide and follows the line of the Himalayas bordering Tibet. Its northern boundary is permanently snow and ice bound, and its southern boundary lies in the scorching plains of India. It has a population of approximately eight million. There is little industry, and land is scarce. Every square yard that is cultivable is cultivated, even the sides of the hills, where narrow terraces are laboriously dug out by hand. Fuel, like food, is scarce. Rice, which is the Gurkha's staple diet is, to most, a luxury.

A Gurkha lives, therefore, a very



Gilung Village, Lamjung, Nepal

frugal and hardy life in surroundings of breathtaking beauty and grandeur. A hundred years of isolation have kept him from the benefits of education, and the lack of industry has precluded him from learning any trade. But his spartan way of life has bred in him courage, independence and endurance, leavened with a lively sense of humour, and tempered with a kindness and generosity one only finds amongst those who have shared hardship together.

A life in the Army solves his problem. He already has the attributes of a soldier. His pay is enough for him to save from, for he is accustomed to making his own entertainment. His service provides him with a pension, and his savings enable him to repair his house, or buy more land, or pay off the money-

lender. Above all, there is the promise of success and of education for his children.

So when a Gurkha leaves his home and his family to join the Army, he may do so with a heavy heart, but he does so partly out of necessity, partly out of curiosity, partly out of ambition and partly to follow in father's footsteps, for there is a very great family tradition in the Brigade.

When he arrives, rather thin and undernourished, at his recruiting depot in Nepal (it used to be in India), he is immediately in the hands of Headquarters, British Gurkhas India, who start to process him through the organization known as the "Gurkha L of C" to Calcutta, and thence, by sea or air, to the Recruit Training Depot at Sungei Patani, Malaya. There the Chief Instructor is ready for him with a stiff nine


months' training programme, which will get him up at 5.30 am every day and allow him to get to bed, if he is lucky, by 9 pm, but at the end of which he is a fit, well-fed and fully-trained soldier.

Officers of the Brigade of Gurkhas

The organization of a Gurkha Battalion is the same as that of a British infantry battalion, and rank nomenclature is, with one or two exceptions, the same as for the rest of the Army.

The most important of these exceptions is the existence of the Queen's Gurkha Officer (QGO). In the Indian Army, there used to be two classes of officers—those who held the King's Commission, and those who held the Viceroy's Commission. These latter ranked senior to a warrant officer, but junior to an officer holding the King's Commission. They were all promoted from the ranks, and were the link between the British officers and the Indian or Gurkha other ranks, and as such, they were the backbone of the Indian Army. They had their own mess and their own gradations of rank, and wore a strip of coloured ribbon under their "pips" and crowns to distinguish them from officers holding the King's Commission. The most junior VCO rank held was designated Jemadar, the next Subedar, and the most senior Subedar Major. The latter officer was the only one of his rank in a battalion and was the commanding officer's right hand man, his power and prestige being something more even than that of the RSM in a British battalion. This system has been continued, not only in the Indian Army, but also in the Brigade of Gurkhas. There being no Vice-

roy, these officers have been designated Queen's Gurkha Officers and their position and status have been specially defined to fit into the structure of the British Army. The Jemadar is now a lieutenant (QGO)—there is no second lieutenant—the Subedar a Captain (QGO), and the mighty Subedar Major is a Major (QGO), and they are more colloquially known in the battalion as Gurkha Lieutenant, Gurkha Captain and Gurkha Major. As before, they wear a strip of ribbon in the Brigade of Gurkhas' colours under their badges of rank. They fulfil their duties in a battalion as platoon commanders, and company seconds in command, and the Gurkha Major is, of course, the Commanding Officer's



Truncheon of 2 GR presented to Regiment for distinguished service at Delhi in 1857. Bearer is a QGO.

right hand man. There is, however, in a battalion a Lieutenant (QGO) who is designated the Gurkha adjutant, whose duties overlap with those of the British adjutant and the RSM, and the Gurkha Quartermaster who is the quartermaster's assistant and understudy. All the specialist platoons also have

a QGO as well as a British officer on their establishment. So much for QGOs. The British officers in a battalion number 17. There are no British platoon commanders except in the specialist platoons, and, by and large, British officers hold the administrative posts and command the companies.



Malayan jungle

There are also a few Gurkha officers who hold commissions similar to British officers. They are known as GCOs (Gurkha Commissioned Officers), and were selected for promotion from the best qualified QGOs. This has now been discontinued, and the GCO is disappearing, being replaced by Gurkhas commissioned from Sandhurst as second lieutenants. In this latter category only one officer exists at the time of writing, although there are three others at Sandhurst, who will be joining shortly.

Ten British officers (including Gurkhas) should join the Brigade each year from Sandhurst; recently the Brigade's share has only amounted to six. In addition, there are officers seconded from British regiments for a three-year tour, short and extended service commissioned officers and National Service officers.

Officers commissioned from Sandhurst are commissioned into one of the four rifle regiments and into the permanent cadre of the Brigade. The number of officers in the permanent cadre is strictly controlled and may not exceed 197. Within this 197 each age group has its quota, so that a proper structure may be maintained. At the present time any deficiencies in a particular age group are made up, if possible, by the voluntary transfer of officers seconded to the Brigade.

Officers of the permanent cadre draw a special rate of pay, termed Gurkha Service Pay, to which they retain a permanent entitlement, and which is higher than the normal additional pay drawn by seconded and other officers.

Officers for the Gurkha Engineers, Gurkha Signals and Gurkha Mili-

tary Police are found by voluntary secondment from their parent corps in the Army. There is no permanent cadre, but a roster is maintained of officers who have served with these units and who, after one tour of service, may be recommended to return at a later date, should they wish to volunteer again. Finally, there are still a number of tasks in the Brigade which, at present, cannot be done by Gurkhas, especially in the more technical spheres. It will take some years to train them and, until then, volunteers will always be required for British other ranks, not only in Engineers, Signals and Military Police, but also in Rifle Regiments.

Service in the Brigade

Service in the Brigade has one common thread for all—everyone carries out a tour of three years, followed by a break. For the men, and for the officers of the permanent cadre—the extended service and some of the short service officers—this break consists of six months' leave. For those seconded, unless they elect to do a second consecutive tour, it means a return to their parent regiment or corps.

For British personnel travelling to and from the UK on leave, it is no problem, but for Gurkha personnel travelling to and from Nepal it is a very different matter. In England, the annual rainfall is spread over the whole year, but in Nepal the annual rainfall occurs in one deluge during the summer. During this monsoon period, from mid-June until mid-August, travel is virtually impossible. So, in order to ensure a safety margin, every endeavour is made to get men and their families into or out of Nepal during the eight month period 15 September to 15

May. Leave, therefore, becomes a bi-annual two-way migration, when men, with their families, are moved to Calcutta from Hong Kong and Singapore, and vice versa, by one DC6 (later it will be one Britannia). The operation, involving some 3600 passengers each time, takes about three weeks to complete, a turn round which will probably be bettered when the Britannia has been operating for two or three "lifts."

From Calcutta men go by train to their depot in Nepal, and from there home on foot, each man being given a date to report back, so that he fits into the pattern of the next airlift. To reach their homes it takes the men anything from three to fourteen days' walking with their wives, children and kit.


In Malaya, where six battalions of the Brigade have operated continuously for the past ten years, grouped according to operational necessity in one of the Brigades of 17 Gurkha Division, "jungle bashing" has been the order of the day. Ten years is a long time to be involved in operations, but a Gurkha, brought up, as he is, in a hard school, can take operations of this kind in his stride. As one gallant QGO said on Christmas Eve in the jungle when his company commander was thinking about his Christmas dinner—"Why don't we stay in the jungle all the time—after all it's no trouble to us—we get our rations, clothing and everything else we need! Our very presence here is a source of worry to the bandits, and helps to prevent them getting their food and clothing." There is no doubt that both British and Gurkha meet on common ground in a love of independent enterprise, which, from company commander downwards, far removed from bat-

talion HQ, each has been able to enjoy to the full during the emergency operations in Malaya.

Recently, due to the emergency being very much more under control, most units have been able to be back in barracks, reorganizing. The barracks in Malaya vary considerably. Some units, like 2/2 GR and 2/6 GR, are in modern permanent barracks built since 1948. Others, like 1/10 GR, 2/10 GR and 2/7 GR, are in a mixture of pre-war barracks and wooden huts. The remainder are in wooden huts. There are advantages and disadvantages to all types of barracks, but each has its share of football grounds and basketball grounds (if it has not, self help will ensure that they are very quickly made), and there is always the NAAFI at hand with beer and rum at duty-free prices.

In Hong Kong where the other two battalions of the Brigade are located, things are different. There, a cold winter brings in a rush of training exercises, and the summer, which is very hot and damp, is devoted to individual training. Distances are short, and even no rifleman is far removed from the formation commander's steely eye. Life is, in fact, a more routine affair than in Malaya. All battalions of the Brigade, in rotation, carry out a two-year tour in Hong Kong. Recently a training area has been sited in North Borneo, and is now being opened up, giving further scope for seeing a little more of the world, albeit the Far Eastern World.

Gurkhas are, however, not entirely confined to the Far East. Her Majesty the Queen has two Gurkha Orderly Officers. These are both QGOs, and both are posted for a six months' tour from April to October



Queen's Gurkha Orderly Officers 1958:
Capt (QGO) Balbahadur Tamang, MM 2/10 GR;
Capt (QGO) Partabsing Gurung, 1/6 GR.

annually. Some 50 QGOs, NCOs and riflemen attend courses at Hythe and elsewhere every year, being first prepared with a concentrated course in English at the School of Education, Beaconsfield. In addition Gurkha provost personnel are trained in traffic control in BAOR from time to time, and a few pipers join the depots of their affiliated regiments for instruction each year. All regiments except 2 GR, who have a military band, have pipes and drums. There is, in addition, a Brigade Major Staff Band, newly formed and not yet fully trained.

If Gurkhas are to be found in England, so are their British officers to be found in Nepal. Apart from those at the Recruiting Depot, a limited number of officers are allowed to visit Nepal officially each year, and trek through the hills and villages from whence their men come. Recently the Gurkha Signals provided communications throughout Eastern and Central Nepal at the Nepalese

Government's request. Men and equipment were flown to airfields in Nepal, where there are several fair weather strips and one all weather strip at Katmandu; the rest of the way to their final destinations was covered on foot. The British officers who accompanied this expedition and supervised it, returned commendably slimmer! One is alleged to have lost 20 pounds! The Gurkha Engineers, who have been building roads and airstrips in Malaya during the latter part of the emergency, are now opening up the training area in Borneo.

From Nepal to Hong Kong, and Calcutta to Singapore, from permanent snow to coral reef, and open grassy slope to thick jungle, service in the Brigade covers most of the Far East with its endless contrasts and unpredictable moods. But notwithstanding this restriction it has one outstanding merit—it is never dull.



Staff Sergeant P. G. Gittins,
Royal Australian Engineers

"There can be a question only of using bourgeois state institutions, not in order to do constructive work, but in order to direct the masses to destroy from within the whole bourgeois state machine and parliament itself. . . ."

*—Second World Congress of the
Communist International 1920.*

PART I—ORGANIZATION AND TACTICS

THE major problems that Asian countries face today are those of economic development—to improve agriculture and irrigation, raise the standard of living, develop industries, and at the same time wipe out the crippling effects of disease. In short the aim is to free the people from the burden of poverty and give them a better life.

But the methods of economic development cannot be separated from the aim that should inspire them. It is the freedom and happiness of the people that counts, not the power of the State. Material progress can be

achieved by regimenting and controlling the entire population, as in China, but it is at the price of freedom and happiness.

The governments of many underdeveloped countries face formidable difficulties in the shape of poverty, over-population, illiteracy, unemployment and disease. Most of these countries lack capital, trained technical and administrative personnel and often adequate economic resources. The population is, in general, too poor to provide the savings needed to develop industry and communications.

What little economic progress Asian countries achieve is often swallowed up by the inexorable increase of population. The standard of living is already very low, yet even this is threatened by millions of new mouths to feed. The great majority of the people of Asia are dependent on agriculture for a living. In most cases this is purely subsistence agriculture—the villages produce just what they need themselves. Increase in food production, particularly in the subsistence area, is vital. Despite foreign assistance, improved crop strains, added use of fertilizers, better farming practices, and more irrigation, this remains an intractable problem. Natural calamities, such as drought, flooding and erosion of the soil can undo in one season the advances of the previous years.

As a result of rural over-population, the average land holding is very small. There are too many peasant families to the area of cultivable land. In many countries the same amount of food can be produced by two-thirds of the farming population—the rest are surplus. But, unlike the developed countries, there is not enough industry or subsidiary services to absorb this labour surplus. In fact, the towns themselves suffer from increasing unemployment. A stream of university graduates and school-leavers is constantly coming on to the labour market. They are unable to find either the jobs they want or any jobs at all.

Discontented intellectuals turn instead to politics, sometimes in violent opposition to the system that has trained them but cannot use them. Often they fall into the hands of Communists. That is why the

greatest effort of Asian countries is directed to "breaking the poverty barrier."

How do the Communists stand in this matter? They face something of a dilemma: either they try to wreck the country's economy (causing confusion and chaos, conditions best suited to the growth of Communism), in which case they are exposed as traitors to their country, or else they appear to support economic development (in order to win public approval), which is self-defeating, because when the economy prospers Communism becomes irrelevant.

In practice the Communists publicly adopt a policy of support for industrialization and planning (though they try to identify these with Communist methods), but at the same time covertly do their best to cause trouble. The Communists basically are not interested in reforms leading to the improvement of the existing order, but rather in promoting an atmosphere of chaos and discontent, which sets the stage for a forceful takeover, or for the undermining of established authority by subversive means.

The Communists know that it is as much by infiltration and subversion (that is, by capturing the intellectual leadership) as by the mass support of trade unions or peasant movement that they can gain power.

The Moscow "Declaration of Communist Parties," drawn in November 1957 on the 40th anniversary of the Soviet Revolution, openly states the need to secure mass support, by rallying around popular issues, before the Communists can be in a position to "smash the resistance of the reactionary forces."

"Today the working class (in non-Communist countries), headed by its vanguard (ie, the Communist Party), has the opportunity, given a united working class and popular front or other workable forms of agreement . . . to win state power without civil war. . . .

"The working class can defeat the reactionary, anti-popular forces, secure a firm majority in parliament, transform parliament from an instrument serving the class interests of the bourgeoisie into an instrument serving the working people, launch a non-parliamentary mass struggle, smash the resistance of the reactionary forces, and create the necessary conditions for peaceful realization of the socialist revolution."

The "Peaceful Struggle" for Power

The Communist Party organization in every country (whether legal or illegal) has been set up for one purpose and one alone: to seize power. It is true that the Communists often make use of "democratic" or nationalistic slogans, but these tactics are intended, first, to advance the cause of the Party, and, second, to cover up its real objective—seizure of power.

Throughout Asia the Communists are turning to what they call "peaceful struggle" in their pursuit of power. But "peaceful struggle" is only a means—and a deceptive one at that. The "struggle" may take the shape of support for nationalism or social reforms, at least in the initial stage, in which the Communists try to be on their best behaviour. But when they have gained a sufficient degree of influence or control (the second stage), the struggle becomes one of mass pressure and intima-

tion, aimed at the breakdown of the government and the revolutionary seizure of power.

"To destroy from within"—this is the key to Communist tactics in Asia and the Pacific. When the opposition to Communism is too strong to be attacked directly, then it must be undermined from within. So the Communists conceal their real objective (which is absolute power) by professing to support peace, democracy, and social progress. Often they make considerable advances in non-Communist countries by the zeal with which they appear to back these desirable aims.

To achieve positions of influence (and then control) the Communists play down their real objective and profess popular aims. But the falseness of these tactics is readily apparent merely by contrasting their attitude towards democracy, freedom and nationalism during the struggle for power and after it. During the struggle they appeal for democracy, demand freedom of activity and support nationalist movements. But once the Communist dictatorship has been established, democracy is smothered, freedom suppressed, and nationalism strictly reserved (within the Communist bloc) for Russia and China alone.

Communism in power and Communism in opposition are two different things. The Communists will support any movement which may help them to gain power, but once this is achieved, they will turn on their former "allies" and destroy them.

Democracy and reform are merely catchwords for the Communists in opposition, their real aim being revolution and not reform; the

destruction of the existing system and not its betterment.

The Communists often talk of "peaceful" or legal struggle and pretend to act like a normal democratic party seeking power through constitutional means. But this behaviour is false. The Communist Party is not democratic at all, but a revolutionary organization. It openly admits that it will not tolerate any form of opposition once it has seized power. Furthermore, they openly boast that, once in power, they will not stand for any defeat at the polls. That is the danger of Communism. Opposition to Communist rule is punished by death or long terms of imprisonment.

Putting the interests of one's own country before that of Moscow or Peking is a capital crime in the Sino-Soviet bloc. Freedom and democracy are a perpetual challenge which Communist dictatorship cannot tolerate.

The Current Communist Policy

A little over ten years ago, local Communist Parties in Asia rose in armed revolt against their governments. In the first months of 1948 Communist rebellions broke out in various States of India, in Burma, Malaya and later in Indonesia, while Communist-led movements in Indo-China and the Philippines increased in violence.

The Communists claimed that these armed rebellions, carried out at the direction of Moscow and Peking, were in reality movements of "national liberation." But the failure of most of these so-called "national" uprisings in South and South-East Asia exposed the falseness of these claims. The Communists did not win mass support.

Now, after ten years, the Communists have long since abandoned armed revolt in India and Indonesia in favour of the so-called "peaceful" or "legal" struggle, while the last rebels in Burma and Malaya have been appealing for negotiations. By "peaceful struggle" Communists mean making use of democratic processes—preparing for elections, recruiting Party members, organizing "united fronts" with other parties and groups, as well as developing trade unions, youth movements, and other "mass organizations" in order to increase their influence and even gain control, so they claim, without the use of force.

This policy springs from the recognition of the strength of nationalism in Asia. The Communists realize they are not strong enough in most countries to seize power in a revolutionary uprising against nationalist governments. Instead they are supporting nationalist aims and infiltrating, wherever possible, nationalist movements.

By these tactics, and by exploiting genuine grievances, the Communists plan to achieve such a dominant position of strength that they can then turn to "mass struggle"—strikes, demonstrations, riots, and sabotage—in order to break down the administration of government and, in the resulting confusion, gain control.

They have, therefore, a three-stage policy:—

- (a) To appear in the guise of a respectable party aiming at power through peaceful parliamentary means, or where Communism is illegal, by underground activities.

- (b) When strength has been built up among key groups, or "mass organization," to work for control through open pressure or intimidation.
- (c) The naked use of dictatorship to maintain and consolidate power.

This was the pattern of events in Eastern Europe, and it was adopted by the Communists in China and North Vietnam. Various democratic parties and nationalist groups were persuaded to join coalition governments with the Communists. But their leaders were placed in positions of purely nominal authority, or, if they objected, forced out, imprisoned or executed. Those that remained, powerless and submissive, formed a convenient facade for Communist Party rule.

These tactics have been tried and tested over the last few years in most of the countries of Asia. The main source of danger has been that nationalist parties may be so misled by current Communist support for "neutralism" that they may fail to realize the basic hostility of the Communists to them and their institutions.

The Nature of Communist Subversion

Broadly speaking, there are two types of subversion. There is subversion in a narrow sense, which is an insidious attack on the institutions of the State from within, culminating at times in armed revolt; and there is also the broader subversive attack from without, which uses diplomatic, economic and cultural weapons. Both types can be combined and there is nothing new in either.

Many examples can be cited from the history of Western Europe, from

the Trojan Horse of Ancient Greece to the Fifth Columns of France and Hitler. But there is a difference between them and Communist subversion. Every Communist subversive act is related to a universal philosophy of life, or, as the Communists would prefer to put it, to a science of history which they regard as absolute. They believe it to be essential and inevitable that the present capitalist system should be overthrown and replaced by a socialist world economic order. Every action on their part is related to that end and therefore every Communist act is only a means to an end. Communism is in fact subversion carried to the nth degree.

Violence, terror, and military action all have their planned places in the Communist world domination campaign but, for the moment, they are secondary, in fact, incidental to, ideological, social, and political persuasion. Their master plan is seen as basically a patient process of political infiltration, indoctrination and subversion, designed to undermine all local civil authority, until the legal government is discredited and collapses. Large bodies of invading troops are not required for this style of operation. Strategy and tactics alike are based on the fluid and evasive principles laid down by Mao Tse-tung in his classic guerrilla campaigns in China.

The words, "a deadly white-anting operation of highly-skilled mass persuasion which we must expect to confront us everywhere in South-East Asia" were used by an American staff officer in a report to Washington on Chinese subversive activities during October 1959.

Political subversion is Communist, or Communist inspired, legal or parliamentary activity within a country, and any such activity from without, designed to extend Communist influence and ultimately to cause the disintegration and destruction of the existing order. If and when the word "Communism" is mentioned, we know we are dealing with a world-wide operation of political warfare, centrally directed by Moscow or Peking.

The enemy in the field is not only Communism. It is the Moscow and Peking controlled network, Communist or non-Communist, which carries out their policy. The Communists constantly draw an analogy between political warfare and military conflict. They accept a militant analysis of society—that society is a battlefield on which the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat is destined to rage until victory is achieved. They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all capitalist states.

Present Communist strategy and tactics are designed to divide the free world and weaken the free institutions which are the strength of democratic government. Potential opposition is to be disrupted and demoralised while the Communists wait for any sign of weakness which can be used as a breach through which to throw their forces.

The Cominform Organization of the Far East

The "Asian Regional Bureau" of the Cominform was established in Peking after the "Moscow Declaration" of 1957, when the Communist Parties of twelve States proclaimed their common purpose and aims.

Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Communist Party, were, in effect, granted a mandate to supervise and direct local party organization and policy throughout the Far East, South-East Asia, and India. It is now clear that the Asian Cominform has succeeded in establishing a basic network of skilled agents in three separate zones of the Orient, and that these agents—some Chinese, some trained locals—are operating a long range Peking master plan of infiltration of unions and government departments.


The three zones are:—

- (a) *Northern*: Including Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines.
- (b) *Southern*: Including South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Malaya, Singapore, and Indonesia.
- (c) *Western*: Including Burma, East Pakistan, and India.

Evidently West Pakistan and Ceylon remain, for the time being, under Soviet "guidance." New Guinea, Australia, and our sister nation, New Zealand, are adjuncts to the Southern zone.

Party memoranda and instructions from the Asian Cominform discovered during the early part of 1959 in Burma, the Philippines, Japan and Singapore agree on these key policy points:—

- (a) Infiltration and subversion are the long range aims, not aggression or violence.
- (b) Gradualism is the Party line, not attempts at bold coups, except on specific orders from Peking.
- (c) At the outset, formal and nominal leadership of the militant workers' unions and peasants'



organizations should be left in the hands of native office-bearers who are not Communists.

- (d) Cominform agents and their recruits should exercise influence preferably from the ranks.
- (e) All recruits must be rigorously screened, emphasis being placed on quality, not quantity.

Information now available suggests that substantial progress along these lines is being achieved by the apparatus in many countries of Asia, particularly of late in Japan.

Communist Front Organizations

Communist Front Organizations are groups of people meeting openly for some common purpose but organized in the background by one or two (or more) Communists. The aim is to present a group or association of people, outwardly respectable, but in reality supporting the Communist line. The more eminent the apparent leaders of the organization—lawyers, writers, trade union or youth leaders—the more successful the Communists have been in establishing “fronts” behind which they can operate.

The technique of infiltration leading to the capture of these “mass organizations” was openly described at the Second Congress of the Communist International or Comintern as long ago as 1921. The Congress declared:—

“Every (Communist) Party . . . must carry on systematic and persistent activity inside the trade unions, the workers’ councils, and factory committees, the co-operatives, and other mass workers’ organizations. Within these organizations Communist cells must be organized which shall, by persistent

and unflagging work, win the trade unions, etc., for the Communist cause. . . .”

The Comintern’s successor, the Cominform, has continued this policy.

Communist Front Organizations can be divided into five categories:—

- (a) A front organization which is established to substitute for the Communist Party. In addition to reaching potential and philosophical Communists who are reluctant to join a known foreign-controlled organization, this type of front organization may substitute for the Party if the latter must go underground.
- (b) A front designed for the consequent domination of other groups, such as socialists, so-called progressives, or “liberals” with Marxian confusion in their heads. This type of front extends Communist political influence into the ranks of others; for example, any leftist party controlled by Communists putting forth Communist policies but disclaiming its Communist character.
- (c) Specific issue fronts which organize people, mostly non-Communists, who side with the Communists on one specific problem, such as anti-fascism, anti-war, anti-racial discrimination.
- (d) Operational fronts, functioning as a part of the Party’s support structure; for example, commercial concerns whose profits go into the Party chest, or organizations which give military training to young Communists, such as sports clubs or flying schools.

(e) Espionage fronts. These may assume several forms, such as political organizations, professional and scientific organizations, etc.

Home Front Organizations

A major function of Communist Front Organizations is to present the programme of the Communist Party to as broad an audience as may be secured. The methods used are:—

- (a) Public assembly.
- (b) Newspapers.
- (c) Books, pamphlets, leaflets, mimeographed statements.
- (d) Motion pictures, radio and television.
- (e) Letters and telegrams.
- (f) Advertisements.
- (g) Posters.
- (h) Delegations.

International Front Organizations

The International Front Organizations are organizations designed to act as instruments of Communist policy, without overt participation by the Soviet or Chinese governments or any Communist parties. They are front organizations in the sense that their real purposes are masked behind a non-political facade of social ideals which are generally acceptable to progressive public opinion. These tactics have been widely adopted and developed by the Communists since 1945.

The International Front Organizations represent what their names indicate, and are divided into various groups and professions, such as:—

- WPC The World Peace Council,
- WFTU The World Federation of Trade Unions,
- WFDY The World Federation of Democratic Youth,

- IUS The International Union of Students,
- WIDF The Women's International Democratic Federation,
- FISE The World Federation of Teachers' Unions,
- WCD The World Congress of Doctors,
- IOJ The International Organization of Journalists.

Each of these international bodies has working under it a network of national committees covering most parts of the world. These in turn control their affiliated local branches.

Communist Fronts in Asia

Front Organizations have played a major role in Communist strategy since the beginning of the movement. They can be particularly effective as a means of mobilizing mass support for overall Communist objectives, and of forming special interest groups to gain support for particular objectives. Given the great variety of groups in the world that are susceptible to the carefully planned deception of front tactics, it is surprising that front organizations have not been more successful.

The Asian and Pacific area, with its sympathy for verbalized moral concepts, such as the five principles of co-existence, is probably specially vulnerable to the manipulation of words as practised by the Communists. This has the more effect because of the genuine feelings of Asians with respect to "colonialism" and "interference." The threat posed by Communist Front activities, therefore, must not be minimized. This threat must be seen as part of the overall tactics of "United Front" and "peaceful struggle" that are now being pursued in the area.

In 1952 the World Peace Council set up a Peace Liaison Committee for Asia and the Pacific. This body prepared the ground for the "Asian Conference for Relaxation of Tension" (also called the Asian Countries' Conference) at Delhi in April 1955. Representatives came from 16 Asian countries, including the USSR.

The results of the Delhi gathering are now evident. Already a new Communist "front" has been formed—the Asian Solidarity Committee—with subsidiary organizations which are apparently taking over the functions of the "national peace committees" (localized organs of the World Peace Council). Similar bodies have been set up in China to promote "solidarity between the Asian countries" as "the guarantee for the defeat of colonialism." In addition to Communist China and the USSR, national branches have been established in India, Japan, North Korea, Mongolia, and North Vietnam.

Other fronts are being established on an Asian-African basis for trade unionists and for students. Still others, also Asian-African, are proposed for women and for journalists. This new "solidarity" drive seems to have three objectives:—

- (a) To exploit in the interests of Communism the genuine Asian-African striving towards co-operation, as expressed at the Bandung Conference.
- (b) To propagate the idea that Asian nations have traditions in common with China and the USSR, and even to suggest to Asia that the USSR is essentially an Asian country.
- (c) To penetrate and influence non-Communist Asian governments

by pretending that the "solidarity" fronts are of quasi-official status and democratic origins.

Characteristics of a "Front"

The Australian Peace Council is typical of most Communist Front Organizations. It was formed soon after the establishment of the World Peace Council, and there is good reason to believe that it was from the beginning a creature of the Communist Party of Australia. Although the Council denies that it is controlled by the Communist Party, the following evidence suggests otherwise:—

- (a) Important executive positions, such as the Executives of State Peace Councils, are mostly filled by Party members or Communist sympathizers.
- (b) The number of Communists actively engaged in Council work is far greater than the relatively small proportion of the population which is Communist.
- (c) The Australian Peace Council is affiliated to and closely follows the directives of the WPC.
- (d) The Australian Peace Council closely follows the Communist Party line, and runs campaigns modelled on those initiated by the Communist Party; for example, "Ban the H Bomb" petition.
- (e) The majority of the Australian Peace Council's delegates to overseas conferences have been known Communists or Communist sympathizers.
- (f) The activities of the Australian Peace Council, like those of the WPC, receive much favourable

publicity in the Australian Communist press.

Seizing Power in Asia

There has been much debate as to whether the Chinese Communist strategy for seizure of power was an original creation of Mao Tse-tung or whether Lenin and Stalin were the formulators. This is a matter of little importance. What does matter is the fact that a well-formulated strategy does now exist. It has been successful, and it is being applied in nearly every country in Asia and the Pacific with flexibility and effectiveness.

The Chinese Communists regard their revolution as the classical type for areas such as Asia, where the masses as yet are unorganized, inarticulate and unsophisticated. Statements emanating from Peking indicate that the leaders there believe they have developed a new dimension of power by turning attention back to the human element of power. They are confident that, through their monolithic organization of formerly inconsequential masses, they have a new basis of superiority.

The internal implications of the organizational weapon have already been noted. With regard to the expansion of Chinese Communist influence and control abroad, Peking may be expected to operate in two general fields:—

- (a) The seizure of power in economically under-developed areas primarily by covert methods which the Chinese Communists developed through their own experience.
- (b) Utilization of their own power to promote Communist goals in-

ternationally and expand areas of influence, by overt methods.

In both, the organizational weapon is the key. Mao told his comrades in Yen-an in 1938, "Politics is war without bloodshed, and war is politics with bloodshed."

In this struggle for power there are, of course, no clear cut divisions between stages of conquest, techniques and issues vary from country to country. There are, however, certain factors which remain constant throughout the struggle:—

- (a) The strategy places a premium on armed revolution.
- (b) There is a constant consultation and co-ordination with the Communist bloc, so that local revolutionaries will always be able to present themselves as representatives of a great world force, but the actual burden of work is carried by organized nationals of the country involved.
- (c) No matter what the fortunes of the revolutionaries at a particular moment, there is never any relaxation in the effort to recruit, train, and organize new members.
- (d) Every local problem and bit of opposition is brought within the two-world-camp interpretation so that the ever-growing strength of the movement can be used to demonstrate that victory for the "camp of peace, socialism, and democracy" is inevitable.

The real basis for their confidence in this strategy, however, rests on the Communists' calculation that they can be the first in such areas to get the masses effectively organized.

In some critical areas of South-East Asia the Communists are now pushing for peaceful co-existence and coalition, but at the same time maintaining a vigorous anti-Western tone. The power of local organizations is being put behind an all-out drive for a united front within each country against the "imperialists," or, at least, in favour of neutralism, which is regarded as the first step away from the West. In this drive China's new prestige and

power position are of immeasurable help, for local Communists are buttressed by Peking's conduct of its foreign relations.

In Part 2 a brief account will be given of some of the major attempts made during the last few years by the Communists to undermine and neutralize the authority of the lawful government and government agencies of the nations of Asia and the Pacific.

(To be continued.)

Defeat is bitter. Bitter to the common soldier, but trebly bitter to his general. The soldier may comfort himself with the thought that, whatever the result, he has done his duty faithfully and steadfastly, but the commander has failed in his duty if he has not won victory—for that is his duty. He has no other comparable to it. He will go over in his mind the events of the campaign. "Here," he will think, "I went wrong; here I took counsel of my fears when I should have been bold; there I should have waited to gather strength, not struck piecemeal; at such a moment I failed to grasp opportunity when it was presented to me." He will remember the soldiers whom he sent into the attack that failed and who did not come back. He will recall the look in the eyes of men who trusted him. "I have failed them," he will say to himself, "and failed my country!" He will see himself for what he is—a defeated General. . . .

And then he must stop! For, if he is ever to command in battle again, he must shake off these regrets, and stamp on them, as they claw at his will and his self-confidence. He must beat off these attacks he delivers against himself, and cast out the doubts born of failure. Forget them, and remember only the lessons to be learnt from defeat—they are more than from victory.

—Field Marshal Sir William Slim in "Defeat into Victory."

SOVIET ATTITUDES

ON THE USE OF

MILITARY POWER

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"A fundamental shift has taken place in the balance of power between socialist and capitalist states. . . . The distribution of forces in the international arena insures a preponderance of the peace-loving states."—Nikita S. Khrushchev.

THUS did Nikita Khrushchev express confidence in the growing strength of the U.S.S.R. and in the future of Communism.

The phrases appeared in his 14 January speech announcing plans to reduce Soviet armed forces strength by 1,200,000 men. Khrushchev used the proposal in a patent effort to portray the Soviet Union as the leading exponent of disarmament and "peaceful coexistence." That the personnel reduction is not disarmament is borne out by the Soviet Premier's admission that lower force levels "will in no way weaken the firepower of our armed forces" and that "there will be no weakening in the defensive power of our motherland." Military might clearly remains a key instrument of Soviet policy.

The Kremlin sees the world as a conflict arena in which Communism and "capitalistic imperialism" are irreconcilably locked in combat for global supremacy. Its outlook is coloured with hostility and fear, and therefore Soviet strategy is, in part, based on national security. Military, as well as political, policies work to

safeguard the homeland—the economic base—and the members of the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

Moscow, however, sees expansion and domination as the best way to achieve national security. It is dedicated to making the U.S.S.R. the centre of an ever-widening Communist empire. Although the Soviets contend that the tide of history is flowing in their favour, that the triumph of Communism is inevitable, they maintain that the process of change needs to be vigorously and sometimes violently prodded—a belief which gives Soviet policy its aggressiveness and militancy.

The dual aspects of security and expansion have shaped the character of the Soviet military establishment. The armed forces have been large, balanced, versatile, and imbued with the spirit of the offensive. They have stood ready to engage in direct expansion if favourable opportunities arose, as well as to defend the U.S.S.R. and the Communist system.

World War II altered the Soviet's strategic situation, undermining the defensive and offensive concepts

upon which the Red Army had been developed. After the war, the Kremlin—instead of being challenged by European or Asian powers—was confronted by a coalition whose power-centre, the United States, was based on the North American continent and immune from direct attack by Soviet forces. More significantly, the United States was armed with a radically new weapon, one which could deliver widespread destruction upon the U.S.S.R. The new circumstances limited somewhat Moscow's freedom of action and compelled the Soviets to pursue courses that would not risk nuclear devastation.

To rebalance their armed forces so that policies could operate under less restraint, the Soviets bent to the task of developing a long-range nuclear capability. This they claim to have done. Khrushchev, in his troop reduction speech, asserted that "the Soviet Union has acquired the necessary supply of atomic and hydrogen weapons" and "the necessary rockets for delivering these weapons." He assured his listeners that Soviet retaliatory forces—secure by reason of camouflage, dispersion, duplication, and triplication—could "give a powerful rebuff to an aggressor."

It is the military and technological achievements of the last two years that generated the boast that the "correlation of forces has shifted radically in favour of the Socialist Camp." While the balance of long-range striking power is not now actually weighted on the Communist side, the Soviets are obviously more confident in their relative power position and in the prospect of continuing a favourable trend.

Strategic Considerations

What does this optimism portend for Soviet strategy toward the West? Will the Kremlin, in an effort to hasten the ultimate triumph it foresees, adopt an even more assertive posture, with the armed forces assuming an overt role as well as lending substance to politico-psychological means?

The men in the Kremlin, despite their ideological framework, are practical observers of the world scene and base their decisions in the final analysis on what they calculate to be the relative distribution of political, economic, and military power. They appreciate fully the destructiveness of thermo-nuclear weapons, and while seemingly assured of their own strength evidently realize that the U.S.S.R. could not escape damaging counter blows in a war with the United States. This was forthrightly acknowledged in Khrushchev's 14 January speech. The Soviet leader, although claiming that the West "would suffer incomparably more" in event of a new world war, made the unprecedented admission for him that the U.S.S.R. also "would suffer great calamities."

In this connection, the Premier restated Soviet caution on the decisiveness of surprise in modern war, a feature of military doctrine to which the Soviets have devoted increased prominence in recent years. Khrushchev declared that the factor of surprise attack with even such formidable weapons as missiles would not achieve victory for the attacker. Although granting that surprise held certain advantages, he noted that it would not enable the aggressor "to put out of order immediately all the stocks of nuclear

weapons, all the rocket installations located on the territory of the power attacked."

Khrushchev's remarks are indicative of a strategy aimed at deterring the West, but they are also an avowal that the Soviet Union is itself deterred from courses of action that run risks of general war.

A nation with expansionist ambitions is hardly satisfied with a balance of power, and the U.S.S.R. is certainly not content with a stalemate. Nevertheless, Moscow does not appear to be undertaking the extremely expensive task of developing military might capable of eliminating by a first strike the ability of the West to retaliate. Soviet leaders evidently consider it more essential to their longer range power position to fulfil their ambitious economic programmes.

To acquire a military advantage, the Kremlin has taken the course of trying to induce the West to reduce or at least retard its military effort. But the Soviet leaders do not seem to be optimistic about their chances of persuading the West to do so. In fact, Khrushchev—even while boasting of growing Soviet might—said that "our enemies . . . will not be marking time" and may soon draw even with the U.S.S.R. in the quantity and quality of missiles.

Soviet military strategy thus appears to be based on the assumption that the United States can keep pace with the U.S.S.R. in military and technological developments, that a nuclear stand-off exists, and that both sides are deterred from general war. Even so, the Kremlin is not likely to view the situation as static

and without prospects for advancing Soviet objectives.

Moscow surely intends to exploit the actual or apparent stalemate which has been achieved in long-range nuclear weapons. If the Soviets did not expect to make gains in the present circumstances, then they would probably engage in a massive programme to develop a preponderant military advantage. But, in the Kremlin's view, there is an alternative to seeking victory in a nuclear war.

Targets of Opportunity

The Soviets evidently see the current situation as one in which the range of Western responses to Communist initiatives can be limited, and therefore new opportunities are available for increasing the scope and intensity of political-psychological means and even for armed conflict at levels short of general nuclear war.

The most likely targets of heightened Soviet pressure are the underdeveloped areas. The Sino-Soviet Bloc in the last five years has made deep inroads into Afro-Asian countries with economic and military assistance, and the Soviets probably expect—as their Seven-Year Economic Programme progresses—to be in a position to extend more and more aid. Improving the economic well-being of the peoples of the underdeveloped countries is not, however, the end sought. It is a technique in the campaign to draw nations into the sphere of Soviet influence and ultimately into the orbit itself.

Conversely, the economic offensive is designed to reduce the position and influence of the West. To succeed in diverting the resources of

Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America away from the Western markets would in itself be a major achievement for the Communists in their drive to weaken the political, economic and military posture of the West.

Thus far, the U.S.S.R. itself has refrained from resorting to direct military action to advance its position in underdeveloped areas, and the Kremlin would undoubtedly prefer to win its objectives there by non-military measures. But they must be eager to see Communist or pro-Communist regimes installed, and will be seeking opportunities for more assertive operations.

Counting on their over-all military posture to deter the West from reacting effectively, the Soviets may encourage and assist vigorous and militant actions such as civil strife and revolution. The veiled Soviet warnings issued in the 1956, 1957, and 1958 Middle East crises forecast an ominous and pointed use of threat in peripheral areas. Moreover, the Kremlin stands ready to commit forces which are especially designed to seize and hold territory.

Need for Ground Forces

Soviet military authorities contend that nuclear weapons increase, not decrease, the need for large ground forces, and that the U.S.S.R. must be prepared to wage either nuclear or non-nuclear warfare. Hence, the development of weapons of mass destruction has not led to any de-emphasis upon the role of ground forces. Although the stress in Khrushchev's recent troop reduction speech was on missiles and nuclear deterrence, the continued im-

portance of numerically strong and balanced forces was reaffirmed.

In a speech seconding the Khrushchev proposal, Minister of Defence Marshal Malinovsky explicitly adhered to the Soviet doctrine of coordinated combined-arms actions. He stated that "it is not possible to solve all tasks of war by one type of troops. Therefore, proceeding from the premise that the successful carrying out of military actions in modern war is only possible on the basis of unified use of all means of armed fighting and the combining of the efforts of all types of armed forces, we are retaining at a definite strength and in relevantly sound proportions all types of our armed forces."

Even if the troop reduction is fully implemented, the Soviets will retain a high potential for dealing with a wide variety of contingencies. Their capabilities for military actions ranging through local, limited, and general war will remain unimpaired.

In spite of their optimism growing out of recent missile achievements, the Soviets recognize that they are not in a position to choose whatever strategy seems most desirable. They continue to be deterred from courses of action carrying with them grave risks of a nuclear exchange. On the other hand, they may believe that their own deterrent capability has been sufficiently enhanced to permit them to adopt a wider and more aggressive range of actions at levels short of general nuclear war. The retention of numerically strong and balanced forces is concrete evidence that the Kremlin seeks not just security but satisfaction of Communism's historic goals.

STANDING ORDERS FOR BATTLE

FROM time immemorial soldiers have practised their profession under an infinite variety of conditions. It is not improbable, therefore, that in the rich experience of military history we can find the answer, or at least a pointer to the answer, to some problem which confronts us today. We commend the two following "Standing Orders for Battle" to compilers of standard operational procedures; they might find in them a point or two they have overlooked. And, in the absence of an official writing on the subject, you can't go far wrong if you follow the rules so clearly laid down by two distinguished soldiers some two centuries ago.

The Light Division, Peninsula War

Brigadier General Robin Crauford, who commanded the famous Light Division under Wellington in the Peninsula War (1808-14), always carried a notebook in which he wrote down anything worthy of remark. From these notes he elaborated his "Divisional Code of Standing Orders," which governed all movements on the march, in camp and on outpost duty. These orders, described by the troops as "Black Bob Crauford's Rules," were designed to "Ensure an automatic response to every order and to give the entire force the precision of a section on the parade ground." Crauford summarized his orders thus—"Such dis-

cipline consists in doing everything that is necessary and nothing that is not."

As a result of Crauford's orders the following procedures became standard throughout his command:

- (1) All sounds preparatory to turning out and marching were commenced at the quarters of the Assistant Adjutant-General, and were immediately repeated by orderly bugles attending on the officers commanding regiments.
- (2) As soon as possible after the first sound, all the bugles were to assemble at the quarters of the commanding officers of regiments from whence all the other sounds were repeated.
- (3) Officers and camp-colourmen went ahead to the night's quarters, the baggage was packed and loaded, and, an hour after the first, a second bugle call sounded for the companies to fall in.
- (4) During the march, guides who had already gone over the ground directed the column, and every officer and NCO kept his appointed place.
- (5) Straggling was forbidden, no man was to leave the ranks save with his company commander's permission and only after a signed ticket had been issued.

- (6) Anyone straying or stopped by the camp guard without a ticket was to be arrested, tried by drumhead court martial and flogged.
- (7) When crossing streams or other obstacles, no regiment, company or section was to defile or break rank unless the preceding unit had done so. Any man who disobeyed was to be given a dozen lashes on the spot.
- (8) Hurrying or exceeding the regulations step was forbidden.
- (9) Half an hour after the start and at hourly intervals—governed by the proximity of water—the division was to halt for five minutes.
- (10) At hourly halts, and no other time, the men were to fill their water canteens.
- (11) Before sleeping, every man carefully arranged his accoutrements ready for nocturnal emergency.
- (12) The moment the division, or any of its units, halted, guards and piquets were posted, every road was examined, cleared and reported upon.
- (13) Unless otherwise ordered, one company of every battalion served as outlying piquet, placed sentinels at all approaches, and stood to arms from an hour before sunrise until a grey horse could be seen a mile away.
- (14) Officers on outpost duty were to personally examine all inhabitants for information, and reconnoitre all fords, morasses, bridges and lanes in the neighbourhood.
- (15) Sentries were posted in pairs on all commanding bridges and woodlands and at night on the reverse slopes of hills.
- (16) Sentries were relieved every two hours.
- (17) Patrols were sent out every hour to visit posts and bring back information.
- (18) If attacked, sentries were to give the alarm and fall back obliquely so as not to reveal the position of the main guard.

The effect of the enforcement of these procedures was described by Arthur Bryant in his "Years of Victory, 1802-1812":

"With less than 3000 British infantry so trained, and their Portuguese and Hanoverian auxiliaries, Crauford for six months guarded a river line of more than 40 miles, broken by at least 15 fords and with an open plain in front. His men were never less than an hour's march from 6000 French cavalry with 60,000 French infantry in support. They never suffered their lines to be penetrated, nor allowed the slightest intelligence of Wellington's strength and movements to reach the enemy."

Rogers' Rangers

Major Robert Rogers was born in New Hampshire in 1727 and raised a company of soldiers for service in the French and Indian War of 1755-63. His standing orders for operations were:—

- (1) Don't forget nothing.
- (2) Have your musket clean as a whistle, hatchet scoured, sixty rounds powder and ball, be ready to march at a minute's warning.

- (3) When you're on the march, act the way you would if you was sneaking up on a deer. See the enemy first.
 - (4) Tell the truth about what you see and do. There is an army depending on us for correct information. You can lie all you please when you tell other folks about the rangers, but don't never lie to a Ranger or Officer.
 - (5) Don't never take a chance you don't have to.
 - (6) When we're on the march we march single file, far enough apart so one shot can't go through two men.
 - (7) If we strike swamps or soft ground, we spread out abreast so it's hard to track us.
 - (8) When we march, we keep moving till dark, so as to give the enemy the least possible chance at us.
 - (9) When we camp, half the party stays awake while the other half sleeps.
 - (10) If we take prisoners, we keep 'em separate till we have had time to examine them, so they can't cook up a story between 'em.
 - (11) Don't ever march home the same way. Take a different route so you won't be ambushed.
 - (12) No matter whether we travel in big parties or little ones, each party has to keep a scout 20 yards ahead, 20 yards on each flank, and 20 yards in the rear, so the main body can't be surprised and wiped out.
 - (13) Every night you'll be told where to meet if surrounded by a superior force.
 - (14) Don't sit down to eat without posting sentries.
 - (15) Don't sleep beyond dawn. Dawn's when the French and Indians attack.
 - (16) Don't cross a river by a regular ford.
 - (17) If somebody's trailing you, make a circle, come back onto your own tracks, and ambush the folks that aim to ambush you.
 - (18) Don't stand up when the enemy's coming against you, kneel down, lie down, hide behind a tree.
 - (19) Let the enemy come till he's almost close enough to touch. Then let him have it, and jump out and finish him up with your hatchet.
-