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
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VICTORIA BARRACKS, MELBOURNE

AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

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CONTRE L'ARMEE DE METIER OR AGAINST AN ARMY OF MERCENARIES

Lieutenant-Colonel A. Green
Royal Australian Army Service Corps

IT is no surprise that two such eminent pioneer exponents of tank warfare as General de Gaulle and General Sir Giffard Martel, have been the most vocative proponents of the elite long-service professional Army of our times. De Gaulle, in his forthright *Vers l'Armee de Metier* was primarily concerned with French conditions and needs before World War II; and Sir Giffard Martel in his post-war writings, has naturally directed his theories towards a solution of purely British military problems, particularly British commitments on the continent of Europe. It is now quite clear that a similar school of thought is emerging from among certain of the most thoughtful and experienced Australian Staff Corps officers, that a compact, well-trained, well-equipped professional army would be more appropriate for the fulfilment of Australian defence obligations than the existing larger AMF, compounded as it is of small regular units and cadres with large complements of CMF and National Servicemen. It would, of course, be unreasonable

and disappointing to expect professional soldiers to prefer amateurs or conscripts, were there any simple choice. Regular officers, by their upbringing and tradition, are unremitting perfectionists, and the achievement of their technical aspirations is greatly facilitated by a long-service professional army. Unfortunately for them, the choice, under Australian economic and political conditions, is not a simple one, and their proposal requires the most careful examination to determine whether it is valid, either wholly or partly.

Rise of Conscripted Mass Armies

It is generally accepted that the growth of great conscript armies, a European and American development, was facilitated by the great industrial revolutions of last century and the resultant capacity for equipping and moving such armies. Of course citizen obligations to serve in time of war had existed in law since feudal times, but only with the support of 19th Century factories and railways could whole national populations be utilised in

war, and, at the same time, did improved political and administrative machinery render the system effective. It was also fortunate that the handling of the earlier weapons produced by the factory system, principally the rifle and bayonet, could be adequately, if not superlatively mastered by conscript soldiers, serving for a term of two or three years with the Colours. Artillery presented certain difficulties and doubtless the device of posting the better men to artillery units compensated for this deficiency. It is noteworthy that although there was some press-ganging, British armies from the Napoleonic Wars until half-way through World War I, as Britain was predominantly a naval power, remained basically voluntary. Hence the thesis that one volunteer is worth three, four or six conscripts, depending upon the mood of the expert: from which it might also be deduced, in parenthesis, that one regular long service man was worth say two last-minute volunteers. The great battles in France and Flanders and static lines of defence played havoc with the equations of military quality and forced most of the armies engaged there to resort to conscription. One of the notable exceptions was, of course, Australia, whose referenda on the conscription issue constitute a precedent which no thinking soldier or politician can ignore. Nevertheless we see a fairly constant tradition of the volunteer standing army, backed by Fencibles, Militias, Volunteers (note well the name) and Territorials (CMF in Australia, or Non-Permanent Active Militia in Canada). As soon as World War I ended the old British Regular Army, at home and overseas, was

revived and conscription was only reintroduced when Hitler's war was manifestly inevitable. The French remained true to their conscript tradition, but the Germans were temporarily forced to maintain a restricted professional army of 100,000. The Germans, having derived great refinement of quality from this Reichswehr, reverted to large-scale conscription after the assumption of power by Hitler.

The Trend to Professionalism

At this stage the more advanced soldiers, notably Fuller in England and de Gaulle in France, conceived a new ideal, of smaller yet more powerful armies, of great mobility, manned by technical military experts. This need came about because the armament industry had developed equipment and weapons of such power and complexity that lesser numbers of more intelligent, better-trained soldiers were required to produce a given volume of fire in a much more mobile form. The instruments of this policy, the aeroplane, the tank, the machine gun and the vehicle were more expensive than the rifle, bayonet and ammunition boots on which the soldier had hitherto principally relied. The new forces, manoeuvring across the land like naval fleets at sea, would render entrenched infantry and horse-drawn transport completely obsolete. The great nations-in-arms, according to these theorists, could no longer be effectively deployed and manoeuvred. On the other hand the mechanised armies would demand the finest human material, intensively trained and hardened for prompt dynamic employment. There is no doubt that much of their prognostication came true in World War II. The effective

battle-winning elements of the German Army, in Poland, France and Russia, were the mechanised forces, which cut through the old-fashioned armies of Poland, France, and initially, Russia, with convincing ease. The conversion was not, however, complete, as probably of necessity, the German and Russian armies notably retained a numerical preponderance of slower, more primitive formations until the end of the war.

Since that war ended the British preoccupation with Hot and Cold War and Imperial Policing has proved costly in men and material. The arguments of Martel, in favour of a regular force to provide the British contribution to NATO and Imperial garrisons, appeal to the soldier and civilian alike. Peacetime conscription is foreign to British tradition and inimical to the body economic as well as to the career of the individual civilian. If a sufficient and adequate force of professional soldiers could be found for the task of the British Army everybody would apparently be pleased: but that happy state has not proved attainable. Meanwhile it has to be remembered that a mobilisation reserve at home remains an essential, which must be found from conscript or volunteer territorial (CMF) sources.

Defects of the Conscript Soldier

It is relevant to consider the principal objections of the professional soldier to the general mass of conscript soldiers. It is a common allegation that, because they are compulsorily enlisted, they are necessarily unwilling. This was certainly true at certain periods in the French and the Italian Armies, and even in the German Army if we are to

believe a certain type of war novelist. It is hard to define all the factors which must exist before one volunteer becomes the putative equal of two, three or six conscripts. Much depends on national tradition, morale, and the political and military handling of the conscript. The Prussians were historically effective conscripts. It must, however, be conceded that generally a volunteer will display more enthusiasm for the task than the conscript; indeed, by the act of volunteering, has already done so. Another drawback suffered by a conscript force is that almost inevitably, despite modern selection procedures, it must contain a definite proportion of inapt soldiers. They may be physically fit and, officially, mentally sound, and yet prove misfits. As they must be placed in units they have a disproportionately bad influence on other soldiers. Above all, the greatest defect of the conscript in the eyes of the *officier de carrière* is the inadequate time available for his training and subsequent bedding-down in his unit. The system can normally only allow time for a concentrated and mass-producing recruit training, whereas that most important phase of the trained soldier's maturing, the welding into the unit and sub-unit team, and the production of good non-commissioned officers and unit specialists, has to be a hurried hotch-potch affair. It is equally deplored that the great numbers of partially-trained soldiers produced by universal training cannot always be fully equipped by modern standards, although technical ingenuity may in time overcome this handicap, by such devices as the Sten sub-machine gun, and the recoilless

field gun, which are the products of lighter, rather than heavier, industry. It is pertinent to note that these objections to the levee en masse are essentially those voiced by modern Western soldiers, who base their thinking upon the attainment of maximum firepower and mobility, and, being responsible to democratic institutions, must exercise every economy in human life. They do not apply to those Asian and totalitarian armies which subscribe to the doctrine of saturating the defence in human sea tactics, although neither can they totally escape the influence of such progressive ideas. (Exchange of military thought is not subject to national frontiers or customs barriers; for the Finns taught the Russians the finer points of winter warfare around Lake Ladoga in 1940 and the Russians were soon busy teaching the Germans the same lessons during the winter of 1941.) Nor should it be assumed that any adverse moral effects of conscription upon the Anglo-Saxon youth will be equally apparent in the young Muscovite, who has been reared in a totally different domestic and intellectual environment.

Virtues of Conscription

It needed powerful influences to force the entire Anglo-Saxon world to conscript its manpower for war and cold war. Therefore there must be some virtues in the system in the present context. Probably the greatest and most obvious of these is the elementary justice of imposing the grave burdens of defence equally over all sections of the population. Two generations have seen the fittest, morally and physically, of the nation, go forth voluntarily to successive decimations.

Nations can afford neither the initial loss of such cadres, nor the subsequent rancour engendered by unequal sacrifice, no more than industry and good administration can withstand the unnecessary dislocations of a voluntary system. The second virtue is therefore the ability of the system to apportion the aptitudes and skills of the nation in priority of war tasks, provided an efficient system of personnel selection, allotment, and industrial mobilization exists. It is also important that, so long as our sturdy democracy functions, the conscripted soldier is serving, not at the behest of the military hierarchy, or of politicians, but of the voter—himself. This is in itself a great safeguard of his freedom and interests. From the purely military point of view the system commends itself because it is, under present conditions, the only means of producing forces of the required strength and, equally important, the reserves for those forces. Thus during World War II the British Commonwealth nations and the USA had to resort to these methods, and, in some form, they have mostly retained the system during the current uneasy peace. At the same time it is incontestable that the French armies which, badly launched, ill-found, nurtured in the school of static defensive doctrine, proved singularly unsuccessful in 1940, and a very poor argument for the system of conscription. There has been much criticism by pre-war regular officers of the post-war National Servicemen in the British Army; but impartial critics of these troops in Malaya and Korea consider that in many cases they compare more than favourably with the pre-war British regular soldier,

particularly in intelligence and keenness.

The Forces We Need

The defence problems and the manpower difficulties of Australia are not generally analogous to those of Great Britain, Canada or the USA. Isolated, and adjacent to South-East Asia, Australian attention is focused on immediate local threats of real urgency, in a vast and absorptive terrain. Her internal development makes a great demand on the available labour force. The quantity and quality remaining for all the defence forces is normally inadequate, and every resource must be carefully harboured. Britain and USA are highly developed and populous territories; even Canada, of comparable area to Australia, but comfortably contiguous with USA, and more remote from all but the trans-Polar threat, is better populated than Australia. Moreover, Canadian and British defence in the North Atlantic is fully integrated with that of the major partner. Such integration, and such allies, are not so easy of achievement in the South-West Pacific or South-East Asia.

Australian policy during the past ten years has required balanced forces of all three services; regular components being permanently available for occupation of enemy territory, co-operation in UN, ANZUS, ANZAM and SEATO. Thus by various devices, a total of all regular services of about fifty thousand has been maintained, more or less constantly. These forces actually only constitute the Cold War and token forces. Behind them are the more basic defence forces, mainly of the army, required to be available for full-scale warfare, and

consisting of a combination of volunteer citizen elements, with the bulk of rank and file being found from National Servicemen. It is certain that without National Service the present force of approximately three divisions could not be kept in being at full strength. Moreover, in view of the critical time factor of modern war, which may be accentuated by the confusion of nuclear warfare, it is accepted that there is unlikely to be a year of respite for training and deployment such as the AIF was given in World War II. Therefore two criteria are important in the consideration of the type of army we need: firstly, what is the size of force required, and secondly, by what system can we achieve the requisite quality and efficiency in that force?

In the worst case, the AMF could, in global emergency, be called upon to operate practically alone, say with a division from UK or USA co-operating, for a limited period; and, as the nearest force to South-East Asia, could be expected to provide the command and services for the force. In such circumstances a force less than a corps of three divisions is unthinkable. Meanwhile there is a constant role for at least one brigade, such as was positioned in Japan, and later in Korea, for early deployment which must be held in immediate readiness. Moreover, in this Nuclear Age, a local home and civil defence force is necessary, comprising coastal, anti-aircraft, and heavy rescue units, let us say the equivalent to at least another division. By these calculations the existing ARA and CMF are not excessive; in fact they are probably insufficient. Furthermore, the tropical theatres in which we will

probably operate demand full and fit cadres with a high proportion of similar reinforcement units to repair a high wastage. And all must be immediately available for service, not in the military chrysalis stage, or as paragraphs in the mobilisation handbooks, but in solid flesh and blood.

It may be contended that such forces are beyond Australian resources of manpower and material. In war it is considered feasible to produce at least one divisional slice from each million of the population, of the inflated Western de luxe model, of about 50,000 all arms, as well as naval and air components. The Russians, at smaller establishments and relying on more primitive yet effective logistics, could double or even treble that number of divisions. The internal needs of the vast territory of the Australian Commonwealth must absorb a higher proportion of population than the civilian economies of the UK or the USA. Making allowance for this, and the naval and air force share of manpower, four divisional slices in peace seems a feasible, from a population of 9m, although not an easy, target to reach; provided the electorate recognizes the validity of the Services' demands.

A Comparison of Methods

Few will dispute the necessity for these forces, but there will rarely be agreement on the best method of raising them. The main choices before us are by:—

- (a) Regular enlistments, i.e., ARA.
- (b) Voluntary citizen service, i.e., CMF.

- (c) National Service Training of limited duration.
- (d) Selective service on the lines adopted in USA.

The regular army, in whole units and formations, is a recent growth in Australia which has rapidly established itself in public esteem. Most of the credit for this success must go to army schools, which have accomplished the transformation from the Interim Army. The old elite cadres of the pre-war Staff Corps and Instructional Corps were more limited in scope than the ARA and had less impact on national life. They achieved the highest quality by selective recruitment and training, therefore they were held in the highest regard professionally by other British Commonwealth armies, and are still bearing excellent fruit to this day. Regular forces are the logical instruments for the formation of instructional cadres, staffs and overseas garrisons. Nevertheless it is abundantly clear that an Australia whose amazing economic development can only be compared with that of USA in the 1860s, can produce a but limited number of regular army recruits. This experience is a close parallel to that of US Navy and Army during the latter half of the 19th Century, when the regular forces faced insuperable recruiting difficulties, but managed to keep a strong and effective cadre of staff officers in being against the emergency of major war. Civilian employment is too competitive for the Services in Australia. Having regard to some of the material at present recruited, it seems unlikely that even a doubling of ARA pay could double the strength and maintain the quality of the

ARA. The necessity to accept some sub-standard recruits in a mercenary army was well known in the old British Army, and is becoming more familiar to the ARA. Canada contrives to maintain a divisional slice of regular soldiers in being, including two brigades overseas at one time, and apparently has not, despite her greater population and prosperity, found it easy. It is probable that the ARA is now at the maximum feasible strength.

The volunteer traditions of Australia are well exemplified, in the Sudan, the Boer War and the two World Wars. There is also a willingness to accept conscription in approved circumstances. Australia before World War I was the first British nation to introduce compulsory training, and has twice repeated the process in peace since then. It might be said that the tradition is broadly one of compulsion for training and for wars threatening the mainland, and of volunteering for Imperial wars. The volunteer has the most endearing quality of enthusiasm, which is to the soldier what charity is to the soul—an indispensable leavening. The volunteer is naturally the easiest man to train because he wants to train himself. Added to this, citizen units attract the cream of civilian talent from a broad selection of professions and trades. The AMF tradition draws heavily on the achievements of these forerunners, from Monash to Morshead, and their mark is conspicuous on Australian public life, as well as in military affairs. There is also a convincing history of successful combinations of the volunteer citizen commander with the specialized assistance of the Staff Corps staff officer, as in the Monash-

Blamey relationship, which commends the citizen leader to the AMF. Unfortunately the wholly voluntary CMF can never produce the number of soldiers needed, at the time required, for modern war. This shortfall is accentuated by the stress of modern professional and business life. The good mature man whom the army requires as an officer or non-commissioned officer is likely to be entering the most demanding phase of his vocational and domestic life. He cannot spare much time or energy for the army. Governments have always sought the maximum support from citizen forces, primarily because they are cheap, and partly because they are regarded as politically innocuous.

There arises now some doubt of the degree of technical perfection, in such units as armour or electrical and mechanical engineers, which can be expected from CMF units, although they have hitherto been notably strong in field engineering. Overall it cannot be immediately expected that such units will ever be up to war establishment with fully trained soldiers. There is reason to believe that only small specialist elements or individuals can achieve complete readiness for war under the voluntary citizen system; thus although we are not informed of the proportion of citizen pilots who fought so successfully in the Battle of Britain, we do know, from the number of Auxiliary Air Force units on the RAF order of battle, and the intake of RAF Volunteer Reserve pilots up to that time, that a high proportion of that corps d'elite was non-regular. There are many indispensable specialists such as doctors, dentists, petroleum engineers, radio and radar techni-

cians who are best recruited from civilian counterparts. Moreover, in an individualistic outdoor loving people like the Australian the proportion of natural soldiers is high, but not so high as to dispense with training as some propagandists imagine. We cannot afford to ignore the CMF as a source of military strength; but unfortunately we can no longer rely on it for the bulk of our force. In home defence it might produce most valuable and effective forces similar to the Boer commandos or Home Guards, but for immediate global employment a definite standard of organisation, training and reinforcements must be imposed. In the AMF the role of the CMF is comparable to that of the ARA, in the quality it contributes and in the limitations of its numerical strength. Moreover, the AMF must continue to draw the majority of its officers from these dedicated amateurs.

National Service was the deliberate declared will of the Australian people, and has fortunately been generally acclaimed as successful by the public. There is sometimes a suspicion that this public success is based more on the social than on the military effects of the training. In an era of endemic adolescent delinquency, service training plays an important part in orienting, disciplining and educating our youth. This can only be a by-product, and soldiers must also be satisfied of its military efficacy. Fourteen weeks' total training in depots compares unfavourably with the sixteen weeks' recruit training once deemed necessary in simpler times before a regular soldier joined his unit. Training methods have improved and with increased Corps Training

in National Service Battalions, the trainee reaches a remarkably good standard of general and corps training. Subsequently his two annual camps and his home training refresh and continue his teaching, but it must be emphasized that they are not sufficient to bring him to that standard required, individually and collectively, of an expeditionary force unit. (At the same time the AMF seems able to accomplish more with its trainees than the RAAF, which does not appear to integrate the trainees into squadron establishments, and is apparently training large numbers of its quota in air-field defence duties which could equally well be undertaken by soldiers.) It is this failure to reach a fully proficient state in units which dismays many Staff Corps critics of the existing system. They find, after experience in Korea and Malaya or from exchange duty in NATO formations, that the statutory period of training is not sufficient to produce a battleworthy unit and formation. The gunner who is barely beyond the trained recruit stage, the driver who can drive but cannot maintain his vehicle, the weak junior infantry leader; all bespeak an army unfit to take the field immediately under modern conditions. Moreover, the critic believes that many soldiers, after training, will never be available in war, either because under existing legislation, they will not volunteer to serve overseas, or because they work in essential civilian occupations likely to be reserved. Therefore the critic sees the National Service scheme as a qualified success; which is both militarily slightly wasteful, and falls short of the desired standards of military proficiency.

The fourth system of raising armies which is open to us is that of Selective Service, similar to American practice. Under this system, when the eligible civilians exceed the number of recruits needed the necessary conscripts are obtained by selection and subsequent lottery. This system has two great advantages: it has an element of fairness so long as the lottery is properly conducted, and it brings in only as many recruits as the service requires. Politically it is disliked, because it ultimately leads to uneven acceptance of the defence obligation. Nevertheless it is an effective instrument to raise the forces to pre-determined strengths with manpower of specified qualities. It is believed that if this system were used in conjunction with a longer period of service a field force of the right size and of the correct quality could be ensured for the AMF. Therefore this system should not be rejected, despite political objections.

A Plan for the Manning of the AMF

It has been shown that the AMF requires three main categories of formation:—

- (a) Standing Garrisons and Overseas Contributions in Peace.
- (b) Field Forces for War.
- (c) Home and Civil Defence Forces for War.

It then follows that these forces could be effectively manned in the following manner:—

- (a) Regular components must be raised, either as units or cadres, in all three categories of force. Nevertheless, from the demographic reasons given earlier,

the bulk of soldiers must be found from other sources.

- (b) Volunteer CMF soldiers should be employed in Field Forces, whenever they are available at the Field Force standard; otherwise they should be made available for Home and Civil Defence units.
- (c) Selective Servicemen will then provide the balance of soldiers required in Field Force units. After extensive training, from one to two years, in formed units and formations, their technical and tactical training will be complete, junior leaders can be selected and seasoned, and the mobilisation process accordingly simplified. Two years in units may sound a long time, but in fact may barely suffice. Refresher training in an active reserve will be necessary for them after they leave their units, to maintain them in fitness for reinforcement. Selective servicemen would also be available for overseas garrisons and forces in peace.
- (d) The remaining fit males should be given compulsory home service training over a period of five to six years, in Home and Civil Defence units of the CMF.
- (e) Deferments should be given to specialists such as medical students, engineers, electronic tradesmen and fitters, to enable them to be called up as fully skilled men and so to take their appropriate places in establishments, which would benefit the Service and the civilian equally. This measure, coupled with Selective Service, would be a

great improvement in manning the RAN and RAAF, who seem to find difficulty in employing their present quotas of unskilled National Service trainees.

This proposal would meet the legitimate desire for a regular army which the reformers express. It would not, of course, be a wholly professional army. It might be unpopular with some politicians, but it will be found correct in the ultimate verdict of history. The perfectionists, whether in France, Britain, or Australia, who have sought their

ideal in a professional army, confuse the means with the end. The means may be several, according to the circumstances and the country, but the end is one—to produce a battleworthy army. Our best war material, to paraphrase the late Marshal Von Blomberg speaking to Field-Marshal Ironside, is that produced by the mothers of our nation. Who can doubt that that material, intelligently and purposefully prepared, will play its part, irrespective of what we call the system?

Yet, because war is fought between men rather than between weapons, victory will always go, when armaments are relatively equal, to the side which is better trained and of higher morale—advantages which are obtained neither easily, quickly, nor without the sacrifice of more than money in peace.

—Field-Marshal Sir William Slim.

HAIL and FAREWELL

Lieutenant-Colonel H. Fairclough
Royal Australian Army Service Corps

THIS is a short and critical article on Personnel Depots, with some suggestions about their administrative activities. That such depots are essential in the military organization is appreciated by all, but there is not a general awareness of their importance, nor how necessary it is to staff them with efficient personnel. During the war personnel depots earned a lot of justifiable criticism, some reasons for which are included herein. Let it be clear from the outset that no adverse reflection is intended on any present-day depots or their staffs. It is also desired to point out that the reason for taking them as a subject for an article is that they are common to all arms and services and what transpires in them is of significance and importance to all with the Army's interests at heart.

Hail! and Farewell! These words broadly encompass the functions of a personnel depot in peace and war, whether it be to receive the recruit, discharge the soldier or to handle transit personnel for leave of reposting. It is important that the individual, whatever his category, should be handled with efficiency, consideration and despatch. A few days of bumble and slap-happy treatment of even seasoned soldiers could well undo months of good

unit training. Inefficiency and bad treatment could be calamitous with raw recruits. It is with the latter that we are mainly concerned in this article, in fact it was they who inspired these words.

The welcome a recruit receives and the manner in which he is treated in his early days in the Army may well affect and dictate his outlook and attitude for the rest of his service. During the time he is in a depot, usually 7-14 days, the recruit is still in contact with his friends and relatives. He is therefore a potential recruiting agency of varying influence; good or evil, according to his standing in the community and the treatment he is receiving. If that is poor then rest assured he will discourage any civilian friends who might be thinking of enlistment at some later date. Likewise, the soldier who has served his time or is awaiting honourable discharge is more likely to give a good opinion of the army on return to civil life than he would if he was badly treated and otherwise frustrated during his last days in the army. The same applies equally to those who are in transit for leave or reposting.

It will readily be seen that the management of these places is all-important. They too can be a force

for good or evil. Let us examine some of the harm which has been done in the past and which can still be done in the future if the staffs are ill-chosen and the administration is bad.

During the war years many personnel on depot staffs were inefficient and obvious misfits. In this all too long heyday of their careers they swaggered about on their particular military stage, arrogant with the authority such postings gave them and contemptuous of those temporarily under their control. These petty Caesars were abominably rude, disrespectful, off-hand and inattentive to the needs of the troops. There can scarcely be an officer or OR from the last war, still in the Army today, who cannot recall the attitude just described. I well remember standing by a queue of soldiers, who, after months in New Guinea, were anxious to get away on leave, whilst one of these morons used the Department of Army's time and telephone for making bets with his SP bookmaker and for regaling some friend with a story of his libations the previous evening. The fact that soldiers were waiting for him to attend to their lawful requirements was of no significance whatsoever to that individual and he completely ignored them until reminded of his duties.

Similar off-hand treatment just described was frequently the order of the day. Taken into consideration with the way troops generally were treated and the conditions under which they lived in these depots, it is not hard to understand their almost universal unfavourable reaction. That these mental scars remain even today with soldiers and ex-soldiers can be

gauged by introducing this subject into any gathering. One or more will soon be producing supporting anecdotes. It is not desired to fill this article with examples of war-time depot maladministration. However, it is very necessary to include the following description of one of the worst features which was responsible for more dissatisfaction and frustration than any other single factor.

On frequent occasions, irrespective of the military situation in operational areas and regardless of the urgent requirement of units to get their soldiers back from leave, many personnel were arbitrarily and unnecessarily held in depots for far longer periods than they should have been. This was due either to inefficiency or because someone on the staff considered he had a better claim to the soldier's service than did the parent unit; more often than not it was the latter reason. These soldiers, very often key personnel, were then employed for weeks on tasks for which they were neither trained nor suited, their particular skills and abilities being prostituted to the domestic requirements of some depot to have its lawns mowed or its gardens attended to, and this in a period of national emergency.

The effect on unit commanders in operational areas anxiously awaiting the belated return of their soldiers from leave; on hearing the reasons for these delays, can be better imagined than described. What was more serious, however, was the fact that many of the better type soldiers lost heart, got thoroughly fed up and took their discharges as soon as they possibly could. It is not hard to imagine that the decent conscientious soldiers who were treated

like that still remember, to the detriment of the service. It might be asked why such a state of affairs was allowed to exist and on this I am not qualified to write. Maybe a lot was done to correct these matters, or it may be that pressure of other work or shortage of suitable personnel prevented any remedial action being taken.

It is not so long ago, in the early post-war years, in fact, that one depot was very adversely criticised by many responsible officers and ORs for certain undesirable features. These have now been eliminated and it is desired to reiterate that the criticism in this article is not intended to infer that there is bad administration today. However, to stop the system from ever again falling down on the job it is recommended that R of O officers, too old for any further active service, be trained now in the running of personnel depots. Whereas before untrained and unsuitable officers and ORs had to be pitchforked into these jobs, future action if taken along the lines suggested would obviate this.

Following on the above suggestion and pleading Army benefit, I would like to further suggest what is needed today. If such is already being done, then so much the better and all this article will have done is to highlight the importance of efficiency and good administration in personnel depots.

It is not proposed to say anything about the location of present-day depots except that they all conform to the requirement of being close to the city and to metropolitan transport facilities. It is hardly worth

while to point out that many leave a lot to be desired in their layout, facilities and appearance because shortage of funds will probably prevent any improvement in the foreseeable future. It is with management and the domestic set-up only with which we will concern ourselves, so let us start with the essential requirements for efficient administration.

First: The organization should take intelligent advantage of the facilities and layout. The buildings and area should be brightly sign-posted, the whole kept clean and attractive and the former maintained in a good state of repair and well painted.

Second: The Depot Commander must create a good military atmosphere and insist on an efficient and well turned out staff anxious to please and ready to help. There must be prompt attention to new arrivals and courteous consideration of their needs and problems. There must be good discipline.

Third: There should be a sensible daily routine for the depot staff and all soldiers using the depot, which will keep them actively engaged. In the case of recruits they must be provided with some essential military background and information.

Fourth: There must be efficient administration to provide correct documentation, good food, adequate facilities, and a well stocked "Q" store.

Those are broad principles. In detail, the floating population must be welcomed at the first opportunity, told the routine, shown their quarters and informed of the date of their on-movement at the first

opportunity. This last is most important as it enables them to plan their private affairs. Opportunities must be afforded them to discuss any personal problems with the OC Depot. No soldier must be held unnecessarily in a depot, whatever its domestic requirements, and no soldier or recruit should be allowed to spend his days in idleness under any circumstances. If leave is warranted, then it must be given.

And now, since this article is largely inspired by the need to look after recruits and to welcome them into the army, let me concentrate on the arrangements which should be made for them. To assist the military atmosphere, to better impart basic knowledge to the recruit and to familiarize him with the Army, an instructional room is required in each Depot. In this room there should be prominently displayed the following:—

- Badges of Rank.
- Titles, Embroidered.
- Signs, Formation.
- Hat Badges.
- Vehicle Formation Signs.
- Photographs of Past and Current Army Activities.
- Employment Codes.

If possible a model of 1 RTB with a brief description of its organisation, activities and key personnel would be of great value.

In this pleasant and informative instruction room a carefully selected member of the staff should coach them in the following matters:—

- (a) All officers, NCOs and key personnel who handle their personal and private affairs

throughout their military service are bound by the Official Secrets Act to keep such information confidential. This will encourage recruits to confide in their officers, etc., and not to brood upon their problems, real or fancied, till they reach the stage of going AWL to find a solution.

- (b) Leave and emergency leave; how to get it and the provisions of free transport.
- (c) The effects of AWL on themselves and their dependants.
- (d) The Army Health Benefit Service and the AMF Relief Trust Fund and how to obtain help from either or both.
- (e) The operation of the Canteen Service; the rebates it gives and the clubs it provides.
- (f) The necessity for advising their units of any change of address of their next-of-kin.
- (g) Advising his next-of-kin and relations, if necessary, to seek information concerning him from the HQ of the Command in which he enlisted.
- (h) The action taken by the Army to advise next-of-kin if he is admitted to hospital. Area Medical Officers, etc.
- (j) Civil and Military Law as it affects the soldier.
- (k) Postal concessions.
- (l) The uniform, army ranks and salutes.

It must be remembered that many recruits have led sheltered lives in their own homes and any instruction or advice which will engender

confidence in the Army and trust in its officers and NCOs is worth while. Particularly is it essential to give correct information on military matters before they get half-baked ideas and distorted facts from some disgruntled soldier or old "sweat" who has preceded them, but who may have fallen on evil times. Within the week or a fortnight that it takes the recruit to get to 1 RTB, much can happen if he is not properly instructed in the elementary but tremendously important matters described above.

If the recruit is inducted into the Army in a sympathetic and understanding but firm manner, the permanent effects will be good. It is not desired to infringe on the functions of 1 RTB, but there is a necessity to get him on side from the start and make him feel that the Army does really need him. Make the "Hail" genuine to all troops and then perhaps there will not be so many "Farewells."

Let Personnel Depots be what they ought to be—the shop windows of our Army.

We must perceive the necessity of every war being looked upon as a whole from the very outset and that at the very first step forward, the commander should have the end in view to which every line must converge.

—Clausewitz.

Proposals for Reorganization

Extracted and condensed by the Military Review, USA, from Report of the British Army League Sub-Committee, 1955, entitled "The Army in the Nuclear Age."

This article presents the views of Captain Liddell Hart (British), General Westphal (German), and Colonel Sloan (United States) on reorganization of the army, and was published as an appendix to the report from which it was extracted.—The Editor.

CAPTAIN LIDDELL HART'S PROPOSAL

UNTIL shortly before the last war the British Army based itself on organization in "fours"—

The British Army League is a group of eminent private citizens with political, military, and business experience. Its membership includes members of Parliament, officers of the armed services, and business executives. The report from which this article was extracted concerns itself with the changes in structure and organization of the British Army necessitated by the advent of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons into military consideration.

four sections in a platoon, four platoons in a company, four companies in a battalion, four battalions in a brigade. Although there were only three brigades in a division, the divisional artillery formed a fourth principal sub-unit. But with the multiplication of new supporting weapons, the number of men and vehicles tended to make the formation too cumbersome, while at the same time modern conditions, and the need for mobility, clearly demanded a more handy rather than a less handy size.

A solution of the problem was sought by reducing the number of sub-units, and changing to the basis

of organization in "threes"—as Continental armies had already done. (The battalion, however, has remained an exception to this rule, maintaining four rifle companies. As it also includes a company which embodies the supporting weapons, it comprises five sub-units, four of which are independently manoeuvrable.)

A tactical drawback of organization in *fours* was, in practice, that it encouraged the average commander to operate "two by two," spreading his effort evenly, instead of manoeuvring to develop a concentration of force at a vulnerable spot. It fitted trench warfare, simplifying the process of reliefs and "leapfrogging," but was less suited to open fighting. By contrast, organization in "threes" fosters the idea of manoeuvre and concentration compelling the commander to distribute his strength unevenly. That is its chief advantage. Nevertheless, four sub-units provide a skilled commander with more scope for effective concentration in attack and defence.

This is all the more important as warfare has become more mobile. But the need has not been met. On the contrary, the general reduction in the number of subdivisions reduced the organic flexibility of units and formations, thus diminishing their power to manoeuvre, that is, the powerfulness of any concentration of strength at a particular point.

We fought the last war with an army organized in "threes." Some of the consequences of this form of organization deserve to be noted.

In the 1944-45 advance from Normandy to the Rhine, Montgomery's headquarters controlled only two

armies, which in turn had only two and three corps respectively and the corps operated only two or three divisions — sometimes, even, only one. The ratio of headquarters was no more economic in the American Army until a late stage. On top of both was Eisenhower's headquarters — reputedly comprising some 30,000 officers and men. The abundance of headquarters was one reason why the "advance to victory" was so protracted, despite mobile instruments and exhausted opponents. Montgomery himself was apt to quicken things up by taking short cuts down the chain, but that sensible course emphasized the excessive abundance of the links.

The command set-up in the Mediterranean had been even more overloaded. Thus for the invasion of Sicily there were three corps headquarters to handle a mere seven divisions, with two army headquarters on top of them; Alexander's headquarters above these and Eisenhower's headquarters above that.

In Burma, at the start of the 1944 campaign, an even smaller force had two corps headquarters and above these successively an army headquarters, a land forces headquarters, and a supreme headquarters (the highest but one of these headquarters swelled to about 7,000 officers and men).

Nothing more cumbersome could be conceived than such absurdly long and narrow chains of command. They fettered mobility and flexibility at every turn.

Weighing these factors, the question arises whether the reduction from "fours" to "threes" was not a retrograde step. It might have been better to go forward—to "fives."

Operating with five sub-units would carry the same advantages as three in fostering the average commander's sense of manoeuvre, but would multiply those advantages. It would also embody the advantages of the four-unit organization, while extending them — since a "five-finger exercise" has even more flexibility and offers a greater range of combinations.

The idea that a commander cannot effectively control more than three or four sub-units has become a fetish. It is not difficult to find evidence from experience that such a limitation is unnecessarily narrow. In the 1918 "advance to victory" the British Commander in Chief, Haig, controlled five armies; while the Australian Corps under Monash, which played an outstanding role, handled five divisions throughout its advance, and at times as many as seven divisions. In the last war the Soviet "front commanders" frequently handled five or six armies, and their army commanders handled up to seven or eight divisions in some of their advances—without intermediary corps commanders.

It is not only in reduced speed and increased friction that we pay for additional links in the chain of command. The multiplication of headquarters swells the volume of the staff as a whole, draining the fighting units of far too many of their most capable personnel. The elimination of superfluous headquarters would go much further than mere combing toward a solution of this problem. It would release a large number of officers and other ranks for service with troops.

The Army Corps

An army commander ought to be

able to handle at least five divisions, and probably more, without having to deal with their commanders through an intermediate headquarters. The gain in time and personal touch would be marked. (An army commander has, in reality, a less complicated problem than that of the commander of a division, which comprises many variegated elements beside its principal sub-units. And a corps commander has so few in comparison that he and his headquarters are the least necessary link in the chain.)

If the number of divisions in any army exceeds five or six, it would be simpler for the commander to control a "wing" through a deputy than to interpose several corps commanders. Only if the total exceeds 10, or perhaps, eight, would the advantages of having corps commanders tend to outweigh the drawbacks.

This would mean that corps would only need to be formed where armies were exceptionally large, and that in such a case the formation of corps would make it superfluous to form groups of armies, so dispensing with the need for any army group headquarters. Thus in any case one link in the present chain would be eliminated.

Significantly, the Soviets in the last war discarded the army corps except in the case of the armoured forces, and there they discarded the division—the armoured corps commanders handling the brigades direct. Moreover, their armoured corps were considerably smaller than those of other nations, so that they gained in handiness as well as in the quicker control due to the elimination of a link. As they had

a far smaller proportion of mechanized and signal equipment than Western forces, it would seem evident that the degree of mobility they nonetheless attained under such a handicap owed much to the way they had simplified and shortened their chain of command.

The Brigade

The elimination of the corps might be followed by the elimination of the brigade, and the reorganization of the division on a five-battalion basis. It would then be under the more immediate control of the divisional commander without any interposing brigade headquarters. By eliminating these, the "overheads" would be greatly reduced, both in quantity and cost. Still greater would be the gain in quickening the speed of operations. Similar advantages might accrue if the field artillery of the divisions were organized in a single regiment of five batteries.

With the change to a five-battalion division and the elimination of brigade commanders, it would be desirable to retain one of them as commander of the divisional infantry or, better still, as deputy to the divisional commander. The change would halve the number of brigadiers but give more chance of promotion, because of the increased number of divisions and, consequently, of major-generals' posts. The effect of the change should tend to raise the level of ability. The proportion of officers who are really fitted to command a modern brigade (which in practice so often becomes a group of all arms) is limited; and those who pass the test would benefit from increased opportunity for advancement.

The Armoured Division

The application of the proposed new basis to the armoured division is even simpler than in the case of the infantry division, for the regrouping is comparatively slight. The present armoured division falls into two distinct and heterogeneous parts—an armoured brigade and a "motorized" infantry brigade. As the latter is carried in large, unprotected wheeled vehicles, its mode of transport emphasizes the incongruity of the combination. The divisional commander can but broadly direct his two brigades and has no real power of handling his armour in manoeuvre unless he "sits on top" of his armoured brigade commander and takes things out of the latter's hands. It would be better if the armoured units and the motorized infantry were organized in separate divisions of a smaller pattern.

The present armoured brigade consists of five units — four tank "regiments" (as they are inaptly called in the British Army) and one motor battalion (of infantry) that can fight on foot. Thus it needs no radical alteration to turn it into a new pattern division, but merely the addition of the appropriate proportion of artillery, engineers, and services. It is worth consideration, however, whether a second motor battalion should be included. In any case this foot-fighting element should be "armoured infantry" mounted in armoured carriers so as to enable them to accompany the tanks and intervene more quickly to help them in overcoming defended obstacles.

On the other hand, the motorized infantry brigade would more suitably be turned into a motorized in-

fantry division of the smaller pattern to back up the armoured division. As it already consists of four battalions, that would require only a slight expansion of its basic component.

Three of the present armoured divisions comprise 12 tank units, three motor units, and 12 motorized

infantry units — a total of 27 units. That would suffice, with a margin to spare, to form a group of three armoured and two infantry divisions of the new and handier type—and it would have the further advantage of bringing an appreciable increase in the strength of the armoured punch.

GENERAL WESTPHAL'S PROPOSAL

Captain Liddell Hart's proposals have received strong support from a number of French and German staff officers, among others from General Westphal, who was chief of staff to Field-Marshal Rommel,

Kesselring, and Rundstedt in turn. In the winter of 1943-44 General Westphal made concrete proposals for the reorganization of infantry and armoured divisions on similar lines. His proposed tables of establishment are shown on page 25.

COLONEL SLOAN'S PLAN

A somewhat similar plan has been advanced by Colonel Sloan, of the United States Army. Colonel Sloan argues that divisions can be streamlined and divisional overheads drastically cut. The field army of today contains more artillery battalions than infantry battalions, and approximately as many engineers as tank men. This concept has been outmoded by tactical atomic weapons. If the idea of relying on indirect fire high-explosive weapons is abandoned, he writes, and the principle of relying entirely on tactical atomic weapons for area saturation accepted, the number of divisions in the field army could be increased by half.

The new type division should be completely "air transportable," and this would involve the use of lighter tanks with the same mobility and firepower as the present medium tank. The basis of the division would be three or more tank-infantry regiments, an atomic weapons battalion, and a service support battalion, with a daily maintenance requirement of about 200 tons, or full loads of 20 aircraft capable of lifting 10 tons each.

Colonel Sloan's proposals are now being tested in practice by the United States Chiefs of Staff, who are experimenting with various new streamlined types of organization, not only of the division, but of every unit and sub-unit.

GENERAL

The proposals advanced by Captain Liddell Hart, General Westphal, and Colonel Sloan, are presented primarily because of the opportuni-

ties they suggest for making economies in the use of manpower. The case, however, for placing more but smaller foundations under a

Infantry Division	Strength
Infantry group: 1 leader, 5 riflemen	= 6
Infantry platoon: 5 groups + headquarters (4 men)	= 34
Infantry company: 5 platoons + company headquarters (15 men)	= 185
Infantry battalion: 5 companies + battalion headquarters (50 men)	= 975
Infantry of the division: 5 battalions each of 975 men	= 4,875
Infantry leader of the division: headquarters + signal unit . .	= 100
Artillery leader of the division: 5 batteries each of 6 guns + headquarters and signal unit	= 1,000
Engineer battalion: headquarters signal unit, 3 companies . .	= 650
Anti-tank battalion (Abteilung): as engineer battalion	= 700
Anti-aircraft battalion (Abteilung): organization in general as above	= 650
Headquarters division + signal battalion	= 650
Services behind the lines	= 1,000
Infantry Division Total	= 10,825

Panzer Division	
Panzer brigade: 3 battalions (Abteilung) of 5 companies each + brigade headquarters	= 3,500
Each platoon: 3 tanks, company of 5 platoons: 15 tanks + 3 tanks in company headquarters	
Each battalion of 5 companies each of 18 tanks + 5 tanks in battalion headquarters = 95 tanks per battalion	
Three battalions = 285 tanks + 15 tanks	
Brigade headquarters, that is, total brigade = 300 tanks	
Rifle brigade: headquarters + 3 battalions	= 3,000
Artillery brigade: headquarters + signal unit + 6 batteries each of 6 guns = 36 guns	= 1,150
Engineer battalion (inclusive pontoon column)	= 750
Anti-tank battalion (Abteilung)	= 650
Anti-aircraft battalion (Abteilung)	= 650
Division headquarters + signal battalion	= 800
Services behind the lines	= 1,500
Panzer Division Total	= 12,000

At least five divisions shall be organized under one army headquarters. Several armies shall be led by one army group headquarters.

single control is greatly strengthened by the growth of Soviet airpower, and still more by the advent of nuclear weapons. "We need," Captain Liddell Hart has written, "to grasp the principle of 'fluidity of force' in contrast to the old and

obvious interpretation of 'concentration' and to develop a technique of 'controlled dispersion.' The embryo was contained in German practice during the later years of war.

"On the Russian front in 1944-45

the Germans often achieved an amazingly prolonged resistance, against much superior numbers, with armoured divisions that were flexibly spread in small combat groups on a wide frontage—20 miles or more per division. The composition of such groups was usually a battalion of tanks, a battalion of mechanized infantry, and an equivalent artillery unit of self-propelling guns.

"On the Western Front, too, remarkable delaying and defensive power was produced by similar groups—which, in many cases, were even smaller. Often they were composed of a tank company, a mechanized infantry company, and a battery or two. The tiny scale of such groups was dictated not only by the scanty strength available to cover the large front, but by the better chance they had of evading the ubiquitous and overwhelmingly strong Allied air forces — and by their greater ability to penetrate between the Allied columns and deliver a quick counter-thrust at the most effective moment.

"To distribute an armoured division in such a flexible chain of smaller groups, each of them completely mobile, is essentially different from distributing armour piecemeal to support ordinary infantry—and free from the drawbacks of that practice.

"The present overlarge division would become a more 'operable' hand if divided into four or five major combat groups subdivided into a similar number of 'fingers,' or minor combat groups, capable of operating separately and practised in doing so. They could at any moment be brought together to make a concentrated punch, if opportunity arises and air conditions permit.

"'Controlled dispersion' is basically different from distribution piecemeal. Little groups thus directed can have multiple effect while not offering concentrated targets to the air. A swarm of bees does not concentrate — it attacks you from all directions simultaneously. That is 'multiple effect' — and should be our guiding idea in applying tactics of controlled dispersion.

"The aim of the new tactics must be to paralyze the enemy's action. The slogan of 'destroying him' in battle leads to self-exposure, self-pinning, and the risk of being smashed. The domination of areas is going to count more than capturing or maintaining positions. We want a new principle of 'offensive fluidity of force'—to operate like the sea or a swarm of bees, not like a battering ram."

The Namamugi Affair

THE MURDER OF CHARLES LENNOX RICHARDSON

Captain K. E. Gallard
Royal Australian Infantry

IN the early afternoon of September 14, 1862, a colourful procession was wending its way along the old Tokaido Road in Japan from Yedo to Kagashima. The daimyo or overlord Hisamitsu Shimatsu was on his way home after having resided near the seat of the Shogunite Government for a stipulated period of fourteen months. Shimatsu had merely been following the custom of centuries in residing at Yedo, for a decree of the Shogun insisted upon the custom ostensibly to allow him to learn of affairs in the far corners of his Japanese Kingdom. Actually, the decree had in mind the fact that many of the overlords may have been plotting rebellion, and residence at Yedo near Yokohama, the traditional seat of the Shogunite Government, allowed the Shogun to keep a watchful eye on his fickle daimyo. Moreover, the movement of the overlord's household from his home to Yedo and back again was an extremely costly business, as each daimyo attempted to outdo

the other in ostentatious display and used up funds that might otherwise have been spent in preparation for rebellion.

On this occasion, Hisamitsu Shimatsu was well pleased. Head of the famous Satsuma clan, perhaps the largest and most powerful in Japan, he was returning home secure in the knowledge that his plot to restore the Imperial administration had remained undiscovered. He was confident, and in his arrogance had issued orders that none were to delay his procession on its way. If necessary, interference was to be brushed aside by the sword. Accordingly, the procession of the great daimyo's household with its retinue of 2,000 servants moved along in double file unhindered as wayfarers gave a wide berth to the great Satsuma warriors wielding their huge swords, who mingled with the procession to give protection to the household.

As the procession neared the village of Kanagawa, near Yokohama, it came upon four foreigners on

horseback who were returning home to the foreign quarter of Yokohama after a visit to the Daishi shrine at Kawasaki. They were Charles Lennox Richardson, a British merchant, his wife, Borodaile, Woodthorpe Charles Clark of the trading company of Augustin Heard and William Marshall, a British silk merchant. Richardson and his wife were some distance ahead of the other two when they turned into the old Tokaido Road and stopped their horses to look at the bizarre yet colourful beauty of the procession. They were absorbed in the gaudy clothing of the servants, the ox carts draped with clusters of morning glory (the current flower of the floral calendar), the gilt sedan-chairs carrying their senior members of the household, the whole against the background of the famous Tokaido pine trees that formed a triumphal arch overhead. The procession appeared so strange and exciting that Richardson and his wife waited too long before the procession was upon them, and found that there was not room for the double file to pass their horses. Accordingly, for fear of trampling the leading members of the files, they allowed their horses to stand at the side of the road.

By this time Marshall and Clark had reached the junction of the roads some twenty yards back, and realizing that there might be trouble, called to Richardson, telling him to turn the horses and come back. At the same moment a huge Satsuma warrior stepped out of the procession and started to harangue Richardson, waving his sword in a threatening manner. Richardson took no notice and attempted to

turn the horses, which put their heads into the procession. Immediately, to the horror of Clark and Marshall, the warrior dealt Richardson two heavy blows with his sword about the head and shoulders, whereupon they rode forward to his rescue. Eventually they managed to extricate the stricken Richardson and his shocked wife from the procession and rode off down the road. However, before they had gone two hundred yards Richardson fell off his horse, dead from loss of blood.

Naturally enough the foreign quarter of Yokohama was thrown into a great state of consternation, and John Neale, the British Charge d'Affaires, acting upon instruction from the British Government, demanded an indemnity of £300,000 sterling from the Satsuma clan and the execution of the murderer. There was further confusion when daimyo Shimatsu refused to pay the sum or apprehend the murderer, on the grounds that the clan was not responsible. The murderer, he insisted, was one Okana, no longer a member of the clan, but one who had merely come to the procession as a sightseer to pay homage to his former lord. From then on he refused to discuss the matter further with either the Shogunite or British Governments.

The incident did not end there. At the time, the British Government was sensitive to treatment of its *nationals overseas*, so that in 1863 seven British warships were sent to Kagashima to demand the indemnity. Again Shimatsu refused to pay, and made the unfortunate mistake of ordering the Satsuma to fire on the warships. His fire was hotly

returned, and Kagoshima was subjected to a bombardment lasting three days, after which the British warships withdrew, having no more shells to fire. Japanese records of the incident are somewhat optimistic, as they enthusiastically describe the British withdrawal "with fifty casualties, including one commander." However, they leave out the important record of casualties sustained in Kagoshima, which must have been considerable, for on 1st November, 1863, Shimatsu paid up the £300,000 indemnity, and the matter was considered closed by mutual consent of both British and Japanese Governments.

The incident, small as it was, became known over the whole of Japan as the "Namamugi Affair," by reason of the fact that the murder of Charles Lennox Richardson occurred near the Namamugi terminus of the Yokohama tramway. It is commemorated by a small monument in stone that still stands today.

It is significant in Japanese history because in 1868 the Satsuma clan played a large part in the restoration of Imperial administration,

and due to this fact the overlord Shimatsu had an important voice in the Government. The bombardment of Kagashima had shown him the helplessness of Japan against a foreign invader and he stressed the need of naval defence. The bombardment also left a deep impression on a small boy who had viewed it; so much so that in later life he continually used it to illustrate his arguments in the Japanese Diet when pressing for an expansion of the Japanese Navy. The small boy was the late Fleet Admiral Togo, founder of the modern Japanese Navy: a navy that made possible Japan's entry into the recent war.

Japanese historians treat the incident with a customary haphazard regret, but make no secret of the fact that the withdrawal of the seven men-o'-war from Kagashima was the result of the first noteworthy victory of the Japanese over the foreigner. There can be no doubt that this treatment in Japanese history did much towards starting the flames of Japanese aggression that have only recently been extinguished.

INDO-CHINA

The Last Year of the War

Communist Organization & Tactics

Bernard B. Fall

Reprinted from the October, 1956, issue of the "Military Review,"
Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, USA

WHEN on 7 May 1954, at about 1900, Platoon Commander Chu Ba The, of the Vietnam People's Army (VPA) planted the red flag with the gold star of the Communist-led Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRVN) atop the headquarters bunker of Dien Bien Phu, a new era opened in Asian warfare. An army that had begun its existence 10 years ago as a small guerilla force had annihilated in open combat the cream of a well-trained Western army equipped with nearly all modern implements of war short of atomic weapons.

This Communist victory had its roots in two different sets of reasons. One set of reasons is inherent to the terrain and to the People's Army itself — its organization, training, and tactics. These will be the subject of the present article. The other set of reasons is imputable to the tactics of the French Union Forces

during the last year of the war. They will be discussed in a subsequent article. Both articles together should give a picture of the interplay of those various factors and their eventual effect upon the outcome of the war.


The VPA is composed of three different combat echelons. The hard core of the VPA is composed of its approximately 10 regular divisions — 9 infantry and 1 "heavy" artillery and engineering division (see Figures 1 and 2). They are known as the Main Force (*chu luc*). It is they who bore the brunt of all major operations between 1950 and 1954: the border offensive of 1950, the 1952 offensives into north-western Vietnam, the stabs into Laos in 1953, and, finally, the liquidation of the airhead of Dien Bien Phu. The *chu luc* units of the VPA are well equipped and its infantry battalions had a distinct superiority in fire-

power — particularly in the field of 81-mm and 122-mm mortars — over the opposing French units.

Not all regular units operated along the main battlelines. For example, during 1953 and 1954 a sizeable part of the 320th Infantry Division, VPA, along with the 42nd, 46th and 50th independent regiments, operated well within the French Union lines in support of regional and semi-mobile militia battalions (*Tieu-Doan Tap Trung Tinh*). Those regional units form the second-echelon troops. They have neither the training nor the equipment for large-scale manoeuvring, but their superior knowledge of the terrain makes them extremely useful as scouting or screening units for infiltrated regular units.

Lastly, the third combat echelon


who do most of the communications sabotage, local espionage, sniping, reconnoitring, and who, in the past, often fought costly rearguard actions to permit the escape of cornered regular units.



VPA and Communist Party

As a glance at an organization chart of the VPA shows (see Figure 3), the political control apparatus within the VPA is extremely important. Indeed, General Vo Nguyen Giap, the DRVN Vice Premier, Minister of Defence, and commander in chief of the VPA since its inception, openly declared that: "The military is the [Communist] Party's essential arm for the attainment of any political aim."

There exist cells of the Vietnam *Dang Lao-Dong* — the "Labour Party" which succeeded the Indo-Chinese Communist Party in 1951— in every VPA platoon. At platoon level there are "political agents" reporting on all signs of political weakness to their own political commissar (*Chinh Uy*) who is



was composed of the locally raised militia units (*du-kich*). It is the *du-kich*, unrecognizable because they wear no uniforms and continue to live in their native villages to take up arms for a specific mission only,


attached to every unit at battalion level and above.

The political commissars of the VPA have far-reaching powers, even in the field of military strategy and tactics. A DRVN decree of 1950 created "Front Command Committees with Political Preponderance" in which the views of the political commissar on a given tactical situation prevail over those of the military commander and deputy commander of the unit. It is obvious that under such conditions the VPA military commander is little more than a tool of his own political machine, with little chance of deviating from a given line. However,

missar for "errors" he allegedly had committed.

This constant political indoctrination has made over the VPA soldier from an illiterate peasant into an efficient fighting machine, much in the fashion of the Chinese Communist as described in a thorough study by L. M. Chassin, the former Commanding General of the French Far Eastern Air Force:

In the day's work of the Red soldier, the Marxist political lesson plays as important a part as the arms manual. Taken in hand by intelligent leaders, the armed peasant rapidly becomes a fanatic, an apostle of the new religion.¹



frictions between the political commissars and the military commanders occur. The author spoke in 1953 to a Communist officer who had deserted from the VPA side after successful completion of an operation, because he had been criticized in front of his troops by the com-

This fanaticism could be found in many units of the VPA, in the militia forces as well as among the regulars. "Death Volunteer" units whose

1. General L. M. Chassin, *La Conquete de la Chine par Mao Tse-tung*, Payot, Paris, 1951, pp 232-33.

members would throw themselves with a load of explosives, "kami-kaze" fashion, against a French tank or against the firing slits of bunkers, proved particularly effective in attacks against fortified positions and were difficult to neutralize. Feats of the "Death Volunteers," along with others emphasizing strict obedience to orders, are often played up in DRVN propaganda to its troops, such as the following incident:

During the attack against the French post of Vinh Trach, the comrade company commander gave an order to the comrade in charge of the BAR to rise and to fire upon the blockhouse. The comrade rose immediately although he was to be sacrificed before he could even fire a shot.

It is obvious that Western fighting methods are not particularly well adapted to cope with an enemy using such tactics, and until the end of the war in Indo-China, French unit commanders throughout Indo-China were haunted by the problem of having to cope with a "Death Volunteers" attack.

VPA Tactics—1953-54

In October 1950, at the end of the first Communist offensive which had cost the French their string of forts along the Chinese border, General Giap held a staff study with the political commissars of the VPA's crack 98th Infantry Regiment, in the course of which he developed the outline of the operation he was going to fight so successfully over the next four years:

During the first and second phases we gnawed away at the forces of the enemy, in the third phase we must annihilate them . . .

In order to pass over to the general counter-offensive (GCO) the following conditions must be met:

Superiority of our forces over those of the enemy.

The international situation must be to our advantage.

The [local] situation must evolve in our favour.

. . . we shall benefit from foreign aid in order to pass over to the GCO [but] merely to count upon such help would be proof of subjectivism and light-mindedness.

. . . other factors may also play in our favour: [French] difficulties in political, economic, or financial

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matters; protest movements against the war in the [French and Vietnamese Nationalist] army and among the people.

When we shall have reached the third phase, we shall use the following tactical principles to fulfil our strategic mission:

Mobile war, as principal activity.

Guerrilla war, as a secondary activity.

Positional warfare, also secondary.

The counter-offensive phase:

. . . the third phase may last over an extended period because we need time, but our possibilities in receiving aid from abroad will also be quite extensive.

It might be considered a tribute to Giap's remarkable military acumen—he is a French-educated high school professor with a Ph.D. in history and no formal military training—that he was able to carry through his plan to the last iota in less than four years. On the other hand, it must surprise the military reader that the French High Command—which had been in possession of Giap's plan since late 1952, when a copy of it was captured by French paratroop raiders—had in no appreciable way reacted to meet the new challenge.

With clockworklike precision, Giap now began to eliminate all threats to his rear areas. The end of 1950 saw all of north-eastern Vietnam outside of the Red River Delta in Giap's hands. A solid link with his main training and supply bases in Red China was now established. Night after night, hundreds of trucks now brought the long-

awaited modern equipment for the GCO, as well as thousands of Red Chinese instructors and specialists from other Communist countries. The year 1951 brought Marshal Jean de Lattre de Tassigny as French commander in chief to Indo-China and with him a series of sharp defeats for Giap². But Giap's green *chu luc* regulars learned from their own defeats: Direct attacks against the fortified "De Lattre Line" of bunkers and blockhouses were abandoned in favour of a thorough political and guerrilla infiltration of the delta, while the main forces of Giap proceeded to further consolidate their hold upon northern Laos and the tribal Thai territory of North Vietnam.

On 11 October 1952 three VPA divisions once more crossed the Red River, destroyed the small French garrisons covering the hill line between the Red and Black Rivers, and reached the latter on 23 October after a forced march of more than 60 miles through thick jungle. A French airborne counter-stab against the enemy communications hub of Yen Bay, followed by a tank-supported overland operation, was disregarded by Giap as being basically too weak to endanger his movement toward Laos.

After an initial attempt at attacking frontally the newly fortified French airhead at Na-San failed, Giap simply by-passed the position, leaving to the French Air Force the burdensome task of providing logistical support for a 12,000-man force uselessly bottled up 150 miles behind

2. "Indo-China—the Seven-Year Dilemma," "Military Review," October 1953, p. 28.

enemy lines. He continued his sweep forward, occupying the then unimportant and undefended position of Dien Bien Phu, until early in January 1953 when he reached his line of departure for the first Communist offensive into Laos. In the meantime, the VPA's guerrillas behind French lines had not remained inactive.

Communist Guerrilla Tactics

In Indo-China prevalent types of terrain have brought about four major types of guerrilla warfare: urban terrorism; rice field and swamp warfare; hill and mountain warfare; and jungle warfare.

Of the four, the first is in no way different from similar operations in other parts of the world. In Vietnam it was particularly effective in view of the latent sympathies of a large part of the population with the terrorists, providing them with shelter and intelligence. Particularly well-conceived operations include the sabotaging of the Hanoi electrical plant by a group of saboteurs posing as repairmen, and the destruction in the spring of 1954 of nearly 40 planes — the Communists claimed 62 — on the Cat Bi, Do Son, and Gia-Lam airbases of North Vietnam by guerrilla demolition squads.


The second type of guerrilla warfare, fought in the marshy and waterlogged rice flatlands which include nearly all of Vietnam's populated areas, large cities, and major communications lines, can be considered as the "local speciality," and is radically different from any of the guerrilla tactics thus far described in available United States Army Field Manuals.

Throughout most of the Vietnamese flatlands — and also those of

much of China, Indonesia, Thailand, Cambodia, and Burma — communications are limited to the tops of dykes of different construction, with the smallest barely wide enough for a column marching single file, while the largest often may carry a double track motor highway or railroad. Such communications lines proved to be the number one target of Communist guerrillas in Indo-China. Their success in either destroying them or in maintaining them in a constant state of insecurity robbed the French Union Forces of nearly one-third of their combat personnel, not to speak of the gigantic effort it required from the engineering and signal units diverted from other tasks to road and telegraph line rebuilding.

Guerrilla attacks in Vietnam, however, were not limited to the roads themselves but also included the convoys that circulated on them. Ambushes generally took place (see Figure 4) in an open stretch of field broken by some bushes or hedges, or an old pagoda. Hand-triggered mines were used to disable the lead vehicle, thus immobilizing the convoy. The rearguard vehicle was dealt with similarly, or was destroyed by rocket launcher (bazooka) or mortar fire. Once the convoy is pinned down, the stage is set for its general attack.

According to American practice in such a case—which was also French practice in the early stages of the war — the escorting units of the convoy detrucked and took cover in the road ditch opposite to the apparent line of enemy fire. In Vietnam such a procedure usually led the detrucked unit into terrain that was either mined or heavily spiked with caltrops of a crude but very effec-



tive model (see Figure 5), and also exposed to enemy fire from a secondary base. If panic ensued, the convoy usually could be considered a total loss.

It became French standard practice to take cover atop the dyke under the vehicles themselves and to concentrate the fire of the heavy weapons of the convoy on major

enemy targets while radioing for help. Air support in such cases proved particularly effective, since the enemy generally was deployed in a clearly defined target area. Counter-attacking a Communist ambush with infantry forces of the convoy itself was considered as costly and of little value since every dyke provided a natural covering position for retreating enemy forces. In clement weather, helicopters and light plans flying as convoy scouts proved effective in foiling ambushes; however, this was only possible in view of the fact that the enemy in Indo-China had no air force of his own and, until Dien Bien Phu, was not believed to possess an effective anti-aircraft artillery.

Hill and mountain guerrilla warfare was widely practised by Communist units in the tribal Thai areas and in Laos. The terrain most suitable for such operations is that covered with 6-foot tall "elephant grass." As in the case of jungle war-





fare, units generally had to progress single file and thus were unable to bring their weapons to bear upon an enemy only yards away. In such terrain, air reconnaissance was well-nigh useless, unless the aircraft hovered practically at grass-top level, in which case it was extremely vulnerable even to small-arms fire. The usual counter-measure against that type of ambush was to avoid beaten paths wherever possible, and to have a light scouting screen deployed on both sides of the column. However, only larger columns have the necessary manpower to do so, and since the scouts then must hack their own path through the brush, the risk of losing them piecemeal may outweigh that of progressing in a body. The best method seems to be to separate the column into several elements sufficiently apart to make their falling together into an ambush unlikely, while still being close enough to each other for mutual support in the case of an attack against one of the column elements.

Jungle warfare in Indo-China followed the usual rules with which American forces in Burma and the Pacific became familiar during World War II. Perhaps it may be useful to stress here again the overwhelming ineffectualness of combat airpower in that type of operation. Roads hacked in the jungle by thousands of Communist slave labourers over a distance of more than 300 miles supplied the four VPA divisions operating in the Dien Bien Phu area with probably more than 100 tons of ammunition and food a day.

In spite of total French mastery of the air, French air reconnaissance photographs throughout the entire Indo-China war told an eloquent

story of the capacity of the Communist logistical system to switch rapidly from truck convoys to hordes of human porters. When three regular VPA divisions broke through 200 miles of jungle in less than 15 days in January 1954 and cut Indo-China in two for nearly two weeks, they did so *without using a single motor vehicle*, but were supported by a logistical lifeline of coolies stretching all the way from the Thai border back to the hills of South China. In the words of a French officer:



Not even an atom bomb could have helped us; assuming that it would have hit one of their coolie trails, they would merely have bypassed "ground zero" and hacked themselves a new path through the jungle.

However, the type of political-military guerrilla warfare fought by the Communists within the main French Union position, the Red River Delta, proved to be the operation that, more than Dien Bien Phu, finally broke the back of the French war effort in Indo-China. As the author has stated elsewhere:

Depleted of their best troops for the sake of Dien Bien Phu, the French garrisons in the delta now had to face the brutal reality that their high command had refused to face for the past five years; the fact that it was the adversary who had effective control of most of the Red River Delta.

Figures 6 and 7 show clearly what is meant by this statement. Figure 6 shows in black the areas within the delta which the French Command acknowledged, one year before Dien Bien Phu, to be Communist-controlled in the military sense,

VIETMINH GUERRILLA INFILTRATION BEHIND FRENCH LINES
SITUATION MAY 1953



At no time did the French succeed in wiping out the guerrilla threat in their own backyard. This is why the entire southern part of the Red River Delta, with the Catholic Bishoprics of Bui-Chu and Phat-Diem, had to be abandoned after the loss of Dien Bien Phu freed another 40,000 Communist soldiers for an all-out attack against the French Hanoi-Haiphong "lifeline."

although other large areas were admittedly "safe" only during day-time. Figure 7 was made by the

author after careful research in the same area at the same time, backed by interviews of local French mili-

tary and Vietnamese civilian officials. All agreed that the area actually under the *administrative* control of the Communists, that is, the area where they collected the taxes, ran the village government, and indoctrinated the children in the schools, was far greater than the extent of VPA military control.

It is worthy of note that precisely the southern area of the Red River Delta which already was so heavily infiltrated in 1953 was the first to be evacuated by the French when, after the fall of Dien Bien Phu, they began to retreat toward the Hanoi-Haiphong "lifeline," with 80,000 to 100,000 Communist guerrillas swarming around them, sabotaging their supply lines and attacking their convoys. By then the French within the delta were, in the apt image of a French officer, like *des grumeaux dans la soupe*—"bread-crumbs in the soup"—and fighting degenerated into a series of small-size Dien Bien Phus as French garrisons desperately fought their way out of trap after trap in an effort to keep their communications lines open.

In other words, efficient Communist guerrilla warfare behind French Union lines had already weighted the scales of war heavily in favour of the VPA before Dien Bien Phu, and even before the development of the Navarre Plan.

It but remains to attempt to draw some general conclusions from the way the Communist Vietminh fought its war against the French in Indo-China. From the over-all point of view, the VPA command has not evolved any particular tactical formula that had not already been field-tested by the Chinese Communists in their fight against the Chinese Nationalist forces of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek³.

However, they have successfully adapted those general principles to local conditions and have made best use of their basic weakness in heavy equipment by simply transferring the entire war to a level of fighting which largely nullified the French weapons monopoly in the field of aviation or armour. The danger of the West's simply "pricing" itself out of the field of conventional warfare by an over-reliance upon super-weapons must be faced and met today from Korea to Indo-China, and from Egypt to Algeria. Experience shows that a series of brush fires is harder to combat than one single major blaze — and one may be just as deadly as the other.

3. Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Rigg, "Red Parallel: The Tactics of Ho and Mao," "The Army Combat Forces Journal," January, 1955.

REPRINTS IN OVERSEAS JOURNALS

During the year 1956 the undermentioned contributions to the Australian Army Journal were reprinted in overseas journals.

Article	Author	Journal in which Reprinted
Are you Intelligence Conscious?	Lt.-Col. J. J. S. Hobbs	Kommando, S. Africa
Atomic Training — Now	Capt. E. McCormick	Military Review, USA
Atomic Weapons and Armour	General von Geyr	Military Review, USA
Defaulters	C. C. Soden	An Cosantoir, Eire
Effects of Atomic Weapons on Military Operations	Lt.-Col. W. F. Caplehorn	Military Review, USA
Examination Technique	Col. K. Mackay	An Cosantoir, Eire
Gasoline or Diesel	Maj. P. V. Stanton	ASC Journal, India
Guerrilla Warfare	Maj. J. G. Sloman	Military Review, USA
Human Endurance and Physical Fitness	Maj. A. W. John	Mind, Body and Spirit, UK
Jungle Belongs to Us	Editor, AAJ	Military Review, USA
Like to Learn Tactics?	Col. K. Mackay	Infantry Journal, India
Medical Effects of Radiological Warfare	Maj. J. G. Sloman and Capt. W. G. Baird	Military Digest, India
Pay and the British Soldier	W.O. C. M. D. Flinn	An Cosantoir, Eire
Pay and the Soldier	W.O. C. M. D. Flinn	An Cosantoir, Eire
Problem of the West	Staff College Student	Military Review, USA
Rise to Power of Communist China	Syndicate Capt. D. H. Morgan	Military Review, USA
Submarine Sappers	Capt. J. D. B. Young	Infantry Journal, India
Tactics and Atomics	Brig. M. F. Brogan	Military Digest, India
Tank Battle of Targul Frumos	Lieut.-Gen. von Manteuffel	Military Review, USA
War Dogs	Maj. J. M. Hutcheson	Military Digest, India

FIELD SERVICE REGULATIONS



THE KEY TO STAFF SERVICE RELATIONS

Lieutenant-Colonel G. F. T. Richardson
Royal Australian Army Service Corps

THE ebb and flow of professional military progress, which results from the varying degrees of peace and cold war between major wars, tends to obscure the established principles which should guide military thinking irrespective of transitory factors. Consequently there is a very dangerous tendency to plan and to make military decisions on the basis of expediency, and to ignore those underlying principles which were proven in the past and will doubtless continue to be valid when the Atomic Age itself becomes as obsolete as the era of the Bow and Arrow. The tendency to superficial and subjective habits of military thought becomes more apparent in the Australian Army than in the armies of major land powers. This is due to the influence of a small peace time army, whose size is limited by national resources, and in which the full applications and implications of many principles cannot be realized nor viewed in a whole perspective in peace.

The principles with which this article is concerned are those of administration, relating to logistics and the control of the administrative services and, in particular, those aspects which are prescribed in Field Service Regulations Vol 1. There is no claim to originality in the nature of this subject, which owes something to a paper which was prepared during World War II. Nevertheless, it is intended to make the treatment of this important subject as distinctive as possible. No apology is needed that such a matter is brought to the notice of the military profession, since any discussion or thought which may arise as a result will help meet the urgent necessity for developing those same techniques and organizations which, so well-tried and valued in the past, are in danger of being overlooked when they are most required in the future.

It is a matter of every-day experience that the inevitable tendency in dealing with administrative problems in the Army is to solve each

problem in a piecemeal manner, in the light of the local context, and generally to ignore any broader implication which might affect those at higher or lower levels, or to the right or left of the line. In small-scale administration the dangers of such trends are not evident to those who are perpetrating them; nevertheless, the cumulative effect of such methods must be bad, in a two-fold manner. Firstly, it leads to a degree of administrative chaos in a machine as large as the Army, and secondly, it leads to a degree of petty economy which prejudices sound, economical and effective administration in accordance with the best-thought-out and proved principles. The methodical study of the science of war administration is particularly necessary in peace. This precept applies to every army, and is increasingly applicable to the Australian Army, because there is very little opportunity for the study of wartime problems; either those found in local administration, general administration or mainland (or home) administration. If the necessity for study is considered in relation to the strong CMF element which constitutes such a large proportion of the Australian Army, then the need is further accentuated, since inevitably the majority of the staff and Army administrators of the AMF in war must be found from the CMF, and must be selected and trained during peace.

The acceptance of administration as an equal-ranking principle of war is now about ten years old. It is not inappropriate to remember that one of the outstanding lessons of the last war was that sound administrative doctrine is vital to the

successful prosecution of modern war. Therefore our administrative doctrine must first be clearly established and enunciated to the Army. It is then necessary, having created a sound administrative and organizational framework, to provide the personnel and the general machinery for the discharge of the task. Finally, before successful operations can be entertained, it is necessary to take the essential elements of the machine, and later the entire machine, and train them for their specific tasks, and for the type of operations and theatre for which they are destined. This preliminary to successful operations cannot be overlooked.

Relationship Between Arms and Services

No consideration of the respective tasks of the arms and services can be complete without a clear definition of the nature of these complementary components of the army. The basic definition which is given in FSR Vol 1 Sec 3 is that, "the fighting troops of the army are comprised of Cavalry, Artillery, Engineers, Signals, Infantry, Tank Corps and an Air Force contingent. These arms are allotted to an Army in the field in certain definite proportions." It is quite obvious that if the nomenclature is brought up to date in accordance with current organization, this definition of the fighting arms still holds good today. It is also clearly implied that these arms form the fighting troops and are under command of the commander of the formation in which they are allotted. The fact that purely technical aspects of the performance of their fighting duties

may be issued externally; for example, the technical details of servicing a gun or building a bridge—does not in any way detract from the authority of the formation commander in the control which he exercises over these arms in operations. FSR continues by stating that the fighting troops, as defined, carry out the actual operations, whilst the services provide all their requirements in personnel, animals and military materiel. This should not be construed to mean that those services which are classified as combatant services do not in fact fight when the occasion necessitates, but it should be interpreted as meaning that the specific function of each service is not fighting but is an allotted sphere in the logistical support of the fighting troops of the army.

The efficient discharge of logistical functions in a fighting force requires the devolution of responsibility for the services, from the commander to the head of each service. This service head must then exercise executive control of the activities of his service in the discharge of his responsibilities. Before this function can be intelligently discharged the commander must specify in general terms the requirements of fighting troops. The commander must then leave the selection of technical means of maintenance to the head of the service responsible.

The enforcement of service technical control in the maintenance of a force, whether applied to manpower or material, is based on essentially functional considerations. These derive from the broad specialist fields of logistics, and the

processes whereby reserves are assembled in the main support areas, from which concentrated reserve holdings must be established, and the subsequent flow and distribution must be controlled in the light of sound administrative principles, and in accordance with proven economic laws. Such minutiae demand direct control, which can only be exercised through the technical representative of the service. Direct technical control of these services, therefore, is the only logical allocation of responsibility.

It will, however, be noted that this purely technical function is not analogous to the command of fighting troops, which is, of course, absolute and undivided.

Maintenance

By maintenance is implied the whole process of supplying the full requirements of the armed forces together with the complementary processes of evacuation, salvage and recovery.

Since maintenance is a function of administration, and administration forms an important part of command, it follows that, like training and operations, maintenance is a subordinate function of command. Therefore, commanders, to varying degrees, are responsible for maintenance. For example: whereas the Commander-in-Chief is responsible for the maintenance of the entire armed forces, formation commanders are only responsible for maintenance of their formations within the facilities provided. Maintenance responsibility within a formation or an area remains a local function, limited to the commander's specific command. Hence

maintenance responsibility in rear of formations, such as forecasting and calculating requirements of material and personnel, procurement, establishment of ports and depots, and the supply forward into formation areas, are all matters of general administration, and are therefore discharged by principal staff officers or heads of services in accordance with established policy.

Responsibilities of the Staff

Since the progress of training and operations is necessarily greatly dependent upon administrative facilities, the work of the administrative branches (AG's, QMG's and MGO's) require co-ordination with the plans of the General Staff. This is normally effected by the promulgation, by the GS Branch, of co-ordinated policy for the composition and distribution of forces, training and operational plans, and personnel and material requirements. For example: general types and scales of equipment. At the same time, priorities are given, in accordance with these policies. The administrative branches responsible for maintenance, (AG's, QMG's and MGO's); then issue their related instructions to commanders and heads of services.

The responsibilities of the AG, QMG and MGO who direct both the home and general administration are defined in FSR Vol 1. Their responsibility in wartime for the maintenance of the forces is direct to the Commander-in-Chief. At lower levels, responsibilities of the "G," "A" and "Q" senior officers of formations, zones or areas in wartime, in the field of local administration, differ in degree only to the respon-

sibilities allotted to the CGS, AG, QMG and MGO in the field of general administration. Similarly, co-ordination on headquarters or subordinate formations, zones and areas is carried out by the senior General Staff branch staff officer.

Co-ordination by the General Staff branch at force headquarters is discharged by the Staff Duties directorate; similarly, at headquarters of armies and corps the staff duties sections exercise comparable functions, although the General Staff branch is not responsible for the execution of functions of other staff branches. It is an essential prerequisite before he can co-ordinate their activities, that the senior staff officer should be sufficiently informed of the situation to appreciate the main factors and problems which affect the performance of the services controlled by his staff branches.

Co-ordination at this level is effected by the promulgation of basic information, intentions and decisions on questions raised by staff branches. This co-ordination should not proceed beyond basic essentials, nor be allowed to duplicate or nullify the efforts of the branch or the service which is ultimately to be held responsible.

Service Responsibility

Responsibility for maintenance falls logically into two basic categories:—

- (a) Maintenance in the home and general administrative sphere, executed by heads of services under the general direction of principal staff officers, and implemented by installations and units directly controlled by heads of services.

- (b) Maintenance in the local administrative sphere, discharged by service units allotted to formations and areas under the technical control of service representatives.

Responsibility for local maintenance is vested in the commanders of formations, zones and areas, and service units are allotted for this purpose.

The relationship of the heads and representatives of services to the staff in service technical matters is defined in FSR Vol 1. Briefly, they are the advisers to the staff on service matters, and the staff should consult them before arriving at any conclusion on what is, or is not, feasible.

Conversely, the staff is charged with the issue of orders and instructions to services at the headquarters, and to subordinate commanders, in such form as will ensure co-ordinated action. It is, however, implicit that, since important technical and financial responsibilities are vested in the heads of services, the precise methods of implementing staff plans are delegated to the responsible heads of services.

Although the respective responsibilities of staff and services are categorically defined, it is also expedient that some latitude be given to service representatives in their routine transactions with other branches and services. Hence, FSR Vol 1 authorizes principal staff officers to allow service representatives discretion in dealing with other branches of the staff than their own, in order to facilitate normal business. Thus, it is accepted practice for Ordnance service representatives to be authorized by the MGO to deal

direct with the General Staff branch of formations regarding releases or other transactions in controlled stores and vehicles.

The question of the degree of co-ordination which can or should be exercised by the staff of subordinate commanders over service functions is a critical one. Whereas lack of co-ordination would result in chaos, over-supervision would equally be wasteful and inefficient. FSR Vol 1 legislates for co-ordination at this level in the following terms:—

“The supervision and direction by the staff of the work of the services, subject to the policy laid down by a principal staff officer (Sec. 15) is limited to matters of a general nature (Sec. 14) to ensure co-ordination between the work of fighting troops and between the work of the several services themselves.

“Under this general supervision the head of a service and his representative on the headquarters establishment of a formation or on the L of C is free to make all arrangements for carrying out the duties of his service within the bounds of the policy laid down by a principal staff officer.”

There are dual channels of responsibility for service functions which run vertically and are parallel. Primarily service representatives on headquarters of formations, zones or areas are allotted to advise and assist the commander and staff in the implementation of local maintenance. Concurrently the same representatives are the agents of their respective heads of service, and upon them devolves the technical and financial responsibilities incidental to local maintenance. These functions are controlled through

service channels. Technical and financial control necessitates executive direction within the service, on methods and procedures to be adopted throughout service operations, and are not confined to mechanical techniques, e.g., of bridge assembly or wireless operation, but cover the broad field of service activity. The overall policy of service operations is the responsibility of the principal staff officers of the branch under which the service functions. The head of service then promulgates executive instructions on technical and financial methods to his service, based on the principles prescribed in branch policy, with the object of ensuring efficient maintenance to meet the requirements of formations.

The responsibility of a head of a service for the direction of his service is defined in FSR Vol 1 in the following terms:—

“Subject to the powers of interposition vested in the C-in-C and the principal staff officers (Sec. 6,3) and in subordinate commanders (Sec. 7,2) the head of a service is responsible for the technical and financial methods employed in carrying out the work of his service. By delegation of authority from the head of a service his representatives with the headquarters of formations and on the L of C discharge similar responsibility, differing only in degree. For these purposes the head of a service and his representatives at the headquarters of formations have direct access to the principal staff officer and subordinate commander respectively.”

The power of interposing in questions of a technical or financial nature in formation, zone or area is

vested in the commander. If the commander requires the service representative to undertake functions exceeding the powers delegated to him by the head of service, and the emergency precludes prior reference to that head of service, the commander's written instructions are sufficient authority. In accordance with FSR Vol 1 a copy of these instructions will then at once be passed by the service representative to the head of the service.

In this context, where technical and financial issues are involved, service representatives have the right of direct access to their formation commanders. Nevertheless it is clear that co-ordination of the work of the services with the requirements of the fighting troops remains essentially a matter for the staff. If access to the commander on such questions of co-ordination is necessary, then that access will be through the staff.

Service channels for the communication of technical and financial matters are authorized to ensure the expeditious functioning of the service as an integral organization and, simultaneously, to free commanders from the responsibility for service execution of technical and financial functions which are beyond the scope of formation commanders and staff.

Although such matters are usually transacted through normal service channels, there are frequently occasions when they indirectly affect commanders or other services. This necessitates the despatch of additional copies of service technical and financial communications to the senior staff officer of the branch of the staff concerned in order that he

may keep the subordinate commander informed of the purport of such instructions.

Conclusion

This subject of service staff relationship follows logical principles and is devoid of complexity. Nevertheless it is common to find it a cause of irritation, even misunderstanding. This is even more surprising when the guiding principles are so clearly stated and easily available in FSR Vol 1.

If we are to train effectively for war and apply a little understand-

ing to the little learning that we have to hand, we must withdraw from too close an entanglement in our petty routine problems and, having placed them in true perspective, apply these proven accepted principles. Only by this process can the concepts and procedures of war administration be preserved in their purity, and thus only can the instinctive and effectual employment of the system be ensured at the time when administrative failure could possibly spell national disaster.



SOVIET EASTERN POLICY

Digested by the Military Review, USA, from an article in the "Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR" (Germany), January 1956

DURING World War II General John R. Deane, chairman of the American military mission to the Soviet Union, defined the foreign policy of the USSR as follows:—

It is more probable that the Soviet Union handles her foreign relations much as a rider handles a spirited horse—giving it its head at times and holding a tight check on the reins at others—always keeping the horse headed toward the predetermined destination and bending its will to that of the rider.

Soviet policy in all spheres is directed toward the establishment of a world-wide Communist dictatorship. This aim has never been disguised; on the contrary, it has always been stressed as the inevitable historical development of mankind. Tactics may change, but the ultimate goal remains constant. The Soviet policy in Europe is at present to preserve the *status quo*. A leading Communist publication stated on the eve of the Geneva Conference:

In the Soviet Union no one is encroaching on the status quo, but there the real situation is taken into account and the starting point for attempts to find a constructive solution to international problems can be seen in it. . . . One must live in a world of reactionary fantasies to

think that the workers of East Germany will agree to renounce their historical achievements for the pleasure of joining the Atlantic bloc. One must be completely divorced from reality to count on the Soviet Union becoming the assistant of the Western Powers in an undertaking like the inclusion of all Germany in the aggressive Atlantic bloc, which is directed against the Soviet Union and the people's democracies.

This point of view determined the Soviet stand at the last Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers.

In the Far East and South-East Asia the Communist parties of the Soviet Union and China predominate, as the free world and the South-East Asian countries themselves are fully aware. However, the aggressive policy of the Communist leaders met with a decisive rebuff from the United States and her allies in the form of SEATO, a collective defence pact. The Soviet and Chinese Communist parties were obliged to change their tactics. Now their immediate target is to disrupt and weaken the anti-Communist world and to ensure Asian neutrality in the cold war and "active peaceful co-existence." This became evident at the Bandung Conference.

Mao Tse-tung and the Soviet collective leadership are striving to

extend the neutralist camp to include not only India, Indonesia and Ceylon but also Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand. The visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev to India, Burma and Afghanistan was aimed at activating neutralist tendencies in those countries. These policies—the preservation of the *status quo* in Europe and the pursuit of neutralism and co-existence in the East—are only temporary, a tactical manoeuvre best suiting the Communists at the present moment.

The Soviet Government's interest in the countries of the East is nothing new. Lenin, as early as 20 November 1917, published his "Message to all Moslem Workers of Russia and the East," in which Persians, Turks, Indians and Arabs were exhorted to lose no time in throwing off their back the capitalist enslavers of their countries and becoming the masters of their own lands.

Lenin contended that at that time the peoples of the East had already been drawn into the capitalist sphere and the workers were thus members of the world's proletariat. Therefore, the national liberation struggle being carried out by the workers and peasants of the East could not be separated from the war of liberation for the workers of the world and from the proletarian revolution.

Next, bearing in mind the peculiarities of individual states and peoples, particularly of countries bordering on the Soviet Union—Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan—the Soviet Government adopted a different plan for the "war of liberation" of these peoples. In Moscow

a general centre, "The Moslem Central Committee," was set up, which in December 1918 held a conference of representatives of Moslem countries to decide what forms propaganda in the Islamic world should take. The conference ended with the formation of the "Union for the Liberation of the East."

The 1920 Baku Congress of Eastern Peoples, which was attended by 1,891 delegates, took up the banner of nationalism, against the wishes of Communist leaders, who came to the conclusion that the peoples of the East were, on the whole, by no means ready to accept a social revolution in the spirit of Communism. For that reason the Communist leaders again changed their tactics and began to seek new ways of asserting an influence.

From 1918 to 1921 Communist parties and cells were created in Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, Syria, Lebanon and other Near Eastern countries. Enormous sums of money were spent on the organization and subversive activities of these groups. However, in almost every case, Communist propaganda met with strong opposition, not only from the Governments of the countries concerned but also from religious circles. The Communists were forced to go underground.

The opposition once more caused a change of tactics, and in 1935 the Seventh Comintern Congress adopted the following resolution:—

In colonial and semi-colonial countries the most important task of the Communists is to work to create an anti-Imperialist popular front. For this it is necessary to attract the broadest masses into the national liberation movement

against growing Imperialist exploitation, against cruel enslavement, for the banishment of the Imperialists and for the independence of the country; it is necessary to participate actively in mass anti-Imperialist movements headed by national reformers, to obtain joint statements, on the basis of a concrete platform, with the national revolutionary and national reform organizations.

These instructions have served as a guide to Communist parties and Comintern agents ever since. The end of World War II saw an intensification of aggressive subversive activities in Iran and other Arab states, often with a certain amount of success. At the same time the Soviet Government tried by means of a coup to annex Persian Azerbaijan, and by diplomatic pressure compel Turkey to return the provinces of Kars, Ardahan, and Artvin, and to permit the construction of military bases in the Dardanelles. Claim was even laid to the former Italian colony of Tripolitania. All these demands were rejected by Iran and Turkey, who were supported by the Western Powers.

After Stalin's death the collective leadership continued in essence his policies and tactics, in spite of constant assertions on the need for peaceful co-existence and the termination of the cold war. In the East the tactics of inciting extremes of nationalism and religious fervour in Iran and the Arab countries, as envisaged by the Seventh Comintern Congress, lost none of their force.

At present Communist policy and tactics are directed not only toward

supporting neutralist tendencies and peaceful co-existence but at preventing the formation of regional defence pacts among the Moslem countries, by propaganda methods, by hampering intercourse with the North Atlantic Pact countries, by preventing the establishment of normal relations between the Arab countries and Great Britain, France and Turkey, and particularly by inflaming the conflict between Israel and the Arab League.

However, in spite of Soviet pressure, Iran joined the Baghdad Pact, thereby completing the mutual defence chain which stretches from Turkey to Pakistan. This pact, of great importance both in military and economic respects for the Moslem countries, is the Soviets' biggest diplomatic setback for some time. It is barely compensated for by their success in the arms deals with Egypt and other Arab countries. However, even the pact cannot be termed an unqualified success, since as yet the countries comprising the Arab League have categorically refused to associate themselves with it. The main cause of contention is probably Israel, and the guarantees given that country by Great Britain, France and the United States aggravated the situation, further turning the Arab countries against the West.

The Soviet Union is openly on the side of the Arab countries in their struggle with Israel. Egypt particularly has been singled out for praise and friendly approaches, largely in an attempt to woo her away from the West and to ensure that the Israel question remains unsettled.

The supplying of Egypt with Czech arms was a cunning move,

for the ensuing diplomatic pressure from the countries of the free world caused Egypt to swing further toward the Communists, since this pressure was viewed as interference in internal affairs. Then, in turn, Israel became alarmed and approached the West and the United States in particular for arms and supplies to match the Czech deliveries.

The success of the Soviet policy can be judged from the statement made by Colonel Nasser on 2 October 1955 in Cairo on the occasion of his country's arms purchases from Czechoslovakia. He made it quite clear that he considered the real aim of the West to be not so much the preservation of peace as the maintenance of control over Egypt by arming Israel but keeping Egypt weak.

Thus the preservation of the *status quo* in Europe and the policy of neutrality and peaceful co-existence in the Far East have given the Soviet Government the chance to step up its policy in the Near and Middle East.

The Soviets are trying to turn to account the religious feelings of the

countries of Islam, just as they have done in their own country. The fanaticism of certain Moslem groups makes it comparatively easy for the Communists to turn them, not always unwittingly, into tools, sometimes even agents, of communism. A similar process takes place with regard to the fervent patriotism found in the Moslem countries.

The formation of the State of Israel was of great direct use to the Communists. Since the Communist Party is not proscribed there, its activities are expanded to include not only Israel but also Palestine, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. In Tel Aviv and Jerusalem centres of propaganda destined for distribution in the Arab countries have been formed.

Communist propaganda has also penetrated into the 800,000 Arab refugees from Palestine and Jordan who, living in extremely poor conditions, are an easy target. These refugees all consider Israel their mortal enemy, and the Communists are not slow to exploit this feeling to their own ends, which in many respects are in direct opposition to those of the Arabs themselves.
