AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

NO. 103 D copy
DECEMBER
1957

Notified in AAOs for 31st December, 1957

MILITARY BOARD

Army Headquarters
Melbourne
1/12/57

Issued by Command of the Military Board

A D H Knight

Distribution:

The Journal is issued through RAAOC Stationery Depots on the scale of One per Officer, Officer of Cadets, and Cadet Under Officer.

AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

A Periodical Review of Military Literature

Number 103 December, 1957

CONTENTS

VICTORIA BARRACKS, MELBOURNE

AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

Editor:
COLONEL E. G. KEOGH, MBE, ED (RL)

Assistant Editor:
MAJOR W. C. NEWMAN, ED.

Staff Artist:
MISS JOAN GRAHAM

The AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL is printed and published for the Directorate of Military Training by Wilke & Co. Ltd. The contents are derived from various acknowledged official and unofficial sources, and do not necessarily represent General Staff Policy.

Contributions, which should be addressed to the Director of Military Training, Army Headquarters, Melbourne, are invited from all ranks of the Army, Cadet Corps and Reserve of Officers. £5 will be paid to the author of the best article published each month, and £40 to the author of the best article published during the year.

Australian-Japanese Relations 1918-1941

Major A W. John,

Australian Army Education Corps

THIS period is of particular importance in the history of Australian/Japanese relations, because in it Japan changed from being our ally of the First World War to become our enemy of the Second World War. Examination of the various factors in our relations during the period should reveal some cogent lessons for the future. Why did the nation which provided naval convoys in 1915 for Australian troopships proceeding to the Middle East and Flanders strike suddenly southwards in 1941 at Australia's island possessions with the intention of invading the Australian mainland? Before examining the events of the intervening years, we must first glance briefly at the main characteristics of the two countries.

Emerging approximately one hundred years ago from over two hundred years of almost complete isolation, Japan entered on a period of rapid industrialization and "Westernization." Japan's abiding problem has been described as that of "many men on little land," and the new era accentuated this problem. Almost static during the Tokugawa regime, Japan's population rose to 31 million in 1872, and increased at an increasing rate to attain 70 million in 1938, when the annual increase was approximately one million a year.[1] With corresponding rapidity, the products of her newly established factories mounted, and, seeking an outlet on the mainland of Asia, she came into conflict first with China in 1894/95 and then with Russia in 1904/5. In this process of expansion, she was tutored and encouraged by Great Britain and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, entered into in 1902,[2] was still in force dur-

1. Ourselves and the Pacific—R. M. Crawford (MUP); P. 241.
2. Renewed in 1905 and again in 1911 for a period of 10 years.

ing the period of the First World War.

Conversely, Australia's problem is one of few men on much land. During the same period the people of the island continent had developed one federated Commonwealth from six separate self-governing colonies, but insofar as they lacked direct overseas representation, had only partial control of their own destiny and remained a Dominion of the British Empire. Diplomatic relations of the Commonwealth were conducted through the Imperial Government, though not without consultation, which became increasingly effective following the Imperial Conference of 1911.

Although actively seeking to expand her secondary industries, and to give them security by means of protective tariffs, Australia's main contributions to the markets of the world consisted of primary products, in particular wool and wheat. The pattern has not greatly altered in the intervening years. Thus, added to the factor of proximity, there is an affinity of interests between Australia and Japan. On the one hand, a producer of raw materials and foodstuffs, unable to produce all her requirements of manufactured goods, on the other a producer of manufactured articles unable to produce the raw materials for her factories or an adequate supply of food for her increasing population.

During Japan's period of voluntary isolation all under-populated and under-developed areas bordering on the Pacific passed under the tutelage of Western powers, and Japan was not slow to learn that security of markets depended upon control of markets. In her wars with China and Russia she had acquired such territories (Formosa, the Pescadores, the Kwantung Peninsula with Port Arthur, Korea and Southern Saghalien), as the Western powers were not prepared to dispute by force of arms. Now, at the outset of our period of review, as a result of minimum participation in the First World War, Japan laid claim to ex-German colonies on the Chinese mainland and in the Pacific, north of the equator. All these areas, adding approximately 100,000 square miles to the Japanese Empire, but already thickly populated, could do little to allay Japan's land hunger. Above all, her future prosperity depended upon free access to the world's markets.

Between 1914 and 1918 the European powers were locked in a death struggle in Flanders, and were exhausting their resources in battle and blockade. The Japanese enjoyed a period of great prosperity and did what they wished in China. Trade with Australia expanded—"Exports of wool and wheat to Japan increased more than threefold between 1911 and 1918/19, and zinc, lead and iron ore began to appear as important items."[3]

Associations during the war gave rise to an official movement in Australia to promote studies of things Japanese. A Chair of Oriental Studies was established at the University of Sydney, and this was financed in part from the Defence Vote. The study of the Japanese language was encouraged, and Oriental History and Japanese were

3. Australia's Interests and Policies in the Far East; Jack Shepherd; IPR Enquiry Series; Page 21.

included for study in the curriculum of the Royal Military College, Duntroon.

The period of conference and settlement ushered in with the cessation of hostilities was further complicated by the aftermath of the Russian revolution. Whilst Japanese war-time economic expansion on the Asian mainland was being challenged, she nevertheless provided an army to help occupy the Russian Maritime Provinces around Vladivostok and proved hard to dislodge by diplomatic procedures.

Negotiations over the ex-German colonies were of far more serious import to Australia. Japan laid claim to those islands she had occupied north of the equator — the Marianas, the Marshalls and the Carolines; Australia laid claim to German New Guinea, which Australian forces had taken in 1915, and New Zealand sought control of German Samoa. The system of control originally drawn up at Versailles Peace Conference posed three main principles: (1) the territories were not to be fortified or converted into military bases; (2) there should be free access for the goods of all nations; and (3) there should be an "Open Door" for all nationals.

The proposal as to the "Open Door" was strenuously opposed by the Australian Prime Minister, Mr. W. M. Hughes, who recognized its inherent danger to the White Australia Policy. Equally as strenuously, Mr. Hughes opposed the Japanese proposal for the insertion of a clause admitting the principle of "racial equality" into the peace treaty. His protests resulted in the omission of the proposed clause. As to the ex-German colonies, "C" Class Mandates were granted, under which the responsible power was not obliged to admit foreign commerce or foreign nationals. "The door to Asiatic immigration to the Mandated Territory of New Guinea was barred by the very first ordinance passed under the new system, which extended to the islands the application of the Commonwealth Immigration Act."[4] Japan accepted the situation, but with reservations as to the rights and interests of Japanese nationals.

However, it should not be supposed that arguments at the peace conference were calculated to antagonize Japan, and we find that, at the Imperial Conference held in London during 1921, the Australian Prime Minister argued strongly for the retention of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which had proved of importance to Australia's security in the First World War. The United States had shown interest in the abrogation of the alliance. In any case, the situation had changed, and the alliance appeared to have outlived its usefulness to Great Britain. The scope and volume of Japanese industry was making her a formidable rival in Eastern markets, and there appeared to be a need for an effective limitation on Japanese naval expansion in the Pacific. Instead of a bi-lateral alliance, an overall treaty amongst the major powers concerned seemed desirable.

At the Washington Conference of 1921-22, the British Empire (the Dominion Governments, including Australia, also being represented), France, Japan and the United States

4. Australia's Interests and Policies in the Far East; Jack Shepherd; IPR Enquiry Series; Page 19.

of America entered into a treaty regarding their "Insular Possessions and Insular Dominions in the Pacific Ocean," and accepted limitation in naval armaments on the basis of a 5 (Great Britain); 5 (U.S.A.); 3 (Japan) ratio, with lower proportions for France and Italy. Fortifications and naval bases were also restricted and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance abrogated. The Nine Power Pact, also produced at the Washington Conference of 1921, guaranteed the independence and integrity of China. The League of Nations increased in prestige in spite of the non-adherence of the United States to its Covenant. In all, the early turbulence of the post-war period was gradually lulled until at Paris on 28th August, 1928, the Kellogg-Briand Pact was entered into by the British Empire, the United States of America, France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Japan, Poland and Czechoslovakia, in which war was renounced as an instrument of national policy.

These events brought an increasing sense of security in international relations and, in particular, relations between Australia and Japan improved as their trade expanded. From 1918 to 1929, about 5 per cent on the average of Australia's total trade was with Japan, and the advantages continued through the depression which began in 1929. In that year the value of Australian exports in London fell from £140 million sterling to £90 million sterling, and tariffs were raised as a measure to cut down imports and stimulate employment. Japan became an increasingly important market for Australian primary production. Her imports of raw wool doubled between 1929 and 1933, whilst imports of Australian wheat rose from 1,686,685 centals in 1929/30 to 10,775,964 centals in 1930/31.[5] By 1935/36, the balance of trade in Australia's favour was £9 million sterling, representing over a third of the amount needed to meet overseas interest payments.[6]

Australians seemed in accord as to the importance of fostering trade with the Far East, particularly with Japan. In keeping with this situation, the Government sent a Goodwill Mission under the leadership of Mr. J. G. Latham (now Sir John Latham), the Federal Attorney-General, to tour the Far East in 1934, and a Trade Commissioner was appointed to Japan, other appointments being made to China and the Netherlands East Indies. In 1935, a return visit was made to Australia by a Japanese Mission, headed by a Minister with diplomatic status. An article in the "Sydney Morning Herald" at this time indicated the general tone of cordiality and referred to "the friendly feeling between Australia and Japan increasing since the war."[7] In March, 1936, the Minister for Commerce, Sir Earl Page, stated that—"Australia has watched with admiration the rise of Japan to the first rank of world powers, and we hail with hope the possibilities for extension of our trade to Japanese ports."[8] Everything pointed to an affinity of interests mutually appreciated.

---

5. Australia's Interests and Policies in the Far East; Jack Shepherd; IPR Enquiry Series; Page 26.
6. Australia's Interests and Policies in the Far East; Jack Shepherd; IPR Enquiry Series; Page 26.
7. *Australia's Interests and Policies in* the Far East; Jack Shepherd; IPR Enquiry Series; Page 3, quoted.
8. Australia's Interests and Policies in the Far East; Jack Shepherd; IPR Enquiry Series; Page 39, quoted.

But in May 1936, without prior warning, the Australian Government introduced a new policy, which became known as the Trade Diversion Policy. It somewhat naively took the position that you could do what you liked to the other party without bothering about the chances of reprisals. This remarkable new policy was introduced by arbitrary Ministerial action, without what should have been routine consideration by the Tariff Board and without prior consultation of Parliament. The objects of the policy, as announced by Sir Henry Gullett, the Minister Directing Negotiations for Trade Treaties, were: to increase exports of primary products; to expand secondary industry and to bring about an increase of rural and industrial employment. He further stated that the new policy was to divert trade from "bad customer" countries to "good customer" countries.[9]

It was palpable that Japan could not seriously be considered a "bad customer" in view of the whole post-war trade record, and the tariffs which were now raised against Japanese imports, particularly textiles, caused bitter resentment in Tokyo. The following month the Japanese Government took retaliatory action and introduced a licensing system which drastically restricted imports of Australian wool, wheat and flour and raised duties on hides, skins, tallow, butter, condensed milk and casein. These moves were met with further restrictions on Japanese goods by the Australian Government.

This fundamental change in Australian trade policy did not appear to be in Australia's own interests, certainly not in her own immediate interests. The underlying reasons for the new policy must be sought in wider and less tangible considerations. To begin with, the United Kingdom market was more valuable than the Japanese market, and the expansion of trade with Japan was seen to conflict with the principles of Empire Preference established in the Ottawa Agreements of 1932. Australian manufacturers feared Japanese competition. The Chambers of Commerce and the Association of British Manufacturers were pressuring the Government to prevent Japanese "dumping."

In the wider field of international relations, Japan's post-war policies in Asia had done little to allay the old fears of Japanese Imperialism. Manchuria was invaded in 1931 and the puppet state of Manchukuo set up. The first Shanghai incident occurred in 1932, and provinces in North China were taken over by the Japanese army. Armed conflict between Britain and Japan was feared. The League of Nations took up the question of Japanese invasion of Manchuria, and there was talk of sanctions.

According to Japan, all was done in "self-defence," with an element of "self-determination" and "containment of Communism" included, and, with impetuous disregard for written pacts, Japan stalked out of the League in 1933. From the Japanese viewpoint, she had been impelled into this expansionist policy in order to ensure that markets would not be closed against Japanese products. Since 1931 she had experienced a quota system intro-

9. Australia's Interests and Policies in the Far East; Jack Shepherd; IPR Enquiry Series; Page 43.

duced by the French and the Ottawa Agreements of 1932, import restrictions by the Chinese and Dutch in 1933, import quotas in British Crown Colonies in 1934, and additional duties in the United States, Canada, Australia and other countries. According to one commentator on the situation at that period, "It has burnt deep into the consciousness of the Japanese people that they can have no security of markets except under their flag."[10]

Japan was not alone in her apostasy. She was soon to find kindred interests with Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy as a "Have-not nation" demanding a redistribution of colonies and markets by the successful colonial powers, in particular Great Britain, France and the Netherlands, described as "Have Nations" which sought to preserve the status quo. In these circumstances it was impossible to press on without paying some attention to the prospects of a clash between the "Haves" and the "Have-nots."

However, quite apart from these wider considerations which doubtless influenced the Australian Government, it appears to have been officially believed that Japan could not do without Australian fine merino wool, which suited Japanese looms. It was confidently expected that, although British products would replace Japanese products on the Australian market, nothing could take the place of Australian wool. At the time Australia was providing from 85 to 95 per cent of Japan's raw wool requirements, but, nevertheless, the Japanese turned to alternative sources of supply from Manchoukuo, South Africa, New Zealand and the Argentine. In addition, she had recourse to the production of staple fibre, which was increased from over 13,000,000 lb. in 1935 to over 45,000,000 lb. in 1936. The Japanese Government encouraged the use of this product as a substitute for more orthodox materials in the manufacture of textiles. By mixing staple fibre, cotton and wool from sources other than Australia, Japan was able to dispense with Australian wool. Australia's favourable trade balance with Japan fell from £9.1 million sterling in 1935/36 to £3.7 million sterling in 1936/37.

If Australian manufacturers were happy at the turn of events, it was not so with the wool growers, who, through their association, protested in a most emphatic manner. Clearly embarrassed, the Government asked the wool growers to refrain from criticism, and the Prime Minister attempted to justify the Trade Diversion Policy in a nation-wide broadcast. The Government went still further, and denied publication of statements of the Chairman of the Australian Wool-growers' Council, which had been delivered in a deputation to the Prime Minister on 17 July 1936, in the daily press.

Australian Government policies appear to have been uncertain and contradictory throughout the immediate pre-war years from 1936 onwards. Two months after the Trade Diversion Policy was ushered in, the Government instituted negotiations for a "peace" in the trade war with Japan. In December 1936, each Government announced its intention of revoking discrimi-

10. Australia's Foreign Policy: Ed. W. G. K. Duncan; comment by Mr. R. L Boyer on Page 117.

natory measures as from 1 January 1937. The situation prior to May 1936 was restored, but the Australian wool market never fully recovered from the reduction in prices which attended the absence of Japanese competition. In announcing details of the new agreement with Japan in December 1936, Sir Henry Gullett, the chief architect of the abortive Trade Diversion Policy, stated: " . . . the Commonwealth welcomes the settlement with the deepest satisfaction, and trusts that it will be followed by the renewal of our long and happy trading association with the great Japanese nation."[11]

But this conciliatory note was not strictly in tune with the thoughts on Japan currently shared by most of Sir Henry's countrymen. A month before the statement was made, Japan had come closer in her international outlook to Nazi Germany in signing the Anti-Comintern Pact (which Italy later adhered to). Insults to British citizens in China were being reported in the press almost daily. On 9 July 1937, Japan made full-scale war on China; Shanghai was bombed for a second time and Nanking taken and sacked. This series of events led to public demonstrations in Australia, letters in the press and demands for the boycott of Japanese goods. The Trade Unions actually took steps to prevent the shipment of war materials to Japan.

In the meantime, the Australian Government had continued its conciliatory attitude. In May 1937, the Australian Prime Minister, Mr. J. A. Lyons, declared at the Imperial Conference in London, that—"Australia would greatly welcome a regional understanding and a pact of non-aggression by the countries of the Pacific, conceived in the principles and spirit of the League."[12] This appears to have been in the nature of a random proposal, but the Japanese Ambassador in London followed it up, assuming that some sort of conference was intended, and proposed that the conference be held in Tokyo. However, following the outbreak of the full-scale war with China, Australia sent a representative to the League's Far Eastern Advisory Committee in September 1937, and joined in a resolution condemning the bombing of open cities by Japanese aircraft and branding Japan as an aggressor nation.[13] But, whilst freely sympathising with China, the Western powers were not prepared for active intervention, either with armed forces or economic sanctions.

On its part, the Australian Government seemed ready to be identified with collective action, but opposed to unilateral action against Japan. This was borne out in a series of incidents which now occurred on the Australian waterfront. On 25 January 1938, Sydney waterside workers refused to load cargoes of scrap tin. They maintained their position for four months, and the boycott was extended to Melbourne, where workers refused to load cargoes of scrap tin and scrap iron. The Government countered by threatening

11. Australia's Interests and Policies in the Far East; Jack Shepherd; IPR Enquiry Series; P. 154, quoted.

12. Australia's Foreign Policy; ed. W. G. K. Duncan, quoted Page 106.

13. Australia's Interests and Policies in the Far East; Jack Shepherd; IPR Enquiry Series; Page 79.

the Waterside Workers' Federation with action under the Transport Workers' Act, and the boycott was abandoned.

Later in 1938 there was a more serious industrial upset over the loading of pig iron from the Broken Hill Proprietary's Works at Port Kembla aboard a vessel named "Dalfram." Seventeen trade unions endorsed the action of the waterside workers. A conference of trade union representatives declared that —"to supply iron in any form to Japan is injurious to the national and defence interests of the Australian people."[14]

The Transport Workers' Act was invoked and licensing introduced, but no free labour was forthcoming to load the "Dalfram." Thereupon BHP closed its Port Kembla Works and 3000 men were laid off. The policy of the Unions had a great deal of public support, as evidenced in comments in the press at that time, and there was some agitation for a referendum on the issue of supplying war material to Japan. The Federal Attorney-General, Mr. Menzies, met Union representatives at Port Kembla and emphasized that however incensed at Japanese aggressions and atrocities in China Australia could not afford to follow a unilateral policy in the application of sanctions. He indicated, however, that a general embargo was a different matter, and the Government might change its policy in the future. On the basis of this discussion, the "Dalfram" incident was settled. Subsequently, however, the Prime Minister announced (14 February 1939)—" . . . It has been said that we should impose a ban upon exports to Japan because of Japanese action in China. The Government is not prepared to impose sanctions upon any country except in conjunction with other countries."[15]

Though the prudent logic of the Government's policy could not be disputed, the announcement did little to pacify the unionists, who felt that something tangible should be done to check Japan. At about this time Japanese militarists were uttering threats as to a day of reckoning for the white race. For example—"The White Yoke in Asia must go. . . . The mercantile interests of the whites must vanish. British aid to China must stop even at the cost of war. The rapid realization of this liberation will naturally bring a general conflagration, but, whatever precautions we take the result will be the same, namely, a general conflagration. Thus fate wills it." (Statement by Admiral Suetsugu, Japanese Minister for the Interior.)[16] It was widely recognized that the Japanese entanglement in war with China might save Australia from a similar fate for a time, but the chilling question was—what of the future? The Australian Government remained acutely sensitive to criticism. The Trade Union owned radio station, 2KY Sydney, was denied the air following allegations by a commentator of censorship of telegrams and tapping of telephones in connection with the Port Kembla affair.

14. Australia's Interests and Policies in the Far East; Jack Shepherd; IPR Enquiry Series; Page 82.

15. Australia's Interests and Policies in the Far East; Jack Shepherd; IPR Enquiry Series; Page 85.

16. Quoted in an article in the "Sydney Morning Herald" of 4/1/38.

Of quite a different nature was the action of the Australian Government over the export of iron ore to Japan. Between 1935 and 1938 the Japanese had expended a considerable sum of their scarce overseas currency in preparing to secure iron ore from a lease acquired at Yampi Sound, off the coast of Western Australia. An English holding company, H. A. Brasserts & Company, had acquired a lease following an inspection in October 1934 by Japanese mining engineers. The Nippon Mining Company, a Japanese Government-backed concern, put up the capital. It was expected that production would begin in 1938, and that a million tons of ore a year would be shipped to Japan in Japanese vessels. The quantity would have represented approximately 10 per cent. of the total Japanese requirement of iron ore.

During 1937, however, a campaign developed in the Australian press, with the intention of thwarting the Japanese plan. Attention was drawn to a world shortage of iron ore, to the need of the United Kingdom to purchase outside the Empire, and, specifically, to the folly of allowing foreigners to develop the Yampi deposits. An article in the Sydney "Sun" posed the problem—"It is easy to see the possibility of complications if and when Japan is drawing 1,000,000 tons a year from Australia. . . . Will the Japanese be satisfied with the costs involved in employing Australian labour?"[17]

In the face of this campaign, the Government first of all saw no reason for banning iron ore exports to Japan, because a survey had shown there was abundant iron ore for all Australia's requirements and to spare; a statement to this effect was made by the Prime Minister in September 1937. However, a complete reversal of this policy was announced only nine months later, the announcement being to the effect that, as from 1 July 1938, iron ore exports would be completely banned. Mr. Lyons now described Australian resources of iron ore as "dangerously limited" in view of domestic requirements estimated at 2,000,000 tons a year, and expected to be doubled or trebled in the no distant future.[18]

The frustration of the Yampi Sound venture, on which the Japanese had already spent £6,000,000, brought an official protest through the Japanese Consul-General to the effect that whereas the reasons actuating the Japanese Government in freeing currency for the development of the Yampi project had been the improvement of relations between Japan and Australia, the embargo now applied by the Australian Government was likely to jeopardise those relations. In the meantime, in pursuance of its conciliatory policy in general commerce with Japan, no further barriers were raised on either side, but the balance in Australia's favour continued to decline until in 1937/38 it stood in Japan's favour at £579,622 sterling.[19]

Other aspects of Australian-Japanese relations in the period

17. Australia's Interests and Policies in the Far East; Jack Shepherd; IPR Enquiry Series; Page 89, quoted.

18. Australia's Interests and Policies in the Far East; Jack Shepherd; IPR Enquiry Series; Pages 92/93.

19. Australia's Interests and Policies in the Far East; Jack Shepherd; IPR Enquiry Series; Page 159.

under review were the shipping agreement of July 1938, in which the three Japanese lines trading to Australia (Nippon Yusen Kaisha, Osaka Shosen Kaisha and the Japan-Australia Line) agreed to share the trade with the British-owned Eastern and Australian Company on a 77½/22½ per cent basis for pooled proportions of cargo, and the incursion of Japanese vessels into the pearl fishing industry in northern Australian waters. The first is notable for the significant part played by the Australian Government in the negotiations with the purpose of keeping the British line active in this trade. The second is notable because of the ineptness displayed in dealing with the situation.

By 1938, it was reported that Japanese sampans, operating from the Japanese Mandated islands and served by "mother" ships, exceeded 150 in number, this being the fleet of the largest company operating—the Japan Pearling Company. During the 1937/38 season, the total Japanese haul amounted to 4,300 tons, equal to the total world demand for pearl shell, as against 2,695 tons gathered by Australian vessels, which, in any case, were dependent in their operations on Japanese divers. The market was glutted and the price dropped. There was agitation for a Government subsidy, and it was claimed by Australian interests that not only were the sampans manned by naval personnel, who were spying in Australian waters, but that the crews were trespassing on native reserves and interfering with aboriginal women. A patrol of two luggers was provided to watch the several thousand miles of coastline, and, in April 1937, an ordinance was gazetted in the Northern Territory imposing "the penalty of forfeiture on any unauthorized vessel entering territorial waters adjacent to any aboriginal reserve."[20] These measures proved abortive, as the owners of the several Japanese vessels which were subsequently seized brought action in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory, and in every case were awarded heavy damages against the Commonwealth Government. It was realised then that this was no simple matter of coastguard action, but one involving complicated legal questions which required very full consideration. The whole episode proved an expensive farce, tinged with hypocrisy, as it was demonstrated in court that the crews of Australian luggers were themselves regular offenders against the ordinance cited against the Japanese.[21]

Australia also regarded with misgivings the activities of Japanese interests over the nickel and chromium deposits in French-held New Caledonia. Later events in Europe showed these misgivings well founded, as the conquest of France opened the way for Japanese action in French colonial possessions. In any case, Australia needed nickel and chromium for its own defence programme, and participated in a conference with British and New Zealand defence representatives at Wellington in May, 1939, when, amongst other business, courses were decided upon for the defence

20. Australia's Interests and Policies in the Far East; Jack Shepherd; IPR Enquiry Series; Page 169.

21. Australia's Interests and Policies in the Far East; Jack Shepherd; IPR Enquiry Series; Page 169.

and control of New Caledonia in certain eventualities.[22]

In the meantime, problems of Australian defence had come to the fore, and the old reliance on the British Navy was seen to be unrealistic in the changing international situation. As recently as April 1937, the Hon R. G. Casey had declared that—"Our policy is based on the belief that the British Fleet, or some appreciable portion of it, will be able to move freely eastwards in case we in Australia get into trouble in our part of the world."[23] Just over a year later, in Parliament on 24 August 1938, the Leader of the Federal Opposition, Mr. Curtin, expressed a doubt that had formed in many minds—"If an Eastern first-class power sought an abrogation of a basic Australian policy, such as the White Australia Policy, it would most likely do so when Great Britain was involved or threatened to be involved in a European war. Would the British Government dare to authorize the despatch of any substantial part of the fleet to the East to help Australia?"[24] The effectiveness of the great British naval base at Singapore was in question. It was realised that the base was intended to support the operations of fighting ships, though some preferred to regard it as an impregnable bulwark against the invasion of Australia. This was in keeping with the Maginot Line mentality then prevalent, and it was not until 1940 that the folly of preparing to fight the next war with the defences which might have served in the last was finally demonstrated when the Maginot Line was completely outflanked.

In the opening months of 1939 Japan seized the critical islands of Hainan and the Spratlys. Mr. Menzies succeeded Mr. Lyons as Prime Minister, and the Australian Government continued its conciliatory attitude towards Japan. An intention to establish an independent legation in Tokyo was announced, but it was not until December 1940 that an Australian Minister to Japan, Sir John Latham, arrived in Tokyo. Sir Henry Gullett, at this time Minister for External Affairs, spoke in Parliament in May 1939 of friendship with Japan—" . . . Why," asked Sir Henry, "in the event of war, or even in these days in which we live under the shadow of war, should Japan prefer its new friends in the Anti-Comintern Pact to its far older friends throughout the British Empire? . . . On our side we greatly valued that friendship, and, whatever the future may hold for us, we and our children after us will never cease to honour Japan for the wholehearted way in which it honoured its partnership in the Anglo-Japanese Treaty during the dark days of the world war."[25]

But it was not possible to put the clock back. Japan pressed on and, on 27 September 1940 became a fully fledged member of the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo military alliance (the Pact of Berlin), under which Japan's "right" to establish a "New Order"

22. Australia's Interests and Policies in the Far East; Jack Shepherd; IPR Enquiry Series; Page 124.

23. Australia's Foreign Policy; Ed. W. G. K. Duncan, quoted Page 98.

24. Australia's Interests and Policies in the Far East; Jack Shepherd; IPR Enquiry Series; Page 101.

25. Australia's Interests and Policies in the Far East; Jack Shepherd; IPR Enquiry Series; quoted Page 128.

in Asia was recognized. In the meantime, after the outbreak of war in Europe, Japan increased her advances along the coast of China and, being poised to strike at Indo-China, did so with the fall of France between May and October 1940. At this stage the Japanese Prime Minister, Prince Konoye, referred to a new concept—"The Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere." It was stated that the Netherlands East Indies was to be an important part of this sphere, and, in some reports, Australia was mentioned for inclusion. Except for wishful-thinkers, Australians were no longer in any doubt that as soon as a favourable opportunity occurred Japan would strike at Australia and continue relations at the point of the bayonet.

The chief hope was that Japan had become so completely involved in war with China that she could not risk the extra commitments of a southward thrust. A great deal depended upon the progress of the war. Australia's policy was designed to keep Japan from extending her war by suitable dissuasive action, such as a joint declaration by the interested powers (Great Britain, the U.S.A., and the Netherlands, in particular) that armed intervention would follow further Japanese advances, such as an invasion of Thailand. In February 1941, the Australian Eighth Division was sent to reinforce British forces in Malaya.

A major factor which changed the situation came in June, 1941, with the invasion of Russia by Nazi armies; there was no longer the possibility of Soviet intervention in the China war. The Japanese militarists took this as the signal for further advances southwards, which provoked an Anglo-American freezing of Japanese assets and the cessation of trade with Japan; measures in which Australia concurred. It was now only a matter of time. In spite of her war with China, in December 1941, Japan launched simultaneous attacks against Malaya, Hong Kong, Guam, the Philippines, Wake, Midway and the Hawaiian Islands. A time, which the new Prime Minister, Mr. John Curtin, described as—"the gravest hour of our history" had arrived, Australia was at war with Japan.

Epilogue

This essay is written at a time when trade with Japan is again in the news and the economic circumstances, though not the political circumstances, are not unlike those of twenty years ago. In the meantime, Australia's independence and responsibility for her own destiny have been clarified. It appears now to be fully recognized that with ten times our population and less than a twentieth of our territory, Japan must have access to raw materials and markets for her manufactures in order to live, and that to deny these essentials is to court trouble. It is further appreciated that Japanese trade is important and likely to be of increasing importance to Australia. It is also a matter of history that the same statesman who, in the highest position in the land, uttered these words in May, 1939: "Our primary responsibilities are around the fringes of the Pacific Ocean, and because my colleagues and I realize that this is so, we have decided to press on with . . . a new

Pacific policy . . ."[26]—is again our Prime Minister. It was then too late for such a policy to make any difference to the inevitable trend of events, but a new chapter appears to be opening up. In commenting on the Japanese-Australian Trade Agreement, signed in Tokyo on 7 July 1957 by the Australian Minister for Trade (Mr. McEwan) and the Japanese Prime Minister (Mr. Nobosuki Kishi), Mr. Menzies, then in London at the conclusion of a conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, was reported as saying that "the prosperity of Japan is linked with the peace of the Pacific, and the present volume of Japanese-Australian trade is such that a trade agreement between the two countries is the most sensible thing in the world."[27]

26. Australia's Interests and Policies in the Far East; Jack Shepherd; IPR Enquiry Series; quoted Page 199, from an address by the Prime Minister, Mr. R. G. Menzies, in the Sydney Town Hall on 15 May 1938.

27. "The Age." Melbourne, of 11 Jan 57.

COMPETITION FOR AUTHORS

The Board of Review has awarded first place and the prize of £5 for the best original article published in the September issue to "Changes in the Soviet Hierarchy," by Major S. G. Kingwell, Royal Australian Artillery.

PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS in the ATOMIC ERA

Translated and digested by the "Military Review," U.S.A., from an article by Major Hans-Joachim Hupfgarten in "Das Parlament" (Germany), 5 September 1956

OUR era is more and more inclined to look for the answer to decisive problems in technique. This idea, however, often blithely disregards the fact that men must control technique, and that their place cannot be taken by robots.

Similarly, an extreme overconfidence in technique occurs in consideration of the principles of warfare and war itself. In addition, there are certain factors which also play an important role in war and cannot be neutralized by technical means. Foremost among them are psychological factors.

The dropping of the first atom bomb resulted in revolutionary changes in political and military thinking which often appears to have greatly decreased the significance of the former principles of war. It would seem more accurate to state that nothing more than a major shift has occurred in the order of rank of the principles of war. Nevertheless, as a result of incorrect understanding, the concept of "push-button warfare" has achieved a high place in military thinking. In a general sense it signifies that the individual man has lost his place as a combatant due to the technical perfection of weapons. This is a dangerous state of affairs, for the push-button warfare of soulless robots could seal the fate of humanity very quickly.

The significance of push-button warfare often is greatly exaggerated for political reasons, and easily gives rise to an incorrect picture of a possible war. In the foreseeable future, in most instances, the individual man still must have his same important functions in the front-lines. He will not only be subjected to the effects of all known and as yet unknown weapons, but also to the ever-increasing influence of psychological factors. It is certain that these will owe their origin, in part, to the effects of the new weapons. In addition to these, however, forces and factors always appear in battle which cannot be

measured in radius of action or other figures, and which are often transmitted through the main body of forces as a chain reaction.

Many political and military leaders—for example, Napoleon, Ludendorff and Churchill—have made use of psychological warfare. Psychological factors always have played a decisive role with generations of soldiers, and will continue to do so in the future. In antiquity, the discipline and bravery of the Roman legions did not in all cases successfully combat the effects of Hannibal's elephants on their morale.

The famous battle standards around which troops rallied from the Roman times down to the time of the German wars of unification, disappeared from the battlefield with the beginning of World War I. Also the close cattle contact of soldier to soldier has yielded to the dispersion of the modern battlefield. Today, in the era of the atomic weapons, all areas and domains of the conduct of war have undergone a "loosening up" of all combat formations. As a result of this the individual soldier and commander faces the difficult task of overcoming, alone, negative effects of the psychological factors of battle.

The significance of psychological factors has by no means been reduced by the development of technique. On the contrary, it seems to be increased. A glance at the concept of panic justifies this idea.

Panic

The word "panic" has been tabooed in the armies of all nations. Hardly a commander has ever dared openly to admit panic as the reason for a defeat, for even the mention of the word would have aroused doubts as to the ability and discipline of his unit. Today, when atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction have increased the amount of psychological influence enormously on both the individual and the unit as a whole, every military and political leader must become acquainted with this problem and seek remedies for it. No commander has yet found all the correct answers.

The skilful employment of psychological influence for military purposes begins in time of peace—so we are taught by recent history. For example, a long time before the outbreak of the war Hitler made political use of phychological warfare against the nations outside of Germany, just as he used it later in the military field. The Allies very quickly followed his example after the outbreak of the war.

After 1945 the cold war between the West and the East arose as a way of avoiding a hot war. Today, great weight is attached to the fortification of the mind by psychological influences in all armies. The measures of the positive indoctrination are subject to fewer unforeseen influences in time of peace, and can be carried out without especial difficulty. A wide choice of ways and means is provided by technique. The other great complex, the negative psychological factors, present themselves only in actual combat. For this reason they are more difficult to define; there are no solutions to be found in regulations.

Influence of Command

Command can and must take preventive measures against the negative effects of psychological factors. In atomic combat, however, the direct influence of such preventive measures will be nullified largely by dispersion. The solution of this problem rests, therefore, with the lowest commands and the individual combatants alone.

One of the factors that occurs most frequently is surprise. This results in a temporary crippling of the mind and defence ability. This terrorizing factor differs both in intensity and duration with each individual. There always occurs, however, a temporary state of helplessness as the result of surprise in combat. The enemy will seek to take advantage of this for gaining the upper hand.

Thus, for example, the first baptism with fire is one of the critical moments for a unit. It constitutes a psychological surprise for every individual, particularly since it seldom occurs as described in training. In the past the sabre-wielding officer and stirring bugle calls were able to halt this paralysis quickly during the first baptism by fire. In the era of the atomic weapons, however, the surprise factor of the first nuclear fire baptism can bring about a catastrophe that will decide the outcome of the battle immediately, or, even in the case of a less impressionable unit, badly shake its morale over an extended period of time.

But even disregarding the modern means of mass destruction, dispersion means that combat in covered terrain or in the dark will involve many factors of surprise which the future combatant must deal with alone. The crippling, terrorizing effect of a surprise increases with the mental tension in the man. Sudden reaction to this state often makes the soldier completely helpless during the first few moments. Furthermore, this shock may spread quickly through the entire unit if some of the men do not immediately recover their capacity for energetic action.

Some of the emergency measures and aids in the face of this shock are personal effort on the part of the leader to regain control of his men quickly, and immediate subjection of distress of mind and fear to the customary combat drill, as well as confidence in one's self and in whatever weapon or protective measure is immediately available.

In addition to surprise, other negative factors arise during combat. Some of them appear from over-demands on the forces. Long, day-and-night fighting and deprivations gradually bring about psychic exhaustion. To these often are added uncertainty concerning conditions in the homeland and one's own situation, along with physical exhaustion through hunger, wounds, sickness, and the effects of weather. All these do not cause tensions in the man but do create an unavoidable increasing lethargy—a dulling of the mind—and, as a result, decrease alertness to danger and undermine the will toward instinctive reaction and self-preservation. Under these conditions every officer is presented the opportunity to show his qualities as a commander. In every sector of the fighting he must seek solutions and introduce measures that will bring the psychic load of

his men and of his unit back to an endurable degree. If this does not happen, the negative factors will attain a degree of influence with which the individual fighter can no longer successfully cope.

Irrational Factors

While most of the factors thus far mentioned can be traced to their origin and for the greater part warded off, there are a few which stand in no casual relationship with the life of the individual soldier. For the most part these are irrational factors which are unforeseeable and not ordinarily susceptible to neutralization by human will power. The sudden death of the immediate commander in battle is one of these irrational factors; another is an adversary who is known for his brutal warfare.

The European soldier with his traditional concepts of chivalrous warfare—even though these may be dust-covered or exist only in his subconsciousness—is more sensitive in the face of merciless warfare than a more primitive people. In the last world war the mere knowledge of this type of warfare many times caused shock effects to appear that even led to individual surrenders.

A counter-remedy is difficult to find in such cases, since the point of origin of the influence is in the enemy himself. But often a few courageous individuals who fight against such crippling factors with all their strength can draw the others with them.

A large number of negative factors have their origin in visible or measurable circumstances. They are based, in part, on the effects of new or unknown enemy weapons as well as on the idea that one's own weapons will no longer suffice in repelling an attack. The panic resulting from tank attacks is an expression of these psychological factors to which all fighting armies have been subject. Since we are dealing here with logically comprehensible causes and effects, the primitive type of individual, as a rule, will be more strongly influenced than the intellectual type, who can calculate, with some approximation, the amount of danger that exists.

Summary

The higher the degree to which armament technique results in leaving the individual soldier alone in his responsibility, the more significant the psychological factors in battle will be. Inner stability, combat morale, and combat worth are an indivisible whole. In battle these enable the soldier to withstand the enormous pressure of psychological factors and influences.

An army which ignores the significance of these factors and believes itself capable of solving the problems involved solely by modern armament technique, will very quickly find itself in the maelstrom of catastrophe. Therefore, everyone who is responsible for human beings, whether in politics or as a soldier, must recognize the importance of psychological factors and co-operate in the solution of the problems that arise. Only in that way will the nation, as well as the individual soldier, be able to survive in the era of the nuclear weapon.

OPERATION KADESH

The Palestine Campaign of March, 1957

ISRAEL is surrounded on all sides except her Mediterranean coast by bitterly hostile Arab states who have sworn, individually and collectively, "to remove and destroy this thorn in the heart of Islam." For the Arab states it is not merely a question of winning a little more territory, or an oil well, or some other economic advantage. For them the conflict is total, the total destruction of Israel. For Israel only the Mediterranean is neutral. On all other sides tides of deep and abiding hatred surge around her frontiers. It is not necessary to go into the rights or wrongs of this explosive situation, but it is necessary to appreciate the depth and strength of the passionate Arab resolve to recover the land held by their people for over 700 years.

The situation has always posed an extremely difficult problem for the Israeli defence services, for there is not a point in her territory which is not within easy bomber range from hostile air bases. Further, the country is so small that if she is attacked from two or more sides simultaneously there is practically no room for manoeuvre. The degree of elasticity in defence is strictly limited, for if she yields even a little ground she will lose one or more of her vital centres. If the Israeli army takes more than a few short backward steps it will land in the sea. Yet the country contains few good defensive zones.

Until Nasser came to power in Egypt the Arab states lacked cohesion and central leadership in their quarrel with Israel, a disability which the new dictator set out to remedy as part of his bid for the hegemony of the Arab world. The tempo of the war of nerves and border incidents increased, but remained below flash point while the powers on whom both Israel and the Arab states depended for munitions kept the supply fairly evenly rationed. Russia wrecked this uneasy equilibrium when she began to supply Egypt with large quantities of arms and equipment. Nasser was able to boast with truth that his army was the best-equipped fighting force in the Middle East, and there was good reason to believe that its training had greatly improved. The Israelis considered that the bulk of the Egyptian army, including practically all its armour, was stationed in Sinai, and suspected that much of the new Soviet equipment was stored there.

The seizure of the Suez Canal by Egypt in July 1956 seemed for a



Prime Minister Ben-Gurion

time to have diverted Nasser's attention from Israel. After a while, however, he returned to the verbal attack, apparently satisfied that Britain and France were not going to do anything drastic. In October he appeared to have ensured Arab political and military cohesion by signing a pact with Syria and Jordan, under the terms of which these two countries placed their armed forces under the command of the Egyptian commander-in-chief. In the Israeli view this pact brought matters to a head, for if the three Arab countries attacked suddenly and simultaneously they might not even be able to complete their mobilization. On the other hand, economic considerations forbade them matching the pact with complete or partial mobilization maintained over a long period. As they saw it, their only course was to break the ring by attacking at their own selected moment. If they could inflict a decisive defeat on Egypt, the alliance would fold up for a long time. The pact establishing the joint Egyptian-Syrian-Jordanian military command was announced on 22 October. The Israelis immediately took their decision to attack, and fixed D-Day for 29 October.

The Terrain

The Sinai Peninsula, the barren tract lying between the Suez Canal and the Egyptian-Israeli frontier, is an unpromising area for military operations. Along the Mediterranean there is a very narrow coastal plain, along which run a railway and an indifferent road. Then comes a belt of sandhill country about 70 miles across, rising to a 100-mile-wide desert plateau heavily intersected with numerous wadis and accessible to strong motor vehicles. South of the plateau lie the practically waterless Sinai mountains, filling the southern portion of the peninsula.

Apart from the railway, the principal route across Sinai is the road, known to the 2nd AIF as the Shell Road, which runs from Ismailia on the Canal along the northern edge of the plateau to Beersheba in Palestine. Further south a less-well-developed ancient road, known as the Pilgrims Road, runs across the plateau from Suez to Aqaba and thence to Mecca in Saudi Arabia. During the last few years the Egyptians have developed a strategic road from Suez down the west coast of the peninsula to their fortified positions at Sharm el Sheikh and Ras Nazrani, which control the

Tirana Straits at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba.

Opposing Forces

In the Israeli Army the brigade is the highest permanent formation, and usually comprises three infantry battalions, a field artillery regiment, an anti-aircraft battery, a heavy mortar unit, a reconnaissance element, engineer, signals and service troops. Brigades are grouped into "brigade groups" or task forces as required. Their armoured brigade usually comprises two armoured regiments, a motorized infantry battalion carried in half-track vehicles, a heavy mortar unit and service troops.

The Egyptian Army was organized pretty well on the British model.

Until a few weeks before the campaign the backbone of the Israeli Air Force consisted of about 40 obsolete Mustang fighter-bombers and about 50 transport planes. On the eve of hostilities they received some 40 or 50 modern French Mystere jet fighters, but even this reinforcement left them in an inferior position in the air. The Egyptians had 130 British Vampire and Meteor jet fighters, about 130 Russian MiG jet fighters and 50 Il-28 jet bombers.

At sea the Egyptians were far stronger than the Israeli Navy, which was composed of motor torpedo boats supported by a few frigates and destroyers.

On the eastern frontier Jordan's British trained and equipped Arab Legion was a formidable fighting force which the Israelis had good reason to respect. In the fighting

Egypt's President Nasser

which marked the birth of Israel the Legion more than held its own, occupied a good slice of Palestine, and emerged from the conflict without a defeat. And it was not at all improbable that Jordan would be supported by Iraq, who could contribute a well-trained armoured division and at least two infantry divisions.

Taken by themselves the Syrians were not very formidable, but, if the Israeli army should become heavily engaged on the other frontiers, they could become a serious nuisance.

Israeli Aims

The Israeli war aim was to destroy the effectiveness of the Arab military pact by crippling Egyptian offensive capacity. A subsidiary but highly desirable aim was the

destruction of the Egyptian guerrilla bases in Sinai and the occupation of the Gaza Strip. And, while they were about it, they intended to gain free access to the Red Sea by occupying the Egyptian fortifications at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba.

Success would depend on surprise and speed. The attack would have to be launched so suddenly that neither the Egyptians, the Jordanians nor the Syrians would suspect it was about to take place. Further, the main Egyptian forces would have to be decisively beaten so quickly that the main Israeli forces could be back in Palestine in time to meet any attack which the Jordanians and Syrians might develop.

Opening Situation

If, as the Israelis maintained, the bulk of the Egyptian army had at one time been concentrated in Sinai, Nasser had certainly withdrawn a considerable portion of it to the Nile Delta to meet any attempt by Britain or France to recover the Suez Canal by force of arms. This fact may have been known to the Israelis, and may have been the determining factor leading to their decision to strike. The actual lay-out of the Egyptian forces in Sinai on D-Day appears to have been:—

El Arish-Abu Aweigila Area

3 Divisions of three brigades and a small mobile force.

Gaza Strip

8 Division of one regular brigade and one brigade of Palestinian Arabs.

Several Fedayieen (Commando) units.

Ras Nuzrani-Sharm el Sheikh

Two infantry battalions and artillery units manning the batteries covering the straits.

Bir Gifgafa

2 Armoured Brigade equipped with about 70 Soviet T34 tanks.

The oases and other important points on the central plateau were held by three or four battalions of the Light Mobile Frontier Force equipped with jeeps and armoured half-track lorries. In front of them was a screen of camel reconnaissance troops of the desert border patrol.

In the Canal area the Egyptians had 1 Armoured Brigade and in the Nile Delta two divisions and an armoured division.

All the Egyptian forces detailed above were fully mobilized.

Economic considerations compel Israel to rely upon a compulsorily trained militia; she has practically no regular army units. A secret and rapid mobilization therefore presents a problem which can be overcome only by thorough training and organization. In this case the mobilization order appears to have been passed around by word of mouth, unit and sub-unit commanders picking up their troops at their homes or their work and moving directly into their assembly areas. They have never stated the number of troops employed in this campaign, but their order of battle seems to have been:

1st Task Force

One armoured brigade.
Three infantry brigades.

2nd Task Force

One armoured brigade.
Two infantry brigades.

GHQ Troops
Airborne brigade.
Motorized brigade.
Reserved infantry brigade.

The Israelis planned to destroy the principal Egyptian concentration in the Gaza-Abu Aweigila-Rafah area with a combined frontal and enveloping assault delivered by 1st and 2nd Task Forces. The Airborne Brigade supported by one battalion of the Motorized Brigade, moving via the Pilgrims Road, was to seize Mitla Pass and sweep northward to cut off the retreat of any Egyptians attempting to reach the Canal from the Gaza-Abu Aweigila-Rafah area. The remainder of the Motorized Brigade was to move on Sharm el Sheikh by the extremely difficult route down the east coast of the Gulf of Aqaba.

The First Phase

The Israelis began hostilities late in the afternoon of 29 October by dropping a parachute battalion of the Airborne Brigade at Sudr el Heitan with orders to seize and hold Mitla Pass until the arrival of reinforcements. By about 1900 hours the parachutists had reached the approaches to the Pass, where they were checked by heavy and steady Egyptian fire. They dug in to await their heavy equipment, which was dropped to them during the night.

Simultaneously with the parachute drop, the main body of the Airborne Brigade crossed the frontier near El Kuntila and moved against El Thamad. At the same time, the supporting battalion from the Motorized Brigade overran the Egyptian post at Ras el Naqr and moved by the Pilgrims Road towards El Thamad to junction with the Airborne Brigade. The leading elements met at dawn, and the Egyptian defences were at once successfully attacked.

Although completely surprised, the Egyptian Command reacted smartly. During the night orders were given for 2 Armoured Brigade at Gifgafa to proceed along the north coast road towards El Arish, and for 1 Armoured Brigade reinforced with lorried infantry and additional artillery to cross the Canal at Ismailia and move to Gifgafa. A force comprising two infantry battalions, a few tanks and some guns started from Suez for Mitla Pass.

At dawn on the 30th the Egyptian Air Force sent out its first bomber sorties. They caught the Israeli Airborne Brigade on the Pilgrims Road on its way to Nakhl and inflicted fairly severe casualties. Nevertheless the leading elements reached Nakhl about mid-afternoon and captured the place after a sharp fight. There they found an underground store of Soviet equipment, including some half-track vehicles, which they promptly brought into service. Eager to join up with their paratroopers, the leading elements pushed on without the main body of the brigade, which was having trouble in the soft sand. They reached Mitla Pass in the evening, attacked at once, and were sharply repulsed.

That same morning—the 30th—the Israeli Task Force 2 attacked El Quseima with one of its infantry brigades. The Egyptians not only held their ground; they counter-attacked and drove the Israelis back beyond their start line. A second attack supported by the armoured


SINAI PENINSULA
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
GAZA
KHAN YUNIS
RAFAH
PORT SAID
PORT FAUD
SUEZ CANAL
BEERSHEBA
EL ARISH
BIR ROD SALIM
ABU AWEIGILA
EL AUJA
QANTARA
ROAD
SHELL
EL QUSEIMA
ISMAILIA
BIR GIFGAFA
BIR HASANA
GT. BITTER LAKE
SUDR EL HEITAN
SUEZ
MITLA PASS
EL KUNTILA
NAKHL
PILGRIMS' ROAD
EL THAMAD
RAS EL NAQB
AQABA
RAS EL SUDR
ELATH
RED SEA ROAD
GULF OF SUEZ
AIN EL FURTAGA
GULF OF AQABA
TIRAN STRAITS
DAHAB
TOR
NAQB
RAS NUZRANI
SHARM EL SHEIKH
FIRST-CLASS ROADS
SECOND-CLASS ROADS
MAJOR CARAVAN ROUTES
RAILROADS
NATIONAL BOUNDARIES
RED SEA
APPROX SCALE OF MILES
0 50 100 150

brigade also failed. Later in the day an air strike with napalm forced the defenders off two of their key positions, and about midday the Egyptians withdrew in good order towards Abu Aweigila. An armoured attack on this strongly fortified position had to be broken off after fairly heavy losses. Whereupon the Task Force left portion of one of their infantry brigades to pin down the defenders, by-passed the fortifications over ground thought to be impassable for vehicles, and reached the Shell Road west of the position.

At daylight on the 31st the Israelis faced an unsatisfactory situation; the stubborn Egyptian defence had taken the sting out of their blitzkreig. In the north the Egyptian 2 Armoured Brigade and their 3 and 8 Divisions were still intact, even if they were not showing signs of aggressiveness. But in the centre their reinforced 1 Armoured Brigade from Ismailia was approaching Gifgafa. Further south the fresh Egyptian force from Suez was approaching the tired Airborne Brigade at Mitla Pass. At Abu Aweigila the defenders, through their command of the crossroads, were making the resupply of Task Force 2 an extremely difficult matter.

Second Phase

If anything at all was to be accomplished, it was necessary to clean up Abu Aweigila. Soon after dawn Task Force 2 sent its armoured brigade into an attack which captured the crossroads but not the outer fortifications. The brigade then had to swing north to meet an attack by the Egyptian 2 Armoured Brigade from the direction of El Arish. The remainder of the Task Force continued the attack, concentrating their artillery fire on each Egyptian gun position in turn. By these means resistance was overcome bit by bit, and only two localities were holding out by nightfall. Leaving a detachment to deal with these, the Task Force hastily reorganized to meet the Egyptian 1 Armoured Brigade, which, despite constant air attack, had almost reached a point where its intervention could be decisive.

At Mitla Pass the Airborne Brigade put forth a mighty effort to capture the feature before the arrival of the Egyptian force from Suez. After a day's hand-to-hand fighting the Pass was in Israeli hands, though Egyptian aircraft were giving them a lively time. After more than three days of continuous marching and fighting, the Airborne Brigade was now so exhausted that a moderately strong counter-attack would probably have wrecked it. Fortunately the Israeli airmen had been able to delay the march of the Egyptian column from Suez.

A few hours before this crisis in the campaign Britain and France delivered their ultimatum to Nasser, followed soon afterwards by their first air strike against the Egyptian airfields. Nasser reacted at once by ordering the immediate withdrawal from Sinai of all units except the garrison at Sharm el Sheikh.

31 October dawned with the Egyptians concentrating their main effort on holding the communication centres long enough for their advanced troops to get through, and the Israelis trying to get across the lines of retreat.

In the central sector the Egyptian 1 Armoured Brigade, now without air support and fully exposed to Israeli air strikes, strove to hold its position in order to give Egyptian formations in the northern sector a chance to get away. But those formations were now under heavy pressure by the Israeli 1st Task Force which had penetrated the minefields south of the Gaza Strip and attacked Rafah from the south. The first assault failed, but the Israeli artillery outranged the Egyptians' guns, and by the morning of 1 November the defences began to crumble. Before midday Rafah had been captured, El Arish was under attack and the Egyptians in Khan Yunis and Gaza were cut off. During the day Israeli lorried infantry relieved the Airborne Brigade at Mitla Pass.

On 2 November heavy fighting continued in the Gaza-El Arish area. During the morning the Israelis captured El Arish and found large stores of Russian equipment. Pursuit of the retreating columns, already disorganized by air attack, was immediately undertaken. Gaza surrendered about midday, leaving Khan Yunis the only position in the northern sector still in Egyptian hands. An Israeli armoured attack during the afternoon was crushed by the Egyptian gunners. Then the Israelis brought up their heavy weapons, and the out-ranged and out-gunned Egyptian artillery was methodically reduced to silence. All the same, the defences were not penetrated until the next morning, and the last pocket of resistance not overcome until midday on 3 November.

While the fighting had been going on in the Gaza-El Arish area on 2 November the Israeli armoured brigade of the 2nd Task Force collided with the air-battered Egyptian 1 Armoured Brigade near Gifgafa. In a running fight which lasted all the afternoon, and in which the Israelis enjoyed a monopoly of air support, the Egyptian armour was totally defeated and forced into a disorganized retreat. At nightfall the pursuit halted 10 miles from Ismailia, the limit of approach to the Canal imposed in the Anglo-French ultimatum. At Bir Rod Salim the Israelis found further extensive underground stores of Russian equipment.

All this time Egyptian pockets were still fighting back strongly at Abu Aweigila. Only when all hope of retreat was gone did they surrender.

By the evening of 3 November all Egyptian resistance in the central and northern sectors had ended.

Sharm el Sheikh

During the fighting in the centre and north, Israeli forces were moving steadily towards their other primary objective—the Egyptian fortifications at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba. The GHQ Motorized Brigade reached Ras el Naqb on 31 October. There a week's rations, fuel and water for each of the 220 vehicles were loaded, and the brigade started its march down the appalling coastal route. On 2 November they reached Dahab, where they took on supplies from a small vessel which had sneaked down the coast from the Israeli port of Elath. On 4 November they reached Naqb, and the next day they ran into resistance at Ras Nuzrani, which had

been under constant Israeli air attack. Here an Egyptian rear party put up a stout fight. By-passing the pocket, the main body of the Israelis pressed on and contacted the Sharm el Sheikh perimeter late in the afternoon. By any man's standards that was a notable march.

Meanwhile the Anglo-French intervention had caused the Israeli command to divert the Airborne Brigade from its intended sweep to the north along the Canal. The brigade was now ordered to move on Sharm el Sheikh by the Red Sea Road. The brigade reached this road near Ras el Sudr soon after midday on 2 November. While they were rolling southward during the afternoon the Israelis air force dropped two parachute companies at the small town of Tor. The paratroopers quickly seized the airfield, and an infantry battalion was flown in to secure the air head. The Airborne Brigade reached the air head on 3 November, took on supplies and continued its march.

At first light on 5 November the Motorized Brigade launched its first attack against the fortifications at Sharm el Sheikh and suffered a severe rebuff. The commander called for air support, which was promptly laid on. The Egyptian gunners fought back strongly and brought down several planes. The diversion, however, enabled the Israeli infantry to penetrate the defences at several points. At this juncture the leading elements of the Airborne Brigade struck the other side of the perimeter, and the Egyptian commander surrendered. The campaign was over.

Review of the Campaign

In launching Operation Kadesh the Israelis achieved complete surprise, but they were surprised themselves by the strength of the Egyptian response. Even with the assistance provided by the Anglo-French intervention the operations took longer than they expected, and they had to commit their last reserve to conquer the Rafah-Abu Aweigila-El Arish triangle.

On the question of whether the Israelis were forewarned about the Anglo-French intervention the available evidence is so conflicting that no firm conclusion can be arrived at. There is no doubt, however, that everyone knew about the threat to Egypt posed by the Anglo-French concentration of force on Cyprus. This threat of itself forced Nasser to deploy about half his available strength in the Nile Delta facing the Mediterranean, and created a situation favourable to the Israeli attempt to break the Arab alliance.

Whether the result would have been any different without the intervention it is impossible to say. We can, however, point out that from that moment the Israelis enjoyed absolute, unchallenged command of the air, with all that that implies on the naked desert. Whether the Egyptian formations from the Delta could have arrived in time to avert the defeat of their forces in Sinai is doubtful. But their armoured division might have arrived in time to strike the Israelis before they could reorganize, at the moment when they were stretched to the limit. And what might have happened if the Egyptian air force

had not been suddenly grounded by the Anglo-French air strikes?

All this, however, is in the realm of speculation. What is certain is that the Israelis conducted their operations with imagination, skill and daring. They took great logistical risks, and if they only just scraped through that was sufficient. All the old lessons of desert fighting are there, particularly the disabilities suffered by columns caught on the move by superior air power, and the unwisdom of relying on fixed positions unsupported by strong mobile forces. But the greatest surprise of the campaign was the performance of the Egyptian forces. While still well below Western standards, they have come a long way since their conflict with Israel in 1948.

Results of the Campaign

The Israelis achieved all their military objectives, but the Anglo-French intervention, coupled with the attitude taken up by the United States, robbed them of the political fruits of victory. Nasser has been able to make out a plausible case to show that he would have won if the British and French had not interfered. At the very least he has been able to argue convincingly that defeat in Sinai was due to the Anglo-French on his rear rather than to the Israelis on his front. And the American assertion that Israel was the aggressor, an assertion which blandly overlooked the Egyptian blockade, their constant raiding across the border and their openly menacing attitude, enabled him to assume an air of injured innocence. The influence of these two factors deprived Israel of her primary political aim—the destruction of Egyptian prestige by the decisive defeat of her armed forces. Further, even if she did capture a large proportion of the Russian equipment, the Egyptians more than made good the loss by seizing the stores in the British military base in the Delta.

Nevertheless, Israel did gain a valuable breathing space and relief from the intolerable pressure. United Nations forces now hold her southern frontier, and that border is free from the Egyptians' nightly incursions. UN forces also hold the Tirana Straits, and Israeli ships have free access to the Red Sea.

Basically the campaign settled nothing. The underlying problem, "the thorn in the heart of Islam," remains unsolved.

THE EMPLOYMENT OF TRANSPORT IN ATOMIC WARFARE

Lieutenant-Colonel S. Kamath
Army Service Corps

"The army is vitally concerned in solving the problems raised by the introduction of nuclear weapons on the battlefield."

"The new missiles have almost unbelievable possibilities . . . the potentialities of such missiles, if or when equipped with nuclear warheads of various sizes, stagger the imagination."

"The army should be capable of employing atomic firepower . . . of engaging and defeating a quantitatively superior enemy through superior tactical and logistic mobility, vastly increased firepower capability, battle intelligence, control and command facilities."

—Lieutenant-General James M. Gavin, US Army.

THE extracts quoted above summarize admirably the problems which are at present facing every country consequent on the discovery of nuclear power and its use as a weapon of destruction. From an analysis of these extracts the following salient points emerge: first, the imperative need for an objective study of the use and effects of nuclear weapons; second, an admission of the fact that for lack of practical experience such a study is bound to be of an exploratory nature; third, an acceptance of the fact that in order to defeat the enemy a country should itself be capable of using nuclear weapons and should employ superior tactics; and lastly, that a nuclear war will presuppose vast changes in the administrative set-up in that it will have to provide for greatly increased mobility and control and command facilities.

The opinions of many writers of military repute on the impact of nuclear weapons on the conduct of

—From the Army Service Corps Journal, India.

future wars, and the incidental changes in tactics and organization, show a surprising similarity of view. It is generally agreed that the basic principles of war and tactical doctrine would remain essentially unchanged. Such changes in the tactical employment of forces in any operation of war, as have been suggested so far, can at the most be considered as adaptations and modifications to meet a given set of aerial and field conditions.

As will be seen from the statement of General Gavin, greater stress is laid on increased mobility. This would suggest, from an administrative angle, the need in any future war for greater troop lifting resources. The modified tactical doctrine would no doubt affect the employment of transport in forward areas, in other words. the employment generally, of formation transport.

The ASC is, however, concerned with the administration and employment of transport throughout the theatre of operations. Therefore, no study of the impact of nuclear weapons on the working of mechanical transport would be complete until this problem is examined, as it affects the whole administrative set-up from base to forward troops.

To facilitate such a study we propose dealing with the subject under the following broad classifications: first, general considerations; second, atomic targets in so far as they relate to mechanical transport; third, the impact of atomic warfare on the working of mechanical transport—in the base and advance base, along the communications zone, and in the forward areas.

General Considerations

Briefly, the arguments of writers on the impact of atomic weapons on the conduct of a future war narrow down to one requirement and that is the avoidance, at any stage of any operation of war, of a "profitable atomic target." In the ultimate analysis it is this requirement which places limitations, as far as we are concerned, on the administrative machinery and its functioning.

In bringing about the changes in organization and administrative set-up, dictated by this necessity to avoid presenting a profitable atomic target, we should take into consideration the practicability of counter measures; our resources in material and money; and limitations of manpower.

Avoidance at any stage of a profitable atomic target would at once suggest a high degree of dispersion. Yet a balance has to be struck between this requirement and the imperative need of effective control. Increased distances between units and sub-units would also necessitate excellent communication facilities. Added to this is the consideration of "combat readiness," or, more precisely, when this term is applied to administration in the field, the question of "functional efficiency." Wide dispersion and the breaking up of administrative units and echelons into small packets would greatly affect their efficient functioning.

As mentioned earlier, the changes, modifications and counter measures suggested should be practical and correlated to our resources. Road transport will always remain an indispensable means of transportation. The amount of airlift which can be made available even with the

inevitable expansion of air power and the inclusion of the latest types of transport aircraft could at best be considered as a bonus to supplement the normal land communications. Any suggestion that maintenance of field formations in a future war would entirely, or even to a great extent, depend on air transport lift does not take into account two main practical implications, i.e., our resources and financial limitations and the necessity for establishment of air superiority at all times to permit the use of air transport lift.

It has been suggested in some quarters that the transport vehicles of the future should provide for better cross country performance. Experiments in this field have indicated that increased cross country performance can be had by employing tracked or semi-tracked vehicles (the latter having only the rear suspension tracked), or vehicles having heavy front and side suspensions, enabling them to maintain balance over broken country.

To attempt to replace our entire transport vehicle fleet with any of the above types of vehicles would be to attempt the impossible. Even if we were to accept that we would at a future date be able to produce all varieties of vehicles indigenously, the cost of total replacement would be prohibitive.

But apart from considerations of finance and availability, the very functioning of road transport in the field would tend to suggest a narrowing down of our requirements of such vehicles. Increased cross country performance will to a great extent militate against speed. The necessity for wider dispersions between combat units in forward areas and constant changes in groupings of forward formations would suggest a need for better cross country performance vehicles in forward areas only.

The discussion in the succeeding paragraphs is based on the foregoing general considerations and assumptions.

Atomic Targets in Relation to Road Transport

Nuclear destruction can be delivered in any of the following ways: by aircraft dropping nuclear bombs on selected targets; by artillery shells, charged with nuclear war heads, and by rockets and missiles.

Atomic power being what it is, the scale of provision of atomic bombs and shells will be controlled and co-ordinated at the highest level. In general it can be taken for granted that atomic weapons will not be dissipated on targets which do not constitute worthwhile atomic targets. So far as transport is concerned, what will constitute a worthwhile atomic target would be a large concentration of vehicles. It will be well worth it, therefore, to consider the maximum size of transport unit which one can afford to concentrate in one area without making it a target for the various types of atomic attack.

The above reflections would limit the size of transport units which could be concentrated in any one area (i.e., the size of units in harbour), to the following: in the case of nuclear air attack—a transport unit of HQ and two platoons; in the case of artillery shells, rockets, missiles charged with nuclear warheads —one transport platoon.

As far as the base, advance base and the communications zone maintenance axis is concerned, the danger from enemy artillery shelling can be ruled out, because of considerations of range. Apart from this the chances of artillery shelling or delivery of rockets and missiles on to a transport unit in harbour can be minimized by frequent changes in location and the maintenance of a high order of secrecy, camouflage and deception. While on the move, the danger of attack can be completely narrowed down to aerial attacks only, because of the limitations a moving target places on ranging of other types of weapons discussed above.

The conclusions that we can draw so far are: transport units along the communications zone are mostly vulnerable to air attack, especially when their concentration in an area is considered in conjunction with other administrative units; transport units in the combat zone are vulnerable to all kinds of atomic attack when such units, either themselves, by virtue of their size, or in conjunction with the concentration of ground forces, make a worthwhile atomic target. The use of artillery shells with atomic warheads in forward areas would further limit the size of a transport unit.

Base and Advance Base

It is proposed to deal with the functioning of road transport in base and advance base separately from the rest of the communications zone, because of the peculiarity of the working of mechanical transport in these places.

It has been assumed that the administrative installations in the base and advance base would not follow the conventional layout so far adopted but their layout would provide for: greater dispersion not only between depots but in stocks of individual depots; holding of stocks of commodities and items more on the composite and balanced stock basis; the setting up of self administering and almost self contained administrative sub-installations; excellent communication facilities for command and control; alternative headquarters, at least at certain levels of command and control.

The function of mechanical transport in the base and advance base is its use in the stocking of depots and in the internal depot work. The changes visualized in the preceding paragraph would literally amount to groups of vehicles working for comparatively small size depots and dumps, widely spread and carefully concealed. So, as against central pools of mechanical transport to be found in more or less concentrated places in one area, as in the past, the future allotment and positioning of transport would be in relation to particular depots or dumps. These groups at any one place should not exceed the size of two platoons as discussed earlier. To avoid the possible danger of disclosing the concealed depots or dumps and, above all, to avoid the possibility of enlarging a target, the groups of vehicles should be harboured away from the depots to which they are attached for work.

The functioning of these groups could still be centrally controlled and co-ordinated, say at a communications zone base area or sub-area level, by provision of communication facilities. Wireless, duplicated by line, should be quite adequate.

As the transport duties follow more or less a fixed routine, frequent changes of allocations or changes of orders would in any case be an exception rather than a rule.

Communications Zone

The haulage up the communications zone to the formation maintenance areas is perhaps the most difficult problem which will face the future employment of mechanical transport in the field.

Road transport will always remain one of the main means of transportation. Speed of operation, considering the long turn-rounds, would make mechanical transport operating up the communications zone essentially road bound. The limitations imposed by road space would make the employment of uneconomically small groups of vehicles, operating independently, almost an impossible proposition. The modifications and and aids necessary to induce cross country performance would reduce the speed of vehicles, and the excessive turnrounds thus imposed would result in unimaginable numbers of expensive vehicles being utilized for a given task.

Individual running (defined as groups of vehicles not exceeding ten in number proceeding at the highest possible speed) has been advocated by some schools of thought. Considering the availability of roads and road space and the amount of traffic on the maintenance axis of a communications zone, this type of running will never achieve results.

In view of the above, and what has been stated earlier on the question of a profitable atomic target, the most feasible course would be to run convoys of economical groups, say, of two platoons strength with decreased density. A density of 10 vtm or less has been found from experience to provide adequate safety from air attack, as a column of vehicles with this density does not give the impression of a formed column of vehicles from the air.

Road space plays an all important role in the employment of mechanical transport. Best use should be made of all available routes, and tracks should be improved to make them vehicle worthy.

Night driving will gain more importance in future. The training of drivers in the operation of mechanical transport by night is therefore an important consideration. In fact, individual training will have to be given more emphasis and drivers should become self-reliant. The briefing on any task or mission will have to filter right down to individual drivers, whose individual initiative will be taxed more and more in any future war.

The necessity for the existence of a number of routes and the improvement of tracks to vehicle-worthy conditions will bring in certain administrative problems. The use of alternate routes by transport columns, when forced to do so, would require the establishment of refuelling stations en route on all possible routes leading to destination. Extra fuel consumption will naturally be incurred due to detours and possibly by a certain amount of cross country performance in low gear. Transport vehicles could also be modified without great difficulty to carry larger quantities of fuel in vehicle tanks, or possibly by the provision of additional emergency vehicle tanks.

Inter-communication facilities for

command and control of sub-units down to a platoon or even to a section level may have to be considered. Wireless sets of longer ranges, possibly 19A sets, would meet the requirement. The practice of issuing definite movement orders may give place to general directives or policies within the scope of which sub-unit commanders could function and carry out a given requirement, reliance being placed on individual initiative and appreciation of a particular situation.

Formation Transport

As discussed earlier, the tactical employment of forces in a future war would involve: frequent and speedy groupings and regroupings; the widest dispersion of forces in contact with the enemy, consistent with combat efficiency; greater mobility to provide for speed of action.

The very requirement of increased mobility would increase our commitments for troop lifting and this commitment may have to be accepted as a distinct one even in an infantry division, much as it is recognised in an armoured division.

Earlier discussion has shown that the likelihood of artillery shells and rockets with atomic heads being used would limit the size of transport units in the forward areas to a greater extent than transport units in the rear. This size can be estimated to be a platoon strength.

Tactical modifications would also bring in the need for greater cross country vehicle performance. Decentralisation of control would have to be extended and self-sufficiency in POL and rations for the administrative needs of the transport unit and sub-units would have to be contrived.

The principle of operating formation transport as a pool cannot entirely be sacrificed to the need for decentralised control. These two requirements are contradictory and therefore decentralisation would have to be within the limits placed by the general policy. Therefore, the practice of issuing administrative orders would give place to the issue of general policy directives. Intercommunication facilities, as discussed earlier, would also have to be improved and multiplied.

In this study we have seen that the introduction of atomic weapons would leave the basic principles of war unchanged, but would necessitate certain changes in the administrative set-up and its modus operandi. As far as ASC transport in this set-up is concerned, the important changes would include reducing the size of transport units in the field; replacing the present very vulnerable convoy system of movement by one in which small groups of vehicles travel at a low vtm; and finally, substituting the present type of vehicles employed in forward areas by those with greater cross country performance. The necessity for these measures, their adequacy in meeting the new atomic threat, and the feasibility of their employment in relation to our resources, have, it is felt, been amply demonstrated.

AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

INDEX

1957

No. 92 JANUARY, 1957 — No. 103 DECEMBER, 1957

PART 1

TITLE INDEX

PART II

SUBJECT INDEX