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FRONTISPIECE

When the Italians extended their grip over Libya in the decade before World War 2 they built strong fortresses at Bardia and Tobruk. Bardia, the most easterly of the fortresses, was taken by 6 Australian Division and other British forces on 3-4 January 1941 in General Wavell's first desert offensive. 6 Australian Division, with supporting British units, then moved on to attack Tobruk.

The Italian garrison of Tobruk comprised some 25,000 men and 200 guns. The outer defences consisted of a double ring of concreted posts, all strongly wired and protected by a deep anti-tank ditch. On 21 January 16 Australian Brigade drove a wide, deep breach through the southern face of the defences. 19 Australian Brigade passed through the breach, and by nightfall the following day all resistance in the fortress had collapsed.

In March Axis forces commanded by General Rommel launched a counter-offensive which drove back the British forces in Libya and invested Tobruk. 9 Australian Division was the principal infantry element of the garrison until relieved by 70 British Division six months later.

The picture shows troops of 9 Australian Division patrolling the anti-tank ditch during the siege.

AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

A Periodical Review of Military Literature

Number 138 November, 1960

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Photo Australian War Memorial Canberra

Tobruk, 1941

AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

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The AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL is printed and published for the Directorate of Military Training by Wilke & Co. Ltd. The contents are derived from various acknowledged official and unofficial sources and do not necessarily represent General Staff Policy.

Contributions, which should be addressed to The Editor, Australian Army Journal, Army Headquarters, Albert Park Barracks, Melbourne, are invited from all ranks of the Army, Cadet Corps and Reserve of Officers. £5 will be paid to the author of the best article published in each issue. In addition, annual prizes of £30 and £10 respectively to the authors gaining first and second places for the year.

WHAT KIND OF AN ARMY DO WE WANT?

RECENT issues of the Journal have contained articles of a controversial nature dealing with the organization, composition, training and efficiency of the Australian Army in general and the CMF in particular. This is all to the good. The fact that these articles are written and published is indicative of virile intellectual activity essential to the well-being of any army. Concurrently, there is a great deal of discussion and criticism going on in and outside the Army. However, if either of these means of discussing the military problem confronting this country is to produce useful results, it is desirable to clear away some of the misapprehensions which are clouding the issue.

In approaching a subject like this it is wise to see if we can draw any useful lessons from experience. In doing so, however, we should remember that history neither proves anything nor teaches anything; history merely records. History is a record of human experiences. It is for us to examine the record and extract from it *all* the evidence we can find bearing on the problem under discussion. We misuse history if we extract from it only that part of the evidence which supports the conclusion we have already arrived at. Examples of this kind of unsound reasoning occur frequently in the book THE CITIZEN SOLDIER, by Frederick Martin Stern, reviewed in the April 1960 issue of the AAJ.

At first glance Stern appears to have written a masterly exposition of his theme. Closer inspection, however, shows that he has fallen into a number of fundamental errors —he misstates some of his facts, he gives undue emphasis to that portion of the historical evidence which supports his theory, and he appears to think that his solution will fit all the circumstances in which his country (America) might find herself.

For example, when Stern says that France used the cadre-conscript type of army in 1914 and 1939, and that it failed on both occasions, he at least distorts the facts. The French Army of 1914 won the decisive battle of the Marne, which was a success. Its failures were due, not to its composition, but to its fighting doctrine, which was quite inappropriate to battlefields dominated by the machine-gun, the magazine rifle and the spade. And the French failure in 1939 is balanced by the concurrent success of the German cadre-conscript type army which

won through its training, equipment and brilliant leadership.

Similarly, when Stern says that the British Regular Army proved woefully small in the crises of 1914 and 1939, he fails to take into account the whole range of British military commitments at those times. In the years before the First World War only two types of army could have coped with Britain's world-wide military obligations—a conscript army of some sort or a volunteer regular army backed by a volunteer territorial reserve. Since at that time conscription was not politically possible, a regular army was the only type of military force which could have provided the numerous overseas garrisons which Britain had to maintain. A citizen force type of army—as we use the term in Australia—certainly could not have provided them. And if the Continental expeditionary force was initially pretty thin on the ground, the regular garrisons overseas retained their grip on every place of strategic or political importance.

In the Second World War seven clear months elapsed between the outbreak of hostilities and the German onslaught in the West. If certain arguments are valid, and we are certainly not disputing the point, this would have given the British Territorial Army ample time to take the field. The real trouble was equipment. The years of parsimony and appeasement had so depleted stocks and hampered development that there was not enough equipment for the Territorials to train with, let alone fight with.

Stern makes great play with the point that in the two world wars the Swiss conscript citizen force army secured its country's neutrality without even having to fight. In doing so he violates the laws of logic by formulating a general rule from a particular case. Switzerland occupies a very special position, politically and topographically. If Stern's argument is valid, a Swiss type citizen force army, instead of a cadre-conscript army, would have secured Belgian neutrality, which, as Euclid used to say, is absurd. Again, if Switzerland was as flat as Belgium, and Belgium as mountainous as Switzerland, on which flank would the Germans have made their grand enveloping manoeuvre in 1914? Would the types of armies of the defenders have influenced them half so much as the respective terrains, the one bristling with formidable, easily defended obstacles, the other with scarcely a defensible position?

In quoting General Sir John Monash's military career in support of his argument, Stern again falls into the error of reasoning from the particular to the general. Monash, like Julius Caesar, was a brilliant civil administrator and a brilliant business man as well as a brilliant soldier. No army can count on the advent of a Caesar or a Monash at a time of national crisis; they can be sure only of the general run of the mill.

Unbiassed reasoning leads to the conclusion that, generally, there can be no one type or form of army which will meet all national requirements over a long period of time. The evidence provided by history strongly supports this conclusion, for the record shows that success seldom attends the efforts of those nations who have fallen into a military rut by failure to keep

their armed forces carefully adjusted to the requirements of their changing political aims. We do not live in a static world. National policies which served us in the past are not appropriate to our situation today. Nor are the policies we now follow by any means immutable; from time to time changing circumstances will demand shifts in our national policies. If our armed services are to give those policies effective support, they too must change in composition and organization from time to time.

In the last fifty years the British Army has undergone three major compositional changes. In 1915-16 the volunteer regular/territorial type army became a citizen conscript army which, at the conclusion of hostilities, was re-converted to the volunteer regular/territorial type. In response to Hitler's challenge, Britain again returned to conscription, which, under the name of "National Service," is still in operation. However, she is about to revert to the volunteer regular/territorial type. So far each change has enabled the British Army to meet the challenge that confronted it.

Advocates of a particular type of army do not always appreciate that the armed forces have an important role in the furthering of national policies in peace as well as in war. This is particularly true of those nations who are members of a military alliance, as Australia is at present. Our fellow-members take a very active and informed interest in our armed forces. And they are not children to be misled with paper tigers.

Nations on the periphery of an alliance, or occupying an exposed sector, are always more interested in being saved than in being avenged. As Eric Linklater showed in PRIVATE ANGELO, the process of liberation is just as painful and destructive as the original conquest, while the dead really cannot be expected to show much enthusiasm in vengeance. In the nature of things, nations so situated place a far higher value on a relatively small force which can support them in time than on a larger force which cannot arrive before they have been overrun. The element of time thus becomes a most important factor in negotiating and maintaining a military alliance.

From the point of view of our allies and our negotiators, it follows that the ideal army is an army in being, volunteer/regular, cadre-conscript or anything else, but whatever its composition, an army that can move *promptly* to the support of a threatened ally. Like most ideals, this one is subject to modification by practical considerations, in our case by political, financial and industrial realities.

Stripped down to basic realities the Australian Government is faced with the problem of producing and maintaining the nearest approach to the ideal within the limits of the funds which can be made available for this purpose. There are many conflicting calls on these funds. If we want the army to be provided with modern weapons and devices, we have to spend a great deal on equipment. This means that there is less money available for pay and maintenance, which means a numerically smaller, but not necessarily less powerful, army.

The Government, of course, could allot more money to the armed services. When the needs and inter-

relationship of the three services are taken into consideration, it would have to be a lot more to make any material difference. Where is the money to come from? When we face up squarely to political realities we see that, within the limits of existing taxation levels, additional defence funds can be made available only by cutting back on projects connected directly or indirectly with the development of our industrial resources. This would be a short-sighted policy indeed, for it would retard the development of the industrial base on which the fighting services depend. They could increase taxation! Facing that suggestion frankly, with the wails of anguish at the last rise still ringing in our ears, who among us will give it his support?

We can take our choice. We can have a large ill-equipped and ill-trained army, or we can have a small, powerful fighting force. If it were not for the necessity of relating that force to strategic realities, we would be free to make it a volunteer regular army, a citizen force army or a combination of both. From the strategic point of view, a regular army is the best alternative. But the regular army we could get with the money and manpower available would be too small to meet our commitments. A purely citizen force army, of its very nature, cannot reach the scene of action within the time limits imposed by conditions in our sphere of military interest, a consideration of great importance to our allies. Nor can a purely citizen force army provide the forces for Korean or Malayan type operations, or respond instantaneously to a call for troops by the United Nations.

We are thus left the alternative of a regular/citizen force type of army, an alternative which permits the very rapid despatch of the regular element, to be followed as rapidly as its state of readiness allows by the citizen force element. This alternative can succeed only if every member of each element fully accepts the basic fact that the whole structure, and not merely a section of it, is the common concern of all.

Once this army takes the field both elements fuse into one homogeneous whole. The expressions "CMF" and "Regular" will cease to have any practical meaning, for we will all be regulars in the sense that we are "in for the duration," however long that may be. After all, there has been a Thirty Years War and even a Hundred Years War. In the last major conflict in which we were engaged non-professional officers held many senior appointments from army commander down to battalion commander, and many important staff postings as well. There is no reason whatever to suppose that they will not do so in the future. It will depend entirely, as it did in the past, on their military ability.

The Government and their military advisers have tried to give Australia one army, not two armies. That army contains two elements—a Regular element and a CMF element. Since the mechanics of bringing each of these elements to the highest possible level of war readiness differ materially, it is inescapable that discussion of the problem should be couched in terms of "CMF training" and "Regular Army training." However, it is essential to remember always that we are not discussing totally unrelated problems.

We are discussing different facets of the same problem—the problem of preparing the Australian Army as a whole for war. All elements of the Army, and all the training problems peculiar to them, are complementary. We cannot separate them, think about them, in watertight compartments without damaging the structure as a whole. If that basic concept is kept steadily in mind, discussion can proceed with profit to the army and the nation. If we fail to keep it in mind, not only in debate but in everything we do or say, much harm will inevitably result.

In the Second World War the Australian Army suffered acutely from the deep spiritual gulf that divided the AIF and the Militia. When history is written it may well be found that much physical evil resulted therefrom. It was an experience we will forget at our peril.

1 Sep 60. E.G.K.

COMPETITION FOR AUTHORS

The Board of Review has awarded the prize of £5 to Major W. F. Sorsby, Royal Australian Signals, for his article "CMF Recruiting and Service" in the September issue of the Journal.

ONE MAN'S BATTLE

Corporal T. Fitzpatrick

2/17 Battalion AIF

The battle of El Alamein, 23 October-4 November 1942, in which 9 Australian Division played a significant part, decisively crushed the Axis forces in north-eastern Africa. The strategy and tactics of the battle have been exhaustively examined, but few really good personal accounts have been published. This unedited extract from a diary kept by Corporal T. Fitzpatrick, 2/17 Battalion AIF, gives a vivid impression of the battle as experienced by an Australian NCO.—Editor.
2200 hours Thu Oct 22 1942

All ready at last to move up to assembly area behind the front line at Tel el Eisa, where we will wait for the big attack on Friday night. Last four days have been very busy getting the carrier in first class order, checking ammunition, guns, water, stores and 1001 other details. We have been told the time and date of the coming offensive. The brigade has practised the first attack four times and we all know our jobs. This evening at mess Capt McLarn called us together and gave us a few final instructions re small detail such as giving morphia to wounded.

Noon 23rd. Splendid trip up to the front last night. Arrived here 0100 hours. Busy morning checking and cleaning guns. My carrier has 1 Vickers, 1 Bren, 1 Browning; also 1 doz hand grenades, 3 rifles and 10,000 rounds. A few enemy planes over early, some mortar fire over towards our rifle companies' positions about 0900 hours, otherwise very quiet day so far. Our guns not firing yet, which is just as well, as we are alongside a heavy battery. Must have a spell this afternoon, as it will be a long time before I get another chance.

During the trip up last night we saw plenty of evidence of the huge amount of preparation going on. Passed Divisional HQ on the way. Morshead turned out to watch us pass. The forward troops (Tommies) don't appear to know what is on tonight.

23rd 1830 hours. Zero hour 1900 hours—much sooner than we expected; suits me fine. Now waiting to move up to the forming up point.

2105 hours. Zero now 2200. We are waiting just behind FUP, excitement intense. Artillery will open barrage in 15 minutes. It will be the heaviest ever known. All hands in good spirits. If anyone nervous he is not showing it. A while ago some silly buffer lit a cigarette, nothing happened; then half a dozen others lit up, still nothing happened.

Within a minute thousands of cigarettes were alight. They shone like little glow worms.

Just before we left last position Gordon Newman and I received a bottle of Scotch from Frank Bryant. We argued about who should carry it, but have now decided that both will carry it, inside us. Heard some bagpipes playing as we were moving up. What a war! Expect to see Montgomery on a white charger.

2120 hours. Apart from the noise of our own vehicles there isn't a sound to be heard over the whole front. It is hard to imagine that in a few minutes all hell will be let loose. Feel fine, that whisky was good.

2139 hours. Just heard an artillery officer behind us call out "One minute to go."

They're off. One of two guns away to the south fired the first shots. A few seconds later there was a great sheet of flame extending as far as could be seen to north and south, followed immediately by a terrific roar. We heard the first salvo go screaming over our heads, and after that the continuous thunder of thousands of guns firing independently. This will go on all night. We can see the first shells bursting on the German lines in front, but already the air is becoming thick with dust and smoke. Every gun is now blazing away. One battery only 100 yards behind us. The din is beyond description.

2155 hours. We go forward in five minutes. No reply yet from enemy guns. Our artillery terrific, the Tobruk barrage of night of May 2nd last year was nothing compared with this.

2210 hours. We are on the way. Enemy artillery opened up for a few minutes during a slight lull in our barrage. As soon as our guns resumed, his stopped. He could not possibly do anything in face of such shelling. My crew comprises Don Osborne, Derek Cunningham and Bill Friend.

Ahead of us is only dust, smoke and parachute flares over the enemy lines.

2230 hours. Still it goes on, if anything heavier than ever. Not much coming from enemy guns. How could they shoot in the face of our barrage? We are halted about halfway to his forward line. It is a magnificent sight.

2245 hours. Machine-gun bullets coming over. Ron Percival wounded. No let up in shelling.

2315 hours. Shells falling around us now. Derek and Bill pretty excited, had to tell them to keep their heads down.

2325 hours. Met first of prisoners coming back, also some of our wounded. They don't know what is happening ahead of us. We have just passed through a nasty barrage. Still a few shells falling close.

24th 0015 hours. Passed through enemy mine field and forward posts, a few bodies lying around. Looked into one post. Occupants all dead except for two fowls crowing loudly. At 2330 hours rockets went up indicating all our battalion objectives gained. "A" company had heavy casualties.

0030 hours. Second phase of attack starting. Enemy guns appear to be mostly silenced, but he is keeping up strong MG fire. Our planes ahead bombing his back areas.

0245 hours. In our positions digging in. Mortars and small arms fire pretty heavy. "A" Company lost half its strength. What a night. Our barrage continuing. 13th Battalion attacking on our left and seem to be having a rough time. Planes still bombing enemy artillery. Ground rocking with continuous explosions. Some of the shells damned close but none of the platoon hit.

1000 hours. Shelled continuously since last entry. Not very heavy until daylight. Got a small piece of shrapnel above right elbow during the night. Arm a bit stiff, otherwise OK.

A hell of a battle going on in front of us where 13th have taken their objective. Ceaseless rattle of machine-guns. Tracer bullets flying everywhere. Since daylight our bombers have been over enemy lines every few minutes. Hope they are finding their targets. Each time they drop sticks of about 50 bombs.

We had to move to a less exposed position and dig in again. The heavy tanks went out about 0800 hours, and for the next 1½ hours a furious tank battle went on. It has quietened down now, but a fair number of anti-tank shells are still passing close to us. One carrier had a close shave.

All divisional objectives gained last night. Highlanders also fully successful. Hope the southern units did as well.

1430 hours. Will try to get a bit of sleep. This morning I had a look at a couple of captured strong posts. Picked up a Luger. Men and bits of men lying everywhere, Ities, Germans, and our own.

From 1100 hours we have been shelled continuously. Capt McLarn wounded. Now our guns have started a spot of counter-battery firing. Hope it will be effective and shut the enemy guns up for a while. Big flights of our bombers still going over at intervals. Saw two shot down this morning; crews parachuted; one lot, I am afraid, went into the sea.

1730 hours. Another tank battle out in front. Impossible to see what is going on owing to smoke screen, which appears to be coming from our mortars; enemy shelling continues. Some of our batteries also firing.

1845 hours. Tank battle has just died down. All we can see of it is half a dozen blazing tanks.

A few minutes ago a shell got 6 men close to here. Think they are 15th Battalion.

2100 hours. Just had hot meal. Told that we will be attacking again tonight, Zero 0200 hours. Expect easier job than last night. Informed that whole of 8th Army achieved last night's objectives. Good start. Now for three hours sleep (I hope).

25th 0100 hours. Assembled waiting for attack to start. From 2300 hours till midnight we were bombed by Stukas. No damage in our area.

0200 hours. Zero hour. All quiet over whole front. Battalion starting to advance.

0930 hours. It was a hell of a night. Our attack was held up by one strong post. Three carriers, including mine, were sent to try to attack it. We reached "D" Company after passing through heavy fire. Lieut Murphy contacted Capt McMaster, who said that Germans

had too many anti-tank guns and that it would be useless to go any further forward. Murphy then returned to Battalion HQ in his carrier, leaving Bill Stewart and self. After waiting half an hour I walked over to where "D" Company was digging in to ask McMaster just what the position was. Told him we would not last two minutes once daylight came. McMaster told me to give him covering fire until his men were dug in, then he would send word for us to go back. While walking back to the carrier I heard bombs falling and ran for it. Managed to dive under the carrier just as they hit the ground. Two more attacks in the next few minutes. Learned afterwards that Ron Avery had been killed in one of these.

About this time an ammunition truck behind us was hit and blew up. It burned till after daylight, lighting up the whole area. Shortly afterwards while I was sitting in the carrier two men from anti-tank regiment came over and asked to be directed to "D" Company. Had just finished talking to them when a mortar shell landed alongside the carrier, blowing one man to pieces and badly wounding the other. We all jumped out to help him and were carrying him to shelter behind the carrier when we got a burst of MG fire. Bill Friend shot through the heart.

We patched the wounded man up a bit and handed him over to his own crowd. Shortly afterwards word came from Capt McMaster telling us to go back, so we went to Battalion HQ, taking Bill's body. Left it with some other dead, among whom I noticed Johnny Spink. We then picked up five wounded men and ran them to the RAP. Met Padre Byrne there, who told me that Capt Tim McCulloch had been killed and Len Mitchell's leg blown off. Our casualties had been fairly heavy.

Went to platoon area just near Battalion HQ, and had to work like hell to dig in before daylight. Derek, after digging his own hole, helped me with mine—very decent of him. I deepened my hole between shells later on. Also mounted the Vickers.

Ken Pratt did a good job when some bags in the back of the truck caught fire. He got the fire out somehow before it got to some petrol tins in the back. If they had caught fire we would all have been in a proper mess.

Since daylight we have been heavily shelled, mainly air bursts very well placed. Twelve more of the platoon wounded and Hank Farrelly killed in the hole next to mine. Who next?

While the shelling was at its heaviest, Keith Sabine came along carrying a big dixie of stew. No one accepted his invitation to have some, but it did me a lot of good to see him walking in the open with the dixie. The old morale had not been too good up till then. Feel much better now and wish I had had some stew.

1530 hours. Left forward position, much to everyone's relief. No further casualties among our platoon although the shelling continued up till the time we left.

Shortly after midday our mobile guns came up just near us and put on a short but heavy barrage. Heard someone say that our artillery could not operate, as they had used all their ammunition in the first 24

hours. Who the hell starts that kind of talk?

Am completely knocked up. Must try to get an hour's sleep before getting ready for another job tonight. Can see a lot of work ahead for the few of us who are left. Haven't enough crews to man half the carriers. My carrier a bit battered and dented by bullets and shrapnel. Just heard that Tony and Ben were wounded before leaving last position.

0300 hours 26th. Late yesterday afternoon a tank battle developed on our left front. This more or less diverted the artillery from our position. By dusk there was a lull in the fighting everywhere, which continued till midnight. Then the battle started again, with two of our battalions attacking in different places. Our medium and heavy artillery, of which we had not heard much since the first night, sent over a heavy barrage. Enemy guns also very busy on our front.

Don Osborne and I took the carrier to transport consolidation stores for "C" Company, who were moving forward to newly captured ground. While loading the stores we were under almost continuous MG fire. We both had our hats grazed by bullets. With the load on we guided "C" Company to their new position.

Just after we started one of a group of ammunition trucks ahead of us (which should have been better dispersed) was hit and blew up, setting alight to the other trucks. These also went up a few seconds later. Some men were killed and their bodies scattered for 100 yards. The air is thick with the smell of burned flesh. The whole area is lit up by the fires and exploding flares, mortars, bombs, etc. It is hell of a job for us to get past.

Capt Dinning has gone forward to try to find a less exposed route to the new position. The company was lucky enough to find some old slit trenches nearby and are sheltering in them. We were under heavy mortar fire, but it has slackened in the last few minutes. A couple of "C" Company have been hit.

Am writing by the light of the burning trucks.

1100 hours. Finished "C" Company job and returned to our new position on a ridge about 0500 hours. I felt completely done, but Rex Auckett, who had got there earlier, saved my life with a swig of whisky.

Turned in then and slept till an hour ago.

This is a quiet possie—a captured post and well dug. From what I have already seen of the captured posts, I gather that the Germans dig-in much more thoroughly than we do. This might be a good idea, but I am inclined to think that they make themselves a bit too secure and don't like getting out for patrols. That is where our chaps have it on them.

We are being intermittently shelled, but only direct hits will count here. So far there have been none of these. We are feeling much more secure than yesterday, when our numbers were diminishing every hour. Our platoon had 16 casualties.

When the shelling ceases I will have my first wash and shave since the show started (was it three days or three months ago?).

Two of the carriers were knocked out yesterday and more early this morning. If the Jerry had had an anti-tank gun handy last night he would have got the lot.

Last night's attacks very successful; large number of prisoners taken and a great many enemy killed. One captured ridge is simply littered with their bodies. Our casualties in the attack were very light. The ground captured is very valuable and should improve things very considerably in this sector.

1800 hours. Our planes bombing enemy front lines at short intervals all day; at greater intervals his bombers have been over our artillery, which has been very busy all day shelling just in front of our post.

Our bombers go over 18 strong in close formation. They drop their eggs all together and a terrific blast follows.

The German bombers come over in formation but come on to the target separately and then make for home individually. Ours return in the same formation as they went out.

Our platoon had quite a good day and I got in quite a bit of sleep. Expect to be out again most of the night. Both my hands are in a mess. Cut them both badly sometime last night, but cannot remember how. Hardly any skin left on back of right hand.

Noon 27th. One and a half hours' sleep last night before midnight, then left to dig a Vickers post in rear "C" Company. We had to be settled in by daylight. The working party finished the digging-in by 0530 hours and then left. Ken Pratt and I occupying the post till tonight. The morning has been very quiet and uneventful. Can see some movement on our right slightly forward of our post. It is within the arc of fire which Paul Murphy gave me before he left us, but I think it is one of our posts, so am leaving it alone.

While we were at "C" Company last night they sent out a patrol which ran into trouble. They came back carrying John Lloyd, who was killed. We brought his body back to where we had left the carriers.

1700 hours. Mainly quiet until an hour ago, except for a few enemy tanks which came close but were soon driven off. One of our planes forced down just near the German front line; I opened up with the Vickers when some Jerries got out of their trenches and ran towards the plane. Don't know whether I got any, but they went to ground pretty quickly.

About an hour ago a hell of a blitz started. Our post seemed to be the first target, but so far no damage done. Dive bombers, artillery and small arms fire all coming over, but now mostly going over our heads. Our own guns also firing; one of them keeps dropping them short and too damned close to us for comfort.

1130 hours 28th. A carrier came out early in the night and brought us and the Vickers back to the platoon position.

The enemy counter-attacked four times yesterday evening and last night. All attacks beaten off. Our artillery pounded his whole front for some hours. The noise was like ceaseless thunder and the ground rocked continuously. Lying in our

deep trench the impression was not unlike that of being in an express train.

Moved our position again after midnight. I was too tired to know or care where we were going, but I got to sleep in a hole about daylight. Woke up some time later. Bruce Culey gave me some tea. Heavy shelling all the morning, but the barrage is falling a little away from us. Stukas came over about an hour ago dive bombing and machine gunning. We have to stick right in our holes, so at least I am getting some much-needed rest, though it is rather too nerve-racking to be fully appreciated.

1800 hours. As the day went on the fighting became heavier, with both sides throwing in everything they had. A steady stream of wounded kept arriving at the RAP, which is near us. Padre Byrne is one of the stretcher bearers. Our platoon's only casualty was Vince Kearney, badly wounded in the chest. It should have been me. A mortar bomb landed at the very edge of my hole. I was badly affected by blast and shock for some time, but am OK now.

The battle has died down now; a short while ago an aerial fight took place right over our heads. About 40 planes engaged. Saw several shot down but could not identify them. Our chaps seemed to have an easy victory, as the Messerschmitts cleared out, leaving the Spitfires in possession of the sky over the battlefield. Since then dozens of our fighters have been patrolling above us, evidently with the idea of preventing another Stuka attack on our line. Our big bombers have been over the enemy lines every few minutes.

Had quite a fair rest today, but no chance of a wash, as we have to keep very quiet here. Heard that Darby Green was killed yesterday. He was the nicest chap I have ever met.

1400 hours 29th. Was able to turn in at 0200 hours; I had quite a decent sleep till daylight. Big battle on our right flank last night. Two of our battalions captured more ground. Tanks also engaged. Our guns put over a tremendous barrage in support. Fairly quiet here since daylight. A few shells and mortars. It will probably liven up again towards evening. Some of the chaps are starting to crack up a bit. Can't blame them altogether, but I think it would be better if we had a bit more to do during the past 36 hours. We have hardly left our holes. ——— is particularly nervous. He was always as game as Ned Kelly, but now he doesn't want to move from his hole at all.

Noon 30th. Not much to write about. Late yesterday afternoon a counter-attack against our battalion was beaten off. While it was in progress we came in for some shelling and a good deal of MG fire, but the platoon had no casualties for the day. At night I took ammunition to "D" Company in the carrier. Uneventful trip and back at midnight, after that a good sleep. Quiet morning. One big dive bombing attack by Stukas and MES to rear of us. Saw one shot down by our fighters. Our bombers not so evident yesterday or today, though they have been over a few times. We see a good deal more of our fighters patrolling over the lines. Big increase in Ger-

man air activity. No attacks around this part last night. Flies are getting very bad and my hands are in a pretty bad way. Frank Bryant brought Gordon Newman and myself each a bottle of whisky last night—God bless him.

1030 hours. Except for the usual late evening blitz things were mainly quiet till 2230 hours yesterday. Then some of our units (including 15th Battalion, I think) attacked the enemy salient on our right flank. As usual the attack was preceded by a very heavy artillery barrage, which continued most of the night. There was a good deal of enemy MG fire and some shelling, but this did not worry us. I had a fair sleep in spite of the noise. This morning at daybreak tanks approached our front, but our tanks took up positions all around where I am and quickly drove the enemy off. Since then the Germans have been firing a good deal of anti-tank and medium stuff. The shells are all going over our heads. They seem to be trying to get some vehicles at our rear. So far have not heard the result of last night's battle.

Slam Sullivan was wounded this morning, I meant to go along to him when things quietened down to get my hands patched up. Bob McIlroy killed.

1800 hours. Plenty of shooting all day by both sides. Our mobile guns came up close and pounded enemy positions from close range. Good news of last night's attack. They reached the coast and captured 1000 prisoners.

1100 hours Nov 1st. Quietest night since show began. Some shelling this morning and our area got its share. Bruce Culey and I had a close shave. We had been along to the RAP, where there is a new MO in Slam's place. On the way back an 88mm shell landed just behind us. Don't know how we got out of it intact. Had my hands dressed at last. I heard that there is more big trouble for the Germans arranged for tonight.

1600 hours. About midday a German counter-attack started on our right towards the coast. The fighting was very heavy for some hours. Artillery from both sides engaged. Our anti-tank guns went into it early. Now our tanks are forward and appear to be awaiting developments, though at the moment things are mostly quiet on the right. Some shelling around here. Hannaford killed today.

1630 hours 3rd. The big attack of the night before last was very successful. A wedge was driven right through the enemy line and our tanks went through. They are still in front. Today we heard that they reached El Daba.

I spent yesterday at "B" echelon getting the carrier serviced. What a treat to have a clean-up and walk around without a tin hat and no shells. Arrived back here at dusk. The road packed with tanks and other MVs moving up—a good sign.

Last night we kept flares burning to guide the planes which were bombing in front of us.

This morning all quiet and enemy appears to have withdrawn. We went out on patrol for quite a long distance, brought in one prisoner and towed back five German guns. The prisoner, an officer, spoke good English, told us his nerves have cracked when his unit withdrew

during the night, he decided to stay and await capture. Said he had been in the fighting in France and Poland but had never experienced anything like the past 10 days.

I took ———— as my driver for the patrol. He did not want to go, but I was determined he would. He stalled the engine and caused the carburettor to flood. Could not start the engine and did not want to. As we have more carriers than crews I made him get into another one, but I drove till we got well out in front then handed over to him. He was much better then and behaved alright. While out we opened up on an enemy post with the Vickers. When a couple of shells came over we decided it was time to get back. Just as we got moving they got the range, and one shell just missed Gordon Newman's carrier.

Later we went out again with instructions to contact the enemy. We were able to keep in dead ground by travelling the waddis, and were a long way out when he met a section of 15th Battalion carrier with Ron Yates in command. They had run into the Germans just ahead, and got back after having two men wounded. Ron Yates, who was one of those wounded, advised us not to take the carriers any further. so we took the two Vickers guns on to a ridge and started firing at 2000 yards. A couple of Spandaus replied from a lesser distance, but we could not locate them. I don't think we were doing much damage and were much more likely to get into trouble ourselves, so we didn't stay long.

0600 hours 4th. On patrol again, three carriers expected to contact Germans. From where we are we can see them a long way off, but so far we have done nothing about it. He is sending a few shells over. Had a look through some of his recently evacuated positions. Plenty of dead lying around but no worthwhile loot.

Heard that Ian McMaster died last night after being wounded earlier in the day.

1600 hours. After waiting some distance out this morning we decided to go further and attack the enemy we could see in the distance near El Rama Mosque. Paul Murphy in one of the other carriers led us to about 500 yds from them. They were digging in. I thought we were a bit too close and kept the engine running while my gunner (Lackey from one of the rifle companies) fired about three belts of ammunition. I don't think the Germans returned the fire, at least nothing came our way. We stayed till an 88mm shell came over, and then, much to my relief, Murphy signalled for us to get back. On the way in an anti-tank shell just missed the front of my carrier. I was driving, and it would have been my own fault if we had been hit, as I had got out of the dead ground without realizing it and was running along a ridge—very careless.

0600 hours 5th. The breach in the enemy line is evidently firmly established, and at the moment the whole countryside to our left is packed with vehicles of all sorts. Three days ago the appearance of even one truck would have brought down a barrage of shells. The vehicles are pouring through the gap and apparently meeting no opposition. There is only one meaning to this. We have won the battle. 9 Division has suffered heavily, but we were the

spearhead of the attack so it could not have been otherwise. The Germans fought back like the good soldiers they are, but finally our tremendous barrages and bombings took effect, and they cracked. No troops in the world could have stood up to the weight of our artillery and air force. We were told before going in that the enemy must be destroyed. I think that we have gone a long way towards doing it.

1800 hours 7th. Moved to a position near the coast, where we are resting. It is all over now, but those of us who are still on deck are not feeling particularly elated. We lost too many of our mates for that. Jo-Jo once said that Henry Ford can make a million trucks but he can't make one Jo-Jo Illingworth. Jo-Jo is right, they can replace all the guns, tanks and trucks lost in the battle, but they can't bring back a single one of our mates who died here in the desert.

THE ART OF WAR

Computations made on an electronic computer by a former president of the Norwegian Academy of Sciences, aided by historians from England, Egypt, Germany and India, have produced some astounding figures on the frequency and severity of wars. Included in these findings is the fact that since 3600 B.C. the world has known only 292 years of peace. During this period there have been 14,531 wars, large and small, in which 3,640,000,000 people were killed. The value of the destruction inflicted would pay for a golden belt around the earth 156 kilometers in width and 10 meters thick. Since 650 B.C. there have been 1656 arms races, only 16 of which have not ended in war. The remainder have ended in economic collapse.

—*Military Review, USA.*

Strategic Review

AUSTRALIA AND SOUTH EAST ASIA

Lieutenant-Colonel R. W. Swartz, MBE, ED, MP

AQMG (CMF) Headquarters, Northern Command

"THE central problem of Australia's foreign policy," it has been said, "is how to reconcile our geography with our history. Historically we belong to Europe; geographically we are an island lying off the coast of South-East Asia." No country can escape from its past history. History determines the way in which any country acts, by determining its national character, its racial composition and its traditions. From an historical viewpoint we are a European people. As a result, the Australian people has cultural ties of great strength with Europe, and especially with Britain. We speak the same language. go to the same churches, live under the same kind of political system. These ties of sentiment and tradition have powerfully affected Australian policy in the past, most noticeably in influencing us to participate in two wars, which at the outset, appeared to be purely European in character. It is foolish, then, to ignore these bonds of sentiment and tradition; they have led the Australian nation to do things which its immediate practical interests did not seem to require.

The ties between Australia and Britain are not only sentimental, however, they are also economic. A considerable proportion of Australian trade is with Britain. We rely upon the British market for the sale of much of the foodstuffs and raw materials we export, and we have depended for much of our imports on British supplies; that dependence has now been considerably reduced as a result of the development of Australian industry.

A country's trading policy can, however, be altered or modified, as, indeed, Australian policy has been altered with the gradual development of manufacturing industry. But the facts of geography, like those of history, are not alterable. The significance of the phrase "continuity of foreign policy" lies largely in this simple truth. If British foreign policy, for example, alters little with changes of government, it is because Britain's geographical position, off the north-west coast of Europe, does

not alter. The same argument, in different circumstances, applies to Australia.

It has to be accepted, then, that the physical facts of geography and national resources, both human and material, leave only limited room to manoeuvre in the field of foreign policy. In the case of Australia, these facts consist of a geographical position on the margin of the Pacific and South-East Asian areas, and the possession of population and resources which are relatively limited. The future will see a considerable expansion of Australia's population, and the discovery and development of new resources. But in the meantime we have somehow to reconcile our geography and our history. We want to maintain our connection with the Commonwealth and to preserve the security of Australia, as a country largely British in character and composition. Yet we want, also, to establish friendly relations with our Asian neighbours in the Pacific area. The two aims are, in fact, not opposed but interdependent, since if we fail to achieve the latter we are not likely to achieve the former.

World War II brought about great changes in the world—in the East and in the West. As a result of all this, the eyes of Australians have been very much more concentrated on Asia than they were twenty years ago. The countries of Asia are our neighbours and we would like them to accept us as friends.

Before the war Australia had no diplomatic representation in the South-East Asia area. We are now represented in 13 South and South-East Asian countries, as well as in Japan and Hong Kong. This means that nearly half of our Australian diplomatic missions are in Asia and the East.

In view of our common interests in the great Pacific area we have developed the closest ties with the United States of America. Indeed, it is natural and proper that we should do so, because Australians believe that the leadership and strength, both moral and material, of this great nation are essential to world peace.

None of these developments, however, means that we have broken the traditional ties which link us with our Mother Country, the United Kingdom, and with Western Europe. These still exist, and are at least no less than they were.

Australia nevertheless remains geographically a country of the Pacific Ocean area. Our nearest neighbours live in the islands of the Indonesian archipelago. Our main air, sea and telecommunications links with most parts of the world pass through South-East Asia. Like many South-East Asian countries, we are a young country, still in the developmental stage.

We contribute to the Colombo Plan and to most of the United Nations Programmes for international aid. However, at the same time, Australia is a net importer of capital because we are ourselves in the developmental stage.

The Colombo Plan has brought about a whole lot of new personal links between Australia and the countries of South and South-East Asia. It has brought about contacts between Ministers of Governments, officials, technical experts, teachers and students.

In the last year two important conferences have been held in Aus-

tralia. In March, 1959, the important United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) held its annual meeting at Broadbeach in Queensland. This was the biggest conference yet held in Australia, with about 250 delegates from round about 30 countries, more than half of them from Asia.

Later delegations from Commonwealth countries were in Australia for a meeting of the Commonwealth Parliament Association at Canberra.

Many of the delegates to these meetings were, of course, from Asian countries. Before and after the conferences. they toured widely in Australia and met Australians in many walks of life.

Countries in Asia, like Australia, want peace, security and freedom from outside pressures and interference.

Australia's destiny is closely bound to South-East Asia. It must be our sincere hope that our friendly relationship with countries in this area will develop and prosper to our mutual advantage in the future.

Now, paradoxically, for better ground or battlefield mobility, we are concentrating on the air!

We find we must look to the air to attain the revolutionary improvement we require in mobility for ground forces. We are working to develop true air vehicles that will fly just above the "nap of the earth," permitting the combat soldier of tomorrow to overcome normal terrain obstacles, such as mud, swamps, rivers, and forests. This type of vehicle will have the takeoff and landing characteristics of the helicopter coupled with the advantages of the fixed-wing aircraft in forward flight.

—General Arthur G. Trudeau, US Army.

LEADERS ARE THINKERS

Major C. W. Wright
Royal Australian Signals

The Frontiers

ALTHOUGH we do not know just how the future will shape our lives, we do know that leadership in this world goes to those best able to adapt themselves to its ever-changing conditions.

To appreciate how fast these changes are occurring we have only to consider the frontiers of knowledge opened up during the last century. During that period man has made more progress than in the whole of his previous existence.

Professor Whitehead has aptly called this situation "The time span problem," and says that we must train ourselves to learn more quickly and think more effectively to face the future successfully.

The purpose of this paper is to show that a person of average natural ability can improve his mental performance to meet this challenge, provided that he is persistent and uses the correct training methods.

First of all, we will investigate the thinking habits of three great leaders of history to see how they developed their minds. Then we will compare their methods with present-day concepts to provide a starting point for those wishing to pursue the subject beyond the scope of this paper.

The Pioneers

Our three case histories have been deliberately chosen because their reputations have stood the test of time, and their biographies provide ample evidence on which to base our investigations.

We now turn back in history to 400 BC to meet the father of clear thinking, Socrates the Greek philosopher. Although he was a teacher, he did not write books, and we are indebted to his pupil Plato for recording the "Dialogues of Socrates."

As a boy Socrates used to listen to the most interesting people of the day when they visited Athens, which was then the centre of the world. He discovered that despite their fame they often contradicted themselves because they did not think logically. He became very interested in the problem, and when talking with friends would ask them to define the subject they were discussing and provide examples to prove their statements.

He further developed this cross-examination technique to deflate egotists and help students to find the true answers to problems for themselves. He jokingly called himself the human "Botfly" who stung people into forming correct think-

ing habits. His system of proceeding from the known to the unknown is still the basis of our everyday thinking.

We now turn our attention to a very important period in American history, the American Civil War, the centenary of which will be celebrated in 1961. There we meet two outstanding men of their time. The first, the Confederate General Stonewall Jackson, needs no introduction to students of Military History.

In two years of war he rose from Major to Lieutenant-General, and died from wounds at the age of 39. In that short time he established such a reputation as a strategist that his campaigns are still used by many nations to teach the principles of war. In his biography by Colonel C. E. Henderson will be found details of how Jackson developed his exceptional ability.

As a boy Jackson received little formal education, but so impressed the Secretary of War with his earnestness to become a soldier that he was able to gain entry to West Point. We will now see how he overcame his deficiencies in order to master his profession.

For most of his years at the academy he was behind in his study assignments. But he always completed them. From the outset he strictly adhered to a set of rules of conduct which he had personally prepared. He also cultivated a habit which was to pay rich dividends in later years. He always sat upright at his desk whilst studying. Then he would close his book and stare at the ceiling until he had fixed the author's ideas in his mind. By this self-discipline he improved his class position from 51st to 17th in four years.



Jackson

On graduation in 1847 he fought in the Mexican War, and by his tactical ability soon earned promotion in the field. In 1851 he resigned from the army as a major to become a professor at the Virginia Military Institute, Lexington. It was there that he was able to devote the next 10 years of his spare time to the study of military history and strategy.

As a teacher he was rather dry, but he did impress students with his thoroughness and respect for truth. He went to great pains to correct errors and always apologised when he found he was wrong. It was during these peaceful years that he developed the mental resilience that enabled him to later out-

manoeuvre the stronger Federal forces and disrupt their advance on Richmond.

Each evening he would sit alone for an hour or so thinking about the conduct of war and the military campaigns of history. He would analyze the significant elements of each situation and determine the best way to achieve success. Later he visited Europe to study these campaigns first hand.

Although Jackson believed that all political differences should be settled within the Union, his aim was clear when war was declared in 1861. After the battle of Bull Run he made representations to invade Maryland whilst the Federals were disorganized and threaten Washington so as to gain favourable peace terms. However, he was authorized to make only a limited advance with his forces to Romney.

In all his subsequent campaigns he was able to find the weak point of the Federal forces without exposing his own. We will later investigate this quality of insight displayed by Jackson to consider ways by which it can be developed.

The second American we now meet is the statesman Abraham Lincoln, known to the world as "The man of the people." Details of his life may be found in any public library. Like Jackson as a youth he had a very limited schooling, but he had a great driving desire for knowledge.

Too poor to buy books, he carried with him sheets of paper on which to write words and ideas which impressed him. He would read, recite and think about them until their meanings were clear in his mind. He walked miles to listen to preachers speak and lawyers argue. Then when the opportunity presented itself he repeated these speeches to his friends.

Later he joined a debating society, and when he accidentally found some books on law, decided to prepare for the legal profession. In 1837 he went into law partnership and spent the next 20 years touring the court circuit and trying to establish his name in politics.

This experience proved invaluable when his big chance came in 1858. In that year he took part in a series of public discussions with Stephen A. Douglas on slavery and secession. It was then that he made his famous declaration that—"A house divided cannot stand." The nation-wide interest taken in these debates helped Lincoln when he was nominated two years later for candidature for President of the United States.

Since he had already spent most of his life arguing law cases and making speeches, it is important that we know how he prepared them. He would gather books concerning the particular subject from the library. Then he would read selected passages from them and write them down in his own words. After he had regrouped, rephrased and revised them he would read these speeches to his friends to ensure that their exact meaning was conveyed. Then he would commit them to memory. Examples of Lincoln's ability to express himself are contained in his Gettysburg and Inaugural addresses, and war letters. They are also reminders of the constant effort and self-criticism required to produce work of high standard.

Now that we have reviewed our three case histories two striking facts are evident. Each leader throughout his life deliberately set



Abraham Lincoln

out to improve his knowledge and powers of insight. In the next phase these two qualities will be more closely examined.

The Pattern

In order to more fully appreciate the allied processes of learning and thinking we will compare the methods used by our case histories with those of present-day educationalists.

Learning, which is a change in behaviour as a result of experience, can be favourably encouraged by the observance of certain rules. The undermentioned are some of the most important:—

(a) There must be a strong desire to learn.

(b) The subject to be learned must be arranged as a meaningful whole before the details are digested.

(c) Learning is an active process, and all the senses should be employed as much as possible.

(d) Learning periods should be distributed over a planned period of time.
(e) Subjects are best remembered when they are overlearned by recitation and testing.

The process of thinking is the most important part of our discussion. Thinking may be stated as the arranging of facts and ideas in order to arrive at a conclusion. Since it is a very profound subject, only those aspects having a direct bearing on mental efficiency will be considered. Since John Dewey in 1910 was the first to explain the process of thinking, his five steps are listed as a basis of further explanation:—

(a) The problem is set.
(b) Facts relating to the problem are assembled.
(c) Suggestions for solving the problem are made.
(d) An estimate is made as to what will happen if the best suggestion is true.
(e) The best suggested solution is verified by application.

Since the format used in military appreciations follows this explanation very closely, servicemen will not deny its effectiveness for solving problems. However, its very thoroughness makes its use time consuming and a more streamlined system is desirable.

James Mursell has produced such a system which contains the following three stages:—

(a) The situation is surveyed as a complete whole.
(b) The essential elements are selected.
(c) Details of the solution are built on these elements.

The survey stage enables us to fix in our minds an overall picture of any undertaking, and leads naturally to the next stage of thinking. The following two illustrations show how it may be applied. Pick up a textbook, note the heading of the chapter, then skim through the whole chapter before reading again in detail. The overall picture gained during the first reading should help considerably in understanding the chapter. Notice also how an artist concentrates on the general shape of his subject before he sketches the outline on canvas. Another good example is the reconnaissance drill carried out by commanders before they commit their troops to battle.

The second stage can be compared with the procedure used by a policeman when looking for the missing clue to a crime. In order to better understand this technique it is advantageous to have some conception of how the human brain operates. The following possible explanation is offered because it is relatively simple.

The brain contains myriads of nerve fibres similar in many respects to the cords of a communication switchboard. These fibres provide the means of receiving and transmitting ideas. When a self-evident idea is accepted through the senses these fibres link it up with similar ideas that have already been registered. This pattern of ideas enables any one idea to be expressed in terms of the others. When we are confronted with a novel situation where the answer to a problem has to be found, the brain fibres have to set about resorting existing ideas to form a pattern to bridge the gap between what we know and what we wish to understand. When one or more ideas are found to unify

the situation into a complete whole we experience a moment of insight when the problem is solved.

Since we use words to express our thoughts we can produce some evidence to show that our concept is sound. It will be found that when we write about a topic we use separate paragraphs to explain each main aspect of that topic. Each paragraph is divided into sentences. The first one generally contains the central idea and the others further illustrate that idea. However, it is the lead sentences that contain the vital ideas that enable us to understand the subject. Now if we conscientiously look for these landmarks whenever we read books, listen to lectures or are faced with new situations, our chances of gaining success are increased.

One of the best ways we can improve our ability to recognize these essential facts is to practise the habit of note making. When we study books we should select the main ideas, convert them to our own words and record them, using no more than one sentence per main idea. Likewise we can use a similar procedure when listening to lectures.

There are many other aids which can be used to train the mind to recognize the key elements to various situations. We can regularly use a dictionary and Roget's Thesaurus to help us in writing tasks. Test papers before examinations are sure to improve our performance. Reading comprehension books used by schools are particularly effective. Apart from direct study methods, there are recreations which also produce good results. Reading detective novels, doing crossword puzzles and collecting stamps all involve searching for key ideas.

Once the main guiding ideas of the situation have been determined it is not so difficult to build the other details of the solution around them. This article may not be a shining example, but the works of Lincoln previously referred to are models in this regard.

Conclusion

Throughout this discussion it has been asserted that leadership efficiency can be significantly raised by self-effort and correct thinking procedures, just the same as the performance of an athlete can be improved by correct training methods. The ideas contained in this discussion are not original, they have been selected from a very small fraction of the literature now available on the subject of thinking. If they are not familiar then it is likely that you are still using "learn by heart methods," which just cannot cope with conditions in this fast-moving world. At this stage it may be wise to ponder on a statement made recently by a newspaper correspondent. "The future of our nation depends on brainpower rather than manpower."

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Chairman Mao Says

Colonel W. B. Maguire, RL

Field Marshal Lord Montgomery has just returned from a flying visit to Hell. His impressions were as follows:—

"I liked Hell very much. It was a good show, a very good show indeed. The Devil is a very sound chap and an able organizer. We had excellent talks. He has everything well under control. Discipline and administration are excellent. All the chaps I met there were warm, happy, fit and well in the picture. I promised the Devil that I would tell everybody what a good show Hell was. This I shall do."

—Peter Simple, in the "London Daily Telegraph."

WITHIN the present framework of international Communist tactics—of "good behaviour," "peaceful co-existence," "trade and aid"—particular emphasis is laid on "popular diplomacy."

"Popular diplomacy" is the process whereby Communist governments seek to influence public opinion in free countries by promoting direct unofficial contact between citizens of those countries and carefully selected groups of its own adherents. In this process guided tours of Communist countries and visits by cultural, economic, scientific and religious delegations play an important role.

The ideas presented through these personal contacts are simple and general and have broad appeal. In many cases the returning visitor makes public his impressions, and in doing so almost invariably, either wittingly or unwittingly, expresses the ideas so subtly put before him.

The articles dealing with China by a distinguished British soldier, Viscount Montgomery, which have appeared recently in the press, call for a close examination, especially in the light of the similarity of their line to that of Peking official propaganda sheets. Viscount Montgomery visited China in May, 1960. His visit was by no means the first by prominent persons in the Western world during recent years.

Chinese Technique

The Chinese Communists have proved themselves adept at receiving foreign guests, and at giving them the impression that they can see whatever they ask without restrictions. Some prominent and

many ordinary citizens have returned from China completely misled by their brief experiences there.

There are several principles which are invariably employed by the Chinese for visits such as these. Stage-management is vital, and the Chinese have made it a highly developed technique. The principles are:

V.I.P. treatment at all times;
Highly skilled interpreters;
Careful selection of places to be visited, and persons to be spoken to;
Well-placed propaganda — "popular diplomacy."

V.I.P. Treatment

Viscount Montgomery records in detail the red-carpet treatment meted out to him:

He flew from Canton "to Peking in a special aircraft placed at my disposal by the Chinese Government."

"I was extended great courtesy, met China's leaders, saw all that I asked to see."

"In all I talked with Chou En-Lai for seven hours, which I was told was a record for any interview given by him . . ."

"On the night before I left Peking, Chou En-Lai gave a banquet for me . . ."

After the warm welcome and show of respect with which he was received, Viscount Montgomery says:

"Mao is a most attractive person . . . Mao is a genuine democrat . . . Mao is a very delightful person to meet and to talk with."

Of Chou En-Lai he says:

" . . . a most pleasing personality and a nice sense of humour . . . charming manners."

Interpreters

As Viscount Montgomery states, two interpreters were used throughout his conversations. The chief interpreter was a Dr. Pu, described as the personal private secretary of Chou En-Lai. Dr. Pu apparently did the actual interpretations. There is little doubt that Dr. Pu faithfully translated the words of his superiors into English, as quoted by Viscount Montgomery. However, when he walked the streets and factories, unless he was as fluent linguistically as Dr. Pu, he had no idea whether the answers to his questions were translated correctly, or indeed whether his questions were accurately framed.

On asking the last emperor of the Manchu dynasty—Henry Pu-Yi, who is now a gardener—if he were happy, the reply was allegedly that he had never been so contented, and that "he reckoned it was far better to do what he liked than to sit on the imperial throne in the Forbidden City, when he had no freedom and could never do as he liked." Of course, under ruthless totalitarianism, there would probably be little future for him if he were to say otherwise; but how can Viscount Montgomery be sure that this was the answer?

Even Chinese churchmen, whose persecution has been well publicised, have in many instances had to state that they are free from any interference from the Government. If they did not, they, too, like many of their fellow-clergy, would be refused permission to practise their religion and would almost certainly be penalised heavily on trumped-up charges.

Selection of Establishments

It should be realized that a host country has the initiative in arrang-

ing visits to various establishments. If Viscount Montgomery wished to see something of the Army or of the communes, he could say so. The actual choice of division or commune would lie with the hosts, and it would hardly be possible for him to refuse their proposals. Had he done so, and proposed other establishments, the embarrassment so caused could do much harm to the generally cordial atmosphere, which he was at pains to preserve.

Robert Guillain, author of "Blue Ants" (1956), who has known and observed China for the last 20 years, leaves no doubt on this point.

"There are 600,000,000 Chinese, but in two months I was never permitted to speak with a single one in private. If I did it was by subterfuge. There are 500,000,000 peasants, but I got nowhere when I asked to stay a few days in a village or even just 24 hours. I was never able to enter a house picked by myself at random. I never stopped at a factory, a farm, or any institution whatever without the visit having been arranged in advance. I tried to talk—without witnesses — with Catholics, with a non-'progressive' clergyman, and with a former landowner; I tried to visit a labour reform camp for 'reactionaries,' etc. Wasted effort . . ."

"Popular Diplomacy"

The Chinese Communists are well aware of the immense propaganda value of their achievements; the implication of their emphasis on these is that they are only possible under Communism. They stress to the visitor those aspects of Chinese policy which they desire to project abroad — "peaceful co-existence," Communist bloc "solidarity." Asian "solidarity," "socialist construction," "peaceful intentions," and so on.

Blind Acceptance

On the subject of communes, Viscount Montgomery says: " . . . one hears it said that children in the communes are removed from their parents. I investigated this statement and found it to be totally untrue"—this after a short visit to one commune, selected by the Chinese, and in the face of many reports to the contrary.

Again, he says without the means of confirmation: " . . . such things as banditry, teddy boys, pickpockets, housebreaking, prostitutes are all forbidden, and have ceased." This is obviously an uncritical repetition of what he had been told by a Chinese leader. Granted that under the strict controls of a police state the incidence of undetected crime might be less, but the assertion that these things "have ceased" is obviously wholly unwarranted and unconfirmed.

Statements Calling for Comment

It is also of interest to examine some of Viscount Montgomery's other statements, which are obviously direct repetitions of what he was told by Mao Tse-Tung and Chou En-Lai:

(a) "China desperately needs peace, and it is not to her interests to be bellicose or to persuade Russia to embark on any policy which could increase tension in the world and possibly lead to war."

China is not alone in needing peace; in fact, no country desires otherwise. It is unfortunate that the Chinese conception of peace is not akin to our own.

"Only by using great righteous war to crush the unrighteous war of the imperialists can we effectively

maintain peace." ("China Youth," Peking, 14/2/1960.)

There is ample evidence of belligerence in China's foreign policy, not only in the words of the Chinese Communist newspaper "Red Flag" and other journals, but also in China's actions in Tibet and on the Sino-Indian frontier during the last 15 months. The prime reason, however, why China needs peace at the present is to give her the years she requires in which to improve her economy and strength, so that, at some time of her own choosing, she can launch into what she calls "a righteous war" (i.e., a war to defeat "the imperialists").

(b) "Out of evil, good is slowly developing."

If so, why is Viscount Montgomery so totally silent on the present evil out of which the good is developing? His picture is completely one-sided.

(c) "The basic philosophy of Mao Tse-Tung is very simple—it is the people that matter."

Mao said on 27th February, 1957: "What should our policy be toward non-Marxist ideas? So far as unmistakable counter-revolutionaries and wreckers of the socialist cause are concerned, the matter is easy; we simply deprive them of their freedom of speech." This view, taken together with the abundance of evidence of ruthlessness, purges, and strict controls, completely belies Viscount Montgomery's statement.

(d) "Mao assured me that China will never commit aggression outside her legal frontiers. If that proves to be the case, then India has nothing to fear."

Viscount Montgomery does not discuss Chinese actions in Tibet, or the legality of her frontier claims, which are very much open to question.

(e) "Chou emphasised again and again that China must have peace, although she will always fight to resist aggression against her own territory—and Mao repeated the same policy. To this end China is engaged in forming non-aggression pacts with neighbouring nations . . ."

The nations—Burma, Cambodia and Mongolia. No doubt readers can themselves assess the threat to Communist China by these small countries! Chou En-Lai stated in 1957:

"All relations . . . are subordinated to the supreme goal, the world-wide victory of Communism."

The Chinese claim to be the correct interpreters of Lenin, who wrote in "Selected Works" (International Publishers, New York, 1943, Vol. VIII, page 297:

"As long as capitalism and socialism exist we cannot live in peace; in the end, one or the other will triumph—a funeral dirge will be sung over the Soviet Republic or over world capitalism."

(f) " . . . Communism, in which 90 per cent. of population firmly believe."

Once again Viscount Montgomery is directly quoting Mao without any means of confirmation. The membership of the Chinese Communist Party is reported to be only 14,000,000 out of the total population of 650,000,000. Where there is no freedom of speech it is impossible to gauge the true following of the Communists. If 90 per cent. do not oppose Communism, then it may be accepted that a very large percentage of them suffer it in fear and silence. The evidence of refugees

from mainland China leaves little doubt of this.

(g) "A way must be found in which states with different ideologies and social systems can live side by side in peace and without interfering with each other's way of life."

Lenin wrote in his "Selected Works" (International Publishers, New York, 1943, Vol. V, page 237):

"Every peace programme is a deception of the people and a piece of hypocrisy unless its principal object is to explain to the masses the need for a revolution, and to support, aid and develop the revolutionary struggle of the masses that is starting everywhere (ferment among the masses, protests, fraternization in the trenches, strikes, demonstrations . . .)."

Again, Khrushchev stated in a speech at Novosibirsk on 10th October, 1959:

"Peaceful co-existence must be correctly understood. Co-existence is a continuation of the struggle between the two social systems . . ."

There we have the Communist viewpoint as expressed by two Soviet exponents. Liu Chang-Sheng, Vice-President of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions and of the World Federation of Trade Unions, said in a speech at a General Council Meeting of the World Federation of Trade Unions on 8th June, 1960:

"To win world peace we should mainly rely on the struggles waged by the peoples of various countries. We should increase the m i g h t of t h e S o c i a l i s t countries, continuously develop the strength of the liberation movements in colonial and dependent countries, continuously expand the revolutionary forces of the people within the imperialist countries, and continuously expose the imperialist bloc headed by the United States . . .

" . . . At the same time, we should make full use of our tactics and exploit the contradictions between the imperialist countries."

—("Pekin Review" of 14th June, 1960.)

This shows the Chinese Communist idea of peace. In plain words, it means aggressive intent and interference in the internal affairs of non-Communist countries.

Repressive Regime

While Viscount Montgomery must be praised for his ideals, he can hardly escape censure for being a party to such obvious deceptions and, above all, for his naivete. There is a wealth of information available to those who care to seek it and which describes the repressive aspects of the regime in China. Chinese students have been dismissed or imprisoned for putting freedom of thought before subservience to the Party; journalists, even on the staff of the leading Communist newspaper —the Pekin "People's Daily"—have been purged in the course of "rectification" campaigns; officials have been expelled from office for criticising Communist policies; families have been split; commune workers are forced to work for long hours and to attend compulsory political lectures; yet Viscount Montgomery reports that everywhere he saw a happy people.

A study of Communist methods of the absorption of other nations into the Communist bloc and the subsequent disposal (including execution) of all who actively oppose the Com-

munist Ideology makes the following statement appear ridiculous:

" . . . let the merging of Nationalist China and the People's Republic be carried out by peaceful negotiations between the two Governments."

Viscount Montgomery was so convinced of the sincerity of the Chinese leaders that he has been moved to express some curious logic:

" . . . I am convinced that what I have written above is correct—the possibility of either bloc, East or West, resorting to all-out nuclear war can be discarded.

"If only this basic truth could be accepted by the nations of the Western bloc the way ahead would be all the easier to organize . . ."

Conclusion

The visitor to a Communist state is shown "evidence" of popular support for the Communist regime and of extensive economic and social progress. The noticeable order and discipline of the population serve to confirm the appearance of strength and purpose of the regime, but the repressive apparatus behind it is carefully concealed from the visitor.

All this display is intended to gain prestige for the Communist countries and approval for their policies, and indirectly—through the favourable reports of visitors on their return—to influence opinion abroad. By influencing public opinion in this way, pressure can be built up against non-Communist governments in order to compel a change of policy.

Viscount Montgomery's articles provide a classic example of the success of Chinese Communist techniques. The value of these articles to the Communist cause is considerable, because they are written by a prominent figure, whose military achievements ensure for him wide respect throughout the free world. The Communist press in Australia has used Viscount Montgomery's comments extensively, and to good effect.

MOVEMENT AND SUPPLY BY JUNGLE RIVER

Lieutenant Colonel J. B. Roberts,
Royal Australian Infantry

A party of five CMF officers recently visited Malaya and during their tour spent three days, under arrangements made by the CO 1 RAR, visiting patrol bases along the Perak River.—Editor.

THE upper reaches of one of the largest rivers in Malaya, the Perak, are a vital line of communication for part of the security forces operating in the area. Together with other Commonwealth troops, one of the companies of the Australian battalion currently stationed in Malaya has been moved and supplied by means of this river for several months.

Rising in the borderland between the State of Perak and Thailand, the Perak River flows generally from north to south for between 200 to 250 miles, turning sharply west before discharging a tremendous volume of water into the Straits of Malacca near the port of Teluk Anson.

The river is navigable for about 40 miles from the sea by small steamers of 300 to 400 tons, and by native trading boats and other small craft for a much greater distance. The intake of many smaller rivers increases the flow constantly as the main stream nears the ocean, major tributaries being the Plus, which flows into it some distance above Kuala Kangsar, and the Kinta Batang Padang, which join it further south.

Some years ago it was possible to hire a native houseboat for a three day river trip from Kuala Kangsar to Teluk Anson, a distance of about 70 miles. These boats were advertised as having "saloon accommodation" for two and had a crew of about eight Malays who cooked, slept and chattered in a small, smelly fo'c'sle. Although the conditions on board were not as luxurious as would be found in houseboats on larger rivers in other parts of the world, the novelty, the scenery and the moonlit river at night all made the brief trip worthwhile.

It is the upper 60 or 70 miles of the river which are at present important to the security forces. Impeded by rocks and rapids, the 60 odd mile trip between the boat-head at Grik and the main northern terminal at a jungle fort maintained by the federal police, Fort Tapong, takes something in the region of eight hours and is a hard, tortuous grind against the current.



Members of 1 R.A.R. patrolling the Perak River

The return trip, however, which can be accomplished in about half the time taken on the outward journey, keeps both boatmen and passengers very much awake. In the monsoon season when there is a big rise in the water level and a corresponding increase in the speed of flow, the northward journey might occupy up to ten hours and the return only about three.

The boats in use are strongly constructed locally built craft varying between 22 and 28 feet long with a 5 foot beam sloping sharply to a 3 feet or 3 feet 6 inches flat bottom and drawing approximately a foot of water.

They are powered by a well-known make of heavy duty outboard motor of 35 and 40 horsepower and are manned by two Malay boat "boys," one on the motor and a for'ard hand who gives signals concerning rocks and banks and mans a long bamboo oar or sweep from the bow when additional control in the rapids is necessary.

Some stretches of the river are comparatively calm water, but there are numerous rapids from which lumps of granite can be seen protruding, or are camouflaged by mounds of water. The boatmen are expert at reading the river. What to the untrained eye appears to be good water is avoided and the boy takes the boat down the rapids without touching the submerged rocks which line the channel.

In the shallower parts, however, it is impossible to avoid all the rocks and the propellors take tremendous punishment. The average replacement rate is one propellor per motor per return trip.

Upstream against the current with a load of five or six troops plus their equipment, two boat boys, and half a dozen jerricans of petrol is a great test for the motors. In some of the faster rapids the boat comes almost to a standstill while the boy squeezes the last few revs out of his motor and the boat inches slowly forward against the fierce flow; or it may be necessary for the passengers to get out and walk, clinging to the boat to maintain their balance in waist-deep water.

Going downstream the boys trim the boats to lift the bows and so increase the speed, and it is quite a sight to see the loaded boats, stern low in the water, carving a passage through the milling and foaming rapids.

The scenery throughout most of the sixty mile journey is the same—virgin jungle down to the water's edge, and the mountains, which line the central feature of the State of Perak; the valley of the Perak River, rising in some points on the eastern side to over 7,000 feet.

Here and there along the banks, small groups of aborigines are seen either fishing or poling their bamboo rafts. There is plenty of wild life in the jungle, but it is heard rather than seen.

The boats are owned by contractors who employ the boat boys and hire out the boats on the basis of a set figure per trip. The number of new motors seems to indicate that the margin of profit is satisfactory.

In all about fifteen boats are in use for Army movement and supply purposes—this, of course, includes

On the Perak River—travelling downstream

forces other than Australian. In addition, there are boats used by the Malayan Police and the Department of Native Affairs.

Contact with the contractors is maintained by a boat officer, an Army officer detailed for the task, who is assisted by Junior Civil Liaison Officers (JCLO's), local men with a fair standard of education who are employed full time by the Army to assist with language and other problems which are met in dealing with the local population. Detailed instructions to the boat boys can also be given by this means.

From observations recently made, this appears to be a most efficient and well organized L of C with the advantages of ease and enjoyment for the passenger. Perhaps those members of the Royal Australian Regiment, who in the course of their duties must spend a good deal of time on the river, would not agree; but for those in a position to take it, the return trip from Grik to Fort Tapong is strongly recommended.

We should learn our lessons from what went wrong at the beginning of the last war, and not from what went right at the end of it.

—HRH The Duke of Edinburgh.

BARON VON GEYR

THE RUSSIAN SOLDIER AND HIS LEADERSHIP

General Frhr. Geyr von Schweppenburg
German Army (Ret.)

General von Schweppenburg was Military Attache in London before the Second World War. During the war he commanded with distinction armoured forces in the Eastern Front. At the time of the Allied landing in Normandy he was commander Panzergruppe West. Since the war he has written extensively on military subjects.—Editor.

The Russian Soldier

THE mastery of a Wereschtschagin has given an easily remembered picture of the Russian soldier characteristically described by Leo Tolstoy. On a picture by the great Russian artist is the inscription "All quiet on the Schepka Pass." At the height of the Pass a Russian sentry stands alone and erect, his hooded cape over his head, his rifle in his hand. Only part of him can be seen from the deep snow. The soldier has frozen to death.

Tolstoy stresses that the simplicity and tenacity of the Russian soldier are his essential characteristics.

One must hesitate to make generalisations concerning the Russian soldier. There are very great differences in military qualities and human characteristics between the Northern Russians and the Siberians on the one hand and the Mongolians, and Azerbaijans and the Turcomans on the other.

In trying to reproduce a typical picture one must, therefore, refer to the characteristics of the people themselves, in whom are inherent the decisive or character forming strains.

In all armies the troops are greatly influenced by the spirit of their leadership. This is true of the Russians, who more than elsewhere are subjected most strongly to the influence of personality. The readiness for passive obedience is common to all parts of the empire. To the Czarist and Soviet soldiers alike discipline is a concept which is taboo in their minds. By nature the Russian has more of an aptitude for defence than attack. As a defence soldier he is at least equivalent if not superior to

the German soldier. Modesty, natural ties and contempt of death are marked characteristics. The people of the East are born with an indifferent fatalistic attitude to death. Their weaknesses, which are probably affected by their race, include less hardiness in times of mental stress, further lack of restraint particularly under the influence of alcohol, a less pronounced consciousness of duty and responsibility and, at the same time, mental instability.

To round off the picture of Czarist times it is relevant that over forty per cent of the Russian troops were illiterate. For this reason, then, one of the most important requirements which was a prerequisite to the intellectual development of the military reserve was that the Soviet leaders should put an end to illiteracy.

A further, now forgotten, influence on the Russian soldier of the old stamp was the widespread and deep-rooted religiousness which was inherent in the people. Indeed, there was no other great army in which the position of the regimental pastor was as strong as it was in Russia in the time of the Czars.

The Leadership in the Last Days of the Czar

The General Staff in Berlin published a manual on the Russian Army. It was issued at the time in a limited numer of copies excellently produced with gilt-edged pages to the leading personalities in Berlin, beginning with the Kaiser. The book gave a model and accurate compilation down to details such as the strength and composition of the Russian field bakery columns. At no page of the moderately thick volume, however, is there a sign of the intellectual and spiritual peculiarities of the Russian leadership. This was probably due to the preoccupation of the General Staff with the military assimilation of the German peoples, based on the assumption that with the putting on of uniform all soldiers are alike. It is worthy of note that the Austrian intelligence service, more perceptive because of difficulties with its own ethnic families, issued a few years later a similar compilation, which included an excellent survey of the characteristics of the great and colourful Russian families.

Criticisms of the Russian leaders and their staffs were sometimes accompanied by marginal notes of the Kaiser's, especially in the reports of the military attache. However, appreciations of the personalities of the higher Russian leaders were difficult to make because in St. Petersburg, as in Berlin, dynastic considerations tended to protect them from criticism.

A marked weakness in the leadership of the old Imperial Russian Army was the relatively high age limits for the higher appointments. Nevertheless it must be conceded that after their defeats in east Asia in the early years of the century the Russian leaders accomplished a drastic reorganization. In their mobile army of millions in the winter months of the war in 1914-15, there were nowhere such pictures of unsatisfactory administration as occurred later in the German army of Hitler's time during the winter of the struggle for Moscow.

That the Russian colossus stood on feet of clay was due essentially to the fact that behind the army there were no industries which could cope with supply requirements, nor

transportation agencies which could meet the demands of strategic mobility. Further, the Russians had to tolerate leaders with German names, mainly of Baltic origin. Of the twelve army commanders, seven bore German names. After the first defeats, doubts about the loyalty of these officers led to much mistrust and friction.

The Soviet Leadership

Like all judgments of Soviet Russia, this one must be restricted to bare objective statements concerning the political and military leaders of the Soviet State, and it must not be influenced by moral or ideological aspects.

Two almost simultaneous statements throw a great deal of light on the course of events on the eastern front in the Second World War. In 1935 Stalin delivered a speech to graduates of the Red Army Academy in which he said:—

"You know that as the heirs of olden times we inherited a technically backward and an almost wholly destitute and ravaged land, ravaged by four years of imperialistic war, again ravaged by three years of civil war, a land of which half the population was illiterate, with inferior techniques, with scattered oases of industries, which were swallowed up in a sea of tiny peasant holdings—that was the land which we inherited from the past. What we must do is to lead this land over from the paths of ignorance and the Middle Ages to the beaten tracks of modern industry and mechanised farming."

In the following year Hitler, ignoring the considered opinions of competent military observers, declared "The Russians are not capable of any organized work." This complete misunderstanding of his opponent, of the Russian people and the Russian climate, as well as the work of reconstruction already accomplished in the Soviet, hardened into a disastrous preconceived notion in the mind of the German ruler.

History has meanwhile already passed sentence. Its background reveals that the transformation of the Soviet Union into the second industrial power in the world within forty-two years of its existence historically must be regarded as an inconceivably vast achievement of its political leadership.

The build-up of the military power of Russia in the '20's and '30's had a difficult row to hoe in every respect. With the disintegration of the Czarist army and the beginning of the build-up of the Soviet armed forces there arose for the political leadership the need to form a new body of military leaders. An army really capable of maximum strains was naturally no longer to be created by the drastic expedients employed in the civil war. Lenin and Trotsky had to overcome serious arguments between opposing lines of thought, within the Party, which believed they must reject utilization of the old military specialists in the building up of the Communist armed forces on ideological grounds, and because of uneasiness due to presumed political unreliability.

The first instructions for the Red Army which appeared in the middle '20's were still very primitive in quality. This changed quickly. A comparison at the end of the '20's with the teachings recognizable in the West by its military precepts, which were refuted after the First

World War, showed clearly that only the least burdened with tradition, the American and Soviet Russian teachings, could be regarded as really progressive. As an example which is also important today in the radar era, through other technical associations, is the fact that already at this time Russian aviation represented the principle of the so-called "razor" flight, that is of a sortie, which by surprise, made resistance in the air-ground struggle exceptionally difficult. In addition, it remains undisputed that the Soviet Russians were the first at that time to have recognized the significance of paratroops in practical as in operative respects, and they tried to change to a broader basis in practice. This has nothing to do with the fact that the outbreak of the Second World War found the well-recruited paratroops with no adequate equipment, unmounted so to speak.

In an historical appreciation of the intellectual development of the Red Armed Forces two things must not be left out of consideration. The first is this, their leadership in the military sphere set a tempo which the organizational and educational development could keep up with all the less, as it was made more difficult to a great extent by the repeated purges of the senior officers due to considerations of internal policy.

Many principles which the tradition-free Russians tried to put into practice were for the most part singularly noteworthy.

One of them was the reduction of the ages of high-ranking commanders. We have pointed out that the Czarist general officers with their age limitations could scarcely satisfactorily meet the physical and mental stresses of the war at the time.

We recall at this juncture a significant scene. The Military Attaches accredited to St. James's Palace were gathered in the anteroom of the newly appointed British Minister of War, Cooper. The Russian, Putra, who at about fifty years of age had the rank of General stated, "I have three more years." "Why do you have three more years?" "In three years I will have reached the age limit." This gifted soldier was unfortunately mistaken. The following year he was shot in the neck in Urbranka. He was certainly one of the best brains in the Soviet Army and immediately before his death he had just completed the "Instructions for Higher Russian Leadership."

One wonders naturally how the devastating defeat of the Russians in the campaign of 1941 came about.

On looking back it would seem that the higher Russian leadership had been so weakened by the political purges of the '30's that it contained a large number of divisional and higher commanders whose military education was elementary, or at any rate unsatisfactory. These officers were generally inferior in training and adaptability to their German adversaries.

From the middle of 1942 a change became noticeable in the quality of the Russian leadership. The influence of personalities like Zhukov began to be felt. They became renowned through personal encounter in the battlefields as well as in the exercise of high command. In their energetic handling of even the most difficult situations, they were decidedly superior to the hesitations of a Montgomery.

The Russian leadership later became dangerously good, and suffered from only one general weakness. The order from above is the guide to conduct, and the readiness to accept responsibility was lacking—at least up till now.

The Soviet Soldier

It is all the same from the practical point of view whether the Uzbeck, the Turcoman or the Azerbaijan feels like a Russian. He actually does not. He feels it, however, when he has served or is serving as a member of the Soviet Red Army. He saved Moscow and took Berlin. Every Russian knows that.

The inferiority complex which pressed heavily upon the Russian soldier of the First World War, due to the technical superiority of his opponent, no longer exists. It remains to be seen how the Red soldier of the Second World War is to be estimated in retrospect. The Red soldier of 1960 might well be different again. The criterion applied should try to estimate factors of pure psychology, such as technical aptitude and battle morale.

The Red soldier is more intelligent than his predecessor, the Czarist soldier, on the average was or could be. The religious impulse has disappeared. The conception of the decadence of the West has spread to the people. One thing must be stated. The change to a new Soviet type was naturally much stronger in the cities than in the country.

Differences in standards of fighting of the peoples which make up the Soviet Union can be smoothed out by pre-military education or by long military service.

The aptitude of the average Russian for creative technique is still disputed, probably wrongly. However, this doubt no longer applies to the scholar. The aptitude for improvization right down to the plain mechanic is generally recognized. It can be said, however, that the performances of specialists at least are best when constant tasks are allotted as much as possible. It is just as certain, and should be kept in mind for the future, that the Soviet soldier of Asiatic origin manifested a greater mastery and enjoyment of modern weapon techniques than the Soviet soldier of European Russia.

The lack of independent technical reliability without supervision is a weakness which cannot easily be eliminated. By nature the Russian requires and appreciates firm direction. The non-commissioned officer corps was not able to play the same role in either the Czarist or Soviet armies as it does in the British Army.

From the point of view of his soldierly attributes the German private considered "Ivan" to be the toughest and most dangerous of his numerous enemies of the Second World War. Seen from the standpoint of leadership, he appears as the soldier who can most easily deal with the geographical and climatic factors of the Russian-Asian country. His lasting power is conditioned by his race, and is supported and guaranteed in other respects by the inescapable force of the system.

In many spheres, such as in camouflage, in adept use of entrenching tools and in night fighting he was absolutely superior to the German soldier in the Second World War.

This favourable judgment of "Ivan" raises the question of the astonishingly high number of Rus-

sian prisoners taken by the Germans in 1941-42. The reasons are that the Russians were surprised by the German onslaught, and their military leadership was still suffering the effects of the great purges of the '30's. The Germans had a long start in the latest war practices, and overwhelmed their adversaries in great battles of encirclement.

However, the leadership and armament of the Red Army had greatly improved by 1943. Faced with almost inexhaustible human replenishment capacity of the Red Army, the German Army, both in quality and quantity, bled to death on the battlefields. They had nothing to match, even approximately, the replacement capacity of their opponents.

Final Thoughts

The advice of the last German military attache in Moscow, General Kosteing, is as valid today as it was in 1945: "I do not know how strong the Red Army is. Take care not to underestimate it."

It must be accepted that the Soviet military leaders have coped successfully with the transition from the bayonet. whose spirit prevailed in the Czarist army, to atomic weapons. In the fifteen years since the end of the Second World War, they have disengaged from the out-of-date, and made striking advances in the science of rocketry.

The present state of military knowledge is not to be sought in the two or three voluminous military books, but in the occasional utterances of really important people like Marshals Schukow and Rotnistrow. Moreover, the spiritual teaching of the Soviet Army has freed itself from the danger of freezing in the doctrines of Stalin.

If a man like Schukow says that wars are determined by the technical state of the armies, the fighting instructions and the quality of the leadership, we must agree with him.

Finally, the elimination of their political opponents leaves little room for doubt that the military leaders are certainly Communists.

The Red Armed Forces were the favourite child at the beginning of the construction of the Soviet State. In contrast to the many currents in the West, they have retained their favoured position, not for sentimental reasons but for their political usefulness.





DETERRENT OR DEFENCE, by B. H. Liddell Hart. (Stevens and Sons Ltd, 11 New Fetter Lane, London, E.C.4.)

Older officers will need no introduction to Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, whose writings have had a profound influence on the development of military thought during the last thirty years. Like many another original thinker, Captain Liddell Hart's work has, in the past, been more fully appreciated in lands other than his own. While his own countrymen failed to discern the inherent truth of the theories he propounded in the 'twenties and 'thirties, German soldiers studied them attentively, and from them evolved the organization, equipment and tactics which won them such brilliant successes in the early part of World War 2. Indeed, Guderian, the great German panzer leader, declared that the German blitzkrieg, which overwhelmed France and very nearly won decisive success in Russia, originated in the teachings of Liddell Hart. But all wheels turn, and today Liddell Hart is recognized throughout the Western world as the foremost military thinker and critic of our times.

In this book Liddell Hart turns his gift of critical analysis to the military problem facing the West in the struggle against the Communist bloc. With his usual ruthless logic he shows that the advent of Russian intercontinental guided missiles has deprived the theory of massive deterrence of any validity it might have once possessed. The development of strategical nuclear weapons by both sides has led, not only to nuclear stalemate, but a balance of forces which is precarious to an extreme degree. He shows that the tight controls which are supposed to make the premature or unauthorized use of these weapons impossible, fail to give nearly enough weight to the practical human and emotional factors which play such a big part in moments of acute tension.

Turning to the tactical field, the author demolishes the theory that small yield nuclear weapons favour the defence. He inclines to the opinion that these weapons are not nearly so economical as their supporters would have us believe. Further, their employment is fraught with terrible risks, for the idea that the first atomic shot will not set off an uncontrollable chain-reaction is founded upon pious hopes rather than upon a realistic appreciation of the forces that come into play when great nations are locked in combat. Since the use of tactical nuclear weapons is, despite hopeful theories, likely to lead to mutual national suicide, Captain Liddell Hart suggests a return to chemical warfare. He

points out that when it was used fairly extensively in World War 1, gas caused far fewer fatal casualties than any other weapon. Although its lethal effects were quite low, it was a very effective defensive weapon even at that stage of its development. The newer war gases are still more effective while causing far less permanent disablement or injury. Since it is the most humane of all weapons, and one which is particularly effective in defence, he suggests that its re-introduction would favour the Western powers.

After examining the problems of the NATO alliance and pointing out the weakness inherent in the current solutions, he offers some suggestions for their rectification. From a discussion of tactics, including the role of armour, he passes to an examination of the various schemes of Western defence put forward of recent years. The clarity and simplicity of his language enables us to readily assess their merits — and demerits.

In writing this book Captain Liddell Hart has made another of his notable contributions to military thought. It should be carefully studied by all officers, indeed by everyone concerned with national defence.

—E.G.K.

HAWAII, by James A. Michener. (Secker and Warburg, London, and 317 Collins Street, Melbourne.)

This book is more than an historical novel; it is a saga which traces the development of the Hawaiian islands from their settlement by the Polynesians to their inclusion as a state in the American Union.

According to the ancient legends of Hawaii, the islands were discovered and settled away back in the dim recesses of time by people from Tahiti. That a voyage of 3000 miles across the turbulent Pacific could be made in the craft available to the islanders seems fantastic, but it is no more fantastic than the mystery of the great statues on Easter Island. Those statues suggest that the Polynesians were in fact capable navigators, and that at some stage of their story they possessed a highly developed culture. Perhaps Arnold Toynbee is right in suggesting that the challenge of the sea was too great for the islanders to overcome, that the wide Pacific arrested their development and held it at a point from which they could make no further advance before the arrival of the Europeans.

The fact that the Polynesians did not develop their shipbuilding beyond the primitive stage does not rule out the possibility that on occasions quite remarkable voyages were made. Easter Island seems to prove that such voyages did take place. Mr. Michener is on fairly firm ground, therefore, in beginning his saga on one of the islands of the Tahitian group. This story of Polynesian culture is fascinating and complete in itself. The tale of the chieftain rebelling against intolerance and persecution, yet held in check by social discipline and fear of the gods, is by no means improbable, for it is a theme that runs through the whole history of mankind. Eventually permission is given for the chief and his chosen band of followers, men, women and children, to sail away to find a new home on some distant shore. After many vicissitudes they reach the uninhabited Hawaiian islands and found a new society free of the

cruelties of the one from which they had fled.

Michener then takes us to New England, where young missionaries are preparing to carry the Christian faith to Hawaii, frequently touched upon by American whalers on their voyages to and from the North Pacific. The clash of cultures is vividly portrayed through the lives of the people involved—tolerant and intolerant missionaries, brutal whalers and traders of varying degrees of honesty. The impact of the newcomers was disastrous; the population dropped from 400,000 in 1778 to 44,000 in 1878. Seeking labour for their fields, the planters turned to China, and Michener writes into his story another epic of courageous migration. The Chinese migrants intermarried with the Hawaiians, and gave them a vital impulse and characteristics which distinguish them from all other Pacific peoples. Japanese migrants followed, and they, too, gradually became assimilated into the local culture. Then came the disaster of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, the service of Hawaiian units with the American forces, and finally the incorporation of the islands into the USA.

Against this vast background of history Michener follows the fortunes of various families caught up in the melting pot, where a distinctive people and a distinctive way of life were gradually and painfully evolved. He weaves the fortunes of the families together with such skill that we are left with an astonishing sense of continuity.

When you have read this book you will have learnt much about many people of the Pacific and the Pacific border lands—about Polynesian customs, ancient and modern, about the Chinese and the Japanese, about American politics, and about sugar cane and pineapples. And you will not have been bored. On the contrary, you will, if you like a well-told story, have been vastly entertained. Michener has given us a story rich in human values. His characters are very real, very much alive. And although there are a great many of them, one never loses sight of any of them; nor loses interest in their fortunes. It is one of those books that one finishes with regret, and remembers for a long time.

—E.G.K.

THE DARK NIGHT, by Sacha Carnegie. (Peter Davies Ltd, London, and 317 Collins Street, Melbourne.)

If you enjoy case studies in psychiatry, like "The Snake Pit," you will probably enjoy this book. It is the story of the closing chapters in the life of a man made mentally sick by parental stupidity and selfishness, a man of undoubted talent, whose character was so damaged in childhood that he ended it wandering aimlessly through the dens and dives of Singapore.

This man, as portrayed by Sacha Carnegie, is not an attractive character. How can he be since his personality has been disfigured as a face can be disfigured by a hacksaw? When one starts to get impatient with him, one has to remember that one ought not to become impatient with a one-legged man with a chest complaint on a mountain climb.

Perhaps the most realistic part of the story is the patient's adventures in the Malayan jungle with a band of Communist terrorists, from which he

escapes to be pursued relentlessly by the leader.

Many people try to help this unfortunate man, most of them with dark secrets of their own. Unfortunately the one person who could perhaps have brought him back to sanity meets him when physical illness is so far advanced that recovery is impossible.

If this is not a pleasant story it is a good one for those who appreciate the theme.

—E.G.K.