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Australian Army History Unit

016000y 2004

AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL



NO. 105
FEBRUARY
1958

Notified in AAOs for 28th February, 1958

MILITARY BOARD

Army Headquarters
Melbourne

1/2/58

Issued by Command of the Military Board

John Knight

Distribution:

The Journal is issued through RAAOC Stationery
Depots on the scale of One per Officer, Officer
of Cadets, and Cadet Under Officer.

AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

A Periodical Review of Military Literature

Number 105

February, 1958

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VICTORIA BARRACKS, MELBOURNE

AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

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The AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL is printed and published for the Directorate of Military Training by Wilke & Co. Ltd. The contents are derived from various acknowledged official and unofficial sources, and do not necessarily represent General Staff Policy.

Contributions, which should be addressed to the Director of Military Training, Army Headquarters, Melbourne, are invited from all ranks of the Army, Cadet Corps and Reserve of Officers. £5 will be paid to the author of the best article published each month, and £40 to the author of the best article published during the year.

SHOULD ARMY EQUIPMENT BE MADE IN AUSTRALIA

Lieutenant-Colonel D. R. O. Cowey

Royal Australian Artillery

A QUESTION which is frequently in the minds of those concerned with the provision of the equipment for our forces is the extent to which it is both possible and desirable to rely on Australian sources of supply. Some items required by the Army include equipments of completely new design and use, involving changes in tactical doctrine or techniques. At the other extreme are commercial type replacement items the use of which is clearly established, but in which variations of detailed design have occurred, for reasons not of any fundamental nature; for example by reason of a change in the organization or facilities of the original manufacturer.

Information about the necessity to procure a new pattern of equipment may come from any of the following sources:—

- (a) Our own procurement organization, which may report that:—
 - (i) the original supplier is no longer able to supply the item concerned;
 - (ii) suppliers are offering an item claimed to be superior to that currently in use.

- (b) Military missions, or officers overseas on visits or training who report that new techniques or improved equipments are superior to those currently in use in Australia.
- (c) Official advice from Allied Governments that organizational or other changes are considered desirable in their own armies, resulting in changes in material.
- (d) Reports from our own schools and formations that existing equipment is inadequate.

It may be clear that the new equipment is so obviously an improvement that the only reasonable course is to adopt it as soon as it is economically possible to do so. In such a case the decision as to whether overseas or local procurement should be undertaken is made on the following factors:—

- (a) Whether production data and process specifications can be made available to Australia.
- (b) Whether facilities exist or can be built for local manufacture and whether the locally made item can be fully standardized with the overseas item.
- (c) The relative delivery timings.

- (d) The availability of local and overseas funds.
- (e) The relative economics of local and overseas procurement.
- (f) The probability of further procurement at a later date.

The question of the availability of production data from overseas is one involving a clear-cut answer, which can usually be resolved in a comparatively short time. Australia has developed over the years since Federation, and particularly since the outbreak of World War I, a well-tried system of obtaining production data for items of military equipment of United Kingdom design. The possibility of obtaining the agreement of the United States to a similar system is being examined. The provision of process specifications, or advice on manufacturing technique, is not always so readily available as the design data, but this is due usually to the difficulties in communication involved, rather than any reluctance on the part of the people concerned to make them available. It can be accepted in general that if the design data is made available the necessary process specifications or advice on manufacturing technique will be forthcoming. It may, however, become our responsibility in any particular case to seek the necessary information by arranging visits by representatives of our own manufacturing agency to the original production agency overseas.

The remaining factors affecting the decision to undertake local or overseas procurement are not so clear cut, and decisions involve the use of judgement based on previous experience with the type and source of the equipment concerned. It may be necessary in some cases for the

Departments of Supply or Defence Production to undertake some preliminary expenditure before the necessary information about some of the factors can be obtained. Such expenditure may extend to the manufacture of small quantities of some of the components of the required item.

If the desirability of adopting the new equipment is not clear, it is usual to procure a small quantity of the item concerned for trials. The procedure is as follows:—

- (a) The Army Headquarters equipment sponsor director, or procurement directorate, as appropriate, makes available particulars of the new or replacement equipment either by trade name or overseas military nomenclature.
- (b) Funds are allotted:—
 - (i) in the case of equipment of a new type, from capital equipment funds;
 - (ii) in the case of an equipment of a type already in use, but in which the matter of change of manufacturer or detailed design is in question, from maintenance funds.
- (c) Procurement is undertaken by the procurement branch according to the usual procedure for procurement of approved equipment.

After User Trials of the small quantity procured in this way it becomes possible to determine whether the procurement of the larger quantity to equip the Australian Army to the appropriate scale should be undertaken. A disadvantage of this procedure is that items procured in this way tend to lose their identity

as equipment procured for experimental purposes. Great care is required by all concerned to ensure that the necessary procedures involved in the procurement in this way of equipment for trials, do not result in the storeholding and accounting machinery of the Army treating the experimental purchase of the item as full acceptance, and so setting in motion a train of events which results in full-scale procurement before trials have ensured acceptability. I believe that consideration could well be given to whether some different and possibly simplified procedure could be evolved for experimental purchases of small quantities of equipment new to the Australian Services.

In some cases when existing equipment has been found to be inadequate it will not be possible for the Army Headquarters equipment sponsor director or procurement branch to locate and recommend a replacement item. In such cases it is the responsibility of the equipment sponsor director to prepare an Army Headquarters User Requirement, which sets out in descriptive form the characteristics of the new item required. Such a User Requirement can be passed to the Department of Supply so that the necessary development action can be undertaken.

The first action by the Department of Supply, which invariably seeks the assistance of the Department of Defence Production, is to ensure that no existing item in commercial or overseas military use can be found to meet the requirement, either in its present form or with minor modifications. If no existing item is found to be available the Design Establishment of the Department of Supply will be given the task of preparing

the design of a new piece of equipment to meet the requirement. Normal development procedure provides that the Department of Supply, using its own funds, will supply sufficient prototypes of the new equipment to the Army to permit User Trials. Concurrently with design action and in co-operation with the design engineers of the Department of Supply, engineers of the Department of Defence Production will examine local industry to ensure that capacity exists for the manufacture of the design finally prepared.

In cases when a decision is made that the use of an overseas design is desirable, after it has been ascertained that funds will be available for all or some of the quantity required to equip the Army, it is necessary to obtain Department of Defence Production agreement that local production is not possible or is uneconomical, before overseas procurement can be undertaken. It is necessary also, after Department of Defence Production agreement has been obtained that overseas procurement is desirable, to obtain Department of Trade agreement to the issue of the necessary import licences. Despite Department of Defence Production agreement to overseas procurement the Department of Trade may refuse to grant import licences on the grounds that:—

- (a) The equipment can be manufactured locally.
- (b) Insufficient overseas credits are available to permit the necessary funds to be provided in the country concerned.

Consideration by the Departments of Trade and Defence Production of the availability of capacity in Australia for manufacture of the item

concerned should take into account the position regarding the design data. It is possible that the Department of Supply will be:—

- (a) Unable to obtain the release of the necessary overseas design data for the particular item desired by the Army.
- (b) Unable to prepare a suitable alternative Australian design because of lack of trained design staff in the particular field concerned, the inclusion of patented features in the overseas design, or similar technical difficulties.

Capacity cannot be said to be available for local production if factory capacity is available, but design or tooling capacity is lacking. Close co-operation is required between the Army and the procurement departments from the early stages of the establishment of an equipment requirement onwards, to ensure that difficulties of the type mentioned above do not frustrate the procurement of the equipment required entirely, from either local or overseas sources.

The Department of Supply is responsible for the design of new items of equipment to be manufactured in Australia and the custody of design data for all equipment for which local manufacture is possible. In view of this responsibility I believe it may be desirable to make the Department of Supply financially responsible for the procurement for trials of new items of equipment and replacement items which differ in detailed design from those in service, irrespective of whether the likely source of supply appears to be overseas or not.

This would result in cases where the question of whether local or

overseas procurement of an item should be undertaken is a contentious issue, receiving early consideration by the procurement departments, with the result that delays at a later stage could be eliminated.

It is essential that the ultimate control of the design of equipment to be procured for the Army should remain with the Army and not be passed to the procurement departments, since only the user of any item of equipment can decide whether it is satisfactorily meeting his requirement. This is provided for by arranging that the control of the funds used to pay for quantity orders remains with the user department, the Department of Army, which permits the Army to refuse to order items for which design is considered unsatisfactory. This does involve "making do" with an obsolete item, which is a preferable course to accepting a new unsatisfactory equipment. However, so that funds will not be wasted on design effort and preparations for production for items which are not eventually satisfactory, arrangements for continuous and detailed consultation between the design and production engineers of the procurement departments and the military users is essential.

No clear-cut answer can be given to the general question of whether military equipment should be procured overseas or locally. Each case can be decided only by careful examination of all the factors involved. The ultimate decision by the soldier in the battlefield as to whether he is armed with a satisfactory item of equipment or not depends far more on the care with which selection matches the equipment to his requirement, than on its country of origin.

Filemanship

Lieutenant-Colonel G. D. Solomon
Royal Australian Artillery

ALTHOUGH there are many competent filesmen still practising it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the Golden Age of Filemanship has passed. Too often now, either from carelessness, or what is worse, ignorance, mistakes are made and errors of judgement committed which would not have been tolerated in times when to have been a good filesman was no mean distinction.

It is not easy to reduce to rules what is more an art than a science, but I try to do so with the hope that young filesmen will come to realize that a basic knowledge of principle is essential—an understanding as it were of the footwork of filemanship. Keeness is not enough; constant practice and an application of the rules are necessary. It takes time, but it can be done.

The Three Rules of Filemanship

The basic rules of good filemanship are:—

- (a) Always carry a file.
- (b) Never get caught with one.
- (c) Keep a reserve.

While examples may be given of well-known and skilled filesmen who by sheer natural ability seem to find it unnecessary to follow the rules, analysis of their most successful

work will show that their technique is based almost invariably on a proper application of the rules. Even the most expert filesman knows that to break Rule Two is to invite Exposure. It is significant that our most distinguished filesmen, after years of practice, do not contravene it unless in desperate circumstances. It is some years since I was unfortunate enough to see a highly respected elder filesman humbled under these conditions. One moment of carelessness was enough to bring down an edifice built up over years of assiduous devotion to duty. I cannot forget it, and it is the thought of that humiliating scene that as much as anything else urges me to the task that I am now undertaking.

Rule One: Always Carry a File

Just as the young cricketer is forever playing with a ball, so the keen young filesman should always be found with a file in his hand. Beyond the obvious advantage that practice brings, it is both his passport and protection and no good filesman should be seen outside his office without one. Considerable care should be paid both the kind of file to be carried, and to a lesser extent to the way of carrying it. Generally the old out-of-date file is to be re-



commended because of the very real danger of loss. On occasions this sort of loss may be desirable, but only when it is a deliberate act. It will be referred to again in the discussion of Rule Two. There is some advantage to be had in carrying a new and ostentatiously important file because it may impress one's equals and possibly even one's superiors. Despite this, there is the danger of acquiring unwanted notoriety, and it must be understood very clearly that the good filesman tries to avoid this at all times. All too often it is the prelude to Exposure. It should be unnecessary to say that from considerations of comfort alone, the file should be neither heavy nor bulky. I have been asked from time to time whether a reference book is permissible, if a suitable file is not available for carrying. At the risk of seeming dogmatic I must say that I do not like it, as it is always possible that a highly unsuitable book will be picked up with the attendant dangers that will be apparent to all filesmen. There is no doubt that all things considered, time spent in

selecting a suitable carrying file is time well spent.

Carrying the file is essentially a personal matter, but a simple and safe way is to grip the file firmly in the right hand (there is no objection to the naturally left-handed using that hand) and to tuck the file slightly under the armpit and across the chest. The method of swinging the file with the arm fully extended is not recommended; it is thought to be both vulgar and showy. More importantly, it may be unsafe. Papers disturbed by the unusual movement may fly loose and be revealed to the busybody who rushes to pick them up as quite unsuitable to the cover, which after all is the important part of the carrying file.

Rule Two: Never Get Caught With One

Very few young filesmen are in a position to select their own table or desk, let alone their own office. Yet here are the fundamentals of never getting caught. So much can be done with merely a good desk or table that every effort must be made to get a suitable one. For preference select an old one with as many drawers as possible, some of which must stick or be made to stick. Even the most inexperienced filesman will see the importance of this. With equipment of this kind it should not be necessary to make recourse to the desperate expedient that an overseas filesman recently sought. It will be recalled that he felt it necessary to hide files under his carpet. This is altogether undesirable, being demonstrably unsafe and savouring of sharp practice.

A dangerous trap into which young and inexperienced filesman sometimes falls when the search is on, is to say that the file must be in


the safe and that he has lost the key. Not only is this a punishable offence, but also he is in the gravest danger of Exposure as some meddler will know where the duplicate key is and hasten to get it. The filesman has been foolish to get himself into this predicament, but this is the time to keep calm. The safe is about to be "forced," but all is not yet lost. If he ensures that he alone handles the duplicate key and looks in the safe—after all we live in a democracy and he holds the safe in trust for the Government—all may yet be well. Having opened the safe he should give a brisk shuffle to the mountain of files that should be inside (to add conviction a second one is advisable), lock the safe door quickly, assume a pained "What did I tell you?" look, and with a little luck the bloodhounds will go their way frustrated once more.

So far I have discussed what might be called "The Filesman's Last Stand," where he is at bay in his office. Quite obviously the whole aim of the good filesman is to ensure that this situation does not arise. Always he must seek the offensive and keep suspect files out. The simplest way, and one that enjoys much popularity among beginner and expert alike, is to pass the file with a little slip of paper to say, if he thinks he can possibly get away with it, "To you for action," or more usually "For comment please." An even better stroke, guaranteed to give more respite though rather more complicated to execute, is the "Round Robin." In this method the file is sent to as many as half a dozen people for comment. This is a lengthy process and there is always the chance of its getting lost on the way. If it can be arranged that the

file has to pass from building to building, or, what is better still, to another area, the chance of ever being caught with the file is correspondingly decreased.

Mention was made in discussing Rule One of the possibility of deliberately losing a carrying file. Although this is considered to be somewhat unethical, many filesmen are thought to have done it when Exposure has been imminent. On the other hand the ways of Providence are known to be inscrutable, and it may be as well on occasions, both to carry files and to subject them to all the dangers of a long "Round Robin" in order to give Providence all the help possible.

It is necessary to add a few words of warning about taking up the obvious defence; the use of "PA" and "BF." The first is dangerous because there is no real warning of approaching Exposure, and should that occur there will be that notoriety which it is so desirable to avoid. It can be recommended only when action is complete, and there is no danger, or when the filesman is in a desperate position. Then and then only should the risk be taken. The use of "BF" is in many senses the filesman's withdrawal, and properly carried out can be of great help. It is a favourite device, too, of the experienced filesman when, executing "The Exhaustion by Interrogation" technique in dealing with correspondence. While this is outside the realms of pure filesmanship it may be of interest to mention it. When the original letter or message is received, a question is asked in return and the file marked "BF on such and such a day." The next move is again with the originator, which can be guaranteed to



madden him. He can decide to forget all about the whole thing or if he is obstinate he can answer the question. However, the initiative has not been lost because his reply need not be satisfactory and he can be asked to try again. The file which has emerged from obscurity to allow this transaction to take place can be marked "BF" once more. This or variations on it can go on until the originator stops from sheer exhaustion or he convinces the filesman that he is in earnest. In the latter case the "Round Robin" can be brought into play.

I cannot impress too strongly on the young filesman the importance of this second rule. Not only is constant practice essential, but every opportunity should be taken of seeing experienced filesmen in play.

Rule Three: Keep a Reserve

It is hard to separate the application of this rule from the previous one, because it can be argued readily

that the maintenance of a reserve is merely another way of ensuring that the filesman is not caught. However, it is of such importance that he would do well to regard it as a basic rule and study it as such.

There are reserves in place, in kind and quantity. In the first instance it is useful to know where a file really is. When the search is on the searcher can be encouraged to try three or four places where it is known not to be and then the filesman blandly says "Oh, I am sure it is with so and so." This will not cause notoriety if it is done with discretion, and a reputation of not being a file holder may be gained. It will be seen that in saying "The file is with so and so," he is not being accused of acquiring it. Filesmen stick together—as much as possible—and the aim is to impress on the outsider that it is the file and not the filesman which is in error. Perhaps this point might have been mentioned before,

but it is so widely accepted that I had not intended to refer to it at all.

Next there must be a reserve in kind. It is difficult to overestimate the value of having a general purpose file always in the office or readily available. When a search is on the filesman can always say after a little thought, "Of course, I know where it is," and with the air of a conjuror producing a rabbit from a hat bring it out in a helpful and willing way. Except in the most unfortunate circumstances it will not be the one that is being sought, but sufficiently like it to gain for the filesman a reputation for alertness and co-operation. Another useful device is to maintain a series of files on the one subject. While this is frowned on by authority, with a little care it can be done and will be found well worth while. It completely confuses all but the most diligent and experienced searcher. Although it is not recommended that the young filesman practice it, it is essential that he study it.

Lastly the matter of quantity. Generally it is preferable to keep either a large number of files or merely a single working one, with the rest concealed. When a search is on a large number of files, preferably disposed of untidily but including a couple of substantial piles, makes it comparatively easy to conceal the fact that the suspect file may be there. Furthermore the sight of so great a quantity of paper and so much apparent activity should be sufficient to shame the searcher into seeking another victim as soon as possible. If the one working file method is chosen, it is wise to have a bundle of what are thought to be unwanted files in a deep drawer in the desk. If the searcher gives no sign of believing that one represents

the filesman's complete stock the bundle is produced from the desk. This is almost invariably successful in getting rid of him.

Beware of the "Pending Tray" and associated equipment. A well-filled one offers some sort of security because of the number of files it may carry, and it gives a becoming touch of neatness. Unfortunately this very neatness may well lead to unnecessary Exposure, for it gives the searcher the chance to make a quick check himself. Such an action shows an unpleasing lack of courtesy on his part, but there is little that can be done about it, particularly if it is thought the suspect file actually is in the tray. If the Pending Tray is considered essential, it is useful to conceal one file within another. A refinement of this technique is to attach inconspicuously one file to another. The simple Glider Clip can perform this connection very successfully, particularly when the files are thin. It may well be that the shortage of these admirable little instruments in the past few years has been a major contribution to the decline in filesmanship.

Envoi

It is this decline that has led me to the task that I have undertaken. Inevitably it has been evocative and in my mind I have been able to see old friends once more—slim youthful files, fat flabby files corseted with pieces of tape, old files of no particular distinction, down at heels shabby files, proud stiff-backed files, secret files, files whose sheets bear notes showing sometimes the enthusiasm of the new recruit and sometimes the weary concurrence of a hand grown old, files of all kinds and all a monument to man's boundless activity. What activity and what monument.

THE ARMY and STRATEGIC MOBILITY

George Fielding Eliot

Reprinted from the August 1957 issue of the "Military Review," Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, U.S.A.

GLOBAL mobility is the greatest strategic advantage possessed by the United States. It is the gift of geography—the insular, two-ocean position occupied by the continent of North America, and the land-locked position of the Soviet Empire. Like all advantages of position, however, it must

Mr. George Fielding Eliot is the author of "Principles of War—Hot or Cold," which appeared in the December 1956 issue of the "Military Review." Although born in the United States, he received most of his education in Australia. He served with the Australian Imperial Force in the Dardanelles and on the Western Front in 1914-18. From 1922 to 1930 he was a member of the US Army, serving with the Military Intelligence Reserves. A military and naval correspondent with General Features Syndicate, Mr. Eliot is the author of The Ramparts We Watch; Hate, Hope, and High Explosives; and Caleb Pettengill, USN.

be understood and implemented to be useful. We cannot maintain true strategic mobility as long as our thinking tends to be immobile.

Unhappily, our popular thinking on this military question currently is confused by the notion that limited and peripheral operations involve a danger that they may spread into general nuclear war.

This is mere rationalization, quite unsupported by experience. Great international wars do not grow out of chance outbreaks of local hostilities. They are the result of the deliberate decisions of governments. The record of the past two centuries offers no exception to this rule. All the major wars of that period came about because one or more great powers decided to resort to arms to achieve a chosen objective, whether of conquest or security. In no case has a small war "spread" until it became a big one. The decision to go to war has often been based on a conviction of military superiority,

and hence anticipation of a quick and comparatively cheap victory. Local conditions, or incidents, have not been the *causes* of any great wars, although they have been seized upon occasionally as convenient excuses by governments already determined upon hostilities.

Capitalize on Mobility

The conditions of the present time give no room for conviction that a resort to nuclear war could serve any national objective save that of mutual annihilation — which scarcely can be called an objective in any rational view—and certainly rule out all anticipation of swift and inexpensive victory. Indeed, the major nuclear armaments of the United States and Great Britain are avowedly directed to the prevention of such a war by the exercise of an imperatively deterrent influence on the minds of the Soviet leaders, and there are indications that all-out nuclear conflict has small attraction for the Kremlin. The means of deterring the Soviet Government from pursuing its ends by piecemeal methods have not been so clearly established. Indeed, in this area our policy in practice evolved into a series of defensive actions to meet hostile initiatives as these developed. This is not deterrence at all, but mere containment.

Surely a far more promising policy could be produced, based on the world-wide mobility of the United States and her allies. This mobility is derived from:

1. Command of the sea and of the air-space above the sea.
2. Outlying bases and overseas deployment of forces.

3. The support of a widespread system of alliances, including many states possessing effective local forces, the whole being linked together by global sea-air lines of communication and supported by our military aid programme.

This mobile capability can be applied usefully to the support of American and free world policies as a true deterrent to prevent local Soviet aggression and to undertake local initiatives of our own where feasible. But this would require that the policies to be supported should correspond, in initiative, flexibility and imagination, to the qualities possessed by the military instruments on which they depend. In the absence of such policies our Military Establishment constantly is exposed to the arguments of the economists that the implementation of strategic mobility (in any other sense than that required for the maintenance of the nuclear deterrent) is a needless expense.

Limited Wars Stay Limited

It is in seeking to combat such arguments that our military leaders—more particularly, Army spokesmen—have shown an unfortunate tendency to preserve the false premise that big wars grow out of little ones by overemphasizing this possibility in seeking to justify our requirement for dealing with peripheral conflicts. "One facet of the Army's interest in strategic airlift," testified Major-General Earle G. Wheeler, Director of Plans, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, before the Symington Committee, "stems directly from national security policy, which requires the United States to have military forces with sufficient

strength and mobility to react swiftly to Communist local aggression in order to defeat that aggression and prevent its broadening into general war." (Author's italics.)

It is this last phrase which confuses the issue, by bringing into the consideration of limited operations the dread sanctions of nuclear conflict which do not belong in this context. Not only has this idea no basis in the history of modern warfare but specifically the record of the Soviet Union does not suggest that the cautious men of the Kremlin (to whom the very adjective "adventuristic" is a term of ultimate reproach) would risk the life of their system for any minor or secondary objective. They have, in fact, invariably cut their losses and looked elsewhere for recompense when confronted in local initiatives by determined resistance: as in Iran, Greece, Berlin, Korea, Trieste, and quite recently in Jordan.

Avoid Nuclear Immobility

American military thought in the atomic age has not managed to separate its concept of local and limited conflicts on the perimeter of the Soviet empire-bloc from the concept of all-out nuclear war, or at least of maximum effort and risk in each such conflict by the USSR. The idea that a limited risk of our own might be countered by no more than a limited risk by the enemy, and the companion idea that our mobility gives us a vast advantage in the concentration of force in such operations, has not been sufficiently expounded. This kind of all-or-nothing thinking is a form of nuclear immobility. If persisted in until it crystallizes into accepted doctrine, it will assuredly deprive

us both of mobile thinking and mobile military power.

Yet when we examine the post-1945 record of Soviet local aggressions we find that each of them was directed toward the accomplishment of a limited object, and involved only a limited risk on the part of the Communists. Such enterprises are, in fact, no more than piecemeal attempts to subtract resources from the free world and add them to the Soviet bag, in the meanwhile undermining the confidence of the remaining free peoples to soften them for future attempts of like character. Nowhere is there the smallest indication, other than blustery verbiage, that the Kremlin has been, at any time since 1945, prepared to risk a general war to accomplish any purpose which it has entertained during that time, except the overall purpose of national security.

This being so, we might well be thinking and planning on the basis of how our ability to move swiftly and in force to any threatened area may be demonstrated, made clearly visible, and employed as a continuing deterrent against local aggression. From that concept we shall move very readily to the concept of a more active and vigorous policy in which, on suitable occasion, may be based useful initiatives of our own.

Use of Mobile Threat

The Army's part in this concept is the historic role played throughout history by the army of a maritime (that is, strategically mobile) power. It is today, with air mobility added to sea mobility, no different in principle than it was when the sailing ship was its mobile

instrument. It is summed up in the trenchant phrase of Sir Julian Corbett (*England in the Seven Years' War*) when he writes of "the peculiar deterrent effect of troops upon the sea." The instance to which Sir Julian here referred is remarkably instructive to us today. It occurred in 1760, when the limited British objective of the war—the liquidation of the French colonial system in North America—had been substantially accomplished, and the chief remaining British purpose was to deter the French from obtaining some compensating advantage in Europe or India to use as a lever at the peace settlement. The main French armies were deployed on the Rhine against Great Britain's ally, Frederick the Great of Prussia, who was in an unfavourable situation. In India the French were clinging desperately to their last foothold at Pondichery; awaiting relief by their naval squadron based on Mauritius.

The device used to upset the French plans in both theatres by William Pitt the Elder (afterward Earl of Chatham), who then directed British policy, was the simple deterrent pressure of mobile amphibious power. He concentrated a force of seven battalions (later raised to 10) at Portsmouth, and provided it with transports and a naval escort under Commodore Augustus Keppel, taking care that this preparation should become known in France.

Already during the course of the war the French had suffered hard blows from British amphibious descents on their home coasts and on their overseas possessions. They were correspondingly nervous. A wide range of speculation as to the destination of the new expedition

exercised the ingenuity of French statesmen and soldiers. "One," says Corbett, "was sure that it was going to combine with Amherst against Martinique. Another guessed Belleisle or the French coast. The Spaniards were sure that it had been intended for Ostend . . . and were equally certain that it was now going to Minorca." Another report insisted that the objective was Mauritius, the French naval base in the Indian Ocean. As a result, every move—the arrival of a fresh battalion, the appearance of the commodore at St. Helens to hoist his broad pennant—caused a fresh outbreak of alarm along the French coast. "Troops were passed from Normandy to Brittany; Brest and Bordeaux were in a feverish state of alarm." In the Indian Ocean "the menace was enough to upset the whole position of the French in the east." The French admiral, d'Aché, preparing at Mauritius to hurry to the relief of besieged Pondichery, received strict orders from home on no account to leave the supposedly threatened island.

Mobile Threat Sufficient

As a result, the force of the French offensive in Germany was weakened seriously, achieving only a partial success, which was more than outbalanced by Frederick's victories at Liegnitz and Torgau, and the French also lost their last foothold in India—a blow from which their hopes of empire in that country never recovered. *Yet the force that had produced these far-reaching effects did not, in fact, stir from Portsmouth Harbour.* Having wrung the last ounce of advantage from it, Pitt on 11 December

ordered the troops to disembark and return to their home stations for the winter. A better example of the deterrent effect of troops provided with strategic mobility hardly could be found.

Does it require any very great effort of the imagination to apply the basic principle of Pitt's strategy to present American strategic needs?

Of course, today's time limits are much shorter than those of 1760. Pitt's concentration was devised in April, the assembly of the troops began in the summer, the first French warning went out to Mauritius in June, and the weakened French offensive on the Rhine got under way in October. All this time, French strategy was enfeebled and confused by daily anticipation of word that the expedition had put to sea—after which the blow might fall anywhere: in a matter of a few days on the French coast, or of a few weeks in the West Indies, or a few months in the Indian Ocean. Since French reaction on the Continent would be limited to the marching pace of infantry on bad roads, or at sea by the uncertainties of the wind and the sluggishness of ships long out of dock, they were deterred correspondingly from any enterprise that might leave a vital interest uncovered at the critical moment.

A comparable deterrent effect today would require implementation in terms of the speeds and ranges now available both to the aggressor and to the deterrent force.

Need Two Deterrent Forces

The "requirements of deterrence" in the field of limited operations

have as their target the process of Soviet decision—the implanting of serious doubt that any contemplated Soviet local aggression or subversion will be successful, coupled with a continuing anxiety as to the security of existing Soviet outposts and dependencies. The principle is the same as in 1760, but time factors must be reckoned in hours instead of days, and days instead of weeks or months. Upon these considerations we must fashion the appropriate military instrument to achieve our purpose.

Just as the basic military instrument appropriate for the nuclear deterrent is a preponderance of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems (including the defence of the latter against surprise neutralization) so the *basic military instrument appropriate for the peripheral deterrent is an adequate force of ground troops and their delivery systems*—in the sense of air, sea and base facilities for their timely movement to wherever their presence may be required.

In every case of a Soviet aggressive initiative since 1945, ground troops have been required to deal with it. The protection of people, of homes and workshops, of entire communities, and even nations, against aggressors on the ground with weapons in their hands has been the essential element in the denial of Soviet purpose and the preservation of confidence among free men and women that they would not be abandoned to the enemy. Thus in Greece the issue turned upon the ability of General James A. Van Fleet to devise a tactical system by which villages which had been bypassed by the operations of the field forces could

be protected against descents by guerrilla bands, without diverting the mobile units of the Greek National Army from their main objectives. A similar condition was encountered by Great Britain's General Sir Gerald Templer in Malaya. In the blockade of Berlin, airlift was the solution, but it was the presence in the beleaguered city of United States, British, and French troops which secured the inhabitants against overt attack. Strong naval and air support were features of the Korean operations, but the issue was decided by the ground forces—rising, in this instance, to an entire American field army, plus a British division, upwards of 20 Republic of Korea divisions, and the equivalent of a division or more from other United Nations participants. The rearmament of Turkey, Japan, and Germany in each case has been based chiefly on rebuilding the army; so has the defence of Israel against Arab pressures on her frontiers, as exemplified in the recent operations in the Sinai Peninsula. The security of Jordan was established by the restoration of loyal Bedouin officers to the command of the army. In South Vietnam, President Ngo-dinh-Diem's reorganized army is the corner-stone of his authority. And it is notable that American inability to intervene in North Vietnam turned on the infeasibility of providing a sufficient army force for the purpose, as General Matthew B. Ridgway points out.

Ground Capability Is Key

The future ability of the United States to deter Communist aggressive enterprises of local character will be dependent on our known

ability to intervene promptly *on the ground*—and our ability to defeat such enterprises, if actually undertaken, will be based on the prompt arrival of ground forces capable of affording protection to the threatened area and its inhabitants. The presence of air and sea forces may have some deterrent effect, as did the recent move of the Sixth Fleet to the Eastern Mediterranean in support of Jordan's resistance to subversion; but this effect may not survive challenge, since the weapons of air and sea forces cannot always be employed in such instances. It is notable that the clincher in the Jordan affair was Vice-Admiral C. R. Brown's brilliant idea of allowing his Marine battalion to go ashore on liberty in Beirut, less than 50 air-miles from the Jordan frontier.

Time may well be of great importance both in deterrence and actual intervention. Deterrence will hardly be effective if the enemy can calculate on presenting us with a *fait accompli* before we can get to the spot with the type of force needed to thwart his purpose; while the timely arrival of a comparatively small force may be of greater value, morally and physically, than the belated arrival of a much larger one.

As a practical matter under existing conditions, the problem boils down to establishing a capability for rapid movement of troops from the continental United States, Germany, Japan, or the Hawaiian Islands to overseas destinations. The target area is global, hence the means of transportation must be adequate to satisfy global time and distance requirements. Two methods

of transportation must be considered—airlift and sealift. Airlift is faster, sealift more capacious. It may be assumed that sealift will catch up and take over the main task of transportation after the first 30 days. Sealift, which is provided by the Navy, is available in adequate quantities, or can be made available in any conceivable limited emergency without impairing other needs. But with airlift this is not so.

Airlift Is the Problem

The provision of strategic airlift is a function of the Air Force. The Army has long been pressing for the direct allocation of a reasonable amount of strategic airlift for its exclusive use. This has been resisted by the Air Force on the ground that it involves fragmentation of total airlift capacity, which is used for many other purposes than for troop movements. Thus a considerable portion of the available airlift is earmarked in any critical situation for the use of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) for forward deployment of bombs, engines, spare parts, and POL. The Tactical Air Command (TAC) also will require strategic airlift, as will the Navy. The actual day-to-day control of most of our long-distance airlift is in the hands of the Military Air Transport Service (MATS), operationally responsible to the Air Force Chief of Staff. MATS provides airlift for all three services on a world-wide basis, and at any given moment a large proportion of its aircraft will be actively in use. The Air Force view is that direct allocation of airlift to the Army would be a violation of the principle that flexibility is the key to the efficient use of air power

in all its aspects. It is this principle which also leads the Air Force to resist direct allocation of tactical air support to Army commands.

Under existing conditions the authority for allocating airlift and establishing priorities for its use in emergency situations is vested in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Air Force view is that the Army's needs for airlift could be met by such allocation, having due regard to other existing needs, which would have to depend, like other difficult decisions, on the judgment of the Joint Chiefs. The Army feels that precious time might be wasted in this process—including gathering in the allocated airlift from heaven knows where—but, more important, they would come up immediately against the number one priority, for a large proportion of the airlift, of SAC.

Priorities May Change

Here, again, we find the paralyzing influence of absorption with nuclear war. *Must it be rigidly assumed in advance that in every limited emergency all the "customers" for airlift will need the immediate exercise of their respective priorities based on "big war"? Are situations not readily conceivable in which, in fact, the number one priority for airlift would be the Army's, since the immediate despatch of ground troops to the trouble spot would be the first thing needed?* Of course, this might mean taking a calculated risk that SAC's airlift requirements could be reduced for the period of time required for the proposed airlift of troops and supplies. This, it must be admitted, would not be a decision easily reached as long as our

limited war concept remains distorted by the "big wars grow out of little ones" illusion—an illusion which, in any given instance, is likely to be reinforced by Soviet bluffing, as instanced by the "rockets-on-England" note of Marshal Nikolai Bulganin during the Suez crisis.

We shall need tougher nerves as well as clearer concepts.

Service Emphasis Vary

Sound solutions for such problems are not made easier by the very natural Air Force tendency to think in terms of its top-priority missions—strategic bombardment and continental air defence—both of which are concerned with "big war." The Army, which has—also quite naturally—given far more consideration to limited war than has the Air Force, has had trouble in selling the Air Force on the strong possibility that limited rather than major war may indeed be the more likely prospect for the immediate future, with the consequence, among other things, that limited demands for airlift for troops may be the rule rather than the exception.

The Army also feels that Air Force preoccupation with its top-priority missions has led to the down-rating, under conditions of budgetary stringency, of procurement of new and more capacious troop-carrying and cargo aircraft. The C-124, with a useful load of 16.4 tons, is the largest aircraft now available for strategic air movement of troops or supplies. Its scheduled successor is the C-133, a 25-ton plane; only two or three of these are now operational, and total

scheduled procurement during the next two fiscal years is only 35. A larger aircraft, the 50-ton C-132, was programmed in the budget for Fiscal Year 1958, but this item has been eliminated. *First things first*, says the Air Force. The Army retorts, *how do you know airlift won't be a first thing?*

Translated into terms of troop-movement capability within time limits measured in days, the situation is not very promising. Using practically all available airlift (an optimum assumption), one division could be airlifted from the United States to the Middle East in 21 days. This is the so-called 13,000-ton division—that is, a "division force" including extra service units and with six days of supply. The maximum *normally available* airlift capability could lift no more than a 5,000-ton division—combat elements only—which means that such a movement could be effective only if made to an area where base facilities already exist, for example, Germany.

Dispersion Undesirable

This does not quite meet the Army's stated minimum requirement for strategic airlift. Lieutenant-General James M. Gavin told the Symington Committee that a divisional (13,000-ton) airlift in the United States was, in his opinion, absolutely rockbottom, and that there would be great difficulty in attaining this today if there were any other demands at all on the existing airlift. Moreover, there must be kept in mind the need, at the delivery end of any strategic airlift, of means for movement of the troops to their operational area. This may involve tactical airlift,

shipping and rail or road transportation. Time is the controlling factor, and the saving of time represented by strategic airlift over the major portion of the journey is the whole point of the argument.

Today, the situation appears locked on dead centre, between the Army's concept of quick deployment for peripheral war and the Air Force's preoccupation with "big war." On the basis of existing programmes, there is no prospect of any change during the next two or three years as far as the provision of additional airlift is concerned.

Additional overseas deployment of troops has been suggested; but this involves undesirable dispersion. The present tendency is toward reduction of existing overseas forces. Such deployments are vulnerable to political pressures, in the accentuation of which the Soviets are assiduous. It was in this way that we came near to losing our base in Iceland; the British withdrawal from Egypt and Jordan and their present difficulties in Cyprus are not encouraging, nor our own current headaches in Japan and Taiwan. Overseas storage of supplies and improvement of air-base facilities may help, but are not the entire answer either. Certainly a higher state of readiness for movement of troop units in the United States is essential—say in terms of one complete airborne division ready to move right out at the drop of a hat. This can be accomplished as a continuing capability; but without enough constantly available aircraft and aircrews it does not mean as much as it should.

The most hopeful fact that emerges from discussion of the

problem with Army and Air Force officers immediately concerned with it is that in hammering out a long succession of "position papers" each side has gained a better appreciation of the other's problems, and both are well aware that appropriations are not unlimited.

Joint Command Suggested

Actually, the gap between the existing positions has narrowed considerably and is far from unbridgeable. What is needed now is a fresh push to get off dead centre—and it appears to the writer that one way to do this might be to establish a Joint Mobile Command, charged with the preparation of plans for the exploitation of strategic mobility as a deterrent to Soviet peripheral enterprises. One of the first missions of such a command should be to set up and carry out a series of Joint Mobile Exercises, involving, perhaps, the overseas movement of no more than one of the new "Pentomic" infantry battle groups at first. Such exercises should be related successively to the movement of troops to each of the principal areas of our possible strategic interest—for example, the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, and South-East Asia. The co-operation or active participation of allied and friendly governments should be sought. Thus the exercises would serve not only to indicate the nature of the problems to be encountered and the measures required to remedy defects but also would be demonstrations of our mobile capability visible to everyone concerned. Moreover, inter-service participation in this new command would establish an atmosphere in which the approach to the solution

of existing difficulties might be made easier: an accomplishment which would, naturally, require the most painstaking care in the selection of the first commander and of the principal members of his staff.

It goes without saying that the plans and exercises of this command should cover the entire area of strategic mobility in peripheral and local emergencies, and of the tactical means associated with the commitment of forces to combat under favourable conditions. The experience of the Navy and especially the Marine Corps in amphibious operations, of the Army and Air Force in airborne operations, and the local knowledge of allied forces should be drawn together and woven into a fabric of global mobility appropriate to today's requirements—both of deterrence and of the defeat of Communist initiatives if carried into the realm of action.

The Need Is Increasing

We also should keep in mind that political changes may well bring about changes in military thought which will help us adapt our mili-

tary programmes to the needs of the times. *As the prospect of "big war" recedes, at least for the time being, under the inexorable pressure of the nuclear deterrent, the need for the peripheral deterrent increases, and surely will be further demonstrated by the enemy.* The creation of a Joint Mobile Command and the prompt activation, under its direction, of exercises demonstrating the strategic mobility of our ground forces should be in itself a useful hint to the Kremlin as well as a reassurance to our friends that they will not be left alone to face a future hour of peril.

The deterrent power of our nuclear armaments is credited by Sir Winston Churchill with having preserved Europe from Soviet attack in the years immediately following World War II. Today, Europe breathes more easily, but around the vast Communist perimeter live many free peoples, who take small comfort from the nuclear umbrella. The threats they fear are of a different character: these threats can best be discounted by "the peculiar deterrent effect of troops upon the sea" and upon airborne wings.

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY AND FREE TRADE AREA

Major R. W. Swartz, MBE, ED, MP
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History of European Economic Community

A dominant theme in the history of Europe since the war has been the series of attempts at closer European integration — political, military and economic. These attempts have taken many forms and have been attended by very varying degrees of success. On the whole the movement towards supranationalism and the surrender of sovereignty to common institutions has so far failed, its only surviving monument being the European Coal and Steel Community. The most successful example in the economic field of the alternative inter-Government approach involving close and systematic co-operation between sovereign Governments, is the Organization for European Economic Co-operation. Founded in 1948, it has been the instrument for reducing restrictions on intra-European trade, through its programme of "liberalization," and for developing a co-

operative approach to common economic problems.

The series of events leading up to the present turning point in the economic affairs of Europe may be briefly summarized as follows.

1948—Belgium, Holland and Luxemburg set up a customs union, known as Benelux.

1948—The Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) was founded, with the UK as a member.

1951—Belgium, France, Germany, Holland, Italy and Luxemburg, the Six as they have become known—adopted the Schuman Plan and in 1953 opened a common market in coal and steel, known as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). In 1954 the United Kingdom signed a Treaty of Association with the ECSC.

1955—The Foreign Ministers of the Six met at Messina and decided to work towards a common market for

all products traded between them. This project became known as the Messina plan.

1956—The United Kingdom announced that, though the UK could not join the proposed common market, it might be associated with it in a free trade area for industrial goods, together with other OEEC countries.

1957—On 25 March the Six signed two Treaties in Rome: One instituting the European Economic Community (i.e., their customs and economic union); the other instituting the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). Both Treaties will come into force when all six have ratified.

France and Germany have taken the lead in securing parliamentary approval and the process is well on the way in Italy and the Netherlands. Ratifications of the Treaty can be expected early next year.

Features of the European Economic Community

The Treaty represents quite a monumental effort at economic and social co-operation. Not only does it seek to form a Customs Union between the six countries, but it encourages a common policy in the fields of transport, social benefits, equal pay for men and women, overtime entitlement, free movement of labour over frontiers, including resettlement assistance, free movement of capital and services and a joint fund to assist economic development.

Australia regards the Treaty as a notable milestone in the strengthening of the Western world and it is welcomed as such. There are, however, some aspects of the Treaty which must cause us concern.

In the Treaty, agriculture is subject to a number of special provisions. Free competition in agricultural trade is put in the background and a co-ordinated agricultural policy is proposed, to ensure the standard of living of European agriculturalists and to guarantee the security of supplies. Although subsidization of secondary industry in the Treaty is prohibited, that of agriculture is encouraged. Governments may arrange policies of stocking and may take measures to stabilize imports and exports. Joint or co-ordinated marketing organizations will be developed to control production, marketing and trade in important commodities.

Of course, the integration of these important economies cannot be accomplished overnight and the EEC Treaty provides for a transitional period of 12/15 years over which its provisions can be implemented. But the provisions for control of agricultural trade are not transitional, but permanent.

The Treaty contains some provisions relating particularly to the transitional period, one of which provides for the conclusion of long-term contracts between countries in the Economic Community producing commodities in surplus, and those in need to import at prices related, not to world prices, but to domestically guaranteed prices. This could be a potential threat to development of our trade in grains with Europe. Another provision which allows an importing country to fix minimum prices for imports to protect its own producers, may be particularly serious in relation to trade in other commodities such as dairy products.

The general conclusion, therefore, on the agricultural provisions of the

Treaty is that there could be a danger that a high level of industrial activity could be used to protect an inefficient agriculture and that European consumers could have to pay high levels of prices for foodstuffs instead of being able to take advantage of the efficient production of predominantly primary producing countries such as Australia and New Zealand.

From an Australian point of view it is a source of relief that the agricultural provisions are not scheduled to apply to wool which is, of course, not much produced in Europe.

Another problem arises from the provision made for association of dependent overseas territories of France, Belgium and the Netherlands and for the association if they so desire of several former French colonies such as Morocco, Tunisia and of Libya.

It will be recalled that in 1954 Australia unsuccessfully attempted to secure in GATT some minor relaxation of the no-new-preference rule. In this Treaty the association of overseas territories resembles far more the creation of a new preferential area than that of a Customs Union or Free Trade Area. It is true that the six Powers state that they contemplate that ultimately the territories concerned will be able to remove all duties and restrictions against trade from the European powers. But no date has been set for such an achievement and we know from previous international trading experience that it could be a very long time.

A further point which needs to be watched is the construction of the Common External Tariff of the six countries. This is, generally speak-

ing, to be an arithmetical average of existing tariffs and in the case of some products this average may be unsatisfactory to us where our trade is now with countries having duties below the average.

The European Economic Community has also serious implications for the Sterling Area inasmuch as the United Kingdom has a very large export trade to Europe. If free entry into the Netherlands, Belgium, France and Italy is to be granted to German manufactures and denied to those of the United Kingdom, a great deal of this trade may be lost.

European Free Trade Area

It is for the foregoing reason that the United Kingdom has proposed the creation of an industrial free trade area to include all western European countries that wish to join. Trade in foodstuffs, feeding stuffs, drink and tobacco are to be excluded for several reasons. In the first place it is obvious that trade in these products in Europe is not to be wholly free, as examination of the Treaty has already revealed. Secondly, the United Kingdom wishes to preserve Commonwealth preference, and thirdly, to continue to protect its own agriculture against European competition.

Australia has a full understanding of the United Kingdom's desire for association with Europe, realizing its importance for the Sterling area as a whole. Nevertheless an essential element in Australia's attitude has been the exclusion of agricultural products.

However, a number of European countries, such as Denmark and the Netherlands, are not interested in

joining a Free Trade Area excluding agriculture.

This is only one of the outstanding problems to be resolved in the creation of a Free Trade Area — another is the facilitation of the use of imported raw materials from the British Commonwealth, and elsewhere, in the manufacture of goods to pass within the Free Trade Area. Agriculture, however, is the most serious issue at present.

Population and Trade of Western Europe

Western Europe has a bigger population than either of the other two great centres of industrial power in the world—the USA and USSR. The population of OEEC countries is approximately 284 million, compared with USA 165 million and USSR 200 million.

The total production of power, basic materials and manufactured goods in the OEEC countries compares favourably with the productive output of USA and USSR, whilst Western Europe's trade in exports and imports is greater than that of either of these countries. In fact, taking its trade with countries outside Western Europe alone, its imports and exports together are 60 per cent. bigger than the USA's total. This clearly emphasizes to Australia the significant trading potential of the area.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

The GATT is an international trade agreement. It has been

accepted by 35 countries and has been in operation since January, 1948. The key provision of the GATT is the guarantee of most-favoured-nation treatment in international trade.

Both the European Economic Community and the European free trade area can hardly fail prima facie to be at variance with the GATT because the countries concerned will be giving more favourable treatment to each other than to outside countries as to customs duties, import restrictions and many other matters, and thus departing from the most-favoured-nation principle. The GATT does, however, contemplate special recognition for new customs unions or free trade areas, which can, subject to certain conditions, be permitted to depart from its rules, on the grounds that such arrangements contribute towards the development of freer trade, which is the basic objective of the GATT. Nevertheless, the Six must seek the approval of the GATT for their Treaty; and so will the members of the free trade area for their agreement, and some preliminary discussions have been held.

Conclusion

Australia is closely in touch with developments in these areas which can have such an important bearing on our economy in the future. Meanwhile the Commonwealth has proposed a Trade and Economic Conference for next year, designed to bring our countries closer together, even if not in the same way as Europe, nevertheless in other useful directions.

CHANGE AND NO CHANGE IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Digested by the "Military Review," USA, from an article by Willy Bretscher in "Swiss Review of World Affairs," Switzerland

This article was prepared prior to the July 1957 shift in Soviet High Command structure.—Editor.

CHANGES which have occurred in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union since the death of Stalin have manifested themselves in a series of not altogether un-spectacular events, both fascinating and confusing to world public opinion. In view of these events it is said that the Soviet Union has proceeded to liquidate the cold war of the Stalin era and to conduct a "policy of relaxation" in the field of international relations. Even if one puts this word "relaxation" (and other words used in the same manner) in quotation marks to denote that it is terminology launched in Moscow with definite propagandist intentions, it still gives a false picture of the problems involved.

Not even a very profound scepticism over the motives and purposes of the Soviets' "policy of relaxation" can always be trusted to keep the Western observer from being

misled by this terminological distortion. It gives a one-sided bias to his thinking and distracts his attention from the real heart of the matter. Neither is it necessary to mention the far greater damage done by the automatic adoption of uncritical reproduction of these slogans in the press and in political discussion in general.

What Has Changed?

To carry out a full investigation and evaluation of the changes which have taken place in Soviet foreign policy since the death of Stalin, we should first determine just what really has changed. A mere quarrel about words on whether the cold war has been liquidated or is continuing, for example, is utterly sterile if the exact meaning of this cold war has not been defined in advance. From the labels of the political facts we must proceed to the facts themselves, which, in the present case, force us to an entirely unequivocal and clear-cut conclusion: The new rulers of the Soviet Union, the successors of Stalin in

the "collective leadership," have, in fact, abandoned the cold war of the Stalin brand—the cold war, that is, in the definite and specific forms practiced by Stalin—and have replaced it with the so-called "policy of relaxation."

That is the most important change which has taken place in Soviet foreign policy. It has involved an astounding transformation in the conduct, behaviour, methods and style of Soviet diplomacy. It would be even more impressive if it were not so obtrusive, so apparently artificial, and at times of such a bear-like massivity. There can be no doubt that the form of foreign policy has changed, that it has changed suddenly and drastically, and to such an extent that a certain "normalization" of the relations of the powers involved in the East-West conflict can be observed.

What Has Not Changed?

Immediately, however, the question of what has not changed in Soviet foreign policy must be examined. The list of the great problems that remain unsolved, despite the so-called "policy of relaxation," the generally uncompromising political attitude, and the continued ideological aggressiveness of Moscow toward the Western World provide us with an answer—they show that the substance of Soviet foreign policy has been left untouched by the changes in method and style.

It is by new ways and means that the new rulers in the Kremlin are defending the orbit of their power and influence as determined by the military and political conquests

made by Russia in the war and the post-war period; but their energy and *intransigence* in no way fall short of that of Stalin. The most convincing proof is their German policy, as unyieldingly opposed to reunification as ever, and as exasperating as they could wish with its cynical reference to the *de facto* existence and "co-existence" of two separate German states.

The Soviet "policy of relaxation" is designed not only to maintain the *status quo* by seeking to persuade the Western Powers to accept and recognize USSR hegemony in eastern Europe and a part of Germany, but pursues still larger ambitions. What Stalin—whose cold war first provoked the free world to unite for a common defence—failed to achieve as a result of the counter-movement of the events he set in motion, his successors now want to bring about by their "policy of relaxation." This is the political disintegration of the West, the dissolution or paralysis of its military alliances, and the withdrawal of American and British troops from the European Continent—thus making way for the unchallenged hegemony of Russia throughout that area. The realization of these aims would set in train a process ending sooner or later in the sovietization of all Europe.

Blueprint for Western Europe

The degree of success the Soviets have achieved already with their "policy of relaxation" and constant assertion of peaceful intentions is bound to encourage Stalin's successors. It is evident that the mere appearance of a reduction of Soviet pressure suffices to weaken the

political cohesion of the West and to give rise to phenomena of dissolution, such as an increase in unrealistic "neutralism."

Since the broad masses in western Europe have, in the past years, viewed the Bolshevik danger almost exclusively as a potential aggression by armed force, the reduction or elimination of an imminent threat of war tends to result in a decrease of vigilance in every respect—moral, political, and military. This reaction, which the statesmen seem to catch from public opinion, is caused by a deplorable disregard for or ignorance of the peculiarities of Bolshevik dialectics. A closer look at these things will demonstrate the unfortunate aspects of the "relaxation" of vigilance in the West.

As Franz Borkenau explains in his book, *Communism in Europe*, the Communist does not know or acknowledge the traditional sharp juxtaposition of "war" and "peace," since from his point of view there is always some sort of war going on between his world and the world of others. War by means of armed force, therefore, is not the answer to political questions for him. For the Communist, armies, military power and threats of war are coordinated with, and subordinated to, a political overall concept which aims at achieving the desired revolutionary upheaval without a "war" in the classical sense.

Typical examples of Bolshevik ideological-political conquests can be found in the recent history of several eastern European countries where the mere presence or geographical proximity of the Red

Army was enough to bring to a triumphant conclusion a prolonged phase of thorough political boring from within. There can be no doubt that the present Soviet "policy of relaxation" seeks to create the psychological and political prerequisites for a repetition of this process in western Europe.

Russia's disarmament gestures—which do no harm whatsoever to the immense military preponderance of Russia on the Continent—are aimed at causing the peoples of western Europe to relax their armament efforts, reduce their general vigilance toward the totalitarian colossus, and abandon their efforts on behalf of their common defence and political integration. Should this happen they would be bound to drift, imperceptibly and yet relentlessly, into a situation where these countries, isolated from each other, would one at a time come face to face with the united pressure of the Soviet bloc. And that, in all its essential elements, would be exactly the same situation as prevailed from 1946 to 1948, and which cost the freedom and independence of the eastern European peoples, one after the other.

The New Style

The present Soviet foreign policy differs remarkably from the characteristic "one-track mindedness" of Stalinism in that it makes use of all possible roads, lanes, tracks, and every suitable vehicle. It has become more flexible and adaptable; more imaginative and more audacious.

It is indicative of the liveliness and versatility of the new masters of Russian foreign policy that they

have succeeded in realizing a diplomatic and political programme embracing such astounding and diversified items as the withdrawal from Austria, the public act of contrition and penitence in Belgrade, the Geneva high-level conference, the invitation of Konrad Adenauer to Moscow, the propaganda tour of Nikolai • Bulganin and Nikita Khrushchev in Asia, the subsequent visit of the two Soviet leaders to the British capital, and Shepilov's journey through the Middle East.

A careful observer of the new ways and means of Soviet foreign policy will not fail to discover its less pleasing aspects, particularly with regard to the "diplomatic tourism" set in motion between East and West. That the Soviet leaders have begun to conduct an individualized education of Western statesmen in the art of "peaceful co-existence" by inviting them to Moscow is a highly significant development. In this, naive minds may see something like a return to classical diplomacy, but which, in view of the present distribution of power, appears in a rather ominous light. And last but not least, there is the dark ambiguity of a policy which in one area—Europe, works toward "relaxation," but at the same time sets out deliberately to increase tension and the danger of war in another area—the Middle East.

Moscow's Offensive in Asia

The most important effect of "de-Stalinization" on Russian foreign policy is in the determination with which the Soviet Union has entered into an area hitherto closed to her influence and attempted to usurp a

pseudo-protectorate over the world of the Arab peoples-in-transformation. The dramatic appearance of the Russians on the agitated political stage of the Middle East, however, constitutes only one of the manifestations of the intensive interest they take in the peoples of Asia and Africa now rising against the "colonial powers."

Stalin, with all his brutal and uncouth conduct, was bent primarily on preserving the Soviet state and consolidating his conquests. To this aim, he ruthlessly subordinated the interests of Communism in the entire world. His successors, on the other hand, believing the Soviet state quite unassailable today, seem to be pushing the idea of world revolution to the foreground again.

This was made clear by Shepilov, when he told the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of Russia that "the linking of the Socialist revolution with the mass struggle of all the oppressed and dissatisfied in the individual countries" was the hallmark of the present epoch. Moscow is quite prepared to supply the "oppressed" not only with ideological but also physical weapons from its abundant arsenal if the pace of the revolutionary movement against the "Imperialist" powers can be stepped up thereby.

If anywhere at all, there is present here the struggle of Russian foreign policy for influence over the political development of the countries hitherto not committed to either the West or the East. This is a genuine return to Lenin and his familiar theories on the decline and fall of capitalism; that same Lenin who has been credited with the statement that the way to Paris leads via Peiping and Calcutta.

In this large-scale political and propagandist offensive which is being mounted from Moscow the offers of economic aid to the "underdeveloped countries" play a considerable role in courting the sympathies of the "oppressed and dissatisfied" and as a means of embarrassing and harassing the Western competitors. They are likely to serve this propagandist purpose, even if the fulfilment should fall short of the promise, since the recipients are said to be inclined to value one ounce of Soviet aid promised as highly as one pound of Western aid delivered.

Aggressive and Expansive

Drawing our conclusions from these considerations, we recognize that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union in the present period of "relaxation" and "peaceful co-existence" is actually more aggressive and expansive than in Stalin's time. This truth is obscured by Moscow's clothing its ideological-political aggressiveness in new formulas, and by the fact that it pursues an expansion of its influence by methods bearing an outward likeness to the conventional instruments of power politics. It cannot be denied that this greater boldness accepts larger risks.

The reconciliation with Tito and the "de-Stalinization" connected with it—saving the Bolshevik "church" from a heresy that was dangerous because it was successful by way of a revision and enlargement of the official creed—may well give rise to "Titoism" in some other places, especially in the satellite nations where the *ex cathedra* sanctioning of the Titoist variety of Communism might be seen as a

means of achieving a certain degree of national independence.

It seems that the "collective leadership" in the Kremlin is not afraid of running this risk—of which it must be fully aware—because it considers itself well capable of mastering such stirrings in the wrong places, and perhaps also because it is confident that the overall European development, in the long run, will be such that a carefully controlled loosening of the reins in the eastern European intermediate zone could no longer endanger the actual hegemony of the Soviet Union on the Continent.

Nevertheless, the recent uprisings have shown that elementary forces and instincts are still alive in the subjugated satellite nations and cannot always be controlled. The calculations of Stalin's successors include, in addition to the assumed "calculated risks," so many unknown quantities that all the arrogance and sense of infallibility of the disciples of dialectical materialism must underlie their belief that history will run quite true to their textbooks.

The dynamism that has been set in motion by the death of Stalin and "de-Stalinization" in the Soviet bloc, and to which the methods and programmes of the new Soviet foreign policy are now committed, also presents the West with some excellent openings, provided—and this is the crucial question—it finds an adequate answer at last to the Communist challenge and evolves a policy that is more than a succession of planless and contradictory isolated moves against the "Red" player on the political chessboard of the world.

THE ARMY APPRENTICES' SCHOOL

A Survey of

Its Aims, Organization and some Educational Problems

Australian Army Education Corps
Lieutenant R. T. Jones, B.Ed.,

ALL three armed services in Australia have now established apprentices' schools to meet the demand for highly-skilled, specialized tradesmen. These schools are the services' answer to a problem which developed at the conclusion of World War II, when large numbers of tradesmen—enlisted for "hostilities only"—returned to civilian occupations, leaving the services with greatly depleted repair and maintenance staffs. The Army alone, in 1947, estimated that vacancies existed for 4,200 tradesmen, of whom 1,500 should be fully qualified. Under post-war conditions, only three sources of such tradesmen existed—recruitment of already highly-skilled men from civilian occupations, training of selected men at Army Trade Training Schools, and the apprenticeship of selected youths to base workshops and technical units.

These sources proved inadequate. The Army could not compete with post-war industry in pay or conditions for highly-skilled (and thus highly-paid) tradesmen; Army

Trade Training Schools could produce only semi-skilled men, and the apprenticeship scheme could guarantee only 100 skilled tradesmen over a period of five years. This last scheme, however, produced tradesmen fitted to the needs of the Army—they had civil qualifications, as their course was subject to the standards and examinations of a State Apprenticeship Commission, and they were conversant with Army methods and requirements. They were, in fact, soldier-tradesmen. Some development of this scheme appeared to provide the answer.

On 2 August 1948 the first intake of apprentices marched into the newly-created Army Apprentices' School, Balcombe, Victoria. This School, modelled on similar institutions in Britain and adapted to Australian conditions, was the Army's answer to its dearth of trained tradesmen.

Aims and Organization

The primary aim of the School is to produce skilled soldier-trades-

men. A consideration of the definitions of the terms "soldier" and "tradesman" will reveal that this is no simple task. In a service geared to meet the demands of modern technological warfare, the requirements of the infantryman and the base-workshops technician are vastly different; as mechanization grows, so does the gap between the two. The School thus faces a problem of emphasis in training a soldier-tradesman.

The growing realization that the soldier is just as much an active member of the community as the civilian has led to a concern with education for citizenship, along with education in trade subjects such as mathematics and science which are integral parts of any apprenticeship course. It can of course be anticipated that a large number of the graduates of the School will turn to civil occupations on completion of their initial term of engagement.

Finally, many types of tradesmen are required—vehicle mechanics, carpenters and joiners, plumbers, bricklayers, fitters and turners, blacksmiths, welders, radio and telecommunications mechanics, electricians, architectural draughtsmen and clerks. Each apprentice requires specialized training; it can be appreciated that the task of providing an organization which will satisfy the aim of the School and yet allow for the inevitable divergence of requirements of its many parts is not simple.

Basically, the School faces problems of organization similar to those met with in a residential school—problems of quartering, feeding, staffing, providing recreational facilities and so on. The compari-

son is valid on the basis of the age of the apprentices, between 15 and 20 years. The School becomes, in fact, a technical boarding school of a tertiary nature. However, it is also a military institution; as the graduates of the School pass into the ranks of the Regular Army, the School must be patterned upon the conditions and requirements of the normal army unit. As a result, the student is regarded as a soldier subject to military discipline.

The School then assumes a pattern similar to that of a technical school, with trade sections catering for the requirements of specific trades; it also has a residential section, similar to that found in a boarding school, and the whole is overlaid with military overtones. The organization can be classified in three groups:—

Administrative Group

School Headquarters, Quartermaster stores, ration stores, kitchens and the staff essential to these.

Regimental Training Group

Three residential companies (corresponding to "houses") and the staff necessary to control them, and to instruct in regimental training, physical and recreational training.

Technical Training Group

Metal Trades Wing, Automotive Trades Wing, Electrical Trades Wing, Building Trades Wing, Drawing Wing, Clerical Training Wing, General Education Wing and instructional staff in all.

The apprentice divides his time between the last two groups, approximately three-quarters of his

normal working hours at trade and educational training. His recreation time, however, is spent under the supervision of the regimental training staff.

The trade apprentice spends three years at the School, a further year in completion of his apprenticeship in a technical unit. In the three years at the School the average apprentice can expect to spend:

- 1925 periods at Trade Training,
- 548 periods at General Trade Practice,
- 572 periods at General Education,
- 420 periods at Regimental Training,
- 420 periods at Sport,
- 210 periods at Physical Training, and
- 105 periods with the Chaplain or in the "C.O.'s Hour."

This gives a total of 4,200 periods, each of 40 minutes' duration, taken during a normal 5-day week. It does not take into account extra-neous week-end sporting activities or extra night classes. A total of almost seventeen weeks is lost each year in leave periods, examination periods and normal public holidays.

During his first eighteen months (with the exception of a few initial weeks of settling in and introductory regimental training) he can expect to spend half his working time at his trade, and to divide the remainder between education and the other parts of the curriculum. In this eighteen-month period he is prepared for the Army First Class Certificate of Education (Technical), which is set at approximately

Victorian Intermediate Certificate level, and consists of mathematics, science and mechanical drawing appropriate to his trade, together with a common course in English and social studies.

At the end of eighteen months the time allocated to Education is transferred to what is known as General Trade Practice, a self-explanatory term and an essential part of apprentice training. At each stage in his trade training the apprentice is examined externally by the Victorian Apprenticeship Commission, and is given the appropriate Army Trade Test. On satisfactory completion of his three years he graduates from the School and is posted to a unit to work under an Apprentice Master for a further year. When he leaves the School it is presumed that he has qualified in his trade (to the satisfaction of both civil and military authorities), has reached a satisfactory standard of education, and has received his initial military training to allow him to take part in unit activities and to fit him for advanced training.

In addition, selected students may be prepared for the Victorian Leaving Certificate examination. These boys, no more than a dozen a year, are selected on the basis of their ability, and may be interested in furthering their Army careers by gaining entrance to the Officer Cadet School, Portsea, or by preparing themselves for a university diploma course. However, this is an "extra"; they voluntarily elect to take classes outside normal school hours, in the early morning, late afternoon, or at night. As may be anticipated, few of these voluntary Leaving Certificate students gain a

full certificate under these conditions—since the inception of the course only 13 students have gained the certificate, although 42 have made the attempt.

Clerical trainees and architectural draughtsman trainees follow special courses—the former for one year only, aiming at English Expression, Arithmetic, Commercial Principles and Practice, and Shorthand and Typewriting at the external Victorian Intermediate Certificate examinations, the latter for three years (at present, preparing themselves for entry to the Royal Melbourne Technical College course, leading to the Certificate in Architectural Draughtsmanship (educational standard required for entry to this course being passes in specified Leaving Certificate subjects).

For every student, then, the School makes provision for trade, education and military training. It is not without its problems.

Some Problems

These can be broadly classified into those problems which are faced by the organization of the School, and those which develop as a result of student requirements.

Perhaps the greatest problem of a purely organizational nature arises from the fact that three "masters" must be served—military, trade and civil. The first dictates that the aim of the School is to produce tradesmen who will make soldiers, the second is concerned only with the trade proficiency of the apprentice, the third—represented by parents, education authorities and society in general—reminds us that the soldier-tradesman is a member of society, and

must be prepared to take his place in it. How, then, can one School satisfy three such diverse masters? Whether a mechanical allocation of periods—some to trade training, some to education, some to military training—together with provision for moral instruction, will provide the answer to the problem is a matter of some doubt. Certainly, in dealing with adolescents in a residential institution, the influence of extra-curricular activities and supervision is most important. The development of desirable social attitudes is not purely a matter of allocating one period a week to religious and moral instruction. The basis of the problem lies in the use of time outside the classroom, and in the provision of specially selected staff.

The School is a military institution. Regimental training, the residential companies and the general organization of the School are in the hands of military personnel. It is not, however, a normal military unit—its students are adolescents, its purpose is primarily trade training; it is a school in fact as well as name. Staffing the School should not, then, be a matter of posting any available man to a vacancy; it should be a matter of careful selection. If this is not always the case, perhaps it is due to the difficulty of finding enough of the right men in the ranks of the Army.

There exists, also, a dangerous dichotomy of control within the School. There is a tendency to regard the technical and regimental training groups as separate entities—to regard their work as contradictory rather than supplementary. This attitude is held by a number of both staff and apprentices, and

is exhibited in a number of ways—a tendency on the part of the two groups to be over-critical of each other, to be insensitive to the peculiar problems of the other, and in some cases to be unco-operative. This is aggravated by the fact that, although the regimental staff is purely military, a large number of the technical staff are civilian and not subject to the same conditions of service as military members. Where the staff of a trade wing is mixed, personal differences are sometimes magnified. This dichotomy is, however, almost unavoidable, due to the varied aspects of training a "soldier-tradesman."

Again, on the purely organizational side, there is the problem of drawing up a timetable. Allowing for two leave periods (each of three weeks, timed on arrival and departure from the apprentice's home State) and other losses in available time, as mentioned earlier, the working year is of approximately 35 weeks. A study of the total period allocation given earlier will show that, if the apprentice was available to his trade wing for a full-time training period (working on 36 periods per week), he would be able to complete his training in 69 weeks—less than 16 months. Similarly, he could fulfil his educational commitment in 16 weeks, and his regimental training in under 12 weeks. The adequacy of these periods can be questioned—particularly when it is realized that an intensive period of 12 weeks' military training (or 16 weeks' education) is more productive than the same content extended over 3 years and 18 months respectively.

Further, the allocation of time to trade wings is such that most technical instructors agree that the average Army Apprentice leaves the School better equipped in theory than his civilian counterpart, but lacking the latter's practical experience. It is hoped that the graduate apprentice's fourth year, with a technical unit, will provide him with this experience. It is feared, in some quarters, that it does not.

All these problems of organization stem from the nature of the course and the nature of the School. It is felt that a partial answer lies in the British Army apprentice school system—a longer course, with an introductory year devoted primarily to education and a little regimental training.

The School has an intake of over 150 apprentices at the beginning of each year, representing all trades. The selection process begins in about August of the preceding year, with a nation-wide advertising campaign calling for applicants, between the ages of approximately 15 and 17 years, of Intermediate or equivalent or Sub-Intermediate or equivalent standard. Applicants are tested medically and psychologically, and in October-November a selection board meets to interview applicants. This board consists of Command representatives, School representatives and advisers. It has the applicants' scholastic records and the results of physical and psychological testing. There is no entrance examination. Requirements are only slightly different for clerical and architectural draughtsman trainees.

It can be seen that the personal interview is held prior to Intermediate or equivalent standard examinations. The entry standard (for apprentices) is thus more properly Sub-Intermediate or equivalent.

Thus the Education Wing has a period equal to 16 weeks' full-time teaching, taken over eighteen months, to bring apprentices to an Intermediate or equivalent standard in four subjects.

The rate of loss or transfer is high—loss to the School through discharges of a personal or disciplinary nature, transfers between wings of apprentices proved unsuited to the trade in which they were enlisted. Already in the current year (up to early November, 1956) 25 apprentices have been discharged at their own request or for disciplinary or trade reasons; at the time of writing, an internal "Retention Board" is considering some 30 cases involving recommended discharge or change of trade. All three intakes at present in the School are represented.

While it is recognized that wastage under such a scheme is inevitable, it is considered that the number of discharges, transfers and reductions for trade or educational reasons could be reduced by an entrance examination. The loss of a final-year apprentice, whose training will have cost in the region of £4,000 by this time, is no light matter. The problem is reduced to a question of quantity versus quality; it is further complicated by the fact that the School is in competition not only with civil organizations but also with apprentices' schools maintained by other services.

The military code of discipline has already been mentioned. It is perhaps unfortunate that the School operates on the same code as regular army units, made up of adult soldiers. In the early days of the School a recommendation was made that a separate code should be adopted, based upon the age of the apprentices (it should be noted that the Royal Military College, Duntroon, has adopted a code modified from the normal unit methods of discipline). The system was based upon the simple "code of privilege"—all members should be given the maximum privileges, punishment being by withdrawal of these, and maximum punishment being the withdrawal of the privilege of attending the school. This code was not approved.

In consequence, the wise administration of an adult code applied to adolescents depends upon the experience and wisdom of those applying the code. This is, at best, a chancy business.

To fill the gap between the administrators of this code and those under its jurisdiction, an apprentice non-commissioned officer system has been created. It is an honorary system, all ranks from Apprentice Regimental Sergeant-Major to Apprentice Lance-Corporal receiving no additional pay but additional privileges in the form of individual cubicles, wearing civilian dress on leave, exemption from certain duties, and so on. It approximates to a school prefect system; it is regarded primarily as an aid in administrative matters. Again, its effectiveness is a matter of control.

The apprentice also feels the grip of the tight timetable. He is subject to certain duties which occasionally cause him to miss classes for a day (such as duties in the kitchen), or which tire him to an appreciable extent (such as guard duties, with consequent loss of sleep). He may be a member of the School Band, which is called upon to fulfil many engagements outside the School, some during working hours. He may be a member of a guard for a special occasion, which requires rehearsal. As a result of all these duties, the average apprentice loses at least one working week during the year, sometimes more. It is time he can ill afford.

The apprentice thus works under a disadvantage in many ways. He is given reasonable facilities for relaxation, in the form of libraries, cinema shows, canteen, Apprentices' Club, sporting activities and so on. The atmosphere in which he lives, however, is considerably different to that he could expect in a residential school or technical college. It requires an adjustment, both in personal and group attitudes, which is sometimes difficult for an adolescent. The training he receives, the material he uses, are of a very high standard, but he is subject to very great pressures throughout his apprenticeship.

Finally, there is another problem which is felt particularly in the General Education Wing. With no common entrance examination, it is found that the educational standard of the apprentices on entry to the School is subject to considerable variation. It is obvious that the content of the curriculum in one State may differ markedly from the

content in another. However, experience has shown a great discrepancy not only in content but in standard; there is an observable difference in standards between "external" and "internal" Intermediate Certificates. Cases have arisen of candidates holding internal certificates who fail to qualify at external examinations after a further year's work. Although other factors may be involved, a difference in standard is evident.

As a result, the first weeks of educational instruction must be spent in establishing a common basis upon which to build the course. As the educational content of the trade apprentice's training is set by Victorian apprenticeship authorities, this often means a major adjustment to apprentices from another State where subject-content and standard differ. This is particularly noticeable in trade mathematics and trade science, where a standard of pure maths and science must be established before work of a more applied nature can be attempted.

A further complication occurs with the voluntary Leaving Certificate class. At the end of the year, just before the external Leaving examinations, the apprentice must sit for both external trade examinations and Army Trade Tests. This causes a disruption in classwork and also results in extreme pressure on the student.

These are some of the main problems; they find expression in a host of smaller day-to-day difficulties, whose solution—as distinct from a temporary abatement—demands a clear view of the underlying elements. It is to the credit of both

staff and apprentices that solutions to these difficulties are constantly being found—the solution to the underlying problem is thus much closer at hand.

Conclusion

All the foregoing problems are actually educational; they are all concerned with the operation of a School which is residential, technical and military in character. Although emphasis must be correctly given to these aspects of its nature,

it is a school, and therefore its problems are educational in origin; the solution to these problems must be provided in the light of modern educational theory and practice.

After eight years the School is still undergoing changes in organization; these changes are being made with the above problems in mind. An acceptance of the necessity for continued modification and controlled development will do much to provide the ultimate solution.

COMPETITION FOR AUTHORS

The Board of Review has awarded the prize of £5 for the best original article published in the November issue to "Guerrilla Warfare," by Major R. F. Rodgers, Royal Australian Army Ordnance Corps.

LOGISTIC PROBLEMS IN AN ERA OF WHOLESALE MOTORIZATION

Digested by the Military Review from a copyrighted article by
Major-General G. J. Le Fèvre de Montigny
in "Revue Militaire Générale" (France) January 1957

The Revue Militaire Générale is a trilingual monthly magazine which began publication in 1956, and already has proved itself an outstanding publication in its field. The sponsoring committee of the Revue Militaire Générale lists most of the major military leaders in NATO and represents 15 Western Nations. The editor in chief of the new publication is French Général d'Armée M. Carpentier.—Editor.

IN order to utilize to the utmost the result of a successful breakthrough and to shorten the duration of World War II as much as possible, the Allied military authorities had proceeded to increase to the maximum the mobility of the forces by means of large-scale motorization and mechanization.

An extensive organization was to meet, with all available means of modern equipment, the enormous POL requirements and the ever-increasing requirements for engineer equipment and ammunition. Enormous demands were made not only

on required movement capacity, but also on transport organization and traffic control in order to keep pace with the operations.

With no intention of minimizing the expert knowledge or the zeal and devotion which the logistic headquarters and establishments displayed in the fulfilment of their mission, it should be admitted that they did not and could not fully succeed in that task. As a result, the Allied offensive toward the Rhine came to a standstill, since the progress of any operation depends on adequate provision of ammunition, gasoline, and other supplies.

Owing to Allied air supremacy the enemy was able to inflict only small losses on transport, so that—from this point of view—circumstances were most favourable.

Additionally, the efficiently organized German forces were unable to take counter-measures in the period following the invasion, as at that moment almost all bridges over the Seine were destroyed. This clearly

manifested how modern motorized and mechanized army units and their logistic support are tied to the road network, and how the more vulnerable points in the road system—notably bridges—can be of predominant importance.

Finally, unlike before, modern matériel proved more vulnerable and sensitive, resulting in increased demands on maintenance and repair. Due to the combination of these circumstances, more and more personnel had to be committed for logistic support so that in the end not even 50 per cent. of the actual strength could be used for combat.

It was a clear case of disproportion.

It can be contended that the demands made on logistic support as a result of wholesale motorization and mechanization are such that the danger of this support being unable to follow the pace of the operations is a very real one. Further, such motorization and mechanization requires a comparatively large number of personnel employed in logistic support at the expense of the numerical strength of the combat force; this leads to support being tied to the road system, in general, and to the vulnerable points thereof, in particular.

These factors should be kept clearly in mind for the future. They are bound to make themselves seriously felt in a future war. Atomic warfare certainly will add to these difficulties.

Atomic Effect

The problem as to the measure in which a possible atomic war will influence strategy, tactics, and organization, as well as the weapons to be used, is a matter of serious study in

most countries and in inter-allied military quarters. The often divergent opinions are in accord in one respect—that future organizations must be simple and flexible and that they must have adequate mobility, great striking power, and great firepower.

The conclusion would seem justified that tanks and mechanized vehicles will retain their places in any future organization and that, for the sake of required flexibility and mobility, motorization will not decrease. In other words, the difficulties encountered in the last war with regard to logistic support will remain undiminished.

The destructive power of the atom bomb on depots and transport units will surpass many times that of former weapons. Radioactivity will render movement through certain areas more hazardous than ever, whereas the vulnerable points in the road network will gain in importance. Considering that atomic warfare in particular calls for swift reactions, the question arises whether and to what extent the current logistic system can remain unchanged or what changes will have to be brought about accordingly, and, moreover, what modern means can be applied to face the anticipated difficulties.

It is certain that the supply system of World War II was burdened the most, and often unnecessarily, by the wide variety of articles required. If, for instance, the number of types of ammunition, types of vehicles and interchangeable parts, and the various kinds of weapons could be limited, this would appreciably diminish the worries of the responsible logistical authorities.

The necessity for paying separate attention to this self-evident aspect is questionable, the more so because we realize that only gradual improvement would be practicable. Existing armament and equipment, which still serve their purpose and for which countries have suffered great financial sacrifices, are not to be abandoned, with a view to *standardization*, without serious consideration. However, this is a point which should be considered in modifying an organization or in procuring new weapons and equipment. From the national viewpoint it would simplify the responsibility of each country for its own logistic support; internationally it would increase the possibilities of "cross-servicing" and thereby increase the combat effectiveness of the appropriate units.

Standardization of matériel and equipment contributes toward limitation of the volume of logistic support and consequently to a greater flexibility.

Depot System

The prevailing logistic system is based on service from a number of major depots, each of which holds goods of one and the same class only. In the event that one of these depots is destroyed, the supply of this class of goods in a large sector is made impossible for some time, resulting in operations coming to a standstill. From this point of view, the vast depots certainly form paying atomic targets. It may be readily argued that it would be better to proceed to dispersal in width and depth, as in the combat zone. Logistic supply cannot remain based exclusively on the depot system which offers such vulnerable targets. Goods

of one class should be dispersed so as to diminish the consequences of the loss of a depot.

Dispersal of all depots would lead to a very large number of minor depots which, in return, would impose higher demands on movement capacity, traffic control and administration, and adversely affect the desired flexibility and reduction of personnel required for logistic support. Therefore, the solution will have to be sought along the lines of formation of depots for various classes of goods. The vulnerability of such a depot may not be solved, but it does meet the effect which the loss of a depot would have on operations. In this way, depots will constitute less profitable and, consequently, less attractive atomic objectives. Also in this light the significance of the standardization referred to here clearly manifests itself.

Petroleum supply forms, perhaps, one of the most vulnerable points in modern warfare. When the motor fuel supply fails, movements of any importance are no longer possible. This makes itself felt both in the operational and in the logistic sectors. Movement capacity—including that of the civilian sector—is limited and tied completely to the road network. It is not surprising, therefore, that special attention has been paid to this aspect.

During the last world war excellent experience was obtained with the use of pipelines. Laid largely underground, the system is proportionately less vulnerable. By proper use of branch lines it will be possible for a centralized control board to fill the requirements by division of supplies in the event of the loss of one or even more vulnerable sup-

ply points. The system requires fewer personnel and meets many difficulties incidental to surface transport. These major advantages justify the investment of large amounts in a pipeline system prepared in peacetime.

Commercial operations are turning more and more to the use of pipelines in peacetime. It would seem that proper co-operation in this field may lead to good results and guarantee a more profitable return on funds invested in peacetime.

However much the above suggestions may contribute toward greater flexibility and reduction of the cumbersome of logistic support, the fact remains that such support is tied to the vulnerable road network; its continuous operation is by no means guaranteed.

Difficulties may be diminished, but a solution has not been found. The question again arises as to whether logistic supply can be based *exclusively* on the depot system with its vulnerable targets, its dependence on the road system, and its lesser flexibility.

Why not, as in the combat area where every commander has learned to maintain a certain reserve, maintain a central reserve in the logistic sector which can be readily committed as required by the operations or in places where the enemy has succeeded in harming logistic support?

But even in cases in which such reserves are available, supply as a rule will take place via the existing channels and be required to use a damaged road network and an overburdened movement capacity.

Aerial Supply

Too little attention is being given to the possibilities of modern transport by air, notwithstanding the favourable results already achieved in various theatres of operations.

One is deterred, no doubt, by the high expenses involved, for air transport is very expensive. It should be borne in mind, however, that the maintenance of central logistic reserves to be transported by air is probably the only practical possibility to meet all the difficulties set forth here. In this respect we would like to repeat what Field-Marshal Montgomery said during a lecture held before the Royal United Service Institution, namely that air transport is the best way to get supplies to most places, the only way to get supplies to some places, and the speediest way to get some supplies to all places.

Air transport centralized on a high level would enable us to maintain our divisions should normal logistic support fail or when operations proceed too rapidly, and to fill the gaps, if any, in the logistic system itself.

Air transport, independent of the road network and traffic congestions, could serve for the movement of both troops and required supplies.

BOOK REVIEWS

COMMUNIST CHINA TODAY. by Peter S. H. Tang. (Thames and Sudson, London.)

COMMUNIST CHINA TODAY is a realistic and comprehensive interpretation of Communistic totalitarianism in action in China. The author assumes a general acceptance that Communism in China is not a unique brand differing in substance from the Soviet pattern, but rather a specialized application of the principles of international Communism to the Chinese mainland.

It is a first-rate study of all major aspects of Communist China, its history and political structure, its personalities and policies. Not only the Who, What and Why of the Communist regime in China, but also an informative treatise on the potential dangers of the Asian variety of this new despotism and its impact on the free world.

This book is not for the cursory reader. It is encyclopaedic in concept and content. It discusses China's role in the World Communist movement and reviews the various periods of the political-military drive for power culminating in the

Chinese Communist Party victory of 1949.

Special attention is given to the organization and functioning of state and party machinery, and the complete integration of economic, social and military institutions in the move towards Asian "Liberation." Questions of importance concerning Peking's relation with Moscow, and China's position with regard to the neutral countries of Asia, the West including the Commonwealth in general and the United States in particular, are also examined in detail.

The author sees no menace to international Communism from within the Chinese Communist Party; there is no evidence of a renegade movement in China working towards a Moscow-Peking feud to the death. In fact, since the death of Stalin, the Mao Tse-Tung has become the leading theoretician of international Communism and the first outside the Soviet Union to reach that pinnacle.

The reader cannot fail to note the increasing use of the Moscow-inspired propaganda weapon, certainly under-estimated by the general Australian public, in Red China's

offensive towards "peaceful co-existence" in Asia.

Peter S. H. Tang was formerly a staff member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Chungking and an attache at the Chinese Embassy in Moscow. Since 1950 he has been actively engaged in research into various aspects of Communism at American academic institutions.

COMMUNIST CHINA TODAY is strongly recommended. Mr. Tang has not only given a detailed survey of China "yesterday" and "today," but above all has attempted a consideration of Communist China, "tomorrow." It is essentially a book for the student of international affairs who is interested in the military history of the new China and the tactics of "the peasant army." Furthermore, he will develop an understanding, if not an appreciation, of the Chinese political-military machine. As their record shows, the Chinese Communists have perhaps even outdone their Russian comrades in the use of this machine for the development of Party strength, the expansion of territorial holdings and the build up of the armed forces. These objectives, the fundamentals of international Communism, have been achieved with a complete disregard of any concern for the welfare and interests of China as a whole, and any scruples in dealing with other parties.

If there is any criticism of the book from an Australian point of view, it could only be that the author, an American-Chinese, is understandably more concerned with possible Chinese-American diplomacy rather than the question of Red China's relations with the Commonwealth.

—Major S. W. Wicks, AAEC.

A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES, VOL 3 — THE AGE OF REVOLUTION, by Winston Churchill. (Cassell and Company Ltd., London.)

The third volume of Sir Winston Churchill's great "History of the English-Speaking Peoples" covers the period from the coronation of William of Orange as William III of England in 1689 to the defeat and imprisonment of Napoleon in 1815. It thus comprises one of the most formative eras in modern history. Certainly "The Age of Revolution," but also the eventful years of great leaders—Churchill's own ancestor Marlborough, Wolfe, Clive, Nelson, and Wellington; great statesmen—Walpole, Chatham and Pitt; great writers, philosophers and scientists. The development and eventual revolt of the American colonies, the War of Independence, the foundation of the British Empire and the long-drawn struggle with revolutionary France.

Churchill the historian is not the type of writer to minimize the drama of his narrative or to reduce individuals to mere names in the pages of history. He does not contend that the rise or fall of nations is due solely to the shiftings of social and economic forces. He is aware that countless small alterations in personal attitudes, or in the nature of a country's resources all have a cumulative effect on the march of events. Essentially a man of action, "a man's man" in the true sense of the phrase, Churchill is therefore more interested in the results of action or in action than in the effects of theory. It is this factor which gives his narrative much continuity of

vigorous interest and renders it a truly magnificent story; adventure such as is the delight of school-boys and adults alike. The enjoyment derived from this book, one of a wonderful series, is undoubtedly conditioned by the unquestionable zeal and enthusiasm of Churchill's style.

At the end of his reading, the reader cannot fail to feel an intense pride of race in that he has at least shared something of the experiences of the great men of our nation, as represented by one of the greatest minds of modern times.

—Major S. W. Wicks, AAEC.
