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### FRONTISPIECE

When World War I began in August 1914 Australia raised the First Australian Imperial Force, to be employed as an expeditionary force in an overseas theatre. On 4 December the leading elements of the AIF arrived in the Middle East.

Early in 1915 a force comprising British, French, Australian, New Zealand and Indian Army formations was concentrated in the Middle East for the purpose of mounting an amphibious assault on the Dardanelles Strait. The aim of the assault was to knock Turkey out of the war and open a supply route to Russia. The French component was to land on the Asiatic shore, while the remainder assaulted the Gallipoli peninsula.

On the morning of 25 April 1915 the Australian component landed at a place which became known as ANZAC. No special equipment was available; troops, equipment and supplies had to be landed from ships' boats and barges. Although the element of surprise was absent, the troops succeeded in winning a foothold. Eventually, after much fierce and costly fighting, the operation had to be abandoned.

The picture shows Australian troops going ashore soon after dawn on 25 April.

# AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

*A Periodical Review of Military Literature*

Number 131

April, 1960

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Photo: Australian War Memorial, Canberra

ANZAC, 25th April 1915

## AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

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# SUBMARINE MENACE IN THE PACIFIC

Staff Sergeant P. G. Gittins  
Royal Australian Engineers

*This article was written before the Russians announced their intention to test fire guided missiles in the Pacific.*

—Editor.

A FEW years ago the location of a Soviet submarine was "confirmed" off the North Australian coast. "Mystery" craft are frequently reported from the islands, and during 1957 one was reported in the Gulf of Carpentaria. In April 1958 missionaries from the Seventh Day Adventist Mission on Lou Island—20 miles south of the Australian naval base of Manus Island—reported sighting "two unidentified submarines."

During the inquiry in September 1958 into the loss of the "Melanesian," a 300-ton patrol and trading vessel, it was reported by Mr. J. L. Smith, a planter (who had served with Coastal Command during the war and knew how to spot submarines), that a submarine had been sighted near the Solomon Islands, at Kaubau Bay, on Guadalcanal, on 14 July—just four days after the "Melanesian" vanished.

Later on, in December of the same year, there was yet another inquiry into a ship missing in the South Pacific. This was the 500-ton schooner "Ian Crouch," which disappeared on or about 27 September 1958, after leaving Hong Kong for Adelaide.

Many island traders think they have the answer to the disappearance, not only of the "Melanesian" and the "Ian Crouch," but also the crew of the 70-ton trading vessel "Joyita." They think it may be Russian submarines; that the crews of these vessels might have unwittingly entered waters where Soviet submarines have been experimenting with their latest devices, and that the Soviet naval officers have considered they have seen too much. Certainly it is a strange fact that not one survivor from any one of these three vessels has ever been found or heard of since. A Commission of Inquiry on the missing crew of the "Joyita" (the vessel itself was later found waterlogged and abandoned) stated that there had been "far too many reports" of the sighting of unidentified submarines in the Pacific during recent years for them to feel easy.

On 18 March 1959 United States Rear-Admiral Benjamin Moore said in Honolulu that the United States electronics barrier in the mid-Pacific had picked up Soviet surface ships and submarines "snooping." Stretching for 1500 miles between

Midway and the Aleutians in the North Pacific, the electronics barrier is an extension of the DEW line. (Distant Early Warning System.) Admiral Moore further mentioned that United States destroyers and planes had made "numerous" contacts with the Russian vessels, and that a 24-hour sea and air patrol was being maintained in the North Pacific.

### **The Purpose of the Submarines**

Has Russia's submarine fleet been training close to Australia's shores? What is their game beneath the waves? What are they after and what is known of their operations? Very little except for the outline of a slim hull on the far horizon . . . a garbled description from a pilot of "something" that disappeared below him in a flurry of foam . . . a missionary's report . . . or even an indistinct photograph that somehow slips through the Iron Curtain.

In May 1958 a "Navy Expert" is reported to have said: "The Reds are presumably doing nothing more than we are in sending their submarines around the oceans of the world." And the Minister of the Navy is quoted as saying, "The Russians have a perfect right to send their submarines where they please—provided they remain outside territorial waters."

On the question of Russian bases in the Pacific, the Soviet feels keenly the lack of an operational centre in the area. Doubtless in war they would use Vladivostock and be allowed the use of Chinese ports, but for any long-range tasks, such as to cut communications between Pearl Harbor and the United States, and between Hawaii and Australia, she must possess fuelling, repair and victualling bases. There is a possibility therefore, remote as it may

seem, that the eventual Russian price for military and economic assistance to Indonesia, may be air and submarine bases in Western New Guinea; and if these become available then Russia could challenge the United States Navy in the Philippines and parade in Australian waters.

### **Russian Surface Craft in the Pacific**

In August 1959 there came reports from Kiel that Russia may be using her deep sea fishing fleet to tap submarine telephone and telegraph cables. The Howaldtwerke of Kiel and Hamburg is building for Russia a fleet of 24 trawlers which are designed to carry an unusual amount of technical equipment. Howaldtwerke officials said it was obvious from Russia's forced expansion of her fishing fleets that "the trawlers are after something more than fish."

It will be recalled that about twelve months ago the Russian trawler "Novorossisk" was boarded by a party from the US destroyer "Roy O. Hale" off Newfoundland, and that the destroyer's captain reported, after a seventy-minute search, that the Russian craft had dragged a cable up and damaged it.

It is significant that in March 1959 the Philippines Government detained five Russian trawlers off the north-west coast of Luzon. They had anchored there for "engine repairs"—yet their commander, Captain Barabanazov, refused to move until he received instructions from Moscow. It is also significant that not so many miles south from where the trawlers had anchored, was Caballo Island, a SEATO front line listening post having radar, sonic and other electronic devices designed to sweep the seas for hostile activity.

### The Podvodnye Lodki—the Russian Submarine Fleet

One of the main reasons why the Russian submarine fleet is so sinister is that we know so little about it. What the Free World does know about the Soviet underwater fleet is that it is big, modern—or relatively modern—and is being adapted for firing guided missiles.

The modern era of Soviet submarines springs from two sources:—

- (a) The foresight of Admiral Nikolai G. Kuznetsov (sometimes referred to as the "Father of the Soviet Navy").
- (b) The Russian looting of the East German U-boat yards at the end of World War 2.

When VE-Day came, the Germans had 119 of the revolutionary Type 21 submarines on the slips. These were capable of 17 to 18 knots when submerged—almost twice the speed of the conventional submarines at the time—and, had they put to sea, they would have been the world's fastest underwater craft. Most of these were taken by the Russians.

The Germans also had an even more advanced boat on the drawing boards—Dr. Walther's Type 26, driven by high-test hydrogen peroxide, capable of a 26-knot submerged speed. Like the Type 21, details of this new type also fell into Russian hands.

Jane's "Fighting Ships" in the 1957-1958 edition listed Russia as having 475 submarines, with another 85 in the course of construction. In June 1959 it was reported that submarines are being turned out by the Russians at the rate of one a week, so that at that rate of production it can be estimated that by 1965 Russia

will have a fleet of over 1000 submarines. Probably three-quarters of them will be atomic powered vessels of 3000 tons or more.

Of the current undersea fleet, almost half, according to United States Navy Authorities, are believed to be on a permanent operational basis in American and Caribbean waters. And from Europe there have been reports of 70 to 75 Red submarines being contacted each week as they head out through the Baltic Sea. As far back as May 1958 the New Zealand Defence Minister, Mr. P. Connolly, estimated that there were 135 Soviet submarines in the Pacific.

Russian submarines sighted in the Pacific are believed to be of the following types:—

- (a) Q Type: A small vessel, 700 tons sea going. Speed and other technical details not known.
- (b) W Type: 1300 tons. 245 feet long, with a surface speed of 17 knots and a range of 16,500 miles. This is the type of submarine that in 1956 cruised 13,000 miles from Murmansk to Antarctica to a rendezvous with the Soviet Slava whaling fleet, somewhere off Queen Maud Land, the entire voyage taking only 12 weeks, with more than half of it being done submerged.
- (c) Z Type: 2250 tons surface displacement, 310 feet long, streamlined, carrying 21 torpedoes or 40 mines, with a



speed of 22 knots on the surface and up to 16 knots submerged. The range, 26,000 miles, is enough to cover every corner of the Pacific.

The Russian Navy had previously been regarded as almost exclusively for the defence of Russian coastal waters. Now it is being turned into an attacking force which could infest the sea routes of the world and carry nuclear missiles across the oceans.

The danger of the Russian submarine fleet being cooped up in the Baltic Sea or the Black Sea has forced the Russians to equip what are in fact four different fleets.

The Baltic Fleet  
The Arctic Fleet  
The Black Sea Fleet  
The Pacific Fleet.

The Baltic Fleet is the least satisfactory, because egress is controlled entirely by the NATO Powers, but the Pacific Fleet has untrammelled use of its own ice-free Pacific ports. Objectives of the Pacific Fleet would presumably be the western seaboard of the United States and Japan—a formidable challenge to the US Navy.

It is well to remember, too, that apart from the Russian Pacific Fleet, Red China is reported to have a submarine fleet of between 20 and 25 submarines.

The growing frequency with which Soviet submarines are being sighted on the high seas is more than just a reflection of the strength of the fleet. It is also an indication of the great need for training crews in this most exacting of naval operations.

And it is interesting to note that the submarine is one of the few weapons which have increased in importance since the introduction of the atomic bomb.

#### New Developments in the Submarine Fleet

Of the latest developments in the Russian submarine fleet, these details are known by Western Intelligence:—

- (a) They have perfected an ingenious "on tow" method of submarine missile launching dating from German experiments during World War 2. Long range submarines—of a type believed to be patrolling the Pacific—tow a launching cannister fitted with ballast tanks for submerged travel. Attached behind the launcher are three rockets in waterproof containers. When the firing point is reached, the submarine surfaces, the launching cannister lid opened, and one of the 42 ft missiles loaded. The launcher is upended by opening sea-cocks in its base, so that the missile is pointed skywards, gyroscopes helping to stabilize it. Compressed air throws the missile clear, and its charge of solid fuel takes it on a planned flight path of some 600 miles.
- (b) The Russians are believed to have begun work on atomic powered submarines at a place called, until recently, Molotovak, but now known as Severodvinsk, near the White Sea port of Archangel.
- (c) American Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh Burke, told newspaper reporters in August 1959 that he thought the

Russians had "both the slow air-breathing, surface-launched missiles, and ballistic missiles capable of being launched from submerged vessels."

- (d) It is known that the Russians, who harnessed atomic power years ago, and presumably have the know-how to build atomic-powered submarines of their own, are working rapidly on the problem. It is not known for certain whether Russia does possess atomic-powered submarines, but there has been strong circumstantial evidence to say that she does. In October 1959 an American and Canadian anti-submarine patrol detected a submerged unidentified submarine and tracked it continuously for four days. It cruised more than 1000 miles without surfacing, and the only known vessel with that underwater capability is a nuclear powered submarine. Before the patrol lost contact with it all other submarines in those waters were accounted for. Naval authorities were convinced the submarine was Russian.

#### **Soviet Scientific Research in the Pacific**

On 1 May 1958 the Russian oceanographic ship "Vityaz" berthed at Port Moresby. The first Russian ship seen in New Guinea since World War 2, it had been surveying areas of the Pacific Ocean as a part of the Russian activities during the International Geophysical Year. Apart from capturing a specimen of a rare fish from the 3000 ft deep Mariana Trench, north of New Guinea, it had also discovered a south trade current, which was previously unknown

to the world. On an early expedition during August 1957 no trace of the current had been found, but in 1958, in a different season, the current was found to be travelling from east to west at a speed of 10 centimetres a second. This current was reported to stretch from the Equator to  $3\frac{1}{2}$  degrees north.

In August 1958 the same vessel made a study of the ocean bed from the Northern Japanese Islands across to the coast of the American continent. The Chief of this scientific expedition, a Dr. Veniamin Petelin, said that the Russian scientists hoped to produce a huge oceanographic plan of the Pacific Ocean, and that this survey was the 27th made by Russia. He mentioned also that for years Russian survey ships had been exploring the Arctic, Antarctic and Atlantic areas.

On 6 June 1958 Moscow Radio announced that a Soviet scientific ship, the "Vityab," had run into radioactive rain 1800 miles west of a US atomic testing base in the Pacific. This vessel also had been conducting surveys and IGY observations west of the Mariana Islands and north of the Caroline Islands in the North Pacific.

#### **Australian Countermeasures**

For the past century, until the end of World War 2, it has been Britain (with the tacit approval of the USA) which has controlled the world and provided peace. Britain exercised this authority by means of a very simple geographic arrangement—she seized all but three of the gateways or bottlenecks between the oceans. The one at Panama was in the hands of friendly USA and the two small ones in the East Indies

were held by Britain's ally, the Netherlands. Not a ton of inter-ocean shipping could move without going past British or United States points of naval control. Nations had to behave or be blockaded into submission.

This structure worked so well, and endured so long, that most of us forgot anything else was possible. Now the sea-power theory has been smashed—it is no longer valid. Today our defence and national security, indeed world security, rests on the Air-Power theory. Not only can troop movements from the Communist Heartland be kept under surveillance through air power, but a close watch can be kept on all naval movement, be it on the surface of the ocean or beneath the ocean.

As a part of its overall defence plan, the Western World must have a series of strategic airports. Some, the SAC bases, are already in existence, others are under construction. The strategic quality of some of these bases is already evident—e.g., Natal (Brazil), Dakar, Istanbul, Bangkok, Pusan, Tokyo, Taipeh and Darwin. These bases, although not directly over the Communist Heartland, skirt its borders and coasts, thus giving us ample warning of any move to expand outwards. From them bomber patrols can be kept flying just as a policeman walks his beat. It is on such strategy that Western defence is planned today, and it is on such a system that Australia must plan her defence.

We must maintain, and in some cases strengthen, our bases in the North. We must set up a series of "listening posts" and observation posts so that nothing between the Antarctic and Australia and the Asian mainland and Australia can move without our being aware of it. We must never automatically limit ourselves to purely local defence against aggression—we must take various counter-measures NOW. To be aware of a danger is not sufficient—we must take positive action against it.

### Conclusion

The world changes daily—sometimes changes taking place without our being aware of them. The change which has been going on for the last few years has been the realignment of political power over the earth. Shrinking global relations plus an expanding technology are rapidly destroying all the old premises from which we have done our reasoning. Technology has taken military power out of the hands of the people, and geography has taken away their time to mobilize for defence. Any next war will start unannounced, with a hundred Pearl Harbors simultaneously.

The safeguard for man, therefore, no longer lies in national valour, but in an international structure that will control all the possible major weapons for offence against him. In such an international structure, Australia must play a leading role.

# THE ACADEMICALLY TRAINED ENGINEER IN THE ARMY

Major J. R. M. Jentzema

Royal Australian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers

**T**HE powers that be have from time to time expressed an understandable concern in respect to the shortage of qualified engineers (and other professionally qualified officers) in the Army.

A serious shortage has accrued over the years, and it is understood that a relatively high wastage has not been made good.

Despite recruiting campaigns, from advertisements and tempting posters, no relief has been achieved, and is not likely to be, unless the Army is in the position to compete with what is offered in the various avenues in civilian life, and other Armies for that matter, in the way of salary, allowances and many other factors affecting conditions of employment.

Posters advertising the wonderful conditions and opportunities existing in the Army are of little value to anyone when they cannot be backed up materially or when they do not compare favourably with the opportunities and conditions offering elsewhere.

## Pay

In this materialistic world of ours, the first thing any applicant for any job at all will ask, is: "What does the job pay?" That is a fair enough

question considering that all and any future planning depends on it.

So, if for his qualifications and experience, an engineer can get a position which will offer him more advantages than the Army (with its drawbacks in many respects), he is not likely to join up.

An inquisitively minded engineer applicant soon realizes that no recognition is given for the brainracking training he went through in obtaining degrees or diplomas as opposed to the medical and dental professionals, who do get such recognition in the way of extra remuneration. This, of course, must strike him as anomalous, and it is just that.

If he figures that in a number of years he may become a Major, provided always he also becomes a tactician and an able administrator, he soon realizes he must be proficient in two professions (engineering and soldiering), but gets paid only for one, in contrast to the Arms officer, the Medical officer or Dental officer.

At this level he soon discovers that his counterpart in many branches of the public service, including some clerical appointments, have an advantage on him, in terms of hard cash, varying from £100 to £500 a year or more, an advantage which his counterpart is able to enjoy until

he reaches the retiring age of 65 years. If he joins the Army, he has to leave on reaching 47 or 50 years of age and start looking for another job, which is not easy at this stage. The chances are that he would be far better off in civvy street, where remuneration is far better.

The Army, he will be told, provides him (only him) with free medical and dental services. This is very good, of course, but considering that the Army man is supposed to be very fit, he is, in general, not likely to require much of those services at any time.

Now suppose the engineer (or anyone else for that matter) joined the Army and dutifully served until reaching the retiring age. If then he managed (foolishly) to find employment with a governmental agency his pension would be reduced to £500 per annum, so here again he is better off to steer clear of governmental ties and offer his services to private enterprises, as at that time his grown-up children may be in need of expensive secondary or higher education and he will need all the money he can get.

#### **Postings, Duties and Many Other Things**

Believing that the Army is possibly all it is claimed to be, and having applied for and duly been appointed as such, the technical officer is posted to a variety of appointments here, there and everywhere, and more often than not burdened with a horde of extraneous duties and with lots of responsibilities and mostly very little authority.

He has to join messes, pay fees for all sorts of funds while a member, partake in all sorts of social

functions, mess-do's and what have you.

While single this is not too bad, but when marital responsibilities arise the picture becomes vastly different.

He may be sent away on duty at any time for a few days, and usually in the performance of such duties he will find himself out of pocket as a result of piddling and unrealistic allowances provided for by an archaic finance system, not to speak of the incredible and cumbersome amount of bumph required to legalize all this in terms of paper, filing systems, clerks, auditors, etc.

During his service he may contemplate the blissful state of matrimony, and so perhaps shortly after being reposted interstate he takes upon himself the unheard of impertinence to get married.

Obviously he wants his wife to be with him, but housing is at a premium. On a points system he has very little chance of getting even sub-standard Army accommodation in a metropolitan area. Even if he did get it he would have to pay 15% of his active pay regardless of whether the accommodation is up to the standard laid down or not, the difficulty arising from the fact that many houses are not Commonwealth owned and concessions or appeals not applicable. Should he decide the Army accommodation offered is unsuitable because of unsuitable surroundings or space, he is out of luck; he can take it or leave it.

He has then no alternative but to organize himself into a respectable house and area commensurate with his "social standing," usually at ex-

cessive rentals far above the reasonable 15% of his active pay. Relief of such conditions, he finds out, is only available to married colleagues whose repostings meant the removal of their families to his new post. In fact, he should have married before reposting or not at all if he did not want to go broke. But then the same conditions would have applied at his former posting, since he was not eligible for relief, and anyway who was to know he was going to be reposted?

During his career in the Army he is kicked from pillar to post to the four winds, his children's education suffers, he is away from home for sometimes long periods, has to attend courses, do all sorts of extra duties affecting his home life in no small way, has to live in areas where living costs increase in proportion to the distance from metropolitan areas. He finds that only certain well-defined areas give consideration to increased living costs, and usually the same piddling restrictions and unrealistic values apply.

He also meets colleagues from other Armies and Commonwealth Armies serving the cause of the same crown, and very soon realizes he joined a poor man's Army.

The British officer, as compensation for many disadvantages inherent in the Army Service, receives upon retiring a terminal grant equal to three (3) times his retired pay. He receives a pension (retired pay) to which he has not been required to contribute, 42 days leave a year, recognition in terms of allowances for any degrees or special skills he may have, allowances for being away from his unit for a certain number of hours or days, allowances

for travelling to and from his place of abode to work, should he not be in Army quarters with his unit; free rail travel up to three (3) times a year anywhere within the UK and concessional rates of travel for his family, medical and dental services are available to his family in every respect, etc.

Surveying the field somewhat further, there is evidence that some countries exist which do appreciate their Armies.

They would blush at the thought of retiring their Army members on a pension which brings them down to a level lower than the bread line. They reason that since during their service officers have acquired and have had to keep up a certain desirable (must keep up appearances, you know!) social standing, it is morally wrong to kick them out, after faithful service, and allow them only a social standing below that of a street sweeper. So they retire their faithful servants on 80% of their last paid salary, or more, which is a very reasonable set-up, especially since the pension keeps in step with the prevailing rate of Army pay while the member is alive.

Should he die, they reason further, it is unthinkable that his widow, now left to cater for children and for their education, should have to go out to work to do that. This cannot and should not be expected of her, the more so, considering that during her husband's service she and her children had to put up with lots of the less attractive aspects of Army life. It is then only fitting and just that she should inherit this well-earned pension in toto to enable her to meet her obli-

gations to her family until she dies or decides to remarry.

From time to time commissions have been set up to investigate certain aspects of Army life, pay, conditions, etc., but usually this slow grinding apparatus, after endless deliberations, conferences, amendments, reports and whatever may be required in this process, produces recommendations which are already outdated by the time the intended ameliorating conditions are ready to be brought into effect. So before long it is necessary to start on the vicious circle once more with the unenviable prospect of attaining the same results as before. In keeping with true democratic tradition, it is always too little and too late.

The analytic mind of the qualified engineer, weighing the pros and cons of possible advantages of Army life against other systems, soon makes him decide against it, which is no wonder.

#### Conclusion

Until a more realistic approach to the problem is made and considerable changes brought into effect in order to enable the Army to compete on equal, and preferably better,

terms with the conditions prevailing outside its system, its quest for engineering and professional talent, on the present supply and demand position, is unlikely to be successful. Any appreciable increase in the intake of qualified professionals or the decrease in the wastage of good engineer material with the present system in vogue, will be very surprising indeed.

To the man who is to meet the hard and factual challenge of civilized life in the community, the Army does not offer any incentive to either get him or to hold him.

The fiery patriotic one may be willing to trade lots of advantages for the pride and satisfaction to serve his country and wear its uniform, but very few of those are to be found in the materialistic world of today.

The present hearing by the Arbitration Court of salary claims lodged by the Commonwealth Public Service Professional Officers' Association and the Association of Professional Engineers is yet another reminder of the need to initiate action for the recognition of professional engineers in the Army.

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## Strategic Review

# CENTRAL AMERICAN SUEZ

Reprinted from the January 1960 issue of An Cosantoir, Eire

THE outbreak of "Go-home-Yankee-ism" in Panama on the 56th anniversary of Panama's independence from Colombia, when rioters actually moved in on the Canal Zone, was an echo—and a strong one—of current Latin American feeling about the United States.

The claim of certain official United States spokesmen that the riots and anti-American sentiments were Communist-inspired may contain some vestige of accuracy, but the basic reasons can be traced back to the early days of the present century, when the comparatively youthful United States was in process of building an economic empire.

Interest in an isthmian canal had been shown in Europe as far back as the days of early Spanish colonisation, but United States interest became live after the Mexican War of 1848, when more Pacific territory was acquired.

It was the French, however, who took the first practical steps towards construction when, in 1882, de Lesseps of Suez fame commenced the task. His inability to foresee the magnitude of the job, together with corruption, fever and the floods from the Chagres River, combined to wreck the project.

### Treaty with Britain

The outbreak of the Spanish-American War and the delay caused by the necessity of sending the battleship *Oregon* around the Straits of Magellan, served to focus attention on the need for an inter-ocean waterway. The United States was determined to build up her power in the Caribbean, then considered to be vital to national security. A treaty was concluded with Great Britain, who agreed to surrender her fifty-year-old interests in an isthmian canal and the United States was given freedom to build and to fortify it.

The United States purchased the French concession and equipment for \$40 million, and proposed an agreement with Colombia, of which Panama was then a part. Colombia was dissatisfied with the terms and rejected the offer, but a revolt against Colombia by Panama broke out in 1903, and the provisional government of Panama offered the Canal Zone to the United States on the proposed terms. If the United States did not inspire this revolt—and its very timeliness makes this a matter for speculation—she did nothing to interfere with the rebels. On the contrary, her naval forces



invoked an old treaty and refused to permit the transit of Colombian troops to suppress the revolt. In addition, recognition was given to the new republic with a suspicious promptitude.

The seeds of present Latin-American hostility to the United States may well have been sown in 1903, since the strong-arm methods of the more powerful country ignored the susceptibilities of the weaker state and suggested that non-interference with other nations was merely hypocrisy, and that self-interest was the political yardstick.

#### Terms of Treaty

Under the terms of the treaty which was signed in 1903 the United States was granted in perpetuity the use, occupation and control of the canal under construction to a breadth of ten miles, sovereign rights within the Canal Zone and the right to use armed forces to protect the canal. The Canal Zone, as a political unit, was organized for administrative control over the canal, but although for all practical purposes it is a territory of the United States, it is not a territorial possession. It is a military reservation under the Secretary of War, and most of its governors have been chosen from the armed forces. For the needs of the canal other territory was granted, including certain islands in Panama Bay.

In return for the grants the United States agreed to pay Panama \$10 million and, after nine years, an annual rent of \$250,000. A treaty in 1955 provided that rent be increased to \$1.93 million. The United States also undertook to guarantee Panamanian independence.


The United States occupation of

the Canal Zone, which has an area of 648 square miles, began in 1904, and ten years later (on 15th August 1914) just 11 days after the outbreak of World War I, the canal was opened to shipping. The cost of the forty-mile-long waterway, exclusive of military installations, was approximately \$360 million.

The 1914-18 war fully justified the outlay. A constant stream of supplies poured through the canal—and the United States Navy had its short means of communication between the Atlantic and the Pacific. Incidentally, it was not until 1914 that Colombia recognized the independence of Panama, and eight years later, in 1922, the United States made the unusual gesture of paying Colombia \$25 million in order to remove all misunderstandings regarding the acquisition of the Canal Zone, a windfall for Colombia that hardly succeeded, however, in removing her sense of grievance.

#### World War II

During World War II the strategic value of the canal to the United States was still regarded as important, and for strategic reasons the construction of an additional set of locks, at a cost of \$277 million, was authorized by Congress in 1939. In fact, however, the role of the canal was again mainly economic, since the United States Navy was divided into three fleets—Atlantic, Pacific and Asiatic—but the strategic importance of the canal lay in the fact that these fleets could combine if necessary in a comparatively short time. Although the Japanese never attacked the canal there was a possibility of naval action against it after the destruction of the fleet in Pearl Harbour, but the Battle of Midway (1942) removed the danger.



Since World War II technological development has reduced world distances, and the strategic importance of the canal has lessened. Naval battles have become outdated and maritime transportation of men and materials has become too slow for the purposes of modern warfare. Furthermore, the canal would be a vulnerable target in an age of nuclear warfare and, in fact, would be indefensible in an all-out war. Military thinking in the United States has apparently reached this conclusion, since the protection of the canal has been confided to the care of two anti-aircraft battalions and one regiment of infantry; naval forces are nominal and there are no combat aircraft squadrons. In the event of an attack there is no doubt that the United States would react by sending reinforcements, but the canal is no longer vital to United States defence.

#### **Economic Viewpoint**

From the economic point of view the canal is of greater importance to Panama and the countries on the western coast of South America than to the United States. It is operated by the Panama Canal Company, which was formed in 1951, and has more than paid its way since then. Toll charges are low, but still total more than twenty times the annuity paid to Panama under the 1955 treaty. Of the collections, roughly two-fifths are assigned to the Canal Company, one-fifth to payment of interest on the United States investment, while one-tenth is set aside for future development. United States shipping is the largest user of the waterway, but a considerable European tonnage also passes through.

Panama itself depends substantially on the canal, and of her half-million population some 9000 are employed either in the Canal Zone or in canal administration. Apart from the annuity paid by the United States, Panama's trade with the Canal Zone, both in goods and services, produces from 35% to 40% of her national income of approximately \$130 million, and on it rests her entire economy. Nevertheless a considerable proportion of the population exists on the verge of poverty, and views with envious eyes the high standard of living of the 11,000 Americans in the Canal Zone and the higher wages and privileges accorded to them. Since it opened in 1914 more than one billion tons in trade have passed through the canal and the gross revenue in 1958 amounted to \$83 million. It is not difficult to understand why Panamanians demand a larger proportion of this or why they sought equal wages and privileges for their nationals working in the Canal Zone.

#### **Sovereignty Question**

It has been argued that the grant of national territory to the United States in perpetuity is inconsistent with national sovereignty, and that such grants should be limited in time or subject to regular review, and also that the 1903 treaty did not grant the United States sovereignty over the canal—which latter is, however, an academic point, since the United States, in fact, possesses sovereign rights. In December, 1958, Panama extended the limits of her territorial waters from three miles to twelve miles, a decision which, in theory, closed off both ends of the Canal Zone and interposed nine miles of

Panamanian territory between it and the open sea—but the United States merely rejected the claim.

The extremists are now demanding that the United States clear out entirely, and are building up tension to such a point that, unless some conciliatory move is made in the near future, the breaking point will come. Panama has no naval or air forces and no ground forces except the National Guard, which is designed to handle internal security. If national feeling should rise to the point of an official act of hostility against the Canal Zone, the United States will be faced with an impossible dilemma. An armed conflict could only have one result, but would irretrievably damage United States' prestige in the West and among the uncommitted nations; in addition, the Latin-American nations might be induced to participate actively in the Panamanian struggle for practical self-determination.

On the other hand, the canal cannot very well be handed over to the caprice of a small Latin American State, since, apart from the need to protect United States investment in the project, the canal is now an international waterway, and any action similar to that of Egypt in refusing passage through the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping would be intolerable. The rather Gilbertian invasion of Panama by less than a

hundred Cubans in April, 1959, could be paralleled on a much greater scale if the defence of the state rested with native forces, and present anti-United States feeling in Latin America could be readily exploited to that end.


#### What Can Be Done

What then is the United States to do? More than ten years ago Truman suggested that the United Nations Organisation take over, but internationalisation would hardly be acceptable to the Panamanians, who would then neither have sovereignty nor the benefits they now enjoy from the canal. The last resort open to the United States would appear to be, firstly, the payment to Panama of a substantial proportion of the revenue received from the operation of the canal; secondly, a less "colonial" attitude to the Panamanians employed in the Canal Zone and a levelling of wages and privileges with that of United States citizens employed there, and, finally, a practical gesture of the recognition of Panama's sovereignty by inviting the Panamanian Government to take a more active part in the administration and control of the canal.

In this way the economic aspirations of Panama may be achieved and her national pride assuaged, but if another Suez is to be avoided the United States must act quickly.

—R.G.E.

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# OFFICERS RANKS IN SEATO

Lieutenant G. M. Capper (RL)  
Editorial Staff

**T**HE purpose of this article is to assist officers in recognizing their opposite numbers in the South-East Asia Treaty Organization, which is composed of Australia, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand and the United States of America.

As the badges of rank in the armies of Australia, Great Britain and New Zealand are the same, these countries have been grouped under the general title of British Commonwealth. Pakistan, a member of the Commonwealth and which, until very recently, wore the same badges of rank, has been dealt with separately.

## General

A short section is devoted to each country in this survey, and the chart on page 24 covers all the member countries with the exception of Pakistan. In the case of Thailand the English equivalent of the ranks is used to avoid confusion, though

the full Thai titles are given in the section devoted to that country.

The lower ranks of all the SEATO nations are similar, and with the exception of the title "First Lieutenant" used by the Philippines and the United States of America, and the titles of "Sous Lieutenant" (sub-lieutenant) and "Commandant" used by France, the ranks follow the same pattern.

In Generals' ranks, however, the French and the Thais use the system common to many military forces of designating Generals by the force they command or the equivalent force to their status—General of a Division in France and Third Soldier in Thailand.

This system of an officer's title being based on his equivalent command is particularly common in the lower ranks of the navies of the world. The Germans have a Fre-

1. This rank is also referred to as "Chef de Bataillon" or "Chef d'Escadron (Battalion or Squadron Commander).

gatten Kapitän, the French Capitaine de Fregate and the Spanish and South Americans have Capitán de Fragata, the British and United States equivalent being a Commander. For the purpose of comparing these ranks and converting to the English language equivalent one "translates" the command. By this a General de Corps d'Armée becomes a General who commands an Army Corps, who, in the British system, is a Lieutenant-General. Similarly, in the naval ranks, though this has no bearing on the present subject, and is quoted merely as a matter of interest, a Vessel (*Vaisseau* Fr. and *Navio* Sp.) is larger than a Frigate (*Fregate* Fr., *Fragata* Sp.), which in turn is larger than a Corvette (*Corvette* Fr., *Corveta* Sp.), and by the same process arrives at the ranks of Captain, Commander and Lieutenant-Commander respectively.

Amongst the SEATO military forces a very common badge of rank is the five-pointed star. This is always shown with the point upwards on all flags and in army rank insignia, and is generally considered to be "upside down" when not shown in this way. However, officers in the "Executive" branch of the United States Navy wear a five-pointed star over the rings on their sleeves or bars on their epaulettes. It is very strange that these stars are upside down, whilst all other five-pointed stars in the United States, including the National flag, are shown with one point upwards. Naval officers in the United States can get some comfort from the knowledge that the Victorian Police have this in common with them.

### Economics

After a careful survey of all the SEATO ranks it would appear that the British system is the most economical. An officer can keep on using the same insignia throughout his service, occasionally purchasing an extra device. An exception is the rank of Brigadier, who uses a smaller "pip" and has no further use for these in subsequent ranks. In the other armies, with the exception of Thailand, new insignia are required as rank increases. The Thais, however, have to have new epaulettes. In the United States of America promotion up to General is an expensive business, as an insignia is only useful for one rank. In France it must be very expensive, as gold braid fades and the mere addition of a new bar would not be successful, a completely new set each time must be necessary—and the kepis, a new kepi each promotion. And what do Brigadiers do with their "pips" when they get Sword and Baton?

### British Commonwealth

No description of these ranks is necessary for readers, but some comments on the basic "pip" may be of interest. The "pip," as it is commonly known, is a replica of the Star of the Knight Grand Cross of the Military Division of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath. It is illustrated in Figure 1, and the motto "Tria Juncta in Uno" is generally accepted to refer to the union of the kingdoms of England, Scotland and Wales. The small symbols in the centre of the star are Albert Crowns, and the star is worn with two crowns "up" as illustrated.




Figure 1

"Pips" are not all the same, some Regiments wearing black ones and others a different device altogether. In the Brigade of Guards the Grenadier, Coldstream and Welsh Guards wear a "pip" fashioned on the Star of the Order of the Garter, whilst the Scots Guards have one fashioned on the Star of the Order of the Thistle, and the Irish Guards the Star of the Order of St. Patrick. Regiments that have been awarded the Victoria Cross as a unit wear a replica of the cross in place of "pips."

#### France

The ranks of the French Army are the most confusing of the SEATO nations to identify. In some respects this is because the badges of rank appear to be going through a transitional period.

Rank in the Armies of France and France Beyond the Seas (*France d'outre mer*) is shown in three ways, either on an epaulette or on the cuffs of the sleeves and on the head-dress. However, this to a great extent depends on the dress being worn.

The simplest method is to concentrate on the tunic or shirt in-

signia and deal with the kepi separately, particularly as rank shown on the kepi, in some cases, covers groups rather than individual ranks.

The basic French badge of rank is one gold bar. This represents a "sous lieutenant" or sub-lieutenant.

As the officer is promoted an additional gold bar is added till reaching the rank of "Commandant" or Major, when four gold bars are worn. Lieutenant-Colonel is treated as a "half" rank, and this officer is distinguished by five bars, three of them gold and two silver, the gold ones being divided by the silver ones. Colonel reverts to the original system and has five gold bars.

This rule, however, is varied in certain instances. In "Chars de Combat" (Armoured Vehicles), "Cuirassiers" (cavalry), certain Infantry, such as Chasseurs, and some services, a Sous Lieutenant has one silver bar. Bars of silver braid are added, following the rules for gold braid. A Lieutenant-Colonel has three silver bars separated by two gold bars.

After passing the rank of Colonel the system changes and stars are substituted for bars. A Brigadier-General (Général de Brigade) is given a good start off and wears two five-pointed stars, side by side, with the addition of stars as rank increases. The arrangement of the stars is also changed, and a General or "Général d'Armée" wears five stars arranged four in cruciform with one star above. The highest rank in the French Army, Maréchal de France, has a jump of two stars, and has seven arranged in what might be described as double or Lorraine cruciform.

All this is quite simple when it is remembered that officers of Field rank and under wear bars and General officers wear stars. Some officers when wearing service dress have the rank insignia on the sleeve and some on the epaulette. The ranks are illustrated on page 24 as worn on the epaulette, and when rank is shown on the cuff of the sleeves the arrangement is the same.

It must be borne in mind that the bars of officers on the sleeve are worn parallel to the cuff. NCOs also have bars on the sleeve, but these are worn at an angle to the cuff.

Rank on the kepi is shown by gold or silver bands (gold and silver in the case of Lieutenant-Colonels) around the top of the crown. The colours of the bands follow the rules described earlier in the section for epaulette or sleeve and are illustrated in Figure 2. The bands, as worn at present, are closer to the top of the kepi than shown in the illustration which is designed for clarity.

Rank in the case of the kepis of General Officers is shown in two

ways. In service dress the system is very simple. Stars, arranged in the same way as the stars on the sleeve, are worn on the front of a plain khaki kepi. This has a chin strap with oak leaves embroidered on it. Readers will no doubt have noticed that the French President is often photographed wearing such a kepi.

However, with more formal dress, a kepi with bands of oak leaves and acorns is worn. One band for a Général de Brigade, two bands (the lower band narrower) for Généraux de Division, Corps and Armée, and three bands of narrowing width for a Maréchal de France. This system can be compared to the British system of different cap badges for Brigadiers, General Officers and Field Marshals.

Unfortunately the system does not stop at this. These bands of leaves are of definite designs laid down and are classified. Officers of the services wear variations of oak and laurel leaves, a definite pattern for each service, similar to the British system of different coloured cap bands. This is very complicated




Figure 2



	FRANCE		PHILIPPINES		BRITISH
MARÉCHAL DE FRANCE SILVER					FIELD MARSHAL GOLD 
GÉNÉRAL D'ARMÉE SILVER					GENERAL GOLD 
GÉNÉRAL DE CORPS D'ARMÉE SILVER		LIEUTENANT GENERAL SILVER		LIEUTENANT GENERAL GOLD	
GÉNÉRAL DE DIVISION SILVER		MAJOR GENERAL SILVER		MAJOR GENERAL GOLD	
GÉNÉRAL DE BRIGADE SILVER		BRIGADIER GENERAL SILVER		BRIGADIER GOLD	
COLONEL GOLD		COLONEL SILVER		COLONEL GOLD	
LIEUTENANT COLONEL GOLD & SILVER		LIEUTENANT COLONEL SILVER		LIEUTENANT COLONEL GOLD	
COMMANDANT GOLD		MAJOR SILVER		MAJOR GOLD	
CAPITAINE GOLD		CAPTAIN SILVER		CAPTAIN GOLD	
LIEUTENANT GOLD		FIRST LIEUTENANT SILVER		LIEUTENANT GOLD	
SOUS LIEUTENANT GOLD		SECOND LIEUTENANT SILVER		SECOND LIEUTENANT GOLD	

MONWEALTH		THAILAND		UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
	<p><b>FIELD MARSHAL</b> GOLD</p>			<p><b>GENERAL OF THE ARMY</b> SILVER &amp; GOLD</p>
	<p><b>GENERAL</b> GOLD</p>			<p><b>GENERAL</b> SILVER</p>
	<p><b>LIEUTENANT GENERAL</b> GOLD</p>			<p><b>LIEUTENANT GENERAL</b> SILVER</p>
	<p><b>MAJOR GENERAL</b> GOLD</p>			<p><b>MAJOR GENERAL</b> SILVER</p>
	<p><b>BRIGADIER GENERAL</b> GOLD</p>			<p><b>BRIGADIER GENERAL</b> SILVER</p>
	<p><b>COLONEL</b> GOLD</p>			<p><b>COLONEL</b> SILVER</p>
	<p><b>LIEUTENANT COLONEL</b> GOLD</p>			<p><b>LIEUTENANT COLONEL</b> SILVER</p>
	<p><b>MAJOR</b> GOLD</p>			<p><b>MAJOR</b> GOLD</p>
	<p><b>CAPTAIN</b> GOLD</p>			<p><b>CAPTAIN</b> SILVER</p>
	<p><b>LIEUTENANT</b> GOLD</p>			<p><b>FIRST LIEUTENANT</b> SILVER</p>
	<p><b>SECOND LIEUTENANT</b> GOLD</p>			<p><b>SECOND LIEUTENANT</b> GOLD</p>

and is best ignored in so short a study. However, officers of the Postal and Treasury services, who rank equivalent to a Général de Brigade, wear a green kepi with silver embroidered leaves upon it.

A further head-dress is worn in the French Army, a forage cap (fore and after) on which rank is also shown. The system for Junior and Field Officers is bars on the left-hand side at the front and for Generals stars, as for service kepi. However, a departure from the general rule is that a Maréchal de France on the forage cap (and the steel helmet) wears crossed batons with leaves instead of stars.

In the services the French Army has a variety of titles. As officers of the Control Corps of Army Administration, Powder Services and Armament Manufacture are hardly likely to be found on either Division or Corps level, to avoid further confusion they are omitted. Officers of other services, such as Medical, Veterinary and the Legal Branch, wear rank badges as for arms, though they have special titles.

Various colours are worn by French officers, but these can be ignored insofar as recognizing rank is concerned, as they relate to arms, and denote Cavalry, Artillery, Spahis, Tirailleurs, etc.

The French system is perhaps confusing to readers, but they may take comfort from the fact that apparently this confusion is shared by the experts, as no two books in the Defence Library and the Public Library of Victoria appeared to agree on the subject. However, thanks to the help and co-operation of the library staff of the Australian


War Memorial, Canberra, a semi-official French publication was produced which cleared up (and complicated further) the contentious matter of the Generals' kepis.

### Pakistan

On 23 March 1957 Pakistan became an independent Islamic republic within the British Commonwealth. As a consequence, the use of the Crown as a device by the Army would be incongruous, and new devices for designating rank were introduced.

The ranks of commissioned officers in the Pakistan Army are exactly the same as those of the rest of the British Commonwealth countries in SEATO, and range from Second Lieutenant to Field Marshal. The President of Pakistan, Field Marshal Ayub Khan, was promoted to this rank on 28 October 1959 and is the first officer to have reached this rank in the Pakistan Army.

The standard British "pip" is replaced by a four-pointed star similar in overall shape to the "pip," but surmounted by the Islamic star and crescent surrounded by a wreath of leaves. This is referred to in this section as the Pakistani "pip" to avoid confusion with the other star referred to later. Similarly, the Crown is replaced by a star and crescent device, the star being five pointed and the crescent surrounding the star. This device is a legacy from the Moslem rulers of India from AD 1093 to AD 1803. This crescent has a leaf relief motif on it, the significance of which is not explained, but similar motifs will be remembered by officers who served in the Middle East.



LIEUTENANT COLONEL — PAKISTAN


Figure 3

The system of showing rank follows the British system exactly, the Pakistani "pip" replacing the British "pip" and the star and crescent device replacing the Crown. Thus a Lieutenant wears two Pakistani "pips," a Lieutenant-Colonel, as illustrated in Figure 3, wears a star and crescent and a "pip," and a Lieutenant-General a star and crescent, a "pip" and crossed sword and baton.

General officers, Brigadiers and Colonels wear gorget patches and coloured cap bands, as in the other Commonwealth countries. The cap bands are scarlet except for Remount, Veterinary and Farm Corps, who wear maroon, and Dental Corps, who wear green.

In the old Indian Army there were certain ranks known as Viceroy's Commission ranks, or V.C.O.s, such as Jemadar, Subedar, Risaldar (cavalry), Subedar Major and Risaldar Major (cavalry), titles which will no doubt evoke Kiplingesque memories in some readers. These officers commanded platoons and troops and were commissioned from the ranks. These have been carried on in the Republic of Pakistan, though now called Junior Commissioned Officers, JCOs, they still maintain their old titles.

Though these officers correspond approximately to warrant-officers, classes III, II and I, to avoid confusion these ranks are described. A JCO is designated by a strip of braid, approximately  $\frac{3}{8}$  in. wide,



SUBEDAR OR RISALDAR MAJOR (PAK.)

Figure 4

sewn across the shoulder strap between the point of the shoulder and the first badge of rank. Apart from this strip, officers' badges of rank are worn as illustrated in Figure 4 and are as follows:—

Jemadar	1 pip
Subedar	} 2 pips
Risaldar	
Subedar Major	} star and crescent
Risaldar Major	


### Philippines

Simplicity is the keynote in the system of denoting rank in the army of the Philippines, and the insignia denoting the respective ranks are arranged in a manner somewhat similar to that of the armies of the Commonwealth.


From the adjoining illustration, Fig. 5, it will be seen that each group of ranks has a different symbol, Lieutenant-General, three stars, being the highest rank in the Philippines Army.

Officers below Field rank wear an equilateral triangle with curved edges. In the centre of this triangle, which has moulded edges, is the Tagalog script letter "K," which signifies "Kalayaan" (Freedom) and "Kasarinlan" (Independence). The triangles are worn in the same way as the Commonwealth "pip," one for Second Lieutenant, two for Lieutenant and three for a Captain.


Field officers wear a different symbol, in the same way as Field officers in the Commonwealth wear the Crown. This symbol is a symbolic Philippine sun  $\frac{3}{4}$  inch in diameter with 8 rays, signifying the first eight provinces to take up arms against Spain in 1896. In the centre of this sun is the Tagalog script



GENERAL OFFICERS



FIELD OFFICERS



OFFICERS BELOW  
FIELD RANK

Figure 5

"K." The difference from the Commonwealth system with Field officers is that Lieutenant-Colonels wear two such suns and Colonels three.

General officers have a five-pointed star, superimposed by the 8-rayed sun and having in the centre the curved sided triangle

Second Lieutenant .. ..	Teniente Segundo
First Lieutenant .. ..	Teniente Primero
Captain .. ..	Capitán
Major .. ..	Mayor
Lieutenant-Colonel .. ..	Teniente Coronel
Colonel .. ..	Coronel
Brigadier-General .. ..	Generál de Brigada
Major-General .. ..	Generál de División
Lieutenant-General .. ..	Generál de Cuerpo del Ejército

It is an interesting point that the General's star in the Philippines Army, by the superimposition of the eight-pointed star and the Tagalog letter "K," has only one "right way" up.

#### Thailand

The system employed to denote the *commissioned ranks in the Thai Army* is easy to follow, and resembles the Commonwealth system more than any of the SEATO nations.

The basic symbol is a five-pointed moulded brass or gilt star, which takes the place of the Commonwealth "pip." Up to Captain the system is the same, one for a Second Lieutenant, two for a Lieutenant and three for a Captain.

Field officers wear a crown, but the crown is joined to a five-pointed star. This symbol is illustrated in the heading of this article, where the Royal Thai Crown is shown joined to the five-pointed star. This whole symbol is worn by a Major, a Lieutenant-Colonel and Colonel, being

with the Tagalog script "K." This symbol is intended to signify the chain of command and cohesiveness in the military hierarchy of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

Spanish is common in the Philippines, and for the record it might be useful to give the Spanish equivalent of the various ranks:

denoted by the addition of one and two stars respectively.

A Brigadier-General wears the same insignia as a Major, but with the addition of a wreath of leaves around the base of the star. This rank has been abolished, but existing Brigadier-Generals will continue to hold the rank until promoted or retired. The remaining general officers are denoted by the addition of stars up to the rank of Lieutenant-General, the leaves in each case being around the base of the lowest star. A General has three stars in addition to the combined crown and star, with the difference that the stars are in cruciform with the leaves around the base of the lowest star.

The highest rank in the Thai Army is Field Marshal, and such an officer wears the crown and five small stars arranged in a circle. A wreath of leaves embraces the base of the two lowest stars, and in the centre of the circle there is a baton and sabre crossed.

However, in one point the Thai ranks differ. The epaulettes differ for each group of ranks. Below Field rank the epaulette is black bordered by a wide gold strip. Field officers have the same epaulette with the addition of two narrow strips down the centre, and General officers and Field Marshals have a gold interwoven epaulette.

Black epaulettes with gold borders are also worn by warrant-

officers and staff sergeants, though they do not have stars and the ranks are denoted by different symbols. Cadets at the Royal Thai Military College wear a scarlet epaulette.

Naturally in referring to these officers as Majors, Generals and Colonels the English equivalent is being used. In the Thai language their respective ranks are as follows:—

		Literal Translation
Field Marshal	.. .. Jorm-pon	"Chief Soldier"
General	.. .. Pon-aik	"First Soldier"
Lieutenant-General	.. .. Pon-tou	"Second Soldier"
Major-General	.. .. Pon-tree	"Third Soldier"
Brigadier-General	.. .. Pon-jutawar	"Fourth Soldier"
Colonel	.. .. Pun-aik	"First of a Thousand"
Lieutenant-Colonel	.. .. Pun-tou	"Second of a Thousand"
Major	.. .. Pun-tree	"Third of a Thousand"
Captain	.. .. Roi-aik	"First of a Hundred"
Lieutenant	.. .. Roi-tou	"Second of a Hundred"
	Roi-tree	"Third of a Hundred"

From the above table a certain amount of Thai can be gleaned. "Pon" is a soldier, "Aik" is first, "Tou" is second, "Tree" is third, and "Jutawar" is fourth. Also that "Pun" is one thousand and "Roi" is one hundred.

Returning to the illustration used in the heading, under the symbol, is the rank of Major or "Pun-tree" written in Thai script. From a perusal of all the ranks in Thai script it can be seen that the two left-hand "letters" denote "Pun," which perhaps doesn't help much anyway.

#### United States of America

One of the unusual points of the United States system of designating rank is that gold is rated lower than silver. When one considers that the United States Army has very

strong roots in the Panama Canal Zone, where the Americans had a very subtle social barrier or colour bar, designating the "non-U's" as "silver" and the "U's" as "gold" on public conveniences in that Zone, it is surprising

The lowest rank is that of Second Lieutenant, designated by one gold bar. On promotion to First Lieutenant a silver bar is substituted, and a Captain has two silver bars, joined by two narrow metal strips. Majors wear a gold maple leaf and Lieutenant-Colonels a silver leaf. Full Colonels have a silver eagle, which gives rise to the slang expression of a "Chicken Colonel," to differentiate from the half rank.

With American Generals rank is designated by an increasing number of five-pointed stars, starting

with one for a Brigadier-General to four for a General. The highest rank, General of the Army, which was created during the 1941-45 war, is designated by five stars arranged in a circle and surmounted by a device which could be described as the equivalent of the Commonwealth Royal Cypher. This device is an eagle, facing right, wings outstretched, holding sheaves of grain in its claws, with the United States shield in front, and the eagle is surmounted by a blue plaque carrying the thirteen stars representing the original states in the Union.

The United States Marines wear the same rank insignia as the Army, though the actual insignia are different in minor respects. For instance, the strips that join a Captain's bars are on the outside edge, and General's stars are joined by a strip when the rank calls for two or three stars and joined together for four stars. It would thus appear

it is more costly to be in the Marines than in the Army. United States Air Force ranks are similar to Army ranks, and officers wear the same devices, though the uniform is different. However, the rank of General of the Air Force is designated by five stars arranged in a circle without the device described earlier.


### Conclusion

Usually in a case like this, where many nations are compared, there are instances where confusion could exist. It is surprising therefore that among all the SEATO signatories no two ranks in their armies have the same insignia.

However, should anyone be labouring under the impression that a United States Major General (two stars) is a Thai Lieutenant (two stars), it is certain that the General will speedily rid them of the misapprehension.







## BOOK REVIEWS

**ONCE THERE WAS A WAR,** by John Steinbeck. (William Heinemann Ltd., 317 Collins Street, Melbourne.)

"Once upon a time there was a war, but so long ago and so shouldered out of the way by other wars and other kinds of wars that even people who were there are apt to forget. This war that I speak of came after the plate armour of Crecy and Agincourt and just before the little spitting experimental atom bombs of Hiroshima and Nagasaki."

In these words John Steinbeck begins his introduction to this collection of the despatches which, as a war correspondent, he sent from England, Africa and Italy in 1943. In assembling the despatches he has not altered them nor polished them in any way. They remain, as he says, period pieces in which he recorded his impressions of the war as it affected the lives of the men who fought it.

John Steinbeck is a great novelist and a great dramatist, and therefore a great observer of human nature. Mostly he is concerned with human beings, with people, rather than with events. Certainly in these despatches he is not at all concerned with strategy and tactics, with the problems of statesmen and generals. In fact he rarely mentions them, and then

only in passing. He writes about the soldiers, sailors and airmen who did the fighting, of their adjustments to the strange environment of service life, of their wonder at new sights and new lands, of their reaction to the stress of combat. Steinbeck writes of these things with deep penetration and understanding and with rare descriptive powers.

In a despatch called "Directed Understanding," Steinbeck sounds a warning against the official information commonly fed to troops proceeding on overseas service. He suggests, as a good many others have suspected, that the result of these well-meant efforts to describe the respective characteristics of the folks we are about to meet is that the two come together like strange dogs, each one looking for trouble.

The trouble with these indoctrination courses, he feels, lies in the fact that they generalize too much. "Once you have made a generality you are stuck with it. You have to defend it. Let's say the British and/or American soldier is a superb soldier. The British and/or American officer is a gentleman. You start with a lie. There are good ones and bad ones. You find out for yourself which is which if you are let alone. If you see an American lieutenant misbehaving in a London club it is expected that you will deny it.

If you meet an ill-mannered British officer, the British are expected to deny that he exists. But he does exist, and they hate him as much as we do. The trouble with generalities, particularly patriotic ones, is that they force people to defend things they don't normally like at all."

In other despatches Steinbeck gives some vivid descriptions of London under the blitz and Dover under the bombardment of the German long-range guns, of battle pieces in Africa and Italy. These vignettes of World War II will touch deeply the memories of those who served in it, and bring something of its flavour to those who did not. And they might well serve as models of English expression. If we could make our official writing half as good as Steinbeck's English we would not need quick reading courses.

"There was a war, long ago—once upon a time."

—E.G.K.

**THE CITIZEN ARMY**, by Frederick Martin Stern (St. Martin's Press, New York, USA).

This book was written in the United States to forward the claims of the citizen-type army. It is a masterly exposition of this theme, and should prove of great interest to professional and citizen soldiers, to politicians who are concerned with the defence of this country, and to all thinking men who are interested in the current changes in the Australian Army.

The author claims that few men of history, and present thinkers of the above-listed categories, have been able to differentiate between

"cadre-conscript" armies and citizen armies — or "citizen-conscript" armies, as he designates this force. There are three types of army, each of which allows a measure of subdivision within its structure.

The Professional Army—which must be volunteer, long service, adequately paid, and responsible for the assistance required by the other types. It is not suited for national defence, being inevitably too small. It is, however, best suited to attack, and to aggression, being compact, trained and cohesive. It is therefore the chosen instrument to support an autocracy (e.g., Prussian Army). It is also the most expensive army.

The cadre conscript army—which is designed to fill out a professional army. It is essentially conscript, and the conscription period covers a minimum of three years. The trained recruits pass into the Regular Standing Army for a specific period, are entirely commanded and controlled by Regulars, although some provision is made for Reserve officers on the lowest levels. This force is better designed for defence of a nation than the Regular Army, by force of numbers. The quality is lower, however, and the maintenance of this army is a great drain on the Regular Army, which must contain a very high proportion of officers to Regular soldiers—in fact, there is little need for Regular privates in this type of army. This force is not as easily controlled politically as a small Regular army, and is thus not suitable for aggression. It is suitable, up to a point, for attack, but the quality is often stifled by the large numbers and the shortage of leaders. This was the German pattern of 1914, and

these semi-trained masses were forced to attack in mass, being unskilled in more suitable tactics. The French Army has chosen this method.

The Citizen-Conscript Army — which must operate in conjunction with the professional army, but is quite separate. It envisages a nation in which military service is quite normal for all young men, and which is accepted by the citizens, in the manner in which compulsory schooling for children is accepted. Regiments are drawn from local areas, the recruits are basically trained for a brief period, and then serve for a number of years in their local regiments. All commands belong to the citizens, and a very small Regular cadre is attached to each headquarters. This force is the ideal national defence force, since it is very economical and can be very large. The rates of pay have not to compete with industry, and can be very low, and this defence force does not need to be mobilized, paid and fed until the emergency arises, apart from the recruit schools, and the annual camps and parades. This force is not at all suited to aggression, and is not suitable as an instrument of national attack, as mobilization gives the enemy adequate warning.

A further force is commonly called "the militia." The author defines this force as the local citizens in arms, often without uniforms and training, and suitable for nothing except local defence. The discipline is usually very poor, and the evidence of history is not in favour of such a force.

Throughout history few men have placed the three armies in their cor-

rect context, and most have confused the citizen-conscript army and the militia.

Historical examples of the various types of army over several hundred years, and in the service of the major countries of the world, follow these definitions. The exigencies of politics have generally determined the composition of the armies, and the results of this composition have been clearly shown in battle. The Regular armies have succeeded on many occasions, the cadre-conscript armies have seldom succeeded, and the citizen-conscript have generally been successful. Militias have hardly a success to record. France used the cadre-conscript army in 1914 and 1939, and both failed as defence forces. Britain used the elite Regular army on both occasions, which twice proved dismally small, and when this army had been shattered there was nothing on which to fall back—witness the awaited invasion of England after Dunkirk, when a single division was all that could be mustered. The citizen-conscript army has most successfully been used in Switzerland, and the author considers that this army, some 600,000 strong during the Second War, was the over-riding reason why that country was never used as a thoroughfare by either side.

Various precedents are quoted of the use of the citizen-conscript army. The Swiss Army is examined in detail, and a considerable number of pages is devoted to the Australian Army. The Army recommended by Kitchener envisaged 80,000 men, served by 215 Regular instructor officers and an administrative body of 135 Regular officers. He stated

that all commands should belong to citizen officers. This proposal was diluted by the Australian Government, and finally emerged as 25,000 citizen-conscripts, 35,000 cadets—administered by 2000 Regulars. This force became, in the main, the AIF—Liddell Hart claimed that they “were the best fighting bodies of troops by the last year of the war.” It is claimed that “the decisive victory (8 Aug 18) was won by . . . real citizen armies, led by a civilian general (Monash) with a brilliant staff of citizen and professional soldiers.” It should be noted, however, that this was a “citizen-volunteer” army, and was thus of better quality than a citizen-conscript army. The further example of the decisive contribution of the CMF to the AIF of 1939 is cited. General Sturdee is quoted as saying: “At short notice, they (the CMF) provided most of the regimental officers and NCOs required for the original formation of the AIF, and many of the staff officers as well.”

Another precedent quoted is the Canadian Army of today, which maintains a citizen force which trains 45,000 men annually, for an outlay of 103 Regular officers and 800 men. The author unfortunately gives little space to the Israeli Army. This army mobilized its brigades of citizen-conscripts in 24 hours, in 1956, and most were winning their battles two days later. It was not overburdened with rank, brigades being commanded by colonels, divisions by brigadiers, and there was only one major-general for an army comparable with that of Australia—less than four divisions. It is also noteworthy that less than 2,000,000 Israelis can produce the same army as 10,000,000 Australians. The au-

thor misses a fine example which supports his theory of the citizen-conscript army, in the Middle East at that time. Of the three main armies in Palestine, the Arab Legion was the elite Regular army, but was too small and was not committed by Jordan. The Egyptian Army was the cadre-conscript army, and was thoroughly defeated by the Israeli Army, which was of the citizen-conscript type. The one fact which fails to fit his theory was the citizen-conscript army was the successful aggressor.

The book moves on to the theory of universal training. It points out that a citizen-volunteer army is dangerous politically, and divides the citizens into two groups—those who wish to escape the obligation and those who would like to monopolize the right to bear arms. This division is avoided by conscription. Volunteers are also somewhat in the Regular category—there are never enough. Witness the scraping of the Australian barrel in 1917, and the fact that England was forced to conscript by 1916. Discipline is examined, and the author concludes that the citizen-conscript (or volunteer) is of an inquiring mind, and will demand the reason for a plan. This was very obvious in the difference between English and Australian troops on Gallipoli, when the 11th Division failed to move to Suvla Bay, and apparently no officer had enough initiative to persuade his commander. “Democracy is by nature as strong militarily as it is economically, if only it builds the type of army that is organized not to cramp the spirit of individual initiative and civic responsibility, but to foster and employ it.”

"The Military Education of Citizens" points out that the Regular soldier often has very little work to do when he is not training. He polishes and parades, and is paid for periods when he contributes nothing to the defence of the nation, and drill is still used to fill in many of these periods. It is noted that in the Swiss programme there are no formal parades at all, even in recruit school. At one stage in Prussian history, the Regular soldier had such an elaborate costume that his daily toilet required three hours. The citizen soldier has many civilian skills, and these may be used by the Army so that if essentials only are taught the citizen soldier can reach efficiency in his particular sphere in a very short time—and this has been proved time and again in the CMF in Australia. It is unlikely that the three months recruit training under the National Service scheme actually produced more concentrated training than three weeks, but the two weeks annual camps that followed in many regiments (but not all) produced a good nine days of solid training. It has been the experience of most countries that civilian recruits, called to the colours at outbreak of war, absorbed knowledge much more rapidly than was expected, yet there are still officers who claim that it takes two years to train an infantryman. The point is neatly illustrated by the analogy of the classroom. The children are conscripts at school, which is accepted by every community. Some classes are unpopular, others are popular—and in the latter classes the children perform well under examination. If, then, a community can accept military conscription in the same manner, it will be noted

that some classes are detested by recruits, and some are welcomed. It has been my experience that the former includes drill, and the latter includes tactics in the field. The lesson is not that only popular military subjects should be taught, but that only essentials should be taught and that the best instructors should be used. Perhaps this is why the Swiss eliminated not drill, some of which is essential, but parades, which are not.

Leadership of the soldiers is well covered. The point that officers must be chosen only for efficiency, and not for any social, political or ethnic reasons, is self-evident, and whilst this point is commonly accepted by all nations, particularly in Regular establishments such as Duntroon, there is still the half-submerged feeling in many officers, which is rarely, if ever, voiced, that some particular candidate is not socially of the officer class, or votes the wrong way.

In time these prejudices will wither away, and it should not be forgotten that commissions were reserved for the nobility in some armies as late as 1914. Leadership should not rely on seniority alone, and it is noted that the US President is free to nominate any officer above Colonel for immediate promotion to any rank—a recent example was the promotion of Admiral Burke to CNS, over the heads of 24 senior admirals.

The author states: "The attempt to provide as much professional military leadership as possible for a wartime mass army of drafted civilians constitutes one of the greatest weaknesses of cadre-conscript armies" and stresses that the citizen officer of the citizen-conscript army is the natural leader of the men.

Numbers alone preclude the exclusive use of Regular officers, and the citizen-officer of a citizen regiment enjoys the special privilege that he has the bond of locality and of understanding with his men. The citizen conscript army is free to tap the deep well of civilian leadership, which is not available to the Regular armies. These leaders cannot be satisfied within the narrow limits of an army career, are trained as leaders in their professions, and need only the further training as technicians (e.g., tactics) to be competent leaders of regiments or of higher formations. Thus no rank should be unavailable to the citizen officer who is competent to fill it. In peacetime, the demands of time may preclude a citizen officer from a top position in the Army, but war removes this limitation. Liddell Hart, comparing the English Territorials, where most regimental commands are Regular, to the Australian CMF notes: "The Territorial Army is still far from being representative of the national resources of talent . . . a change might be possible if they could acquire the attitude of the Australian citizen soldiers, who . . . offset the Regulars' inevitable superiority in certain aspects by developing their own natural advantages to achieve a superiority in the tactical field."

During the World War, no British amateur soldier rose above Brigadier, and in the Second War there were only a handful of Major-Generals. This is contrasted with the Corps leadership of Monash and the roles of Morshead and others in the Second War. Lloyd George states, "Monash was . . . the most resourceful General in the British Army (in the World War)." Many

have proven the theory that the natural civilian leader, given suitable and brief training, is available for the highest posts in war. This is also true of peacetime. "Nothing can replace a clear mind, a great personality. A well-organized citizen army combines professional excellence with civilian talent."

Readiness for war has usually meant "present on parade," trained and equipped. This maxim has died hard—in fact, it is not yet quite dead. The author points out that a citizen-conscript army, trained and equipped, is as ready as any soldier "present on parade" and is still usefully following his civilian occupation. If he is organized into civilian regiments, and not part of a military reserve pool, he can mobilize at very short notice, leaping into his particular posting, ready for action. There are none of the confusions, time wasting and man wasting procedures that characterized the forming of the AIF in 1939. Furthermore, a civilian army, with regiments located all over the country, lends great flexibility to the rulers of the country in time of war. One portion of the army may be called to the colours at short notice, and another portion left uncalled until needed, thus causing less disruption to industry and maintaining a reserve virtually under arms. It has the merit of immediate readiness, and the further merit that it is not being maintained uselessly, in camps, at great expense.

National unity of effort is well maintained in a citizen-conscript army, in that the military mind is not greatly removed from the political mind, both having in common their citizen background. The con-

servative attitude of the English Regular generals, when they failed to support the production of the initial tanks, which was fostered by a citizen-politician (Churchill), is quoted from Lloyd-George. He further is quoted as being a great supporter of Monash, but an opponent of Haig, which shows the antipathy, during that war, that existed between the Regular generals and the civilian directors of the war.

This book is written by an American, and he summarizes his requirements for the citizen-conscript army of America:—

1. Universal Training and Service.
2. Preparation at high school age.
3. Short initial training, realistic and intensive, concentrating on effectiveness.
4. Medical and aptitude examinations before induction.
5. Full utilization of civilian skills.
6. Refresher courses, providing advanced training.
7. Training and leadership cadres, to top ranks, of citizen soldiers, backed by very few Regulars.
8. Advanced officer and NCO training.
9. Organized units, and no un-organized pools.
10. No "frills and coddling," without undue drill and "spit and polish."

He summarizes the advantages of

such a system to the Regular army, and notes that the man who has been introduced to the army in the citizen army is more prone to enlist in the Regular army than the man who has never served. It has a recruiting potential for the Regular army. The further point is made that this citizen-conscript army, which should use very few Regular soldiers, will free the Regular army from national defence requirements, and will allow it to concentrate on defence of overseas possessions and allies, and will thus lighten its load of responsibility.

This book is certain to be most controversial. It is a deep-thinking book, biased in the direction in which it is headed from the opening chapter. The Regular soldier will not agree with all the examples of history, or the conclusions drawn therefrom, or with the general conclusions drawn throughout the book. The citizen soldier will find much common ground with the author, but many will not support the author's stand on the question of conscription.

This book may well pass into history, as have a limited number of military studies of the past, many of them being quoted herein. For that reason alone, it is a book which will attract the military minds of this country, and will provoke many new thoughts and theories.

—Major J. C. Gorman, RNSWL.

# OPERATION GREIF

Major Burton F. Hood

General Staff Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Department of the Army

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**A special German task force was infiltrated behind American lines in an attempt to kill the American First Army leaders. It now can be disclosed. . . . This special German force was part of much larger saboteur battalions dropped behind American lines during the current German counteroffensive.**

—*Reuters Dispatch, New York Times, 27 December, 1944.*

THE German use of deception to enhance the shock of their offensive in the Ardennes in December 1944 is a remarkable example of a form of Unconventional Warfare that is too often neglected in tactical studies. The Battle of the Bulge will best be remembered in history as the death throes of the Wehrmacht. But perhaps the most vivid memory in the minds of most of the participants of that great battle was best described by General Omar N. Bradley as the spectacle of "half a million GI's . . . playing cat and mouse with each other every time they met."

From the moment when a jeep load of English-speaking Germans wearing American uniforms was captured and admitted that they were the vanguard of a major effort to destroy, confuse, and subvert behind the Allied lines, the potentialities of such an action were obvious and the alarm spread like wildfire. Reports of encounters began to filter in from all along the front, and, indeed, from most of Western Europe. Paris police tightened local security with the observation that not since the darkest days of 1940 had one

Frenchman looked at another with such suspicion. All manner of mischief, ranging from pillage to political assassination, was attributed to the Germans. A bank in Southern France was reported robbed by a specially parachuted group.

The fact that the leader of this audacious expedition was alleged to be Colonel Otto Skorzeny lent credence to the wild rumours, for here was a man who was capable of the most incredible exploits—his liberation of Mussolini was still fresh in the public mind. General Eisenhower's headquarters picked up "reliable" reports that the primary mission of the Skorzeny group was to kill or capture the supreme commander. Security officers turned Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, into a bristling fortress, and restricted the general's movements.

At the front the apprehension and mounting suspicion caused by the infiltrating "battalions" placed an almost intolerable restriction on communications. Staff officers driving from one unit to another found their way barred by innumerable



road blocks manned by heavy-fingered guards. Failure to respond to any number of security checks brought delays and time-consuming interrogations. More than a few futilely protesting soldiers were arrested for wearing items of German uniform or failing to produce their identification tags. No one was excused from this exercise, including the Army commanders. General Bradley described the exasperating situation that forced him to prove his nationality:

"The first time by identifying Springfield as the capital of Massachusetts (my questioner held out for Chicago); the second time by locating the football guard between the centre and tackle on the line of scrimmage; the third time by naming the current spouse of a blonde named Betty Grable."

The cumulative effect of this hypertension was extremely damaging to the morale of the Allied armies, to say nothing of the increased burden it placed on the requirements for rear area security.

#### Fact versus Fiction

Let us now separate fact from fiction. News reports of the time led the public to believe that battalions of parachutists were dropped behind the American lines, dressed, equipped and trained as Americans, with the objective of converging on Paris and destroying the Supreme Allied Headquarters. Perhaps the most charitable observation that can be made of these reports is that they were the product of the hysteria brought on by the shock and fury of the unexpected German assault. It should be noted, too, that the exaggerated reports were not confined to irresponsible press releases, for

official communiques and intelligence reports also carried accounts of the parachutists and the havoc they wrought behind the lines.

It was not until after the war, when it was possible to interrogate the German leaders, that the enormity of the extravagant claims of the deceptive operations in the Ardennes came to light. Many an intelligence specialist was abashed to learn that:

1. None of Skorzeny's forces were parachuted behind Allied lines, and actually only 44 men were successfully infiltrated through the lines.
2. The Germans, far from being completely equipped with American material, had only two Sherman tanks and a handful of miscellaneous equipment.
3. The mission of the unit was never to capture General Eisenhower or other American leaders, but rather to create confusion so as to assist the crossing of the Meuse River by elements of the main battle force.

#### Concept

Viewed dispassionately today, Skorzeny's deceptive operations solicit further study by military students, not only for historical interests but for the implications they may have on their use in future struggles.


The concept and original planning for Operation Greif is obscure. Presumably it originated in the German High Command; possibly by Hitler himself in one of his intuitive planning studies. Implementation of the plan began in the latter part of October 1944, when Colonel Skorzeny, who was then the Commander

of the German Commando Centre at Friedenthal, was summoned to Hitler's East Prussian Headquarters and was briefed by the Fuhrer himself. He was told that he was to form a special brigade which would support the Sixth Panzer Army in its major effort to split the Allies and drive to Antwerp. (Figure 1.) The brigade was to fight in an unconventional manner. It was to be equipped completely with American and British material, and, as far as possible, it would be manned by English-speaking officers and men. Skorzeny was assured that the High Command had gathered enormous reserves of artillery and Luftwaffe support to ensure success of the break-through.

Immediately after the meeting with Hitler, troops began to arrive, and training for the unique operation began. It soon became apparent, however, just how far the High Command had isolated itself from reality. A blundering order to all

units of the Wehrmacht for all English-speaking men to report to Friedenthal produced only 600 volunteers. A cursory examination soon revealed, moreover, that no more than 10 spoke fluent English; some 40 spoke halting English, and about 150 others could barely make themselves understood. The equipment picture was no brighter. Two Sherman tanks and 12 German Panzers, together with 10 British and American reconnaissance cars, were the nucleus of the armoured support available. What clothing that was supplied consisted of a nondescript mixture of captured uniforms that could deceive only a very confused opponent.

At this stage of the war expediency was the byword of the German effort, and so Skorzeny's staff frantically attempted to patchwork a brigade to satisfy the requirement. The language problem was the most immediate obstacle, but very little could be accomplished in the short



time before the attack. Schools were organized and all personnel were drilled in English, including American slang. Finally, in desperation, Skorzeny instructed most of his men to keep a grim-faced silence if they ran into the Americans. There was also instruction in how to act "GI"; the mysteries of chewing gum and field stripping a cigarette were explained; and an attempt was even made to have a few of the more advanced pupils mingle with American prisoners of war to observe the finer points of behaviour. The equipment shortage was somewhat alleviated by camouflaging German vehicles to resemble American tanks. Some jeeps were "mid-night requisitioned" from nearby units. Artillery and ammunition, however, remained scarce.

#### Organization

Skorzeny's mission, as he received

it from Hitler, was twofold: First, to provide units to follow the advance of the assault divisions and, at the proper moment, pass through the broken front and move rapidly to seize and secure the Meuse bridges; and, second, to infiltrate the lines with small groups to obtain information and create confusion. To accomplish this mission he had to design a unique organization that probably can best be described in today's terms as a reduced strength armoured division, reinforced. (Figure 2.)

The infiltrating forces in the brigade were grouped into a Commando Company. This unit contained the most fluent English speakers and had the best of the meagre supply of Allied equipment. Functionally, it was subdivided into three groups:




FIGURE 2

1. Demolition Group.—This group was organized into smaller squads of five to six men each, whose job it was to destroy bridges, munitions and gasoline dumps.

2. Reconnaissance Group.—Three-to-four-man squads in this group were to reconnoitre in depth east and west of the Meuse River to report information on enemy armour, artillery and troop movements. They also were instructed to give false commands to enemy units they encountered; to reverse road signs; to remove minefield signs; and to put minefield markers on lines of communications to mislead and cause road jams.

3. Lead Commandos. — These squads of three and four men each had the mission of disrupting communications by cutting telephone wires, destroying radio stations, and giving false commands.

The entire Commando Company had American uniforms and an adequate supply of jeeps. Meticulous care was exercised in providing these men with proper insignia and identification papers. The highest American rank simulated was that of colonel.

The 150th Panzer Brigade was composed of three combat command headquarters and various tank, armoured infantry and parachute infantry units supported by signal, engineer and maintenance units. The brigade was woefully weak in artillery support, with only two heavy (120-mm) mortar companies. The combat commands were a combination of the units in the brigade. Two tank and one infantry commands were organized on a semi-permanent basis. Each tank com-

mand consisted of a small staff, a communications platoon, one company of tanks, three companies of infantry, two platoons of heavy mortars, two antitank platoons, two platoons of armoured infantry, one platoon of engineers, and one maintenance platoon. The infantry command was similarly organized except that it had no tanks. While two infantry battalions of the forces were parachutists, there was no planned employment of these units in an airborne role.

The mission of the 150th Brigade was to seize undamaged at least two Meuse River bridges at Amoy, Huy or Andenne. The three combat commands were placed in direct support of the 1st and 12th SS Panzer Divisions and 12th Volks Grenadier Division—the three assault divisions of the Sixth Panzer Army. Their action was to be initiated when the attack of the assault divisions had reached Hohes Venn, a plateau running roughly north-east and south-west from Spa. At that time the commands were to move in three parallel columns through the assault divisions and to their objectives in six hours. All plans were contingent upon an expected collapse of the Allied front on the first day.

#### Employment

The most optimistic hopes of the German High Command were fulfilled on the morning of 16 December. Effecting complete surprise and aided by extremely bad weather that hampered ground and air support for the defenders, the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Panzer Armies drove a deep salient into the Allied lines. Such a situation was ripe for exploitation by Skorzeny's forces. In the first three days of the attack,

four reconnaissance squads, two demolition squads and three lead Commando squads were sent through the Allied lines. In all, only 44 men were used on this mission. All but eight returned successfully. What did this handful of men accomplish? Here, historical records are incomplete, but in a postwar interrogation Skorzeny recalled:—

"In the first two or three days, when your positions were extremely disorganized, we were able to get some information from these commando groups. The following are some of the facts which these units brought back to me:

- "(a) A jeep drove through Malmedy and discovered that the town was very lightly held.
- "(b) Enemy movements were spotted south of Liege.
- "(c) We discovered that all airports east of the Meuse River had been evacuated. This was very important to us because we then knew that the enemy air forces would not be employed immediately.
- "(d) We located munitions dumps at Liege and Huy. One group destroyed a small ammunition dump.
- "(e) We located one gasoline dump, which I think was in the neighbourhood of Vaux Chauvenne.
- "(f) One group claimed to have misdirected an entire American regiment, but of course we cannot be sure that this is so. However, we did monitor some American broadcasts which mentioned the fact that a regiment had been sought for two or three days."

While these incidents were a significant part of the German effort,

they do not match the greatest contribution of the Commando Company, which was, of course, the imposition of the paralyzing mistrust engendered in the Allied front.

The combat commands of the brigade were not so spectacularly employed. The Sixth Panzer Army did not enjoy the rapid advances of the Fifth and Seventh Armies in the south. It was its misfortune to run directly into the American First Army in the act of advancing toward the Roer Dams, and the determined defence of key strong points such as St. Vith doomed the German effort. Dependent as it was on a complete rupture of the Allied lines by the Sixth Army, the 150th Brigade waited in vain for the order to advance. After two days of interminable delays it became apparent that the opportunity to exploit had passed, so Skorzeny assembled his commands and fought them as a conventional force in the vicinity of Malmedy. Lack of artillery support, however, limited the capability of the brigade, and it played no outstanding part in the grinding withdrawal from the Ardennes.

In all, Skorzeny's brigade was in action for only 13 days, and, in retrospect, it did not change the outcome of the battle significantly. But, in fairness to the unit, it must be remembered that it was hastily assembled, ill-equipped, and never employed in the role for which it was fashioned. Perhaps its greatest contribution was its potential. The problems of securing rear area installations against infiltrating groups dressed and trained to operate as friendly forces were multitudinous, and even to accomplish the task partially distended the front lines

at a moment when combat strength was critical. The surprising fact is that the actual accomplishments of Skorzeny's brigade trailed so far behind Allied capability estimates.

### Observations

Deception is as old as warfare itself. The Trojan Horse technique is as applicable today as it was centuries ago. The most successful military leaders always have depended on the many facets of deception to lend surprise to their operations. The confusion created by Skorzeny's infiltrating forces was almost exactly duplicated 82 years before by Grierson's famous raid during Grant's Vicksburg Campaign, which is described in M. F. Steel's *American Campaigns*:

"With barely 1000 horsemen Grierson had ridden entirely through the state . . . destroying many miles of railway and telegraph lines and much other property. 'But, far more important than all this, he had distracted the enemy's attention in an extraordinary degree at a most critical moment'—while Grant was making his preparations to cross the Mississippi . . . the Confederates were kept in a wild state of ignorance, excitement, and alarm. 'The most exaggerated rumors were current of Grierson's 'presence in a dozen places at once,' and large infantry detachments were sent out from almost every garrison to try to cut him off. . . . In its strategic effect, this was, perhaps, the most successful cavalry raid of the Civil War, or of all modern wars. . . ."

No, confusing the enemy by creating chaos behind his lines is certainly not new, but that is not to say that it is not as useful a technique today

as it ever was. On the contrary, with modern weapons and the wide open troop deployments that may be expected in the future, there probably will be even more opportunity to employ this element. The use of small, well-trained, highly-motivated groups of determined men armed with tremendous destructive power may be the key to future battlefield success. Rapid technological progress in communications and mobility brings long-range reconnaissance to the imminent future. The packaging of nuclears in portable loads opens a Pandora's box of unpleasant possibilities.

Certainly the potentialities of the highly successful techniques demonstrated by Skorzeny and Britain's David Sterling were not lost to the Communists. On at least two occasions after the war, the Russians unsuccessfully attempted to kidnap Skorzeny; probably in an attempt to elicit from him some of the details of his unconventional tactics. They were more successful, however, in absorbing the lessons from these exploits, for observers in the Indochina war noted that the Vietminh long-range patrols and infiltration tactics closely paralleled those of World War II. Again, in Korea, one of the most nagging problems faced by United Nations commanders was the line crossing of Communist forces and the subsequent destruction of key installations to the rear. The use of these techniques is not just a theory—it has been put to the test and accepted by world-wide Communist forces.

One of the basic problems that a soldier wearing his opponent's uniform must face is, "What will be my status if captured?" An annex

to the Hague Convention of 1907 forbids fighting in enemy uniform. The term "fighting," of course, is somewhat nebulous. Is reconnaissance or patrolling fighting? Skorzeny was assured by a senior German Staff Judge Advocate that small Commando units were likely to be judged as spies, but that it was a legitimate *ruse de guerre* to wear the enemy's uniform as long as you do not actually fight in it. This is, of course, a very fine legalistic point and is completely dependent upon the jurisprudence of the power judging the offence. In fact, however, Skorzeny was tried by a War Crimes Commission in August 1947 for a violation of The Hague Convention and was acquitted of the offence. Evidence was submitted that indicated that wearing the enemy uniform was not exclusively a German predilection. In substance, then, from the legal standpoint, The Hague Convention does forbid fighting in enemy uniform, but there is precedent for acquittal of the charges on proof that the

enemy employed the same deceit.

#### Conclusions

One of the great surprises that came out of the study of World War II was the revelation that a mere platoon of Germans, dressed in American uniforms, infiltrated the Allied lines during the Battle of the Bulge, and reaped a harvest of confusion completely disproportionate to their numbers. This incident is unimportant in itself, but it furnishes another example of the ability of small groups of well-trained men to accomplish military miracles by confusing their opponents. The use of deception is not new to warfare, but the important lesson here is that it is not obsolete because of this. On the contrary, there is evidence that the Communists are embracing all forms of Unconventional Warfare, and the Western World will be less than circumspect if it does not fully explore the full potentialities of this type warfare. Small groups of determined men can still influence great issues by bold exploit.

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# THE BATTLE OF ULM SEMUR

Captain E. M. McCormick  
Royal Australian Infantry

THE present close liaison between Malaya and Australia and the presence of Australian troops in Malaya fighting alongside Malayan soldiers, should make the Royal Malay Regiment and its fighting ability of great interest to the Australian soldier of today. Strangely enough, little seems to be known, even by troops who have served in the country, of the standard of the Malay infantryman.

The Malays are a warlike people, and until the turn of the century were more or less constantly engaged in wars of some type or another. The present Royal Malay Regiment can be said to have really originated in Ceylon, where the Dutch had recruited five companies of Malay soldiers. These companies were disbanded by the British when they captured Colombo in 1796 and then re-raised by them in 1802 as the Ceylon Rifles. The Malay Regiment sent troops to Hong Kong and Labuan and formed part of the nucleus of the Sarawak Rangers formed by Rajah James Brook in 1845. The Regiment was disbanded in 1873 but came alive again in 1933 in the Federated States of Malaya as an experimental company at Port

Dixon. By 1938 it had expanded to battalion size with ten Malay officers risen from the ranks. The battalion first saw action on Singapore Island when it fought with great gallantry on Pasir Panjang Ridge. Today the regiment comprises some seven infantry battalions of the Federation of Malaya Army.

On 22 March 1950 a platoon of 3 Battalion, The Malay Regiment, was detailed to patrol, up to a limit of three days, to the Sungei Menggiri area of Kongsai Sunkai and investigate any signs of terrorist activity they could find in the area.

The platoon, consisting of one Malay officer, 25 MORs and one policeman as guide, set up an ambush position on the night 23/24 March. They were out of luck, however, and on the 24th they began their return to camp, stopping for the night with some attap gatherers. They left their nests on the morning of 25th and proceeded without incident to the river Semur.

On reaching the river the platoon suddenly came under heavy fire from a large number of Communist terrorists from across the river and from the platoon's left flank. The



fire was heavy and accurate and immediately a number of troops became casualties and the platoon commander was killed.

The platoon sergeant, Sergeant Jamaluddin, immediately took command and directed fire on the Communist terrorists across the river and ordered the 2 in. mortar into action. The mortar fired two bombs and was knocked out of action with one of the crew killed and the other wounded.

The platoon was then suddenly engaged by a further number of CTs on the south bank of the river. Sergeant Jamaluddin and one private attempted to counter-attack this position, but were pinned down and unable to move without exposing themselves to the enemy fire. During this time the platoon was steadily being whittled down by the superior fire power of the CTs.

Suddenly the firing stopped and the CTs called on the Platoon Commander to surrender. The platoon's answer was to continue firing, and the CTs then moved in on the Platoon Sergeant. The action continued for about twenty minutes. By this time there were only about seven

men capable of engaging the enemy. These seven men continued to fight and broke up four more CTs attacks until 1430 hours. Then Sergeant Jamaluddin and the private of Platoon Headquarters, while engaging the north bank, were overwhelmed from the rear and captured, as was the one remaining private capable of fighting.

The platoon had fought for four hours against an enemy force of at least 250, and not until they had run out of ammunition were the last three men overwhelmed. Although in a hopeless position, there had been no thought of surrender. Later patrols in the area credited the platoon with killing twenty-nine CTs, perhaps more, as some of the graves may have contained one or more bodies. The platoon itself had one officer, one policeman and 16 MORs killed in action, with 6 MORs wounded and three captured. The CTs were so impressed by the courage of the platoon that they released the survivors. So ended an action that any regiment would be proud of, an action that showed that the fighting spirit of Pasir Panjang Ridge lives on in the new generation of the Royal Malay Regiment.