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FRONTISPIECE

In World War I armoured fighting vehicles were in their infancy. The only armoured cars available for deep reconnaissance in Egypt and Palestine were heavy converted civil vehicles unsuitable for operations on the rough desert country. To meet the need the British organized a unit of unarmoured T-model Fords, each carrying a crew of three men and mounting a Lewis light machine-gun. Handled with great dash and vigour, this improvised equipment rendered valuable service throughout the campaign. The picture shows a patrol of these cars manned by Australian troops.

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Photo: Australian War Memorial, Canberra.

Light Car Patrol

AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

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THE RED DRAGON OF CHINA



A BRIEF REVIEW OF COMMUNIST CHINA AS A MILITARY POWER

Staff Sergeant P. G. Gittins
Royal Australian Engineers

WHAT the Western World regards China as a Great Power is a measure of the change that has taken place in China. The rule by the selected few, with wealth and wisdom (or Oriental shrewdness), has gone. The image of the inscrutable Chinese, too wise and civilised for war, has passed. China today is ruled by men of peasant stock, patient men, men who have shown on the battlefield that they know how to fight, and that they will fight.

During the last two decades, the Chinese have been engaged in two major wars, internal insurrection, civil war, participation in a war of aggression in Korea, a "hit and run" war with the Nationalist strongholds of Quemoy, Matsu and Formosa, assistance in a civil war in Indo-China, a full-scale war in Tibet, and just recently, armed skirmishes on the Indian frontier. It has been a period in which it may be said that their martial spirit, never dead at any time, has been rejuvenated. Peking, echoing the all too familiar catchphrases and clichés of Moscow, has given calls to arms in "defence of the Fatherland," and has stirred the masses with their own peculiar war-like slogans and propaganda, with

visions and dreams of China's vast potential and latent strength transformed into dynamic military energy.

We have learnt, through lessons that are all too expensive in men and material and strategic "real estate," that the organized military strength of China is a force to be reckoned with. Fifty years ago, about the time of the Boxer Rebellion, when the Chinese were most anxious to rid themselves of the "foreign devils" on their soil, the Western World spoke of the "Yellow Peril." Today, from all accounts, it looks as if we are beginning to witness the transmutation of this old bogey into fact. It is only too clear that China's vast manpower—some 605 millions, with a daily increase of 40,000 (Australia's annual population increase)—is being harnessed and controlled by the Communists for militaristic purposes.

New party slogans include "Every worker a soldier, every soldier a worker" and "The true Chinese has a hoe in one hand and a rifle in the other." We are now witnessing the logical Asian Communist extension of total warfare.

Brief Historical Note

The Red Army of Communist China was born on 1 August 1927, when a group of young guerrillas, including Chou En-lai, now Prime Minister; Chu Teh, the Vice-President; and Ho Lung, Vice-President of the National Defence Council, led 30,000 troops in revolt against Chiang Kai-shek in South China.

Just over a week later another young guerrilla, Mao Tse-tung, started a series of peasant uprisings in Hunan and Kiangsi Provinces. Both uprisings were quickly put down, and in the late autumn of that year Mao led a thousand beaten and battered survivors of his revolt to a pine-covered mountain hideout. His men had only 200 rifles—one to every five—and they lacked both clothing and food.

Early in 1928 Chu Teh brought another 2000 survivors to join Mao, and with additional recruits picked up on the plains around Chingkan-shan they formed the 1st Army Corps, with Chu Teh as its commander and Mao its political commissar.

Mao planned, Chu Teh executed, and from that alliance and years of bitter struggle has come the modern Red Army, the biggest massed manpower force in the world.

Manpower Figures

In 1958 the strength of the Red Army was estimated at 3 million men under arms. Since January, 1959, however, this figure is reported to have dropped, through demobilization, to 2.6 millions. Reserves are estimated at some 15 millions, and according to unconfirmed reports, there are another 10 million discharged men who can be swiftly remobilised.



Mao Tse-tung

Added to this is a militia force of some 250 million men and women, of whom at least 130 millions are receiving part-time training to fit them for mobilisation as a front line reserve for the regular army in time of war.

The Reorganization of the Army

As in the case of most armies and international army groups, such as NATO and SEATO forces, China's Red Army has undergone vast changes—a complete reorganization and modernization.

The Minister for Defence, Marshal Lin Piao, announced in October, 1959, the completion of this reorganization and modernization. This means that, in blueprint at least, the Chinese army is now prepared for the eventual use of, and attacks by, nuclear weapons. Lin is quoted as saying:

"Our army's command organization, technical equipment and training system have undergone a series of reforms. The People's Liberation Army has changed from a single armed force into a composite armed

force consisting of several specialized branches."

He also referred to a militia force "several hundred million strong."

Lin does not disguise that his appointment, in late September 1959, as Defence Minister and the appointment of Lo Jui Ching, former Chief of the Secret Police, as Chief of Staff, followed evidence of disaffection and discontent among officers and men in the army. Warning that absolute party leadership over the army is essential, Lin conceded that "the struggle between proletarian ideology and bourgeois ideology still exists in the army."

He is reported as having said, on taking up his new appointment:

"The struggle against bourgeois ideas will remain an important task in building up the new army. Most officers and men were former peasants, and some of them, under the influence of the bourgeois and petty bourgeois, are wavering during the high tide of the socialist revolution. Some comrades regarded as an extra burden the servicemen's participation in mass campaigns and in helping people to carry out production. Others think that in modern warfare, techniques, iron and steel machines are more important than the human factor. We hold that the human factor is more important because techniques have to be understood and grasped by men."

The reorganization and modernization plans followed the advice given to Lin by the four Soviet Red Army generals of the Military Mission in Peking. Summarized, their plans were as follows:—

(1) Modernize and streamline China's regular army establishment.

- (2) Combine Mao Tse-tung's guerrilla traditions with Soviet blitz tactics.
- (3) Enforce military discipline and efficiency inside the people's communes.
- (4) Develop the 30 million partly trained and poorly armed militia as an effective auxiliary.
- (5) Ensure command unity at all levels and all times between the party and the army.
- (6) Expand industrial and agricultural sideline activities of the standing army.
- (7) Improve and expand educational facilities available to the armed services.
- (8) Institute effective speedy mobilization plans for the 15 millions and possibly 25 millions held in reserve.

This complex project was launched as a mass effort towards the close of 1958. In twelve months it was reported as now being complete! It represented a prodigious combined exercise in army reform, economic planning, manpower diversion, forced labour, technical education, and political propaganda unique in military history. At one extreme the plan envisaged, for the first time, the use of nuclear weapons by Chinese land forces; at the other extreme it accepts a policy that garrison forces will grow their own vegetables and food, and tailor their own uniforms!

The basis of the regular army reorganization was the streamlining of the "human sea" infantry divisions which fought in Korea, into smaller, more compact, higher firepowered "composite" divisions, modelled on the United States' pentomic pattern. Each division is organized for the use of and eventual reception of nuclear weapons.

Marshal Lin Piao

The architect and director of this reorganization and modernization of China's Red Army is 51-year-old Marshal Lin Piao. He is one of Communist China's outstanding soldiers, and is regarded as her leading strategist. And what is more important for China's rulers, he has an unequivocal record as a dedicated Communist.

The son of a felt factory owner, Lin was attracted to the Left Wing while at school. In the early days of Chiang Kai-shek, Lin was one of the most brilliant students at the Whampoa Military Academy. There he was noticed and approved of by General Vasily K. Bluecher, the Soviet Military Adviser, and the chief of Whampoa's political department, Chou En-lai.

Before he was 20, Lin was a full colonel commanding a Kuomintang regiment. On Chiang Kai-shek's break with the Communists in his Kuomintang Party in 1927, the young Colonel Lin did not hesitate. He defected, with his regiment, to the Communists. Then began an exhausting life of war—both civil and foreign.

When the Communist Chinese forces made their epic "long march" of 1934 and 1935, in the vanguard was the 1st Red Army Corps, and leading it was the tireless, unyielding Lin.

He had a brief respite from war—but not from Communism—when he was sent to Moscow for treatment for wounds received whilst fighting the Japanese in 1939.

When the Japanese surrendered in 1945, Lin rushed into Manchuria to organize the Communist movement there. He held off the Nation-

alist forces for some time, and then harassed them with guerrilla tactics until he was able to lead his army on the offensive and to drive the Nationalists into South China.

From then on he received important administrative posts under the Communist regime. He became the political and administrative head of six provinces in Central-South China. When the Communist leaders of China created in 1955 the rank of Marshal for the first time, Lin was one of the ten raised to that rank. He is Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee, and ranks seventh member of the Peking politburo. He is recognized as being very close to Mao Tse-tung, and has at times been mentioned as a possible successor as Number One man of Communist China.

As Minister of Defence, he has with him as aides the Chief of the General Staff, General Huang Ke-Chang, and the Director of the army's Political Department, General Tan Cheng.

The Militia and Army Reserves

In the greatest peacetime recruiting drive in history, Red China has drafted a nation-wide militia of 250 million men and women inside the nation's 26,000 communes.

From this huge force, at least 130 million will now receive part-time training to fit them for mobilization as a front-line reserve for the regular army in time of war. No other nation has ever attempted to maintain a peacetime militia of such a prodigious size.

Marshal Lin stressed the fact that recruiting on this unprecedented scale would have been impossible if the Draconic commune system

had not been established. By a comparison there were less than 6 million in the militia in China in 1950 at the time of the Korean War.

This massed manpower is divided into two main categories:—

- (a) Basic—comprising men between 16 and 32 and women between 17 and 22, who will be drafted immediately into the regular army in time of war, and
- (b) Ordinary—which includes all men between 33 and 50, and women between 23 and 50, whose tasks in wartime will be “to support the front and maintain peace and order in the rear.”

There is also a rear contingent comprising children under 15 and persons above 50 who will be called up to “co-operate” with the ordinary militia in wartime.

In Peking alone, according to the “People’s Daily,” over 2 million have volunteered to join the militia, and are organized in 155 divisions, 345 independent companies, and 392 independent battalions. In Honan Province, 20 million have joined the militia, in Szechwan 30 million, in the coastal areas of Fukien Province 14 million, and in Shantung 25 million.

The newspapers, in divulging these figures, report that “equal stress is laid by the militia organization on work, study, and production on the one hand, and military training on the other. Workers are described as going off to the fields in the morning with a rifle on one shoulder and a pick or shovel on the other, and, again according to the “People’s Daily,” “grand war songs can be heard everywhere along the banks of the Yellow River and the Yangtse.”

While all of this might be dismissed as merely a means of keeping the communes from fretting about their misfortunes—which are many—the type of military training the militia is receiving suggests, on the contrary, that the purely military aspects are extremely important.

Hundreds of military schools have been opened in China, and millions are being trained as “special service troops” in courses which include parachute training, gliding, radio operating and other highly technical subjects. For the hundreds of millions in the rank and file, men and women alike, militia training is not confined to learning how to use a rifle, but includes instruction even in the use of artillery.

Since Mao does nothing without a purpose, this almost inconceivable plan to turn China and its 605 millions into one giant army clearly has an important part to play in the Communists’ broader scheme of things.

In searching for that part, the appreciation that the Chinese leaders realize war would be folly has to be measured against Chou En-lai’s statement to ex-French Premier



Chou En-lai

Mendes-France in early 1958, that "China could lose 3 million people and still win a war." And again must be recalled the comments made to a British MP visiting China late in 1958. He addressed a group of Communist officials, and ended with the comment that "atomic war, of course, means mutual extinction." His audience laughed as an interpreter replied, "You don't realize, but that's the most absurd thing you could have said. Atomic warfare would mean extinction for the West. But there would still be two or three hundred million Chinese, and we would be the most powerful nation on earth."

And in December 1959, Marshal Chu Teh is quoted as saying:

"Because of its many commitments, and because of 'threats' to its borders, Red China feels it must have an armed force of at least 3 million men. In no circumstances could Peking accept the 1,750,000 limit suggested in both Soviet and Western disarmament proposals."

Nuclear Weapons

Many times during the last 18 months reports have reached the Western World that China has nuclear weapons. Foreign Minister Chen Yi said in August 1959, "China will have nuclear weapons in the not too distant future." Lin Ya-lou, Commander-in-Chief of the Communist Chinese Air Force, had spoken of "atomic weapons and rockets, made by the workers, engineers and scientists of our own country." Certainly early in 1959 Red China made a big pitch to snare some East German nuclear scientists, and in July of the same year there were reports that the convicted atom spy, Klaus Fuchs, would probably be given an important

atomic job in China, after first undergoing a "refresher course" in Moscow. Even as early as November 1954, there were persistent reports that Professor Pontecorvo was directing China's atomic effort, with the locale a plant in Sinkiang Province.

The Chinese of course may be bragging. It is an old Communist trick to boast of military advances long before they have been made. Yet Western Intelligence rates Communist China's scientists quite capable of solving the theoretical problems of nuclear weapons. And this much is known for sure:

- (a) In 1958 the USSR gave Communist China a 25 million volt electron cyclotron built at Tomsk Polytechnic Institute.
- (b) Since 13 June 1958 a small (7,000 to 10,000 kW) atomic reactor has been in operation near Peking.
- (c) During the last 18 months there have been tremendous underground explosions in Western China, since confirmed by Soviet journals and described as "the biggest deliberate chemical explosions the world has known."

Western scientists calculate that a 10,000 kW reactor can produce roughly 3 kilograms of plutonium per year. In theory, this means that without any further Russian help at all the Chinese could produce enough plutonium for their first atomic bomb within 18 months. In practice, however, Western scientists doubt if the Communists can do this or anything like it. In August 1959 Dr. Herbert York, Director of the American Defence Department Research, said, "I doubt if Red China has made any progress

on developing nuclear weapons of her own."

During the last 12 to 18 months there have been reports and denials that Russia has supplied China with Soviet-made nuclear weapons. On 2 November 1959 a Soviet official who accompanied Khrushchev to Peking issued a statement that the USSR had again rejected Mao's demands for Soviet nuclear weapons. Khrushchev is reported to have argued that his visit to America convinced him that the US had no intention of starting a war. Red China therefore has no need for atomic weapons.

Russia must be weighing the consequences of sowing dragon's teeth in a China that might one day become her chief rival, and it is quite apparent that she has no wish to expose her eastern borders to a nuclear armed "partner." Indeed, some Western observers believe that a major clash is already looming between China and Russia over the question of Outer Mongolia.

The Soviet Union and Communist China are competing in classic great-power fashion for domination. The competition is being carried out behind a camouflage of honeyed words and platitudes about collaboration and friendship. But neither camouflage nor verbiage can conceal the fact that in Central Asia Soviet and Chinese policies are competitive and are directed towards divergent goals.

Rockets and Missiles

In June 1959 the Chinese Communists were reported to be wooing a group of East German rocket and missile experts to help them run the research laboratories built for them by the Russians. It was fur-

ther reported in July 1959 that the Russians had given China enough rockets to blast the US Seventh Fleet out of the Formosa Strait. China however has denied this. Information on the numbers and types of rockets and missiles available to the Chinese Communist Army is extremely limited.

What has been ascertained for certain is that at the beginning of April 1959 artillery officers and technicians from the Red Army stationed on the South China coast were recalled to Peking for instruction by Soviet experts in the use of rockets and potential nuclear missiles. An official announcement made from Peking disclosed that more than 600 "outstanding artillerymen" from the Amoy and Fukien areas were attending this course of instruction. An earlier "artillery conference" was apparently held in December 1958, when "many other artillery officers mastered a great variety of techniques outside gunnery, and became all-round artillery specialists." The president of this artillery course or conference was General Chen Hsi-lien, Commander of the Artillery Corps, People's Liberation Army. Hsi-lien, Moscow trained, is an exponent of the Soviet's Red Army's massed artillery tactics. It is believed that these picked officers and men receive theoretical training in rocket and missile fire as a part of the general reorganization plan of the Chinese Red Army for nuclear warfare.

Selected officers have also been attached for one year training courses with Eastern European satellite armies. These courses are reported to have covered artillery, engineers and nuclear warfare.

According to Nationalist Chinese reports from Taipeh, rocket and guided missile sites have been established on the mountainous coast opposite the Formosa Straits.

The Army and the Communes

Groups of "progressive" army officers have been and are being posted to every commune to improve administrative and operational technique under a local commandant acceptable to both the Party and the Army.

The commune extends far beyond agriculture and its ancillary occupations. It will control military, industrial, commercial and cultural activities, and is intended to become the basic unit of local administration. Says the Party magazine, "Red Flag":

"In the communes, industry (the worker), agriculture (the peasant), exchange (the trader), culture and education (the student), and national defence (the soldier) merge into one harmonious whole."

The communes would embrace all the people and property within an area approximating that of a county or township—running in typical size from 10,000 people up to several times that figure. They are slowly replacing the entire present system of government in rural areas. They would thus be roughly the equivalent of a division or army corps and be organized in much the same fashion.

Although the commune's officers would not have precisely military rank in peacetime, there would be a chain of command and "militarization" of civilian life on a broad scale. The communes would embrace all type of activity within their area of responsibility — economic, cultural,

educational and military. Through the communes, Communist China can therefore effectively put to use its main national resource—hordes of human beings—massed manpower—to push the nation forward on the path of modernization and the building up of economic-military power.

The Chinese Soldier

What of the Chinese soldier himself? It is well to remember that the Chinese soldier, born in a land of conflict where human life is nothing but a cheap commodity, is fatalistic, having little regard for human life. Some twenty years ago, a Major Magruder had this to say of him:

"The Chinese soldier is the most docile material from which to build a disciplined unit. He will stand an indefinite amount of hardship and discomfort without grumbling. He can march tremendous distances on footwear that would ruin a Western soldier in the first mile. Whereas our soldiers wear themselves out nervously during rests, and while engaged on duties which to them seem useless, the Chinese soldier recuperates as soon as physical exertion ceases. He cares little where he is or how long he stays, provided he has the bare necessities of food and clothing. He does not worry about the difficulties or shortcomings of the hierarchy of command, from the squad leader to the President . . ."

Like other soldiers, he is bound by discipline, though for him it is a discipline more rigorous, more harsh, more blind than most—its basic components being the hope of reward and the fear of punishment. However, no matter what its components, it is an effective discipline,

and no one can doubt the battlefield courage and combat persistency of the Chinese. Their will to fight has been proved beyond any shadow of doubt.

His strong sense of blind obedience, which makes him attempt any mission, no matter how slim his chance of surviving, is a formidable combat quality, but it seems to be coupled with a lack of individual initiative.

Induced feelings of hatred have been especially effective in stimulating the Chinese soldier's fighting spirit, and the Communists have made the most of this, the Chinese soldier's credulity making him a pliable instrument. To quote a United States' battlefield report:

"In general, Chinese soldiers have a very low standard of education, lack of ability in discerning the truth, and are easily misled through false propaganda—factors which the Communists have exploited to the utmost."

Chinese Air Force Developments

In August 1958 it was reported that the Red Air Force consisted of 27 divisions and 5 independent regiments, with a total plane strength of about 3500. Of these aircraft, half were reported to be jet fighters—MiG 15 and MiG 17. It was also reported that they had "a couple of divisions" of IL28 light jet bombers.

At various times throughout the past year (1959) the Nationalist Chinese Defence Ministry has reported that up to 1200 warplanes were poised along the South China coast, facing Formosa. China had been making large-scale shipments of Soviet jet fighters to several previously unoccupied coastal airfields, and these

were ready for attack on the Nationalist stronghold.

Information concerning the Chinese Communist Air Force has been rather scanty over the last year or so. However, certain facts are known to be correct, i.e.:—

- (a) Emphasis has been laid on glider training and production. With the help of Polish experts, two large glider factories and a central training school have been set up. Production of gliders of Polish design began in 1955-56, and "substantial numbers" of four types had been delivered. A Chinese glider design office was formed towards the end of 1956, and the prototype of the "first glider of original design" flew in May 1958.
- (b) Communist China's state aircraft factory near Mukden, Manchuria, is now assembling more than 20 MiG 17 jet fighters a month, the first Chinese version of this Soviet single-seater fighter being produced in 1956.
- (c) Engines, radio instruments and certain other items of equipment are imported from the USSR, which also supplies technical assistance in aircraft factories and training schools.
- (d) China will soon introduce the Soviet turbo-prop Ilyushin 18 on its main international and domestic airlines. This aircraft can be very quickly converted to military use.
- (e) It is known that the Air Force and some elite Army units, such as the paratroopers, have been kept to a high state of efficiency during the past 12 months.
- (f) Combat training of fighter pilots has been vigorously increased under Soviet tutelage (agitated

over the heavy losses during the Quemoy and Matsu sparing). Facilities for ground maintenance and repairs are being expanded at main coastal bases between Canton and Shanghai.

- (g) The bomber arm of China's jet air force is weak. It is safe to assume that the Soviet is not anxious to strengthen Chinese bomber potential any more than the United States wishes to strengthen the Chinese Nationalist bomber potential.

Chinese Naval Developments

As with the Chinese Communist Air Force, very little is known of their naval strength.

There have been reports filtering through to the Western World over the past two years that the Russians have given the Chinese "some" submarines and light cruisers, and it is known that there are a limited number of naval advisers (from the Soviet Union) stationed at some of the major ports and naval dockyards. It is also known that there has been some considerable amount of "frogmen" training. This has been confirmed by the number of frogmen attacks and reconnaissance patrols on the offshore islands.

One major item of news, which passed almost unnoticed in February 1959, was the fact that Red China had begun to colonize the tiny but strategically important *Paracel Islands* in the South China Sea. These islands sit right in the centre of the sea routes from Hong Kong and Manila to Saigon and other South-East Asian ports. Some 600 civilian settlers were reported to have moved in, and these were later joined by Chinese naval forces.

Industrialization and Military Strength

Assessing China as a military power, the first governing factor is that of its major weakness—shortage of materiel. One of the lessons learnt from the Korean War is that jet planes, armour and manpower do not constitute the beginning and end of military strength. Warfare today, more than ever before, is a matter of economics. Military efficiency and strength are dependent to a certain extent on a nation's industrial strength, development, and scientific and technical knowledge. Any nation, to be a great military power, must have the big factories and heavy industries capable of turning out and maintaining a continuous flow of war material to the fighting men. Herein lies China's weakness. She is lacking in big factories and heavy industries.

To overcome this industrial weakness, the Chinese Communists have borrowed the same technique used by the Russians. They have instituted a system of industrial development based on the "Five Year Plan," a "Great Leap Forward." They have commenced and are now in the process of an economic and industrial blitzkrieg. Together with Russia, they are challenging the industrial development of the Western World—challenging it as it has never been challenged before.

Communist statistics are often erratic, but the upward surge in ten years is unmistakable. Communist figures have been announced as follows:—

Coal from 31 million tons to 270 millions.

Oil from 100,000 tons to 2.2 millions.

Electricity from 4.3 billion kilowatt hours to 27 billion.

Steel from 0.1 million tons to 11 million.

Peking, which had no industry except one brewery in 1949, now has 50 new factories. A nation that couldn't produce aspirin a few years ago now mass produces penicillin. It turned out no tractors in 1957, 10,000 in 1958; now builds cars, TV sets and jet bombers. In the ultimate criterion of modern power, China has also extracted from Russia the know-how to operate at least two large nuclear reactors and several smaller ones. A former MIT professor heads its missile research, and it appears to be only a matter of time before China will blast its way into the nuclear club.

The mass manpower has been geared to working round the clock, 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Slogans urge them to greater efforts and greater production, and, strangely enough, these slogans appear to be having the desired effect. There have been instituted a whole series of new ideas involving the national economy. An entire set of principles have been worked out by the Communist Party for the simultaneous development of agriculture, light and heavy industry, and they involve the entire "Great Leap Forward" programme, the communes, dam building, general construction and the armed services.

Communist China, posing not only a military threat, will soon present an industrial threat. Almost overnight a nation of peasants has been forced to become highly skilled engineers and technicians. An industrial revolution, on a scale never before envisaged, is taking place in China, and there is considered to

be every prospect of China emerging as the largest and most highly disciplined community in the world. A complete nation is being regimented.

Education and Military Strength

Education is the main hope China has of becoming a world power—on education depends everything—industrial development, scientific research, technical knowhow and military efficiency.

Chou En-lai has given China until 1969 to produce scientists and technicians on a par with those of the USA and USSR. The task is formidable, but not impossible. Under Mao Tse-tung's programme, "the million teach, the hundred million learn," there is every likelihood that illiteracy will be wiped out in China within the next generation.

The Chinese education system has been given a thorough overhaul. More and more opportunities exist for the teaching and training of technicians and scientists, a vital necessity if a nation is to keep abreast of the advances in atomic and nuclear power and modern industrial development. Over 125,000 schools have been constructed throughout the mainland, perhaps the biggest school construction project in history. In addition, teams of instructors go out into the field with educational films on sanitation, health, scientific farming, showing the population of even the remote villages the road to self-improvement. Some 5 million high school students are being taught aeronautics, chemical engineering, and how to build dams, railroads, motor cars, bridges, and jet planes.

And what of the illiteracy in the armed services? Political officers

are running educational classes—yet another Russian feature adopted by the Chinese. They are slowly teaching the peasant soldier to understand battle maps and written orders, and to be able to read and understand the military textbooks. Prior to this reform in military education, written orders were something of a rarity. Most of the soldier's instructions were verbal, and therefore extremely limited.

Communications

Good communications are as essential to a country as a well-trained and efficient army. And in the sphere of road, rail and air communications, China is making an all-out effort.

In 1957, the Vice-Premier, Po I-po, announced that the construction, development and expansion of the railroads would go ahead on a scale never before imagined. "All China is to be covered by a network of railways within 15 years," he said. And as early as the Korean War China proved her ability to move thousands of troops from the extreme limits of her vast land mass to the battle areas.

In 1958 a total estimated £2000 million was spent on railroad construction, and that was 17.8 per cent. more than during 1957. Figures issued in the "China Reconstructs Pictorial" in December 1958 reveal the following:—

1868 to 1949: A total of 15,970 miles laid, with an annual average 197 miles.

1950 to 1957: A total of 6036 miles laid, with an annual average 754 miles.

This figure includes 2195 miles of double tracking.

An estimated 350 million tons of

freight was moved, and an estimated 330 million passengers carried.

Even allowing for Communist "inaccuracies," there can be no doubt that railroad development is going ahead on a large scale.

Road and waterway construction has been advancing and improving on a parallel with the railways, but few details have been issued by the Chinese Communist authorities. However, it is known by the Western World that good main highways link up the major industrial centres of Manchuria and North China, and that a major military road is under construction running from Peking to the Soviet border at Erhlien, and then through to Ulan Bator, capital of the Mongolian Republic, and finally to Moscow.

A good road system links up the major cities of Harbin and Mukden, in Manchuria, and Tientsin, Nanking, Shanghai, Hankow, Wuchang, Canton and Chungking in China proper. Road links also reach out to the borders of Indo-China, Burma, Tibet, Bhutan, Kashmir and Pakistan.

Internal air communications are somewhat limited, although there have been reports that China is to expand her domestic airlines with the introduction of the Soviet turbo-prop Ilyushin-18 on the major routes. Most of the major cities have jet ports capable of taking the heaviest jet aircraft in service today.

Chinese Communist Underground Movements

Coupled with the reorganization and modernization of the Chinese armed services comes the information that the Asian Cominform, Peking's shadowy but powerful apparatus for the "overthrow of the

imperialistic yoke which still enslaves the Afro-Asian community of nations," has undergone some basic changes.

The so-called "Asian Regional Bureau of the Cominform" was apparently established in Peking after the Moscow Declaration of 1957, when the Communist Parties of 12 states proclaimed their common purpose and aims. Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Communist Party were, in effect, granted a mandate to supervise and direct local party organization and policy throughout the Far East, South-East Asia and India. It is now clear that the Asian Cominform has succeeded in establishing a basic network of skilled agents in three separate zones of the Orient, and that these agents—some Chinese, some trained locals—are operating a long-range Peking master plan of infiltration of unions and government departments.

The three zones are:—

- (1) Northern: Including Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines.
- (2) The Southern: Including South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Malaya, Singapore and Indonesia.
- (3) The Western: Including Burma, East Pakistan and India.

Evidently West Pakistan and Ceylon remain, for the time being, under Soviet "guidance."

Party memoranda and instructions from the Asian Cominform discovered during the early part of 1959 in Burma, the Philippines, Japan and Singapore agree on these key policy points:—

- (a) Infiltration and subversion are the long-range aims, not aggression or violence.
- (b) Gradualism is the Party line,

not attempts at bold coups, except on the specific orders from Peking.

- (c) At the outset, formal and nominal leadership of the militant workers' unions and peasants' organizations should be left in the hands of native office-bearers who are not Communists.
- (d) Cominform agents and their recruits should exercise influence preferably from the ranks.
- (e) All recruits must be rigorously screened, emphasis being placed on quality not quantity.

Information now available suggests that substantial progress along these lines is being achieved by the apparatus in the Philippines, especially in Manila and other urban areas.

Conversely, Communist interests have slumped in Japan, where official party membership has fallen from 140,000 to 45,000 over nine years, and where the top hierarchy is riddled with undetected police agents.

Violence, terror and military action all have their planned places in the Communist world domination campaign, but, for the moment, they are secondary, in fact, incidental to, ideological, social, and political persuasion. Their master plan is seen as basically a patient process of political infiltration, indoctrination and subversion designed to undermine all local civil authority, until the legal government is discredited and collapses. Large bodies of invading troops are not required for this style of operation. Strategy and tactics alike are based on the fluid and evasive principles laid down by Mao Tse-tung in his classic guerrilla campaigns in China.

The words, "a deadly white-ant operation of highly-skilled mass

persuasion which we must expect to confront us everywhere in South-East Asia" were used by an American Staff Officer in a report to Washington during October 1959.

Conclusion

Everywhere China's neighbours are being assailed by the hot and unsavoury breath of the Red Dragon. An American aircraft shot up near North Korea, Laos being harried, Burma being threatened with claims to her North-East Provinces, a shooting war with India on the borders, frontier violation with Pakistan, trouble in Outer Mongolia, economic threats to Malaya and Singapore, and veiled threats to Indonesia—all complete a picture of Chinese Communist power politics.

With a new streamlined army, greater agrarian and industrial development, China may, in the next decade, use straight-out military action to achieve her aims of a Communist Asia.

South-East Asia is still far from presenting a united front against the Communists, and no one is hankering to join SEATO, but the knowledge that Peking's often ridiculed

industrial goals will eventually be achieved, and that China will expect to include South-East Asia within its sphere of influence, has had a profound effect in almost every country in the area.

Awareness of the danger does not mean that the danger has been overcome. But for many long years even awareness has been lacking. Asian conflicts continue to drive more deeply, insidiously and dangerously towards Australia, where national security must become ultimately as vulnerable as living standards.

As Mao's new China develops momentum, it can be expected to push outward ever more belligerently. Confronted by the strength of America, even Mao Tse-tung has so far drawn back from the brink of war, but his motto remains the same as when he was a bandit in the Shensi hills—"Ta ta, tan tan; tan tan, ta ta (Fight fight, talk talk; talk talk, fight fight)." At the moment Red China may prefer tan tan to ta ta. But the military threat remains, and when the Chinese dragon can breathe its own atomic fire the danger of world war being started in Asia inexorably will recur.

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SOME UP-TO-DATE THINKING

Captain E. M. McCormick
Royal Australian Infantry

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL ROBERTS in his article "From Our Own Point of View" (AAS 124) states he made his comments in an attempt to start some up-to-date thinking about the CMF. Yet all he offers, apart from some unconstructive patronizing remarks on constructive dreaming by younger officers, are the hackneyed catch-cries of "good uniform, good food, good pay." These slogans may attract the unemployed, if any, but will most certainly not attract the calibre of volunteer required by the CMF, and completely ignore the fact that something is wrong with the CMF at the present time. The aim of this article is therefore to discuss some of the reasons why the present CMF is largely inefficient, and suggest a solution to overcome the problem.

The present undoubted inefficiency in the CMF can be attributed to

- (a) The National Service Training Scheme.
- (b) The military ignorance, lack of leadership and moribund attitude of many officers and NCOs.
- (c) Bad, ill organized, uninteresting training.

The advent of National Service Training caused many of the better calibre volunteers to leave the CMF

rather than have anything to do with conscription. The scheme itself, although it undoubtedly benefited the health and outlook of the trainees, was militarily a failure. It overburdened CMF units with hordes of semi-trained conscripts without increasing the staffs of such units and at a time when many CMF instructors were resigning. To this confusion was added inefficiency when it was found that the annual period of obligatory training was insufficient to do more than recapitulate the meagre knowledge gained by the trainees. This constant sameness, in turn, forced many more volunteers to leave the CMF from boredom, leaving it with a small group of dedicated, public-spirited and capable volunteer soldiers, plus a large group of time-servers, dun-derheads, social aspirants and plain mercenaries, to whom the shortage of good leaders suddenly offered a bright future, enabling them to aspire even to field rank.

This shortage of leaders and potential leaders and promotion of mediocrities is primarily responsible for the present ills of the CMF, ills which are commonly discussed by all right-thinking officers in units, and just as commonly glossed over in the paper-war reports lest it should be thought that units were

inefficient. Officers of the following type are common and known to all in the CMF, nor are the cases cited day dreams of the younger officer school. These are cases personally known to the author of company commanders unable to work out training programmes within the framework of the Commanding Officer's directive, and who persist in wasting the Commanding Officer's time by requesting rulings on minor matters of a nature domestic to the company and which they should be capable of handling themselves. Such are happy to have a cadre Warrant-Officer run their company so that any blame may be conveniently shifted. They neither adequately administratively prepare nor reconnoitre bivouacs. They complain that their own inadequacies are the result of the uselessness of their junior officers, but they lack the moral courage to submit an official report on such useless officers. Add to this some junior officers with an equal lack of responsibility to the unit and their men, officers who first of all post RPs to ensure no NCO or soldier will leave the rifle range until it is cleaned up, then immediately hand over to a sergeant, climb into their private cars and drive off to the mess or their homes. Officers who after a bivouac do not turn up to ensure the necessary administrative procedures, such as stores checks and weapon cleaning, are carried out because their home is nearer than the depot, are not unknown.

NCOs and Officers are promoted without having the requisite military knowledge or ability required of the rank. Men with no leadership potential are considered for promotion because they are good-

type fellow accountants, therefore they will make excellent infantry officers. The same people would be horrified if it was suggested that an infantry officer would obviously make a good accountant. With such leadership it is amazing that the CMF is not more inefficient than it is, and this fact can only be attributed to the hard work put in by the minority of officers and NCOs with a sense of responsibility and interest in their jobs. It is no wonder training is bad, ill-organized and uninteresting.

The young man of today is no more stupid or lacking in initiative or public spiritedness than his father or forefathers. He will not therefore regularly attend parades in draughty drill halls, where he either:

- (a) Stands around kicking his heels and wasting his time,
- (b) Sees training film after training film all without explanation, and many of them old and difficult to follow,
- (c) As a change from pictures be submitted to lengthy ear bashing, in many cases given by people with less than a nodding acquaintance of the subject.

Yet these are the things he is most likely to be inflicted with under the guise of home training today. Training programmes are prepared and look good on paper, but there it stops. Little or no preparation is made by nominated instructors. They are not notified of the subject they are supposed to instruct in until ten minutes before the period begins. Many NCOs have an astounding lack of knowledge of even basic subjects such as weapon training, as is instanced by the sergeant

who could not removed the breech block from a bren gun. Yet troops are subjected to such instructors and unforeseen changes of programme because the instructor made no prior preparation, and decided instead to talk about a subject he thinks he knows something about.

In many cases an added aggravation is that in order to maintain paper efficiency, training programmes are of much too high a standard for the troops involved to even understand the application of the subject, let alone learn about it.

NCO training is not organized for the gradual absorption of knowledge over a period, but takes the form of short cramming courses, ending in examinations. Ten days later the successful candidate has, in seven cases out of ten, little or no recollection of anything he is supposed to have learnt, but has qualified at the examination.

If we turn to statistics, the number of efficiency grants a year point to a very low standard of weapon training, and if we concede that twenty-five per cent. of such grants are blatantly falsified the standard is even lower. The young man of today has better things to do than dress up in uniform to be marched around by so-called experts. He must feel he has learnt something after each parade, or that he has exercised his military skill in some way, and not just wasted his time. Bribes of good uniform or high pay are no substitute for the required feeling of achievement.

The preceding paragraphs have presented an exceedingly black picture, but unfortunately in many cases it is a true one, and one that is rarely or ever admitted in re-

ports, although often discussed by the more interested unit officers.

The CMF is now being reorganized on a volunteer basis, and now is the time to ensure that it is also rehabilitated and made attractive to recruits. Only by being efficient can it carry out the much more difficult process of retaining its recruits. It may well be asked how can this be done? The solution is relatively simple, if drastic, and can be achieved as follows:

Firstly, each unit must examine its present leaders, both officers and NCOs. The time-servers, inefficient and those without leadership potential, must be ruthlessly eliminated. The remaining potential must be carefully groomed. Leadership training must be thorough and practical as well as theoretical. This means that leaders and potential leaders cannot be taken away from their jobs on unit parade nights; another night must be set aside for such training. Rank must be made a prize to be striven for, not just a reward for long service. Training should extend over a period of twelve months. Officers and NCOs must not be promoted until they have at least one year's experience in their present rank, including an annual camp. A two-year period would be preferable. The training should aim at giving each aspiring officer or NCO a sound basic knowledge of his job and the opportunity to put the lessons learned into practice. *This practice can only be obtained by officers and NCOs commanding and instructing their sub-units on home training parades.* They have no other opportunity to practice with live soldiers. Promotion must be the result of the man's ability to do the job as well as his

ability to pass the required qualifying examination. No man should pass an examination because of his natural good looks; he must obtain the qualifying marks or be failed.

Unit training must be interesting, stimulating, challenging and progressive. Where there is any doubt in the unit's overall efficiency it must start from the beginning. The AHQ training cycle must be instituted from the first year. When the second year of the training cycle is reached a training wing must be instituted to cater for new recruits. Officers and NCOs must train their own men. All instruction must be well prepared and instructors given adequate warning of the lessons they are expected to teach and access to the required text book or books. Lesson plans must be submitted for scrutiny 14 days in advance of the actual lesson. Officers must get out of their offices and supervise training, ensuring that lessons are taught in accordance with current principles, with a maximum of doing by the trainee and a *minimum of ear bashing* by the instructor. Immediate action must be taken against officers and NCOs who refuse or are incapable of maintaining the required standard.

To enable an efficient training programme to be run by units, formations must ensure that training directives are issued far enough ahead to allow for unit planning. Formation courses should not interfere with unit programmes; if they do they take away the instructors just when they are most required by the units, and consequently disorganize the unit training. It is doubtful if a formation is in any way more capable of training infantry specialists than the units themselves. The for-

mation can be of real help by training officers and first appointment candidates, and ensuring an equitable standard throughout the training, thus relieving the unit of an added burden and the officer of unguided study on his own.

In addition to such normal training, the soldier should be given the opportunity of taking part in voluntary unpaid exercises which will capture his interest, try his endurance and initiative and give him a sense of achievement. Such things as escape and evasion exercises, long-range patrol exercises, exercises in conjunction with other services, such as raids on airfields, should be undertaken. The possibilities are limitless, and such exercises present the soldier with a challenge, test his endurance, give him confidence in his ability to move across unknown country, by day and night, develop his initiative, and show him why his weapon handling must be perfect, why he must be fit, and why he must have a sound *basic military knowledge*, in addition to giving him a sense of achievement and a pride in his own capabilities. They need only be held at three-monthly intervals to maintain the soldiers' interest.

None of these suggestions is new, revolutionary or sensationally different, but, if properly applied, they do get the required results, hold recruits and produce keen, efficient soldiers. All that is required is hard work and interest on the part of all officers and NCOs coupled with the moral integrity to ensure that the unit learns to walk before it runs. From personal experience the author has seen a company with young, keen and aggressive leaders apply these points, and in a year treble

their strength and produce a full-strength volunteer company. Then by hard work and insistence on a high standard throughout, retain these recruits and increase their keenness. He has seen a junior officer in charge of a training wing get, by the high standard of his instruction, recruits a rifle company in the same area was unable to attract.

In conclusion, it can be said that there is undoubtedly much ineffi-

ciency in CMF units today, but the volunteer spirit is most definitely alive, and can be utilized if given good leadership coupled with sound, interesting and challenging training. Training aimed at producing a sound basis of knowledge from which the trainee may aspire to higher things. This can and must be done if Australia is to receive her money's worth from her investment in the Citizen Military Forces and provide an effective fighting force in time of war.

COMPETITION FOR AUTHORS

The Board of Review has awarded first place and the prize of £5 for the best original article published in the March issue to "An Australian Task Force," by Major D. M. Butler, Royal Australian Infantry.

No award was made for February, since that issue was wholly taken up with an official description of the organization of the Pentropic Division.

Strategic Review

THE ROAD TO NOWHERE

Reprinted from "An Cosantoir," Eire

THE post-war version of the Total Disarmament story was fourteen years old last January and, unless its delicate life is ended overnight by a new world conflict, there is every reason to believe that its chequered career will continue indefinitely and indecisively.

In January 1946 the United Nations General Assembly, at its first session, adopted a resolution setting up the Atomic Energy Commission with the object of eliminating the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes and of promoting its widest use for the peaceful advancement of science. That was barely five months after Hiroshima. Universal reaction had set in and the potentialities of the atom bomb made disarmament seem imperative. It was generally agreed that control was necessary and desirable, particularly as at that time the USA alone possessed atomic weapons.

New Slant

However, the knowledge of the possession by Russia in 1948, or earlier, of the atomic formula brought an entirely new slant to the negotiations. The Soviet attitude shifted, and the Commission declared that an impasse had been reached, and recommended the suspension of its work. In addition, the Conven-

tional Armaments Commission, a parallel body established in 1947, was meeting with difficulties, and thus, three years after a beginning that had promised so much to humanity, the entire question of disarmament was precisely as it had been in 1946.

In succeeding years, several attempts were made to break the deadlock. In 1950 President Truman suggested the merging of the two Commissions in an appeal for an all-out effort to procure an agreement. Ironically enough, UNO forces were currently involved in the Korean War, and the participants were busily engaged in building up their armed forces, while NATO was rapidly expanding to meet the Soviet threat in Europe. None the less, the plea by the US President was valid, and the three basic principles laid down by him for the guidance of the proposed commission were, and are, fundamental to any genuine disarmament agreement. They were:

- (a) *Any agreement must include all kinds of weapons capable of mass destruction.*

The outlawing of any particular type of weapon would represent little more than lip service to the principles of humani-

tarianism. The weapons of World War II were capable of wholesale destruction such as had not been visualised even by the League of Nations Committees of the pre-war era who sought to prohibit weapons now accepted as conventional. Disarmament, to be effective, must be complete.

- (b) *The agreement must be unanimous.*

The compliance of only a few or even of the majority of nations might render an agreement ineffective, since the arming of one state would be a threat and a danger to all.

- (c) *Disarmament must be based on safeguards which should be adequate to give immediate warning of any threatened violation. In fact, it must be policed continuously and thoroughly.*

A foolproof system of inventory and inspection is obviously the only means by which the regulations of armed forces and armaments could be controlled.

Commission Established

It was not until almost two years later, in January 1952, that the General Assembly of UNO approved a resolution providing for the establishment of the Disarmament Commission to replace the two original bodies with the object of preparing proposals to be embodied in a draft treaty. The USSR, although voting against the resolution as it stood, intimated her willingness to participate in the work of the Commission.

This was not a very promising start to the activities of the new body and, indeed, from its inception, the Commission was deadlocked. The Soviet Union insisted that an armament census would be

nothing more than a "legalised spying system" for the USA unless the Western Powers would first agree in principle to the prohibition of atomic weapons and to a substantial reduction in armament. On the other hand, the Western Powers maintained that some effective means of international control should precede, and not follow, the banning or reduction of such armaments.

No Agreement

By June 1954, the talks, which had been delegated to a sub-committee, had become academic and dragged to a dismal halt. In the following September a resolution calling for a resumption of talks was jointly sponsored by the West and the Soviet Union, but, although in the succeeding two years some eighty meetings of the Disarmament Sub-Committee had been held, the differences had not been reconciled. The failure of ten years' negotiation to produce a single major point of agreement was a sad commentary on the lack of mutual confidence among the negotiating powers, and the protestations of peaceful intentions were becoming slightly tarnished as each new and much-heralded "concession" was hedged about with conditions, prevarications and escape clauses.

In July 1956, the USSR called for the joint assumption of "a solemn obligation" not to use atomic or hydrogen weapons, but this proposal merely sugared the pill of bitter attacks on NATO, SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, and the Western reaction was naturally one of doubt as to the good faith of the Soviet Union. The debate ended inconclusively in mutual recrimination.

Abolishing Testing

By 1957 total disarmament was

in a cul-de-sac, and the Powers concentrated on investigating the possibility of abolishing nuclear weapon testing. It speaks much for the tenacity and optimism of the Western Powers that after so much fruitless endeavour they were prepared to explore so unpromising a back-alley. Perhaps, however, they felt, in common with Russia, that world opinion would be outraged by the complete abandonment of efforts toward disarmament, and that the appearance of a desire to seek agreement was worth the trouble.

In May 1958 Mr. Khrushchev agreed to President Eisenhower's proposal that technical experts of both sides should commence work immediately in practical problems of supervision and control of nuclear tests. The conference opened on July 1 in Geneva, and by August agreement had been reached that it would be possible to detect nuclear explosions by various methods and that these methods should be included in a control system.

As a result of the comparative success of this conference the United States and British Governments expressed their willingness to suspend tests for one year if the Soviet Union would not resume tests during this period and if all Governments which had tested nuclear weapons were prepared to open negotiations on an agreement for the complete suspension of tests under effective international control. The Soviet Government agreed to talks, but, shortly afterwards, capriciously and with characteristic inconsistency resumed nuclear weapons tests on the grounds that there was "inequality" between the number of tests carried out by themselves and that of the Western Powers.

Four Point Agreement

However, the talks continued, and by October 1958 agreement had been reached on four points:

1. *The structure of the control agency should comprise a control commission of seven—the Big Three and four non-nuclear powers.*
2. *The executive officer should be an administrator.*
3. *A system of detection and identification (details to be settled).*
4. *The general composition of the organization, which should have at least twenty Powers acceding.*

The outstanding points of disagreement were:

1. *The voting in the Control Commission.* The Soviets insisted on what amounted to veto powers, as they feared they would be systematically outvoted. The West claimed that the terms of any treaty should be so framed that action by the Control Commission should be almost automatic and thereby render voting unnecessary.

2. *Manning of Control Posts.* The Soviets demanded that the nationals of each country should, under a foreign controller, comprise each team, while the West felt that this arrangement might lead to the sabotage of detection instruments and insisted on international control.

3. *Inspection teams.* The USSR objected to permanent mobile inspection teams, as they claimed that these would be an incitement to espionage, but the Western Powers held that inspection teams would always be under the watchful supervision of nationals.

Currently, the settlement of the question of the suspension of nuclear tests rests, theoretically, on

the effectiveness of the control. The Soviet insistence on a system based on "the principle of unanimity of the three atomic Powers"—in other words, the veto—appears to be the principal obstacle to agreement remaining, and it is a formidable one. The Soviet fear of being outvoted is understandable, but the use of the veto would undoubtedly negate the effectiveness of any plan, and the history of the veto in the functioning of UNO has been a sorry one.

The fact of the matter is, however, that full agreement will not be reached, and it is probable that, if the veto question should be settled, yet a further obstacle would be produced. These endless conferences are like a fantastic game of chess played without kings and therefore incapable of conclusion; advantages gained and concessions made are of no importance eventually, since checkmate cannot be effected.

Even in the USA it is argued by Dr. Edward Teller, who has much top-level support, that if nuclear weapons are renounced the door is open to aggression, and that if "clean" explosives cannot be developed, then people are exposed to radioactive fallout in any serious military conflict. He also asserted that underground nuclear explosions could evade detection—which would nullify any system of control so far visualised.

Universal Agreement

In the unlikely event of agreement being reached between the USSR, the USA and Great Britain, such agreement is not binding on Communist China or indeed on any other state with the capability of producing a nuclear weapon. How then is it proposed to secure uni-

versal agreement? By persuasion? It is not certain or even likely that the USSR is in a position to influence Communist China to this extent. By coercion? Who will bell the Chinese cat?

Great Britain and France, to name only two countries, cannot feel secure while the nuclear deterrent is the property of two great Powers, and a school of thought in both these countries maintains the right to nuclear weapons to establish equality vis-a-vis the USA. They realize that a time may come when disagreement may occur on the advisability or otherwise of using the "ultimate deterrent."

The West Side-tracked

The discouraging point about the failure to reach agreement is that the point at issue is but one aspect of the whole disarmament question. The Western Powers have permitted themselves to be side-tracked to the extent that they no longer insist on the duration of a treaty (to end nuclear testing) being conditional on satisfactory progress in other fields of disarmament. The original objective—to end war—can hardly be satisfied with limited concessions that could, at the most, prevent experiments designed to improve the effectiveness of nuclear weapons without in any way limiting their manufacture or preventing the arming of the various blocs with already tested weapons.

All the righteous protestations of men like Dr. Teller and his supporters of their aims to perfect a "clean" bomb cannot gainsay Mr. Truman's first "basic principle," nor can it alter the fact that "unclean" bombs are in existence which would be used in the event of war, and that death by nuclear bomb (clean

or unclean), high explosive, or, for that matter, by any form of offensive weapon, is equally effective and permanent.

Economic Disaster

Meanwhile, the armaments race continues. When it is considered that an *Atlas* intercontinental ballistic missile costs two million dollars, a *Thor* or *Jupiter* medium-

range missile a mere one million dollars, and that a *Nike* anti-aircraft missile launching pad (of which it is reckoned 1400 would be required for the defence of Western Germany) costs three-quarters of a million dollars, it is not difficult to foresee the inevitable universal economic disaster, as the only alternative to war.

—R.G.E.

CORRECTION

In the April 1960 issue, in the article "Officers' Ranks in SEATO," page 27, first paragraph, the text should read "General" and not "Lieutenant-General" as wearing a star and crescent, a "pip" and crossed sword and baton. The symbols of a Lieutenant-General are star and crescent and crossed sword and baton.



DUNTROON CHAPEL


APPEAL

Chapels of permanent construction are needed at the Royal Military College, but for reasons of policy their cost may not be financed wholly from public money. So that the gap in Duntroon's growth may be filled, the Commandant RMC has put into operation a funds-raising plan of broad scope which so far has been directed towards the Churches, the RSL, RMC graduates, and the parents of cadets now in residence. As it is believed that widespread knowledge of this appeal would find support for it from the Army generally, the existence of the fund and the reasons for its creation are brought to your notice in this fashion.

Duntroon is a name which has been known to the Australian Army since 1911. It was in that year that the Royal Military College opened and began to function in its role of training young men for careers as officers of the Australian Military

Forces. So it was that RMC commenced playing its part in fulfilling the need commented on by Lord Kitchener in his report of 1910 on the defence of Australia.

Duntroon, then, has been for 49 years an integral part of the Commonwealth's army structure. In that time it has had its vicissitudes, but despite these it has grown steadily, and there are now many fine buildings for instruction, accommodation and other purposes. More are being built, and the number of temporary hutments is becoming smaller. However, for the reason already mentioned, the College Chapels do not enjoy a guaranteed part in this progression, and it is necessary to conduct religious services in wooden huts which are totally unsuited to their function and quite out of character with their surroundings. This incongruity tends to give the cadet a false sense of relative values when he compares the temporary Chapels



The Royal Military College, Duntroon

with buildings erected to meet material needs.


There is significance in this that will not escape you. Leadership training and character development are vital and integral parts of the RMC course. Fundamental to both is the fostering of moral qualities, and at the root of these are religious instruction and regular attendance at church services. Therefore it is considered of prime importance and urgency that suitable and dignified chapels of permanent construction should be erected. So the fund has been launched.

The intention is to erect a building that will contain two chapels under the one roof. Each is to be completely self-contained, sound-proof from the other, and with a separate entrance. One is to be used by the Anglican and Protestant denominations, and the other by Catholics. This design is more economical than two separate buildings, and more importantly, is demonstrative of unity of purpose. It also has the blessing and approval of the Chaplains-General.

It has been estimated that the cost of erecting these places of worship will be to the order of £35,000. The

Government has indicated its willingness to make a grant of £8000 towards costs, but it will be necessary to find the balance from voluntary subscriptions. The quest has been initiated already, and it is planned to have the chapels completed, dedicated and opened in 1961, when RMC will celebrate its fiftieth anniversary. It is with confidence that *Duntroon*, whose graduates serve with all components of the Army, whether ARA, CMF or Cadets, looks to the Army as a whole for aid in bridging the gap.

Concerted effort will achieve the aim. Therefore this area of the appeal is addressed to you who read the *Journal* but who are not RMC graduates in the hope that you will wish to contribute in some measure to the building of Duntroon's permanent chapels and also to create awareness of the appeal among those members of your units to whom the *Journal* is not distributed, so that they too may have the opportunity of participating. Duntroon would be very grateful indeed for individual and unit contributions, which should be made payable to the RMC Chapel Building Fund.



BATTLE SCENES AT YASNAYA POLYANA

General Frhr Geyr von Schweppenburg,
German Army, Retired

Translated by G. M. Carrington, BA, AAORG


TOWARDS the end of October 1941, following the capture of Orel and the mud battle about Mzensk, the 24th Panzer Corps, which I commanded, was leading the Panzer Army Guderian, and was stuck in the mud of the completely disrupted great highway Orel-Tula-Moscow. As soon as radio communications between the army and the staff of the 24th Panzer Corps, which was moving at the head, were re-established, the Chief of Staff of Panzer Army Guderian (Lt-Col Freiherr von Liebenstein) called me up, and in closing the conversation remarked: "Are you aware that in the next few days you are going to reach Yasnaya Polyana?" I said I was not.

On 26 October the reinforced Regiment Gross-Deutschland had managed to crawl as far as Plawskoye. I met it there in the afternoon in battle. That same evening, its leading elements penetrated the wide strip of forest which lay between Yasnaya Polyana and Tula. In this location the battle was heavy and partly at night. Casualties were unfortunately heavy.

On 27 October I drove during darkness through Plawskoye to Yasnaya Polyana, and there met the Command Group of 3 Panzer Division. The Russians had mined the highway with time fuses and made further stretches of it useless through

demolition of bridges. Therefore, we had to use railway tracks to advance with the tracked command vehicle. This was no pleasure jaunt.

Round about Yasnaya Polyana the monotonous Russian landscape alters somewhat and graduates into rolling, hilly country, which at another season, with its patches of forest, would give a delightful view. I met the new commander of the Division in the farmyard. Following the official issue of orders, I asked Major-General Breith if I could see the grave of Tolstoy. He said it was impossible; the Russians had mined the grave, and access to it was forbidden to all members of the Division until such time as it was cleared. During this conversation we were visited in a most unpleasant manner by Russian low-flying bombers. As the largest part of the Corps was stuck, together with all spares and especially the petrol, on the Moscow-Orel Highway, the advance troops were in a precarious position between the northern border of the Yasnaya Polyana forest and the southern border of Tula. The most urgent requirements for petrol had to be filled by our faithful comrades in the Air Force. As our own fighter cover was insufficient, flying in supplies was a rather risky undertaking. How risky I was made aware when I witnessed a chase



which took place directly above my command vehicle between a German Ju. and a Russian Ratas.

On 30 October two company commanders of 6 Armoured Regiment were killed on the outskirts of Tula. They were Lieutenant Graf Saurma and Second Lieutenant von Kriegsheim. Their last resting place was in the park of Yasnaya Polyana, in close proximity to the grave of Leo Tolstoy. A friend of the Graf Saurma and his successor as company chief described the position of the graves to their next-of-kin in a letter to Saurma's mother:—

“From the manor house leads an avenue through an orchard and an old copse to a small grove of birches. In the middle of it, surrounded by trees, is the plain undecorated grave of Leo Tolstoy. A little above it, between two tall trees, stand slightly

to one side the shining birch crosses with their Iron Crosses and inscriptions.”

This is a good opportunity to speak about the spiritual attitude of the front line troops who had been driven for six months in almost daily battles by the idiotic aspirations of their political leaders and by a general staff who did not know the conditions at the front. This attitude was expressed very well by the sermon at the graves of Lieutenant Graf Saurma and Second Lieutenant von Kriegsheim, given by the Protestant divisional chaplain, Padre Heitland:—

“Brothers in arms, the place where we are standing demands that we should speak of love. The great Russian who lies here in the earth wanted above all to be the prophet of love. . . . We who are ready to

receive love know that we go from death to life. For this kind of love the way has been shown through death by the Son of God. . . . What is the meaning of death for our fallen comrades here? It is not the end of life, but only a step on the same road out of the shadow of death in this world into the light of eternity. . . . Our farewell to them, therefore, should not be sad. We can safely lower them into their graves because through the graves we can see into the full eternal life beyond. We are greeting them not as if we are separated by an unbridgeable gulf but as if they are a little further along the road we have to travel. Over us still lies the shadow of death, they already stand in the Light. This is what the old soldier's song means when it says "Remain you in eternal life, my good comrade."

In an east-west direction the Upa River flows through Tula, and hence the southern part of the town is rather elongated. On 31 October the excellent Intelligence Section of 3 Division reported that the whole southern part of Tula, the largest explosives factory of Russia, was being prepared for demolition. Since I had no desire to be blown into the air together with my advance troops, as had happened to a Rumanian general staff in Odessa, and to others, I suggested to Guderian that we should by-pass Tula to the east and attack it from the north, from the direction of Moscow. From an operational point of view, this was rather a daring plan, but Guderian supported me, as he usually did in all such daring plans.

On 4 November it began to get colder. The effective strength of the

companies of the Regiment "Gross Deutschland" was on the average 35 men, some sections of the mounted infantry of 3 Division were not much stronger.

We advanced, against at times stiff opposition, with the biggest part of the Corps eastwards from Tula across the Kukuy River. It was here only that I found out that several officers of 6 Regiment of 3 Division had been killed in the battle south of Tula. One of these was Saurma. Not only was he known to me personally, but his mother, who had before our invasion of Sudetenland quartered me and my staff of the then 3 Division at her castle near Ohlau, had begged me to take care of her son. Being unaware of the excellent funeral sermon which Heitland had delivered, and assuming that Saurma was a Catholic, I ordered that the Catholic Corps Padre Weissner, an extremely sympathetic and pleasant person, who unfortunately later perished in Russia, should bless the grave and send a picture of it to the Grafyn von Saurma. This was done. Weissner closed his letter to the mother with the following words: "And finally we have the faith that Our Father who takes our lives and gives them to us, who separates and unites us, knows what is best for us. I pray for you that you will have the strength this sacrifice requires."

The presence of this religious feeling amongst the troops was not considered highly desirable by the political leadership. This latter was supported by the boot-licking lackeys on the general staff, whom Guderian called in an argument with "the greatest military leader of all times" the "company with heated toilet seats." A few days later this out-

standing soldier was relieved of his command. Anyway, any attempts to stifle Christianity amongst the front-line soldiers were remarkably unsuccessful. There were more pernicious attitudes which made us think.

When I returned to Yasnaya Polyana in order to go to the southern border of Tula for personal reconnaissance, the leader of an independent unit suggested to me that the inmates of an asylum could be evacuated by using euthanasia methods, which would relieve the difficult accommodation problem for the troops. I kicked him out through the door. What happened about his idea later I don't know. Just by the way, I heard during this visit that a few days beforehand a Russian commando unit had penetrated through the surrounding forests into Yasnaya Polyana, confident that it would find the German staff there. During the fight which ensued one of the Russian commandos penetrated as far as the quarters of the Divisional Commander. There he was killed by one of the Russian prisoners who worked for the staff of 3 Division.

On 4 November the Russian winter set in properly. At first it was not unduly severe. On 12 November the thermometer showed 16° F. and rose on the 13th to 24°, and on the 14th moved between 33° and 40°. Whereas the winter clothing of the Russian troops was excellent, the German troops had no suitable winter clothing as yet. The German forces possessed no establishment to cover winter fighting conditions. During a short stop in Orel, I had prepared a translation of the excellent Soviet establishment, and ordered that this be issued as a guide

for my troops. During my visits in Yasnaya Polyana I enquired about the Russian attitude towards the home of Tolstoy. I spoke for a considerable time with a woman who gave me the impression of being well educated. At that time the estate was still unharmed. From my previous experience during stays in Russia in peacetime, I was aware that any honest conversation could only be expected vis-a-vis, and therefore created an opportunity for one. But no complaints were raised against the behaviour of the German soldiers quartered there. I did not find out the name of the lady concerned, but was later told that she was supposed to be a relative of the house of Tolstoy.

Guderian himself had arranged, because he was often in the area, an overnight stopping place in the manor house. At the same time he was careful to ensure the preservation of the library and of the art museum it contained. In this he was supported by his Chief of Staff, *Liebenstein*, who was anyway a highly sensitive person. In recognition of the world-wide importance of this historic place, both had thought that whatever had remained should be as far as possible preserved in its original state.

The battles in the area north-east of Tula went on with undiminished ferocity, despite cold and snowstorms. On my right flank I now had 53 German Army, which had moved up against stiff opposition. It was commanded by General von Fischer-Weikersthal, whom I still remember from the days of the officers' school in Stuttgart. When we met, he opened his conversation with his typical dry Swabian wit: "Geyr, we're going to have a real bloody

mess on our hands." Unfortunately he was to prove only too right. In the meantime, most of the German Air Force had been withdrawn after months of faithful co-operation, and the reason that was given for this was "reorganization." The German Supreme Command had declared on 5 December "the Russian is on his last legs." We got quite a different impression at the front!

At the beginning of December the Corps had advanced to just south of Moscow. On its western flank the battle group Eberbach had penetrated with 19 tanks as far as the Tula-Moscow Highway. 4 Panzer Division, or more precisely its reserves, had stopped a counter-attack with severe losses for the Russians. South of Tula 296 Infantry Division had advanced in an exhausting night march during great cold and snowstorms as far as Yasnaya Polyana. When the order to retreat was issued by Guderian, the Russians tried with all means at their disposal to drive a wedge from Tula into the gap between the right wing of the Fourth Army and 296 Division. As a result a number of severe battles occurred just north of Yasnaya Polyana.

When I visited 296 Infantry Division on 12 December its commander, Lieutenant-General Stemmermann, had just been wounded, and its chief general staff officer killed. Stemmermann was quite unaware that he had been wounded when a house collapsed on top of him, and continued to command the Division despite a fractured skull. During my visit the divisional command post was located about two miles north of Yasnaya Polyana.

With the serious battles and their close proximity to the estate, it is

possible that a certain amount of damage was done to it, especially as the Russians made liberal use of mortars, rockets and concentrations of artillery. Under these conditions nobody could bother himself about the German military cemetery, and any idea of levelling off the graves was for reasons of time and frozen ground out of the question. This levelling off was necessary because of the Russian habit of desecrating the graves in a bestial manner.

When on 13 December the Corps was withdrawn further towards the south, I visited again the rearguard battalions. I met the commanders in their command post. It was located several miles south of Yasnaya Polyana. The troops mounting the rear guard were a battalion of the mounted infantry regiment of 4 Armoured Division and a battalion from the regiment "Gross Deutschland." Neither of the two battalion commanders mentioned anything during the lengthy conversation about any fighting or damage to Yasnaya Polyana. It is of course possible that the straw-covered houses of the village which lay slightly to one side of Yasnaya Polyana were burnt down. It is also possible that the roof of the manor caught fire during the fighting. But accusation that the German forces had set fire to the manor and at the same time had also desecrated the grave of Tolstoy seems to have been maliciously spread by Russian sources. Unfortunately, on orders from above, villages were burnt down during our retreat to prevent the Russians from using them as shelter during the intense cold somewhat in the manner of their own scorched earth policy.

As to the Soviet methods employed

in these winter battles, south and south-east of Moscow, these are illustrated by the following captured orders:—

“Extract from Order No. of the S.R.1322 of the 17/11/41.

1. The commander of 1 Infantry Battalion.

During the night of 17th and 18th November—you are to set fire and destroy the following villages: Barykova, Lutowinowo, Krjukowo. To do this, you are to send out a strong and well-armed group carrying machine-guns and grenades in order to kill any persons attempting to leave the houses. The houses are to be burnt down using incendiary materials and ‘Molotov cocktails.’ The signal is a red rocket if successful. If villages found already destroyed, proceed on your own initiative.

Signed Chief of Staff—

Major Yakov.”

The question of who was to blame for the destruction of the Tolstoy manor I cannot answer.

The war went on its fateful way to an end, which, considering the political and military leadership at

the top, was inevitable. About a year after its end, some twenty or so senior German officers were working on war historical projects in American Prisoner of War camps for the U.S. Historical Section, in Oberursel. During a conversation at dinner the subject of Yasnaya Polyana was raised. I recounted my own personal experiences and the Russian allegations. A senior officer, as far as I can recall it was General Engels, a man respected for his military abilities and his humanity, even in Hitler’s time, interrupted me. He said that the Russian allegations were pure propaganda. He had captured a film which showed the re-taking of Yasnaya Polyana by Soviet troops, with a Soviet guard of honour at the grave of Tolstoy.

Only one thing is certain. Looking back at the events of fifteen years ago, the two thousand year old proverb is still true in this particular act of the drama of the Second World War—“Quidquid delirant reges, plectuntur Achivi—Whatever the powers at the top do, it’s the common soldier who gets the blame.”



BARON VON GEYR



PROPHET WITHOUT HONOUR

Lieutenant-Colonel Robert M. Walker
Artillery, US Army

**A prophet is not without honour, save in his own country,
and in his own house.—Matthew xiii, 57.**

SIR HALFORD JOHN MacKINDER, British author, geographer, teacher and explorer, has many claims to fame. He was the leader of the 1899 Mount Kenya expedition and the first man to reach the top of the 17,000-foot peak. Director of the London School of Economics and Political Science for five years, he was at one time Vice-President of the Royal Geographical Society, and was given the accolade of Gold Medallist by the American Geographical Society in 1943. His clear-cut and objective study of geography, the mainspring of national power, was a cornerstone for Haushofer (Hitler's geographical mentor) in organizing his fanatical Geopolitikers in pre-World War II Germany.


Oddly enough, in spite of all this, MacKinder is chiefly remembered today as the author of a little jingle:

Who rules East Europe commands
the Heartland;
Who rules the Heartland com-
mands the World Island;
Who rules the World Island com-
mands the world.

There are very few in the Free World who really know much about MacKinder except this little verse, a quote-out-of-text that most inadequately expresses his thoughtful analysis of world power and geopolitics. Yet, of all the thinkers of the past who have postulated the future, MacKinder, a prophet little honoured and of little public recognition, today is in a unique and outstanding position to say, "I told you so!"

MacKinder first outlined his theory of the heartland and the World Island in "The Geographical Pivot of History" in 1904. It was received with something less than enthusiasm by the military strategists of that day, and contemporary American thought dismisses his "Pivot of History" as well as his later writings with a sort of tolerant amusement. Let's not waste our time, we seem to imply, with the thoughts of a man who has the effrontery to call the Americas "lesser islands."

We disregard the fact that his "Democratic Ideals and Reality"



which presented his three-line jingle to the world also predicted with uncanny accuracy the changing circumstances that would draw the world into the Second World War. In many particulars, MacKinder's thoughts in this volume are as true of the post-World War II geopolitical situation as they were of post-World War I.

As George Fielding Eliot said in his introduction to the 1942 reissue of "Democratic Ideals and Reality":

"This book should be read by soldiers charged with the prosecution of the war; by statesmen concerned with the formulation of grand strategy; by diplomats who deal with international affairs; by journalists who are concerned with the underlying facts of the last war, the last peace, and the

present struggle, and certainly by citizens who are consecrated to victory and ponder the principles which govern a post-war settlement."

In MacKinder's mind, successful counter-action against aggression required a previous understanding of the shape, form, and direction in which aggression was most likely to occur. More important yet, he saw the need for recognition and appreciation of the geopolitical indications that serve as signposts, pointing to the future.

MacKinder's World

MacKinder reasoned on a basis of landpower versus seapower, regarding the aeroplane as a weapon of the land rather than the sea forces. He conceived the closely connected continents of Asia, Africa and Europe

as the central land mass of the earth—a gigantic World Island set off from the smaller land areas by oceanic isolation. The Americas and Australia to him were minor land units—mere appendages to the World Island of the eastern hemisphere.

He warned the world in 1904, 1919 and again during the last great war that the power in control of the inner reaches of Eurasia, which he calls the Heartland (roughly the area now occupied by the Soviet Union), could some day expand their rule to encompass the entire world.

Following World War II he enlarged his Heartland to include the Black and Baltic seas and extended it into Scandinavia. He felt that this entire region was and is the pivotal area of world domination.

The Soviet Viewpoint

MacKinder realized, perhaps better than anyone else, the possibility of his Heartland theory reaching fruition under impetus from the Soviet Union. During World War II he wrote prophetically:

“ . . . if the Soviet Union emerges from this war as the conqueror of Germany, she must rank as the greatest land power on the globe. For the first time in history the Heartland is manned by a garrison sufficient both in number and quality.”

Many will disagree with this premise. However, a glance at any up-to-date map will show the immense progress the Soviets have made, in less than forty years, along the lines MacKinder projected. In 1921 the Russian western border had been pushed well back to the east. Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were independent states. Poland had been re-created, and

Bessarabia was part of Roumania.


Today all these nations are within the Soviet bloc. The USSR has engulfed countries as far to the west as Albania and East Germany. The satellite states, generally created as a buffer zone after World War I, today are only an extension of the Heartland power, Russia.

China is communistic, and although in some ways her ties with the Soviet Union are tenuous, it must be admitted that in a major international dispute China would be on the side of its Communist neighbour to the north rather than MacKinder's “smaller islands” on the other side of the Globe. The Kurile Islands are now Russian. North Korea is surely communistic, and just as surely anti-West. North Vietnam is in the hands of the Communists. Egypt and Syria have formed an Arab Union that is considerably closer to the USSR than the West so far as political, economic and military affiliations are concerned.

That the extension of Soviet influence to many areas of the World Island has been accomplished by “peaceful” means in no way negates MacKinder's theme. The fact of the accomplishment actually vindicates him, for he thought in terms of the end that might result, rather than the means by which it might be achieved.

The Soviet use of economic and military aid has been of considerable assistance in their progress toward world domination, and our own action in this department seems to have placed no great obstacle in their path.

Soviet economic aid to many nations, as part of their expansion programme, actually did not start until



1955. Since then it has pushed forward with ever-increasing effectiveness. Military aid, either direct or through a satellite, has widened their influence and complemented their economic aid. For example, the Syrian Army is completely armed with Soviet-furnished weapons. The Egyptian Army, which lost the major part of its equipment in the Sinai campaign, has been re-armed with equipment from behind the Iron Curtain.

There can be no doubt that these actions have been extremely effective in spreading their demesne beyond the Heartland. The speeches and resolutions of the 1957 African-Asian conference with 400 delegates from 38 nations singing the praises of the Communist system and condemning the democracies of the West is ample proof of this, despite the "unofficial" nature of the assemblage.

From this welter of expansionist accomplishments, one thing can be seen as quite certain—the Soviets do not disagree with MacKinder's Heartland theory!

The Western Viewpoint

American thought is basically at variance with MacKinder's concept of the new world as lesser islands. We feel that he overestimated the importance of the World Island and underestimated our own great effect on world politics and position.

Many examples of this are to be found in our college textbooks and other reference material. One textbook states categorically: "MacKinder, however, could present no really convincing support of his geographical determinism." Another

proposes that a reversal of MacKinder's postulate would be more nearly correct: "Who controls the rimland (the perimeter of the Eurasian complex) rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world."² This latter, however, is far less the reversal it is claimed to be than merely an admission that MacKinder was basically correct. In this two-side world of today, with the rimland in one control and the Heartland in the other, no one controls the world. If the Soviet Union ever takes control of both Heartland and rimland, it will be doubly true.

There are some in the West, however, who take a different view of the progress the Heartland power is making. Doctor F. C. Schwartz, Executive Director of the Christian Anti-Communist Crusade, in testimony before the Congressional Committee on un-American activities, said:

"... assessing all the evidence on a world-wide scope, the Communists' continuing advance is terrifying and the possibility of the fulfilment of Khrushchev's boast, 'We'll bury you,' looms closer every day."

Although few in the Western world have expressed any real belief in the Heartland theory, some rather ambitious measures have been taken to prevent the Soviets from translating the theory into fact. We have ringed the Eurasian continent with bomber and rocket bases. Our major oversea force is stationed in the vital central European area. We have aligned ourselves militarily with other anti-Communist nations in alliances aimed at

1. International Politics, by Vernon Van Dyke.

2. The Geography of Peace, by Nicholas J. Spykman.

bringing the expansion of Communism to a halt. We have poured billions of dollars into economic and military aid of all types.

Call these actions what you will, they are, among other things, a tacit admission that MacKinder's theories have validity—that Russia controls the Heartland and we must prevent her from taking over the World Island. In the American viewpoint, then, it appears likely that MacKinder was not so much unhonoured as unappreciated—not so much disbelieved as disregarded.

Conclusion

MacKinder did not develop his Heartland theory as a prophecy of disaster, but to point out to the world the dangers inherent in the occupation of this critical area by an aggressive and ambitious power. He did not say that the non-Heartland powers were lost before they started, but he did point out the direction the Heartland expansion would take. What is more, he is an oracle of proven credibility.

As far back as 1919 he clearly

foresaw the possibility of the resurgence of German nationalism that came with the rise of Hitler. In "Democratic Ideals and Reality" he noted:

"It may be that German mentality will be altered by German defeat. He would be a sanguine man, however, who would trust the future of the world to a change in the mentality of any nation. . . . The Prussian is a definite type of humanity with his good points and his bad points, and we shall be wise if we act on the assumption that his kind will breed true to its type."

We did not heed his warning then, and World War II was the price we paid. If there is any value in the old saw about "forewarned" being "forearmed," we dare not fail to heed him now.

The Soviet Union obviously hopes to prove MacKinder's "possibility" is their "probability." His little-heeded and half-forgotten warning to the West are the Soviet guidelines to world conquest.

THE CONDUCT OF ARMY EXAMINATIONS

Major-General Sir Kingsley Norris, KBE, CB, DSO, KStJ, ED, MD

Major-General Sir Kingsley Norris was Director-General of Medical Services from 3 Mar 48 to 25 Jun 55.—Editor.

MOST people dread examinations. This dread is engendered among candidates because failure is always humiliating, also because candidates are acutely aware of blanks in their knowledge and hope against hope that the examiners will not hit upon them. One hundred and fifty years ago in "Lucon" Charles Caleb Colton wrote:—

"Examinations are formidable even to the best prepared, for the greatest fool may ask more than the wisest man can answer."

But the awe of examinations is not confined to the candidates. Any examiner who appreciates his responsibility undertakes his duty with a heavy heart.

Each year of school progress is clouded by examinations. Each of the six years of a medical course at the University concludes with apprehension, as a professional career hangs upon this annual thread.

This depressing experience, together with the subsequent fearsome responsibility of examining medical students, medical officers in the army and nurses, has provided a reasonably direct contact with the subject of examinations in general.

The conduct of examinations is continually causing concern in many academic spheres, and the results in Army examinations have recently

provided the subject of a valuable article by Lieutenant-Colonel C. L. Thompson, MBE, in this Journal (No. 126, November 1959).

The aim of any examination is to test. To test any person or any thing we must have some determined standard. If the person or thing conforms to this standard, a pass is obtained; if he falls below this standard a failure results. There are sometimes grades of passing indicated by First, Second or Third Class Honours, etc.

The aim of an examination is NOT to fail or to pass, but to test. The first important decision is to determine the standard required, and this requires a deal of consideration. With inanimate objects there seems no alternative to a mathematical assessment, weight, length, volume, calibre, gauge, etc. In addition, other attributes such as finished appearance may be included.

In testing the knowledge of a person concerning any subject again numerical marks are usually applied. In mathematical subjects this is generally simple, as figures are finite and permit no discretion. The answer is either right or wrong. With non-mathematical subjects many difficulties arise in allotting marks. Examiners differ and, what is more, the same examiner differs from time to time. Some years ago papers marked

by a series of examiners were re-submitted to the same examiners, but with no indication of the previous marking. In no instance was the marking the same as earlier. A number of previous passes were failed and vice versa. This anomaly may be reduced by having at least two examiners for each subject or each question. A pass by one examiner was sufficient, but two failures were necessary to discard a candidate. A further attempt to ensure satisfaction was the introduction of a large series of short questions requiring a "yes" or "no" answer, a predetermined percentage of correct answers being required for a pass. Some subjects—but not many—lend themselves to this simple solution.

An oral examination, although an ordeal to most candidates, does provide the examiners with a more personal opportunity to test the candidate's knowledge. An efficient oral examiner can generally test the soundness of the candidate's knowledge fairly accurately, and this is his sole responsibility.

There still inevitably remain the many examination papers consisting of a small series of questions requiring more or less lengthy written answers. In this category are included the various written examinations for service personnel. The results from such examinations depend upon:—

- (a) The candidate's knowledge and ability to express this on paper.
- (b) The ability of the examiners to assess this knowledge from these answers.

In Lieutenant-Colonel Thompson's article concern was expressed as to "the unhealthy picture" of these results over the past ten years, with

barely "fifty per cent. of the students sitting" being passed. An admirable suggestion was made towards remedying the candidate's inadequacy. However, it is now submitted that however sound or inadequate a candidate may be, if the examiners are not capable of assessing this, the results of such examinations may well be misleading or "unhealthy."

Because a person possesses a certain degree or diploma it does not follow that he is fitted to teach or examine others in the same field. This fallacy may well account for the disturbing high failure rate at our University in subjects other than Education which is concerned with teaching and testing. Because a soldier has been promoted to a certain rank or has passed the Staff College examinations, this does not necessarily indicate his fitness to teach or examine others seeking similar heights. An essay implies some literary qualities beyond a mere factual record. The AMF Gold Medal is an annual award for the selected essay on some prescribed subject. The judgement on these essays is committed to regular officers of high rank. On one occasion—perhaps on others—two at least of the three judges could claim personal literary knowledge only of a low order, as indicated by their conversation and their correspondence. One of these judges actually rang one of the essayists before the results were announced and informed him that his essay entered under the *nom de plume* "Noblesse Oblige" was "jolly good." As the candidate concerned had not used the *nom de plume* referred to he was left in a

quandary as to the conduct of the examination.³

It has been reported that army candidates have been recorded as passed or failed in subjects for which they did not present themselves.

It would appear from these misfortunes that something is lacking in army examinations besides any inadequacy of candidates. The Army is wisely turning more and more to civilian guidance on certain specialised spheres requiring knowledge and training beyond those available in the Regular Army. Surely the attainment of rank which may well affect the future service career of a soldier is a high consideration and not "to be enterprised nor taken in hand unadvisedly, lightly or wantonly." Is the Army Education Service ever consulted as to the conduct of examinations? There are basic principles in examining just as there are in teaching—whatever the subject may be—and there is available in the Education Faculty of the University simple basic training in these responsibilities.


If Lieutenant-Colonel Thompson's excellent suggestion of a Military Coaching Academy for candidates be ever implemented, may consideration be given also to the teaching and testing of potential examiners.

Umpires of football and cricket matches are required to satisfy competent examiners before they are charged with the conduct of important contests. Should not army examiners similarly be required to submit themselves to tests as to their fitness to discharge their high responsibility?

If consideration were given to Lieutenant-Colonel Thompson's suggestions and to those included in this article, we may look forward to a more satisfactory and realistic future in our army examinations. The "unhealthy picture" deplored by Lieutenant-Colonel Thompson may be erased and replaced by a further extension of Army Health, which really has a place in every branch of the Service.

A modern army is one whose doctrine, organization, personnel and logistical support systems, as well as its ability to shoot, move and communicate, are constantly being raised to higher levels of effectiveness by the practical application of discoveries in all fields of thought and technique, so that at any time and in any land environment it can operate with greater combat effectiveness than its actual or potential enemies.

—US Army Information Digest.



War in the Modern World, by Theodore Ropp (Duke University Press, Durham, N.C., U.S.A.).

THEODORE ROPP is a professor of history in Duke University. He is the author of a number of works on military strategy.

Reading the volume under review one can judge that the author's main avenue of research leads him into the field of national war effort rather than the conception and application of strategy as such.

Professor Ropp freely quotes the better-known military theorists, and his frequent reference to the great master theorist, Clausewitz, indicates perhaps that he bases many of his own views on this authority.

The book has a magnificent bibliography, and in his frequent references the author includes actual quotations, which not only adds great interest but solidly backs up the views being expressed.

The book is presented in three parts. The first part, under the title "The Age of the Great Captains," covers a period of some 300 years from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century, and is in the main a synopsis of the organization and means of control of land armies during that period. To the average student of military history this part of the book deals with familiar subjects, and it is only towards the end

of the part that one may discern the development of the author's main theme, which is, in the opinion of the reviewer, the transition from the professional army period to that of the harnessing of a state for war, conscription in fact.

In part two, "The Industrial Revolution and War," the author really stresses his theme. He points out that from the beginning of the nineteenth century the dependence on a standing army to fight the nation's war gave way to the realization that no nation now could hope to wage war successfully unless the whole nation, that is the people, not only supported the political decision to go to war, but was prepared to give support by enlistment in the forces and increased effort in producing from the land and factories.

Professor Ropp now makes his strong point, which is that if a nation faces the likelihood of war, preparation for such an event must be accepted and practised in peace. He goes on to record the systems used over a long period, mainly by European nations, of ensuring public support and participation in preparedness for the final probability of armed conflict.

One can see during this part of the book that the writer is looking at history through American eyes. His comments and deductions may not, therefore, be easily digestible

to a reader with a background of British history.

It is in his recording and description of events over this period that the author makes, again in the opinion of the reviewer, two points which are extremely topical. Firstly, he deduces the need for a small, highly-trained professional force ready to take the field at instant notice. Secondly, whilst insisting on the need for continuous training of the civil population he stresses the need for their close integration into the professional force. Otherwise, he suggests, a trained militia force could, in fact, be useless.

Part 3 of the book "The Age of Violence" makes familiar reading to those who have studied world events over the past 20 years. Perhaps the most interesting view expressed by the author in this part is his insistence that "World War II," as known to many, was in fact a series of separate wars which occurred simultaneously over a period. In fact, he states that one war is still being fought. Australian readers should be intensely interested in Professor Ropp's view, as he nominates that war as "The War for East Asia."

This is a book for a library rather than an individual, unless of course the individual has his own library. It is not easy to read, but as a reference it is first class.

—Major K. B. Thomas.

The Heroes, by Ronald McKie. (Angus and Robertson Ltd., Sydney.)

On 7 July 1945, one month before the atom bomb burst above Hiroshima, ten Australian and British officers and men were beheaded with full samurai ceremony on Singapore Island.

These ten men had been prisoners of the Japanese for six months. During this time they had not only been treated with courtesy and consideration, but they were regarded by Japanese officers with "respect verging on awe," and likened to heroes from Japanese history and military tradition.

After their execution Major-General Otsuka, of Seventh Area Army, Singapore, reported to a staff conference on the "patriotism, fearless enterprise, heroic behaviour and sublime end" of all members of the party. He praised them as the "flower of chivalry" which should be taken as a model by the Japanese Army.

And a few days later, the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, General Itagaki, told his staff: "We Japanese have been proud of our bravery and courage in action, but those heroes showed us a fine example of what true bravery should be."

Although it is hard for the Western mind to grasp, the Japanese officer-class regarded the ten men so highly that they killed them not so much because they were guilty of breaking the rules of war—which they were—but to give them immortality as heroes. They had lived as samurai, they would die as samurai. Death was the highest compliment the Japanese could pay them.

This was the tragic and terrible end of the men of two extraordinary seaborne operations launched from Australia against Singapore by raiders of Z Special Unit ("Z" Force), and described by Sydney journalist, author and former war correspondent Ronald McKie in his latest book, "The Heroes."

In the first raid, Operation JAY-WICK, 14 men led by Captain (later Lieut.-Col.) Ivan Lyon, of the Gordon Highlanders, sailed a captured Japanese fishing boat, the *Krait*, from Exmouth Gulf, WA, to within a few miles of Singapore.

There, three canoe teams, armed with powerful limpet mines, were dropped to penetrate the harbour defences. They sank or damaged 40,000 tons of Japanese shipping before being picked up by the *Krait*, which had waited near Borneo, and returning to Australia.

Twenty-three men took part in the second raid, Operation RIMAU, or, as the Japanese called it, Operation TIGER. Again under the leadership of Lyon, the raiders went by submarine to the China Sea, pirated a junk, and sailed to the edge of Singapore Harbour.

What really happened there is, necessarily, conjecture; RIMAU left no survivors. But Mr. McKie's research, which runs like a detective story through the telling of RIMAU, showed that one of the party fired on a Malay water police boat. Panic? An incredible blunder? No one can say with certainty. But in the concentrated Japanese manhunt which followed, 11 men—one of whom died—were captured and the rest killed.

These two unique raids, the total success and the total failure, are profoundly moving documents from the secret war the public knew nothing about. They make astonishing and fascinating reading. They are stories of the daring and courage of ordinary men under seemingly hopeless odds and under impossible conditions.

But "The Heroes," apart from containing some of the finest writ-

ing that has yet appeared about the last war, is also an important military document; particularly, because current military training places emphasis on tropical warfare in the countries north of Australia.

The men of JAYWICK not only sailed to Singapore and back—about 5000 miles—in a slow, old tub of a boat, but they spent more than a month in strongly-patrolled enemy waters. And added to the problems of distance and sketchy geography, disease, and heat, and rain, were white skins and fair hair, amateurishly stained, and blue eyes, and big, muscular, non-Asiatic bodies, and language little understood.

That these 14 men were able to cruise and attack unchallenged under the very noses of the Japanese says much for their training, equipment, discipline and methods. It says much for the audacious thinking and planning behind a raid which, on paper, looked crazy.

Despite the gaps in RIMAU'S story, there is a totality about this book that makes run of the mill war stories very stale bread indeed. "The Heroes" is a magnificent tale and a valuable addition to Australian military history.

—Corporal A. L. Harrison,
30 Inf Bn (NSW Scottish).

The Uncertain Trumpet, by General Maxwell D. Taylor, United States Army, Retired. (Harper and Bros., New York, \$4.00.)

Reviewed by Lt-Col George B. Macauley, Artillery, in the March 1960 issue of the MILITARY REVIEW, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, USA.

In this book General Taylor, until this past summer the Chief of Staff

of the United States Army, sets forth clearly and without equivocation his analysis of the deficiencies of the present US defence programme.

General Taylor explains how our national strategy should be developed in theory, and then highlights the reasons why the system has failed in practice.

The former Army Chief of Staff clearly and concisely sets forth the major problems that have arisen during his tenure of office and explains the position of each service in relation thereto.

According to the author, a primary purpose of this splendid book is to show that the concept of Massive Retaliation is a fallacy. General Taylor maintains that this policy in its heyday could offer our leaders only two choices—the initiation of general nuclear war or compromise and retreat.

While our massive retaliatory strategy may have prevented the Great War—a world war III—it has not maintained the Little Peace; that is, peace from disturbances which are little only in comparison with the disaster of general war. General Taylor cites the many limited conventional wars that have occurred since 1945, loss of atomic monopoly, inferiority to USSR in numbers of ballistic missiles, no anti-ballistic missile, no effort to cope with Communist strength on the ground, all of which add up to our playing a losing game under current strategic concepts. A change in strategic doctrine to one which provides for the capability to react across the entire spectrum of possible challenge is required. This is the strategy of Flexible Response advocated by the former Army Chief of Staff. Such a

change, however, is made difficult, according to General Taylor, by the weaknesses of our strategy-making machinery and procedures, particularly the JCS system.

General Taylor sees deliberate general war as less likely than lesser forms of aggression, even though our national military policy is based upon general war and the attendant Massive Retaliation concept. We should abandon the policy of Massive Retaliation and adopt one of Flexible Response, which General Taylor first advocated in 1956 in a paper prepared personally by him, approved by the Secretary of the Army, and presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a "National Military Programme" in March of 1956. This document contained the unqualified assertion that "deterrence of war is the primary objective of the armed forces." It then delineated the military requirements embodied in a programme to support a strategy of Flexible Response. The Army proposal was read politely by the other service chiefs, then, as General Taylor expresses it, "quietly put to one side."

The former Chief of Staff proposes a complete reappraisal of our military needs. This, he states, is made necessary because of the following new factors:

1. Loss by the US of technological superiority over the USSR in many fields of military weaponry.
2. Our lack of ballistic missile defence.
3. Increasing danger of general war initiated deliberately (due to our decline in protection in mid-range future beginning 1961) or by accident.
4. Our inferiority to Communists in

conventional forces, which General Taylor contends is self-imposed, since the Free World outnumbered the Communist nations in manpower of military age.

The critical period facing our nation can be offset by the adoption at once of what General Taylor calls "quick fixes" and the concurrent recasting of our longer-term efforts in a National Military Programme of Flexible Response. The "quick fixes" are:

1. Improved planning and training for limited war.
2. Exploitation of the mobile IRBM.
3. Better protection for SAC.
4. A limited fall-out shelter programme.

Having initiated the "quick fixes" as a matter of urgency, we then turn to a reappraisal of our strategy. At the outset we should renounce reliance on the strategy of Massive Retaliation. General Taylor then lists in priority those forces we should provide for in our new Military Programme of Flexible Response.

To place this programme in operation requires that the roles and mis-

sions of the services be rewritten. Along with this, the current method of "vertical" budgeting should be discarded for a "horizontal" or functional approach. In addition, General Taylor proposes a realignment of our defence structure. He recommends dissolution of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as it now exists. He would substitute a single Defence Chief of Staff, who would preside over the Joint Staff. He would establish a Supreme Military Council to provide professional military advice to the Secretary of Defence, the President, and the Congress.

Controversial? Yes! And the former Army Chief of Staff faces each issue directly and coherently. He brings to light many factors which contribute to faltering and lack of co-ordination in our defence effort.

This is a brilliant book. But it probably will be challenged by many brilliant men. Its issues cut to the core of our multi-billion dollar defence programme and impinge upon the basic functions of our traditional military structure. It should be required reading by all men—in and out of uniform—engaged in the development or the implementation of national military policy.
