AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

No. 113

OCTOBER

1958

Notified in AAOs for 31st October, 1958

MILITARY BOARD

Army Headquarters
Melbourne
1/10/1958

Issued by Command of the Military Board

Distribution:

The Journal is issued through Base Ordnance Depots on the scale of One per Officer, Officer of Cadets, and Cadet Under Officer.

AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

A Periodical Review of Military Literature

Number 113 ——— October, 1958

CONTENTS



VICTORIA BARRACKS, MELBOURNE

AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

Editor:
COLONEL E. G. KEOGH, MBE, ED (RL)

Assistant Editor:
MAJOR W. C. NEWMAN, ED.

Staff Artist:
Mrs JOAN FULLER

The AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL is printed and published for the Directorate of Military Training by 1 Base Printing Company, RAAOC. The contents are derived from various acknowledged official and unofficial sources, and do not necessarily represent General Staff Policy.

Contributions, which should be addressed to the Director of Military Training, Army Headquarters, Melbourne, are invited from all ranks of the Army, Cadet Corps and Reserve of Officers. £5 will be paid to the author of the best article published each month, and £40 for the author of the best article published during the year.

TRAINFIRE . . .
and the AMF

MAJOR B. S. O'DOWD
Royal Australian Infantry

THE Australian Army is considering a change over to the US Army Trainfire system for training and classification in rifle shooting (see *Australian Army Journals* 95 - 99). This is necessary because the present system has been found lacking when tested against the conditions under which modern warfare is conducted and the short training time available before the soldier goes into battle.

The steady calculating marksman produced by the classification system was at his top in battles of the 1914 type. Here the enemy steadily advanced, virtually shoulder to shoulder, making a splendid target for the rifleman from the medium ranges onwards. No hurry, calm accuracy was the essence. However, having suffered the results of this treatment, the tacticians began to exercise their minds, devising means of closing the range at which they were to draw fire, and at which it was necessary for them to fire. Of course this was achieved by better use of ground and camouflage, by systematic, deceptive movement and by the development of supporting weapons to cover the attacker closer to the objective.

The aim of all training in weapon handling and shooting with the rifle is to produce a marksman who can kill an enemy with his first shot under battle conditions. Recent research has delved into the circumstances in which the modern soldier has to do his shooting and the results are summarized as follows:—

(a) The range will rarely exceed 300 yards.

(b) The target may appear anywhere on his front without warning.

(c) The target will make itself as difficult as possible to locate, by using camouflage, all available cover and a merging background.

(d) The target itself will not always be visible, often the soldier will have to engage a point where he has only observed flash, smoke, dust, noise or movement.

(e) The target will only expose itself for the minimum time and will take cover if fired at but not actually hit. The first round hit is important.

(f) Battle conditions usually preclude use of the lying position and favour standing or kneeling positions, mostly with the weapon supported.

In the present system of marksmanship training the soldier is required to progress through a sequence of lessons and practices —

(a) a complete weapon training course in holding, aiming and firing from various positions;

(b) introductory firing practices on the miniature or 25 yards ranges;

(c) classification practices from 100 to 300 yards on a known distance range. (Selected personnel to fire a practice at 500 yards);

(d) transition practices at figure targets on a known distance range;

(e) field firing on service targets at unknown distances.

Theoretically any soldier receiving the above training should develop into a proficient battle shot. In practice, however, this does not work out, mainly because battle proficiency is conditional upon the soldier progressing through the whole five stages whereas in fact it is rare in the ARA (or indeed the AIF) for the soldier to get past stage three. This is due to a variety of reasons, mainly shortage of time, manpower and facilities required to lay on a Field Firing practice, and suitable ground is not always available. Another reason for not progressing beyond stage three lies in the fact that there is no annual requirement to qualify at Transitional or Field Firing practices, in the same manner as the annual classification practices.

In practice it seems to work out that the stage of shooting a soldier reaches in the recruit training unit is the stage at which he will enter the battlefield. The ideal situation, therefore, is one where the soldier is brought to battle proficiency at individual Field Firing during his recruit training, thereafter he is tested annually on Field Firing ranges in the same manner as he is now tested in classification practices. This can be done by reorganizing our shooting practices to eliminate the classification ranges and using the time gained to concentrate on transitional and field firing practices. This is in effect the Trainfire system.

To many soldiers who cut their teeth on the classification range, this departure may seem to radical to tolerate and they may justifiably point to many fine shots produced under the old system. However, the proportion was small and classification practices have many disadvantages. Here are some of them —

(a) The targets do not resemble any battle target in either shape, colour or size.

(b) The exact range is always known.

(c) The point at which the target will appear is clearly indicated and the time of exposure constant.

(d) Almost all targets are engaged from the lying position.

(e) After firing there is a considerable time lapse before the result of the shot is known.

(f) Firing a number of shots at a single target stresses an action which is rarely required in battle. It tends to give the soldier an impression that accuracy depends upon unlimited time and a well defined target.

(g) Classification practices are uneconomical in terms of manpower. During a day on the range the soldier spends minutes shooting and hours on butt duty, ammunition number, dragging stores fron one firing point to another, telephone orderly, etc.

(h) Classification ranges are elaborate and costly to construct, requiring stop butts, mantlets, marker's gallery, target frames and mounds.

Trainfire overcomes these disadvantages

The Target

The target which the soldier must learn to recognize and hit is a man, a man either standing, kneeling or lying. This will be the only target used in Trainfire once progress is made past the 25 yards introductory and grouping practices.

The "pop up" target used in Trainfire is activated by a small electric motor attached below ground level. By remote control from behind the firing point the



FIG 1 — EXAMPLE OF A MECHANICAL TARGETS RANGE

Note the use of Fox Hole and Stump at the Firing Point — This is a feature of all Trainfire Ranges.

target can be made to "pop up" or drop back out of sight, thus permitting timed exposures at any part of the range without the necessity of fatiguemen. The target will also drop back when a bullet passes through it, even though is passes through a hole made by several previous rounds. This permits scoring without butt parties and eliminates patching out. It also has the great advantage of providing the firer with an immediate reward for his success.

These targets are simple to set up on a range; all that is needed is a hole in the ground sufficiently deep to protect the motor and a buried cable back to the firing point. They are quite mobile and can be shifted from range to range as long as the protective holes have been prepared beforehand.

Trainfire Practices

Using the Trainfire method battle proficiency is reached in four stages —

Stage 1 — Basic Rifle Instruction and 25-yard range.

A progressive combination of basic rifle lessons (reduced to fourteen including revision periods) and introductory and grouping practices on a 25-yard range.

Stage 2 — Mechanical Targets Range.

Shooting practice at electrically operated figure targets up to 300 yards.

Stage 3 — Target Detection Range.

Conjointly with Stage 2 training and practice in detecting targets which become progressively more difficult,

judging distance and wind allowance. On this range the soldier is also practiced at target indication.

Stage 4 — Record Proficiency Range.

In this stage the soldier is tested at engaging fleeting camouflaged targets in a natural terrain setting.

Stage 1

Basic lessons in weapon handling still aim at producing a high degree of skill in holding, aiming, firing and bolt manipulation. One obvious difference, however, is that the four firing positions (standing, kneeling, sitting and lying) are introduced at the beginning of training, together with unsupported weapon firing and firing over or around cover.

With Trainfire the soldier's interest in his rifle is quickly captured by giving him his first shot from it in the seventh period of training. From this time on weapon training lessons run parallel with shooting practices on the 25-yard range. This greatly increases the soldier's interest in his training and, at an early stage, dispels any fear of the weapon that he may have.

The firing carried out at this stage includes both supported and unsupported positions, therefore, the 25-yard range firing point must now include a weapon pit and a tree stump or upright log upon which to practice firing over or around cover. The practices carried out on the 25-yard range would include —

(a) demonstration of rifle capabilities;

(b) recruits' introductory practice;

(c) grouping practices from supported and unsupported positions;

(d) snap shooting and rapid practices;

(e) zeroing;

(f) progressive zeroing.

The target used at this stage is a plain piece of paper or cardboard with an aiming mark in the middle. The only scoring the soldier (and instructor) need worry about is the three-round group of 1½ inches for supported positions or 2 inches for unsupported positions. As soon as the soldier can group consistently the weapon is zeroed and he progresses to Stage 2.

Stage 2

Now that the soldier can hit a stationary target at close range the time has come for him to progress to surprise targets appearing anywhere on a lane to his front from 75 to 300 yards. This training is done on the Mechanical Targets Range and is carried out conjointly with Stage 3, Target Detection Range.

The mechanical target range is simply a piece of flat, open ground 300 yards in length. It is divided into lanes 5 to 10 yards wide and at varying ranges in each lane a number of "pop up" targets are set in. The firing point consists of a weapon pit and tree stump or upright log for each lane.

On this range the soldier learns to find his own target, estimate range and windage, then hit it. Initially there is no time limit for engaging the target but as the soldier becomes more proficient the exposure is decreased to ten seconds and finally five seconds. The object is to produce a quick, accurate first round hit.

As the maximum range is 300 yards there is no need for alteration in sight setting. From the beginning of his training the soldier is taught to leave his sights at 250 yards, making any necessary adjustment for range or windage by shifting the point of aim.

On the 25-yard range the instructors are insistent upon orthodox firing positions (unless a member is shooting particularly well from an unorthodox position) but during Stage 2 this is relaxed so that individual technique is developed to suit the firer.



FIG 2 — EXAMPLE OF A TARGET DETECTION RANGE

Stage 3

The Target Detection Range is used to teach all those fieldcraft lessons which are closely associated with shooting —

(a) searching ground;

(b) judging distance;

(c) remembering the location of an obscure target, or targets which have disappeared, by selecting a reference point.

(d) selecting a point of aim in relation to range and windage;

(e) target indication;

(f) movement with the rifle;

(g) how and when to engage different types of targets.

A Target Detection Range should be located in the same areas as the Mechanical Targets Range and the Record Proficiency Range, so that firing details can alternate between shooting and target detection.

No firing is done on a Target Detection Range. The range consists of a piece of natural undulating scrub country to which several obvious reference points have been added for speed in target indication. For targets, camouflaged fatiguemen are located in various positions on the range. The observer is required to locate his target, estimate range and windage and select his point of aim. By means of an aiming device the instructor will check the target location and point of aim. Observers will also be required to indicate targets by the direct and clockray method.

Initially the camouflaged fatiguement go through a set routine at thirty second intervals —

(a) perfect stillness;

(b) slight movement;

(c) deliberate movement;

(d) fire a shot.

The observer will score points for the phase in which he detects his target. The instructors take advantage of detection training to emphasize good and bad points regarding the camouflage employed by the fatiguemen.

Practices on the Target Detection Range get progressively more difficult until the soldier can detect and remember the location of several simultaneous fleeting targets.

Stage 4

The Record Proficiency Range is really a combination of the Mechanical Targets and Target Detection Ranges. Here the soldier will be called upon to use all the skills he has so far learnt.

The range is set on any piece of ground which offers good natural cover for the "pop up" targets. The targets are concealed in weapon pits, behind stumps, alongside trees, in folds in the ground or in any situation likely to be met on service. The firing points again consist of a weapon pit and a stump for each firer.

The course requires the soldier to engage 32 "pop up" targets at ranges 50 to 300 yards from the supported position. This is accomplished by firing at 8 targets in each of four lanes. It also requires the soldier to engage 24 targets from an unsupported position of his choice as he moves slowly forward. The soldier has a total of 56 targets exposed to him. He is permitted to fire only one round at each target. He receives no credit for unexpended rounds — only hits count.

The course is fired twice for recording qualifications. In each firing the soldier is required to fire over different lanes. Firing should be so conducted that the details which fire in the morning of the first day fire in the afternoon of the second day. This tends to equalize light conditions which effect the ability of the firer to detect targets.

The scores obtained on each firing are added to determine the qualification score which has tentatively been assessed as —

68 hits Marksman.

54 hits 1st Class Shot.

36 hits 2nd Class Shot.


RECORD PROFICIENCY RANGE
1
2
3
7
8
350 yds
300 yds
250 yds
200 yds
150 yds
100 yds
50 yds
First 50yds reasonably clear
30 yds
15 yds
15 yds
5yds
CONTROL TOWER
REMOTE CONTROL WIRING

When scoring, a record is kept of hits, misses and non-engagements, so that an analysis of scores will produce the following deductions:—

(a) A majority of hits may indicate a satisfactory shot.

(b) A majority of misses indicates the firer requires further training on the Mechanical Target range.

(c) A majority of non-engagements indicates that the firer is not locating his target and requires further traning on the Target Detection range.

Introduction Into The ARA

If the Australian Army adopts Trainfire in its present form the complete changeover cannot be effected until sufficient "pop up" targets are available to set up ranges in our main training areas. In anticipation of this, copies of the manufacturing patterns have been ordered from America so that these targets can be produced locally. It will be some time, however, before "pop ups" start to come off the production line.

Meanwhile the School of Infantry has been given the project of preparing the way for Trainfire and will receive sufficient "pop up" targets, purchased from America, to construct an experimental three lane range. Lesson plans have been devised to co-ordinate weapon training and individual fieldcraft subjects in the desired quantity and sequence for Trainfire requirements, and details of firing practices to suit our conditions will be worked out.

Interim Project

As an interim measure the School of Infantry has developed a method of adapting the Trainfire system to our existing ranges. This consists of —

Stage 1 — Basic Rifle Instruction, 25-yard practices as previously detailed.

Stage 2 — Target Detection Range as detailed previously.

Stage 3 — Modified transitional practices on a known distance range, using figure targets.

The Trainfire Interim Project was tested on a platoon of the first 1958 intake of 20 National Service Training Battalion. The course was enthusiastically received and the results sufficiently encouraging to warrant a larger scale experiment. The next step was to train a complete Battalion and measure the results. This was done with the second 1958 intake of 20 National Service Battalion with the following observations:—

(a) The standard of shooting for this intake was better than for intakes trained by the old classification system.

(b) There were 50 per cent fewer training periods required to achieve the result.

(c) The quantity of ammunition fired was approximately the same as under the old system.

(d) There was a pronounced increase of interest in weapon training and shooting.

Comments by the instructional staff of 20 National Service Battalion were wholeheartedly in favour of the Interim Project, firstly because trainee interest in weapon training subjects made instruction easier and secondly the commonsense lesson plans took a lot of drudgery out of instruction.

The lesson plans which make up the interim project are in the process of being published in pamphlet form. When ready they will be forwarded to Commands together with instructions regarding their implementation in the AMF.

Conclusion

The phase of marksmanship training discussed in this article has been confined to the basic soldier requirement, applicable to all those arms and services who normally receive instruction in shooting with the rifle. In the recruit training units the soldier is required to qualify on a Record Proficiency Range before progressing to corps training. Thereafter annual qualification on the Record Proficiency Range takes the place of the present classification range requirements.

Other practices have been designed for automatic weapons (Autofire) and for collective field firing by sections and platoons (Trainfire II). This latter is directly related to tactical incidents in defence, attack and on patrol, situations where remote control "pop up" targets permit a greater degree of realism than can be achieved with our present improvised gadgets. More about that later.

COMPETITION FOR AUTHORS

The Board of Review has awarded first place and the prize of £5 for the best original article published in the August issue to "Talavera" by Lieutenant-Colonel M. P. O'Hare, Royal Australian Artillery.

"PAULATIM"

A Brief Description of the early Medical Services of the Army in Australia

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL PETER KAYE, MB, BSC

FOR some few years it has become the established custom for the Australian Army Medical Services to participate in a day of Commemoration now recognized as "Corps Day". This newly founded tradition arises from the granting of a Royal Warrant to the Corps, by the late King George VI on 12 November 1948, whereby the prefix "Royal" was added to the former AAMC title. This distinction derives from a time honoured royal prerogative by which, for distinguished or outstanding services, a regiment or corps was favoured by the Sovereign with the title "Royal" added to its regimental nomenclature, and certain privileges, as exemplified by the wearing of Royal Blue uniform facings, etc, were accorded it.

In the case of the Australian Army Medical Services, this Royal distinction was conferred upon the Corps in recognition of its outstanding achievements in the past, particularly its distinguished record of service in both World Wars.

The form of observing this commemorative day varies somewhat in each Commnad, but generally the pattern is a Parade of all RAAMC and RAANC personnel, terminating with a memorial service. On such an occasion one is apt to speculate on the future role of the Corps in this Age of Atomics and, perhaps, conjecture in retrospect on the earlier days of the Medical Services, its trials and difficulties in its formative years, and its origin in eras now largely forgotten. It is this latter subject which it is proposed to outline briefly in this article.

Army Medical Services in Australia prior to Federation

An appreciation of the medical services in Australia primarily requires a knowledge of the service from which it derives its origin, namely the medical service in the British Army. However, space does not permit a study of this subject in an article of this length. Suffice it to state that in the late 18th Century no actual organized medical service existed in the British Army. An administrative medical structure existed within the framework of the staff in the form of a triumvirate of a Surgeon-General, an Inspector-General of Hospitals, and an Apothecary-General. Between this and the regiment, there was no form of military medical service to provide for hospitalization or evacuation of casualties, still less that of any sanitary service.

However, within the establishment of each regiment of the line, cavalry and artillery, a Regimental Surgeon was appointed as an integral part of the unit. This appointment, being purely regimental, was divorced from any outside medical service, except that general supervision was exercised by the Medical Directorate of the Staff. The Medical Officer purchased the "Surgeons Commission" in his regiment, and sold it

again on quitting the service. Occasionally he was aided by an Assistant-Surgeon, but generally he conducted a regimental hospital with the help of a hospital sergeant and orderlies, a number of whom were selected from the older, and perhaps more trustworthy members of the regiment. Additional nursing assistance was often available in the form of the soldiers' wives, a limited number of whom accompanied the regiment on active service or garrison duties at home or abroad.

The surgeon was paid a limited sum from regimental funds, and derived the remainder of his income from a daily deduction from the soldiers' pay and subsistence allowance for those in his medical care in hospital. He was responsible for the care of the sick and wounded, and the provision of drugs and dressings together with surgical instruments and appliances.

In the field, judged by modern standards, his scope was limited. Alleviation of pain by opiates, and amputation for wounds of the extremities were his main contribution to the suffering of the wounded, most of whom eventually found their way into civilian institutions as no base hospital organization existed in the Army. Transportation was also limited so that '*ad hoc*' means of evacuation were resorted to, eg, commandeered wagons from the Commissariat, local farm carts, etc.

Such then was the primitive and undeveloped state of the medical arrangements within the British Army when the first colonization of Australia is inaugurated in 1788, the year in which the first fleet of settlers and convicts disembarked at Sydney Cove to form the Colony of New South Wales. A military detachment of 212 members of the Royal Marine Light Infantry who had acted as the escort for the settlers remained in the Colony, and included in their establishment were five medical officers who were to provide the medical care for both civilian and military personnel. The senior medical officer of this detachment was Principal Surgeon John White.

Two years later the second fleet arrived with a further group of colonists and the New South Wales Corps, which subsequently relieved the Marine detachment. The Regimental Surgeon of this unit was John Harris who, therefore, has the distinction of being the first army medical officer in the Colony. He was stationed at Parramatta in 1791.

In 1810, following action taken to suppress the illegal trafficking in rum, the New South Corps was returned to the United Kingdom, and for the next sixty years successive garrisons of British regiments, often only of Company strength, were stationed in Sydney, and as other colonies were established formed the garrisons also of the other leading settlements. These small detachments of British soldiers were generally accompanied by their own surgeons or assistants and a small regimental medical establishment whose function was mainly medical attendance on official personnel and the superintendance of public hospitals.

Volunteers

As early as 1803 it was found necessary to augment the small regular British garrison by the enrolment of a local volunteer force known as the Loyal Sydney and Parramatta Association, in order to quell the lawlessness and violance of some of the convict immigrants. This force lasted only a few years and was subsequently disbanded. Again in 1837 at Port Phillip it became necessary to raise a domestic force of militia to assist the Mounted Police in dealing with attacks by aboriginal natives, and in 1854 at the Eureka Stockade local levies or special enlisted Militia joined forces with the regular troops of the 12th and 40th Regiments in the dispersal of the rebellious gold miners. Most of these volunteer units



Surgeon-Major
Victorian Volunteer Infantry 1875

were short-lived until the year 1867, when in NSW the Volunteer Forces Regulation Act was enacted by the Government in order to raise a properly constituted volunteer force. This Act provided for a Land Grant after five years of efficient service, but abuse proved the scheme to be unsatisfactory, although a considerable number of volunteers enlisted.

In Victoria in 1854 the Melbourne Volunteer Rifle Regiment, later known as the Victorian Volunteer Artillery Regiment, was established with a posted strength of approximately 2000 men, and in 1860 when the Regular British garrison was ordered to New Zealand it was replaced by these volunteers who took over their normal duties.

The last of the Imperial troops were withdrawn from Australia in 1870, and the Colonies then became responsible for their own landward or military protection.

Thus in each Colony, military defence was invested in a small locally enlisted regular force for garrison duties, supplemented by part-time volunteers or militia.

In NSW a regular force was enrolled, comprising one battery and two companies of Artillery, the latter being disbanded in the following year. The establishment of this artillery force included a medical officer, and in 1871 Dr W. J. G. Bedford was appointed Staff Surgeon thus becoming the first regular Australian Army medical officer in the defence forces of the Colony.

The volunteer units consisted in the main of Artillery and Infantry, and, following the pattern of the British Army, included medical personnel in their regimental establishments. Thus in 1870 one Staff Surgeon, five Surgeons and eleven Assistant Surgeons were attached to these volunteer units in NSW. Likewise in the other colonies medical officers were enrolled for part-time duties, and it is of interest to note that at an inspection of the Prahran and South Yarra Southern Rifles, among those present on parade was Assistant Surgeon Llewelyn, the unit medical officer.

Soudan Campaign 1885

A small contingent composed of 700 volunteers was raised in New South Wales and embarked for the Soudan in March 1885. This force consisted of

two batteries of field artillery and a battalion of infantry accompanied by an Ambulance Corps of 34 personnel including 3 medical officers. The Principal Medical Officer of this medical detachment was Staff Surgeon W. D. C. Williams holding the relative rank of Major, and two other medical officers — Surgeons Proudfoot and Glanville with the relative rank of Captain. In equipment, this unit was entirely self-contained, providing its own five ambulance wagons, two store carts, a water cart, and a complement of twenty-six horses.

The force was only committed in action to a minor degree and sustained a relatively small number of battle casualties and sick, arriving back in Sydney three months after embarkation. It did, however, mark the first occasion on which Australia provided an overseas force, although individual volunteers had already served with the British Forces in the Maori Wars of 1860. It was the first time also that a formed medical detachment raised in Australia had acted in support of the armed forces.

1888 — 1898

Various modifications and improvements were made in the defence forces of the Colonies during these years with a basic Permanent Force supported by a part-time volunteer movement. In Victoria in the year 1884, the unpaid volunteers were replaced by a Militia system in which each member received a small annual sum by way of payment. The entire force in Victoria in 1891, for example, was composed of the following:–

Permanent —

The Victorian Artillery
Engineers — a small company
Mounted Infantry — small detachment.

Militia —

Troop of Cavalry
Nordenfelt Battery
Brigade of Field Artillery
Corps of Engineers
Victorian Mounted Rifles
Victoria Rifles — Four Battalions
Cadets — Eleven Battalions.

The medical staff for these units was rudimentary, and consisted in the main of regimental surgeons and assistants attached to most of them. Later, the total medical staff consisted of 16 officers, together with an Ambulance Corps of one officer and 45 other ranks.

In New South Wales, however, the medical services had grown apace under the guidance and enthusiasm of Staff Surgeon Williams. It was on his recommendation to the Commandant of the New South Wales forces that in 1888 the first New South Wales Medical Staff Corps was established on a voluntary basis, and in 1889 he was appointed the Principal Medical Officer of this Corps and promoted to the rank of Brigade Surgeon with the relative rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. At its outset, the corps comprised a PMO, four surgeons and sixty-three other ranks; and in 1891 from this source the permanent medical Staff Corps was recruited as a small cadre to perform administrative and instructional duties.

It is of interest to note that at this time in the British Army, the medical officers were formed as Army Medical Staff in a corps quite separate from the other ranks who comprised the Medical Staff Corps, and it was not until 10 years later in 1898 that both were united in the one Corps as Royal Army Medical Corps. Colonel Williams, however, had sufficient knowledge and foresight to recognise the inherent defects in this system, so that in raising the medical service in NSW in 1888 he incorporated both officers and other ranks in the one organization — The New South Wales Medical Staff Corps.

Training and organization of the medical services continued to develop slowly in each colony, and in NSW the

corps continued to flourish under the care and guidance of Williams. Camps and bivouacs were organized and officers and other ranks attended various schools and courses in addition to providing medical coverage for the forces on peace-time manœuvres. At this stage in its development the establishment for the field medical service in the British Army consisted only of two units, namely the Field Hospital and the Bearer Company each of which maintained a separate organization and was independent of the other. The bearer companies being attached to brigade, and under command moved with them as the tactical situation demanded, often leaving the field hospitals immobilized with casualties for lack of bearers to evacuate them. Conversely the field hospital was frequently too far in the rear to enable the bearer companies to transport cases to them. This lack of co-operation and liaison was most evident during the Boer War and was the subject for much thought and discussions in the reforms instituted after this campaign. It was not until 1906, however, that the problem was finally solved by the creation of the "Field Ambulance", in which establishment the functions of both bearer company and field hospital were successfully integrated in the single unit. This new progressive step in the development of the medical services in the field was adopted by the Australian Army Medical Corps in the same year, together with the newly formed "Clearing Hospital" better known as the Casualty Clearing Station.

It is of more than passing interest to note that the conception of a field ambulance was largely due to a S sgt Stapleton of the RAMC Volunteers who addressed a gathering at the Royal United Service Institution in February 1902 on this subject. A great deal of discussion followed, not only in service circles but also in medical schools and hospitals, and it has been claimed, not without justification, that the Field Ambulance is obstetrical in origin as it was "conceived in the dissecting room at

NSW Medical Staff Corps 1896

Charing Cross Hospital, received antenatal treatment in a Sergeants Mess of Volunteers, and was finally born in the lecture theatre of the Royal United Service Institution". One could add that it has survived the vicissitudes of two major wars in its childhood and adolescence.

With the formation of the Royal Army Medical Corps in 1898, the NSW Medical Staff Corps followed suit and became the NSW Army Medical Corps in the same year, discontinuing the prefix "Surgeon" for its commissioned ranks. In this year also, an Army Nursing Service Reserve was organized in NSW with Miss E. J. Gould as Lady Superintendent and an establishment of 24 nursing sisters, some of whom, together with nurses from other States, subsequently saw service in South Africa.

South African War

With the outbreak of this war in 1899 each of the Australian colonies raised and equipped several contingents for service in South Africa. Each such contingent was accompanied by its own regimental medical officers and a small medical establishment. But only NSW was able to provide formed Army Medical units which subsequently took part in active operations agains the Boers. These medical units provided bearer companies and field hospitals and were well trained and fully equipped to the last detail, including a pattern of ambulance waggon specially designed in the Colony and utilized with great success in this campaign.

A total of four contingents embarked for overseas at the expense of each Colony, and in all 30 medical officers and 338 other ranks were sent together with 265 horses, 16 ambulance waggons and 46 transport carts. The service achieved no little prestige in collecting and attending the sick and wounded, and was commended by the PMO of the British forces who stated inter alia — "These Colonial medical units were more mobile than the regulation field hospital or bearer company — and their equipment was exceedingly good and practical". Again, when Lord Roberts, the Commander-in-Chief, inspected the Field Hospital at Bloemfontein, he complimented the staff and sent a special message of thanks to the NSW Government.

The first and only Victoria Cross ever to be granted to a member of an Australian Army Medical Service was awarded in the course of this campaign to Captain N. R. Howse who, at Vredefort in July, 1900 — "went out under heavy cross-fire and picked up a wounded man and carried him to a place of shelter". Howse was a member of the NSW contingent and subsequently became the Director of Medical Services of the first AIF in World War I, and before his death in 1930 was the Minister for Defence in the Commonwealth Government.

Federation and the Foundation of the Australian Army Medical Corps

The federation of the Colonies of Australia under a single Commonwealth or Federal Government was inaugurated in 1901 during the Boer War. Thus began a new era in which the various Colonial defence organizations were welded into a homogeneous force under a unified command to become known as the Australian Military Forces. In this new force the separate colonial medical units and services were amalgamated to form the "Australian Army Medical Corps".

Colonel Williams, who commanded the medical detachments from NSW in South Africa, was recalled to Australia to complete this medical re-organization, which was largely based on his own recommendations of 1897. In 1902 he organized and despatched to South Africa the final overseas medical contingent, an "Australian Army Medical Corps" field

hospital and bearer company with representative personnel from all States of the Commonwealth. This took part in the final mopping-up operations and remained overseas until the cessation of hostilities. This, therefore, represents the first occasion in which the AAMC as such participated in active operations with an overseas force.

In the General Order of 30 July 1902 which promulgated the change from State to Federal organization of the Australian Military Forces, the general basis for the future organization of the Medical Services was to be effected as follows:—

(a) Permanent Army Medical Corps — nucleus only.
(b) Militia Army Medical Corps.
(c) Volunteer Army Medical Corps (unpaid).
(d) Reserve of Officers.
(e) Army Nursing Service Reserve.

The administration and command of the AAMC was vested in Surgeon General Williams who was appointed Director General. In each military district, which generally covered the State areas, the Medical Services were controlled by a District Principal Medical Officer, being a part-time duty appointment from the Militia. Except for minor amendments and variations this has remained the basic organization for the administration of the Medical Services of the Army up to the present era.

The permanent medical services consisted of small cadres of instructors who were attached to the Militia medical services, were responsible for the medical care of the permanent forces, and the care and maintenance of transport vehicles and equipment.

The Militia and Volunteers provided the personnel for the field medical units, in the form of Regimental Medical Establishments, Mounted Bearer Companies, Infantry Bearer Companies and Field Hospital and Garrison Companies. After 1906, with the introduction of the Field Ambulance in lieu of the bearer companies, etc, the militia medical services became responsible for manning its establishment.

No lines of Communication or Base (Communications Zone) troops were raised in peace time, but the Reserve of Officers, composed of retired medical officers, was designed to create a pool from which the war establishments of both field and base medical units could be filled in a national emergency.

The Army Nursing Service was raised as a voluntary body for the "purpose of supplying trained and efficient nurses under an organized system available for duty at base hospitals and stationary field hospitals in times of national emergency". Its organization closely followed that of its predecessor, the Army Nursing Serving Reserve of NSW, and became embodied in the military forces of the Commonwealth on 1 July 1902.

The training, command and administration of the AAMC closely followed the pattern of the RAMC in all its aspects with the one exception that first appointment to Commissioned rank of medical officers was to the rank of Captain instead of Lieutenant, as prevailed in the British Army.

From this nucleus of a Corps, the Medical Services developed steadily over the ensuing years reaching a high standard of efficiency, despite the restrictions imposed by peace time economic measures on the supply of transport and equipment. Universal military training was introduced in 1911, and this had the beneficial effect of increasing the numbers of personnel and units for medical training. Thus, just prior to the outbreak of the First World War a Strength Return dated July 1914 showed a Permanent Force of 4 AAMC officers and 29 other ranks; in the militia and citizen forces 183 AAMC officers and 1649 other ranks, comprising the establishment for 16 Field

Ambulances, 5 Light Horse Field Ambulances, 3½ Sanitary Companies and 121 Regimental Medical Establishments. It was from these resources that the Medical Services of the first Australian Imperial Force were initially mobilized on the outbreak of war in August, 1914.

In conclusion, two lesser known factors are worthy of comment. Firstly the "King's Banner". This was presented to the AAMC by King Edward VII in 1904 in recognition of the service rendered by the Corps in the South African Campaign. The Banner was consecrated and presented at a Royal Review in Melbourne on 14 November 1904, and in recognition of the number of medical personnel from NSW who served in South Africa, an AAMC detachment from the 2nd Military District (NSW) was sent to Melbourne to receive it. This distinction is unique, for as far as can be ascertained the grant of a King's Banner to the AAMC is the only known instance in which a medical service has been so signally honoured. The Banner is at present laid-up in the Australian War Memorial at Canberra.

Finally the present motto of the RAAMC – "Paulatim" – the significance of which often arouses curiosity and comment as to its applicability to a medical service. This word was the original motto adopted by the NSW Army Medical Corps and was introduced during an address by Surgeon Colonel Williams to the United Services Institute in 1893 in which he stated —

". . . when we consider the slow growth of the Medical Services — springing from seed sown on none too favourable ground, badly cared for in their early growth, occasionally pruned to such an extent as to cut them down altogether, may I suggest a motto which conveys in one word the life history and growth of the Medical Services, and could most fittingly be adopted. I give you "Paulatim" — 'little by little' . . . . "

References

1. Official History of Australian Army Medical Services, 1914 - 18. Butler. Aust War Memorial.
2. Medical Services in NSW Prior to Federation. Colonel A. M. McIntosh. Med Journal of Aust (Reprint) 17 Apr 1948.
3. Her Majesty's Army Indian and Colonial Forces (1891). Walter Richards, J. S. Virtue and Co Ltd.
4. RAMC Jubilee Scrapbook. Gale and Polden Ltd 1948.
5. Manual for Med Staff Corps (1894). Her Majesty's Stationery Office.
6. Orders for Aust Army Medical Services 1906. Government Printer.
7. Field Service Manual for AAMC (1908). Government Printer.

. . *Wanted* . .

A PERPETUAL ARMY HOUSING CO-OPERATIVE

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL A. GREEN
Royal Australian Army Service Corps

The Persistent Problem

HOUSING is a topic which never flags in the ARA. The nature of the problem is not restricted to army knowledge, but is also public knowledge, as the press comments on the Allison Committee awards testify. Since the previous discussion of this problem in "Bedouin or Troglodyte" (*Australian Army Journal* No 84 — May 1956) a wealth of evidence has accumulated which confirms that the housing problem is generally the greatest worry of the married ARA soldier.

Of course there has been really appreciable progress in providing proper accommodation, and it has been gratefully received. Nevertheless much remains to be done; and the concurrent evils of immobility, compassionate cases due to housing difficulty, and all the wrangling and chicanery that go with such personnel questions, are yet with us. Still it has been good to see and hear of some lucky ARA men moving into new homes at equitable rents.

The housing problem we face is, however, ultimately a twofold one which transcends the more obvious immediate requirements, ie —

(a) How to house ourselves during our service?

(b) How to house ourselves after retirement?

It may be objected that the second phase is no concern of the Department of Army; but it is a constant preoccupation of the serving soldier, and, therefore, a potent morale factor. It is thus worthy of investigation, to see whether anything could be done to produce a housing system to cater for both serving and retired soldiers.

There are additional reasons for such an enquiry —

(a) House ownership is an established national characteristic. At present we are debarred from owning houses, except at unreasonable financial penalty and material risk, since we are precluded by postings from consistently supervising any house property we may acquire, and may only sell it at some incidental expense and risk.

(b) We pay rent to Commonwealth, State, or private agencies during our service, and are not able to acquire the same house investments as our brothers in civil life except under considerable disadvantage.

The Houses We Need

If these disadvantages are to be eliminated, some comprehensive system of co-operative house building and purchase should prove effective. Such a system would have to meet the following requirements:—

(a) Provision of married quarters in cities, country areas, and standing garrisons, for the normal establishment of married men.

(b) Provision of homes in the State of their choice, in cash or kind, for soldiers on retirement.

It is not suggested that these two services are coincident by nature, but rather that they might be undertaken on a common financial basis.

Precedents

There are good precedents for such an approach to house provision in the various house rental/purchase schemes of State Housing Commissions. In the field of army enterprise we should also be encouraged by the success of the Army Health Benefits Society to examine the prospects for an Army Housing Co-operative. In operation it might take similar or parallel form to the DFRB scheme.

The Types of Houses Required

The types of homes which would be required under such a scheme would vary greatly. Married quarters for serving soldiers present a straightforward problem. They must be in proximity to the soldier's unit or installation; they must contain accommodation of the capacity to house the family of the soldier, and they must be of a suitable standard, in appearance and internal fittings for the ARA. In course of time there may be some fluctuation in the requirement, in size, locality, and general standard, but these variation will not normally be extreme.

Homes for retired soldiers present a variety of problems. The first is in the locality, to enable the man to retire in the state and district of his choice. The type of home could vary from residential shop premises to private town house or seaside cottage. There needs to be a broad freedom of choice. The pattern of house distribution for retired soldiers will thus vary greatly from that for serving soldiers. For example, there are many more West Australians to be resettled in WA, compared with the number already serving there. Also the majority of serving men need homes near Command and formation HQ in metropolitan areas or in proximity to garrisons and army schools: they will disperse widely to city, coast and bush when they retire. Any practicable scheme must, therefore, consist of two elements:—

(a) Static housing for serving men.

(b) Flexible arrangements for retired soldiers to build or acquire homes to suit individual requirements.

Essential Concept

The basic idea of an Army Housing Co-operative is that every married soldier should invest his rentals in a productive scheme during his duty on the active list, designed to return him an equity on retirement towards the purchase of his own home.

This would entail a central co-operative agency owning and administering married quarters, and financing (and perhaps constructing) homes for retirement. It would be a partnership of the Commonwealth and the soldier, as it would undoubtedly require initial grants from government funds to purchase existing married accommodation and tide it over the first 15 years. It would require a constitution giving proper representation to the Commonwealth and to army contributors, and would thus be a form of corporation. It would also need central and state organizations responsible to a central court of directors.

It would have to establish sections to handle finance, technical building questions, land, and general administration. In the interest of good supervision, and of economy, it should be located in the Department of the Army, although if the other services decided to participate it could with equal facility be located in the Department of Defence. The machinery of the army pay system could also be adapted to collect rentals and contributions, as it does for DFRB. Indeed the DFRB organization could, with some additional staff, undertake the financial control of the scheme, and the QMG Branch, Directorate of Quartering might well administer the quartering aspects.

Basis of Participation

If such a scheme is to operate successfully, I believe it must have the broadest possible coverage of the eligible population of the army. Therefore, it should be compulsory for all married ARA personnel and optional for unmarried men (since they also require homes in their retirement). The standard contribution would be in the nature of rent. Alternative arrangements would be needed for men serving overseas and accompanied by their families. The level of contributions, likewise the ultimate scale of entitlement at retirement, would be regulated according to the rate of pay of the soldier, although additional contributions could be optional.

The entitlement at retirement would consist of —

(a) Lump sum of accrued contributions, towards purchase or construction of a home, or for the optional use of the contributor in any way he thinks fit.

(b) Advance on a credit foncier plan of the balance needed towards completion of home purchase or construction.

The level of contribution would probably be much higher than prevailing rentals from the Commonwealth, but also lower than rentals from private owners. It is considered that, in view of the capital appreciation which will accrue to the contributors, these rentals could be fixed at upwards of 20 per cent of service pay, but they must be considered in conjunction with other levies such as DFRB, which are already a substantial commitment. The question of relief of such contributions from taxation is also worthy of investigation.

It would be most desirable that soldiers taking up terminal appointments in the state of their choice should be able to buy or build a home under this scheme before retiring. This should present little difficulty, and would greatly facilitate resettlement. Moreover the scheme would in some cases be supplementary to existing entitlements to loans under War Service Homes and State arrangements.

The great merit of the scheme is that it would enable essential house purchase to begin at a relatively early phase in a soldier's career, at the best period of his earning capacity, without committing him to premature arrangements in any one place to interfere with his service obligations.

The income of this scheme would be derived from two main sources —

(a) Excess of contributions over the actual cost of accommodation occupied as married quarters.

(b) Earnings on loans from (a) to retiring soldiers for house purchase or construction.

Factors To Be Examined In Detail

The financial aspects of the scheme require a most careful actuarial examination in the light of the following main factors:—

(a) The value of existing married quarters, which in some areas has

been reduced to a nominal amount by amortization of the original cost by years of rental.

(b) Depreciation trends of these quarters.

(c) Distribution and cost of the balance of married quarters required to meet current army needs.

(d) A forecast of future army plans for stations and garrisons.

(e) Survey of the age and pay structure of the army population, with particular reference to marriage and retirement.

(f) Survey of the housing needed by soldiers on retirement, particularly in relation to cost and location.

(g) Policy aspects of the ownership of houses by such a corporation within Departmental stations and installations.

(h) Taxation policy in respect of such a fund.

Thus, assuming an average contributing life from 27 to 47, of 20 years, and an average effective surplus contribution of £100 per year, with cumulative simple interest at 4 per cent, a capital asset of approximately £2800 will accrue to the contributor. Upon retirement at age 47 the contributor may require a total of £3800 to finance house purchase and will require a loan of £1000 from the co-operative at say 5 per cent interest (allowing 1 per cent for administrative charges) repayable in 20 years, ie, at a rate within the means of a retired soldier.

The essential principle in the scheme is that it is co-operative, and an important aspect of the scheme would be the capital strength it would acquire from providing the whole of army married accommodation. Moreover, once this had been built there would be only limited calls for new construction of married quarters in new areas or in replacement of old housing.

After the clarification and publication of the findings on these aspects it would be necessary to secure the support of army members, preferably by plebiscite.

Conclusions

(a) An Army Co-operative Housing Scheme could remove the anxiety which many soldiers feel about acquiring a final home at the end of their service. It would, therefore, be good for morale.

(b) It should not be confused with questions of DFRB or Resettlement, as it would be essentially self-help, supplementary to those two other essential provisions.

(c) It would partly redress the disadvantage to which army life puts us in the question of house ownership.

(d) It would defer soldiers from premature house-purchase, and thus add to the mobility of the soldier.

(e) It could be a powerful factor in retaining serving soldiers in the army, and in recruitment.

(f) It would promote independent home ownership, and therefore, would encourage thrifty, stable citizenship.

I recommend that the administrative and actuarial aspects of such a scheme be investigated, and if they are such as commend it, it be then referred to the soldiers of the ARA for compulsory introduction for all ranks; furthermore that the other fighting services be invited to participate on a common basis, to add to its strength and economy. If only we can eradicate the old complaint that servicemen pay rent all their working lives and are homeless at the end, we will be a long way towards making the services an attractive career. I believe such a perpetual housing co-operative to be feasible. It remains to determine whether it is acceptable to the Commonwealth, the Departments, and the servicemen themselves.

Strategic Review

Progress of SEATO

THE South-East Asia Treaty Organization came into being on 19 February 1955 when the eight member countries ratified the treaty signed at Manilla the previous year. The member countries are Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States.

When SEATO was established the principal threat to the Treaty Area was that of the armed aggression by the Communist Powers. If SEATO had not been established it is more than probable that this threat would have been translated into positive military action. The mere existence of the Treaty and the firmly expressed intentions of the signatories to fight in defence of each others' national integrity, served to impose an effective, if temporary, check to the immediate military threat. The breathing space thus gained gave the Treaty Powers time to set up the elements of the machinery necessary to enable the Organization to become an instrument of peace and stability in South-East Asia.

Before the Treaty came into being the Communist bloc was more or less openly seeking the immediate overthrow of all non-Communist Governments in the area. When the Treaty was signed and the signatories showed their determination to support it, the Communists changed their tactics and adopted the more subtle approach of political infiltration.

This new attack was thrown into disorder by the intellectual turmoil and ideological differences in the Communist world which followed Stalin's death. However, these differences were soon composed. The Communist parties of the Soviet bloc reaffirmed their determination to work for a Communist world revolution in their joint declaration at the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in Moscow. This successful testing of a Russian intercontinental ballistic missile and the launching of the Sputniks have provided evidence of Soviet scientific and technical achievement which has strengthened Soviet leadership of the Communist bloc.

Sino-Soviet solidarity has been reaffirmed by Mao Tse-tung's unqualified acceptance of Soviet leadership at the Moscow celebrations; by renewed expressions of Chinese gratitude for Soviet assistance; and by Chinese Communist support for Soviet action in the Middle East and elsewhere.

Having re-established its hegemony in the Communist world, the Soviet Union adopted a tougher line, especially in Europe and the Middle East. Its armed intervention in Hungary and its subversive attack in the Middle East were backed by more or less open threats of total nuclear war. Although this new 'tough' attitude has not yet been openly applied in the SEATO area, it is against a background of threats and intimidation in their world policies that the Communists continue to pursue their self-appointed mission of subversion, and economic and political penetration in South and South-East Asia.

By maintaining an apparently correct attitude in their dealings with Asian Governments, and through their political

and economic missions, the Communist powers attempt to show themselves as respectable and co-operative members of the international community, upholding the independence of all nations and abstaining from any interference in their internal affairs. Behind this facade of respectability the Communist bloc and local Communist parties seek by every means to subvert, to isolate, and to divide those forces in South and South-East Asia which strive for unity with the rest of the free world. The aim of this attack is to weaken the will and capacity of nations in the area to defend themselves individually and collectively.

As a specific means of achieving this weakening and division of the free world, the Communists increased their efforts to distort and capture what has become loosely known as the Afro-Asian movement. The non-governmental Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference held in Cairo in December 1957 and January 1958 had a distinctly pro-Communist bias in its agenda and discussions. It was used by its sponsors — Soviet, Chinese Communist, Egyptian and various Asian 'Solidarity Committees' — to mobilize Afro-Asian sentiment in a manner designed to aid the Communist cause.

At the Cairo gathering and at Communist-managed congresses such as the World Peace Council meeting in Ceylon, the Moscow Youth Festival and the meeting of the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the Communists have bent every effort to stimulate tendencies towards non-alignment and neutralism, and to give impetus to their campaign for 'peaceful co-existence'.

Of recent months the Communists have stepped up the virulence and frequency of their attacks on 'colonialism' and 'Western imperialism', with violent tirades against SEATO and other free world collective security arrangements. Communist parties and cells everywhere in the Treaty Area support openly or by indirect means those national elements which oppose collective security. The Soviet bloc, in the United Nations and elsewhere, supports the claims of neutral countries of South and South-East Asia, irrespective of their intrinsic merits, especially when these claims are directed against the interests of members of collective security organizations.

Communist offers of capital aid, credit and technical assistance are mainly directed towards uncommitted countries in the Treaty Area, in an effort to show that non-alignment is a profitable policy. Communist statements at the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Cairo suggest that the economic aid campaign may be enlarged. This calls for special watchfulness, for experience has shown that the external economic policies of the Soviet bloc are essentially designed to promote political ends. Economic aid is the means of creating ties which enable the Communist donors to exert pressure on the receiving countries, and is in itself, a vehicle of subversion.

The Communists make a particular target of minority groups. Threats, intimidation, economic pressure, and actual violence have been used in attempts to turn these people into subversive agents and to prevent them from becoming integrated members of the communities and countries in which they live.

Behind all these activities lies the thinly veiled threat posed by the steady build-up of Communist military strength in China and North Vietnam.

A permanent SEATO Secretariat, headed by a Secretary-General has been established in Bangkok. The overall controlling body is the Council, consisting of ministerial representatives from member countries who meet at least once a year to make policy decisions, to state general objectives, and to assess progress towards those objectives. To provide continuity in control and direction the Council Representatives, consisting of the

heads of diplomatic missions of member countries in Bangkok meet as often as necessary.

Broadly, action to combat Communist penetration of the Treaty area is being taken along two main lines of endeavour, through military agencies on the one hand and through civil agencies on the other. Military activities are directed by the Military Advisers who constitute in effect a committee of Service representatives from the member states. The Military Advisers meet twice a year.

A Permanent Military Planning Staff has been established in Bangkok to undertake on a continuing basis detailed planning for the collective defence of the Treaty Area. This staff consists of a number of Service officers from each of the member nations.

From time to time elements of the armed forces of the member nations carry out combined exercises.

The Executive Secretariat provides the civil side of the Organization with general administrative and budgetary support, including the servicing of SEATO Headquarters, provides a conference secretariat for meetings, and ensures that all SEATO bodies and delegations are kept informed of activities relevant to their work.

On the civil side there are a number of permanent bodies, the chief of which are —

The Public Relations Office, which is responsible for the Organization's press relations and the implementation of the information programme.

The Economic Office, which assists the Organization with economic matters affecting the implementation of the Treaty.

The Cultural Relations Office, which is responsible for carrying out the cultural programme.

The Research Service Centre, which produces reports on current developments in Communist activities for the use of member Governments and of the various SEATO bodies.

In addition *ad hoc* committees are formed as necessary to deal with matters lying outside the regular work of the permanent bodies.

While there is good reason for satisfaction in the thought that so many nations of widely differing cultures have succeeded in creating an organization which is having some success in combating Communist penetration, there is still no reason whatever for complacency. Asia, as well as the Middle East, has always been regarded by the Communists as a particularly favourable target for the expansion of their influence. There is no evidence to suggest that the present Communist leadership deviates from this view, but there is much to indicate that they continue to work towards the domination of free Asia. It is quite clear that the current abstention by the Communists from violent and aggressive moves in the Treaty area, far from implying any modification of these aims, is merely a more subtle, and probably temporary phase, in their continuing struggle for domination of the area.

1 Sep 58 — E.G.K.

AUSTRALIAN ARMY ADMINISTRATION IN AN ALLIED THEATRE OF WAR

COLONEL F. W. SPEED, OBE, ED
Australian Staff Corps

SOME eighteen months ago the Australian Government indicated that, in the event of major war, Australian forces would be more likely to operate in South-East Asia than elsewhere. From this it could be inferred that, because of USA involvement in that area, the Australian Army might well form part of an allied command, the logistical system for which might be organized on US lines.

Much discussion has since taken place about the basis and degree of integration which would be desirable in that situation. Some are for complete integration. Others favour retention of our present, British, maintenance system — together with a 'pipeline' complete in all respects back to the Australian mainland. Both sides cannot be right.

It may, therefore, be a useful exercise to ventilate this problem — to bring out the many aspects confronting the Australian Army faced with the possibility of taking part in allied operations where the US Army is the major partner.

At the same time it should be noted that the exercise deals only with that one kind of situation. There are others in which the considerations will be different. It is the unenviable task of the planners to find a solution which will fit the likely circumstances.

Background Factors

Government Policy

In a statement before Parliament on 4 April 1957, the Prime Minister set out five points on which Australia's military planning would be based —

(a) It is of immense importance to Australia that the free countries of South-East Asia should not fall one by one to Communist aggression. We believe that participation in regional arrangements for collective defence is the most effective method of securing the safety of Australia and the other countires who are parties to these arrangements.

(b) The association of the massive power of the United States of America with these regional arrangements, and her assurances of support in the event of Communist aggression, are vital factors.

(c) Despite the re-organization of her forces which is in hand, the United Kingdom will continue to maintain substantial and flexible striking power in this region.

(d) These regional defensive arrangements are expressed in the SEATO, ANZUS and UKANZ organizations.

(e) Particularly in the event of "global" war, maintenance of forces in South-East Asia is likely to be more feasible from the United States than from the United Kingdom, but this does not completely rule out the latter. Therefore, Australia should standardize so far as we can with the Americans.

The Prime Minister also stated that, as a step towards the production of mobile, well equipped and readily available forces a regular Brigade Group of over 4000 had been organized as a cohesive battle formation trained to the highest pitch(1).

Forces Likely to be Involved

From these points, and from an intelligent forecast of the world situation likely to obtain in the event of war, a set of assumptions can be drawn. These assumptions will help to keep the problem within reasonable bounds so that useful conclusions can be reached. At the same time, however, any or all of them can be modified or discarded later to permit broader or more detailed investigation by those concerned in planning the future course of action.

For present purposes, then, assumptions which can be usefully employed in a first examination of the problem are —

(a) On the outbreak of war, Australia will despatch to the theatre the newly re-formed regular 1 Inf Bde Gp. This will be followed as soon as practicable, by the remainder of one infantry division. The build-up from there will depend on the size of the outbreak and the possibility of commitments elsewhere; but the next step will probably be to a corps of three divisions and corps troops. Parallel with the build-up of the field formations, there will be established the pre-determined Australian logistical organization.

(b) The contribution from forces local to the theatre, being dependant on the area of the operations, is unpredictable; but it can be assumed that it will be numerically stronger than the Australian contribution.

(c) The British Far East Forces have elements in the area at present and have concerted plans for operations in event of war. The size of these forces and the extent to which they will be reinforced from the United Kingdom is at present problematical. On the army side, an availability of one to two divisions is possible.

(d) The United States have practically no forces in the area at present, but have plans for movement of forces as necessary. The strength of such forces is likely to exceed the other national contributions.

Influence of the Locale

The location of the theatre in which the integration takes place is, of course, a considerable factor. However, for the purposes of study we have assumed that the theatre will be South-East Asia: and this reduces the influence of locale. Experience in Burma in the 1939 - 45 War provides a useful overall guide to the salient points(2) —

(a) The terrain will be rugged, disease infested, inadequately mapped and possibly sparsely populated.

(b) Communications will be insufficient. A rudimentary railway system will have to be used for the bulk of the heavy lift; proper roads will be few, and the remainder little more than tracks; airfields will be scarce — in most cases capable of taking light aircraft only; and

(1) Australian White Paper. Statement by Prime Minister, 4 Apr 57.

(2) Slim, Field Marshal Sir Wm. "Defeat into Victory" 1956 pp 169 - 171.

(c) Climate will be a substantial influence with periodical monsoons to interrupt communications.

The inference from all this is that the organization of the Australian contribution will need careful planning, not only to ensure efficient integration into the normal elements of the Allied logistical system but also to ensure that the peculiar requirements of the locale are adequately anticipated.

Finance

A very pertinent factor in any scheme of integration will be the questions of finance.

Australian participation in the theatre logistical system will be greatly simplified if items of common use — equipment, stores and supplies — can be drawn from US depots, etc. The same applies to services. The question is whether such issues and services will be on payment, lease-lend, or free.

There is hope that Australia may in time become a source of supply of part of the equipment and stores required in the theatre;(3) but it is clear that payment in dollars, even on a "charge account", will be quite beyond our capacity unless the United States is making massive purchases from Australia. Initially at least, some form of lease-lend or free issue will be essential if any useful degree of integration into the theatre logistical system is to be achieved.

For the purposes of this examination, therefore, it will be assumed that a finance method has been devised and that issues and services of US origin which are suitable for use by Australia can be taken without restriction.

From these background factors we can advance to an examination of the possible basis and degree of integration of Australian forces into the overall Allied Command.

(3) Australian White Paper. Statement by Prime Minister, 19 Sep 5.

Basis and Degree of Integration

The Quick Answer

There is a simple and direct solution to the question of the basis and degree of integration. The Australian Army could adopt the US logistical system in its entirety, also such of its army organization as may be necessary to function on parallel lines. The Republic of Korea Army has done this, as far as can be determined, with notable success. So, too, have others.

In the latter stages of the 1939 - 45 War when participation in the main assault on Japan was being examined, Britain considered three ways of taking part in the projected campaign — by

(a) a force American equipped and trained and supported by American administrative services;

(b) a British equipped force, maintained as far as possible after the initial assault by American rear administrative services;

(c) a British equipped force administratively self-supporting.

Investigation of the first two of these propositions led to the following considerations which are germaine to the proposals now being examined:—

(i) The Joint Planning Staff favoured course (b) and the Joint Administrative Planning Staff set about developing a modus operandi.

(ii) A constitutional question was raised whether the Secretary of State for War, who is personally responsible to Parliament for the welfare and administration of the Army, could confide the administration of such a large force to a foreign power.

(iii) Because of this, and the fact that the plan was both unorthodox and untried, the British Chiefs of Staff decided against course (b) and ordered a plan based on course (c) to be prepared.

(iv) When the proposal was put to the Combined Chiefs of Staffs, at Potsdam in July 1945, the US Chiefs of Staff invited General MacArthur's comments. His cabled response welcomed the participation of a British corps of three divisions, provided that these should be completely US trained and equipped, and maintained entirely by US administrative services — in fact the first of the three courses.(4)

The British Chiefs of Staff decided to adopt General MacArthur's solution; but the war came to an end before the decision was implemented.

Such a revolutionary step would be too drastic for Australia at the present time. Although we have our thoughts turned directly towards the defence of South-East Asia, our commitments may not always involve a US logistical system. We, therefore, cannot go completely American. Also, standardization is a very long term objective as has been seen in NATO.

Australia's policy must be to seek standardization or compatibility with the United States of America while retaining the maximum compatibility with the British Commonwealth, of which the United Kingdom element is a major part. We must determine at what points short of complete conversion we can stop and yet achieve a very workable degree of integration.

Scope of Logistics

In the US Army organization, "logistics" means the planning and execution of military movement, evacuation and supply.(5) In order to examine the integration problem it is necessary first to define the components of logistics. For ease in this examination, British (ie, Australian) terms will be used.

(4) War Office Publication. "The Second World War 1939 - 45. Administrative Planning". 1952. pp 116 - 117.

(5) United States Field Manual FM 100 - 10. Administration Definitions.

Converted to Australian terminology, the subject of logistics includes —

Personnel replacement and reinforcement.

Medical evacuation and treatment.

Movement.

Maintenance.

Evacuation and repair of equipment, etc.

Logistics is embraced in the broader US term "Administration" and there will be certain minor aspects, not listed above, which will be involved in any plan to integrate with a US logistical system. However, for the purposes of the present study, the foregoing subjects only need be examined in detail.

As a prelude to the examination, it can be said that, basically, the British and United States systems are quite similar. Their aims are virtually the same. However, there are differences in method which need to be examined. Moreover in some cases the same term has a different meaning; this needs particular care.

It is to be observed that neither the British nor the United States system is at all firm. As thinking on the two systems develops, there is a possibility that the influence of NATO will bring them closer together. However, this will aid, rather than hinder, Australia's problem.

Personnel Replacement and Reinforcement

Personnel for replacement of individuals, and reinforcements, will arrive in the theatre in accordance with a normal (Australian) plan. They should go into a transit camp or reinforcement holding unit staffed by Australian Army personnel, operating either as a separate unit or as wing of a theatre unit.

Movement forward will be by the theatre transportation agencies: in the case of reinforcements, after normal reinforcement demand. Again, such transit holding organizations as they may travel through should be Australian manned. It is essential that reinforcements be handled by Australian personnel to ensure proper control and routing.

Personnel replacement and reinforcement will, therefore, present no complication. The only difficulty will be to ensure that the Australian organization fits effectively into the theatre set-up and that its relations with the transportation organization are soundly and amicably based.

Only thus will it be possible to retain the reinforcements in good morale, and ensure that they are not unnecessarily delayed in their movement forward.

Medical Evacuation and Treatment

The essence of the American system is that the casualty should be evacuated at once to the particular medical echelon which will undertake full treatment. To this end helicopters and fixed wing aircraft are used as far forward as possible and usually direct to general hospitals. This system accords fully with the British idea, except that the greater facilities of American air transport achieve the aim more quickly.

From the morale aspect, it is most desirable that the general hospitals which undertake the treatment of Australian patients should be Australian: or, at least that theatre hospitals should have wings manned by Australian personnel. Where practical, the echelons through which Australians pass on their way to the general hospitals should also be Australian manned.

It should not be necessary to pattern the Australian forward medical organization closely on the American. But the existing system of Field Ambulances, Casualty Clearing Stations, specialist teams, etc, should be so deployed as to take full advantage of the theatre organization for evacuation.

The Australian medical organization will of course always be ready to reciprocate by accepting US casualties when desired.

At the staff level, two aspects will be of very great importance —

(a) The closest liaison and co-operation between the Australian and American organizations will be necessary to ensure that early advice is secured of changes in the theatre evacuation set-up.

(b) The Australian medical organization must be in such consonance with the other parts of the Allied organization that mass casualties due to nuclear or other "disaster" incidents can be coped with on a theatre-wide basis.

Movement

The Movement Control organization will be largely American and there will be no room for a parallel Australian system. At the same time, Australia will need some influence in the theatre organization — to interpret Australia's requirements and to see them through. Australian personnel should, therefore, be integrated into the theatre organization, in such places as is necessary to meet the requirement, and in such numbers as can be provided and accepted.

The transportation organization will be on an Allied basis and a parallel Australian system will be impracticable. Australia should make a contribution, of units, to the theatre organization.

Maintenance

The term Maintenance as used in Australia means the process of supplying the material requirements of the force.(6)

This subject is probably the most important, and certainly the most contentious, aspect of an integrated logistical system.

(6) War Office Publication "Joint Services Glossary" 1952 p 16.

The more significant points of difference between the Australian and American systems seem to be as follows:–

(a) *Rations.* The American ration is substantially different from the Australian — and it is not too much to say that, in its complete form, it is unacceptable to the Australian soldier except in an emergency and for short periods. A separate Australian ration scale will, therefore, be required. Fortunately the problem has already been encountered in Korea and a solution produced. It will, therefore, only be a case of adopting past experience, with such modifications as are indicated as a result of passage of time and the difference in size of forces involved. It is sufficient here to note that the answer will probably lie in dividing the commodities comprising the rations into common-use and non-common-use categories. Common-use items can be supplied from Allied depots, non-common-use items will come from Australian sources.

(b) *Petrol, Oil and Lubricants.* A comparison of the Australian with the US range of petrols, oils and lubricants will be necessary to determine whether Australian requirements can be met. It is reasonable to suppose, however, that no difficulty will be encountered. Production of an Australian scale special to the theatre, using US terminology, will probably be the quickest means of achieving integration.

(c) *Other Supplies and Stores.* For the sake of simplicity it is undesirable, at this stage, to divide *other supplies and stores required* by the Australian troops into categories. Provided there is no financial difficulty, it can be taken as a principle that Australia should draw from US depots every item of supplies or stores which is identical with, or an acceptable substitute for, the Australian item. In addition, the Australian force should be alert to make such changes in scales as will permit the wider use of US stores and supplies, where such changes are not contrary to broader Australian policy.

Nevertheless, despite a realistic policy of standardization and compatibility, there will be a great range of stores and some supplies which cannot be obtained from US installations. Assuming that each is essential, such items must be provided from Australia, held in Australian installations, and issued chiefly through Australian channels.

Note — It will be observed that specific reference is not made to engineer, or medical, stores. The principles set out above apply to all stores and supplies, whatever the category.

Evacuation and Repair of Equipment

The subject of Evacuation and Repair of Equipment is perhaps next after Maintenance in its difficulties. The American system is somewhat different, the range of equipment, etc, is almost entirely different, and there will probably still be differences in the system of measurement, terminology, thread styles, and so on.

At least in the early stages and probably for some considerable time, the US repair organizations are unlikely to have any spare capacity for repair of Australian equipment (including vehicles). For several reasons, US support of local national forces will have higher priority than the Australian force. With a few particular exceptions, therefore, Australia will have to augment the US organization or provide its own.

While its aim is virtually the same, the US organization for repair of equipment is radically different from the British and Australian. The US system is much less centralized in that it does not have a Corps of Electrical and Mechanical Engineers responsible for a high proportion of repair and maintenance; and its division into echelons is different.

Short of making a major change in the Australian organization it seems, therefore, that Australia should establish its own repair organization to meet its own commitments subject to the following possible exceptions:—

(a) Materials and replacement parts should, where practicable, be drawn from US sources as outlined under the heading of Maintenance.

(b) It may be practicable to arrange for the US organization to repair equipments of a specialized nature which are held by the Australian force in numbers so small that a separate Australian repair unit would be uneconomical.

(c) At the base repair level, it may be economical and possible for some integration of workshops or tasks.

Other Aspects

Having considered in detail the principal functions of the logistical system, it is desirable to note that there are other aspects of the system which will need study when research into the problem begins. These do not require detailed examination at this stage but can be listed briefly as follows:—

(a) *Survey.* It will be most desirable to use the same maps as other Allied forces, even if technically they are inferior. The importance of a common system of reference needs no emphasis. Accordingly all maps, etc, should be drawn from Allied sources.

(b) *Provost.* Although not strictly a function of logistics, the provost organization merits attention. In all military movement, efficient police control is an essential. Best results will be achieved by a process of integration which ensures that there is Australian representation at the working levels and a proportion at the command levels.

(c) *Postal.* Experience has shown conclusively that the supply of personal mail is a potent factor in the morale of troops. Australian mail can be carried in the theatre transportation system; but it will be important to ensure —

(i) that the rearward terminals, as well as the forward, are manned by Australians or have Australian components to handle inward and outward mails; and

(ii) that there is adequate Australian representation at intermediate points — to ensure that mail is not off-loaded, or unnecessarily delayed at transhipment points.

(d) *Canteens.* Without going into reasons, it can be noted that canteens, canteen shops, etc, are an important part of 'western' military organizations. Since the logistical system will be organized on US lines, it can be assumed that it will contain American style PXs, etc. Provided currency difficulties are overcome, it will be very satisfactory if Australian troops can have access to these facilities. It will also be desirable for the AACS, or at least the NAAFI/EFI organization, to supplement the theatre system by supplying a supplementary list of Australian items to unit canteens and messes, to provide home-delivery gift schemes and to run hostels and clubs.

Ability to Co-operate

Ability, or willingness, to co-operate is an essential separate element in any scheme of integration. Any national component which cannot see the need for team work in logistics as well as operations will be an impediment to efficiency.

Australians will have to realize not only this fact but also that the Americans, being in the box-seat, will quite naturally tend unconsciously to treat co-operation as a one-way track. Australians in the integrated system, particularly those carrying out a liaison function, will need to develop tact, charm and flexible determination. These attributes will also be required in varying degree in dealing with other nationals, including other British Commonwealth troops.

In more than one phase of the Second World War it was found that, in logistics as in other problems, British and American points of view often tended to differ. Fundamentally this difference was due to a divergence in mental outlook which led each nationality to make a different approach to any given problem.(7)

Even in such ordinary matters as vocabulary there is a substantial difference between them. As one realist put it, they are two nations "divided by a common language".

It is important, therefore, that the greatest care be taken by the Australian Army to ensure that its members thoroughly understand the variations in the US method and are prepared to learn the working of the theatre system.

Requisitions and other Forms

Consideration of a logistical system would be incomplete without thought to the printed forms (including signal messages) necessary to secure the issues or services sought.

(7) "Administrative Planning". Op cit. p 31.

This aspect of the problem will require detailed research, but the following observations will indicate its scope:—

(a) The Allied logistical system will almost certainly be using US forms, and will be entitled to expect Australia to conform.

(b) It may be practicable for Australia to adopt some of the US forms in place of its own, and in some instances it will be possible for Australian units to make their requisitions on US forms which they themselves will fill in.

(c) It will be unreasonable to expect an Australian unit when requisitioning a single group of issues or services to put some items on an Australian form and some on a US form. Ordnance stores are an example of this complication.

(d) Machinery will, therefore, be necessary to translate documents from Australian units onto US Forms.

Effect of Build-up

When detailed studies begin, it is likely that separate consideration will need to be given to each of the stages of build-up of the Australian force. Initially Australia will inject a small advanced element into the theatre to prepare the way. This will be followed by the regular Brigade Group. Large components will arrive later.

The advanced element will have to be maintained almost entirely by the Allied organization. This will require one system.

The Brigade Group will be partly self-supporting; and a modified system will be needed.

The arrival of subsequent components, which will include the units necessary for the maintenance of the larger force, will begin to cause further changes — until the ultimate set-up is achieved.

These changes will need careful planning.

Related Considerations

In the British (Australian) sense, Administration embraces the organization, discipline and well-being of men and the movement and maintenance of men and materials.(8)

Primarily we are concerned only with those aspects which are covered by the American term logistics. However, there are certain other aspects of administration which are closely related and have a direct bearing on an integrated logistical system.

Administration of Discipline

Where any element of the integrated logistical system does not necessitate the provision of a wholly Australian unit to run it but requires an Australian wing, cell, or other component, the difficulty of administration of discipline will arise.

The problem is not so great where officers only are concerned because the few incidents which will occur can be dealt with by the senior Australian Officer or one to whom the necessary powers are specifically given.

Where other ranks are involved, experience in previous wars, reinforced by experience in Korea and Malaya, has made it clear that the contribution should be in the form of one or more complete sub-units, preferably commanded by a field officer. Australian personnel in the relative unit headquarters itself can come under the sub-unit commander for discipline.

The commander for discipline must, of course, co-ordinate his disciplinary policy to that of his superior in order that the administration of discipline will be as uniform throughout the whole unit as is possible.

(8) "Joint Services Glossary". Op cit. p 2.

Conditions of Service

In all integrated installations, etc, a very real difficulty will arise with the different conditions of service which apply to the various national elements. This has been found so in all campaigns and even with such closely related components as Australia and New Zealand.

It will be important to arrange that Australian conditions of service for the force are equated to the other Allies, as nearly as is possible.

Though by no means the only factor, Pay is one of the most significant. For many reasons, it will not be possible to have exactly the same rates for all national components, but it may be practicable for the higher command to arrange that approximately the same rate is drawn in the theatre by equivalent ranks. This might be achieved by a system of deferred pay and of 'bank' accounts maintained at home.

Economy

A factor which will have to be watched is that of economy — in men and material. The US forces are well known for their luxurious standards in most things. Such conditions are contagious and, unless great care is taken the Australian Army will suffer.

Let us note well the lesson brought out by Field Marshal Slim in the 'Afterthoughts' to his "Defeat into Victory" —

> "We discovered that, instead of the four hundred tons a day not considered excessive to keep a division fighting in more generous theatres, we could maintain our divisions in action for long periods, without loss of battle efficiency or morale on one hundred and twenty. As we removed vehicles from units and formation which joined us on European establishments, they found to their surprise that they could move farther and faster without them . . . . . This relation between tactical mobility and numbers of vehicles,

between the size of staffs and effective control, will increase in importance in any future war."(9)

Research

Need

Since the introduction of an integrated logistical system is not just simply a matter of Australia adopting the current US system, it will be necessary for us to engage in research — to determine —

(a) What modifications to the existing Australian system should be made now.

(b) What organization will be necessary at the time Australian forces enter the Allied theatre.

(c) How best Australian personnel at all levels may be trained in the functioning of the foregoing organization and of the current US logistical system.

Such research should be undertaken by, or under the auspices of, the General Staff at Army Headquarters, Melbourne. It is probable that, in the early stages of research, its volume will be beyond the capacity of the existing staff. Perhaps the best method will be to appoint a small team under a senior officer, attached to the Directorate of Administrative Planning. This team will study the problem in conjunction with the Heads of Services, and the Arms concerned; reporting its conclusions to the Military Board, at intervals, for adoption or modification as necessary.

This team should function only until the problem is reduced to a size which can be handled by the normal staffs; and it should gradually merge into the training organization which will be required at a later stage.

Experience of Other Nations

The Research Team may well devote consideration to the extent to which Canada has met the problem of integration. Canada has retained basically a British organization for its forces. It has adopted, and is adopting, a substantial range of American equipment. Some of its forces already work in very close contact with US forces. It is patent that there will be much to learn from Canadian experience and intentions.

The Broader Concept

A study of integration must not be confined only to the viewpoints of how much of the US logistical system can be used with advantage by Australia. Australia must be prepared so to operate that other elements of the allied forces may be served by the Australian organization — when such is economical, and also in case of need. This will be particularly so if nuclear action should be adopted by the enemy.

The study of integration should, therefore, be approached not only from the aspect of how much Australia can get out of the Allied system, but also how much Australia can contribute to the system consistent with the size of its administrative echelons.

Administrative Training

The requirement will not be met without special arrangements being made for the training of those who will have to work in, and from, the integrated logistical system. A few really keen officers will engage in private study of the problem without official impetus, but the great majority are either too heavily engaged in their day-to-day duties or on promotion examination, voluntarily, to devote adequate time to training in the integrated system: and some form of instruction will be necessary.

There are four chief means by which training in the integrated logistical system can be carried out —

(a) Study at recognized institutions such as the Staff College and the School of Tactics and Administration.

(9) Slim. Op cit. p 940.

(b) Teaching at Service Schools.

(c) Exercises conducted in the major headquarters such as Army Headquarters Melbourne and Command Headquarters.

(d) Overseas training including attachments to gain practical experience.

These are now examined in some detail.

Staff College

By its nature the Staff College will be involved in any decision that the Australian Army will train for use of an integrated logistical system. The Staff College aim is to train for all forms of war[10] and the syllabus will automatically be adjusted to provide for the new commitment.

However, the Staff College syllabus is already over-full. It cannot devote much time to this special subject and other arrangements will also be necessary.

School of Tactics and Administration

The School of Tactics and Administration devotes itself to promotion courses and to courses at unit officer standard. It does not ordinarily conduct training of the kind now under consideration.

On the other hand, it is an established organization with good facilities, and it could be the best place for the extensive training of Commanders and Staff Officers.

An Alternative

Some may think that the subject is sufficiently important and large enough to warrant the establishment of a special school. This would be expensive, in capital outlay and manpower. However, desirable, it may prove too costly.

A possible alternative is to set up a wing of the Staff College expressly for extensive instruction in Logistics and the US Logistical System. The scheme would have four advantages —

(a) The subject would acquire the dignity of close association with the Staff College.

(b) The Wing would have the use of the excellent facilities of the Staff College; and would go along with it if it should later move to more suitably located acommodation.

(c) The programme of the Wing would be so designed that it would dove-tail with the Staff College syllabus. The staff of the Wing could assist in conducting the periods allotted to the subect at the Staff College; and the staff of the latter could gain that measure of respite which would increase their efficiency.

(d) As a Wing of the College, the subject — which is in fact directly within the aim of the College — would be seen in its correct perspective.

Study versus Research

In whichever school it is finally decided the extensive instruction will be given, it will be most desirable to carry out there at least part of the Research which is discussed above. In the absence of trial-by-war, trial-by-exercise is a valuable means of testing theory. A substantial proportion of the method of integration will emerge from study of Logistics and the US Logistical System under school conditions.

It is chiefly for this reason that the proposal is advanced that the team which conducts the initial research should develop the courses and itself gradually merge into the training organization. This is the practical method, and the most economical.

(10) Military Board Instruction No 9/1955. Part 2, para 4.

Service Schools

Each Service school, of course, will give instruction in the subject of logistics and the US logistical system — in outline as to the subject as a whole, and intensively in its own particular branch.

Exercises

The value of exercises conducted in the major headquarters cannot be over-emphasized. It will be a long time before every staff officer and potential field commander has absorbed the knowledge of the subject necessary to efficient functioning in the even of war. Initially at least, such exercises will cover considerable ground with those officers who, for various reasons cannot undertake courses at the Logistics School.

Overseas Training

Overseas training will be vital. The subject of logistics and the practical detail of the US logistical system cannot be launched into the Australian Army by instructors who learn from books. Nor can an Australian system be efficiently devised unless the American system is studied on the spot.

Initially, it will be desirable to seek the assistance of instructors lent by the US Army to operate under the Australian chief instructors. This need will lapse when the research project is completed and the courses established.

Once the task is well in hand and the courses are running satisfactorily, there will be diminution in the need for overseas training. But the requirement will not entirely disappear. There can be no real substitute for the final polish gained by some at least of the students being attached to United States formations.

Summary

1. Present government policy is directed to the defence of South-East Asia. This will be achieved under SEATO, ANZUS and UKANZ.

2. Whilst any major conflict, and most small ones, will probably be undertaken in concert with US forces, the possibility of operations in conjunction with UK forces cannot be ignored. For this, and other reasons, Australia should not go 'all American'.

3. When each element of logistics is examined it is seen that the integration of Australian units and personnel into the theatre system is possible. However, the basis and degree of integration will vary with each element.

4. There are a number of matters which will require special consideration. Some are cognate matters such as requisitions and forms generally. Others, though not part of logistics, will have an influence on organization. These include administration of discipline, conditions of service, etc.

5. In order to prepare for entry into such a logistical system the first requirement is for research.

6. Thereafter a full programme of training will be required for commanders, staff and service officers.

It is significant to observe that the partners in NATO have found that standardization is a very long term project, longer than most thought likely. Even preparation for integration into a logistical system organized on US lines will take much time, research and training. If Australia intends in the proximate future to take part in operations in which US forces are likely to predominate, we should start now to prepare for it.

The Stifling Embrace of Administrative Staffs

COLONEL FRANK KOWALSKI
United States Army

Reprinted from ARMY, February 1958, by permission of the Association of the US Army.

SOME months ago during a visit to the Command Management School, General W. G. Wyman, Commanding General, Continental Army Command, said, "Over the years we have accumulated a network of organizations which never decrease but always increase, producing staff control within our structure rather than command control."

I don't believe General Wyman meant our tactical staffs; I think he referred to those ever-expanding offices which direct and control administrative operations.

In a tactical unit, particularly the combat division, the primary functions of the staff are to assist the commander in co-ordinating the efforts of his command, to plan operations, and to help line outfits to do their assigned tasks. Tactical command channels are short, clearly defined, and strongly established. Relationship between division headquarters and subordinate commander, is direct and personal. The staff is small and its officers are junior to commanders of major organic units. The special staff and the technical services are more concerned with supporting and servicing the line than with supervising, co-ordinating and controlling line operations.

In our administrative echelons, these conditions are reversed. The Pentagon[1] and major commands are more clearly bureaucracies than military headquarters. Command channels are long, diffused and impersonal. Power and authority flow not from superior commander to subordinate commander, but from headquarters to headquarters. Staff officers are more concerned with inspecting, supervising, co-ordinating and controlling lower elements than they are with assisting the doers in accomplishing their tasks.

In this impersonal bureaucratic climate a most curious practice has evolved in which a staff officer exercises authority without responsibility. This practice has been legalized in part by policies and regulations which assign review and approval authority to the staff; in part, it exists under the false

(1) The Pentagon is the building in which the American Army Department Headquarters is housed. In the context of this article it may be taken as the equivalent of the Australian Department of the Army.
— Editor

and contradictory dogma that while a staff officer cannot command, he orders in his commander's name.

This strange arrangement stems from the fact, or belief, that commanding is a job of such magnitude that it cannot be performed by one person, and must be shared by a staff. The result is that the commander who is totally responsible for accomplishing an assigned mission, has under him a committee of staff commanders. In principle, only he can command, but in practice that function is performed by a staff under cover of its power to inspect, supervise, co-ordinate and control. All this has been rationalized by an amazing mental process which denies that a staff officer violates principles of command so long as he specifies "by command of" his superior, even though the order or decision may be issued at his own discretion, to someone not responsible to him. The whole procedure acquires a kind of mystic logic that assumes the staff officer is only expressing the policy or will of his commander.

The Mystique of the Staff Officer

This ambiguity arose through a deterioration in our understanding of what must be done when a person assigns a part or parts of his total job to others. A brief look at the process of delegation may be helpful in pointing up our problem.

Human organizations come into existence when a man envisions a goal he desires to reach which requires human power greater than his own. At this point, he analyzes his task, divides it into functions, and assigns functions to others to perform. Through generations of experience, we have found that best results are obtained when responsibility for a function is vested in a person rather than in a group, a board or a committee, and the individual is given authority adequate to carry out his responsibility.

When one man delegates his power to another, something critical happens in the relationship between the leader and the person to whom he has delegated authority. First, the subordinate is obliged to carry out his responsibility and must hold himself accountable for results to his superior. On the other hand, when delegating power to a subordinate, the leader demonstrates one of the greatest virtues of mankind: trust in his fellow man. He must believe his subordinate can and will carry out that responsibility. Our failure to believe this has caused mis-organization and has exacted a heavy price in waste and duplication.

This failure is demonstrated when a commander, unable directly to influence or control tasks he has delegated, gathers around him advisors and staffs to oversee those who have been given the job. At the first sign of trouble, instead of determining the cause and providing corrective guidance or adequate assistance to subordinate commanders, he appoints additional members to his staff to help him watch those below. The staff watchers become supervisors and soon are telling the doers how to do their jobs. Our administrative staffs, from Pentagon down to installations, are loaded with watchers, checkers, co-ordinators, controllers, and all sorts of command helpers.

In these circumstances it is not surprising that in our administrative echelons a staff officer thousands of miles away from the point of action can convince his superior that the commander on the scene doesn't know what he is doing. It happens every day. One would think a more reasonable solution would be for the supervisor who thinks his staff officer is better qualified to carry out a mission than the person to whom he assigned the responsibility, to relieve the latter and assign the former to do the job. But that doesn't happen. The subordinate commander continues to be responsible, while the staff officer in the echelon above him tells him how to do the job.

It is difficult to understand why we olerate this entrenched practice of exercising authority at staff level without being accountable for results.

In my opinion there are three powers of our administrative staffs which undermine command authority: the power to review and approve; the power to say No; and the power to supervise and control.

Power to Review and Approve

Two examples will illustrate how we hold back authority from the senior subordinate by delegating the power to review and approve his actions to a member of the staff above him.

The first concerns reports of survey. All installation commanders regard the responsibility for safeguarding government property as a major trust. When acting on a report of survey, they handle each case with judicious scrutiny and devote to it considerable personal time and thought, or else delegate review authority to the post deptuy or chief of staff, usually a senior officer.

Regulations prescribe that after action at installation level, reports of survey, under certain conditions, must be forwarded to the army commander for review and final disposition. This seems logical, since the installation commander is accountable to the army commander. The procedure thus amounts to a review of the recommendation of a subordinate commander by his superior.

This seldom happens. In practice, the report of survey is reviewed by a civilian or military staff officer at army headquarters and is returned to the installation approved or disapproved with the magic words "By command of the army commander." The action is made official when it is signed by the army adjutant general or an assistant AG. Usually neither the army commander nor the deputy army commander, nor the chief of staff, sees the typical report of survey. The helper on the staff makes the necessary review and command decision. So, despite the fact that at installation level the highest command consideration was given the case, at army level review authority devolves upon a minor member of the staff. For some long-forgotten reason, someone has provided a staff watcher for the army commander to approve or disapprove the actions of his installation commanders.

This is the question that must be answered: Do we believe our installation commanders are trustworthy and capable of making decisions in accordance with policy, or is a staff watcher at army headquarters needed to review the *installation commander's decisions*? *It* seems reasonable to assume that the Secretary of the Army would take a chance on the installation commander.

Here it the other example of the same kind of staff control.

Current regulations prescribe the conditions under which an ROTC cadet may be discharged for his own convenience or for the convenience of the government. Despite the fact that *regulations spell out these conditions* in considerable detail, discharge is authorized only with the approval of the army commander.

In practice, this enjoiner is fictitious. It is a rare situation indeed where an army commander personally approves the discharge of an ROTC cadet. What usually happens is this. The PMST, after careful study, forwards a letter to the army commander requesting authority to discharge the cadet. At army headquarters hundreds of such letters are referred for review to a staff officer. This officer, sitting in an ivory tower far removed from the ROTC unit and not accountable for the consequences of his actions, has the authority to make a decision which is binding on the local commander *(the PMST) — this despite*

the fact that the PMST and not the staff officer is accountable to the army commander for results. All is legal and proper providing the usual magic words "By command of" appear over the signature of the army adjutant general or an assistant AG.

Here we must ask the same question posed in the previous situation. Do we believe the local commander (the PMST) is trustworthy, capable of making sound decisions in accordance with announced policy; or do we believe we need special staff commanders at higher headquarters to make wholesale decisions for a commander in the field? Surely full authority to discharge ROTC cadets can logically be delegated to a PMST. If necessary, the policy governing discharges can be redefined and appropriate appeal procedures established. In any case, it is poor organizational procedure to hold the PMST accountable for results at his institution and at the same time give a staff officer at a higher headquarters the authority to review his actions and decisions.

One thing is certain: the practice of providing a large staff to ride herd on commanders in lower echelons is nothing more than a false hope of getting quality through quantity. Similarly, developing rules and regulations to insure that operators make no mistakes is a movement toward standardized mediocrity. Somehow, the Army must come to realize that staff control is no substitute for the ability and initiative of a subordinate commander.

Many similar examples can be found if we examine our regulations and policy directives. This whole wasteful practice could be knocked in the head if the commander and members of his staff at each echelon would ask themselves: "Is it necessary for this case to come up to this echelon for review, approval or decision by me?" An objective answer would collapse these accepted procedures (and the staff jobs) like a house of cards But we don't ask the question and if we should, nothing will be done until the Army's management climate is changed.

Power to Say No

Probably nothing frustrates a subordinate commander so much as the negative power that a staff officer or a group of staff officers in echelons above him can exercise over an operation. This is a hazard the commander faces every day. The practice is so entrenched and so well protected by the system that only the rash or the most courageous dare to challenge it.

In the usual situation, a local commander finds it desirable to do something new or different. First he determines whether or not he has the authority to do it. If he does not have this authority, he customarily writes his immediate superior, explaining what he wants to do, justifying the proposed action, and recommending how the proposal can be implemented. The correspondence is referred to the staff section having primary interest.

If what is suggested or requested is authorized or prohibited by regulation, circular, or policy, the staff officer handling the matter is relieved because he can return the communication with a firm endorsement citing the authority or prohibition. Such an endorsement properly supported by a memorandum for record causes the staff officer little difficulty. But, if the request is neither clearly authorized nor clearly prohibited by regulation, circular or policy, he has a problem on his hands.

He can take several actions. A man of strong character will support the subordinate commander and recommend approval of the suggestion. One who plays safe will salve his conscience by bucking the correspondence up to the Pentagon. One who doesn't want to be bothered will return it disapproved.

The last action is the most acceptable because it can be cleared through the staff officer's headquarters without too much difficulty. Under the conditions described, he cannot cite the prohibiting regulation or policy, so he rests his

decision on the premise that "there is no authority for the proposed action," or that it might "set a precedent." Usually all he has to do, particularly if the subordinate commander is not a general officer, is to prepare an endorsement to this effect and send it to the AG for dispatch. The magic words are typed or stamped on the correspondence and the subordinate commander's suggestion is as dead as the dodo. The matter may have been handled by a major in the G 3 section or by a captain in the AG section, but the decision is as official and binding as though it had been made by the army commander. Does the frustrated subordinate commander know whether the army commander has personally passed on it? He doesn't.

If, on the other hand, the staff officer has the courage of his convictions, he can support the commander's suggestion and prepare an endorsement authorizing the proposed action. But he would be sticking his neck out. It is not likely that he would dispatch such authority without clearing his action through the maze of staff officers above him — branch chief, section executive officer, and finally, section chief. In the restrictive atmosphere in which our staffs operate today, it is doubtful if anyone in the labyrinth would authorize something not specifically permitted by regulations, circular or policy. Someone in the staff oligarchy will surely find a way to say No.

The kindest thing an action officer can do with a bothersome suggestion is to send it to the Pentagon. There are two ways of doing this. A courageous person can try to process the correspondence for the signature of his commander — usually a formidable task. A much easier procedure is to move the letter up, for that requires only the preparation of an innocuous endorsement like, "For your consideration," and the correspondence goes to the Pentagon over the signature of an assistant AG. We might add that in this method the suggestion has also received the staff officer's kiss of death.

After a proper period of staff study in the Pentagon, the suggestion comes back to army headquarters with the conventional opening paragraph: "Not favourably considered." Once again the magic by-line. On special occasions, the second endorsement might even be signed, "For the Deputy Chief of Staff" by an acting branch chief.

Much of the difficulty stems from the fact that subordinate commanders or their staffs are unwilling to act on their own initiative. Too many ideas, suggestions and requests are sent to higher headquarters for "clearance." In many instances this is the fault of subordinate staffs who are unwilling to make a positive recommendation to their commander, preferring to pass the buck up to the next echelon. It is also the fault of the subordinate commander who habitually leans on higher headquarters. On the other hand, the management climate in the Army today does not encourage the development of commanders and staffs who will act on their own. Too many who have so acted have not been treated kindly.

It is useless to talk about positive thinking and initiative in the Army so long as the staff has the power to say No. Few imaginative suggestions from subordinate commanders can possibly weather the negative climate which exists in our staffs today. It is not that staff officers themselves lack imagination; it is merely that a negative decision is a safe one, and there is little chance that it will be questioned by the subordinate or ever reviewed by a superior. That staff officer is safe who says No.

The policy at some headquarters is that only the commander or his chief of staff has the authority to disapprove. This is a commendable attempt to stimulate a can-do atmosphere, but today's directives and regulations are loaded with so many requirements for clearing actions with superior headquarters that there is just too much correspondence for the chief of staff or commander.

Power To Supervise And Control

The power to supervise and control subordinate units is a radical departure from the basic concept of a staff's functions. History shows that the staff was created to assist the commander in planning his operations and carrying out some of his administrative duties. As it became necessary for the staff to specialize, subordinate line commanders found it useful and desirable to consult with its various specialists who offered suggestions and advice and generally assisted them in executing their tasks. Gradually, there developed a relationship in which the subordinate leader received his mission and orders from his superior, and advice and assistance from his superior's staff. Strong adherence to the principle of unit of command and the accepted concepts of delegation of authority and responsibility prohibited staff officers from supervising and controlling subordinate line commanders. Today, these principles are generally accepted in civilian enterprise; in business and industry a staff officer is essentially a specialized assistant to his superior and an *advisor* to subordinate line operators. Usually the staff officer of a superior echelon in business offers advice only when he is asked for it; the line operator is not obliged to accept his advice.

In the military, the staff officer has been given command powers under a subterfuge, perhaps, but command powers nonetheless. This concept has created in our operations an intricate maze of centralized controls and wasteful checks and duplications.

Power Through a Latticework of Subterfuge

Undoubtedly, the greatest damage to command authority is done through the fantastic latticework of technical channels that rise in the Pentagon and penetrate to the lowest elements of the military establishment. They are loaded with special instructions, directives and requirements. Through these channels, the technical services impose costly demands upon line operators and, unde accepted dogmas, pay lip service to th principles of decentralization an integrity of command. When on watches the heavy flow of traditiona control reports that travel up thes channels, from installations direct t the technical service office, he wonder who really commands the installations.

I do not mean to imply that control are no good or should not be exercise by higher echelons. Certainl commanders have the right and obligatio to supervise activities under their charge The objective, however, should be t insure exercise of control throug command channels and not through th idiosyncrasies of individual staff officers

A few months ago, Mr Chester R Davis, then an Assstant Secretary of th Army, in a lecture on financia management at the Army Comman Management School, said: "We believ that improvement of managemen effectiveness at the installation leve cannot be accomplished without radica changes in our thinking. By this, mean, we must be willing to give up some of the detailed controls which hav traditionally been exercised vertically throughout the Army organization, from the Department of the Army straigh down to the installation. In other words we must be willing to give authority t the commander commensurate with his responsibility and evaluate his effective ness primarily in terms of programme performance."

I have endeavoured to show that our staffs have become so cumbersome that higher administrative echelons resemble bureaucracies rather than military headquarters. There is virtually no chain of command, and only limited personal contact, between commander and commanded. While responsibility is severely fixed in the individual commanders at operating levels directions and orders from the staffs above rain upon them in a heavy down-pour. In this bureaucratic climate initiative is restricted, unnecessary staff

positions are created, and the resulting duplication breeds inefficiency, increased cost of operations, and dissatisfaction.

When an Assistant Secretary of the Army advises us that a "radical change in our thinking" is necessary he is implying a radical change in our way of doing things. If our administrative staffs are causing our difficulties something must be done to recast their roles. This calls for an objective appraisal of our present way of doing things and of our basic thinking.

To begin with, why are staffs so large? We like to answer that by saying that the Army is first a unique enterprise and secondly a very large one. Consequently a large staff and a massive staff organization are necessary. The nature of an army and the size of our army undoubtedly influence our organization, but they are not the basic causes of our elephantiasis.

The magnitude and power of the administrative staff stem from our military belief that a commander needs a committee to help him command. We call it a general staff, and support it with another committee which we call the special staff. Together, they furnish the persons who perform the command function which in principle belongs solely to the commander. If we accept this diagnosis of our ailment, the cure is obvious: we must delegate the power to command to qualified subordinates.

I daresay no one will quarrel with this. It would seem to be axiomatic that if "the commander holds each subordinate commander responsible for all that the subordinate unit does or fails to do," he should delegate the power to command to the subordinate. Unfortunately, in practice our regulations, policies and directives hold back much of the command power. Instead of delegating it to responsible and accountable subordinate commanders, this power is grudgingly reserved and cautiously distributed horizontally among staff members.

And so, although every military person subscribes to the principle of delegating command, in practice the principle is diluted. Accustomed to being closely supervised throughout our careers, we find it difficult to refrain from looking over a subordinate's shoulder. As years pass, the habit becomes ingrained. When we finally reach the higher echelons, we behave in the pattern in which we have developed. We are reluctant to trust local commanders who have to do the tasks. The greater the rank differential between staff and subordinate commander, the more pronounced the reluctance.

Decentralization — Forcefully Defined

There is only one way of changing this restrictive climate. The highest military authority must announce a clear and positive philosophy of decentralization. Because decentralization means different things to different people, the new philosophy of military management must be forcefully defined. This philosophy should preserve the great contributions of our military past and, at the same time, endeavour to achieve the flexibility inherent in small organizations. It should establish these definitions —

- The installation (post, depot or arsenal) is the basic element of the non-tactical military structure.
- Headquarters between installation and Pentagon exists only to make plans and to assist the installation in performing assigned tasks.
- The installation commander must have maximum authority to make decisions without reference to higher headquarters.
- Authority delegated to an installation commander will not at the same time be retained by a superior commander.
- Where review of the decisions of an installation commander is necessary, it will be accomplished personally by his immediate superior. (This will force

maximum authority down to the installation commander and will prevent retention of command and review authority by higher echelons).

- All orders, instructions and directions will be habitually issued through the chain of command.
- All regulations, policies, and directives will be governed by the principle that authority to make decisions will be placed as near as possible to where the action will occur.
- The organization at installation level will be designed solely to provide the most effective structure and greatest amount of efficiency. (The technical services concept has no place at installation level.)
- The staff and services in all echelons will have the role of developing plans and rendering assistance and advice to the commander and line elements.

If the Army accepts this philosophy, with its theme of decentralization, it can face the Interplanetary Era not only with new scientific weapons systems and advanced tactical forces, but with a progressive, dynamic management structure. In this permissive climate, we shall be able to examine and appraise dispassionately new ideas and ways of doing things. Vested interests, long established procedures, restrictive regulations and many jobs will have to go. This will require critical self-analysis.

The Jaws Of Tweedledee

Theirs not to make reply,
Theirs not to reason why,
Theirs but to command and die;
Into the valley of negation
Rode the commanders.

Staffs to right of them,
Staffs to left of them,
Staffs in front of them
Supervised and undermined;

Stormed at by AGs and clerks,
Boldly they command their works,
Into the jaws of tweedledee,
Into the mouth of tweedledum,
Rode the commanders.