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TACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE HUMAN FACTORS IN WARFARE

Major J. O. Langtry, DCM, B.Sc.,

Royal Australian Infantry

"Human nature is the one constant not transformable through the reiteration of 'doctrine.' We may find a better way to use men's powers through heavier ordeal. But we will not change cockroaches into butterflies. Our basic subject is man. All advance depends on knowing him better as a fighting animal, in the mass and under pressure, a highly sensitive, tough, yet fragile vessel, with definable limits."

—Brigadier-General S. L. A. Marshall, *US Army Reserve*.¹

INTRODUCTION

ANY experienced leader of men in battle has learned a good deal concerning human behaviour under stress. In recent wars, World War II and Korea particularly, the trained psychologist also has had opportunity to carry out studies in the battlefield. Many of the gaps in knowledge of the "definable limits" of man under pressure have been closed. The question is—have we made the best use of this knowledge? Has the full scope of application in the military field been appreciated?

The author believes that there has been unnecessary conservatism,

if not prejudice, in application of the knowledge now available. Perhaps this is due to failure in appreciating the true significance of the soldier in the battlefields of today and tomorrow. It is agreed that psychological warfare and the art of leadership have received a measure of attention. The data available from recent campaigns suggests that there are useful examples of the application of psychological truths to other aspects of the military scene—namely, minor tactics, instructional methods and the nature of weapons.

A study of these examples shows up some interesting conclusions and ideas for research. These ideas are sufficiently unexpected to warrant special attention.

Note:—All references are listed on pages 19-20

DISCUSSION

Background

Recent history has shown that the "hot" war may never eventuate in our time. Nevertheless, at this moment differences between sovereign states are being settled on battlefields by men at arms. The wars of attrition which have been continuous since Korea 1951 seem to be regarded as something less than "hot" war—a limited extension of the "cold" war process. Nonetheless, they are wars in which the tactics, particularly the minor tactics, are conventional by World War II standards. The outcome of these conflicts has not always been decisively in our favour, at least militarily. This lends emphasis to a need to examine the technique of employment of our limited manpower in battle. Perhaps more than ever before success in local engagements will depend upon successful employment of the individual soldier, especially the infantryman, and for this we need to understand his make-up.

Even considering the significance of push-button warfare, the implications of which are often grossly exaggerated, the functions and responsibilities of the infantry soldier in the front line of battle will remain unchanged in the immediate or foreseeable future. The advent of new weapons and concepts of war will place increasing stress on the individual infantryman, and will necessitate a detailed study of his psychological, physiological and spiritual make-up to ensure that he is correctly and efficiently employed. "It is only through an understanding of the elementary

truth that a fighter's day has well-defined mortal limits that we achieve that enlightened usage of him which lifts his heart and exalts his spirit." This is true whatever the nature of war, be it guerrilla or atomic.

It is perhaps natural that the detailed study of the infantryman in his particular environment has been retarded. The role of physiology in the art of man management is being given increasing attention. The study of the psychology of man has, however, been largely restricted to the needs of psychological warfare on the one hand and the improvement of leadership and the suppression of fear and panic on the other. In current study the suppression of undesirable psychological manifestations has received most emphasis, and the references quoted at the conclusion of this paper provide a sound basis, particularly for the field of leadership development, for immediate consideration and application. *However, just as it is an obvious requirement to develop means of suppressing undesirable psychological manifestations in our own troops, so it is to our distinct advantage to develop techniques for exploiting similar weaknesses in the enemy, and it is contended that, in the Australian Army, the scope of the application of psychology to the military scene has not been fully appreciated.*

To date relatively little consideration has been given to the application of psychology to military minor tactics and training. There have been some notable exceptions

in both the German and British armies; commandos, SAS type regiments and sabotage teams developed special tactics to capitalize on predicted human emotional reaction. Skorzeny (Germany) and Stirling (Great Britain) and others based many of their tactical plans for individual raids on the principle "that once real disorder is created almost anyone can get away with anything."³ Skorzeny went so far as to study in detail the extent and duration of shock effects in relation to the nature of the cause and the size and complexity of organization of the group affected. For example, in one instance Skorzeny with a handful of troops crash-landed by glider into Mussolini's mountain top prison in Northern Italy and "snatched" Mussolini from under the nose of Marshal Badoglio's troops. Skorzeny found that troops confronted with such a reverse do not recover their senses for quite a time; like an anaesthetist he tried to estimate when his patient would come round. For the Mussolini operation he counted on three minutes of chaos after the glider landed—long enough to reach the prisoner's side—and was not disappointed. Later, Skorzeny reckoned it nearer four minutes than three; "but then," he said jokingly, "three minutes is the time for good soldiers, and Mussolini's guard was very well drilled indeed."³

Much of Skorzeny's alarming success was based on his, in some cases intuitive, appreciation of the human frailties of the opposition and a clear understanding of the quality and capacity of his own troops. One of his axioms was—"Ask for volunteers for dangerous work. Pick out

the best, train them in fellowship. Then they will develop qualities that no one has ever suspected them to possess . . ."³ Skorzeny also gave special attention to his training methods and the selection of weapons most suited to the troops in the execution of their specific task. The real truth in his axiom for the purpose of this discussion is that man has qualities that "no one has ever suspected . . ." These qualities are not restricted completely to special groups of men. To some extent they are inherent in all men. Special units are remarkable more for the achievements of the group as a whole rather than extraordinary qualities inherent in the individual members. Given suitable leaders with adequate knowledge of man, develop and apply improved training techniques, adopt the right sort of weapon so that the man/weapon combination is perfect in the sense of it being a unified system with optimum fire effect, adopt a similar approach to minor tactics, then almost any unit of infantry should be capable of emulating the characteristics of special units. At the very least, ability at conventional infantry tasks would be enhanced considerably. Perhaps Field-Marshal Slim had this in mind when he remarked: "The level of initiative, individual training, and weapon skill required in, say, a commando is admirable; what is not admirable is that it should be confined to a few small units. Any well-trained infantry battalion should be able to do what a commando can do; in the Fourteenth Army they could and did."⁴ It is the unsuspected good qualities as well as the hitherto concealed frailties of the

common infantryman which must be brought into open forum discussion so that tactics, training methods and weapon selection can be reviewed realistically.

A Fundamental Principle

It will be useful background to obtain at the outset a clear picture of the reaction which can be expected in a group of men confronted with sudden danger. Glass⁵ provides a clear explanation which has merit, in that it is supported by observations in combat. Approximately 15 to 25 per cent. of persons confronted with sudden danger can be expected to respond purposefully, quite rapidly developing sustained effective activity. These are those best adjusted psychologically to develop immediate action. They are usually "too busy" to remember feeling subjective fear during the period of danger, but they may have a typical "let down" afterwards. The remainder and the majority of the groups confronted with the same immediate danger will be stunned and bewildered. There may be "instinctive" crouching and turning movements, but they will need an appreciable time to evaluate the situation. This very inhibition due to the initial fear reaction may set up a chain reaction which further delays the process of evaluation. However, in perhaps a matter of seconds, most persons will regain sufficient control to initiate some action, usually negative, towards self-preservation. It will generally take the form of flight or quick movement to a place of presumed safety. From this position, although the immediate concern is usually for self-survival, in many

persons social consciousness is re-awakened and they are capable of positive unselfish action. If the unselfish action requires movement and is associated with general movement by other members of the group, fear is diminished or dissipated. On the other hand, inaction is likely to intensify the fear reaction, thus increasing the chances of non-effective behaviour. It follows that in the military sense we must make every endeavour to capitalize on such predictable enemy reactions to sudden danger, and at the same time develop techniques which will reduce the fear reaction and/or its consequences in our own forces.

From the reaction to the situation described a fundamental principle emerges:—

In situations where the impact of danger is sudden and of personal concern, especially at the section or platoon level, an immediate action (IA) drill is infinitely preferable to a more considered plan developed from a conventional appreciation.

Psychology and Training for War

The war in Korea provides a good example for analysis. During the early stages of the "static" war, Australian troops encountered severe casualties on patrol at night when caught in ambush. Slowly a successful technique emerged which cut casualties and facilitated ultimate domination of no-man's-land to a degree perhaps higher than other allied battalions in the theatre at that time.

Initially, one specific problem was associated with "forcing" a Chinese

ambush. The scene is a rice field—a bare, flat landscape intersected by earthen embankments (paddy bunds). Almost inevitably a patrol would be caught by the Chinese as it passed near a bund. The Chinese force might number fifteen or more, armed with a preponderance of automatic weapons ("burp" guns). The Chinese in ambush along the bund or behind it would hold their fire until the range was 10-15 yards. The technique found to be most successful required the patrol immediately to turn into the enemy ambush and charge through behind the enemy to beyond grenade range. From this position, if circumstances were favourable, the enemy ambush was attacked from behind. The increased success resulting from this technique built up confidence, and in time the technique became standard policy throughout the Commonwealth Division.

Having become a standard policy, a definite "immediate action" (IA) drill was laid down and included in the syllabus of training for reinforcements at the Divisional Battle School in Japan. It was here that great difficulty was encountered in putting over this particular technique. These troops, without any experience of war, were not impressed with a technique which called for them to "walk into" a well-concealed force of, say, fifteen Chinese, all firing fully automatic weapons from a position of great tactical advantage. The IA drills for "Action front," "Action left" and so on were practised, but it was apparent that the trainees had little or no confidence in the technique, despite the reassurance of instructors who had distinguished them-

selves in the Korean war. The instructional method was at fault.

Instructors responsible for training in patrolling techniques were encouraged by the School staff to adopt a new approach:—The battle situation was to be described realistically and in detail. Then the fact of there being a natural, undisciplined reaction to run away was to be acknowledged. Usually this caused intensified interest in the squad; whereupon it was pointed out that in this case speed in getting out of the line of fire was the first essential in self-preservation. By re-examining the actual situation in theory and on the training ground, it was demonstrated geometrically that the quickest way out of trouble was to pass directly through the enemy to a position immediately behind rather than attempt to follow the natural inclination to run away or by-pass the ambush.

From this point on the change of attitude was marked. Necessary refinements to this aggressive but at first glance apparently foolhardy action were eagerly adopted. Assimilation was hastened and the required standard was achieved quicker and with less need for close supervision by forceful instructors. The method of instruction had been improved.

It was interesting to note that after the first sympathetic acknowledgment of fear, expressed as recognition of the desire to escape from the ambush being strong enough to override all other considerations in the mind of the novice, it was never mentioned again. At a very early stage the trainees adopted a tough, aggressive atti-

tude, intimating that their penchant for executing this particular manoeuvre with such gusto was a reflection of their attitude to war in general—an attitude of fearlessness in which they took pride.

The first point is established—certain training and instructional techniques, particularly those related to IA drills developed in combat as a result of experience, can be improved by an understanding of trainee attitude, in this case the over-riding self-preservation factor amongst novices to war not integrated into battle-wise combat groups. Secondly, in a sense the trainees were “conditioned” to an approved line of emotional reaction to the actual combat situation before joining their unit. Actual battle experience would still be necessary, but it is contended that the time necessary to gain the critical level of experience was foreshortened. This “conditioning” is best carried out at a battle school, because time may not permit adequate indoctrination “in the line.” Further, the commander receiving the reinforcements may not have the aptitude or knowledge to put across the particular IA drill as well as the skilled battle school instructor. It should also be remembered that the reinforcement having arrived in the line for the first time is by no means fully susceptible to a strong personality, even when speaking with the voice of experience.

Psychology and the Counter-Ambush Drill

Re-examining in more detail the actual manoeuvre as described above, it is clear that several spe-

cific psychological influences are present which influence human behaviour to our advantage and to an extent that our chances of success will always be enhanced if the same technique is applied in similar situations.

- First, the action of turning into the enemy, being concerted and involving movement, reinforces the emotion to an extent that an aggressive attitude is achieved. With training and experience the assaulting group will develop the facility to fire or bludgeon with their weapons—such action intensifies the release from fear, and the group becomes increasingly “professional” in outlook. The emotion from the outset becomes positive with respect to the tactical aim. However, had the IA drill called for withdrawal or by-passing, the activity is likely to have caused uncontrolled flight or panic. Had the IA drill called for “going to ground,” the inactivity is likely to have caused reinforcement of the fear emotion to the extent that the group would become completely non-effective in the passive sense.
- Second, the aggressive action and speed of mounting the charge generates a shock reaction in the enemy. This shock would not cause the enemy to cease the firing already begun, in fact it might cause intensification of the activity of firing as reinforcement of the panicky emotion involved in fear. However, the shock would delay the reorganization necessary to counter

the action of the ambushed once they had passed through those in ambush and had developed a threat from the rear.

Sufficient has been mentioned to show that the IA drill under discussion embodied psychological factors which strongly favoured success. Since the principles involved are simple, it is suggested that similar IA drills lend themselves to analysis along the same lines in order to evaluate their effectiveness in battle. Quite apart from this implication, it is clear that such analysis, together with realization of recruit reaction, led to an improved training and instructional technique, whereby the recruit accepted the efficacy of the IA drill on logical grounds and was therefore less dependent upon experience in actual combat. This process of psychological "conditioning" coupled with sound leadership and discipline does much to improve operational efficiency quickly, although a series of exposures will still be necessary before the shock reaction to first combat is eradicated.

Analysis of Linear Ambush Drills

A second example provides further illustration of the technique of improving minor tactics by exploiting known characteristics of human reaction to combat stress. Consider the case of the linear ambush, in particular the ambush as set in "close country" in daylight. Theoretically, in terms of causing enemy casualties, the conventional method of execution should be much more successful than is frequently found to be the case in practice. This is exemplified even today in Malaya. The general technique adopted is to

select, say, 10-15 men armed with a preponderance of automatic weapons, including at least one LMG. They are concealed alongside a track at relatively close range. The patrol commander usually stations himself near the LMG because his control over the LMG fire is generally the key to any success they may have. However, once the initial burst of LMG fire is over, the extent of overall success depends largely upon the part played by each of the other members of the team in ambush.

Those in ambush have the initiative and have the tactical advantage in that they are on ground of their own choosing; they are well concealed and may even be dug in. The enemy walking into the ambush, particularly in forward areas, might be expecting trouble at any moment but not necessarily at this particular moment more than any other. Consequently, with the first burst of fire an element of shock is achieved. Enemy reaction initially is one of confusion. They will have difficulty in orientating themselves in relation to the location and extent of the ambush. In general the immediate reaction of those actually trapped in the ambush is self-centred on taking evasive action by getting out of sight.

If the enemy has the moral fibre and is well trained and disciplined, there will be recovery from shock, after a period, leading to a return of fire and then the development of an assault against the ambush, should sufficient members still be available. This stage is a moment of concern for those in ambush. They have not annihilated the enemy caught in ambush, and the

enemy are regaining the initiative by attacking them in what is usually a disadvantageous position for defence against organized attack. The problem is to extricate the ambush party, and it is at this critical stage that casualties to the ambush party are most likely to occur.

During World War II, amongst certain Australian units in New Guinea and Bougainville, the problem of disproportionate numbers of casualties in such situations caused grave concern. Further, despite numerous ambushes set with the purpose of taking prisoners, little success was achieved. It was decided that failure was caused by neglect to capitalize fully on the shock reaction following the opening burst of fire and remaining too long in the ambush site before breaking contact. The ambush drills were varied to incorporate the principle that, where layout permitted it, the ambush party would assault the enemy immediately after the initial burst of fire from *all* weapons, "winkle out" the survivors in close combat and, should it be expedient, break clear by passing directly through the enemy and away. The whole operation, including the breakaway, could be completed in a matter of minutes, two or three at the most. This procedure was adopted and the results were most encouraging. The percentage of kills and captures rose markedly; casualties to our own troops were greatly reduced; morale improved and an unsuspected degree of aggressiveness emerged. In this enthusiastic state, seemingly impossibly large enemy parties were engaged by ambush parties of perhaps ten or less. Generally they

were able to create havoc and make their getaway unscathed.

One or two units have employed successfully a similar technique in Malaya during the Emergency. In this case the technique possesses one additional advantage, in that the speed in closing with the enemy facilitates the interception of those terrorists attempting to make good their escape, remembering that the Communist terrorist is not trained to stand and fight in situations such as the one under consideration. If caught in ambush his tactical doctrine will reinforce a natural inclination to run for it. Speed in capitalizing on the initial shock reaction achieved by tactical surprise is essential if a battalion is to be successful in the Malaya Emergency. It is interesting to note that captured and surrendered CTs also agree. They have frequently asserted, at interrogations, that security forces failed to achieve maximum success after successfully springing an ambush because they were too slow in "following up" the initial burst of fire.

The technique described owes its success to a thorough understanding of what reaction surprise would cause in well-trained troops. Surprise results in a numbing of the mind. The duration and intensity vary with each individual, but even amongst fearless men (and they do exist) there always occurs a temporary state of helplessness. It is this situation, even should it exist only momentarily, which should be turned to good purpose. Having achieved surprise, every effort must be made to prolong the state of helplessness, especially helplessness of the group as a single entity.

Should the group surprised be ably led, the leader will strive to make personal contact, regain control and suppress the persistence of helplessness by initiating the customary IA drill. He will endeavour to prompt energetic action in the positive sense, tactically. The reader's attention is directed to the account of an actual incident which occurred in Malaya during the Emergency (attached as Appendix "A"). Twenty to twenty-five Communist terrorists (CTs) set a linear ambush which was skilfully sited. The CTs had all the advantages when the security force patrol walked into the trap. The range was short and yet the CT commander allowed a fire fight to develop which ultimately caused him to withdraw precipitately, losing casualties and equipment. Undoubtedly the actions of the security force were exemplary; certainly the CT ambush was carefully planned; but, from what is known of the CTs' intention, the lesson which the account fails to bring out is that the CT ambush was shockingly executed. Had the CTs assaulted from ambush it is most likely that they would have annihilated that element of the security force caught in ambush and made good their escape before any considered action by the remaining two groups of the security force could have been developed. It is the opinion of the patrol commander that, notwithstanding the rapidity with which his security force initiated the counter-attack, the CTs still had time to assault from their ambush and break contact cleanly. The lesson is that the security force success was due very largely to failure of the CTs to capi-

talize on the shock reaction they produced.

From the above considerations it is clear that the success achieved by assaulting from ambush is to be expected. The initial burst of fire causes surprise. Before there is time for orientation and the initiation of an IA counter-attack, those caught in ambush are assaulted at close quarters. The helplessness reaction is intensified and prolonged. Panic under these circumstances is often the final outcome. Apart from these more obvious advantages associated with this technique, there remains a much less well known but even more significant advantage. The co-ordinated group activity ensures maximum effort from the ambush party. Those in ambush are actually compromised to close with the enemy and fight effectively for their lives. That such an action should be advisable is based upon data available to the effect that generally a significant percentage of men in combat will deliberately fail to fire or fire non-effectively as a matter of choice.

Deliberate Failure to Fire

There are fearless men and these are best suited to war. That such men have an uplifting influence cannot be denied, but the fact remains that there are all too few fearless soldiers—certainly there are too few to enable a force to be recruited from the unafraid type alone. Tactics, training and the design of weapons must be based upon the capacity and qualities of ordinary people. "The ordinary human being shows his bravery by overcoming his fear by the power

of his will. The individual who is thus able to retain his inner equilibrium and the unimpeded use of his powers of reason is to be counted among the brave and to be considered the equal of the unafraid. The inborn instinct of the human being not to appear cowardly, his sense of duty toward his country, and his natural feelings of comradeship with its mutual aid in times of need and danger are the usual forces that sustain him. For those persons who have limited will power, discipline and fear of punishment sometimes serve as props to keep them in line. If an actual or imagined danger suddenly arises, alarm may increase to fear, and fear to terror. *Depending on his subjective make-up, the individual who is overcome by terror becomes prey either to an incapacitation which makes him incapable of any action, or gives himself over to purely instinctive action whose objective is solely the preservation of his life.*" It is this group of people with which we are concerned here.

American research teams in World War II and the Korea War studied closely the incidence of deliberate failure to fire. It is said at least 75 per cent. of trained and experienced infantrymen fail to make use of their weapons in battle. German troops during World War II and Commonwealth troops in Korea also displayed this deplorable but characteristically human failing. It was not unusual to find that up to 40-50 per cent of the individuals in night ambushes in Korea failed to fire at all or produced ineffective fire as a result of firing their weapon in such a way that their position was not be-

trayed to the enemy by the muzzle flash of their personal weapon. The underlying reason for this apparent defection was simply active expression of the desire for self-preservation in the more psychologically inadequate individuals. It was probably more prevalent at night, because under cover of darkness there was a better chance of getting away with it. Nevertheless, even by day, the potential is present, especially in extended linear ambushes in close country.

Suppression of Undesirable Reactions to Battle Stress by Modification of Tactics

Suppression of fear and panic reactions by leadership techniques is well appreciated. But consideration should be given to means whereby the degree of personal effort by the leader is reduced or made more effective. Certain tactical arrangements can be modified to channel human behaviour under the stress of battle. This coupled with realistic training, firm discipline and good leadership, must increase operational efficiency.

Realizing the incidence of "non-shooters" liable to be present in any group, particularly the inexperienced group, it will be appreciated that it is to the leader's advantage to compromise the individual in such a way that his reaction is to produce effective fire if only as a means of self-preservation. The case of the assault from ambush demonstrates a method of compromising the individual. It is unlikely that the non-shooter will elect to stay behind. Once committed to the assault he must fight for his life. In so doing his tension

will be released and his fire will probably become effective.

The actual layout of a static position can also influence human behaviour. Any soldier who has taken part in successful attacks against even such renowned fighters as the Japanese will recollect the number of cases in which the enemy overrun were found to be cowering at the bottom of their weapon pits, firing noisily but aimlessly into the air. It would seem that after the initial cracking of the defence the assaulting force may arrive at their objective by courtesy of the enemy. It is easy to see how this defection can arise. One has only to sit in a weapon pit on a rifle range whilst small arms fire pours into the revetment and cracks overhead, to imagine the strength of character and purpose required to stand up and expose oneself. A reasonable sequence of events as effecting the defender is probably as follows:—

- Initially he is in position to fire with a fully charged magazine, and is probably determined to beat off the attack before a break-in is achieved. He is comforted by the effectiveness of his weapon and the noisiness developed as well as the stimulus of activity.
- Time comes when he must change or recharge magazines. Particularly with weapons with an action similar to the rifle, the technique requires great dexterity if the soldier is to avoid being distracted from observation of the approaching enemy. There is a tendency to take cover. Thereafter the battle of will to expose himself

again to a situation which may have changed to his disadvantage occurs; the psychologically inadequate may elect to remain at the bottom of the pit.

The question is—what can be done? The individual can be compromised by ensuring that he is not alone. Two men sharing one weapon pit are less prone to panic than one man on his own. Interdependence in the form of teamwork is most beneficial. An LMG team is less susceptible than a pair of riflemen. These factors may have much to do with the current British policy of establishing the weapon pit system in groups of four. Personal contact by the commander is always valuable. He can encourage, coerce and above all he can supply some orientation of purpose in a state of genuine chaos. There is a tendency to lose sight of this chaos in conventional organized accounts of battles.

To emphasize the need for inter-communication an extract from Brigadier-General Marshall's address "Combat Streets" is quoted²: "Later on, during the Marshalls invasion, General Arch. Arnold asked me to determine why it was that an infantry line, checked three times by enemy fire in a quite short movement, even though it took no losses, became spent and could not renew the advance. It was a puzzling phenomenon. I found certain things wrong with our tactical procedures. We were fighting through semi-jungle, much like the growth in Florida Keys. When the line went flat after being fired upon, the men could not see one another. They remained inert and fearful;

there were no devices for giving them quickly a sense of the presence of others. So group collection stagnated and the individual spirit withered. A technical solution was immediately possible. It was recommended that at the onset of any such situation it be made Standard Operational Procedure for all junior leaders to crawl along the deployed line, each calling to his men. In this way we could partly overcome the greatest enemy of the individual rifleman—individual loneliness. (Rioch⁷ provides a psychological explanation— . . . “short of complete panic, human transactions under stress include functions designed to reduce the stress, chiefly by increasing group cohesiveness. In this regard the importance of inter-personal relations and group organization can hardly be overemphasized.” Any outside action such as Marshall describes tending to restore cohesiveness assists in relieving the strain). Man is a gregarious animal. His greatest steadying force is the touch of his fellows under battle's pressure, he cannot long endure out of sight and voice contact with them. It was so in time of the Medes and Persians, it will be so in the wars of undefined dimension in a terrible tomorrow. Such marvels as radio and television do not change it. We need the touch of the hand, even as we need the conviction that we are a useful part of something larger and more important than ourselves, whenever the pressures of life put inordinate demands upon our frail persons.

Reaction to Battle Stress and the Nature of Weapons

The design of weapons for defence is another important field for examination. Research should be aimed at producing weapons which the soldier can handle with ease and confidence under battle stress and in such a manner that during the process of reloading or recharging magazines he need not be distracted from his study of the enemy's movement. In this regard the reloading mechanism of the Bren LMG and Owen machine carbine has advantages over the No. 5 rifle. For such reasons the family of small arms as a group will bear investigation. A weapon found to be adequate in training may well be far from satisfactory when the soldier is under considerable emotional stress in the heat of battle. The Germans in Italy during World War II studied this problem of designing a weapon in such a way as to nullify the tendency to “non-shooting” under stress. Their approach was rather negative in that it undermined morale. Nevertheless they were quick to recognize the problem. Apparently the incidence of “deliberate failure to fire” amongst their second-rate infantry troops was extremely prevalent. They introduced machine carbines (MP 43) with curved barrels and periscope-type sights. The idea was that since troops could not be forced to stand up and fight from their pits then perhaps they would produce effective fire while cowering at the bottom of their weapon pit by extending the curved barrel over the parapet.

It is not the intention of this article to provide a solution; it is,

however, the intention to create an awareness of the problem. It has been suggested that in addition to designing a defensive layout embodying the principles outlined above the optimum family of small arms for defence should incorporate a very much increased scale of grenades. Should the individual elect not to expose himself to fire his principal weapon, then he can comfort himself with regard to the production of noise and the stimulus of activity lobbing grenades. In this way at least his efforts would be turned to good effect, if not the best. The arguments against this suggestion are obvious, but the fact remains that study of the weapon system for defence could profit from critical examination of the human reaction of troops under battle stress in defence.

Fatigue and Recuperation

It is difficult to define man's limits under emotional stress. There is a relatively new science developing which deals with the inter-relationship of psychological and physiological processes and their effects — psychosomatic effects. Until this subject is studied more pertinently, serious under- or over-estimations of a soldier's capacity in battle will continue to occur. For instance, from a physiological standpoint one can recommend fairly precisely for the individual soldier the optimum load and rate of carrying the load. However, in practice the optimum should only relate to conditions well to the rear of the combat zone, for, as the soldier approaches the centre of combat, his capacity for physical performance drops drastically as the

psychological stress increases. General Marshall¹² interprets this phenomenon in a more serious sense. "The more heavily men are loaded the farther they move, the more susceptible they become to fear. The more intense becomes their fear, the greater becomes the impairment of their physical power." It is almost axiomatic that the physically fit are less susceptible to fear. On the other hand, the "old soldier" with battle experience comes to adopt a philosophic attitude to danger, not akin to fear, more in the nature of superstition.

Fear and fatigue are inter-dependent and reciprocal in their effects. The related subject of recuperation is also of great importance in that it has a bearing on the design of tactics. Where emotional stress has been the main contributing factor in fatigue and the stress has been of short duration, only a very brief period of rest is necessary for recuperation. A 20-minute spell at the conclusion of an attack, should the tactical situation permit it, will work wonders and pay great dividends in terms of restored confidence and increased physical capacity. Even after intense and prolonged battle stress over a period of days, 48 hours' complete rest will restore full operational efficiency. There is a definite tendency to underestimate the resilience of man. Unreal limits are set to his performance, usually as a result of a false interpretation of his apparent physical condition when in fact the state is a reflection of emotional distress rather than physiological distress. Even the briefest rest after each emotional experience will pay dividends in much the same way as a stitch in time

saves nine. On the other hand, failure to recognize the requirement for rest can prove disastrous. "... when fighting men are totally exhausted, no amount of discipline can make them dig foxholes or use average prudence. It becomes a physical impossibility. The time comes when inertia overpowers reason, and men would rather take a chance of death than make one more move."

In addition to the delay necessary for recuperation after an attack, there is another aspect which influences the employment of the same troops on successive tasks. Brigadier-General Marshall found: "It occasionally happened that with the completion of a task group organization broke down and it required a strong stimulus to initiate co-ordinated action for attaining a further objective, even though reasonable safety depended on it. It would appear that the accomplishment of the interim mission temporarily destroyed all anticipation of anything further happening." The implication is clear that any tactical plan should only require one body of troops to tackle one task. A definite period of reorganization and rest is required before full operational efficiency can be called for a second task in the same sequence of battle.

Brigadier-General Marshall is interesting on the subject of combat fatigue (emotional breakdown). "One of the most challenging military statements I know is that in World War II more than 50 per cent of our so-called combat fatigue cases failed their first time in battle, and that the majority of these were men who had just arrived and were

given no opportunity to meet their unit. Yet we still tolerate procedures which directly promote this rate of wastage, and we even call it good. The condition in Korea under rotation was the sorriest example I can call to mind. Replacements would arrive at the front-line unit and be given a battle station. For maybe six weeks or more they would belong to a company without ever seeing it, though they were part of it in combat. They knew only the men living in their own bunkers." It speaks well for 3 RAR in Korea that they did so well despite the iniquitous individual rotation scheme. Nevertheless an unnecessary burden was thrown on commanders at all levels and on individual riflemen. It may have been cheap or expedient, but it was no help to the human spirit.

National Characteristics

The reader hardly needs prompting to grasp the significance of national characteristics as determinants of individual and collective reaction under stress. It is common knowledge that some nationalities are more susceptible to panic than others. Rommel certainly appreciated this fact when disposing his German and Italian formations for the Battle of El Alamein.

Some nationalities are more suited to one phase of war than another. It is said that the English are at their best with their backs to the wall, whereas Australians are at their best in attack and exploitation. In these days of integrated forces, a commander will do well to appreciate the national characteristics of his various national units/formations with a view to ex-

exploiting their good characteristics and inhibiting their weaknesses.

Concluding Remarks

Sufficient examples have been quoted to illustrate adequately the theme of this discussion. The field has not been anything like exhausted—panic, standard of training and discipline as affecting behaviour in battle, esprit de corps, personal and group responsibility are just a few more aspects of this problem which can be examined with profit.

Human weaknesses in battle should not be placated. But a thorough evaluation of human reaction in battle can be to our distinct advantage, if we are successful in exploiting it in the enemy and inhibiting it in our own troops.

Detailed knowledge of man at war—the bad as well as the good aspects—given to the young leader uninitiated to battle, will do much to reduce his dependence on battle experience before he can attain the peak of operational efficiency as a leader.

Summary

By "conditioning" the inexperienced soldier; by developing realistic minor tactics; and by designing weapons with proper regard to the nature of human reaction to battle stress, a realistic advance can be made in the field of utilization of "man the weapon." Let us take advantage of the raw material now available for enlightened tactical research.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The author wishes to acknowledge with thanks the advice and assistance given by Squadron-Leader R. M. Waite, M.A., Dip. Psych., New Zealand Defence Scientific Corps.

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Appendix A

COUNTER AMBUSH REPORT ON A PATROL OPERATION

2 RAR—MALAYA

Extracted from Infantry Bulletin,
Vol 2 No. 7

General

On 22 June 56 a platoon of 2 RAR, on operations in the Sungei Siput Police District NW Malaya, was patrolling in the vicinity of Sungei Buloh village. The platoon

had established a patrol base in this area not far from a reservoir. During the afternoon of 22 June a Communist terrorist ambush incident occurred along a pipeline leading SW to this reservoir located on

the Sungei (river or stream) Bemban. The area of this Communist terrorist ambush was along the line of a track running between the Sungei Bemban and the pipeline.

The ambush position itself was located on steep ground in dense undergrowth overlooking the track. This position contained twenty-three prepared fire positions, 12/18 inches deep, spread over a distance of approximately 100 yards (see diagram). The track through the ambush was mined and booby-trapped and covered by automatic fire positions from the ambush. All the fire positions in the ambush were linked together with a network of rattan-vine alarm signals.

To the rear of the ambush position several large hut frames were found from which the pancho roofing had been removed. This camp site included a kitchen and a water point.

Our troops involved were:—

- (a) One patrol of 5 men (including an LMG) under command of a Corporal.
- (b) One patrol of 6 men (including an LMG) under command of a Corporal.
- (c) Platoon Commander's party, consisting of himself and two men.

Twenty-three to twenty-five Communist terrorists were involved in the incident.

For narrative purposes the patrol in sub-paragraph (a) above will be known as No 1 Patrol. The patrol in paragraph (b) as No 2 Patrol and in paragraph (c) as Platoon Commander's party.

Description of Engagement

At approximately 1445 hours on 22 June No 1 patrol and No 2 patrol met on the pipeline approximately 100 yards inside the jungle edge from the rubber in Lombong Division of Heawood Estate. That day both patrols had done sweeps from the patrol base at the reservoir to the jungle edge searching for Communist terrorist signs and likely security force ambush positions. No 1 patrol had searched in an arc to the west of the Sungei Bemban and No 2 patrol similarly to the east.

At approximately 1500 hours No 2 patrol moved off SW along the track beside the pipeline to return to the patrol base near the reservoir. Ten minutes later this patrol was ambushed.

The ambush was sprung by a land mine explosion and automatic fire from Sten and Thompson SMGs. Most of No 2 patrol (five men) were thrown to the ground by the explosion, but no fatal casualties were initially sustained from the explosion. The patrol scattered into fire positions beside the track. No 2 patrol commander was killed by automatic fire while making a dash across the track to a better fire position. Although mortally wounded the Owen gunner fired three magazines from his Owen gun at the Communist terrorists before he died. The remainder of the patrol, although unable to move because of the fire, returned the fire of the Communist terrorists. The Bren gunner, although blown over initially by the mine and blown off his feet a second time by a terrorist grenade,

kept his LMG in action and continued to rake the ambush. During this initial engagement the patrol did not see the terrorists, who were extremely well camouflaged in dense undergrowth. The fire returned by the patrol, in fact, was directed at where the terrorists' fire was coming from. The terrorists talked and shouted among themselves, and a further group was heard to come from an area north of the ambush position.

During the time No 2 patrol was being engaged, No 1 patrol and the platoon commander's group moved on the sound of firing. No 1 patrol doubled along the track from the NE and the platoon commander's party doubled down from the patrol base 400 yards away from the SW.

No 1 patrol commander moved his patrol on the track towards the sound of firing and was fired on by the flank of the terrorist ambush, approximately 50 yards NE from where No 2 patrol was in action. No 1 patrol commander and a Dyak tracker were initially pinned down by terrorist fire, but they charged the terrorist position, having sent the remainder of No 1 patrol to assault from the NE flank. Both No 1 patrol commander and the Dyak tracker were wounded. The patrol commander was hit in the arm and the tracker hit in the leg.

The flank assault, commanded by a soldier of No 1 patrol, with three men, was carried out, one man being killed in the assault. The terrorist who killed this man was seen to move towards the Sungei Bemban. He appeared to be the cut-off man and had been wounded in this engagement. The commander

of this assault group shot one terrorist in the chest at approximately 5-10 yards' range. The flank party got into fire positions above the terrorist ambush positions and poured LMG, Owen and rifle fire down into the ambush position.

At the same time the platoon commander with two men moved NE down the track and sighted a group of terrorists moving off the track headed SE. One terrorist was seen to cross the track and head towards the Sungei Bemban. The platoon commander's party was then engaged by three weapons from unseen terrorists in the ambush position, they returned the fire. After the platoon commander had hurled two grenades at where this firing was coming from, the terrorists ceased firing and moved off. Following a series of whistle blasts from the ambush position, six terrorists ran down across the track and the pipeline and ran into the undergrowth towards the Sungei Bemban. It is now known that the remainder of the terrorists vacated the ambush in a SE direction.

The platoon commander together with his two men then swept towards the Sungei Bemban, where they located and killed one terrorist and recovered one Thompson SMG.

At this stage another small patrol of six men, which had also moved from its patrol area near the reservoir, joined the platoon commander's party. The terrorists had evacuated the ambush position by this time. The platoon commander regrouped his men from all the patrols and conducted an immediate

search of the area. This search revealed the following:—

- (a) Slit trenches had been dug.
- (b) Blood trails indicated that at least two terrorists had been wounded.
- (c) A track leading SE from the ambush position.
- (d) Four terrorist packs had been dropped by the terrorists during withdrawal.

Comments

This platoon moved into the jungle in the vicinity of the pipeline at first light 21 June 56. It is not thought that they were observed prior to entering the jungle. In view of the proximity of the terrorist base to the patrol base it is probable that patrols moving inside the jungle edge on 21 June were observed by the terrorists during that day, who then made the necessary arrangements for the laying of the ambush on 22 June 56.

The area selected by the terrorists for the ambush was extremely well sited and left very little room for manoeuvre by security forces. The ambush was obviously carefully planned with the intention of allowing the whole of a security force patrol to enter the killing area before it was sprung.

Determined action on the part of the ambushed party and a quick reaction by other patrols on hearing the firing undoubtedly turned what would have been a highly successful ambush for the terrorists

into an action in which casualties were inflicted on the terrorists and weapons and ammunition captured. No losses of material or equipment were suffered by the patrols.

Total Equipment Recovered

- 1 Thompson SMG
- 1 Magazine (Thompson), damaged
- 1 Rifle Mk 3
- 63 rounds .303 ammunition
- 5 packs
- 4 booby trap mine devices (electrically operated), including roll of electric flex and torch batteries.

Lessons Learned

- (a) Inadvisability of consistent use by security forces of recognized patrol areas, even though they may be inside the jungle edge.
- (b) Requirement for careful reconnaissance of alternative tracks leading to a patrol base, avoiding where possible obvious defiles liable to successful ambush.
- (c) Maintenance of adequate spacing between men within the patrol to allow for retaliatory action in the event of leading elements being ambushed.
- (d) Even carefully planned terrorist ambushes can be negated by determination, high degree of leadership on the part of the junior commanders and willingness to fight it out even although in a tactically inferior position.

What is the true position of the Red Army today?

General Freiherr Geyr von Schweppenburg

Translated by G. M. Carrington, Esq.,

Office of the Scientific Adviser to the Military Board

THIS question can be answered from a number of different angles. Firstly, we have to consider the measure of progressive tendencies and spirit of the purely military development of the Red Army.

We have to clarify to what extent, in the field of external politics, is the Red Army likely to be an effective and willing instrument of Soviet Imperialism, which by its very nature is aggressive.

Finally, we must consider the frictionless "booting out" of Zhukov. Does the removal of this merited and, both within the Army and the nation at large, popular marshal allow us to draw any fundamental conclusions about the relationship of the regime to the Army?

The complicated nature of the three problems mentioned above requires us to give a prior, even if brief, illumination to the stage and background.

Firstly, Western observers are only too much inclined to try to interpret logical and natural occurrences in the development of the USSR in the light of their own wishful thinking. They tend too often to forget that they are not dealing here with a homogeneous nation. They are instead looking at the historical and psychological problems connected with the change and assimilation of some 150 diverse nations of different and varying histories and types into one nation.

From time to time great hopes are expressed in the West that the Red Army may have a decisive influence upon the internal politics of the USSR. These are as pointless as they were in the case of the Third Reich in the middle 30's.

Even if the artificial rivalry of the army leaders was not supported by the regime, and even if the existence of this rivalry was denied today, it is still important to re-

member that it does not matter whether the man at the head of the army is Koniev or Zhukov or somebody else, because he will always be a Communist. These men are fully aware that the Party is the bonding agent that keeps this mixture of peoples and races united.

Next to the armed forces the MVD is the only large military type organization. After the death of Beria it stepped into the background. The restrengthening of this force has given the regime a stronger position, not being dependent upon the army only.

It is also important to remember that officers junior to the marshals mentioned above know, for

From 1933-1937 General von Schweppenburg was military attache in London, where, due to his adverse comments on the adventurous external politics of Hitler's regime, he incurred the Fuhrer's displeasure. Similarly, he incurred his displeasure at various later times. From 1937-1940 von Schweppenburg was commander of the 3rd (Berlin-Brandenburg) Panzer Division. He had experience as commander of various Panzer Corps on all fronts, finally in 1944 becoming the commander of the Panzer Army Group West, which position he held till August 1944. He was then appointed inspector of Armour. After the war he was active in compiling works on the German general staff. He was called in as an adviser for the foundation of the Bundeswehr, but due to criticism of minor details became unpopular and had to relinquish this position.

all practical purposes, no other form of government than the Communist one. The junior officers and NCOs have been almost exclusively through the ranks and under the influence of the Communist youth schooling. The non-party officer, who still did exist during World War II, has now almost completely disappeared.

We shall now deal in a few short words with the technological development of the Red Army. This development tendency, continuing from previous decades, continuing today, could be described most accurately as an extremely favourable evolution in full flood. In this respect the Red Army has much to its credit, not the least of things in its favour is that, compared to some Western lines of thought, it is poor, or even completely lacking in traditions.

Secondly, the Red Army is fully aware that its importance is appreciated by the political regime. It realizes that only through the security and inviolability of the state is the achievement of the long-range aspirations of the USSR assured. The equipment of the Red Army is as good as that of any other national forces. During the period of thorough-going re-equipment following the last war, the latest technological developments have been, and still are, as fully as possible, exploited. Influence exerted by profit-greedy munitions manufacturers had as little part in that programme as the obtaining of "politically desirable" weapons or equipment, or interference by ignorant and meddling politicians. The weapons and equipment supplied are uniform and not a foreign

arms "show" with doubtful factory re-supply and spare parts conditions. But most important, the soldier has the final say in his choice of weapons, not outside economic or political interests. Hence the forces know themselves to be well equipped not only for an atomic conflict but also for so-called "conventional warfare."

We come now to the second point, namely, is the Red Army under all conditions of external politics a willing tool of its "revolutionary" masters? To this the answer is strongly in the affirmative.

However little we may expect the Soviet to start a decisive war of aggression, the basic creed of the Red Army is still the same. It is well trained and ever ready, if it is considered that such a move would be desirable, to launch an attack in support of the "forthcoming Socialist revolution."

This principle of a first class attack force in support of the revolution was brought into being originally by Tuchatchevsky, supported by Lenin. Its role can just as well be executed by just presenting a threat when the regime transfers the attack into political and economic fields, and scores victories in these fields in both Asia and Africa.

That the voice of the generals is heeded by the Kremlin in politico-military and strategic matters proves the case of Hungary beyond doubt. Politically the move was more likely than not to have a doubtful outcome. But the Red Army considered the risk well worthwhile, due to the strategic importance of the territory in question.

Finally, it is not easy to clarify the relation of the Red Army to the current regime. It has been solely due to the efforts of its soldiers that Soviet Russia has achieved the prominence in world affairs that Tzarist Russia never had, not even under such great leaders as Catherine the Great or Alexander I following the rout of Napoleon. Russia's scientists have now been acknowledged as equal to the best in the rest of the world. The fall of Zhukov was overshadowed by the rocketing into the news of Sputnik I, timed for that moment deliberately or otherwise. The Red Army knows that since the First World War it has caught up with the West technically and in some respects possibly even passed it.

The singularly monotonous fate that, since Byzantium, in Asia and in the East generally, has overtaken even distinguished political and military leaders is not as important, anyway, in the light of the fatalistic attitude of the East in which the Red Army shares, as the high opinion, regard or dread, it stands in both within the borders of its own country and without. The army knows that the state looks well after its material needs. It has no reason whatsoever, therefore, to behave in a revolutionary manner towards the internal policies of the regime, but should much rather be looked upon as having grown into and become part of the present form of government.

From the point of view of the regime it is irrelevant whether the loyalty to it of the higher ranks of the army is prompted through patriotism or through acceptance and

firm belief in its Communist principles. Further, we have to bear in mind that the part played by the army and its commanders in achieving victory has been freely acknowledged by Krushchev, in contrast to the self-praising and historical juggling of Stalin. Besides, the militaro-technical journals are enjoying an unprecedented freedom of speech and discussion.

A word finally on the relation of the military leaders towards the political commissar. The attitude of the army towards these was, in the past, not a highly favourable one. In the present adjustment we can expect a solution that should prove satisfactory to the army. But the foreshadowed replacement of the current Chief Commissar, the more politically inclined General Scheltov, by the more militarily in-

clined armour specialist General Golikov should under no circumstances be considered as a retreat of the Party from the army. General Golikov has after all been for over 40 years a member of the Party, and the move should be rather regarded as a clever psychological move by the regime. The opinion of the frontline soldier carries in this army, after all, considerable weight.

The Red Army knows itself to be well looked after by the regime, physically and mentally. Due to its fatalistic attitude, the fate of individual leaders is not going to move it into revolting against the government, and it is even less likely to be prompted to do so by the wishful thinking of Western diplomats. It knows it is appreciated, and it is content in its position.

MOBILIZATION

It is said that when the Italians attacked Abyssinia in 1935 the Emperor, Haile Selassie, issued the following call-up order:—

All men and boys able to carry a spear will go to Addis Ababa.

Every married man will bring his wife to cook for him.

Every unmarried man will bring any unmarried woman he can find to cook and wash for him.

Anyone fit for service and found at home will be hanged.

—RAAOC Information Bulletin.

GOOD and BAD ADMINISTRATION

Major G. R. Woods,

Royal Australian Army Ordnance Corps

An original article under this heading was written by Robert C. Marsh and appeared in "Phi Delta Kappa," Vol XXV, No. 4, Jan 54 (State University of New York).

As one does in music, Major Woods' composition is based "on a theme of Robert C. Marsh."—Editor.

BAD Administration has the following characteristics:—

The bad administrator feels he has absolute power which he may use as he pleases. Since he has power, he assumes his decisions are correct because he makes them and denies others the right to question them. His ego is inflated, and he desires only immature relationships in which he is spoiled, fawned upon and pampered.

A bad administrator wants timid, weak-willed co-workers whom he can dominate without difficulty. Any sign of independent thought or judgment is taken as a threat

to his authority and potential if not actual insubordination. For this reason he selects persons of only average ability who he feels cannot compete with him. In this group he will probably have one or two favourites who serve, among other functions, as agents for the discovery of insubordination among the staff, and this leads to the formation of cliques and a general atmosphere of instability and suspicion. The bad administrator is not troubled by the fact that such a policy limits his outlook to his own point of view.

A bad administrator has feelings ranging from paternalism to contempt for those with whom he deals. He accepts without further thought the idea that his power makes him superior to them and that he need not "take" anything from anybody. He never feels that his actions may cause his office to lose dignity by appearing to take on the defects of character which are his personal failings. He has no inhibitions about reprimanding his subordinates in front of their co-workers or otherwise causing them to lose face.

A bad administrator trusts no one, delegates only such duties as he cannot possibly find time to do himself, and harasses his assistants for fear that they might act on their own initiative and do something of which he would not approve. There are no policies for them to carry out, other than his individual decisions, and even routine business causes a series of crises. If charged with inefficiency he will complain that his subordinates are lazy and untrustworthy, so that he must spend a great deal of his time frustrating their evil designs.

A bad administrator takes heroism on the part of his staff for granted. He assumes their devotion to him to be such that they will do anything he asks of them, however unreasonable. On the other hand, he reserves the right to formulate policies which run contrary to their best interests. He assumes the right to try, judge and punish those who do not act as he desires. If, as a result of this, staff morale is not high, he takes this as a further sign of wickedness on their part.

A bad administrator assumes that his power is limited only by his superiors (to whom he shows respect when necessary and hostility on other occasions). He is not responsible to anyone under him or to whom his actions might apply. He makes his own policy decisions, sometimes inviting token participation from those likely to be affected, but never allowing their opinions to alter his own views greatly. He feels his subordinates are to be used as instruments for the execution of his designs.

Good Administration: The following criteria are neither original nor new, but they suggest the standards to be adopted for the evaluation of administrative procedures:

A good administrator is first of all a good man. It is impossible to combine the qualities which make for the successful performance of administrative duties with a bad character.

A good administrator wants to be a part of a strong team rather than a strong man standing alone. He selects able and creative persons as his co-workers, co-operates with them in a "give and take" relationship, and desires the efficiency and broad viewpoint that is possible when several first-rate minds are analysing a situation. He realises that any one person, however able, will be limited in both his outlook and his ability to deal with various types of problems effectively.

A good administrator has respect for all those with whom he deals. He respects them, first, because he believes in the fundamental dignity and worth of every human being, and, second, because he believes that a person should be treated with consideration, not only for what he is but for what he might become. He realises that when he acts in his official capacity it is his office and the larger institution of which it is a part that is acting as well. He will not allow either to appear in an unfavourable light.

A good administrator selects qualified assistants. He delegates as much routine to them as possible, and co-operates with them in deciding the policies which they are to carry out. He will expect them to

bring exceptional cases to his attention for discussion of the action to be taken. Normally he will assume that they are able to carry out their duties without his supervision.

A good administrator is compassionate. He does not ask others to do things he does not, or would not, do himself. He does not formulate policies which cause clear and direct injury to those under him. He does not expect persons to give of themselves beyond the normal call of duty or the services for which they are employed. He attempts to bring about a feeling of harmony between himself and his co-workers on all levels.

A good administrator never forgets that his power is delegated to him by others, and that it is his to exercise only so long as he makes use of it in the spirit and for the purposes behind its bestowal into his hands. His authority is not absolute in any sense; it is limited on every hand by the objectives he is seeking and the interests and desires of those who are affected by his actions. Consequently, in making all policy decisions he will cooperate with the persons concerned (or their representatives), determine the interests and desires of all, and attempt to formulate a policy which will combine the effective

pursuit of the objectives they have selected with the desires and interests of the majority of those concerned.

Good Administration has four great advantages:—

1. It is democratic, as procedures in a free society ought to be.
2. It is efficient because a team is at work, not just one man.
3. It leads to good morale and pleasant, mature relationships among those concerned in the administrative process.
4. It offers the greatest chance for the discovery and implementation of policies which serve the best interests of all the persons involved.

Bad administration defends itself on the basis of two faulty arguments. First, it pretends that it is more efficient than good administration, and, second, it assumes that the administrator is a superior mortal who can accomplish great things if he is excused from the responsibilities which society imposes on ordinary men, and allowed to do as he pleases. The critical examination of any authoritarian administration reveals that neither one of these claims can be justified, even though few situations are wholly bad.

THE AMF GOLD MEDAL AND AACS PRIZE ESSAY

Rules

Title

The competition is titled the "AMF Gold Medal and AACS Prize Essay."

Eligibility to Compete

All ranks on the Active and Reserve Lists of the Australian Military Forces.

Subject

A separate subject shall be set annually for each section by the Chief of the General Staff, and promulgated in AAOs.

Sections

There shall be two sections.

- (a) Junior — Members up to and including substantive captains.
- (b) Senior—Substantive majors and above.

Prizes

- (a) For the best essay in each section—£25. In the case of two or more essays of equal merit this prize money may be shared.

- (b) For the better of the two section winning essays—provided it is of a sufficiently high standard—the AMF Gold Medal and a further £50, making in all the AMF Gold Medal and £75.

Submission of Essays

- (a) Essays will be typewritten and submitted in quadruplicate. Units will co-operate with competitors and arrange for essays to be typed, if this assistance is requested.
- (b) Essays may be of any length. It is not desired to define the length limits, but as an indication they should be between 3000-5000 words.
- (c) Authorship will be strictly anonymous. Each competitor will adopt a motto and enclose with his essay a sealed envelope, with the motto and section identification typewritten on the outside, and his name and address inside.

- (d) The title and page number of any published or unpublished work to which reference is made in the essay, or from which extracts are made, must be quoted.
- (e) The essays will be addressed to the Secretary, Military Board, Victoria Barracks, Melbourne, S.C.I, the envelope being marked "AMF Gold Medal and AACS Prize Essay."

Judging

- (a) Essays will be judged by at least three referees appointed by the Chief of the General Staff.
- (b) The decision of the referees will be final. They are empowered not to award the AMF Gold Medal and the AACS prize of £50 if, in their opinion, no essay submitted comes up to a sufficiently high standard of excellence.

Promulgation of Result

The results of the competition will be promulgated in AAOs. Additionally, the AMF Gold Medal and AACS Prize Essay will be published and distributed.

Subject for 1958

The subjects set for 1958 are as follows:—

Senior Section

Sir William Slim ("Defeat Into Victory") makes the following statement about the soldiers' role in battle:

"There comes a moment in every battle against a stubborn enemy

when the result hangs in the balance. Then the general, however skilful and far-sighted he may have been, must hand over to his soldiers, to the men in the ranks and to their officers, and leave them to complete what he has begun. The issue then rests with them, on their courage, their hardihood, their refusal to be beaten either by the cruel hazards of nature or by the fierce strength of their human energy."

Leadership has been defined as the art of influencing and directing men to an assigned goal in such a way as to obtain their obedience, confidence, respect and loyal co-operation. In the military sphere the mastery of this art is essential, because the one instrument of war on which the ultimate success of all battles depends is the man. Recognizing the paramount importance of leadership training in the preparation of an army for battle, discuss the problem of such training in the Australian Military Forces.

Junior Section

Recent developments in long-range transport aircraft have made possible a degree of flexibility in strategic deployment of ground forces not previously attainable.

Having regard to the possible employment of an Australian infantry brigade at short notice in a tropical theatre, discuss the means by which we can take full advantage of the flexibility which these developments bestow.

Closing Date

Essays must reach the Secretary, Military Board, by 30 Jun 58.

JUNGLE TRAINING SCHOOL FOR CMF

Warrant-Officer J. G. Littlewood,
8/7 Infantry Battalion, CMF

WITH the changeover from higher to tropical establishment a new and vital problem has arisen—the need for complete CMF units to attend a jungle training school. The situation now is that all CMF units train for jungle warfare but:

- (a) Individual officers and NCOs only receive jungle warfare training at the JTC, Canungra.
- (b) Only units close to the JTC can hold their annual camps in that area.
- (c) Most CMF units have no experience of jungle training, although individuals may have.

It is realised that the present JTC cannot possibly handle every member of the CMF, either individually or by units. Therefore to have all members trained in jungle warfare it becomes necessary to look elsewhere, and where better than in our own Commands. Commands could establish jungle training schools where CMF units could carry out their annual camps and gain experience in rain forest areas.

Setting About It

Let us first consider the problem of how to commence "setting about it." What are the main points to be considered? I visualize three. They are:—

- (a) Ground.
- (b) Construction of training and administration areas.
- (c) Administration staff of the school.

Ground

The selection of a suitable site will be by far the biggest problem to solve. What must this site contain? As stated in the introduction, we are looking for an area of rain forest, which must be hilly, with growth close enough to form a canopy overhead. The foliage must indicate primary and secondary jungle. We must have swamps of a mangrove nature with a river close by, and the area must be uninhabited to allow field firing and range practices to be carried out. It must be accessible by road and have a railhead within ten miles.

To obtain all this we must first make an extensive study of Victoria by maps and air photographs. After this has been done, then all prospective sites will be subjected to a searching reconnaissance until the right site has been selected. Two possible sites come to mind:—

- (a) Beech Forest (near Colac).
- (b) Forest (Wilson's Promontory).

Construction

The first CMF unit on the site would be the Army Engineer Regiment. They would carry out their normal functions of roadmaking, erection of administration buildings, ablutions, cookhouses, latrines and levelling of tent lines. Next would follow

the Infantry units, one every three weeks. Victorian units would hold their annual camps in rotation. The first unit in would erect the tents, then carry on with normal battalion jungle training in the area, while the QM and Assault Pioneer Platoons would commence the preparation of field firing ranges, assault, confidence, muscle toughening and various other courses that are necessary. This work would be carried on by successive units.

Staff

The administration and training staff for such a school could, I feel, be limited. A suggested establishment of Cadre Pool personnel would be as follows:—

Camp Commandant	Major
QM	Captain
RQMS	WO2
Training Supervisors (2)	WO2
Orderly Room	S Sgt
Battle Simulation	Sgt (Engrs)
Cook	Sgt
Driver Mechanic	Cpl
General Duties (4)	Ptes.

If the staff is selected at an early stage, it can carry out the search for the most likely piece of ground, plan the layout of the school and supervise the erection of buildings and the preparation of the ranges.

Once these problems have been overcome the others can be solved in a sequence that would allow normal training to go on and the completion of the school to be achieved.

Training

To fully appreciate the training aspect of this school we must first deal with the duties of the staff:

Camp Commandant would be re-

sponsible direct to the Director of Military Training for the co-ordination of all types of training held at the school. He would be available to unit commanders for advice and any other matters appertaining to the training of the CMF unit.

QM and RQMS. The functions of these personnel would be the same as for any other school.

Training Supervisors would be responsible for drawing up the training syllabus to cover unit training and assisting units on their reconnaissance of the area prior to their movement into camp.

Orderly Room Sergeant. His duties would include all those normally handled by him, pay representative for the staff and assistant to the RQMS.

Battle Simulation Sergeant. This soldier must have a sound knowledge of this subject and must be authorized to carry out battle simulation sound effects. When not engaged on exercises he will be responsible for the maintenance of the firing ranges, targets and the courses.

Cook. Would be responsible for meals for the staff, and when CMF units are in camp he must supervise and aid the unit WO Caterer.

Driver. The duties of this soldier would include minor mechanical repairs.

General Duties (4). Two would be attached to the QM as storemen and two to the battle simulation sergeant to aid in the maintenance of the ranges and courses, etc.

Each CMF Unit has a number of personnel who have completed courses at the JTC Canungra. These members would be invaluable in the training of their sub-units under the guidance of the training supervisors. After a period of eighteen months the school should be ready to commence officer and NCO instructional training, and thus increase the efficiency of instruction within units.

Finance

Now we arrive at the problem that seems to worry everyone in all walks of life—money. This school would bring about the saving of large amounts of public moneys. I visualize this large-

scale saving being brought about by:

Advance Parties. Whether or not units will admit it, they do take quite a large advance party to camp. This party moves in to the camp site up to a week before the main body marches in and immediately commences the movement of stores from the Base Ordnance Depot and the erection of tents. At the CMF JTC the advance party would come in two days before the main body, the size of the advance party would be limited to four. As stated in an earlier paragraph, the tents at the CMF JTC would already have been permanently erected, thereby saving two days' work for an Infantry Battalion.

Camp Administration. Training at the present type annual camp rarely commences until after the second day of the march-in of the main body, due to the problem of transport of stores and the erection of accommodation. At the school it would be possible to have the administration completed two hours after the march-in.

Petrol and Stores. Under the system which exists in the Puckapunyal/Seymour area the cost of moving stores and equipment from BOD to the camp site is astronomical; each unit in camp has a large fleet of up to twenty vehicles moving backward and forward from early morning until late at night. Most of these vehicles are old WD types, and the petrol consumption ranges from two to six miles per gallon. This arrangement goes on for six days prior to camp and three days after.

The CMF JTC would hold stores on the site to equip an infantry

battalion, and issues could be made by the QM of the unit in occupation. Certainly the "Q" staff would have to remain behind to complete a stocktake of the stores, but this would take no more than three days as against seven under the present system.

In the Scrub Hill area suitable training localities are quite a distance from the camp, and when troops are there the field transport must go out several times a day; a vehicle can average 150 miles a day on these trips. At the CMF JTC all training areas would be within marching distance of the school, and the only transport used would be the jeep and trailer. These vehicles have an average petrol consumption of 14-16 miles per gallon.

Air and Rail Travel. Air and rail fares to the JTC at Canungra would be eliminated entirely. The cost of sending one man by air to Canungra is £40/8/-, so that saving in itself would become substantial. At the CMF JTC the cost in the initial stages would be high, but, as it can be seen, the saving over a period of time would more than justify its existence. Readers will be able to bring to mind other examples that would result in the saving of further moneys, but, remember above all, the AIM must be to save money and save time by all means, but the standard of training must be high and parallel to the contemplated role of the Unit in battle.

Most of all, the real saving in time of war is the number of lives that would be saved by undergoing realistic training in time of peace instead of training in simulated conditions. How many times have you

heard an Instructor say, "Imagine that this is jungle country . . ." Unless you have been in jungle you could not possibly IMAGINE what it is like.

Rations

Much has been said for and against the Mainland ration scale, and I agree that it is satisfactory for troops who are not carrying out extensive and exhaustive training. Special consideration will have to be given to the diet of the troops whilst they are in the school. Tactics have changed since the days of the Napoleonic wars, but an Army still marches on its stomach.

Co-operation

A complete exchange of views and information between the JTC at Canungra and the CMF JTC would result in the highest class of instruction being available. Much experimental work could be carried out by the CMF school and reports submitted to the JTC for confirmation.

Comments of Personnel

A series of comments on the subject under discussion are appended as an indication of the thoughts of a reasonable cross-section of the personnel who in time of war will have to DO the job.

QM

"From the point of view of a Quartermaster I would say that the saving of time and labour would more than repay the cost of establishing such a school. Even if the unit had to move into a virgin site, as long as the stores were at the railhead the saving would still be great."

Senior NCO

"From my point of view such a proposal would result in a very high degree of interest being shown in this form of training, and indeed the instructors would have little difficulty in maintaining that interest. When the troops have complete interest in their training then the result of the camp is a foregone conclusion."

Private

"As a private soldier I would say, without doubt, that this type of camp would suit me better than the normal annual camp, because not only would the training be novel and new but would also give me an insight into the conditions that I could expect to experience in jungle warfare."

CMF personnel to whom I have spoken are all for the scheme. Who will start the wheel turning?

COMPETITION FOR AUTHORS
Award of Annual Prize, 1956-57

The Board of Review has awarded equal first and second places in the annual competition for the prize of £40 to Lieutenant-Colonel A. Green, Royal Australian Army Service Corps, for the following articles:—

Contre L'Armee de Metier, AAJ 94 — Mar 57.

Military Air Transport — Everybody's Darling, Nobody's Baby, AAJ 96 — May 57.

MONTHLY AWARD

The £5 for the best original article in the January issue has by Lieutenant W. R. G. Fleming, Royal Australian Artillery. the mass and under pressure, a highly sensitive, tough, yet fragile

COMMUNIST CHINA

A NEW MILITARY POWER

Staff-Sergeant P. G. Gittins,
20 National Service Training Battalion

ALTHOUGH it may have been true some twenty or thirty years ago to say that the Chinese were pacifists, it is more than evident today that such a statement hardly fits the facts.

During the last two decades, the Chinese have been engaged in two major wars, internal insurrection, civil war and participation in a war of aggression in Korea, a period in which it may be said that their martial spirit, never dead at any time, has been rejuvenated. Peking, echoing the all too familiar catch phrases and clichés of Moscow, has given calls to arms in "defence of the Fatherland" and has stirred the masses with visions and dreams of China's vast potential and latent strength transformed into dynamic political and military energy.

That the Western World regards China as a great Power is a measure of the change that has taken place in China. The rule by the selected few, with wealth and wisdom (or Oriental shrewdness), has

gone—the image of the inscrutable Chinese, too wise and civilized for war has passed—China today is ruled by men of peasant stock, patient men, men who have shown on the battlefield that they know how to fight and that they will fight.

We have learnt, at great cost of men and materiel in Korea, that the organized military strength of China is a force to be reckoned with. Fifty years ago, about the time of the Boxer Rebellion, when the Chinese were most anxious to rid themselves of the "foreign devils" on their soil, the Western World spoke of the "Yellow Peril." Are we today beginning to witness the transmutation of this old bogey into fact? Will China's vast manpower be harnessed and controlled, either by Communism or Nationalism, or, which is more than likely, by a blend of the two, to a militaristic purpose.

This is a question the answer to which can only be conjecture or as-

sumption. It cannot be answered positively or precisely, but in making our conjectures and assumptions we have far more first-hand experience of Chinese combat efficiency and potential than we had some twenty years ago.

Assessing China as a military power, the first governing factor is that of its major weakness—shortage of materiel. One of the lessons learnt from the Korean War is that jet planes, armour and manpower do not constitute beginning and end of military strength. Warfare today, more than ever before, is a matter of economics. It is vitally affected by a nation's industrial strength, development, and scientific and technical knowledge.

A nation must have big factories and heavy industries capable of turning out and maintaining a constant flow of war materiel to the fighting men. Herein lies China's weakness—she is lacking in big factories and heavy industries. We saw in Korea that the farther south of the Yalu the Chinese advanced the more difficult it was for them to supply themselves. It is fairly safe to assume, therefore, that the old "Yellow Peril" bogey will not and cannot exist until China is organized, developed and industrialized—a process that may require not years but decades.

What has China done to overcome this major weakness? How is she combating this lack of industrial development and inadequate supplies of "ready-to-use" war materiel? The Communists have organized an administrative and military control centre in Peking; it is the heart or nerve centre of their

overall industrial and military development plan. There is the strongest control that any Chinese Government has had over many decades. It is the first basic step in acquiring military strength and efficiency.

The Chinese education system has been given a thorough overhaul—more and more opportunities exist for the teaching and training of technicians and scientists, a vital necessity if a nation is to keep abreast of the advances in atomic and nuclear power and modern weapon development. Chinese youth is being given the opportunity, through Russian technicians, of learning of the marvels of the nuclear and space-travel age. This youth will form the nucleus of Chinese scientific and industrial research groups.

With the aid of Russian "advisers" and Russian raw material, some limited industrial development has started. Over the last ten years her railways and road systems have improved considerably, and she has proved her ability to move thousands of troops from the extreme limits of her vast land mass to Korea.

Modern implements of war—jet planes, tanks, artillery, and some reports even mention submarines—have been supplied by Russia to the Chinese forces, and they, the Chinese, have clearly demonstrated their ability to use them, and to use them successfully.

Russian "advisers," both military and civil, are established in many parts of China, teaching and training the Chinese armies. There are said to be Russian promises of suffi-

cient equipment for 1,000,000 Chinese—a result of the Sino-Russian Treaty of Friendship—and such an equipped force would constitute a threat of tremendous importance in South-East Asia. Re-equipping and reorganising administratively and tactically the whole Chinese army after the Soviet pattern would constitute a threat to Russia itself, inasmuch as it could establish China as almost independent of Russia. In view of this, it may well be that Russia will limit her economic and military aid to an absolute working minimum, and increase her number of military, economic and political “advisers,” thus maintaining some form of control.

What of the Chinese soldier himself? It is well to remember that the Chinese soldier, born in a land of conflict where human life is nothing but a cheap commodity, is fatalistic, having little regard for human life. He is similar to the Japanese soldier of World War 2, only less effective: His strong sense of blind obedience, which makes him attempt any mission, no matter how few his chances of surviving, is a formidable combat quality, but it seems to be coupled with a lack of individual initiative—and again, like the Japanese, a sometimes blind adherence to orders.

There probably exists no better description of the Chinese fighting man than the one penned by a Major Magruder some twenty years ago:—

“The Chinese soldier is the most docile material from which to build a disciplined unit. He will stand an indefinite amount of hardship and discomfort without grumbling. He can march tremendous dis-

tances on footwear that would ruin a Western soldier in the first mile. Whereas our own soldiers wear themselves out nervously during rests and while engaged in duties which to them seem useless, the Chinese soldier recuperates as soon as physical exertion ceases. He cares little where he is or how long he stays, provided he has the bare necessities of food and clothing. He does not worry about the difficulties or shortcomings of the hierarchy of command, from the Squad Leader to the President . . .”

Detailed battle maps and voluminous written orders are not the norm in the Chinese Army. Most of its soldiers are illiterate or barely literate, hence most of the instructions must be verbal. The Chinese soldier has a retentive memory and a good sense for terrain; he can, and does, follow his orders literally.

This illiteracy is being overcome by educational classes organized and run by Political Officers—yet another Russian feature adopted by the Chinese.

Their will to fight has been proved, beyond any shadow of doubt, on the battlefields of Korea. Communism aside, it would possibly be a mistake to discount too much the emotional or ideological motive in assessing this will to fight. In the past there has been relatively little sense of personal loyalty on the part of the Chinese soldier to great leaders or high causes. Being of a mercenary nature, they would often fight for the general or leader who could offer the most tangible rewards. Induced feelings of hatred have been especially effective in stimulating

the Chinese soldier's fighting spirit, and the Communists have made the most of this, the Chinese soldier's credulity making him a pliable instrument. To quote a United States battlefield report:

"In general, Chinese soldiers have a very low standard of education, lack of ability in discerning the truth, and are easily misled through false propaganda—factors which the Communists have exploited to the utmost."

Like other soldiers, he is bound by discipline, though for him it is a discipline more rigorous, more harsh, more blind than most—its basic components being the hope of reward and the fear of punishment. However, no matter what its components, it is an effective discipline, and no one can doubt the battlefield courage and combat persistency of the Chinese.

At the time of writing the Chinese Communists are seeking a new way of getting along with other countries—they are seeking a way of getting what they want from Asian countries without risking an actual "shooting war." They want trade with the free world, they want a chance to industrialize, and,

above all, they want a way to consolidate their present position and to increase their influence in Asia. Their long-range programme, the movement to bring all people in the world under one all-powerful central authority, has not been changed. They are simply using another means of achieving their object—control of Asia.

The current "soft" line is an admission that their open bullying tactics of the past have not quite paid the dividends that they expected.

Nationalism is the greatest problem confronting the Chinese Communist regime today. Nationalism, the pride of a people in their heritage, their passionate desire to live their own lives in their own way, their determination to be independent, is one of the greatest assets on the side of Free Asia. However, by posing as a champion of the Nationalist Movement, the Communists can sometimes gain important advantages, as they did in Viet Nam; but in the end the strong, fervent nationalism of a subject people will break the Communist Empire into fragments. Already the stress and strain are evident.

BOOK REVIEWS

**THE JAPANESE THRUST, by
Lionel Wigmore (Australian War
Memorial, Canberra).**

THE JAPANESE THRUST is Volume IV of the Army Series of the History of Australia in the War of 1939-1945. The author is Lionel Wigmore, who deals with the strategical and tactical aspects of the Japanese invasion of South-East Asia, while A. J. Sweeting contributes an account of the experiences of the Australians as prisoners of war of the Japanese.

Mr. Wigmore's descriptions of the attacks on Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, Hong Kong and New Ireland all reveal that from the very beginning the strength and ability of the Japanese were very **much** underrated. In Malaya there was a lack of decision and hesitant deployment of the defending forces who, on the landing of the Japanese, had to occupy defensive positions while the enemy imposed a vigorous war of movement that ended in the capitulation of Malaya and Singapore.

On the Island of Singapore an attitude of apathy, and differences between the military command and civilian control in no way contributed to an efficient defence of the island. Finally, the fall of Singapore was hastened by the imminent failure of the water supply.

The controversy of General Bennett's escape is discussed at some length in an appendix, which states that although the Commission of Enquiry found that General Bennett was inspired by the highest of motives in escaping, he did not have the permission of any competent authority and therefore should have remained. A comprehensive examination of the legal aspects of the escape are summarized, and the conclusions of an eminent military lawyer are that as the surrender took place at 2030 hours on 15th February (which is at variance with the finding of the Royal Commission) General Percival and his forces at that hour became prisoners of war, and as such were individually entitled to escape. He considers that under Australian military law General Bennett was not placed under an inflexible obligation to remain on Singapore Island,

and was therefore legally entitled to leave.

The invasions of Hong Kong, Rabaul, Kavieng, Ambon and Timor are narrated in detail, and fundamentally show that ruthless forces possessing the initiative had overwhelming success against small garrisons whose main role was to delay and impede the enemy. Relating to Ambon in particular, the historian is of the opinion that the determined resistance there held up a Japanese Division for at least two weeks, and that, as a result, the invaders prepared to take Timor instead of proceeding to Darwin.

Australia's refusal to allow the 7th Australian Division to be diverted to Burma is dealt with at some length.

1 Australian Corps was destined for the Netherlands East Indies, and an advance party had already reached Batavia, but, with the increased tempo of the invasion and the capture of adjacent islands, the situation changed abruptly, and both General Wavell and General Lavarack agreed that its diversion from Java was necessary.

Mr. Curtin, the Prime Minister, acting on the advice of the Australian CGS, cabled Mr. Churchill asking that 6th, 7th and 9th Australian Divisions should be returned to Australia, stating that Australia was now the main base and that its security must be maintained. General Wavell to some extent supported this contention, but recommended to Mr. Churchill that one Australian Division should be sent to Burma to defend Rangoon, keep the Burma Road open and to retain China in the War.

From that moment controversy developed, and Mr. Churchill informed President Roosevelt that the Australian Government refused "point blank" to allow 7th Australian Division to go to Burma's aid.

Despite considerable pressure Mr. Curtin maintained that 7th Australian Division must be returned to Australia, and most reluctantly Mr. Churchill agreed to this course.

As the 7th Australian Division convoy had not been "tactically" loaded in the Middle East, it is extremely doubtful if a Brigade of that Division would have been landed in Burma in time for a successful counter-attack, and even had the counter-offensive been successful it is doubtful whether the success could have been maintained in view of the increased Japanese air power and naval control in the eastern part of the Bay of Bengal.

It is now evident that 7th Australian Division could only have arrived in Burma in time for a long retreat back to India, which would have made it impossible for them to have been sent to New Guinea in time to defeat the Japanese in July, 1942. The historian considers that the Allied cause was well served by the solid persistence of General Sturdee and the tenacity of Mr. Curtin.

In their invasion of South-East Asia, the Japanese commanders proved themselves able to conceive and carry out a plan of great magnitude. In all spheres they were possessed of great courage and applied their tactical skill with more vigour and initiative than their opponents.

In five months they conquered the Far Eastern colonies of Britain,

United States and Holland with a population of 100,000,000, damaged the main United States fleet, and sank nearly every British, American or Dutch ship in East Indian seas or the western Pacific. 250,000 troops surrendered to them, and their own casualties only amounted to 15,000 killed and wounded.

South-East Asia was under Japanese control, and to the south, within range of their aircraft, lay Australia.

The trials of 21,000 Australian prisoners of war are described by A. J. Sweeting, who covers all areas where the Australians were held.

The story is one of sadistic brutality, starvation, beatings, neglect, floggings and executions.

On the notorious Burma railway men worked, sweated and died under intolerable conditions, where sick men were forced to labour in shifts of twenty-four hours, and where, in building one cutting, sixty-eight men were beaten to death. In the construction of a bridge thirty-one men were killed in falls and twenty-nine died through beating.

The horror of the forced march of 500 Australians from Sandakan, where only one hundred and forty-two reached their destination after terrible privations is vividly described. Of those who arrived at the journey's end many more died and the remainder were massacred. Only six survived the terrible march.

While the atrocities of the Japanese have been dealt with in an objective manner, one cannot but feel

an overwhelming revulsion to actions for which there can be no moral justification.

"The Japanese Thrust" is a detailed account of the invasion of South-East Asia, which places many important events of Australia's part in the War in their right perspective. From the point of view of the Australian Army it is, perhaps, the most important historical work yet produced. Although overburdened with detail and defective as a military narrative, many extremely important lessons can be learnt from its perusal, lessons which should be constantly in our minds today. It should certainly be read by every Australian officer.

—Lieutenant-Colonel S. A. Embling

AUSTRALIA IN WORLD AFFAIRS, Edited by Gordon Greenwood and Norman Harper. (Published by F. W. Cheshire, Melbourne, for the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1957.)

The front flap of this book bears the following synopsis:

"An authoritative survey of Australia's actions and commitments in world affairs, it is the collective work of nine outstanding scholars. They spotlight what happened, discuss the background and explain what Australia's policy was; and they draw valuable conclusions from the continual shifts of viewpoint and friendship, of trade relations and military ties."

This necessarily brief outline does a considerable injustice to a collection of expert opinions. Contributors include Fred Alexander, Gordon Greenwood, Geoffrey Sawyer, Wilfred Prest, Norman Harper, C. P. Fitzgerald, N. G. Neale, R. B. Joyce and Dr. John Andrews. One might reasonably have expected a contribution from Professor W. Macmahon Ball, whose intimate knowledge of Asian affairs qualifies him to comment on Australia's currently pursued policies and their effects on nations in this vital area.

The reviewer was particularly impressed by Greenwood's chapter on the Commonwealth. To an advocate of the Commonwealth cause, this chapter not only makes pleasant reading but offers valid reasons for the view that this Commonwealth of Nations provided the model for the conduct of relations between widely differing nation states.

Geoffrey Sawyer has treated key issues in which Australia has

figured in an absorbing chapter dealing with the United Nations. From detailed analyses of these issues, Sawyer makes a succinct observation:

"The broad difference between the Evatt approach to the United Nations, on the one hand, and the Spender-Casey-Menzies approach on the other, is that the former hoped for and believed in the United Nations, whilst the latter only hope for it."

Although the several essayists overlap, to some extent, in the treatment of various aspects of Australian attitudes to world affairs, such repetition is never monotonous, the contrary interpretations clarifying rather than confusing the issues.

This is a book which should be read by all thinking Australians. It is particularly suited to officers studying for promotion, and in fact to all students of national and international affairs.

—WO J. E. C. Carter, AAEC.

ARTICLES PUBLISHED OVERSEAS

ARTICLES PUBLISHED OVERSEAS

The undermentioned articles, published originally in the Australian Army Journal, were reprinted in service journals overseas during the year 1957.

Article	Author	Journal in Which Reprinted
Army Officer—Mercenary or Missionary	Lt-Col A. Green	Military Review, USA
Army Officer—Mercenary or Missionary	Lt-Col A. Green	An Cosantor, Eire
A New Look for an Infantry Division	Major A. L. Blake	Military Digest, India
Atomic Weapons—10 to 500 KT Airburst	Major E. U. Gooch	Military Digest, India
Base for Airborne Penetration	Commander R. A. H. Millar	Military Review, USA
Comparison of Two Failures	Major J. A. Munro	Military Digest, India
Contre L'Armee de Metier	Lt-Col A. Green	Military Review, USA
Future of Anti-Aircraft Artillery	Major R. J. Salmon	Military Review, USA
Guerrilla Warfare	Major C. H. A. East	Military Review, USA
Guerrilla Warfare	Major C. H. A. East	Military Digest, India
Logistics are Logistic	Lt-Col A. Green	An Cosantor, Eire
Maintenance — Yesterday and Tomorrow	Major J. A. Munro	Military Review, USA
Order or Anarchy under the Atomic Umbrella	Lt-Col A. Green	Military Review, USA
Purple Testament	Maj-Gen A. G. Wilson	Military Review, USA
RAPs and Olympics	Capt H. Longdon	An Cosantor, Eire
Tactics and Atomics	Brig M. F. Brogan	Military Review, USA
Water Supply in Nuclear, Bacterial and Chemical Warfare	Lt F. B. K. Ley	Journal of the ASC, India