AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

No. 114

NOVEMBER

1958

Notified in AAOs for 30th November, 1958

MILITARY BOARD

Army Headquarters
Melbourne
1/11/1958

Issued by Command of the Military Board

Distribution

The Journal is issued through Base Ordnance Depots on the scale of One per Officer, Officer of Cadets, and Cadet Under Officer.

AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

A Periodical Review of Military Literature

Number 114 ——— November, 1958

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

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AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

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Contributions, which should be addressed to the Director of Military Training, Army Headquarters, Melbourne, are invited from all ranks of the Army, Cadet Corps and Reserve of Officers. £5 will be paid to the author of the best article published each month, and £40 for the author of the best article published during the year.

Unification by Evolution

From a lecture given before the USI of Victoria by
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL A. GREEN
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The Nature of the Subject

THIS is a difficult subject because it is not of the military arts, nor can it really be classed with the military sciences. It would be better described as an excursion into military philosophy, in the No Man's Land between them. It is so important that if we are right in unifying, then victory in war may be assured, but if we are wrong, we invite failure. In this respect it is comparable with the theory of pure air warfare which characterized Royal Air Force doctrine before the last war began, and which, when correctly applied, resulted in the amazing victory of the Battle of Britain.

It is also delicate because it is a subject which touches the soul of the fighting services. It, therefore, arouses the best of loyalties and the worst of emotions; as we have already seen in America. Furthermore it necessitates changes in accepted mental habits. It is automatically accepted that the Services are fundamentally different from each other. "The Army, a well disciplined service, all think alike; and the Navy, a versatile service, all think differently; but the Air Force, the swift and mobile service, have little time to think at all." This is an obvious cliche, but it does demonstrate that the Services think of themselves as being different. In this habit of thought lies much of our problem. I can think of no better place to discuss unification than in a United Service (singular) Institution.

In discussing unification we can choose from several concepts —

(a) We may think of unification as, basically, the grouping of the three service departments and perhaps Supply, under one political head, leading to ultimate complete amalgamation.

(b) A second concept is that of unification of the higher command and the staffs at the highest level.

(c) Another school of thought advocates primarily the unification of the logistical and administrative system, because of the efficiency and economy which would obviously ensue.

(d) There is another party which believes that the three services should first be completely combined, and then re-organized horizontally, with separate agencies for the main functions of Logistics, Personnel and Operations.

All real unifiers look forward explicitly or implicitly to ultimate complete amalgamation. I must admit that when I began thinking on this subject some five years ago I believed in outright, immediate unification. After mature consideration I have modified my views, and subscribe to gradual coalescence, leading to complete amalgamation.

Background of British Defence Organization

The defence organizations relevant to to Australian point of view are the British and American. Modern British defence organization derives it origin from the Esher Report of 1904, which created the Committee of Imperial Defence. This was formed to give advice and to make plans, but had no executive functions. In 1924, primarily as a result of the emergence of the third service, the Royal Air Force, the Chiefs of Staff Committee was found to be necessary. Subsequently in 1937 the British appointed a Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, an eminent lawyer, Sir Thomas Inskip. He, also, lacked the power to execute a unified policy, being merely a co-ordinator; hence the serious unpreparedness for war of Britain in 1939. It was not until 1940, when Mr Churchill became Minister for Defence as well as Prime Minister, that an effective central defence organization emerged. He, of course, imposed and unprecedented degree of unified control, with joint service planning, which he executed by means of two committees, one for Operations, the other for Supply. The Operations committee, acting on the Chiefs of Staffs advice, was primarily concerned with issuing operational instructions and strategic guidance, which the three fighting services then implemented in day to day orders and action.

In the field of higher command and political direction of war, there arose, therefore, in the British system a certain degree of co-ordination by committee which is fundamentally co-ordination by compromise. This was exemplified in the Middle East where a complete organization existed under a Minister for State, at one time Mr McMillan and later Mr Casey, and there was a joint Headquarters, with three equal Commanders-in-Chief. A new trend emerged later in the system of supreme command adopted in Europe and in South-East Asia. This was essentially due to American influence.

Since World War II ended the patterns of defence organization in the United Kingdom and in Australia have been similar — a Minister for Defence with a Chiefs of Staff Committee and a Joint Staff (a joint planning staff and a joint administrative staff) co-existent with equal and independent service departments, each under its own minister and chief of staff. I do not suggest that this system is devoid of virtues, particularly the virtue of responsibility in planning; because chiefs of staff who go to the Chiefs of Staff Committee have to implement the plans once they have been agreed upon. This is an excellent feature of our system which was lacking in the old German OKW system. It is interesting, however (unless there has been a change since the recent appointment in Australia of the permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff) that if Australia went to war in the Pacific, under existing arrangements, and no Commander-in-Chief were appointed, then the Chiefs of Staff would presumably exercise independent command as individuals.

The present British system has been described by Lord Tedder as "Unitarian at the top and Trinitarian all the way down." The British Prime Minister himself is basically responsible for defence, and has a Defence Committee (which has largely taken the place of the old Committee of Imperial Defence) and he now has a Minister for Defence. Originally the primary duties of the Minister were the allotment of supply, and certain common administrative policies and inter-service organizations, such as the Joint Intelligence Bureau, and the combined operations organization. Under this system the Chiefs of Staff were essentially joint, and they were served by joint staffs. There was a degree of co-ordination in budgetary matters, and certain inquiries were pursued into common administrative questions, especially personnel, supply and mutual medical interests. These inquiries made no remarkable progress, although some changes have resulted,

notably in the loose integration of supply systems and increased co-ordination of civil defence and research and development.

British defence policy underwent a profound change as a result of the nuclear threat and the need for national economy, when the absolutist Mr Duncan Sandys took over from Mr Head. Mr Sandys is reputedly a man of very strong views on higher defence organization. His Prime Minister gave him a charter in January 1957 to effect certain reforms. His main task was to make economies in money and manpower, and reorganize the services in the light of nuclear missile warfare. He was empowered to make decisions on the size, the shape and the dispositions of British Forces, and on certain matters of equipment, supply, pay and conditions of service; furthermore to make decisions on administrative functions common to the three Services. In order to give him the necessary executive powers he was vested with the choice of personnel for certain higher appointments. He proceeded to appoint a permanent Chief of Staff to preside over the Joint Chief's Committee, an airman, Sir William Dixon.

It is important from our point of view that, in considering the issue of unification at the time of these changes, the British White Paper did not reject the idea of complete amalgamation of the services. It did go on to say that this device was not yet definitely established as efficient or economical, although it was desirable to proceed as soon as possible with co-ordinated medical services, education services and chaplains.

The New British Defence Organization

After eighteen months of operation and considerable heart-searching, the British organization was recently reviewed, and in the main, confirmed. At the same time three new features were introduced, ie —

(a) Cabinet Defence Committee

(i) The composition of the committee will in future be flexible as the Prime Minister may require. The members may thus be convened as the subjects to be discussed affect their particular responsibilities. The full membership consists of the Prime Minister, Home Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Commonwealth Secretary, Colonial Secretary, Minister of Defence, Minister of Labour and National Service, First Lord of the Admiralty, Secretary of State for War, Secretary of State for Air, and Minister of Supply.

(ii) The Chiefs of Staff will be in attendance. They may also be invited to attend full meetings of Cabinet.

(b) A Defence Board has been established to facilitate consultation on inter-service policy subject to the Minister of Defence. This board consists of the Minister of Defence, the ministers of the three service departments, their chiefs of staff, the Chief of Defence Staff, the Permanent Secretary and the Chief Scientist of the Defence Ministry.

(c) The Minister of Defence is ministerially responsible to the Prime Minister for the execution of military operations.

(d) (i) A new post of Chief of the Defence Staff has been created. He is principal military adviser, responsible to the Minister of Defence.

(ii) The Chief of Defence Staff, with the service chiefs of staff, constitute the Chiefs of Staff Committee. They are responsible, through the Chief of Defence Staff, to

the Minister of Defence for the conduct of military operations.

(iii) The Joint Planning Staff are, in their collective capacity, directly responsible to the Chief of Defence Staff, who can call on the service chiefs of staff to assist him, when their respective staffs are regarded as a Joint Defence Staff.

The British government has eschewed any abrogation of the constitutional responsibilities of the individual service ministers, and it has avoided the cleavage between planners and executors which occurred under the German OKW system. The revised system represents careful and moderate progress, and is probably an intermediate stage towards unification. It makes an interesting comparison with the latest American reorganization.

American Defence Organization

American unification derives its origins from legislation promulgated in 1946. This brought into being a National Military Establishment under the Secretary of Defence. The apparent aim of this law was to produce a weak federation, and not a merger of the fighting services, in which the Secretary of Defence would supervise the independent services, and the services themselves would execute the policies which they had agreed upon. There has been a considerable evolution from this point since 1946.

The B 36 Controversy and After Effects

In 1949, presumably emboldened by the progress which had been made by the unification law, the aim of unification was modified and a centralized civilian authority was sought in one executive Department. This was to be discharged through the Department of Defence which would be responsible for basic policy, for its subsequent direction and control, would be responsible for the elimination of duplication and overlap between the services, and furthermore would act as the overall budgetary authority. At this point a great controversy arose between the Navy and the Air Force. It was caused by their conflicting policies, since the Navy had embarked on an ambitious carrier building programme with the type of 60,000-ton carrier, the USS "United States", and, on the other hand, the US Air Force had embarked on a nuclear bomber programme founded on the B 36 bomber. Controversy between proponents of the two policies waxed furiously and disturbed the services to such an extent that a special Congressional enquiry sat to elucidate the causes for it and the rights of the case. The lucid report which was issued is, incidentally, one of the best source documents that can be read on the subject of unification.

Public interest was fanned by press campaigns and political lobbying, as well as direct public pronouncements by service chiefs. During the enquiry the aspects of aviation which were among the major subjects under discussion were most complex, including problems of naval aviation, marine aviation, carrier-borne aviation, strategic (nuclear) aviation, and close-support aviation for the Army. The services were so deeply committed in their arguments that the US Marine Corps claimed that, in peace, it needed more close support aircraft than General Bradley's Army Group possessed at the very peak of the fighting in Europe. This was the atmosphere in which the issue had to be resolved. It is a matter of history that Admiral Denfeld was retired as a result of the controversy, but the general result of this partisan development was regression from the concept of unification under a central civilian authority, and in 1953 a new basis of unification was promulgated. This insisted on a comprehensive defence programme, as was manifestly necessary. It also insisted that the policies and procedures of the three services should be integrated as far as

was necessary, but it gave the three services a guarantee of their own entity as services, and it promised them that, for the time being anyway, there would be no outright merger. A major cause of the B 36 controversy was that the US Air Force had criticised the Navy's carrier programme as though they were, in fact, experts on the problems of naval aviation and carrier operations and their strategic use. The right so to criticise another service was rejected, and in fact the right of each individual service to be the prime arbiter of what it needed, and the main advisors to Government of what should be done in its own fields, was maintained. However, it was also decided that the three services should be under effective overall strategic direction, from the Secretary of Defence. In practice it meant that centralized unification had slowed up.

The Second Phase — Regression

The new law emphasized that the Chiefs of Staff were joint although the Secretary of Defence would be responsible for fiscal matters in particular, and would be empowered to co-ordinate certain mutual fields including personnel and administration. At this time it was understood that there would be a new accent on integration; in strategy, which would include America's diplomacy; in technology and research (apparently applying a lesson from the Communist book); and in the basis of all war making — industrial mobilization. The main achievements of this second phase were not in fundamental co-ordination of the services but in supplementary fields. The services began to educate one another, in their similarities and their differences. Joint training was accelerated, personnel policies were co-ordinated, eg, to the point that they embarked on co-ordinated housing projects for their forces. There was a degree of unification in military law systems, medical effort was co-ordinated, a uniform clothing allowance was introduced. (Would such a reform in Australia give soldiers those handsome rain coats which the other services wear?) Integration of research progressed until the Navy openly admitted using rockets which had been developed by the other two services. Procurement of subsistence was co-ordinated, inasmuch as one service, the Army, was made the Single Manager for the purpose of procurement for the others. (This is an aspect in which we in Australia are particularly interested).

The organization consisted of a Secretary of Defence, with Joint Chiefs of Staff to advise him from the services, with their own Chiefs of Staff, and their own operational commanders within higher commands such as NATO; also with their own logistical support. These are independent services with certain legal responsibilities; that is the Chief of the Naval Staff is legally and personally responsible for naval operations. This was, therefore, still a compromise system.

Recent Developments — Presidential Message

More recently, presumably as a result of public concern at American technical progress in nuclear warfare, and the growing public concern at the expense of the three services, since 1/8th of the national income of the United States goes to the fighting services, the President sent a message to Congress specifying certain reforms which he wished Congress to undertake. The first of these was that all the operational commands should be fully unified, while the services within them should not, in fact, be merged, remaining as individual services, but under the full unified command of the theatre or supreme commander. Furthermore there should be direct control of these commands by the Secretary of Defence, by-passing the service departments. This meant that the Chief of Staff of the Air Force or the Chief of Naval Operations would no longer have operational control of their forces. In order to enable the Secretary of Defence to fulfil his new functions the military staff in the Defence Department

should be strengthened, and the joint chiefs, instead of being merely the heads of committees should become members of an integrated operational staff to direct the new unified commands. The great new role of the independent fighting services would be to undertake the administration, training, and logistical support of their own services. The President also asked for more co-ordination of research and development, and that wasteful competition between the services should be eliminated.

Finally he asked for full over-riding authority to be given to the Secretary of Defence, particularly in fiscal appropriations, in the distribution of functions between the three services, and in the political relations and public relations of the services. This latter presumably, was to avoid any more controversies of the B 36 type. Last, but not least, he requested that the Secretary for Defence control certain important personnel matters, particularly all promotions to 3 and 4 Star rank, and should have power to transfer officers between the three services as circumstances might demand. This would be necessary for technical officers and officers of special qualifications which could be usefully employed in another service. It would give the Secretary of Defence greater control over the upper structure of the services, and would give him actual operational control through his joint operational staff, of the US combined or unified commands in the various theatres. As we now know, Congress did not accede to all the President's requirements. At the lower level it concurred in the unification of operational command, but it demurred at the abrogation of the powers of the heads of the three services and the formation of a great unified operational staff in the Defence Department.

This uncompleted saga of American development is a continuing if fluctuating evolution and is full of warnings that unification must be tackled gradually and logically. Also, in view of our close dependence upon America it may serve to remind us that unification is, in fact, inevitable for ourselves also. Moreover American unification has progressed further than the British.

The Canadian Example

The Canadian organization naturally interests us. Canada has one Minister of National Defence, a Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and three service Chiefs of Staff. There is thus real emphasis in the present Canadian system on a single defence policy. Canada, like Australia, has British Commonwealth antecedents and American alliances. She appears to have taken very positive steps towards unification. Her example is, therefore, relevant.

Australian Developments

The Australian Parliament recently rejected service amalgamation on various counts, including that of the Parliamentary difficulties which would be incurred, and has also rejected the horizontal-functional reorganization which was suggested from some quarters, because it was felt that it would lack the necessary authority to execute its tasks.

However, it is understood to be our policy to establish the complete superiority of the Department of Defence and there has been appreciable progress in the appointment of a permanent incumbent as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, to obtain comprehensive decisions, to make broad appreciations in matters affecting the three services, and to advise the Minister and the Defence Department, as well as to act as our liaison officer in military matters with the SEATO, ANZUS and ANZAM alliances. It is also understood that by Defence Department review of Organization and Methods in the three services, changes in procedure and the institution of common administrative services will take place on the domestic plane.

Germany and Russia

The World War II German organization had a separate combined planning staff known as OKW. It was divorced from the responsibility for the implementation of its plans. This cleavage has been held to be a fatal flaw in this early German attempt at unification. OKW was founded in 1939 by a directive on unified preparation for war. It issued operational directives to the Navy, Army and Air Force, whose supreme commanders then proceeded to execute them. The cleavage between planners and executors was indeed a serious one. Nevertheless, as we now know, political interference from the head of government, who, fortunately, eventually took over complete and detailed control of operations, finally wrecked its prospects of success. We cannot derive valid conclusions from this that OKW was inherently inefficient for the function for which it was intended, but it certainly did not turn out to be the key to victory.

There is very little published material on Russian defence co-ordination, but we are told that the co-ordination of Russian forces is based on its monolithic structure; "absolute internal homogeneity combined with external unity of action", one writer has phrased it. Extreme centralization has always characterized the Russian theory of government, and pressures and sanctions are applied to ensure unity in action by that system. In doctrine the Russians achieved great unity under Frunze's system which was embodied in their staff colleges, and equivalent unity in their organization was the achievement of that extraordinary soldier Trotsky.

They have not apparently been greatly concerned with the problems of diverging service interests because the Russians, like the Germans, were primarily a land power. Whatever pleased the Army has necessarily pleased the other two services, the Navy and the Air Force being largely supplementary to the Russian Army. However, the existing system which is understood to be under one Minister for Defence, who has close control of autonomous services, apparently works efficiently. I cannot believe that, with the growing strength and prestige of the Russian Air Force, there are no cleavages within the Russian services. The Air Force must have a doctrine of independent operation and it is most probable that that doctrine will tend to differ from that of the hitherto paramount Army. Such "deviations" could not be solved by merely liquidating the proponents. The Russians must also experience and solve these crises of organizational change.

Some Factors In Unification

Fundamental Service Differences

The most obvious factor is that of the difference between the services themselves. This is deep seated and generally accepted. We even take pride in it, in building esprit de corps we train men to know that their own service is the best; and to give their best to that service. We cannot, therefore, destroy this virtue without losing a great asset. In doctrine, differences are profound. The US Army promulgates in its field manuals that, ultimately, land forces must secure the decision and, therefore, all efforts of all services must be pressed towards that ultimate victory on land, and, as a corollary, the Infantry is the Queen of Battles. The US Air Force in its manuals stresses a diametrically opposite view — that air power is dominant, and that the intervention of the other services is not necessarily essential to victory for the USA, so that in some circumstances, without their help, the Air Force could win the war. Thus deep are these differences.

Single Service Conservatism

A cynic has expressed the differences in organization quite simply. The Army is divisional in its organizations; the Air Force, a modern service, is organized functionally; and the Navy is (Nelsonically) traditional. General

Hollis, A Royal Marine, who claims to speak impartially, speaks of some tests of tableware in which various types were all laid out in sets — in separate displays, for the three services to consider whether one unified type of tableware could be introduced. The demonstrator took a naval representative to one of these tables and asked him to state exactly what was wrong with the tableware from the Navy's point of view. The naval officer said, "Yes, it's stuff like this that has caused mutiny in the Navy in the past". The demonstrator then replied that it was actually the standard naval pattern. Such differences are closely allied with service conservatism. It is possible for a service, from purely conservative motives, to reject valid progress. It was originally difficult to persuade the Air Force to accept the 8-gun fighter. Similar difficulties now persist with guided missiles.

Loyalty — Virtue or Vice?

Service loyalty is one of the finest of virtues, but it can be dangerous, particularly in technical fields. The disasters at Singapore in 1942 were presaged in earlier experiments affording conclusive results, in the "Centurion" trials in Britain, of the effects of dive bombing on battleships. In the United States, General Mitchell's trials had reached similar conclusions. Yet the new dominance of Air Power at sea was only partially understood. It was preferred to invest in coast artillery for the defence of Singapore instead of putting the same resources in to the air component, which would have made a great difference.

Human Limitations

A favourite argument against unification is that one man cannot comprehend the necessary range of knowledge to work it. Every man serving in an independent service looks to that service for his future prospects and promotion. Ability to work with other services is not valuable in itself, compared with his value to his own service. If we are to have true co-ordination of the three services, it is necessary to develop men with the background, the knowledge and the experience to become the higher commanders of joint or unified forces, depending upon the system of reorganization. The loyal Navy, Army, or Air Force officer, tends to distrust the military eclectics who have to serve as go-betweens. An important limiting factor is certainly that of human adaptability. Specialization in the services reaches a very high degree. We regard sappers in the Army, submariners in the Navy, and the air-crews of the Air Force as being dedicated specialists. The problem is to create, from such Specialists, the Generalists who come become supreme commanders, and staffs of supreme commanders in the future. However, Blake became an Admiral when he was 45 years of age, and defeated the Dutch professionals. Kesselring, after a distinguished career in the German Army was transferred in his late forties to the Air Force because he was a brilliant administrator, became an airman of some ability himself and successfully commanded air fleets and land forces. The father of the RAF, Lord Trenchard, was over 40 when he became an airman, after a full career of soldiering. It is not impossible to create the leaders or the staff officers for unified forces but we have to prepare them. The ability is not intuitive in every potential leader, and we must devise an educational system for their production. Without it they will not be produced, and when we hear that people want to curtail the education of service officers or narrow it, I think we should resist them in the interests of future unified command.

Technology

Military technical factors continue to grow in complexity. Scientific development rapidly changes the nature of weapons and speeds up the time factor in war. Weapons are developed during the course of war on which experience before war has not been available.

Weapons are becoming more complicated so that it is difficult for the layman to understand them, yet beyond the capacity of the scientists to apply them. Weapons are costly, which intensifies the need for economy. If a guided missile costs millions of pounds to build, then we have to save money somewhere. If we can economize through unification (and I do not agree that we necessarily economize by unification) then it will assist to provide more modern weapons. When one weapon is common to two services, the services tend to wrangle as to who should own and operate it. In technical development a problem also arises when industrial resources have to be divided between the services, and opposing interests clash. An impartial body must then allot the resources. Therefore, there must be a uniform and clear policy on the strength of forces, and their nature, before we can begin our industrial mobilization. This is a factor calling for unification.

Overlaps

In Intelligence there has been such a broadening that Joint Intelligence Services or a unified Service become essential. We are now interested in the broadest forms of intelligence such as the basic war potential of our potential enemies, their atomic production, and their technical development. The balance of forces becomes an acute problem on several planes; producing arguments within the services on the strengths of the arms as opposed to their ancillary services — between "teeth" and "tail"; armoured and infantry factions, fighters and bombers, destroyers and submarines. These differences call for a strong co-ordination. There are similarly inter-service functions which require co-ordination and would benefit from unification, which are hard to define in terms of one particular fighting service. An example is air field construction in a theatre. Airfields are not necessarily for the benefit of the Air Force alone — they may be there for the primary needs of land forces, ie, airfields to carry close support aircraft and to carry transport aircraft. These requirements are constantly overlapping and air power itself is an overlapping service. We see this even in the use of strategic bomber aircraft on occasions to give tactical support to the Army, quite apart from normal land/air warfare, and the similar use of carrier-borne aircraft. The need for co-ordination there becomes great. When Bomber Command was first called in to assist the land forces at Caen there was disagreement between the airmen. The tactical air force did not succeed, and Bomber Command was recalled to plan the operation again. This time it was a success. There is a strong case for more unified control over all inter-locking functions. The control of the missiles which are being developed at the present moment; the question of at what stage is it desirable that the Army would cease to control missiles, ie, at what stage do missiles cease to be of tactical use; these are some of the issues to be resolved. It is interesting to note the Von Runstedt complained of the difficulties of disunited command in the German Army, where, with the Luftwaffe anti-aircraft, with their field divisions, parachute divisions and para-political formations, it was impossible for him to exercise a truly unified command.

Finance

It is dangerous to advance financial economy or financial co-ordination as the principal reason for unification. Economy is obviously desirable, and it is necessary in difficult budgetary problems to have a strong guiding control. But it would be wrong to allow mere finance to dominate what is essentially a problem of the functions of the three services. Reasons of finance are at best secondary reasons. The problems of sharing the budget persist particularly when there are cuts to be taken. Every year we see this battle of the budget. The United States controversy on the B 36 was basically a financial one. If strong budgetary

control is exercised the priorities can be settled quite clearly. There should be one overall responsibility, and not the present divided responsibility.

Administration

The easiest and strongest case for unification lies in the field of administration. Field Marshal Montgomery has stated that separate self-contained services lead to wasteful duplication. He has advocated integration of the administrative services now, and would start with the Chaplains, the Supply Services and the Medical Services. There are many homely examples of opportunities for integration of administrative services which can be left to the knowledge and experience of the reader.

In America the Single Manager System has been applied to what they call Subsistence (our Supplies). In the British System we have the Agency System. If a function has to be discharged in an area, then the service which has the major interest there can undertake it for the other services. This actually happens in war, but is not applied to peace. It seems axiomatic at first sight that a system which has to be worked in war should also be applied in peace. However, Sir John Slessor believes that it does not follow inevitably. Nevertheless, since the time factor in warfare has been so greatly accelerated, most administrative facilities which are known to be needed in war should be available and working on the correct organization in peace. Administration needs rationalization to ensure economy with efficiency.

Leadership

There has been an increased burden on command and leadership in the type of war which has been evolving during the past two world wars — total war, global war, involving alliances and coalitions in which unified action is necessary. The present systems of co-ordination by mutual consent on so many planes tend towards confusion and waste of effort. Lord Allanbrooke states that in 1940 when the Germans were expected hourly to invade England, the greatest danger was the fact that there was no Combined Service Commander; that there was no co-ordinating hand. It was a highly dangerous organization. In our times we require standing forces ready for instant employment, and unified command is essential for those forces if they are to be directed immediately to their war tasks. General Hollis believes, from his experience, that a single armed forces Chief of Staff is an over-riding essential.

The last war produced great integral commands; the systems of Supreme Command. The American system had a Supreme Commander, served by separate Commanders-in-Chief of Air, Land, and Sea Forces. The British co-ordinated largely by committee. One unified system is certainly desirable. Moreover, we have to produce Supreme Commanders to lead us in war, to whom we must give experience in peace. One of the last acts of Lord Mountbatten in South-East Asia Command was to call attention to this need to train Supreme Commanders in peace, and that they should be trained on the job, with experience of handling the forces, the men, and the materials which they will have to direct in operations.

Political Advice

We are greatly concerned with ensuring sound military advice to our parliamentary leaders. Without unified command it is impossible to ensure balanced advice. One of the gravest sins of disunited services, as Field Marshal Montgomery has pointed out, is that of "Empire Building", suspicion; the wrong application of service loyalties, leading in turn to bad policies and bad plans. He says "Get rid of the triumvirates of specialists, abolish the separate services, and put the senior officers on common senior lists. A Rear Admiral could command a division

without any great difficulty." To which Sir Richard Gale replied that, if he had an Admiral as a divisional commander, he would put his hat on.

A Miscellany of Typical Opinions

There is considerable variety of opinion on this subject among our erstwhile leaders. Lord Tedder is prepared to absorb all services, including the services of supply, into one large department. When we think of absorbing services into one large department, we should put the problem in perspective. Certain British experts said it was impossible because the services are individually too big for one man to direct. Opponents of that view disagreed, because, in actual fact the US Army, and even the US Air Force, was as large as all the British Services together. If they could be directed by one man, there was no reason why unified British Services could not be directed by one man. This argument is, in fact, more valid for Australia. Admiral Dickens has countered Lord Tedder by saying that integration is absolutely impossible except in minor aspects, and he was probably referring to administrative aspects. Sir John Slessor, who has had a great deal of experience of planning war, and planning war in alliance, claims that the British Chiefs of Staff had just as much power as their apparently more exalted American counterparts, and he believes that our present Chiefs of Staff system and its committee methods is the best we can have. He rejects the idea of a super Chief of Staff, and prefers to resolve differences between the services in Cabinet. He wants a typical British system.

Sir Ian Jacob, with considerable experience of defence co-ordination, has advocated a merger at the top of the three services, a strengthening of the Ministry of Defence, with the adoption of one Chief of Staff and one promotion list for senior officers of all three services. Admiral Hughes-Hallet has written that he is prepared to merge the Navy and the Air Force, because they have a similarity in function and, apart from that, he would merge certain administrative services such as intelligence, organizations and plans.

Air Marshal Kingston McCloughry has written on this subject at some length, and has advocated a stronger Defence Ministry in the British system, but prefers separate systems of individual services, co-ordinated by committee. Sir Ralph Saundby, who was the Chief of Staff of Bomber Command under Air Marshal Harris, rejects the "inertia of vested interests" inherent in the present system.

On the question of finding a Supreme Commander who can over-rule the senior officers of other services, it has been suggested by critics that it was very rarely that the Supreme Commanders over-ruled their experts; that for example, General Eisenhower never actually over-ruled Admiral Cunningham. One critic has even gone so far as to point out that the whole idea of a Supreme Commander who tells the various services what to do is UnBritish!

History clearly demonstrates that failure in co-operation on the personal level in command can be fatal to operational success. Marlborough had to adopt devious means to keep his allies with him, and to outwit their politicians and their commanders. There are classic examples of the clash of personalities in some of the greatest fiascos of the Russo-Japanese War which can be traced to the fact that the senior commander in the field had actually slapped the face of one of his leading generals some years before on a Moscow station. By merely hoping for the best we do not ensure that the best of results emerge. We must organize to win.

Some Conclusions

Gradual Inevitability

The process of absolute amalgamation is a painful and difficult one. But the old concept of joint service operation

and procedures does appear to be gradually atrophying, and the prospects of amalgamation become clearer. The emphasis has changed, particularly because of the need for clear command machinery in war, and also because of the budgetary problems which have arisen in peace. (I would again stress that mere budgetary problems and economies are not more important than functional questions which over-rule all other aspects of this question). There is an inevitability in unification, because of the complexity of modern war, and also because of the overlaps which are already manifest in the existing system. The process must be gradual, particularly in view of the American history. We see there an initial concept, of slow federation; changing to a belief in rapid centralization; slowed down to mere co-ordination; and, by the latest announcements, the evolution of a more rigid and direct control of the three Services. The best common ground of Defence organization before the nuclear age was in amphibious operations. Since the emergence of nuclear missiles and the imminence of nuclear warfare, the need for much swifter and more direct control has become obvious.

Unification in Alliance

In the light of our political alliances in Australia, and future co-operation with our allies, our considerations of unification should start from the nature of the Allied forces with whom we will be co-operating.

Initial Approaches

There are favourable approaches if we are to achieve unification with less difficulty and with a greater degree of acceptance by the public and by the services. If the Parliamentary machine were streamlined, and we had one Department of Defence, it would ensure simplicity of control and direct responsibility. Furthermore, we should aim to unify the higher command and staffs first of all, and to rationalize and unify our administrative services. These services are eminently susceptible to unification.

Education

The prerequisite of efficient unification lies in education at all levels, but particularly in education of the young officer. Young officers who have been educated together and inspired by a common doctrine will find future mergers between their services easier, particularly if they are educated in a broad tradition.

Selectivity

I would also suggest that we need to unify the essentials and yet retain the benefits of the present traditions and systems. It is nonsense to scrap what is good but organizationally we must keep abreast with the times. If we rationalize the political and higher command and the administrative aspects, the remaining stages of amalgamation will be realized in their own good time. It is not yet timely to evolve a new unified uniform of khaki hat, dark blue jacket, and lighter blue trousers, and then to tell the men that they are in one service. No doubt almost everybody would hate the idea. This amalgamation must necessarily be a gradual growth.

I close with a text from Field Marshal Montgomery, who has gone so far as to say that, in the next war we will all end up in the one service, or in two — the quick and the dead!

Author's Note — Acknowledgements are made to the American and British White Papers, Sir John Slessor, US Air Force University Journal, Air Vice Marshal Kingston McCloughry, The RUSI Journal, Brassey's Annual and the Journal of the USI of India.

INDONESIAN PROBLEMS

Reprinted from An Cosantoir, Eire

THE Republic of Indonesia is a simple name for a complex of islands and an assembly of heterogeneous peoples.

There are, in fact, more than 3000 islands and probably thirteen principal races. The islands include Sumatra, Java, Madura, Bali, Timor (in part), Borneo (in part), Celebes and the Moluccas. Northern Borneo is British and part of Timor Portuguese. New Guinea, which geographically belongs to the complex, at least in its eastern part, is partly Dutch, partly Australian and poses a special problem. Indonesian unification for some time to come would appear to be more likely nominal than real.

Geography

The physical separation of thousands of islands scattered about an oceanic area larger than the United States presents an obstacle to administration that is complicated by inadequate communications by sea, by jungle and swamp by land, and by a population which as yet has not had time to produce a significant and educated middle class.

Ireland, north and south, which is about one twenty-third the size of Indonesia, had, by comparison three years ago, twice the number of miles of roads, almost four times as many road vehicles and an equal amount of miles of railway. Lack of communications in Indonesia has hampered education and promoted racial and regional differences. Geography, however, is the great barrier to national unity.

The population of Indonesia, estimated in 1955 at 80 millions, makes the country the sixth most populous in the world. Java and Madura hold 52 millions of this figure, and in consequence, enjoy a favoured position. Sumatra, richest of the islands, holds 12 millions, Celebes 6 millions and Indonesian Borneo almost three.

Bahasa Indonesia is the official language of the Republic but there are almost 200 languages and dialects spoken by the inhabitants.

Religion, more than race or language, is the potent unifying force. Though the Constitution grants religious liberty to all, the overwhelming majority of Indonesians are Moslems. There are only three million Christians, two millions of whom are Protestant and the remainder Catholic.

The Chinese who live in the islands occupy a special position. They are numerous — almost two millions in number — influential, since the contribute a disproportionately important share to the trade and economy of the islands, and responsive, as are all Chinese in the Pacific, to political events in the homeland.

Most of them have taken out Indonesian citizenship but their absorption in Indonesian life is not complete. Resentment against their wealth and industry, which the Indonesians do not share, has extended to the point of governmental decree in their disfavour. They have to carry

special identification papers, and restrictions have been put on their business activities. It is not unlikely that the relationship of the central authority to this significant minority may be found unrewarding if, at some time in the future, China seeks to view it as an issue in which she has some concern.

History

Nationalist movements among the Indonesian peoples started in their modern form shortly after World War I, but the movements lacked direction until 1927. In that year Achmed Sukarno, a graduate of the Bandung Technical School, founded with a few friends the Partai Nasional Indonesia, or PNI. Its ultimate aim was the achievement of independence. On Sukarno's arrest and imprisonment by the Dutch the PNI was officially disbanded but a group headed by Mohammed Hatta continued its activities until the approach of World War II. The outbreak of war gave a tremendous acceleration to political events in the East.

The Netherlands East Indies armed forces capitulated to the Japanese in March, 1942, and Japan took over the East Indies territory. The Japanese, however, despite their slogan of "Asia for the Asiatics", did not hasten to form an Indonesian satellite government. They tolerated an organization called Puetra Tenaga founder by Sukarno and Hatta (which gave rise to a post-war accusation of Sukarno as a Japanese Quisling) but were more interested in exploiting Indonesian raw materials and conscripting Indonesians into labour units.

When the fall of Japan was imminent Sukarno and his friends set up a committee for the preparation of Indonesian independence. Two days after the Japanese surrender in August, 1945, the Nationalists proclaimed their independence. Sukarno became President of the Republic with Hatta as Vice-President and a presidential cabinet was appointed.

While the Second World War proceeded the Netherlands sought to counter de facto deprivation of her East Indies territories by de jure declarations. In December, 1942, the Netherlands government issued a royal proclamation in which Queen Wilhelmina stated the intention of her government to raise the Netherlands Indies to equal status with the home country. With war's end the government reaffirmed its intention to make Indonesia an autonomous partner in a union of states under the Dutch crown.

The Dutch plan of Indonesian federation, however, never became effective. Dutch and Indonesian views proved to be irreconcilable on three points: (1) the character of the relationship between the Netherlands and Indonesia; (2) immediate independence or autonomy after a transitional period; and (3) federal or unitary structure of the new Indonesian state.

Negotiations with the Dutch proceeded, broke down and finally disintegrated in violence. With armistice the parties succeeded in reaching the agreement of Linggadati in October, 1946, by which the Republic of Indonesia, comprising Java and Sumatra, accepted the status of a federal state within the United States of Indonesia to come into force on January 1, 1949. The other federal states were to be Borneo and East Indonesia, each of which was to be an aggregate of many semi-autonomous regions.

The Linggadati Treaty, in the event, provided no firm base for Indonesian-Dutch co-operation. The armistice, in turn, broke down and in July, 1947, the Dutch government decided to resort to force.

The Dutch claimed — and the claim had been recognized by the United States, United Kingdom and France — that they retained full and formal sovereignty over the whole of Indonesia until an agreement was reached. Dutch claims, however, met with the opposition not only of the USSR but also of Australia, resulting in the

resolution of the UN Security Council, August, 1947, by which both parties were requested to end hostilities and accept the services of a good offices' commission.

The good offices' commission accomplished nothing more practical than the establishment of a military demarcation line. The Netherlands, wearied of the worry and expense of the problem, seemed disposed to surrender the substance of its claims when the young Republic was shaken by internal clashes.

The Indonesian Communist Party resorted to open revolt and under its leader Muso, attempted a *coup de etat*. With opportunities thus presented the Dutch undertook a new police action. The Republican capital was taken by surprise and the Republican government taken prisoner.

The Security Council of the United Nations retorted at once with strong re-action. By a resolution in January, 1949, it enjoined the Netherlands to withdraw its troops from former Republican areas, to release the captured leaders and to restore the government of the Republic. The Netherlands' government after some delay yielded to the Security Council's injunctions and an agreement was concluded which not only restored President Sukarno to power but also laid the basis for a general treaty confirming nearly complete independence for Indonesia. The agreement had the further effect of uniting for a time the extremist Republican leaders, of whom Sukarno was chief, and the more conservative Indonesian leaders of the territory under Dutch control.

A constitution was drafted and accepted. Sovereignty over Indonesia, except for New Guinea which was to remain under Dutch control, was transferred to the new federal state of Indonesia. The Netherlands and Indonesia were to form a union under the nominal guidance of the Dutch crown. Provisions were made for regular union conferences of ministers and a union secretariat. Both states were to grant special privileges in their territory to the other's citizens.

The union and the federal form of government in Indonesia were short-lived, however. New disputes broke out between the signatory parties. The Indonesians complained of the Dutch policy in New Guinea (which they call Irian). The Dutch government accused the Indonesians of not living up to the agreements safeguarding the minorities in Indonesia and of failing to honour the treaty's economic clauses.

During 1950 the representative bodies of several federal states adopted resolutions which resulted in the liquidation of member states and their incorporation into the Republic of Indonesia and on August 15th, 1950, the unitary state, Republik Indonesia, was proclaimed.

Indonesia Today

History and geography, therefore, have united to present the young state of Indonesia with a set of problems with which it is now attempting to cope. Chiefly, the problems are internal disturbance and the West Irian issue.

Domestically, Indonesia has been in upheaval for the past eighteen months. In the spring of last year the outer islands passed out of the effective control of the central government as a result of a series of bloodless coups carried out by local army commanders. The revolt in the outer islands, Sumatra, Celebes and Borneo, was not, however, simply an army mutiny. The army leaders identified themselves with the grievances of the local people and acted in most cases in conjunction with local authorities.

The coups had primarily an economic cause. Sumatra and Borneo alone usually earn almost three-quarters of

Indonesian export receipts — Java, the seat and centre of power of the Central Government, consumes well over three-quarters of all Indonesian imports. The benefits of this state of affairs were largely enjoyed by the Nationalist party, PNI, which gathers its main strength from Java where the President himself was born.

The army revolt was, at the same time, a protest against the President's willingness to allow Communist influence in the national government. The President's toleration of the Communist party springs, of course, from expediency as well as from indulgence towards its theories. In effect, it would seem that President Sukarno and his party have sought to make a distinction between Communism as a set of political and economic principles and Communism as a subversive force whose supporters are trying to overthrow the government.

An alliance with the Communist party, PKI, moreover, has been found necessary to maintain President Sukarno's government party, PNI, in office against the opposition of the Masjumi, a moderate Moslem party, which has wide support, especially in Sumatra. The Communist party derives its main strength from the SOBSI, or Communist Trade Union Federation, which claims a membership of 2½ millions. The voting strength of the party, however, more than doubles this figure.

In the October 1955 elections the Communists polled almost six million votes out of a total strength of 42 million Indonesian voters.

This alliance between the PNI and the Communist PKI has been made easy for the nationalists because the PKI has taken pains in the last few years to appear highly nationalistic.

West Irian

Nationalism continues to exert the first influence in Indonesian life and each of the political parties is concerned to present itself as the standard-bearer of nationalism's aims. The claim to New Guinea (or West Irian, as the Indonesians call it) is a national claim backed by every Indonesian party without exception. The most demanding voice, apart from that of President Sukarno himself, is that of the Indonesian Communist party. Association with President Sukarno, widely revered as the embodiment of Indonesian nationalism, has clothed the party with the cloak of respectability. Good organizational work on its part in regard to the West Irian issue has attached to it the support of some of the more dynamic and intelligent sections of the people. Communist party support has served the short range aim of maintaining the nationalist part in office but it would seem likely that the PKI will in the end derive more benefit from the association. At the minimum it will inherit a large legacy of good will when the partnership comes to be dissolved.

Communism is not an immediate threat to Indonesia, perhaps. Probably most Indonesian peasants have never heard of it. But its potentialities are evident from the groundwork that is being laid.

International Significance

The claim to West Irian has a wider significance than that of merely being a common policy which helps to unite the Communist and nationalist parties. In Indonesian eyes continued Dutch occupation of West Irian is both a remnant of colonialism and an illegal seizure of a portion of Indonesian territory. President Sukarno, in particular, has found in it an issue sufficiently powerful to distract attention from troublesome internal difficulties of economics and mass poverty. But in Western eyes the claim would appear to rest more upon an emotional basis than a rational one.

The Papuans of New Guinea are not racially related to the Indonesians.

There can be no genuine claim to annex them on ethnic grounds. It is not quite clear what commercial use the territory is to the Netherlands. It is even less clear what use the territory might be to Indonesia unless a huge amount of capital — which is not available — were invested in its development. Indonesia, indeed, has better situated areas for colonization by Java's impoverished masses.

It would appear, therefore, that the problem of West Irian is primarily one of prestige and legality between the Indonesians and the Dutch. To a young and sensitive nation these are important considerations. They are frequently more potent and always more unmanageable than straightforward one of national profit. Above all, the problem is embittered by harsh memories of Dutch colonialism.

Anti-Dutch Feeling

Antipathy to former Dutch domination is, in fact, the operative factor working upon the Indonesians in West Irian's regard. British Borneo and absolute sovereignty over Timor which might appear equally valid objectives of Indonesian policy, have evoked no similar manifestation of national will. The Indonesian case is that by the Treaty of Linggadati, 1947, the term Indonesia embraced the territory of the Netherlands' East Indies in its entirety. Yet, it is said, the Dutch after putting their official signature to the Treaty have worked to separate West Irian from that territory.

The United Nations, the complaint continues, have been ineffectual in the matter. In the meantime, the Netherlands has constitutionally incorporated West Irian within its territory. The dispute continues and so far as can be seen the Indonesian claim is unlikely ever to be peacefully surrendered.

Other Powers

Indonesia's claim to West Irian creates opportunities and at the same time raises difficulties for the great powers. Indonesia, rich is natural resources and manpower, is a desirable ally but one whose wooing is complicated by the fact that the country has an emphatic mind of its own. The aim of Indonesian policy is to keep a balance between the country's need for financial and technical assistance, which the Western Powers can give, and reluctance to engage in any formal undertakings which run counter to the policy of neutralism. Neutralism, however, has not had the effect of inhibiting Indonesian flirtation. Both power blocs, in consequence, can enjoy satisfaction from evidence of Indonesian favour.

American aid to Indonesia commenced in 1950 with technical and material help in the fields of public health, agriculture, fisheries, industry and education. The Soviet countered with a technical aid agreement signed in September, 1956, which granted a £36 million credit to Indonesia for 12 years at the unprofitable interest rate of 2½%. President Sukarno received invitations in turn to visit Russia and the United States.

The United States visit was a very great social success but the Russian visit ended with the issuing of a joint statement which showed a remarkable identity of Soviet and Indonesian view. The statement declared that the Soviet Union and Indonesia were guided by the Bandung conference on questions of disarmament, the struggle against colonialism and the prohibition of thermo-nuclear weapons. It condemned the existence of military pacts including SEATO, within whose operational area Indonesia lies.

It was agreed between the parties and expressed in the statement that the Suez dispute should be resolved on the lines of full respect of Egypt's sovereignty and honour and that China should be admitted to the United Nations.

Foreign Policy

On her own part since her admission, Indonesia's allegiance to the United Nations has been firm and consistent. Within the organization Indonesia pursues a policy described by Indonesian spokesmen as "independent and active". According to Mohammed Hatta, the elder statesman and intellectual of Indonesian politics, the Republic of Indonesia has no desire to set up a third bloc in partnership with the states of Asia and Africa. She wishes, however, to see a "moral union" of African and Asian states which might influence, in the interest of peace, those states which are banded into blocs. The distinction is a sophisticated one and Western statesmen can be excused if they see in it the expression of an attitude which may tend to become the object rather than the agent of influence.

Indonesia, moreover, subscribes fully to the five principles of co-existence, devised by Chou-En-lai, propagated by Pandit Nehru, and warmly approved by the USSR. The policy of Asiatic neutralism, which fathered these five principles, has come to be regarded by the West as generally hostile or at best ambiguous.

Indonesia and USA

Co-existence is, of course, in direct conflict with Washington's efforts to create a united front against Communism in South-East Asia. Nevertheless, official Indonesian sources describe relations between the US and Indonesia as "fundamentally good". The Indonesians, who are a charming and appreciative people, value American help already given and are unwilling to forego prospects of help yet to come. Whatever view one may take of the Indonesian posture in foreign affairs, they themselves regard it as logical and straightforward.

On the other hand, they have come to detect what they believe is duplicity in American policy. In what is to them the vital matter of West Irian, American policy is, so far as they are concerned, intolerably ambiguous.

In the Indonesian view, the stand of neutrality taken by the United States in the feud between Indonesia and the Netherlands over West Irian gives support, in fact, to the Dutch.

US Position

An Indonesian proposal in the General Assembly of the United Nations for the re-opening of discussions with the Dutch regarding West Irian has failed three times to muster the necessary two-thirds vote. The negative attitude of America, it is believed, has brought about this situation which frustrates honest Indonesian attempts to right a wrong and impels her to seek comfort and support elsewhere.

The dilemma which confronts America as a friend of both the Netherlands and Indonesia creates no sympathy. To the United States the Netherlands is a mother country, a firm friend and a formal ally. The promotion of Indonesian claims by America at the expense of the Netherlands would, in consequence, be considered an unfriendly act by the Dutch. The Dutch, indeed have several reasons for wanting to hold on to New Guinea. They wish to retain one last outlet in the Pacific for their energies and capital. All else is gone of a great Asiatic empire except New Guinea, and its loss to the Dutch would be psychologically unacceptable.

To the psychological is added a humane consideration in the possibility that New Guinea may provide a more acceptable home than the Netherlands or Indonesia under native rule for nearly a quarter of a million men and women in Indonesia of mixed Dutch and native ancestry.

SEATO

The Dutch case commands sympathy from American statesmen and support from American strategists. The strategists wish to retain New Guinea bases in Western hands. The Australians, *fellow members of SEATO*, are directly involved as co-administrators of the island. They have an interest in promoting a strong Netherlands position in New Guinea as an added defence in depth against a possible Communist attack from the north. They have, consequently, no wish to encourage a nationalist government in New Guinea, however much they may favour it elsewhere. They fear that Indonesia, after obtaining West Irian, would claim Australian New Guinea, though this fear is declared by Dr Hatta to be totally unfounded.

Only Pakistan of the SEATO powers might be depended on to support wholeheartedly Indonesia's claims. Pakistan is bound to Indonesia by firm ties of common Moslem faith and close cultural association. In this matter, Pakistan, probably to her discomfort, finds herself on the same side as India.

From remote times India and Indonesia have shared a common cultural and religious heritage. To this link is added present personal friendships between Indonesian Republican leaders and statesmen now in power in India. Indonesia acknowledges India's eminent position among the newly emancipated nations of Asia and can confidently rely on her patronage and support.

The West Irian issue, therefore, is a factor which may contribute to the closer unity of Asia against the West. Nor is that all. So long as it continues, extremists in the nationalist party, encouraged by the Indonesian Communists, may be tempted by money and arms from the USSR.

Strategic Situation

Indonesia's 3000 islands form a strategic chain from Singapore to Australia. Sumatra, in particular is an important reservoir of strategic raw materials. Rubber, tin and petrol are produced in large quantities. The islands are sited to outflank the American global defence perimeter in the Far East, and isolate Australia. Of the string of islands that half circle the great continent of Asia — Janan, Okinawa, Formosa, the Philippines, Indonesia — only Indonesia is not committed to the West.

Progress to her natural position as one of the richest and strongest states in Asia is inevitable with the solution of her internal and external problems. It is in the West's interest to strengthen claims upon Indonesian gratitude and loyalty by helping with that progress.

The army revolts at present rending Indonesia would seem to have no radically separatist aim. The desire for a greater regional share of the country's wealth and reaction against internal Communist pressure may be satisfied by compromise on President Sukarno's part. But even if President Sukarno were to abdicate his position, the national will to recover West Irian would remain, for it is the one issue on which all the Indonesian people are united.

—P.J.L.

How to Soldier From 9 to 5

CAPTAIN H. B. CHAMBERLAIN
Royal Australian Infantry

IT is proposed to review certain aspects of this subject with a view to overcoming current difficulties. A comprehensive survey is not at present possible due to the wide diversity of military activities, and the various factors which govern the work load of numerous members.

From time to time advanced ideas are put forward and courageous examples are displayed by the more forthright adherents of the cult. So many frustrating counter attractions are laid in the path of would-be followers that it is considered that advice of a practical nature would be most opportune. The humdrum attempts by milk and water copyists serve only as poor examples, and can only do great harm to a time-honoured institution. Recent surveys have indicated that the novice has much to learn.

Perhaps the most important factor is to begin early in one's career. Failure to do this can have crippling results in later years. The chains of habit cannot be broken once their weight begins to be felt. Almost every member is aware of those unfortunate fellows who, caught in a whirlpool of annoying toil, flounder on and on trying to do a task which could well be left until the morrow.

It is stressed, however, that in no sense should one attempt to evade work. The important thing is to catch it, behave as though endowed, and then place it firmly in the arms of a subordinate. More practice is required to foist it on to one of equal rank. Consummate skill and more than ordinary courage is required to pass it back to the originator, particularly if he is of higher rank. Trivia such as this should never be allowed to deter the true follower.

Problems for the junior officer studying the cult are legion. No great cause is without them, however, and here it is intended to put forward a few basic rules which could also serve as an aide-memoire. Situations will arise where a student will be called upon to be in attendance for more than the necessary forty hours a week. It will be of advantage to the student to memorize the rules to assist in meeting these situations.

1. Cultivate a bad memory. The fellow with a poor memory is sympathized with rather than maligned. Absence from a late lecture will often be passed off.
2. Be most conspicuous during normal hours of duty. Any lapse occuring after hours will then probably be overlooked.
3. Clear yourself by ordering others to work late. This is handy in case of one of those irritating enquiries.

4. Be vague and difficult to approach. Subordinates will hesitate to submit a problem to you, particularly when the magic hour draws near.
5. NEVER commit anything of minor importance to paper. This not only takes time but may clarify the issue in the other fellow's mind, thus encouraging him to come back for more.

The above rules are basic only and should be varied to meet a particular situation. Constant practice will ensure an evasive approach to any after hours chore and enable students to be ready to disappear and delegate at the appropriate times.

Regimental life has somewhat specialized problems and will test the student's ingenuity to the utmost. Absence from Reveille and Tattoo parades by Orderly staff is generally recognized as being the ultimate challenge. Successful instances have occurred, however, and although the student should note this well, it is not practicable to give a case history at present. Some company commanders are inclined to be less strict than others. It is important, therefore, for the student to assess his seniors as soon as possible after arriving at a new unit. This will often enable one to pick his mark. A few words then on company commanders and regimental officers generally.

By the time an officer becomes a company commander he is usually in his early or middle thirties. The bloom of youth has passed and he tends to become gullible and forgetful and, if encouraged, will talk at length on climbing yamas or beating off human-sea attacks. This invariably occurs whether he has had the experience or not. It is important to appear to listen eagerly, but hesitate to smirk as this could possibly cause a slight pause.

Several sessions of listening to reminiscences will enable the student to become well thought of, and it is then time to attempt the ultimate challenge. It is realized that it is not a simple task to miss supervising a Reveille parade but this must be carried out if one is to have a clear conscience. The practice is also excellent quicksand for staff appointments which may occur in later years.

Despite the difficulties which face the student in regimental life there is great inspiration to be gained from the progress which is being gradually effected elsewhere. A hard core of brave hearts literally force the issue in the many depots, centres and headquarters throughout the Commonwealth. It would perhaps be fiting to end with a case history alleged to have occurred some years ago.

A junior officer was posted to a large headquarters in a minor staff appointment. During the first day he shuffled with the contents of his predecessors "awkward" basket. Anxious to conform, late in the afternoon he scanned the faces of his fellows, both military and civilian, to detect any sign of evacuation. A low rumbling as of a distant dance was heard. The sound rapidly increased. Curiosity caused him to raise his head to the level of the ancient parapet-like window and observe.

Tightly packed in wedge shape formation and spearheaded towards the main gate a body of troops and civilians resolutely pressed forward across the open ground astride the exit road. The axis of advance was directed from the doors of a nearby service depot. Once the forward elements reached the gate the main body rapidly dispersed apparently according to plan.

Perhaps here lies the main lesson to be learnt from this review: ALWAYS CONFORM.

Crystalline examples as described above can only be achieved by the co-operation of all concerned. To exceed the normal number of hours by trifling with an irksome problem can only help destroy the temple which has taken years to build.

BRAINWASHING

Some Notes on Psychopolitics

CAPTAIN G. R. FINLAY
Australian Intelligence Corps

"The safety of the free world seems, therefore, to lie in a cultivation not only of courage, moral virtue and logic, but of humour: humour which produces the well-balanced state in which emotional excess is laughed at as ugly and wasteful."

— William Sargent in "Battle for the Mind"

THE free peoples of the world have been horrified in recent years to read, not once but many times, of responsible persons, both civil and military who have, after a seemingly short period of incarceration by the Russians or Chinese, made confessions of the most heinous crimes. Many will doubt that these statements are an effective propaganda medium but it cannot be denied that in countries within the Communist bloc or with Communist sympathies the effect has been considerable. Even in Australia it is not uncommon to hear citizens of "true blue" quality quote the dangerous saying, "there's no smoke without fire" and add that "there probably was something behind those confessions by UN airmen that they used germ war in Korea".

Surprisingly little of a military nature has been written on this subject, and of that which has appeared no attempt has been made to prepare our forces positively against similar treatment should they fall into enemy hands. In discussing this problem with officers representative of all arms I have found a number of confused and confusing opinions. By some, brainwashing is considered another method of interrogation, others remark that the Germans tried it unsuccessfully, still others regard brainwashing as a stunt to which only the mentally unstable or politically doubtful are susceptible. These views are fallacious.

To those who knew China prior to 1949 it was inconceivable that the nation could be united, that graft and corruption could be virtually abolished and a national discipline imposed. Early scepticism that this had been achieved by the Comunist regime changed to firm belief that this could have happened as a result of mass slaughter and brutality. Though it is true that hordes have been murdered in the process, it is something far, far more diabolical which has placed this vast land of 500 million people under complete domination. The Communists use the term "psychopolitics".

Origin

It was Ivan Petrov Pavlov, a Russian Neuro-Physiologist generally opposed to his Communist masters, who provided the basic research which was later to be used so effectively in evil practice. For some thirty odd years after the beginning

of the twentieth century, Pavlov carried out extensive experimentation into the behaviour of dogs, in his studies of the "conditioned reflex". He found that a dog which had been given a definite signal such as an electric shock, the ringing of a bell or the beating of a metronome as a prelude to being given food would, after a time, salivate in anticipation without the necessity for the odour or sight of the food itself. So well defined became this reaction that a dog which had been conditioned to salivate when a tone of 500 vibrations per minute was sounded would fail to react if the sound rate were varied to 490 vibrations per minute.

These important findings, which were intended for the betterment of the mentally or emotionally disturbed, have formed the basis of practical psychopolitics — brainwashing. Physical debilitation, prolonged deprivation of any or all the normal functions of daily life, or drugs, are media used to make the subject ready for "correction". This fact must be stressed, for when physical torture is used by the Communists, unlike its use by the Germans or Japanese, it is rarely, if ever, intended to produce any result other than the preparation of the subject for what is to follow.

To date, the Communists have not shown themselves to be particularly skilful in the art of military interrogation. Strangely enough it appears that the extraction of tactical information from captured enemy has been treated as relatively unimportant and many prisoners received little or no interrogation in the field. Brainwashing then is not "another method of interrogation", nor is brutality, starvation or other ill treatment designed expressly to obtain information.

Aim

There appear to have been alternative aims in the process of brainwashing, firstly and desirably — conversion, and where this seemed unlikely, confession. The other alternatives, where the practitioners had no time limit on their operations, were either the unfortunate demise of the subject or his collapse into complete insanity. No authority that I have read has accepted the theory that any man yet born could withstand "brainwashing" indefinitely without being affected. This should emphasize the need for any man to escape from captivity if the slightest possibility of success is apparent.

Technique

When a man is deprived of sleep for days — ten to twelve days are recorded in some instances, his rest continually interrupted and his thoughts controlled by a system of noises, motion picture projections or interrogations he finds that his will power becomes paralyzed, he suffers from hallucinations and eventually comes to doubt his own sanity. Then he is a suitable subject for the imposition of a will other than his own. Whilst hunger or physical torture can produce a similar result, violence is not necessarily employed. A typical method is the use of a prison routine to "condition" the subjects physically and mentally. A prisoner in solitary confinement without natural light is allowed to measure his days by the regular arrival of food, the consistent movement of guards, etc. After weeks or months of this regular pattern the timetable is subtly varied — lunch may follow two hours after breakfast then with the usual interval to the next meal. The irregularity is so subtly introduced that the prisoner tells himself that he must have slept when he knows that he has not, he believes his stomach is playing tricks on him and in time loses his hold on reality until he is ready to grasp at anything which offers a tangible assurance that he is still in possession of his faculties. The "confessor" is then able to suggest, without too much objection, that if the prisoner is so unsure of the events of the previous month or even day he is certainly not able to deny that he *might* have done things before his arrest which

he can no longer remember. A "confession" is the next step.

The process of conversion may well be similar in the early stages, but the end differs in that the subject must be brought to the stage where he will go out of the treatment room ready to propound the gospel of his new faith.

The group method of brainwashing and indoctrination was used to bring the masses of China to subjection. Groups are brought together and kept together with the sole occupation of confessing to one another, day after day, actual or imagined evils. Always there is the pounding question "Why? Why? Why?" as the group forces the individual to turn his secret thoughts inside out in an endeavour to find something new to confess, some hidden motive to reveal. Add to this the constant repetition of the "creed" of Marx, Lenin, Stalin or Mao. At this stage in the process the creed is meaningless but it is forced upon the memory so that as the subject loses his faith in his past way of life he will tend to hold onto the only things about which he can safely talk or think. Do not think that this process could only affect the illiterate oriental mind, too many cases are on record of the effectiveness of this group system upon intelligent Europeans. I have heard a Priest of the Roman Catholic faith tell of the gradual mental and spiritual disintegration caused during his four years of imprisonment. After some weeks of the "breaking down phase" it is to be expected that the point beyond endurance is reached and members of the group give way to hysteria, tears and some of the weaker to mental derangement. Some few who have been insufficiently affected may be taken out of the group and disappear to the further demoralization of the remainder. Here it is that the formerly almost meaningless precepts learned by rote become all important, as for the drowning man will clasp at a straw so the individual will eagerly embrace the only thing left for him. The doctrine he formerly loathed becomes his salvation and his tormentor becomes his saviour. He looks eagerly for guidance and grasps any opportunity to bring others to the new freedom he enjoys.

I have dwelt at some length upon the actual process of brainwashing because I believe it is essential that we accept the evil for what it truly is — not just as another means of forcing a prisoner to give information, but as a diabolical weapon against the masses.

Effects on UN Prisoners

Did the Communist efforts at indoctrination in the prisoner of war camps of North Korea really achieve very much? The number of Australians captured was too few for a statistical analysis to be made. A pamphlet issued by the British Ministry of Defence[1] in 1955 concludes: "Officers and senior NCOs (who made up about 12 per cent of the total of British soldiers captured by the Chinese) remained almost completely unaffected by the Communist propaganda and were segregated from the remainder, while among the junior NCOs and Other Ranks some two-thirds remained virtually unaffected. Of the remainder, most absorbed sufficient indoctrination to be classed as Communist sympathisers". Only one British soldier elected to remain in China after the armistice, but it can be seen that of the 946 who were repatriated some 29 per cent, or approximately 230 other ranks, had been indoctrinated to some degree. No official figures are available to me concerning the forces of the United States, but a newspaper report carried the following statement by an Army psychiatrist, "Only 10 per cent of the prisoners refused to either collaborate or co-operate with the enemy in any way. Thirteen per cent were active and vigorous collaborators — the kind of men who made Anti-American broadcasts or betrayed their comrades. Seventy-five

(1) From "Treatment of British Prisoners of War in Korea" published by Her Majesty's Stationery Office — 1955.

per cent "played it cool" acceding to the Communists' demands but not doing anything particularly treasonable". It is worthy to note that of 229 Turks captured in Korea not one collaborated, became a Communist or signed a confession.

There is an obvious conclusion from these statistics; that a dangerous number of United Nations troops succumbed to the treatment but a large percentage proved that *it is possible to withstand brainwashing under military conditions and to defeat the aims of the captors.*

If any proof of this is needed it can be found in the citations for gallantry in captivity which resulted in the award of a number of decorations. Of Fusilier Derek Godfrey Kinne of the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers who was awarded the George Cross, the citation states, "Fusilier Kinne was during the course of his periods of solitary confinement kept in no less than seven different places of imprisonment, including a security police gaol, under conditions of the most extreme degradation and increasing brutality. Every possible method both physical and mental was employed by his captors to break his spirit, a task which proved utterly beyond their powers. Latterly he must have been fully aware that every time he flaunted his captors and showed openly his detestation of themselves and their methods he was risking his life. He was in fact several times threatened with death or non-repatriation. Nevertheless he was determined to show that he was prepared neither to be intimidated nor cowed by brutal treatment at the hands of a barbarous enemy."

Dangers

What then are the essentials, from a military point of view, if a man is to withstand such treatment? Some measures have been considered which are highly undesirable. A US Army publication states, "As far as military information is concerned, then, you should give only your name, rank and service number. But the chances are that the interrogator will ask you other questions about yourself. You can tell him a little about yourself; maybe you come from Iowa and you're a farmer, or you're from Pennsylvania and you worked as a coalminer. Don't tell him your entire life history; he is an experienced interrogator and before you know it, you will be telling him how you came in the Army, what training you had, what weapons you know and what your specialty is". The latter sentence will serve to emphasize the danger and fallacy of the earlier. All research at the School of Military Intelligence has gone to prove that it is fatal to give more information than is required by the Geneva Convention which now provides for a prisoner to give his date of birth in addition. I questioned the Priest mentioned earlier concerning this and he replied; "If I were to face imprisonment again I would accept any physical punishment rather than say one word because the unimportant information which I gave after my arrest was the Communists' greatest weapon against me later on". This is by far the greater danger resulting from "inconsequential" chatting with interrogators. The old saying that "there is no such thing as an innocent question or an unimportant answer" is more than ever true. "Certain basic principles, however, do emerge from a study of animal behaviour under stress and seem equally relevant to man . . . When a dog sullenly refuses to pay any attention to the flashing lights and other food signals intended for his conditioning, his brain remains unaffected; consequently Pavlov used to bring his dogs to the experimental stand in a hungry state, hoping to fix their attention on signals which might be followed by food. Human beings, like dogs, do not break down if they simply refuse to face a problem or task presented to them, or take evasive action before giving it a chance to upset their equilibrium. Whoever refuses to co-operate in any technique of conversion

or brainwashing and, instead of paying attention to the interrogator or preacher, manages to concentrate mentally on some quite different problem, should last out the longest. A good example is Kipling's Kim, who resisted Indian hypnosis by the desperate recollection of the English multiplication tables . . . Any uncertainty about the amount of legitimate co-operation desirable with the enemy leads to trouble and often to breakdown".(2) The elements of successful resistance can be considered in two parts; group factors and personal requirements.

Group Factors

I need not labour the value of esprit de corps as it affects the efficiency of the unit, but its importance in relation to the individual soldier needs stressing. When he is alone in confinement he must be able to rest on the knowledge that his unit is worth fighting for, that he cannot let the team down even though no member of the team may be aware of his lapse. This spirit is, as we know, compounded of many things; discipline, faith in his leaders, confidence in the ability of his side to win. The example of officers and NCOs in captivity may be a mainstay even when direct association is not permitted. However, all group factors to have any ultimate impact must affect the soldier as a person, for he will be unaccompanied when his test comes.

Personal Requirements

Just as each man is different physically and has a different mental and emotional make-up to his comrades, so the ingredients necessary to build upon his normal intestinal fortitude will differ. Again national characteristics differ and this make different armies more or less susceptible. Many aspects are worthy of consideration. On view is quoted from a US publication "ARMOR".(3) "For the United States the founders of the Republic laid a solid spiritual foundation in two great documents — the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. In these papers are recorded the ideas and principles upon which American patriotism must be built. Inspiration gleaned from them should be reinforced by a knowledge of American history, particularly of American military history. The importance of this instruction is illustrated in the report of an officer, who examined all the former prisoners of war of his post who had successfully resisted the Communist enemy's efforts to break them down. There he states 'All those interviewed, when asked what fortified them most against capitulating to the inducements or tortures of the enemy, unanimously placed the knowledge of American history uppermost'. Army officers, who are responsible for national security in the event of a national emergency, can no longer take it for granted that young men called to the colours are spiritually and morally prepared or imbued with a love of country which will sustain them in case they are subjected to the tortures of a cruel and barbaric enemy. They must include such instruction in their own programme".

There are, however, two basic requirements for each man — officer or private soldier — and these are FAITH and PRIDE.

Faith

Most of us, if we are frank, will have to admit that we have devoted little if any time or energy towards building an active faith in God and yet we are all ready to accept that we are currently involved in an ideological war — a war involving our freedom of worship as opposed to an anti-Christian philosophy.

(2) "Battle for the Mind" — William Sargent.

(3) "The Significance of Military History in the Education of Officers" by Brigadier-General P. M. Robinett USA — RET in "ARMOR" Sep - Oct 1957.

Too many cases are on record of men who have endured to the end because of an unshakeable belief in God for there to be any doubt about this fundamental issue. No evidence need be called to show the devilish origin of the system which has created psychopolitics. Thus if we are to fortify ourselves against the enemy we need a pointer from the leaders of our nation towards FAITH IN GOD.

Next, we all require the assurance of FAITH IN THE CAUSE. It was said of the war in Korea that a great percentage of the troops involved was not really aware of why they were fighting. This may well have been a major contributing factor in the subversion of many. During World War 2 an excellent series of films was produced, the "Why we fight" series which left no doubt in the minds of the viewers as to the nature of the struggle. But today the matter is much more complex — an ideological war is much harder to interpret and explain — yet how much more important it is today for officers and men to comprehend the nature of the struggle. Whilst this is something that regimental officers can and should attempt, I consider that an approach is needed from a much higher level. We must accept that the Communists are in the front rank of world propagandists, we should not present them victory without bringing our own force to bear. I believe that countless opportunities to show our citizens and our soldiers the evils of Communist domination have been lost because we have no functioning Ministry of Propaganda. Who really forced on the conscience of our nation the horror of the suppression of the Hungarian freedom fighters? A few newspaper reports, a published United Nations document and the matter was closed. In wartime, we include Psychological Warfare teams amongst our offensive units. In peace I consider that we should employ with the Forces, Counter-Psychological Warfare Teams to actively combat the massive propaganda output of the enemy and as a field unit of the Government department mentioned above. It must rest upon our consciences if we send troops into battle not knowing why they are fighting. They must have FAITH IN THE CAUSE.

Pride

"Vastly more Americans are alive because of pride, theirs and that of their comrades, which would not let them give in to fear. Where pride and spirit are lacking, 'anxiety complex' is frequent, as are skulking, malingering, self-inflicted wounds, the pinned-down cry, easy surrender and prisoner collaboration with the enemy. There is a close correlation between lack of pride and all these things. Prisoners who refused to collaborate, refused to be brainwashed, fought back, took all the tortures and indignities the enemy could devise, had tremendous pride and you can bet your bottom dollar on that".(4) I have spoken with a number of former prisoners and there seems to be no factor as important as personal pride — a man's PRIDE IN HIMSELF tempered with a sense of humour that enables him to see the enemy's efforts as weakness not strength.

If pride then is so important, how is it cultivated — or is it something inborn which a man either has or has not.

Every normal man has pride — even the anti-social criminal who might sometimes be termed as "shameless — absolutely without pride" — will be found on investigation to have his share of pride, even if it is merely that he is proud of his skill as a burglar or in his ability to drink so many tankards of ale before collapsing. The essential then, from the military point of view, is to discover each man's individual pride and to build on that foundation. You will many times have seen the recruit at his first range practice, nervous and unsure but, after careful guidance by the

(4) "How Do You Get That Pride" by Brigadier-General Edwin A. Rangle in the US "ARMY" June 1956.

instructor, emerge full of confidence with pride showing on his face, as though he had been sure of himself all the time. Or you may have found a soldier whose usefulness has been impaired by a poor instructor who failed his pupil and left only a feeling of ineptitude.

But more than that, the need for personal pride requires a process of careful selection so that a man is enabled to build upon his strengths and thus minimize his weaknesses. The training pamphlet entitled "Leadership" (1957) states, "Discontent and unhappiness will result from giving a man a task which is beyond his physical or mental capacity or for which he is not emotionally suited". That statement does not cover all the truth of the matter. To give a man some task beyond his ability will certainly destroy a large amount of pride, and may, should fate so decide, make him clay in the hands of a Communist potter. A soldier must be selected for the work for which he is most suited and then the junior officer and the NCO must discover just what particular ability the man has and build up his pride in that. Similarly senior officers and commanders must closely build on the abilities of their subordinates, for in the testing before the Communist brainwashers a man is a man, not a major, a sergeant or a private, but a very solitary man who can only react as he is in himself without the stimulus of the group to support him.

Conclusion

Psychopolitics is a very potent weapon in the hands of the enemy, in peace for the subjugation of the masses and in war for the dissemination of propaganda. If the enemy produces a bigger and better tank there is no great decision necessary to commence the production of an effective anti-tank device; is there any reason why we should not as actively set about countering the enemy's psychopolitical offensive? This matter requires action from the top, from the leaders of our nation, and from there down through all levels of the community and the services. There should be training for all mature officers, by a competent team of instructors, in the modus operandi of the enemy so that in the event of capture they can guide the troops in the right attitude to adopt. I do not consider this subject should be taught to the troops as knowledge may engender apprehension rather than confidence. But that does not mean that we should adopt a "do nothing" policy. It is vital that officers of all ranks set actively about the task of preparing their subordinates for the problem which may arise at any time. To know why he fights, to be proud of himself and his unit, to have faith in God and the cause for which he fights, these things a man needs to defeat the brainwashers, and these are the things which every officer should encourage, develop, and show by example.

SOVIET ROCKETS

Reprinted from the April 1958 issue of the "Military Review", Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, USA.

THE following is a compilation of currently available published reports on the weapons which make up the Soviet rocket arsenal.

The surface-to-surface T - 1, originally designated the M - 101, is a single-stage rocket developed from the German V - 2. It is about 50 feet long and five feet in diameter. Propelled by a liquid rocket engine of 77,000 pounds thrust, it has an estimated range of about 300 miles and develops a top speed of 4,900 miles an hours. It is used by the Soviet Army, and is submarine launched by the Navy.

The two-stage T - 2 rocket uses a 275,000-pound thrust (approx) liquid rocket engine in its first stage, and a T - 1 rocket forms the second stage. This operational weapon, which is about 15 feet in diameter at its largest point and weighs from 80 to 95 tons at take-off, has a range of 1800 miles and a top speed of 10,000 miles an hour. This missile is reported to be at launching sites in Czechoslovakia and East Germany. About 2000 of them have been constructed.

The T - 3, formerly the M - 104, is said to have been fired successfully over a range of 4000 to 5000 miles, and may be in production. It attains a maximum speed of 15,000 miles an hour and an altitude of about 900 miles. Its take-off weight has been estimated at from 100 to 250 tons, and it utilizes a liquid rocket first stage with a thrust of about 800,000 pounds.

Solid fuel rockets in the surface-to-surface class are the Comet I and II. The Comet I is in mass production. It is designed for use by submarines, can be launched from under water, and has a range of 600 miles. The Comet II is a development of the Comet I and also may be operated from submarines. It is about 50 feet long, and achieves a range of 700 miles and a speed of 6000 miles an hour.

The T - 4 is a winged rocket now in production. A development of the T - 1, it has a range of about 900 miles. It utilizes the same power-plant as the T - 1, and can be controlled near the end of its flight due to its glide characteristics.

The T - 4A is the designation of the Soviet's rocket "skip" plane. The last stage of this rocket is 68 feet long and uses three liquid rocket engines.

Air-breathing rockets are the J - 1, a pulse-jet development of the German V - 1 with a range of 300 miles; the 700 mile-an-hour turbojet propelled J - 2; and the supersonic ramjet-powered J - 3 with a range of from 1500 to 1800 miles. All three of these weapons are capable of being submarine launched.

The short-range, surface-to-surface T - 7A is a simple design, single-stage weapon with an operational range of from 30 to 60 miles. This weapon is vertically launched, and is carried into battle on a tank-mounted launcher-carrier.

Another short-range support rocket is the T - 5B, a weapon with a large nose section, large fins, and a considerably narrower motor tube.

Among the Soviet's ground-to-air missiles are the M - 1 and the T - 7 which

approximate the US Nike-Ajax and Nike-Hercules, respectively, in range. These two missiles are said to be in use around Moscow and other key areas. The M - 3 ground-to-air missile is a two-stage rocket with a solid propellant booster.

The major Soviet launching area, at Kaspustin Yar, near Stalingrad, uses a test range which stretches 1500 miles into the desert area north-east of Lake Balkash. Both ICBM and Sputnik vehicles have been tested from this site. The major portion of the impact area lies across Siberia, and a network of tracking stations have been established to track the test launchings.

The T - 1, M - 3, T - 5B, and T - 7A missiles are reported to have been displayed in a Moscow parade in November of last year.

(See "New Soviet Weapons", AAJ 108, May 1958).

No study is possible on the battlefield, one simply does what one knows. Therefore, in order to do even a little, one has to know a great deal and know it well.

— *Marshal Foch*

IN SEARCH OF PHYSICAL FITNESS

Condensed from the Royal Bank of Canada Monthly Letter, January 1958

ARE we content to be merely free of sickness, or do we wish to be heartily healthy? Instead of answering "not so bad" when someone asks us "How do you feel?", do we wish to reply with an enthusiastic "grand!"?

We are well acquainted with the toll of sickness, the serious, sometimes tragic, consequences of neglect of physical care, the dreariness of being half well. Let us try now to accustom ourselves to the thought and experience of being positively fit.

Business men, alas, are among the world's worst practitioners of health habits. They may be able administrators, well-informed about company operations, excellent in work systems, and towers of strength in production, but they tend to be careless and thoughtless with regard to their own fitness and neglectful of their responsibility to see that their families learn to enjoy physical effort.

We no longer believe that disease is the result of angering pagan gods, or that it is spread by night air, or that it can be cured by blood-letting. But what are we doing effectively to use our advanced knowledge of how to stay well in these days of pressure?

It is true that by paying taxes we support public services which set up health safeguards, but they cannot do everything for us. Quarantine and isolation and immunization contribute to physical efficiency by protecting us from certain diseases. Surely our ambitious minds can fix upon some better state to work toward.

When we raise our standards of physical fitness higher than mere freedom from contagious disease, we find that we are in the realm of personal effort. The responsibility for achieving positive good health is upon us individually.

The art of hygiene is very simple; perhaps that is why it is so often neglected and despised. Cleanliness, wholesome diet, moderation in alcohol and drugs, exercise according to one's needs and strength, and mental attitudes of confidence, hopefulness and calmness: these are the basic laws of health.

A Shocking Report

The art of healthful living is not being carried into action by people in North America today, nor is it being taught effectively to the citizens of tomorrow.

This statement is made on the authority of a report that shocked President Eisenhower into appointing a special committee two years ago. The report was that of Dr Hans Kraus, of the Institute of Rehabilitation, New York University, and Miss Ruth Prudden, of the Institute for Physical Fitness at White Plains, New York. It asserted that the United States of America is rapidly becoming the softest nation in the world.

Here are the bald facts revealed by Dr Kraus —

58 per cent of United States children who were tested failed in one or more of six tests for muscular strength and flexibility, while only 9 per cent of the European children who were tested failed.

44 per cent in the United States failed in the one flexibility test (of back muscles) included in the six tests, against only 8 per cent of the European children. 36 per cent of the United States children failed in one or more of the five strength tests, compared with only 1 per cent in Europe. Three of these tests measured the power of abdominal muscles, and two the power of back muscles.

There are black-figure entries in our health ledger as well as these red-figure entries. But even when the balance is fairly struck, said Dr F. G. Robertson to the First Commonwealth and Empire Conference on Physical Education, we must acknowledge that the findings of the study apply with almost equal force to us in Canada.

"Is it not a startling conclusion", Dr Robertson continued, "that the children of families on this prosperous North American continent, with what we like to boast of as the highest standard of living in the world, with all the material prosperity that surrounds us on every side, measure up so unfavourably on a simple test of minimum muscular efficiency, stamina and endurance, with the children of families in Italy and Austria, countries which have known so much of hardship and deprivation during the past few decades?"

A pamphlet published by The Canadian Association for Health, Physical Education and Recreation confirms that the report is pertinent to Canada when it says: "there is no reason to believe that Canadian children would do better".

Dr. Doris W. Plewes, Consultant, Fitness and Recreation Officer of the Deputy Minister of National Health and Welfare, writes: "the very evident lack of stamina and endurance as exhibited by Canadians in competitive sports has surprised many".

Edith W. Conant, Director of the Programme Department, Girl Scouts of America, added evidence gathered when she took a group of girls to an international gathering in Switzerland. "Many of our girls did not have the physical energy for the extended hiking, mountain climbing, cross-country games, or even folk dancing, that girls of other countries tossed off without losing their breath".

What is to Blame?

What is the cause of this failure of North American children to measure up to the physical health of children in Europe? General opinion leans to the belief that the typical way of life on this continent is to be blamed. Our children are driven everywhere; to school, to play and to the shops. Even on weekends and vacations, says Dr Mary O'Neil Hawkins in "Child Study", they often sit for hours cooped up in cars. Their recreation has become increasingly passive and visual. Movies and television take up much time.

It is always unpleasant to assign blame, but those who have studied the matter most closely do not hesitate to say that parents and schools are at fault, in that order. Robert H. Boyle writes that 54 per cent of six-year-old children fail to pass the muscular strength and flexibility tests; at the other end of the education ladder, 52 per cent of high school graduates fail. Private schools, which devote much more time to physical education, have a failure rate of only 14 per cent upon graduation.

Parents are careful to see that their children are inoculated, vaccinated, and given the anti-polio and other treatments as they become available. They accept chlorination and, in some places, other treatment of tap water as normal. But they lose sight of the need for the child's

muscular development which in rougher ages resulted from what the child did naturally. "The playpen and a plastic toy keep him sanitarily quiescent", charges Boyle.

What is to be Done?

No one is suggesting that we turn back the clock so as to provide the exercise given by chores no longer necessary: carrying water, chopping wood and carrying it to the box beside the stove, hanging out the wash, walking over hill and dale to bring home the cows for milking, running errands now attended to by the telephone, and a hundred other duties that were done as a matter of course by young people. But it is necessary, if we are to save our young people from untold suffering and dissatisfaction with life, to recognize that our labour-saving machines impose a duty upon us to fill by other means the body-building place of these necessary human physical exercises.

Physical training in our schools needs an overhauling, according to those experienced in physical fitness. We have spectator sports in plenty, but only a few children are on the teams. Only the members of the teams and their replacements and the cheer leaders get any muscular exercise: the rest are admirers, exercising nothing but their lungs.

A well-planned programme of physical education would include a wide variety of activities and many skills.

Mere "provision" of playgrounds and equipment is not enough to meet the menace about which we have been warned. Participation should be required of every child, just as strictly as attendance at academic classes. The fortunate ones who make the teams will look after their own muscular development; attention needs to be paid to the one hundred or the one thousand in every school who are not one one of the athletic squads.

Does it pay? A school in a suburb of New York City had a 32 per cent rate of failure among its students. The physical education teachers added specific exercises to the existing programme of tumbling and gymnastics. Within five months the rate of failure fell to 24 per cent, and in eleven months it had dropped to 13 per cent.

Causes of Illness

For the first time in Canada's history we have a statistical statement of the causes of illness by age groups. It is given in a report published by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics in October, of which the following is a very brief extract:—

Children under 15 years of age reported a high incidence of the diseases of the respiratory system and after those came infestive and parasitic diseases. Diseases of the respiratory system dominated in all age groups.

Adolescents, 15 to 24 years, were afflicted by diseases of the digestive system, every tenth person having at least one attack.

Young adults, 25 to 44 years, followed the same pattern but with more occurrences. Diseases of the bones and organs of movement, which had a rather low rate for persons under 25 years of age, began to show prominence, increasing from 9 to 22 illnesses per 1000 population.

Middle-aged persons, 45 to 64, showed the increasing prominence of the diseases of the bones and organs of movement, about 42 per 1000. If the recurring attacks were also counted the rates would be 80 persons and 105 illnesses per 1000. Diseases of the circulatory system also began to be important at this age.

Persons 65 and over suffered most frequently from diseases of the circulatory system and diseases of the bones and organs of movement. There were 146 new and recurring attacks of the former and 147 of the latter per 1000 population.

It is evident that anything that can be done in childhood and adolescence and young adulthood to develop top quality in the bone, joint and muscle structure of the body will be a service of great value in middle and later ages.

Not, indeed, that physical fitness in childhood should be sought only because it will be beneficial in later life. It is of value here and now.

Accidents kill more children of school age than all diseases put together and, says Dr Plewes, most of these unfortunate children fall within one or more of these categories: they have a low energy level, they are slow reactors, or they are clumsy because of "muscle stuttering" and awkward because of lack of basic movement skills. "They are physical illiterates".

"We are paying the price of progress," says Dr Kraus. "The older generation was tougher because it had to undergo adequate physical activity in the normal routine of living. Let's take the sting out of the benefits".

Get Out of Our Seats

We sit at our desks in school or office all day; we sit on the bus or train or in our automobiles while going to and from school or work; we sit before our television sets, in the stands at hockey, baseball and rugby games; we sit in our cars or on buses on our way to the theatre, where we sit again to watch a play or a moving picture.

Even in the home, where no housewife will admit work is too easy even now, there is a lot of sitting as washing machines, dryers, ironers and the rest do jobs that formerly exercised leg, back and arm muscles. These new tools need to be balanced with some other kind of vigorous activity.

Individual Physical Fitness

Everyone can increase his physical fitness if he will aim at a worthwhile target. Let's shift our emphasis from "freedom from disease" to "the best possible health".

We might summarize this sort of fitness in this way: ability to fill one's place as an active member of society, without fatigue and with an energy reserve to meet unexpected stresses.

In the everyday work field, such a state of well-being will have good effects upon our job opportunities, our chances for promotion, and our earnings throughout our working life. More broadly, it will extend to give us emotional stability, mental security and social adequacy.

A certain amount of what is needed physically has been decided for us before our birth, and is ours by heredity: the type of body we have, our bone structure, the length and breadth of our bodies, and the number and pattern of muscle fibres that make up the muscles of the body. But the important thing is not whether we inherit a ten cent or a ten dollar constitution, but what we do with it. An old model car, properly serviced, can give longer and more consistent service than a modern and more expensive model carelessly used.

This is an individual challenge to today's adult people: to adjust their bodies to the changing conditions of modern life so as to keep them in reasonably good condition to handle peak loads. What we need is to give our bodies regular and intelligent care: sufficient sleep and rest, a balanced and adequate diet, daily vigorous physical activity.

One sign of a strong body is that the muscles perform their functions properly, giving the necessary support to the vital organs. This is something that can be improved by regular, systematic exercise, and by making sure that sufficient oxygen is taken to our muscles to produce energy.

While it is the blood that carries the oxygen and other nutrients to the working muscles and the waste products away

from them, it is that muscular organ the heart which produces the force to move the blood. And, says Dr Plewes in an article published in Canada's Health and Welfare, "persons whose muscles are in reasonably good condition are less likely to suffer from heart disease than those whose daily routine requires only limited physical effort".

In an interview, Dr Plewes enlarged upon the connection between physical efficiency and the action of the heart. "The failure to develop strong muscular tissue," she said, "prevents the blood from carrying oxygen to the muscle tissue and removing wastes fast enough to permit rapid repetitions of muscle action and hence the individual lacks endurance and fatigues easily, even though he may be able to make one short presentable effort".

Other research teams have pointed out that lack of adequate physical activity can be a menace to health and even to life. Two British medical research men found that coronary heart disease occurs with more than twice the incidence among the physically less active than it does among the active and when it does occur the mortality is much higher among the less active. They illustrated this by comparing British bus drivers and conductors. The drivers, sitting all day behind the wheel, were found to be far more susceptible to coronary heart disease than were their more active colleagues, the conductors, who spent the working day going up and down the stairs of the double-decker buses.

The worth of exercise rests upon a basic principle: The Law of Use. The Father of Medicine, Hippocrates, the first to break away from the idea that disease is due to the anger of the gods, declared in the fourth century BC: "That which is used develops and that which is not used wastes away".

Exercise gives us other benefits. It tends to lessen states of tension and fatigue and to reduce violent emotions. It contributes to weight control. Fat shuns the active muscles of those who limit their daily ration of calories to the amount they balance with exercise. It wipes away many backaches of the sort caused by lack of muscular strength and flexibility.

In short, adequate exercise of our muscles contributes to physical fitness, adding to our enjoyment of work and leisure; it encourages our zest for adventure, contributes to our courage in tackling problems, and gives us the vigour to do things of consequence. A fit person uses 20 per cent less energy for any move he makes than does a flabby or weak person.

In Mature Years

As the years pass, physical fitness demands that we constantly adjust to new pressures as well as to aging arteries. "Survival of the fittest" means no more than the survival of those best fitted to cope with their circumstances.

We are masters of our fate only when we have made ourselves fit to meet the new conditions that surround us; when we have learned to give in when the situation does not much matter and save our strength and energy for the important things in life.

A physically fit man easily finds his way out of difficulties that would keep his nerves twanging if he were sick or only half well. He gives birth to business ideas as no ailing man can. He has the grit to carry them into action.

It is a sign of maturity to know when to exercise and when to rest, when to hang on and when to let go. Francis Bacon, Lord High Chancellor of England, writing some 360 years ago, said a man seeking good health should be ready to say: "This agreeth not well with me, therefore, I will not continue it". If we hurl ourselves against Nature what can we expect but wreckage? Nature is so old, so strong, so fixed.

Let us not be content then, in our mature life, to add up all the illnesses

we do not have, and say we are healthy. There is a wonderful experience available to us: positive well-being. The only thing lacking is a desire so strong that it prompts us to do the necessary things.

The suggestion that we can be better than we are faces two stages of opposition. First, we say it is ridiculous. This is the great enemy of all progress, people's disbelief. Then we say that the proposed betterment is not needed, that our present state of fitness is good enough.

But those who push on from feeling "pretty well" to feeling "very well" gain a rich reward. Instead of raising gravestones to mark the spots where noble enterprises and great hopes perished for lack of his physical vigour to embody them in deeds, the wise person will rejoice in the strength to do his work and to achieve his happiness.

COMPETITION FOR AUTHORS

The Board of Review has awarded first place and the prize of £5 for the best original article published in the September issue to "Staff Corps at the Crossroads" by Lieutenant-Colonel A. Green.

BOOK REVIEW

THE HOLLOW SQUARE. By Geoff Taylor, Peter Davies Ltd, London, and William Heinmann Ltd, 317 Collins Street, Melbourne.

FROM time immemorial commanders of fighting organizations have been plagued with the problem of the man who finds it impossible to face the dangers of war. Since the problem could not be ignored, the armies of ancient times evolved a system which dealt more or less successfully with all but the exceptional case. The earliest system rested almost exclusively on a code of discipline which made the enemy less fearsome than the penalty entailed in failure to face him. Gradually this simple system was elaborated by the addition of other elements, chiefly esprit de corps and a moral attitude which made it more difficult to admit fear than to face the danger. The cases which this system failed to cope with were simply charged with cowardice and generally shot.

This system can be justified on the grounds that until very recently man's knowledge of psychiatric medicine was so meagre that he was unable to discern that the strain of constant fighting could inflict psychological wounds as disabling as physical injuries. We now know that all men are not endowed with the same degree of moral strength, any more than they are with physical strength. This knowledge presents fighting organizations with new aspects of the age-old problem — how to recognize the symptoms of impending breakdown, and how to cope with them in such a way that the morale of the organization is not impaired, that real justice is done to the sufferer and that he is, if possible, cured of his disability and returned to duty. The problem cannot be ignored. It increases as modern war piles terror upon terror, strain upon strain.

Most men can, with or without the assistance of discipline and training, develop their own moral strength to the point where they are unable to understand that some men simply cannot do it to the same degree. They are impatient with the results of psychiatric research, the technical mystery defeats them and they fall back upon a denial of the phenomenon. The difficulty lies in the dry, impersonal way in which the problem is usually presented. It requires to be humanized, to be translated into a recognizable picture of ordinary men reacting to extraordinary conditions.

In THE HOLLOW SQUARE the author, using a group of very ordinary men drawn together from the four corners of the British Commonwealth, shows the impact of the problem in the Royal Air Force at the time when Bomber Command was losing 67 four-engined bombers a day. The central figure is a sergeant-pilot with a magnificent record whose nerve begins to fail towards the end of his tour of duty. The deterioration manifests itself in an increasing inability to make a safe landing on return from an operation. Finally the pilot, for the sake of his crew rather than his own, refuses to fly on operations.

In presenting the reactions of the individuals and the Service to the situation thus created, Geoff Taylor tells an engrossing, human story. If he pulls no punches he is eminently fair. He draws all his characters with equal sympathy and understanding, from the unfortunate sergeant to the men whose duty it is to guard the integrity of the RAF.

From his own experience as a RAF pilot, the author draws a colourful picture of life on a Bomber Command station. Just how accurate the picture is I do not know. Probably most soldiers, with the experience of centuries behind them, will be inclined to think that a few organizational improvements would have gone a long way towards taking care of some of the doubts and fears that beset this particular group of air crews.

In Geoff Taylor Australia has found a novelist of distinction. He draws his characters with broad yet clear strokes, carries his story forward briskly and handles his theme with compassionate understanding. THE HOLLOW SQUARE is good reading considered either as straight entertainment or as a serious study of a Service problem.

—E.G.K.

COMPETITION FOR AUTHORS

The Board of Review has awarded first place and the prize of £40 for the best original article published in 1957/58 to "Guerilla Warfare" by Major R. F. Rodgers, Royal Australian Army Ordnance Corps. This article appeared in the November 1957 issue of the Journal.

During World War 2 Major Rodgers served with 2/25 Infantry Battalion and the AAOC. After the war he continued his service in the Interim Army until commissioned in the Regular Army in 1949. After holding various RAAOC appointments he attended the 1955 course at the Australian Staff College, and is now Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, Northern Command.

THIS BUSINESS OF RESERVES

MAJOR J. A. MUNRO
Royal Australian Army Ordnance Corps

THERE is an increasing interest being taken in the logistic problems associated with nuclear warfare. This almost invariably results in some discussion of the advantages to be gained by "cutting the tail". One of the most popular methods advocated as a means of making the cut is *reduce the reserves.*

Unfortunately in the consideration of this problem many of the advocates for *reducing reserves* do not define what they mean by *reserves.* In short, they do not differentiate between *operating stocks* and *reserves* and conveniently use the latter term to mean all the stocks in the theatre other than initial equipment with units.

Military Board Instruction 67 of 1957 defines the various categories of stocks. In brief it can be said that *reserves* are the quantities held as an insurance against some eventuality, whilst *operating* stocks are those held to meet normal usage and include the quantities required by the various services to keep their supply systems operating.

An examination of these two definitions shows that the problem of reducing stocks falls into two parts, one relating to the reserves and the other to operating stocks. It is the latter which is by far the major problem. Just as the total reserves in a theatre may be made up of more than one type of reserve, each intended for a specific purpose, so is the level of operating stocks dependent on a series of operating factors. The important point to note, however, is that the total operating stocks are generally much greater than total reserves. Thus, if the means of being able to reduce operating stocks can be found, the effect will be much more appreciable than a reduction of reserves. Reserves can be reduced by such means as accepting a greater administrative risk, cutting over-insurance, centralizing reserves and such like. To reduce operating stocks we must in fact alter the method by which the services function. They must be able to satisfy demand with less in the pipeline. In other words we must speed up the mechanism of service activity.

The method most generally advocated for achieving a reduction of overall theatre stocks is the wider use of air transport. Investigation shows that the overall speed of stores supply is primarily dependent on the procedures of the supply organization. Mere increase of the transit speed of the stores does not materially improve the overall time lag. These remarks are of course made in the context of discussion of the overall maintenance system, and are not applicable to calculations isolated to the short haul in the forward parts of an overseas theatre. To really achieve something it is the procedures we must speed up. Before discussing procedural changes it may be advantageous to note two other drawbacks of air supply which make that answer less attractive.

The first is the question of fuel for the aircraft. A return trip aircraft having an economic payload is not currently operational. If the theatre of operations is in an area having no indigenous refined fuel, it is necessary to ship into the theatre fuel for the aircraft's return journey. With aircraft of the C 130 type carrying approximately 15 tons of stores from Sydney to Malaya it will be necessary to deliver either 25 tons or 34 tons of fuel to intermediate points to cover the return journey. The alternative fuel loadings quoted are dependent on the route available.

The second point is that, whilst it is continually stressed that Western nations must offset their lesser manpower resources by adopting means to save manpower, air transport of stores is in opposition to this as ton for ton an air supply system is much more demanding on manpower than a surface transport system.

To return to the problem of reduction of operating stocks.

So that we may examine the problem in detail it is necessary to find out why we have operating stocks at all and why are they so large.

It is obvious that any supply organization must hold stocks of its commodities so that the customer may be supplied with his needs on call. The supplier then replenishes his stock from the manufacturer. The problem for the supplier is how much will be hold "on the shelf". Practically the same considerations apply in the military field as in civil business. If too much is held losses may occur through deterioration, through an article being superseded by a better one, through labour being wasted on warehousing activities, through waste of storage space and transport, and finally through capital being tied up which could well be spent on other articles. If too little is held, ultimately some customer will have to wait and excess effort and finance will be expended in arranging an emergency special rush delivery. The requirement is, therefore, to hold just sufficient to meet needs.

A supply organization has many, many more customers than providers. It must, therefore, work on the basis of placing a limited number of bulk orders to the source of supply and receiving a large number of consumer demands. Its purpose in life it to collect from a limited number of manufacturers stores which it distributes to a large number of consumers spread over a large area. It cannot itself place a corresponding order on the manufacturer for every demand from each customer as the paper work would be so great as to be beyond the capacity of both the supply organization and the manufacturer. Thus the supply system must hold enough stock to meet all its small customer requirements until such time as they add up to a reasonable order quantity or, if orders are handled at set periods, until the next order shipment time arrives. Before he orders, a supplier must check over each item he holds and see if more is required. The complexity and method of this operations becomes greater with the size of the enterprise involved. A housewife does this task at intervals by casting her eyes over the shelves. This is a method which leads to the necessity for special rush replenishment demands on all too frequent occasions. In any large organization the stock is too great to be looked over so the office staff does the replenishment operation by reviewing a paper on which is recorded the stock movements of the articles. The frequency when this can be done will depend on the number of papers to be reviewed, that is the number of items stocked and secondly the number of people or machines available to do the reviewing. If the number of items and people are such as a period of two months will elapse between the times when the stock position of that item can be reviewed then the organization must hold sufficient stock to maintain its issues to customers for that period. The stocks which are represented by this maintenance period

are part of the operating stocks of the organization. In the services they represent the major component of our operating stocks. The best means of reducing these stocks is to utilize machines to handle the processes of review so that the maintenance period may be reduced.

It will be realized that the supply organization must prepare its orders for stores on the basis of experience of what customers are likely to require. This is not a difficult process where items such as foodstuffs are concerned as usage is fairly constant. With many other items, however, the demand fluctuates, so that what was used in the last three months may be nothing like the same as will be used in the next three months. As the period of issue experience is built up these fluctuations can be examined and the estimated usage be nearer the mark. However, it is always desirable to hold in store a margin of stock to cover any difference between what is thought will be expended and what is actually delivered into the theatre. This store margin is the second component part of what, in total, is operating stocks. It is normally a much smaller quantity than the maintenance period stock and in fact does not have an appreciable effect on the total holdings.

Another means by which stocks can be reduced is to discard from the overseas theatre many items altogether. On this basis we would hold in the overseas theatre only fast-moving items. Trials conducted by the US Army in Europe appear to indicate that only about 20 per cent of items are fast moving. Fundamentally an item is held in an overseas theatre because the delay involved in bringing it from the support area is unacceptable. If this delay time can be reduced to an acceptable period then it will be possible to limit the stock holding in the theatre. As has been mentioned earlier the delay is largely a procedural one, actual physical movement of stock not being the most important factor. As well as enabling us to discard items from the theatre, there is another incidental advantage in reducing the period between demand and receipt. This is that the amount of stock in transit at any one time will be considerably reduced. Although the stocks involved in overcoming this "interim period" between demand and receipt are not operating stocks and lessening them will not effect reduction of stocks within the theatre, there is a reduction in the liabilities of the supply organization as a whole.

By introducing into our services a data processing system we can replace stocks by speedy communication. It is realized that the machines required are costly and cannot all be obtained at once. Nor is this desirable for the services must be given time to incorporate them into their systems. The capacity of the machines is such that it is probable that no one service in the Australian Army could fully utilize the capacity. It would seem, therefore, that there is a case for logistics staff communications and processing centres to handle the needs of all the logistic services.

In the meantime, when studying the problems of logistics, it is well to carefully assess the stocks that supply services require to operate their systems with the means at present available to them. If this is not done there may well be an under-estimation of the tonnages required to be moved and held in an overseas theatre.

The Royal Danish Lifeguard at Foot

CAPTAIN E. EHNHUUS
Australian Intelligence Corps

ONE of the oldest Regiments in the world, the Royal Danish Lifeguard, celebrated its 300-year jubilee on 30 June this year. In view of the Regiment's close association with the British Army in the past it may be of interest to look at the Regimental history and some of its customs.

The Regiment was raised in 1658 by Count Ahlefeldt as a regular unit for the personal protection of the Danish King Frederik III (1648 - 1670). In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Regiment took part in various campaigns in Europe, mostly against Sweden.

One battalion went into British service in 1689 - 98 to support William III of Orange in his fight against the exiled King James II. The battalion, named "The Danish Guards" saw active service in Ireland, and later in Flanders, and was often mentioned in despatches for outstanding bravery, particularly during the Battle of Steenkerke on 3 August 1692, when the battalion lost 50 per cent of its Officers and Other Ranks.

The Regiment again saw service with the British Army from 1701 - 09 during the war of the Spanish Succession and shares the following Battle Honours with "The Grenadier Guards", "The Buffs" and "The Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment":—

Oudenarde	1708
Malplaquet	1709
Siege of Lille	1708

From 1658 to 1803 the Regiment consisted of regulars only, since then with the introduction of National Service, only a small percentage of Officers and NCOs are regulars. The rest are short service NS men; they serve 18 months with the colours and belong to the reserve for 8 years.

1658. 30. JUNE 1958.

The original uniform was scarlet with white trousers. Today this uniform is still used for certain ceremonial parades. In 1848 a new uniform consisting of a dark blue tunic and light blue trousers was introduced as field uniform and is still worn for garrison duties. The bearskin cap was introduced in 1803 and was worn until 1890 on active service; it is still worn but only for ceremonial purposes. The Regimental Colours are light blue and white, and the badge, still the original design, consists of a star on which is mounted the Royal Danish Crown with the Cypher of King Frederik III below. The Crown and Cypher are set squarely under the Regiment motto "Pro Rege et Grege" (For King and People).

The privilege of carrying out guard duties for the King and the Royal House has been maintained since the regiment was raised, and with few exceptions the Regiment has for nearly 300 years mounted guard outside His Majesty's residence.

The present King of Denmark's father, King Christian X, was personally more attached to the Regiment than any other Monarch as he began his Army career in 1889 as an ordinary NS man at the training depot. According to Danish law and traditions, nobody can take up a commission without having served in the ranks, and Royalties are no exception. As Crown Prince, he eventually became Colonel of the Regiment which later became his personal bodyguard.