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Editor:

COLONEL E. G. KEOGH, MBE, ED (RL)

Assistant Editor:

MAJOR W. C. NEWMAN, ED.

Staff Artist:

MISS JOAN GRAHAM

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LEADERSHIP in MANAGEMENT



Field-Marshal Sir William Slim, GCB, GCMG, GCVO, GBE, DSO, MC
Governor-General of Australia

This address was delivered by His Excellency to the Adelaide Division of the Australian Institute of Management on 4 April 1957. It is the fourth William Queale Lecture, a memorial established to commemorate the name and work of the late William Queale, who played a leading part in the development of the Institute.—Editor.

ON 1939 there were in Australia 27,000 factories employing half a million people; in 1955, 16 years later, there were 51,000 employing a million. That is a phe-

nominal expansion. It is still going on and must go on if Australia is to become, as we all mean her to be, a great nation based on a well balanced economy. But a movement of this impetus and magnitude holds perils as well as promises. Ill directed, unintelligently or selfishly directed, it will either collapse in ruin on itself or, losing its way, bring more in human misery than in happiness. There can never be growth on the scale required which is at the same time dynamic and healthy without sound direction. Yet already in Australia expansion is outstripping the supply of men trained in management. The most vital ques-

tion in industry today is, therefore, where and how shall we find the right men to inspire and direct this expansion.

William Queale was a man, who, rather sooner than most of us, realized this outstanding and growing need in industry. These annual lectures commemorate his life and work, but his real memorial is the influence he had, and which is still felt, in the remarkable industrial advance of South Australia. As an enlightened exponent of individual and private enterprise, he was not content, as some successful men have been, merely to make a financial success of his undertakings. He took pains to be as good a citizen as he was a business man; to see that his commercial and industrial achievements benefited many besides himself and that they were a real contribution to the whole community in which they operated. Much of his success was due to his far-seeing views on management, and it was his practical interest in the subject that led him to take a leading part in the foundation and growth of the Institute of Management in Australia.

Three of these annual lectures have already been given. One by the Prime Minister of Australia and one by the Premier of this State—both men who have played a large part on the political level in Australian industry and its development. The other lecture was delivered by a distinguished University professor, who had made a study of the financial structure of industry. That all three were well qualified to speak, with knowledge and authority, on aspects of industrial affairs was obvious. What is perhaps not so obvious is why a soldier—a general—should be asked to give this, the

fourth lecture. What could a general have to say that was worth listening to about management? What a queer choice!

Yet is it? Consider a moment. In any great city—Adelaide, if you like—day and night, an immense variety of activities, public and private, go on. Hundreds of thousands of people are fed, clothed, housed, moved, educated and entertained. Vast quantities of materials are transported; large-scale construction, manufacture, and maintenance are carried out; police, public health, water and communications services are provided. Churches are active, law courts function, the output of newspapers and the radio is ceaseless. A thousand other needs of a modern community are met. Yet there is no activity among all these that is not daily carried on also in the Army—and carried on, too, often under conditions far more difficult than ever municipality or industry has to grapple with.

What industrial corporation has attempted an enterprise comparable in extent, complication, or difficulty with the invasion of France or with any of a dozen operations of the last war? Yet generals planned, organized, co-ordinated and carried out those vast undertakings—they managed them and, on the whole, managed them very successfully. Why shouldn't they? After all, soldiers were the first to practise—and what is more to study—organization and management. We should, after the thousands of years we have been practising management and passing or failing our tests in it, have learnt something about it. So perhaps, after all, a soldier need not be too shy at speaking on management even to such an informed audience as this.

There is one point, however, I must make clear. People are always ready to tell generals what they ought to do—or more often what they ought to have done—I am not returning the compliment. I am not telling you how to run your own businesses. All I will try to do is to say something about the Army view of management. How far, if at all, anything I say could be applied to your work and your problems is entirely for you to judge.

The problems met at the top of any great organization whether military or civilian, are basically the same—questions of organization, transportation, equipment, resources, the selection of men for jobs, the use of experts and, above all and through all, human relations. Now while the problems are much alike, there are certain differences between the military and the civil approach to them and in the climates in which they have to be solved.

To begin with, we do not in the Army talk of "management," but of "leadership." This is significant. There is a difference between leadership and management. The leader and the men who follow him represent one of the oldest, most natural and most effective of all human relationships. The manager and those he manages are a later product, with neither so romantic nor so inspiring a history. Leadership is of the spirit, compounded of personality and vision; its practice is an art. Management is of the mind, more a matter of accurate calculation, of statistics, of methods, time tables, and routine; its practice is a science. Managers are necessary; leaders are essential. A good system will produce efficient managers but more than that is needed. We must find managers who

are not only skilled organizers but inspired and inspiring leaders, destined carefully eventually to fill the highest ranks of control and direction. Such men will gather round them close knit teams of subordinates like themselves and of technical experts, whose efficiency, enthusiasm and loyalty will be unbeatable. Increasingly this is recognized and the search for leadership is on.

What should we look for? Where are we likely to find it? When we have found it, how shall we develop and use it? Can the experience of the Army be any help? Let us see.

In this matter of leadership we in the Fighting Services have, of course, certain very marked advantages over civil life:—

- (i) The principle of personal leadership is traditional and accepted.
- (ii) Besides, there is a strict legal code for the enforcement of obedience to lawful direction.
- (iii) Officers and men recognize that they are on the same side, fighting together against a common enemy.
- (iv) Then commanders do not, in war at any rate, have to pay so much regard to the financial effects of their action.

I can well understand a business man saying, "If we had all that, management would indeed be simple!" So, lest you should think that military management is too easy, I would remind you that:—

- (i) Personal leadership exists only as long as the officers demonstrate it by superior courage, wider knowledge, quicker initiative and a greater readiness to accept responsibility than those they lead.

- (ii) Again military command is not just a matter of bawling orders that will be obeyed for fear of punishment. Any commander's success comes more from being trusted than from being feared; from leading rather than driving.
- (iii) Officers and men feel themselves on the same side only as long as the officers, in all their dealings, show integrity and unselfishness and place the well-being of their men before their own.
- (iv) In war the general may not be haunted by finance, but his is the responsibility for good management and economy in matters more important than money—his men's lives.

These things, not stars and crowns or the director's Rolls-Royce, are the badges of leadership anywhere.

When we talk of leaders in the Army what sort of men do we picture? Not the explosive old generals of the comic strips, whose complexions are indicative of blood-pressure and of the consumption of port—both high; whose conversation is limited to reminiscences of Poona and of blood-sports; whose only solution to any political or social problem is "Damn it, sir, shoot 'em." If those generals ever existed in real life they were well on the way out before I joined the Army. No; the first things we require in a leader are character, of which I will speak later, and an alert mind. Of course, it will be a military mind. Every profession produces its own type of mind which shows itself in its trained approach to any given question. A scientist, for instance, if you ask him something, will probably answer, "I cannot tell you now.

Come back in six months when the experiments I am engaged in will, I hope, be completed and I shall have compared my results with those of other research workers in the same field. Then I may be able to tell you."

If you ask an engineer what sort of a bridge should be put across a river, his answer will be, "Before I can give an indication I must have exact information. What is the width of the river, its depth, its flow? What are its banks like, its bottom, what is the highest recorded flood? Is the site accessible; is labour available? What is the climate? How much traffic will the bridge be expected to carry in the future?"

But your general cannot answer like that. He knows the information he has is far from complete; that some of it is bound to be inaccurate. He is only too well aware that there are all sorts of factors over which he has no control—the enemy, the weather and a dozen others. Yet he has got to say promptly, clearly and with every appearance of complete confidence, "We will do this!" Other professions are trained quite rightly not to reply until they have the exact and correct answer, some to give an answer made up of alternatives or possibilities. The military mind has to provide, not necessarily the perfect answer, but one which, in the circumstances as far as they are known, will work. That given, the commander has to back his judgment, face the risks, force his plan through and stand or fall by the result. It seems to me that wouldn't be a bad kind of mind to initiate and carry through enterprises in other fields—possibly even in those of commerce and industry.

What is leadership? I would define it as the projection of personality. It is that combination of persuasion, compulsion and example that makes other people do what you want them to do. If leadership is this projection of personality then the first requirement is a personality to project. The personality of a successful leader is a blend of many qualities—courage, will power, knowledge, judgment and flexibility of mind.

Courage is the basis of all leadership, indeed of all virtue in man or beast. Courage is no less in the higher than in the lower levels of command, but the greater the responsibility the more the emphasis shifts from physical to moral courage—a much rarer quality. Rare, but essential to higher leadership.

Will power is, I suppose, the most obvious requirement in a leader's make-up. Without it no man can remain a leader for he will have to force through his purpose, not only against the enemy, but against the weariness of his troops, the advice of his experts, the doubts of his staff, the waverings of politicians and the inclinations of his allies. I am sure these obstacles are duplicated in industry; will power is as needed in the board room as in the council of war.

The main task of a leader is to make decisions, but if he has not the judgment to make the right decisions, then the greater his strength of will, the higher his courage, the more tragic will be his mistakes. When looking for your leader, make sure of his courage and his will power, but, for the love of Mike, see that he has judgment, that he is balanced.

I said he must have knowledge. A man has no right to set himself

up as a leader—or to be set up as a leader—unless he knows more than those he is to lead. In a small unit, a platoon say—or maybe a workshop gang—the leader should be able to do the job of any man in the outfit better than he can. That is a standard that should be required from all junior leaders. As the leader rises higher in the scale, he can no longer, of course, be expected to show such mastery of the detail of all the activities under him. A Divisional Commander need not know how to coax a wireless set, drive a tank, preach a sermon, or take out an appendix as well as the people in his division who are trained to do those things. But he has got to know how long these jobs should take, what their difficulties are, what they need in training and equipment and the strain they entail. As the leader moves towards the top of the ladder, he must be able to judge between experts and technicians and to use their advice although he will not need their knowledge. One kind of knowledge that he must always keep in his own hands—is that of men.

"Flexibility of mind" is becoming more and more important to leadership. The world, in material and scientific matters, is advancing much more rapidly than most men can keep up with. A leader is surrounded by new and changing factors. What it was wise to do yesterday may well be foolish today. Some invention, some new process, some political change may have come along overnight and the leader must speedily adjust himself and his organization to it. The only living organisms that survive are those that adapt themselves to change. There is always the danger that determination becomes only obstinacy; flexibility

mere vacillation. Every man must work out the balance between them for himself; until he has he is no real leader.

Now if a man has all these qualities—courage, will power, judgment, knowledge, flexibility of mind—he cannot fail to be a leader in whatever walk of life he is engaged. Yet he is still not the leader we seek; he lacks one last quality—integrity. Integrity should not be so much a quality of itself as the element in which all the others live and are active, as fishes exist and move in water.

Integrity is a combination of the old Christian virtues of being honest with all men and of unselfishness, thinking of others, the people we lead, before ourselves. Moral reasons are, strangely enough, the ones that both in war and commerce tell most in the long run, but apart from its spiritual aspect this attitude—and there need be nothing soft or sloppy about it—has a practical material value. The real test of leadership is not if your men will follow you in success, but if they will stick by you in defeat and hardship. They won't do that unless they believe you to be honest and to have care for them.

I once had under me a battalion that had not done well in a fight. I went to see why. I found the men in the jungle, tired, hungry, dirty, jumpy, some of them wounded, sitting miserably about doing nothing. I looked for the CO—for any officer; none was to be seen. Then as I rounded a bush, I realized why that battalion had failed. Collected under a tree were the officers, having a meal while the men went hungry. Those officers had forgotten the tradition of the Service that they look

after their men's wants before their own. I was compelled to remind them. I hope they never again forgot the integrity and unselfishness that always permeate good leadership. I have never known men fail to respond to them.

So much for the type of man we want as a leader. How, in a big organization are we to find him? In the Army we believe it is vitally important to recognize the potential leader at an early stage of his career. Then, while cultivating the natural root of leadership in him, to graft on to its growth the techniques of management. To uncover the natural leaders in our own ranks—to attract them from outside, too—and then give them the chance to get out in front and lead.

I think we have done this more deliberately, more systematically and more constantly in the Army for the last forty years than has been done in industry.

From the day he joins, a recruit is scanned constantly for signs of potential leadership. Within a few weeks at his depot if his alertness, intelligence, education and general character justify it, he finds himself in either the potential officers' or potential NCO's squad. When he joins his unit, watched for leadership all the time, he may be recommended for a commission. A Selection Board tests him and if he satisfies it, he moves on either to an Officers' Training School for a National Service Commission or a Cadet College for a Regular one. Over that hurdle, the young officer joins his unit where for some time in decent obscurity he should learn the bolts and nuts of his trade and, equally important, gain his first real experience of leadership.

Our aim is to extract the potential officer at the start of his career and begin his grooming for leadership as soon as possible. Too long in the ranks is not good for him and the sooner he enters junior management the better. Responsibility breeds responsibility; the best training for leadership is leadership.

Schools, where the use of weapons and tactics are taught, staff colleges which study not only the techniques of staff work—management, but the principles and practice of command leadership all help to turn the young officer into a leader. In this the annual Confidential Reports submitted on every officer help a great deal. A study of his reports over a period of years will give a very fair idea of an officer's character, capabilities and what sort of post he will fill best. Eventually he may be placed on the select list of officers, whose careers are planned some years ahead to give them the kind of experience they will need to be fitted for high command. Such officers are well up in management and the very highest appointments are coming within their reach.

Of course the pyramid narrows rapidly towards the top and on the climb there many are dropped out, but by starting in management early, being watched all the time and given varied experience the best men do get to the top. One of the most difficult but none the less important things about estimating a man's capacity is to be able to recognize his ceiling—the point beyond which he will be tested too highly.

I have talked so far about those destined for the higher appointments but the Army in which the only leaders are the generals will win no victories. All down the line there

must be leaders. We have the equivalent of the supervisors and foremen of industry; they are our Warrant and Non-Commissioned Officers. You will note we call them officers. They are very definitely a part of the management, feel themselves that they are and are recognized by others as such. It has seemed to me that the position of the equivalent ranks in industry suspended as they often are, between management and workers, must be terribly difficult. I have sometimes thought the American system where they are made to feel much more a part of management has advantages.

The greater the size of an army, of an organization, the more difficult it becomes for the leaders to make their ideas and intentions clear and vivid to all their thousands of subordinates. All sorts of ways of doing this have been attempted. There has even grown up in industry a special class of officer whose job roughly is to keep touch between management and work. I think there is some danger they may interpose rather than correct. Leadership is a very personal thing and like some germs it is weakened by passing through other bodies.

In my experience there are many things that can be done to keep touch, but if they are to be effective they must all be based on two things:—

- (i) The head man of the army, the firm; the division, the department; the regiment, the workshop must be known as an actual person to all under him.
- (ii) The soldier or the employee must be made to feel he is part of the show and what he is and what he does matters to it.

The best way to get known to your men is to let them see you and hear you by going among them and talking to them. The head man should be able to walk on to any parade-ground in his command or into any factory in his firm and be recognized—even if it's only "Here comes the old so-and-so." It's surprising how soldiers and workmen can use an uncomplimentary expression as an endearment. The boss should talk to individuals as he moves about and occasionally—only occasionally, as it should be something of an event—assemble his staff and workers, mixed together for preference, and tell them something of what he is trying to do. It's not more difficult, I should think, to talk to a meeting of employees than to one of shareholders—and I do believe it's worth more. To talk to men like that doesn't require great eloquence; only two things are needed—to know what you are talking about and to believe it yourself. That last is important.

To make anyone feel part of a show you have to take them into your confidence. We soldiers have long grown-out of the "theirs-not-to-reason-why" stage. Any intelligent man wants to know why he's doing things and what for. It's not a bad idea to tell him; let him look a bit farther along the chain of which he is a link. Personally I believe a good system passing on to every man information of what is going on outside his immediate view is worth more than such things as joint consultation which really only reach a few. Security, I know, may enter into this as it does in military matters, but a little risk with security is more than repaid by the feeling chaps get that their leaders have

confidence in them, that they are let into the know and that they belong.

From washing machines to electronic brains we live increasingly by technology. Technicians are vital to our industry. But we don't make a man a general in the field because he is an expert in explosives; the most brilliant surgeon is not necessarily the best man to run a great hospital; nor the best-selling author to run a publishing business. The technically trained man is not the answer to the management problem. There has in some quarters been a tendency to make managers out of technical men. Some of them may make good managers because they have in them the qualities of leadership, but the better the technician, the better to use him in his own field.

Industry in the past has produced some managers who were true leaders; you have had your share in Australia, in South Australia, but management itself is now a specialized field. It is little use any longer to let men work their way up in haphazard fashion; then grab the nearest at hand, make him a manager, hoping he will learn the techniques and provide the leadership as he goes along.

We anxiously calculate stocks of raw materials, seek new minerals, study technical advances overseas and push them on at home; we devise new processes, we equip our factories with new machinery. In all these matters we take great thought for the morrow. Yet too often we just hope that tomorrow's leaders will, by some miracle, bob up when needed.

The only way in which the growing need for leadership in management can be met is to find the poten-

tial leader and then start his training and give him his chance to lead.

Here in Australia, believe me, there is no lack of potential leaders—the climate, the freedom, the tradition of this country breed them: Leadership material is lying around in every factory, office and university in Australia. Unless we spot it and give it a chance, a lot of it is doomed to rust. That would be a tragedy but a greater would be that our expanding industry should lack leadership.

The raw material of leadership is there and the Australian worker, properly led, from what I have seen of him, is as good as any and more intelligent than most. But the words properly led are vital. Australian

industry deserves and will need leaders, not just efficient managers.

In industry you will never have to ask men to do the stark things demanded of soldiers, but the men you employ are the same men. Instead of rifles they handle tools; instead of guns they serve machines. They have changed their khaki and jungle-green for workshop overalls and civvy suits. But they are the same men and they will respond to leadership of the right kind as they have always done.

Infuse your management with leadership; then they will show their mettle in the workshop as they have on the battlefield. Like me, they would rather be led than managed. Wouldn't you?

One thing that worked very seriously against us was the fact that the Luftwaffe in Africa was not subordinate to the Africa Korps. As a result, fighter and ground strafing groups were used more in a strategic role than tactically in support of the ground forces. It would have been far better for the cause as a whole if the Luftwaffe Commander Africa had been responsible for the tactical requirements of the Africa Korps while X Luftwaffe Corps took care of the strategic tasks.

—Field-Marshal Erwin Rommel.

CHOICER TAILS

Lieutenant-Colonel S. J. Hill,
Royal Australian Corps of Signals

THE state of international tension that has existed for some years has been accompanied by the publication of numerous articles and books speculating on the course of future wars and the types of forces that are likely to prove victorious. Most are agreed that the successful armies will have a high degree of mobility, and in the search for improved mobility it is not beyond reasonable expectation that the rate of movement of the fighting troops alone can be increased readily. But these troops are tied by ever-strengthening bonds to an administrative body whose retarding influence has long been recognized, and from time to time the ratio of fighting to non-fighting troops has been improved by cutting the "tail." Such arbitrary cuts give immediate relief, but can produce quite unexpected results, for the "tail" is an indefinable body contributed to by each and every part of the army. The effect on the combatant power of the army is the only criterion when deciding the value of this or that part of the organization, and as the success of the true fighting arms, armour and infantry, express this power, the need to the fighting arms becomes the practical gauge for determining

the size and variety of their operational and administrative support. Classifying that part of the army providing support into four groups, headquarters, supporting arms, supply and maintenance services, and humanitarian services, assists in a brief evaluation of the fighting troops' need. Headquarters to plan and co-ordinate operations are a must, although the number of echelons deemed necessary to conduct some operations in past campaigns is worthy of reflection. The supporting arms contribute much to the battle efficiency of armour and infantry, whose agreement to a reduction in the strength of these arms is most unlikely, except that the promise of small thermo-nuclear weapons will reduce the scale of artillery effort now necessary to saturate target areas and to give a measure of protection against hostile aircraft. The supply and maintenance services which keep the soldier fed, clothed and equipped cannot be reduced; in fact, the helicopter and television are warning signs that, in the technological field, the size of this group will increase. The last group, containing the medical, postal, canteens, and other like services, together with the amenity and philanthropic organizations, is

usually regarded as the most suitable field for "tail" cutting operations. But the physical well-being and serene mental outlook of the soldier is important in this democratic age, and the probable conditions under which the next war will be fought will increase the need of these services. A reduction would revert the conditions in the army to those of many years ago, a course which would be nationally rejected.

It is clear, then, that although small changes will be made here and there the army that will fight the next war will have the same blending of arms and services as now. If the armour and infantry allow no changes in the scale of services performed for them, any improvement in the ratio of fighting to non-fighting troops must come from a variation of the organization and the system of control of the administrative part of the army.

Read in the light of seeking administrative changes, the two manuals devoted to the basic fighting formation, the infantry division, offer a number of interesting possibilities. A natural first interest is the headquarters, and Section 2 of "The Infantry Division in Battle" informs the reader "The headquarters is designed to work as an entity, and as such the more concentrated it can be the more efficiently and expeditiously it will work. Conditions of modern warfare, however, demand dispersion . . ." Section 14 of "Administration within the Division" explains why in this extract. "The headquarters of a division is too unwieldy a formation to keep assembled as a whole during operations; that portion which is essential to fight the

battle must be as far forward as possible, whereas the remainder can carry out its duties better if held further to the rear." As the A&Q staff are not essential to the division headquarters for battle, they should not be part of the headquarters of a formation organized solely for battle, and Section 4 of the first manual referred to suggests this in "Owing to this decentralization, the AA&QM though a staff officer, approximates very closely to a commander of the administrative staff and services." A Service Group, including the administrative staff and services, and organic to the division, would solve neatly the problem of headquarters size, legalize a "fait accompli," allow the division to function in the classic manner, but would have no effect on the "tail," perhaps even encouraging a small increase in the non-fighting strength.

When the division is considered too large and unwieldy a formation the brigade group is an attractive organizational device, certainly creating a smaller entity than the division, but at the expense of an increase in stature of the administrative part. This increase is instanced by the cargo vehicles, for three brigade groups require 50% more vehicles than a division of three brigades (Appendix K to Administration within the Division). A parallel growth to a greater or less degree would occur in other service units in a brigade group once these units lose the mutual support provided in the centralized divisional organization. So, too, the brigade headquarters would be expanded to cope with the increased administrative load. Should a number of these brigade groups be

formed, the enlarged set-up in the forward area would bring about incremental increases throughout the system. The extra vehicles use more fuel, which in turn demands more capacity in the supply and transport echelons. Similar effects would be felt in ordnance scaling and workshop loading. This shows quite sufficiently that no decrease in the size of the "tail" is achieved by having a greater number of "little" divisions to replace the larger formations.

The mention of cargo vehicles in the foregoing paragraph leads naturally to supply and transport, and again it is interesting to read the relevant chapters in the manuals and compare the system of operation with practices in the commercial field. The development of motor transport over the last decade has brought to common notice the two main advantages that it enjoys. Flexibility limited only by terrain is used to the maximum extent by the army, but ability to haul goods from pick-up to delivery point is not, because the divided executive control of transport echelons encourages the system of off-loading, breaking bulk and reloading, and in so doing denies economies to the army. To achieve maximum return on capital investment a commercial transport agency seeks continuous operation of vehicles under full load conditions. Section 21 of "Administration within the Division" presents an opposite viewpoint, for the reader learns that the range of a load-carrying vehicle is limited by the physical endurance of one man. The army cannot work on a profit and loss basis, but the nation will receive the best return for the manpower and materials devoted to

equipping the army with vehicles when these are properly treated as machines capable of continuous work. Single executive control of cargo transport in a field force would aid the introduction of through loading, which with maximum vehicle usage would demand the minimum number of vehicles.

As well as vehicles there is found in the division a great variety of technical equipment, which unfortunately requires a good deal of repair, and this feature makes the role of the electrical and mechanical engineers one of utmost importance. A characteristic of this service's operating units is the production time lost when they are getting ready to move, moving and setting up again. The manual on administration notes that keeping a repair capacity available within the division calls for a centralized plan, with probable loss of affiliation. It is beyond doubt that a force plan for repair and recovery would minimize workshop movement, and so ensure that capacity is kept at a high level in force. Availability would then become a reasonable proportion of total repair capacity, and the scale of workshops for a force could then be reduced. The ordnance field park, the engineers' field park squadron, and the field dressing station are other service units that operate best when static, and would be most economically employed under centralized control.

The advantages of central control of the administrative resources of the division are recognized in the manual, which preaches the doctrine of divisional control in all phases of war except when a part of the division is geographically remote from the headquarters. The manual

also draws attention to the inability of the division to function without the administrative backing of a higher formation, and in the definition "The infantry division contains in its organization balanced elements of all arms and services . . ." the word "elements" is truly descriptive of the services. This being the case, it is logical that the elements be joined to their parent bodies and placed under one executive control, which action would require fewer men and vehicles, and less equipment than is now necessary to support a number of fighting units. Centralised control should ensure with more certainty that administrative support is at hand for fighting formations and units in sufficient quantity and at all times. The principal disadvantage will be lack of affiliation between fighting and service units, but this is largely nullified by the common language, customs and procedures in a small national army.

The greater degree of administrative centralization in a force is made possible by the army signal system that can handle quickly large volumes of traffic between forward and rear areas, and by the rapid transport now possible with ground vehicles and helicopters, both developments being complementary in enabling one headquarters to exercise control over the military activities in a large area. Equally these two means of communication can be applied to give the source of the administrative requirement, the armoured and infantry units primarily, a greater measure of autonomy, as the administrative channel can be direct between units, the services supporting

them, and the higher formation headquarters in executive control of the services. At this higher formation headquarters unit administrative information and demands could be processed with the aid of modern office machinery, and administrative support provided immediately, should departure from routine be necessary.

It can be postulated now that to achieve maximum economy in the administrative body basic fighting formations should not have administrative staff and services included in their organization, the control of the services should be concentrated at the highest headquarter level, and the administrative channel should be direct between this latter headquarters and units. The proposal is evolutionary in character, for already a good deal of central control is effected by means of various scales, tables of equipment, census returns and such like, and efficient long-range communications have brought about conditions under which delegations of authority are increasingly limited. It is not difficult to imagine a force organized as outlined, and to visualize the comparative ease with which basic fighting formations and units could be moved and be supported from a network of semi-static installations, for the formation "tail" is very nearly removed. The case of a force of fighting strength of division or less presents little difficulty, as the removal of the administrative staff and services from the fighting formation organization is no great step from one current practice of raising a force headquarters commanding both the formation and the additional administrative resources.

A common organization in peace and war is desirable, and is achieved by retaining the framework of war organization and adjusting various services to take advantage of public utilities and commercial enterprises, so avoiding duplication and extravagance. Despite care in this direction, the demands of international planning and representation, of development and provision of stores and equipment, of all degrees of military education, and of annual budget preparation

and discharge, all contribute to the necessity for a large central headquarters. When national wealth and manpower are limited, this headquarters, associated with the usual command and area structure, is an overhead disproportionate to the size of "new look" field forces. The administrative organization proposed earlier could be applied profitably, as the command structure could be eliminated or severely reduced, and the savings applied to improve the conditions of the field force.

GENERAL DIRECTIONS FOR GIVING BATTLE

When a General intends to give Battle he must have regard to three principal things, viz.—He must never suffer himself to be forced to fight against his will; never fight his soldiers when their spirits are dismayed and cast down, and he must choose the place for the battle fit for the quality and number of his soldiers.

—From "*Fortifications and Military Discipline*," published by Robert Morden at the Atlas Press, London, in 1688.

WHAT'S NEW IN FIRE POWER

Brigadier-General T. A. Weyher
and
B. K. Zobrist

THE ability to deliver fire upon one's opponent has always been a primary consideration in military conflict. The use of the infantry battalion as a solid block of men and firepower, manoeuvred much like a naval vessel, became an accepted mode of combat in the early stages of modern warfare largely because of the limited killing range and the inaccuracy of the cumbersome muskets then in use. For similar reasons, the command "Don't fire until you see the whites of their eyes," had to be given to 18th century troops if their firepower was to have any effect.

Today, we find ourselves at the other extreme. With the advent of missiles, rockets, and other weapons of tremendous firepower, capable of delivering mass destruction at a single stroke, many military strategists and other observers of the world scene have concluded that a

universal awareness of the dire consequences of an atomic or hydrogen war has conversely made more probable the possibility of "limited warfare" dependent on classical or conventional weapons.

Others, recognizing that atomic weapons will be a part of any modern army's firepower, reason that all types of weapons, both atomic and classical, must go to make up the balanced forces of our armed might, providing the responsible commander with a complete "family of weapons" of different powers and ranges, pinpoint accuracy, area coverage, and other variations as required.

In any event, it appears certain that any conflict fought within the near future will be largely, if not totally, dependent on classical weapons and that any war of the more distant future will, in all probability, still require the same wide range of weapons. For these reasons, in this period when new scientific horizons are continually opening up and new threats to our security are

constantly being posed, those responsible for the development of classical firepower have not been complacent.

In recent months, several advanced weapons have been revealed for the first time. The new 175mm Gun represents the latest and one of the most versatile of field artillery pieces. In it are incorporated battlefield capabilities in many respects superior to the combined features of the 155mm Gun, the 8-inch Howitzer, and the 8-inch Gun.

The 175mm excels all of these World War II weapons in its ability to fire readily in any direction and to occupy its firing position quickly, with no need to dig recoil and spade pits. The gun and top carriage of the weapon are balanced on a ball on a centre float so that the rear of the carriage can be raised off the ground in a moment by a built-in jack located over the track of the centre float.

The weapon then can easily be pushed around a full 360° to any approximate azimuth desired. The rear float is then lowered to the ground. New elevation sights on the weapon have further added to the speed and accuracy of the gun's fire control. Human error is minimized by mechanical counters displaying actual numbers in lieu of the familiar coarse and fine micrometer scales requiring interpolation by the gunner.

Adopting unusual features already utilized in the 280mm Gun, the 175mm Gun is equipped with a double recoil arrangement of the hydropneumatic, floating-piston type. Two complete recoil systems—one for the gun and the other for the top carriage—operate independently of each other to absorb the recoil

forces and to return the recoiling masses to the in-battery position. Ninety percent of the entire emplaced weight of the weapon actually recoils. The long movement of this large mass makes it possible to fire such a large gun without having an elaborate system to restrain the base and provide carriage stability.

While the 175mm weapon is classed as a gun, its included angles of elevation (0° to 65°) and its selective use of three graded propellant charges, enables it to bring plunging fire down on enemy positions on reverse slopes—a type of firing usually performed by a howitzer. Thus the 175mm Gun provides considerably more versatility than is normally found in a weapon of its size.

Complementing the Army's present 81mm mortars is the new 105mm Mortar. It permits greater traverse without re-emplacement and, although lighter in weight, offers improved stability and ruggedness. In field artillery role, the mortar will supplement the light howitzer by providing an initial volume of area fire. Capability of the light howitzer unit will be augmented by provision of a very high angle fire to reach over obstacles and by the immediate response possible by close association with the supported unit. The new mortar weighs approximately 450 pounds and breaks down into three easily transportable loads.

The 7.62mm Machine Gun M60, a lightweight general-purpose weapon, has been developed to supersede all of the present United States Army calibre .30 machine guns. Aside from its reduced weight, the weapon offers additional advantage in the fact that its barrel and gas system can be replaced in a matter of seconds. The new gun can be fired from the shoul-

der or hip, from a bipod or a newly developed aluminium tripod mount. It is chambered for the standard NATO cartridge.

Two rather spectacular weapons—

developed for the Air Force by Army Ordnance in co-operation with private contractors, but foreshadowing development in other fields—are the 20mm Aircraft Machine Gun



First Atomic Gun: The US 280-mm artillery piece.

M39 and the 20mm Gun T171, better known as the Vulcan.

The M39 has been in general use on aircraft since 1954, but is of significance in that it presents a marked improvement in firepower over former types. A relatively lightweight, electrically-fired, gas-operated gun, the weapon functions on the revolver principle, thus affording greater firing rapidity and higher muzzle velocity than formerly possible. The 30mm Automatic Gun T182, also for Air Force use, is generally similar in design and operation to the M39.

The 20mm Gun T171, named the Vulcan after the ancient Roman god of fire, was shown to the general public for the first time in the late summer of 1956. Specifically designed for present supersonic jet aircraft requiring split-second firepower against fast moving planes, the new weapon has "borrowed" features from the original Gatling gun, patented in 1862.

Utilizing a rotating multibarreled cluster principle and externally powered by either electric or hydraulic motors, the gun's volume of fire has been increased to the point where one officer characterized the sound of its fire as a fast "Bronx cheer." The Vulcan can expend more shells in sixty seconds than an infantry company of 400 men can shoot in 20 seconds. The gun fires at the 12 o'clock position; the cartridge case is ejected at the 7 o'clock position, while another round is picked up at the 5 o'clock position. All action is accomplished virtually simultaneously.

The gun's six rotating barrels greatly reduce the problem of barrel erosion and heat generation normally associated with high cyclic-

rate guns. An excellent dispersion pattern is produced because the six barrels are rigidly clamped together to eliminate the "whip" of a single barrel.

The Vulcan fires one round of ammunition at a time which eliminates the erratic recoil of multiple installations. No turret recoil is experienced with the centralized recoil, and the smooth machine-like action reduces vibration. With its external drive, the mechanism is inherently cleaner and less susceptible to corrosion than gas actuated weapons. Indeed, the outstanding performance of the new gun is attributable to its basic design characteristics and the rapid progress made in overcoming engineering problems.

These are only a few of the newer weapons which provide superior firepower for our troops. Other recent developments of no less significance include the air-transportable 90mm Self-Propelled Gun, and the ONTOS, a self-propelled armoured vehicle mounting six 106mm recoilless rifles, developed by the Army and adopted by the US Marine Corps.

The 280mm Gun, capable of firing both conventional and atomic shells, has been in the Army's arsenal slightly over four years. The Battalion Anti-tank 106mm Recoilless Rifle System, a superb weapon at the battalion level for defeating armour, with a secondary role against personnel gun emplacements, pill boxes, caves, and the like, was revealed in 1954.

Despite the fact that man has been continually developing and improving weapons utilizing gunpowder for over four hundred years, the ultimate potency of this type of weapon has by no means been reached.

Guns capable of firing hypersonic projectiles and utilizing liquid propellants combined with the revolver or Gatling principle, for example, could increase firepower tremendously, to say nothing of their effect on tactical doctrine, logistics, and other factors. The application of metallurgical advances in lightweight metals has already created a minor revolution in weapon ground mobility and air-transportability. Improvements in fire control have produced astounding results in locating and pinpointing targets in any weather, day or night.

In arsenals, universities, and industrial plants at this very moment, numerous investigations are in progress to improve the Army's present weapons and to develop newer ones yielding even greater firepower. Research and development efforts are being expended to increase further the firepower available to the individual soldier as well as to small units which must be self-supporting for more extended periods, particularly in case of an atomic war.

Numerous approaches to the problem are being meticulously explored

—increased rates of fire, increased effectiveness of individual rounds, sustained optimum rate of fire for longer periods, and increased range permitting concentration of fire of more weapons on a target and the reaching of targets deeper in enemy territory. In addition, the characteristics of increased mobility and air-transportability are being stressed to insure the availability of reliable and effective firepower at the time and place required.

Ordnance applications of the most modern technological advances are constantly making it possible for the United States Army to realize not only greater volume in firepower, but increased range, accuracy, mobility.

Basically, firepower must still be equated with accurate target identification and the effective execution of no more destruction than is necessary to achieve a specified purpose. Whether this purpose calls for area weapons delivering mass destruction or the lobbing of a shell into a gun emplacement, our Armed Forces must and will stand ready with the proper weapon for the specific need.

GUERRILLA WARFARE

A Study of Guerilla Warfare and the Administrative Problems Resulting
from a Hostile Local Population

Major R. F. Rodgers

Royal Australian Army Ordnance Corps

"When you study military history, bear in mind the importance of the administration factor, because it is where most critics go wrong."

Field-Marshal Earl Wavell.

INTRODUCTION

THROUGHOUT history guerilla forces have usually fought in countries occupied by an enemy, sometimes in support of their own or allied forces, or alone, as a last desperate attempt to gain independence or to refuse to accept defeat.

During the Second World War Guerilla Warfare rose to new heights and it is now clear that the Germans and Japanese in their calculations had under-estimated its possibilities. The big part played by guerilla forces was largely due to the result of the opening operations by the aggressor nations, who overran and remained in occupation of large territories in Europe and South-East Asia. They were then faced with

the heavy burden of suppressing hostile populations, whilst having extended lines of communications to their armies in the field. Resistance by the local populations of these occupied countries was a factor which stretched the German and Japanese Armies (and their security services) far beyond anything their High Commands had ever contemplated.

One of many problems which may face the Australian Forces in any future war is the conduct of successful operations in a country where the local population is hostile to our own and allied forces. Whilst Russia, Communist China and their satellites remain the potential enemies of the Western Democracies, this problem is one which takes on gigantic proportions to our forces,

—Reprinted from the RAAC Information Bulletin, March, 1957.

especially in the conduct of operations in areas such as South-East Asia. It is a problem, therefore, to which all sections of the Australian Army, particularly the services, should pay more attention.

The aim of this paper is:—

- (a) To examine the influence that guerilla forces have had on twentieth century campaigns.
- (b) To consider likely roles of these forces in any future war.
- (c) To consider certain administrative aspects in the conduct of operations in areas in which the local population is hostile.

The paper, which is in three parts, is general in its nature, and is in the form of an introductory study of the problem. Administration is given closer consideration in Part III only,

as any study of this type must first consider both operational and administrative aspects.

The terms "Guerilla" and "Guerilla Warfare" are used in their widest sense throughout the paper, and no attempt is made to discriminate between the words partisan or guerilla. The term is accepted here to include all forms of Irregular Bands, Partisans, Terrorist and Resistance Groups. Guerilla Warfare is defined as: a method of waging war, employed by local resistance forces in an area occupied or surrounded by the enemy. It aims at reducing the effectiveness of the enemy's forces by the employment of unorthodox tactics either separately from, or in conjunction with, the operations of an established Field Army.

PART I

THE INFLUENCE OF GUERRILLA FORCES ON CERTAIN TWENTIETH CENTURY CAMPAIGNS

The Boer War

It was hoped that the dispersal of the main Boer Army at Komatipoort would have marked the end of the Boer War in South Africa in 1900. However, there remained at large a considerable number of armed men who, led by such officers as De Wet and Delarey and reinforced by the local Boer farmers, adopted guerilla tactics against the British. These forces operated with such skill and energy that they prolonged the war well into 1902, and compelled the British to employ a much larger force against them. They could not have accomplished what they did, had not their supply problem been made easy by the support of the

countryside over which they campaigned. Except for small quantities captured from the British, all maintenance requirements, including horses, were supplied by the local farmers.

The chief factor which brought an end to their resistance was the elaborate blockhouse system set up across the whole of the country, cutting it up into sections, in which the British forces systematically carried out anti-guerilla operations.

The First World War — The Arab Revolt

The maker of Arab strategy and the chief tactical leader, during the Arab revolt against the Turks from

1916 to 1918, was one Colonel T. E. Lawrence, better known as Lawrence of Arabia. For a period of five years before the war Lawrence had become familiar with the countries of the Middle East. He knew the people well and he spoke their languages. In 1916 he united the Arab bands and welded them into a formidable force.

The Turkish forces in Arabia were, for the most part, stationed on the Hejaz Railway, with a large garrison of some twelve thousand around Medina. Lawrence's policy was to keep the railway under continuous attack by blowing up sections of the line and, if possible, derailing supply and troop trains at the same time; but not applying so much pressure that the Turks would evacuate the area. The enemy did much less harm in Lawrence's view by sitting on the railway and in Medina than if they had joined the armies opposing Allenby in Palestine.

Lawrence's tactics were to develop a highly mobile guerilla force, and use it successfully at distributed points of the Turkish line. The power of this striking force could not be reckoned merely by its strength. By having five times the mobility of the Turks he could be on terms with them with one-fifth their numbers. These tactics were so successful that many thousands of Turkish soldiers were held in the south-east by Lawrence until Allenby was ready to strike for Damascus.

Although the British forces were undoubtedly strong enough to defeat the Turkish Armies in the field, the operations of the Arab force did hasten the end of enemy resistance in Palestine and Syria:

Russia-Germany 1941-45

Before the German invasion of Russia, the Soviet Government prepared to carry out guerilla warfare. Although the invading German advance overran a great deal of the country, the Communist party went underground, and by the middle of 1941 partisan activity constituted a serious danger to the German supply line. From 1942 onwards the tempo of their operations was increased, and the effects of the enemy can be gauged from Hitler's "Fuehrer Order" of 6 September 1942, which stated: "The bands in the East have become an unbearable menace during the last months, and are seriously threatening the supply lines to the front."

Throughout the whole of the campaign in Russia the partisan bands co-operated fully with the Red Army, and during the Russian advance provided guides, intelligence, and secured river crossings over the great rivers, such as the Bug and the Dniester. Probably the outstanding example of co-operation with the Red Army was during one of the crucial battles of the war, when the Russians broke through the German lines in the Bobruisk-Witebsk area, in the middle of 1944. Even before the Red Army attacked, the German position was weakened by guerilla attacks in the rear. Large areas behind the German lines were dominated by the partisans and practically removed from German control.

During his court-martial after the war, Field-Marshal von Manstein said: "In 1944, in the Army Group Centre, in the course of seven hours nearly a thousand raids took place

1. Communist Guerilla Warfare, by Brig. C. Aubrey Dixon and Otto Heilbrunn.

on supply dumps, roads and railways in the rear, and in the Crimea these raids happened every single day.”

The Russians claim the equivalent of twenty German divisions of casualties to men and equipment caused by guerilla action. Although this claim may not be completely accurate, it is quite definite that German losses were extremely heavy. These forces made a considerable contribution to the defeat of the German armies.

Malaya 1941-45

During the Japanese occupation, the local Chinese Communist party organised forces which operated by guerilla tactics against the enemy. These forces were advised in many cases by British officers who had escaped capture at the fall of Singapore.

In 1943 contact was made with South-East Asia Command through liaison officers of “Force 136” operating from Ceylon. Plans were put into effect for some six thousand communist guerillas to co-operate with the operations to be launched against Malaya in 1945. The cessation of hostilities prevented this. However, the guerilla forces and liaison officers had provided intelligence on which the plan for the operations had been based; and the guerilla forces had neutralized a number of troops who would otherwise have been available for operations against the allied field forces.

The Philippines

During the Japanese occupation of the Philippine Islands from 1942 to 1945, guerilla forces neutralized many thousands of Japanese troops in the islands.

Radio contact was established with Headquarters South-West Pacific Area late in 1942, and as a result liaison teams infiltrated into the islands. Urgently needed supplies (particularly medical stores) were delivered to the guerillas either by aircraft or small naval vessels. These liaison teams co-ordinated the actions of most guerilla groups, and through them obtained a great deal of the intelligence required to plan the operations which culminated in the reconquest of the Philippines by United States forces in 1945. In a few instances, the Communist controlled group known as the “Huk-balahap” did cause disorder and confusion by openly attacking other guerilla groups on Luzon.

The majority of the forces co-operated with the Americans after the invasion, and played a major role in the defeat of the enemy. They operated mainly against the enemy's flanks, supply lines and lines of withdrawal, and provided intelligence and guides to the American forces.

The Campaign in Burma

Two particular types of guerilla forces operated against the Japanese in this area:—

- (a) The local guerillas.
- (b) Long Range Penetration Groups who adopted guerilla tactics behind the Japanese lines. (The operations of these forces are not considered in this paper.)

The local guerilla forces consisted of the Burma Defence Army, the Chin, Kachin and Nagar tribesmen. The hill tribes carried out widespread, harassing activities against the invaders from 1942 onwards.

Late in 1944 the resistance movement in Burma contacted South-East

2. Communist Guerilla Warfare, by Brig. C. Aubrey Dixon and Otto Heilbrunn.

Asia Command, through liaison officers of "Force 136" operating from Ceylon and India. A request was made for additional arms to be supplied, in order to completely arm the Burma Defence Army, as an uprising against the Japanese was contemplated. The decision to supply arms to this force also had political implications, and it was argued by civil affairs officers that to arm this group would imperil the future internal security of Burma. The military and political implications of the situation were described by Earl Mountbatten, the then Supreme Allied Commander in South-East Asia, as follows: "If I discourage the only resistance movement in Burma (apart from the hill tribes), I would be throwing away a chance of fighting over territory in which elements of the local population were actually fighting on our side. As a matter of fact, I might find myself placed—as a logical consequence of having discouraged resistance activities—in the predicament of having to suppress the Burma Defence Army by force. This could not fail to have unfavourable repercussions in the United Kingdom, the United States, and other parts of the world."³ The decision was made to supply arms, ammunition and medical supplies to the guerillas, through agents of "Force 136." In 1945, these forces inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. During the whole of these operations in Burma the Japanese base installations and supply lines were singled out for the main weight of guerilla attack. The guerillas therefore neutralized large numbers of enemy troops in rear areas, who would

otherwise have been able to operate against the Fourteenth Army in its drive towards Rangoon. The activities of the guerillas were co-ordinated by the liaison teams. Where necessary the guerilla forces were maintained by air during these operations.

Malaya 1948-57

In December 1945, the Communist controlled Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army was disbanded by the British authorities. However, the Malayan Communist Party retained an underground military organisation, and in 1948 put into effect a plan which aimed at the overthrow of the British administration. The plan began with an outbreak of lawlessness and violence, and terrorist activity based on guerilla tactics has continued to this day.

Although the campaign has to some degree disturbed the economy of the country, the Communists cannot achieve their aim, because of the weakness in their organization and the strong measures adopted by the authorities to combat their activities.

The strength of the Communist forces is approximately four thousand. They have few communications with which to effectively control their operations. The result is a series of small, poorly co-ordinated operations, which are often misdirected and useless. Their original tactics were mainly directed to firing rubber plantations, ambushes, murders, attacks on supply trains, and damaging rail communications. Air supply is now used by British Forces where possible, to prevent attacks on the supply lines.

The success of terrorist activities to date can be attributed to the nature of the country in which they

3. Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, by the Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia, by Earl Mountbatten of Burma.

operate, and the assistance they receive from the local population. Their major success is, undoubtedly, the amount of military and civilian effort which has been directed against them over a prolonged period. As in example, in 1953 there were nearly three divisions of troops (including local battalions), twenty thousand regular police, and thirty-seven thousand special constables in Malaya! A large proportion of these forces was used in anti-terrorist operations, and large forces are still being employed in this role.

General Summary

In discussing the influence of guerilla forces on campaigns in which British or allied forces have been engaged since 1900, it has not been possible to cover all important activities of these forces. During the Second World War guerilla forces were widespread throughout Europe in particular. In addition to Russia, the French Maquis and the Partisans of Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece and Italy all contributed to the defeat of Germany, and neutralized many German divisions that would otherwise have been available for operations against the allied field armies. The contribution of the French Maquis to the successful landings in Normandy in 1944 was considerable. In the war against Japan, the Chinese guerilla forces carried out large-scale operations against the invaders. The operations of Special Units, such as Australian Independent Squadrons in the islands to the north of Australia, and the British Special Air Service Regiments in the Middle East and in Europe, were based on guerilla tactics. These units, operating behind the enemy's lines for limited periods, achieved great

success and inflicted heavy casualties both in men and materials.

Lessons

The main lessons which can be gained from a study of campaigns since 1900 are:—

- (a) The theatre commander must ensure that guerilla activities are co-ordinated and controlled in accordance with the requirements of the field forces. He must ensure that direct liaison is established and maintained with these forces.
- (b) Guerilla forces which are capably led, and have the sympathy of the local population, can neutralize opposing forces of much greater strength for a considerable period.
- (c) Guerilla forces which do not operate in conjunction with a main army in the field, must eventually suffer defeat if they are opposed by a larger, well-equipped, and capably led regular field army.
- (d) Groups and bands must be united and their activities co-ordinated, or the effort will become disjointed and misdirected.
- (e) Agents or liaison teams operating with guerilla forces must know the country, the customs of the people, and speak their language.
- (f) The great value of intelligence which can be provided by the local population; particularly in the jungle terrain of South-East Asia.
- (g) The enormous value of air supply, from two aspects:—
 - (i) Supply of guerilla forces.
 - (ii) Supply of a field force where normal methods are open to attack by guerillas.

- (h) The great possibilities of well-trained Special Units (for example, Special Air Service and Commando type Units) adopting guerilla tactics behind the enemy's lines. These operations require careful planning and co-ordination with the operations of the main allied field force.
- (j) The political implications and civil defence problems which may arise as a result of arming the local population.

PART II

THE EMPLOYMENT AND LIKELY ROLES OF GUERILLA FORCES IN ANY FUTURE WAR

The development of long-range aircraft and guided missiles will result in a future major war being more global than in the past. Strong airborne and highly mobile ground forces will be used in conjunction with naval and air power. The use of weapons of mass destruction cannot be discounted.

If guerilla warfare is to be successful in any future war it must be organised in advance. The speed with which operations will develop may well preclude the use of guerilla forces in a particular area unless the planning and organisation is completed before the outbreak of hostilities.

During the planning stage it is necessary to carry out a detailed analysis of a country and the national characteristics and customs of its people. The political, economic, and military aspects must be co-ordinated. When planning operations, the capacity and limitations of the forces must be considered in relation to the enemy's ability to counter operations.

Guerilla activity is most advantageous if closely co-ordinated with the military and political strategy of the forces it supports. Timing of operations is therefore important, in

order to ensure that complete co-operation is achieved with the established field force. On this subject Von Clausewitz said: "We must imagine a people's war always in combination with a war carried on by a regular field force, and both carried on according to a plan embracing the operations of the whole."

Guerillas never wage positional war, and do not fight decisive battles. Although this type of war may be either offensive or defensive, tactics are predominantly offensive and consist principally of small-scale, brief operations, conducted over a wide area. These tactics compel the enemy to divert forces to anti-guerilla measures, thereby reducing the effort which can be directed against the main field force.

Roles

The major roles of guerilla forces in campaigns up to the present day may be summarized as follows:—

- (a) Destruction of bridges, signal communications, power lines, roads, railways and airfields.
- (b) Destruction of supply dumps, and attacks on administrative and base units.

4. Von Clausewitz, by Joseph J. Green.



Personnel must be trained to carry out patrols in addition to their administrative duties.

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| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (c) Neutralisation of enemy forces in a particular area, thereby weakening his effort on other fronts or areas. (d) Dissemination of propaganda with the aim of lowering the enemy's morale, and fostering high morale and loyalty amongst the civilian population. (e) Provision of information regarding the terrain and the enemy. (f) Prevention of enemy destruction of vital communications, bridges and installations. (g) Indication of targets for attack by allied forces, and observing and reporting the effects of allied attack. (h) Assistance to allied personnel behind the enemy's lines. | <p>Important rules for the conduct of these operations have been established. They are:—</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) Avoid superior forces. (b) Strike at targets which most hinder the efforts of the enemy. (c) Operations must be carefully planned. (d) Obtain surprise. (e) Attack inferior forces. (f) Strikes at the enemy must be delivered with the maximum speed and weight. (g) Concentrate when the enemy can be destroyed. (h) Disperse quickly if conditions are unfavourable. (j) Guerillas must master the tactics of deceit. |
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- (k) Security is vital and forces must always move secretly.

Future Employment

Four major roles for the future employment of these forces, in addition to those described above, are:—

- (a) Attacks on dispersed formations, units and base installations.
- (b) Operations in conjunction with the use of weapons of mass destruction.
- (c) Attacks on the increased number of communications in port and base areas.
- (d) Attacks on airfields and aircraft on the ground.

Dispersion in both forward and rear areas will lend itself to guerilla attack. The most attractive targets will be those units and installations in rear and base areas which are widely dispersed to avoid destruction by nuclear weapons. These attacks may force the deployment of troops for the defence of rear areas, thereby weakening the effort of fighting formations.

The state of disorganization which will follow an attack by nuclear weapons will present guerilla forces with ideal targets. As the enemy will be dispersed, guerilla strikes will not only be directed against his ground forces, but also at the communications and bridges he will require to effect the movement of reserves. The use of these forces in conjunction with airborne and amphibious operations would be advantageous where nuclear weapons were first used for neutralization. Guerilla forces could then hold specified areas to allow the unopposed airdrop, airlanding, or amphibious landing. The possibility of operations aimed at prevent-

ing the functioning of the civil defence organization in industrial and base areas, following nuclear attack, is considerable.

There will be an increased number of ports functioning in a future major war, because any large-scale concentration of shipping and material would only provoke attack by nuclear weapons. This will necessitate an increase in the network of roads, railways and pipe-lines leading to the dispersed base installations. It will be most difficult to provide sufficient troops to protect these lines of communication which will, therefore, be vulnerable to guerilla attack.

Forward of the base areas the lines of communication will not always provide unlimited targets as in the past. Petroleum pipe-lines will be used, and road and rail communications to more limited degree. Air supply, including the use of helicopters, will become an established means of supply, especially in the area of South-East Asia. However, base and forward airfields or landing grounds will be more subject to attack by guerillas. These attacks would not only be made against installations, but primarily directed at aircraft on the ground. In the Second World War, the Special Air Service Units illustrated how valuable such attacks will be in the future.

Employment of Guerilla Forces by Potential Enemies

The potential enemies of the British Commonwealth and allied countries, in any future war, are the communistic nations, headed by the Soviet Union and Communist China. In assessing the employment of gue-



Administrative personnel may be required to spend their rest periods under similar conditions to these!

There are also rain, heat and mosquitoes to contend with.

rilla forces by these nations it must be appreciated that Russia employed large numbers of guerillas in the Second World War, and that Red China's Army originated from a conglomeration of irregular forces. The Chinese leader, Mao Tse-Tung, is considered one of the leading world authorities on this type of warfare. Guerilla tactics used by Russia and by the Chinese against the Japanese during the Second World War were based on his concepts. It can be assumed, therefore, that our potential enemies will make full use of guerilla warfare in any future conflict.

Russia and China have undoubtedly organised an underground

movement throughout the Communist satellite countries of Europe and the nations of South-East Asia and the South-West Pacific Area. A study of Communist activity in South-East Asia since the end of World War II indicates that in every country agents of Communist China are active. There are approximately ten million Chinese throughout this area, therefore on the outbreak of hostilities it is likely that the Western Allies will have to face guerilla activity on a large scale.

As the roles and methods of employment of communist guerilla forces may well be as outlined above, a careful study of anti-guerilla operations must be undertaken.

PART III

CERTAIN ADMINISTRATIVE CONSIDERATIONS IN THE CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS IN AREAS IN WHICH THE LOCAL POPULATION IS HOSTILE

Mao Tse-Tung, the Chinese Communist leader, said:—

"Guerillas never attack a force poised for battle. Their task is to conduct a war in the rear. They have to exterminate small enemy units and harass large ones, to undermine his morale, to attack his supply lines.

General

In considering this problem it is suggested that, in any future war in which the Western Democracies may be opposed to the Communistic States, the Australian Army is likely to be employed in the area of South-East Asia. Although this is not an established fact, wherever our forces may fight they will probably have to combat guerillas and a hostile population, to a greater or lesser degree, dependent on the following:—

- (a) The area of particular operations.
- (b) Allied success or failure in future cold war operations.
- (c) The success of Western propaganda in winning friends both behind the "Iron Curtain" and amongst "would be" neutrals.
- (d) The degree of success obtained by agents who are preparing the way for revolutionary movements in Communistic countries.
- (e) The success of such projects as the Colombo Plan.
- (f) The strength, on the outbreak of war, of the Chinese Nationalist Forces in Formosa; and the support and loyalty given to them by the millions of Chinese throughout South-East Asia.

(g) The attitude and support of neutral countries. This is particularly important throughout the Middle East, Asia and South-East Asia.

(h) The extent to which Communism spreads throughout South-East Asia in the future. The danger of this is more apparent to us when we look to the near North, particularly the Republic of Indonesia.

If it is accepted that the problem of a hostile population will probably exist, what then is the solution—if any? The most important administrative part of the problem is ensuring that at all times our forces receive adequate logistical support.

It is suggested that a complete solution to the problem will probably not be found in peace time, and to simply state that—"troops from fighting formations and units must be found for the protection of our depots, units and supply lines"—is just wishful thinking. Where this is necessary it will only be in exceptional circumstances, and in fact would be playing into the enemy's hands. This is one of his aims.

In an attempt to emphasize the main administrative aspects applicable to an overseas theatre of operations, the following will be considered:—

- (a) Protection of units and installations.
- (b) Protection of the supply and evacuation channel.



A storeman or driver for eight hours—on patrol hunting out guerillas for a further eight.

- (c) Control and employment of the local population.
- (d) Organisation.

Protection of Units and Installations

Commanders at all levels are responsible for the protection of their own units and sub-units. This might seem like "wearing out a well worn principle." However, when dealing with guerillas and a hostile population it is a fact we must consider.

The problem becomes more difficult when consideration is given to the dispersion desired in order to gain protection from nuclear weapons. Over-dispersion will of course result in less mutual support and invite attack from hostile bands.

It is quite clear that administrative units must be prepared at all times to defend themselves. This does not mean that such units will always be located in areas which are easily defended. Administrative units must be so located that primarily, they can adequately support operations.

Full use must be made of the principle of mutual support and, dependent on the nuclear threat, composition of units, terrain, etc., sub-units and units should be grouped for defence.

The requirements of good basic training for soldiers and tactical training for officers becomes most important. A high standard of tactical knowledge is required of the

administrative officer, and more attention should be paid to the basic requirements of all soldiers, i.e., weapon training, fieldcraft, a knowledge of minor tactics, and above all, a high standard of physical fitness.

The following are a few suggestions for defensive methods which may be taken by administrative units to meet this threat:—

- (a) The "Strong Point" system used in the defence of a Brigade Maintenance Area could be adopted to meet particular requirements. This system is based on, say, two strong points for the area in which approximately eighty administrative soldiers (Engineers, Medical, RAASC, Ordnance, RAEME, etc.) both rest and conduct defensive operations. This system of "strong point defence" accepts that:—
- (i) All round defence is impossible because of lack of men.
 - (ii) Penetration by the enemy into the general area is inevitable.
- (b) Large depots and installations should be laid out tactically and could be defended by a combination of the "village" and "strong point" defence systems. Defensive measures taken as a protection against nuclear attack should be based also on defence of the depot from air attack and attack by guerilla forces. For example, defensive earth works should not only be based on the requirement of getting troops *below the surface of the ground*; they should also be sighted so as to provide the framework for defence against ground attack.
- (c) Bulky equipments and large

numbers of other smaller equipments, such as stocks of concertina wire, tanks, etc., could be sited to provide defensive barriers and so canalize attacks.

- (d) Equipments could be stored in relation to their value and susceptibility to destruction by raiding parties. This may not always be possible, e.g., with POL and ammunition. However, in the case of ammunition and explosives, siting by types may provide the answer. For example, HE and some items may be so located as to gain the maximum protection. POL could be so stored that small quantities could be used for defence, by release into a drainage system and igniting for illumination of the area; the system being co-ordinated with the layout of defence posts.
- (e) Mobile patrols should be used to the fullest degree for the defence of all depots.

Dependent on circumstances and locations, troops from fighting formations and units will often provide protection to administrative units, installations and areas. Instances of this could be:—

- (a) Units in reserve or in rest areas before and after battle.
- (b) The intelligent location of Reinforcement Holding Units, Reception Camps, etc.
- (c) The administrative movement of fighting troops (reinforcements and complete units) forward from base areas.

Protection of the Supply and Evacuation Channel

It may be suggested that the simple answer to the problem is plenty

of supply aircraft, including helicopters. Air supply will be a most important and, at times, the only method of supply and evacuation in certain tropical areas of South-East Asia. The use of air supply including helicopters takes on greater importance when considering the possible elimination of certain intermediate depots, units, etc., in view of the nuclear threat.

Fixed wing aircraft and helicopters in flight are not normally subject to guerilla attack and, therefore, every effort should be made in the planning stages to ensure the use of this mobile, flexible and simple form of supply. However, when air is the principal or only form of supply, guerilla forces will strike even harder to destroy or capture the following:—

- (a) Forward and base airfields, and installations and dumps in close proximity to airfields.
- (b) Aircraft on the ground.
- (c) Stores which have been dropped from aircraft.

It must be realised, however, that air supply depends on a number of factors, not the least of which are the gaining of air superiority, weather and the availability of aircraft and airfields of all types. It may well be that the major portion of maintenance requirements will at times be moved by road, rail, smallcraft and manpack.

The following are a few suggestions for the protection of the land supply and evacuation channel:—

- (a) Supply and evacuation must be strictly controlled, full use being made of a simple and efficient traffic control system.
- (b) Where possible larger convoys or

pack trains, etc., should be used. (The governing factors of course include the nuclear threat and the route capacity.) Small convoys are easily ambushed and overall will require more troops equipment for protection.

- (c) Full use should be made of armoured cars and mobile hard-hitting patrols for the defence of the channel.
- (d) Militarized zones, in which the movement of civilians is forbidden, should be laid down.
- (e) Times of movement should be staggered. Avoid repetition—keep the guerilla intelligence service guessing.
- (f) Alternative routes should be used when possible. The principle is the same as the staggering of times—keep the enemy guessing.
- (g) When possible the movement of reinforcements and supplies going forward should be coordinated.
- (h) Villages should be avoided. In particular do not halt convoys in a village. Innocent looking women and children are sometimes more dangerous and destructive than men.
- (j) OPs equipped with wireless should be used whenever possible, to give warning.
- (k) Picquets should be mounted at vulnerable points such as important defiles, bridges, etc., which are to be held intact.

Control and Employment of Local Population

There are three objectives:—

- Firstly—Civilians must be controlled.

Secondly—We must gain their confidence and support wherever possible.

Thirdly—Use should be made of this valuable source of manpower, dependent on the degree of hostility in particular areas.

Control

This can be achieved by the following actions:—

- (a) Laying down militarized zones.
- (b) Re-settlement or merely temporary relocation.
- (c) Imposing strictly controlled curfews.
- (d) Strict control of the movement of civilian traffic, especially refugees.
- (e) The immediate establishment of an adequate military government/civil affairs organization to cater for the needs of the local population, e.g., food, hospitalization, etc.

Confidence and Support

This is not only the task of the civil affairs organization. It is the responsibility of every man in uniform to see that by example and fair treatment, elements of the local population become friendly towards us. Any unfair treatment of these people will result only in further bitterness and attacks. "Firmness" with "Fairness" must be the method of approach. By showing the local inhabitant that we respect his family, his particular way of life and his property, we can hope to attain the following:—

- (a) A source of manpower.
- (b) A counter-intelligence system.
- (c) Anti-guerilla measures.
- (d) Supply of local materials and food.

- (e) Storage facilities, etc., which would otherwise be denied to us.
- (f) Provision of certain local forms of supply which may be necessary in operations in South-East Asia, e.g., river and coastal smallcraft.

Manpower

In rear Administrative Areas local inhabitants can be of immense value in the provision of manpower for varying tasks, ranging from labour in ports and depots to porters for the carriage of supplies in forward areas. If the local population is hostile towards us this source of administrative manpower may be of greater hindrance than value. However, as operations develop certain elements will become friendly towards us as a result of propaganda and fair treatment.

It should be borne in mind that the outright hostile sections of the community will use this medium for the infiltration of saboteurs, spies, etc., and it will only be by careful screening, selection, and in many cases segregation, that local manpower can be used to our advantage.

Organization

It is suggested that it would be quite difficult to prepare ideal organizations in time of peace to fully cope with the unknown quality of resistance from the local population in time of war. Primarily the test of a satisfactory organization for all administrative units on the Order of Battle is:—

"Can these units adequately support the force being employed at all times?"

In considering the problem it is not only necessary to examine the

organization of individual units, but also it must be decided whether a unit HAS or HAS NOT a justifiable role.

It is not just a matter of stating "we will have air supply in the next war—helicopters and fixed wing aircraft of all types. Let us do away with this and that unit"—

This may well be the answer. However, it is suggested that FLEXIBILITY is the salient principle at all times—a flexible organization, and the flexible mind of the administrative planner and organizer on the spot at the time.

In considering whether present organizations of administrative units are capable of meeting the guerilla threat; the following should be borne in mind:—

- (a) Administrative units will not normally be called upon to function both operationally and administratively at the same time. Their prime function is administration.
- (b) Bearing this in mind, can the unit either on its own or together with other units or sub-units, still provide self-protection when the need arises.
- (c) The enemy is not interested in whether or not a driver, a storeman, or a fitter can work efficiently for, say, 10 hours straight, and must then have relief and rest. The enemy will use the full 24-hour day as a basis for his guerilla attacks.
- (d) Have our units the means with which to fight or patrol, etc., as necessary? Have they the necessary weapons and communications, or has the Unit Equipment

Table been drawn up merely to provide a comfortable way of life in rear areas?

- (e) Are our administrative units organized in accordance with a British Establishment to support operations in Western Europe, or are they organized to support operations in South-East Asia?

Conclusion

An attempt has been made in this paper to indicate how important is this problem of guerilla warfare and the hostile population, and also how important it is to study and appreciate administrative aspects related to the problem. It is only by studying the past that we are able partially to foresee the future, and consider the different methods and means which changing conditions demand.

The problem is one which should be borne in mind when considering ways and means of meeting the nuclear threat, and overcoming the supply problems associated with the terrain in South-East Asia. It is a problem which should be included for consideration in exercises and discussions wherever possible.

It is felt that the seriousness of this problem is not fully realized throughout all sections of the Army. During the 1939-45 War practically all guerilla or resistance forces were fighting on our side. We never looked upon them as anything but patriots. The Germans learned to their cost what guerilla warfare meant. We can neglect the lessons only at our peril.

At the beginning of the paper there appears a statement by the

late Field-Marshal Lord Wavell. Here is another:—

“The more I have seen of war, the more I realize how it all depends on administration and transportation (what our American Allies call

logistics). It takes little skill or imagination to see where you would like your army to be and when; it takes much knowledge and hard work to know where you can place your forces and whether you can maintain them there.”

“PERSONNEL”

“It is possible, just possible, that a more degrading, a more ill-favoured synonym for two or more members of the human race has at one time or another been coined; but, if it has, it has never gained the ubiquitous and tyrannical currency of this alien collective. Personnel, though in theory they are men and women, have only to be called personnel to lose their full status as human beings. They do not go, they proceed. They do not have, they are (or more often are not) in possession of. They do not ask, they make application for. Their minds, in so far as they may be deemed to have minds, are stocked not with the glories of knowledge but with irrelevant and unmemorable statistics, such as their father's nationality at birth and the date on which they were last inoculated against yellow fever. Once they either kept things or gave them up; now they must retain or surrender them. Want (if it is true) they do not know, nor need; but deficiencies and requirements are just as inconvenient. They cannot eat, they can only consume; they perform ablutions; instead of homes they have place(s) of residence in which, instead of living, they are domiciled. They are not cattle, they are not ciphers, they certainly are not human beings; they are personnel.”

—From “The Times,” London.

Changing the Chinese Mind

Sergeant N. G. Truman
Australian Intelligence Corps

TO change completely in a decade the mental character of six hundred million people with a social system extending over a period of two thousand years or more would seem impossible, but in modern China it is being done with remarkable success. A propaganda system, utilizing the experience of other totalitarian states and adapted to fit the Chinese mentality has been developed, and is to-day one of the most powerful weapons at the disposal of the Chinese Communist Party. It has a two-fold objective, the winning to Communism of the younger generation within China, and the revival of the Nationalist sentiments of the 12 million "overseas Chinese" living in practically every country in the world. The control of this system is vested in Lu Ting-I, one of the Old Guard of the Chinese Communist Party, and one of the few intellectuals with a long Party association. He was born in 1907 in Kiangsu province and

graduated from the University of Communications, subsequently studying in Moscow. While still a student he became a Party member and has been one of the less conspicuous but nevertheless influential leaders since its early struggle for power. The extent of his influence over the minds of the Chinese millions can be gauged by the administrative posts he has held concurrently. Since 1951 he has been a member of the Central Peoples' Government Council, Minister of Propaganda and Information, Member of the State Administrative Council for Literature and Deputy Director of the Committee of Cultural and Educational Affairs.

The tentacles of his influence reach to the most remote corners of the Chinese mainland and beyond to the millions of wealthy, influential Chinese living in every country in South-East Asia. The propaganda emanating from his Ministry of Propaganda and Information is awakening in the younger, well educated generation, who in all probability

—From the Australian Intelligence
Corps Bulletin.

have never seen the land of their ancestors, a nationalistic fervour which must eventually be a threat to the internal security of those nations from which their family's wealth was derived.

Within the mainland the Chinese Communist propaganda system has generally followed the tried and proven Russian system of complete suppression of information from independent sources, government control of newspapers and education, and mass parades and hand-clapping orgies for the glorification of the National leaders. A few modifications have been necessary to suit local conditions. The Chinese family system, basis of the Chinese civilisation since Confucian days, had to be broken and repudiated, the traditional Chinese contempt for the military profession had to be supplanted by a fervent consciousness of military honour and glory. In fact, the minds of almost a quarter of the human race had to be changed from a peace-loving, ancestor-worshipping society of introvert families into a militaristic, state-worshipping nation of individual automatons.

An old Chinese adage reads "Hao T'ieh Pu Ta Ting, Hao Jen Pu Tang Ping" or "Good iron is not used as nails, Good men do not become soldiers." This reflects the traditional Chinese attitude towards military affairs. Members of the military profession did not even rank on the social scale, which was "Scholars, Farmers, Workers, Merchants" in that order. Military strategy, such as it was, was evolved by certain scholars who never participated in the actual fighting, which was left to military leaders chosen generally for some physical prowess or feat of bravery. The troops themselves

were a mercenary rabble of bandits and brigands, ready and willing to fight for any war lord willing to pay their moderate fee.

A slight change in the status of the soldier followed the 1912 revolution and the subsequent attempt to model the Chinese Army on European lines. This reform was given considerable impetus by the establishment of the Whampoa Academy in the 1920's and the resultant appearance of the professional army officer. It was not, however, until the expulsion of Chiang Kai-shek from the mainland in 1949 that any real effort was made to elevate the social and economic position of the professional soldier to a level comparable to that of his counterpart in Western countries.

In 1930, when the father of the Chinese People's Liberation Army and its erstwhile Commander-in-Chief, Chu Teh, was organizing his 4th Route Army, he laid down a set of "Three Principles of Discipline and Eight Rules of Conduct of the Red Army." These rules, designed to dispel the conception of a soldier as nothing more than a bandit were, "Always obey orders; Do not take a single needle or a single thread from the people; Hand over all captured property to the authorities"; and the eight rules were "Be friendly in speech; Be just in business transactions; Always return anything borrowed; Give compensation for damaged property; Do not beat up or bully the people; Be careful to protect the crops; Do not flirt with women; Do not torture prisoners of war." These regulations, rigidly enforced, resulted in harmonious relations between the Communist Army and the local civilian peasantry, contributing no doubt largely

to the almost incredible speed with which the Communist forces swept the Nationalists from the mainland.

During the Korean War the Chinese Volunteer Army came into existence, providing an excellent opportunity for the glorification of the Chinese soldier and his profession. Civilian organizations such as the "Resist America, Aid Korea Movement" were set up to support the "Glorious Heroes" who were defending the "Motherland" from American aggression. An immense quantity of propaganda flooded the country showing how Chinese troops, outnumbered and ill-equipped, had, by virtue of love of the new regime alone, gained many victories.

The most fantastic statistical reports of casualties and grossly distorted accounts of battles fought found their way to countries as far away as Australia and provide almost humorous reading for the translator today in the light of official UNO reports. The families with soldier sons in Korea were honoured as "Kuang Jung Tze Chia" or "Glorious Family" and were given a sign bearing this inscription to be hung over the entrance of the family home. Returned servicemen were granted plots of land and given preferential treatment. The abolition of the Confucian concept of a soldier's worth had come a very big step closer. In 1954 the Chinese People's Liberation Army was completely reorganized, Officer-Other Rank distinctions on Western lines were introduced and ranks were created to supersede "Appointment Titles" which had been in use since the inception of the Red Army in 1927. An officer is now a Captain or a Major instead of a "Company Leader" or a "Battalion Second in

Command." Conscription has also been introduced and, utilizing the good grounding laid during the Korean War, a great spectacle is made of the young heroes leaving the village to defend the "Motherland." All the villagers are required to attend a public ceremony, medals are presented by a military political representative to the parents of the new soldier, and the family duly declared to be a "Glorious Family." The professional soldier now has terms of service, medals, pay regulations and a good deal of the ceremonial which is found in Western armies. The older generation still consider the son to be virtually lost once he has enlisted, but the soldiers themselves are certainly much better off than they would be as part of the labour force of the local peasants' co-operative. The nucleus of a young efficient and inspired Army is already forming and such an army is vital to the leaders of any totalitarian state.

Another difficulty on the road to socialization which had been anticipated many years ago by the Communist leaders was the Chinese family system. Since the days of Confucius, Chinese social life has centred on the family. The antiquity of this system can be gauged from the fact that, despite the immense population of approximately 400 million indigenous Chinese, there are only 1458 family names and of these only 438 are really common!

The part the propaganda machine had to play in this field was to convince the younger generation that it was their duty to serve the state and not the family head. Confucianism itself advocates allegiance to the state, but as it is also a doctrine of allegiance to the family head, who

would probably be a steadfast Confucian and very reluctant to relinquish his autocratic power over the family group, it had to be supplanted by a doctrine aimed more specifically at the malleable minds of the young. Participation in the reconstruction of the "Motherland" was lauded as the "Glorious Duty" of every young man and woman. Family groups were broken up to sever the bonds of subservience to a parochial family head. Cantonese were sent to Peking and Pekinese were sent to Shanghai, regardless of family consideration. School groups were formed where children were taught that their first allegiance lay with the state and it was a "Glorious Duty" to inform on a member of the family whose conduct or speech at home deviated from the Party line. Thus the tightly knit family group has been shattered. The system on which the Chinese civilization was evolved and which has kept the Chinese for 2000 years as a peace loving nation of introverts has been supplanted by an insidious system of children spying on parents, sons and daughters defying parental direction and that filial piety which has been a characteristic of the Chinese since before the days of Christ, has been lost, perhaps for ever.

Illiteracy is one of the great enemies of the propaganda system, and the adage "The pen is mightier than the sword" is true when applied to the mass subversion of a people by a new doctrine. The "Pen," however, loses a great deal of its power when only ten per cent. of the people can read the written word, and this was the standard of literacy in China when the Communists came to power. To consolidate their position the Reds required the support of

the 500 million peasants, the vast majority of whom were totally illiterate, so immediate steps were taken simultaneously to simplify the written language and to elevate the literacy standard. More than 800 basic characters have already been radically simplified, and a panel of experts has been established to evolve and to introduce a practical system of romanization to dispense with the several thousand characters in current use. The mainland newspapers and periodicals, all published under the supervision of the Ministry of Information, now use these simplified characters to such an extent that it is virtually impossible for a foreign student of the language to get more than a sketchy idea of the meaning of an article published for consumption on the mainland, unless he has made a study of this new style.

To supplement the written propaganda during the transitional period from total illiteracy to partial literacy a number of unique methods of disseminating propaganda have been evolved. Every village now has closed circuit re-diffusion speakers mounted at street corners and places of public assembly. From these speakers blare the well-chosen programme of the local political commissar so that a little of its message at least must impress itself on the mind of the most involuntary listener. Every village has its "Blackboard Newspaper," where selected news items are displayed in pictures and simple language. Compulsory village discussion and study groups are held almost nightly where current affairs are debated under the guidance of the village political representative. Periodically an item of particular significance is displayed

by the "Living Newspaper," a group of actors who enact a play portraying current affairs. Thus the ignorant have their news brought to them carefully monitored by Party representatives and distorted as necessary. Some of these methods would hardly convince even the most illiterate Western mind, but they are having a very profound and very definite effect on the Chinese peasant. He may have no rice to fill his belly today but he knows everything is in good hands and a more prosperous and enlightened life is his tomorrow.

In addition to the five hundred million Chinese living on the mainland, there are over 12 million "Overseas Chinese" scattered throughout the world. Most of these 12 million are resident in countries of South-East Asia and have been, for many years, the subject of an international dispute between the countries in which they are domiciled and the mainland Government—be it Nationalist or Communist—due to their "Dual Nationality." If a Pole emigrates to America, he becomes, quite rapidly, an American; if an Englishman emigrates to Australia he becomes, within ten years or so, an Australian. But a Chinese, no matter where he lives nor how long he has lived there, remains forever a Chinese. The name "Overseas Chinese," taken from two characters meaning "Chinese" and "Sojourn," is evidence enough of the Chinese conception of a Chinese emigrant to another country. This attitude is probably due to the Chinese mentality, his perpetual looking into the past and his ancestor worship. He has bonds with his homeland which he can never sever. The Communists are well aware of this and are exploiting it to their own advantage.

The Chinese communities in these South-East Asian countries, though minorities, except for Singapore, are of considerable economic and political influence. The economy of the 90 million Indonesians, for instance, is largely in the hands of the two million Overseas Chinese living there. Their wealth and influence is eagerly sought by the Chinese Communists and no effort is being spared to awaken in them a resurgence of national and racial pride. Again it is through the propaganda system that the new doctrine is being fed to them. That this subversion of young Chinese of wealthy families, born and educated in foreign countries, is having effect is obvious from the ever-increasing number of young university graduates who are returning to the "Motherland" which they have probably never seen. In recent months two cases of wealthy Malayan-born Chinese flying to Hong Kong to attempt to thwart the return to the mainland of a son in one case and a daughter in the other have been headline news.

An edition of the parent newspaper "TaKung Pao," one of the two most important mainland newspapers, is published in Hong Kong, obviously for Overseas Chinese. It specialises in nostalgic pictures of famous Chinese beauty spots with captions similar in tone to "Oh to be in England now that April's there." Feature articles depict the rapid reconstruction of the Chinese mainland and the fantastic expansion in industry. Farming communities of Overseas Chinese have been established in the southern provinces and are frequently shown as model settlements. This newspaper has a unique literary style, the conventionally ambiguous, cryptic sentence

having been supplanted by a lengthy, almost legal style so that the reader cannot possibly misconstrue the intended meaning.

Numerous booklets, wearisome in the extreme to the translator, serve to show the Overseas Chinese how fervently and willingly the Chinese people are going about the construction of their homeland. A typical example referring to railway construction in Fukien reads, "Two drillers who went off work at 3 p.m. voluntarily returned to the site at 7 p.m. and resumed their work at the drills. After completing their task at the northern end they rushed to support those working at the southern end. The loading team also 'stepped on the gas' and created a new record by loading two cars in three minutes. Every team strove for honour in the work aimed at breaking through." The commander said, "We must break through, whether the watershed agrees or not." This may well be true, but the fact is that most of the workers engaged on these projects have been uprooted from their homes and forcibly transferred to remote areas, seldom earning enough to support themselves and their families, who are left to rely on friends and relatives for subsistence.

The tremendous potential of this "Sleeping Dragon of the East," now that it has been roused from its slumber and united, can hardly be estimated. Almost a quarter of the world's people in a country rich in minerals and fuels, as yet virtually untouched, if aroused to a fanatical state of national pride and resentment to past oppression by the West, actual or fancied, could become more of a threat to Western civilization

than the Japanese became in less than 50 years. Under a ruthlessly efficient totalitarian leadership China has emerged in less than seven years from obscurity to the position of a world military power. She has the world's largest standing Army, at present poorly equipped by Western standards but, with such rapid industrial development being made in the country, she could within a few years rank alongside the two other great military powers. Industrialization will be a long, hard road and the national leaders will need to maintain a firm grip on the nation until the benefits from it can be passed to the people. Their national expansion programme necessitates the loss of those democratic freedoms dear to the Western mind, but China and Chinese Philosophy have never held personal freedom in high regard. Hers has been a long history of oppression and exploitation of the masses and she has now simply switched from one form of political and economic oppression to another. Any change in the life of the Chinese peasant must be for the better and the task of the propaganda machine of the Communists is to convince the peasant that socialization is the only way in which this change can be brought about. Every conceivable means is being used to pound this message into his brain, he sees it and hears it over and over every day, his children are taught it at school, and he and his wife are taught it in study groups in the evenings. Given time, even the rigidly insular Chinese mentality, steeped in hundreds of years of tradition, will succumb and another era in the history of civilization will have come to an end.

PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION AS SEEN BY A CMF OFFICER

Captain P. F. Baxter
2 Stores Company, RAAOC

MUCH has been written during the past decade of the difficulties confronting the managers of industry in their task of maintaining discipline in their work forces; and writers have clearly indicated that there has been a need for similar authority to that vested in Army officers in their personnel matters. As one who sees both sides of the situation, might I briefly analyse the case, because I consider that it is easier to manage personnel in industry today than it is in the Services.

Let me make a few comparisons. The industrial manager has a more flexible objective in attaining an efficient work force. He can give rapid promotion, adjust his own rates of pay above award rates (within economic limits), engage and dismiss labour as and when he pleases, and by offering greater incentive or opportunity, woo the trained operator from rival organizations. He is

able to train his workers at an early age, virtually from when they leave school. On the other hand, I think the personnel practices in the peacetime Army have always been somewhat unwieldy, particularly when faced with a situation where industry offers a weekly wage plus (very often) overtime pay, incentives and complete freedom outside of working hours. Admittedly the policy of "Training in Peace for War" is correct; but should this apply to such corps as RAAOC and RAEME, whose role in peace is functional and vast?

Since the 1939-45 war industrial management has not been difficult where those managers, mostly ex-servicemen, have insisted upon firm control of personnel, stood no "monkey business" and, on necessary occasions, used their managerial authority of dismissal. There are many instances of highly successful organizations which have kept costs down by the application of a firm but fair personnel policy; but have gained the mutual respect of work-

—From RAAOC Bulletin, March, 1957.

ers and Trade Union officials, and have experienced little trouble with absentees, labour shortage or strikes.

How has the Army fared during this decade? Firstly, it has been confronted with an "age-increase" to which I cannot see any solution until large numbers of lads are recruited from the schools. Secondly, its personnel organization is too inflexible. For example, a soldier wishing to transfer from one corps to another, really finds himself confronted with a major task. There is little "settling-down" for the promising soldier, who seems to be perpetually going off to a school; and for some reason or another, it is only when one goes to an Army school that one really learns. I would much prefer such schools, where feasible, to become mobile and move to their students at night and during weekends, and thus retain students' services during normal hours of parade. Thirdly, discipline, to some degree, has been undermined by failure to raise the maximum amount by which a commanding officer may fine a soldier found guilty of an offence. Whilst I agree that good administration will prevent many offences, there will always be some indivi-

duals to whom a £5 fine means little in these days of inflation.

Industry has a far wider choice of operatives, but in the Army a commander takes whoever he is given, and is thankful to get him. In many cases the soldier is not entirely suitable to fill the posting, whereas he was suitable in his previous unit. This anomaly can be overcome in industry by regrading or dismissal; but the soldier promoted to sergeant whilst in a "Q" posting may prove inefficient as a platoon sergeant, and must therefore be placed elsewhere in the unit until he proves satisfactory.

If I were asked to choose, I must confess that personnel administration in industry is so much more simple and flexible than in the Army, that I would prefer it as an occupation; but my sympathy is with the Army. However, I do not consider the situation to be too grave, as in many recent instances, RAAOC officers seem to be applying the most modern techniques of personnel management! At the same time, a complete independent survey of Army personnel practices would, I feel, be worthwhile, and result in "streamlining" many things, thereby developing a more efficient Army, with correspondingly higher morale.
