


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*A Periodical Review of Military Literature*

Number 91

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## CONTENTS

	Page
Quick Fire Plan . . . . .	5
Tibet, Past and Present . . . . .	10
The Organisation of P and RT in the Army . . . . .	23
Japan's Rearmament . . . . .	28
Book Reviews . . . . .	37
Index of Australian Army Journal for 1956 . . . . .	41

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VICTORIA BARRACKS, MELBOURNE

# AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

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# QUICK FIRE PLAN



Captain P. J. Norton,  
Royal Australian Artillery

**T**HE subject of quick fire plans is one which we tend to neglect, and one which very seldom seems to be practised during training. The reason for this is perhaps the fact that in the past it has been given only the briefest of mention in our training pamphlets. This has been rectified to some extent in the 1956 issue of *Artillery Training*, Volume III.

In the meantime it is hoped that these notes may be of some use to armoured and infantry commanders in that they may have a better understanding of what their gunner officers are doing, and perhaps help them to put their requests for artillery support in a form which will save time and possible

confusion. They may also help artillery officers who have had little experience in the subject to approach the problem along the correct lines.

## **The Quick Fire Plan**

A quick fire plan is made normally at brigade level or lower. The artillery officer (troop, battery or *regimental commander*) makes the plan direct with the commander of the supported arm, and is responsible for passing the orders for the engagement of the targets direct to the command posts which will control the guns. It should not be confused with the deliberate fire plan which is normally originated at a higher level, and usually involves the fire of more than one regiment.

The type of fire plan in mind is that made between a battalion commander and his direct support battery commander for an attack to be mounted in about an hour's time. The fire of the direct support battery and possibly one other battery is available. The number of targets to be engaged would be four or five.

The success of this type of operation will often depend on the speed with which it can be mounted. It is vital that the gunner producing the artillery support keeps the time factor uppermost in his mind and strives to cut his preparations to an absolute minimum.

The only measure of success of a fire plan is:—

- (a) That it is on time.
- (b) That it is in the right place.

Of these two, the time factor is the most important. Minor adjustments can be made quickly after the fire plan has started.

#### The Gunner's Part

In making a quick fire plan the gunner officer has three main tasks.

- (a) To be sure in his own mind as to what the commander of the supported arm wants.
- (b) To take steps to ensure the fire comes down where it is required.
- (c) To pass the necessary orders to the guns.

Let us have a look at each of these and see how they concern both parties.

#### What the Supported Arm Wants

Once the gunner has said he will lay on a certain fire plan he automatically gives a guarantee. But

before he does this he will ensure he has the plan and targets correctly, and the commander of the supported arm may find that he is asked a lot of questions. Much time will be saved if clear and concise indications of the targets to be engaged are given to the gunner.

For a start the vital information to the gunner is the targets to be engaged and if possible the order of engagement. Once he has this he can get registration under way.

The following details must then be decided:—

- (a) Weight of fire in terms of guns and rates of fire.
- (b) The type of shell required on each target.
- (c) Timings, unless the fire plan is on call.
- (d) Who may modify the fire plan once it is under way, and the actual means of doing it.
- (e) Any signals required to indicate the end of certain phases.
- (f) Liaison and FOO's.

A simple plan has a better chance of success than a more complicated one. Time will be saved if the supported arm commander refrains from asking for such things as linear targets and varying rates of fire on the one target. In many targets where linear treatment is requested the same effect could be produced by a simple concentration. The gunner must be prepared to advise the supported arm on this, and in turn the supported arm must recognize such advice as being aimed at speeding up preparation rather than an attempt to avoid a little extra work.

### To Hit the Target

In order to hit any target a gunner must have certain information, namely:—

- (a) An accurate grid reference of his guns and the target.
- (b) Accurate orientation for his guns.
- (c) Accurate information about certain weather conditions in order that allowances can be made for abnormal conditions.

Under the circumstances, when a quick fire plan is usually required, this information may not be accurate enough to produce rounds on a target without ranging. For instance, in a rapid advance where the supported arm has suddenly come up against opposition, it is probable that guns will have been in action only a very short time and accurate survey in the gun area has not been completed. Some of the guns required for the fire plan may not have even been deployed.

The standard of the maps in use also has a bearing on the subject. If good maps of a scale of 1/25,000 are available, targets may be engaged effectively with little or no ranging. However, with maps of scale of 1/50,000 or 1/63,360, ranging will be necessary to ensure effective fire.

By carrying out ranging or registration these errors are ironed out, and provided the fire plan is fired within two hours of registration the corrections for weather conditions found by ranging hold good.

So we may say that in most quick fire plans some registration will be necessary, and it is the time taken

for this registration that governs the time the guns can be ready.

With a view to saving time in this registration, the gunner responsible for producing the fire plan may bring along one or more of his officers while the commander of the supported arm is pointing out the targets. This saves time, as he does not have to indicate the targets afresh to the officer or officers who will be carrying out registration. If the order of engagement is known at this stage, then the first target to be engaged can be registered last. This leaves the guns laid for the beginning of the fire plan and again saves time.

It is essential that this registration gets under way as soon as possible. If the commander of the supported arm realises this and is prepared to give his targets and then allow his gunner to issue orders for registrations, he will help to cut considerable time off the production of the fire plan.

The ideal that the gunner would like is to see a round from each gun that is to fire on a particular target, and to make any necessary adjustments. This is a long process and seldom possible. At the other end of the scale he may only have time to see one or two ranging rounds for each target, and order his guns to record the target at a correction, without seeing any rounds on the target itself. In practice, registration usually falls somewhere between these two extremes.

The gunner must appreciate the time available for registration, and once it has started keep an eye on its progress and if necessary modify

his registration plan to keep within his time limit. If his registration is not going to be as full as he would like, he must warn the commander of the supported arm that minor adjustments may be necessary on some targets after the fire plan has started. The more important targets should have the most time devoted to them for registration. This priority must be given by the commander of the supported arm.

#### Orders to the Guns

In a quick fire plan the orders for engagement are normally sent to the guns by wireless. The gunner should have at least two nets available to him, i.e., the regimental net and his battery net. If more than one battery is being used, then other battery nets will be available.

Registration should be under way by the time these orders are prepared, and the gunner officer responsible for the fire plan must fit them in on the air when he can. Some regiments do not allow registration of this sort on the regimental net. This leaves the net clear for the passage of such orders.

If the fire plan is simple, with no varying rates of fire and not more than four or five targets, the orders may be sent in an officer-to-officer conversation. However, if it is complicated it must be entered on a "Task Table" form and sent serial by serial. This is a tedious process, but is necessary in order to ensure that the guns produce the fire plan as intended by the originator. If communications are bad and relay stations are in use, the passing of a "Task Table" can take a long time.

A copy of this "Task Table" is always given to the supported arm.

#### The Guarantee

The supported arm commander will want a time from his gunner as to when the guns will be ready. Once this has been given the gunner guarantees that the fire requested will come down on the correct target at the correct times.

The value of this guarantee may be limited for reasons already discussed, i.e., minor alterations during the fire plan. This is acceptable provided that the commander of the supported arm is fully aware of the limitations and has agreed to them.

The gunner must realise that the supported arm is liable to be committed well before H-hour, and that last-minute postponements and alterations to the fire plan are not acceptable. It is only in very minor operations that these late-hour alterations will be possible.

The commander of the supported arm should not be alarmed if his gunner will not give him a "time ready" as soon as the plan is decided upon. At this stage he may not be in a position to do so. For instance, if some of his guns have to deploy in order to take part in the fire plan he will not know exactly how long this will take. However, he will have an idea of the time needed, and will be prepared to give the latest time at which he can give the time ready. If it is considered necessary, it is a good idea to decide also on a latest time for any pre-H-hour modifications.



### Synchronization

A lot of quick fire plans are fired on the "I'll go as soon as you are ready" system. Even if this is used the gunner will give an H-hour to his guns, in order that command posts may continue with the fire plan even if there is a complete breakdown of communications. He will give the time for H-hour as two or three minutes after the time he and the supported arm commander have both agreed that they are ready.

Synchronization within an artillery regiment is kept up to date the whole time, and is always passed from the guns to the OP. This synchronization originates at divisional or higher level, and will be in sympathy with the time kept by the

supported arm at that level. All that should be necessary is for the gunner and the commander of the supported arm to agree on the time between their watches. Unless there is a very good reason, the gunner should not be asked to alter his watch.

### Conclusion

At the best most quick fire plans are a compromise between what is wanted and what is possible in the time available.

The time factor is vital. Both parties must be on the lookout the whole time for the saving of odd minutes here and there. These minutes can add up to half an hour or more, and could prejudice the chance of success of the operation.

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# Tibet

## Past and Present

Major G. M. F. Wood,  
Australian Intelligence Corps

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To the west of the Five Treasuries of Great Snow, in the Jurisdiction of White Glass Fort, near Rocky Valley Inner Monastery, is the Bird Country of the South (Lho Cha-Mo Lung).

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### Tibetan description of Mt. Everest The Roof of the World

THE highland of Tibet is one of the least known, most enigmatic, exclusive and fascinating countries in the world.

From the earliest times the Government and people of Tibet have consistently maintained a deliberate policy for the exclusion of foreigners and foreign influence. Even during the troubled days of World War 2, when the allies were endeavouring to find an alternate airway from India to China to replace the difficult and dangerous Hump route, the Tibetan authorities, although still friendly to Britain, refused permission for a proposed aerial survey of a route

which passed over Tibetan territory.

The old explorers called Tibet "the Roof of the World," and this seems a valid and logical term. The three highest mountains in the world lie close to its borders, Everest and Kanchenjunga in the Himalayas and K2 (Godwin Austen) in the Karakorums.

The country seems designed by nature for insularity, and is guarded by the natural obstacles of distance, altitude, marshes, rivers, mountains and deserts.

To the east rise the Amne Machin and Tangla Ranges and the terribly broken country of Sikang. Along the whole southern border is the immense bastion of the Himalayas, the highest range of mountains in the world.

To the west are the mighty Karakorums backed by the Pamirs, and in the north the Kunlunshan ranges.

Beyond the Kunlunshan stretches the vast Takla Makan desert and to the north-east the endless marshes of the Tsaidam. Beyond the Tsaidam are the beginnings of the great wastes of the Gobi Desert.

From the immense mountain ranges that encircle Tibet spring a number of mighty rivers. The Hwang Ho (Yellow) and Ch'ang Chiang (Yangtze) into China, the Mekong into Indo-China, the Brahmaputra, the Ganges and the Indus into the sub-continent of India.

It can be seen, therefore, that the natural barriers of the country are formidable. Access to Tibet from the south is limited to a small number of easily-guarded high passes, some traversable for only a few months of the year.

#### Insularity

The natural barriers of entry, the rigours of the climate, the harshness of the terrain and the difficulty of movement all assisted in the isolation of the country. All Governors or chieftains of border areas were required to report and discourage any attempted entry into the country. The people were not permitted to give food or shelter to strangers and were severely punished if they did so. Despite all these deterrents, certain determined travellers were able to enter Tibet.

The great British Survey of India trained native surveyors and draughtsmen and sent them on incredible journeys into countries not open to official entry. Many of

these men endured slavery, robberies and heavy manual work before completing their tasks; some penetrated deep into Tibet.

A few Europeans, generally in disguise, occasionally visited Lhasa. These include at least one woman, a Mde David Neel, who disguised herself as a Buddhist nun.

After the Younghusband expedition of 1904 a British political agency was established at Lhasa, and from that time forward certain Europeans were permitted to enter and we began to learn something about the country.

#### The Land and Its People

Tibet proper is about the size of South Australia; its true boundaries, especially to the East, have never been clearly defined. It is conservatively estimated to have a population of about 3,000,000.

The populated areas vary in height from 10,000 to 15,000 feet and the average elevation of the country is estimated at 16,000 feet. Most of the people live in the valleys and lowlands of the south, where some food can be grown. Lhasa is the religious and commercial capital. The only other centres of any size are Shigatse, Gyantse and Gartok.

The Tibetan climate is very severe. There is little snow, as it is almost too dry for snow, but ceaseless biting cold winds of almost gale force sweep over the land and are especially violent during winter and spring.

Tibet is shielded from the monsoons by the tremendous arc of the Himalayas. Two hundred or more inches of rain fall yearly on their

U S S R

SIN-KIANG

THE GOBI DESERT

PAMIR

TAKLA MAKAN DESERT

KUNLUN

AMNE MACHIN RANGE

CHINGHAI

CHINA

TARAKORAM RANGE

CHANTANG PLATEAU  
KARAKORAM RANGE

MOUNTAINS

HWONG HO (YELLOW RIVER)

HIMALAYA

TIBET

TANGLA RA

CHANG CHIANG (YANGTZE RIVER)  
MEKONG RIVER

NEPAL MOUNTAINS

SIKANG


LITANG

RUDDI  
GARTOK  
SHIGATSE  
GYANTSE  
YATUNG  
LHASA

MT EVEREST  
MT KANCHENJUNGA

SHAMPUTRA RIVER

BURMA



southern or Indian slopes, while only an average of 7 inches falls into Tibet. The rarified air is so pure, dry and cold that meat keeps well for up to three years and grain keeps indefinitely.

For generations the topsoil of Tibet has been carried by water action to the lowlands of China, Burma and India, leaving most of Tibet with a hard, barren soil suitable only for pastoral pursuits. The sparse grazing provides sustenance for a hardy type of sheep and the yak. The yak provides almost everything for the Tibetan's comfort; transport to save his legs, clothing to keep him warm, and meat for his belly. The Tibetan religion forbids the killing of animals, but a certain amount of meat is almost a necessity in the high altitude.

The soil is better in the sheltered and warmer southern valleys, and crops of barley, peas, mustard, turnips, radishes, wheat, buckwheat and some fruits are harvested in the short summer.

Very few trees except stunted willows and the like grow in northern Tibet, and it is possible to travel for hundreds of miles along the Changtang plateau and see no plant higher than six inches. The greater part of the country is ice-bound, and for over half the year even the southern inhabited areas can be cultivated for a few months only.

There are indications of mineral deposits of considerable value, including oil, but little has been done to exploit these in the past, mainly due to religious difficulties.

The basic diet of the Tibetan is yaks' meat, mutton and tsamba. The latter is a sustaining but tasteless

concoction of parched barley and yak butter, salt and rice. This is washed down by continuous floods of buttered tea. This tea reaches Tibet from China in the form of concentrated bricks. The method of making buttered tea is to break off a sizeable chunk of the tea brick and throw it into a container of water. This is stewed for some considerable time, when yak butter (preferably rancid), salt, rice and other odd solids are added.

Westerners who have tasted this tea are not hopeful of its popularity outside Tibet, but state that it is "very sustaining." The average Tibetan is said to consume upwards of 50 cups daily.

### The People

"The people," to quote Sir Charles Bell, formerly British political agent in Tibet, "belong to what is loosely called the Tartar branch of the human race. The majority is related in physical type to the people of the steppes and deserts farther to the north.

"They are not closely related to the Chinese of China proper . . . they are still in the feudal age. By occupation they are farmers and, in a lesser degree, shepherds. Many take a trade. One man in every three is a monk or a priest; one woman in every 15 a nun. Monasteries are everywhere and some of them are huge; most families send at least one of the sons as a monk.

"The climate, food and conditions have produced a race exceptionally strong, robust and hardy, though not particularly long-lived. They are handicapped by venereal diseases, pneumonia, goitre, influenza

and small-pox. There is no malaria, cholera or typhoid fever."

The people are cheerful and friendly and accept their primitive conditions with fortitude, equanimity and a happy grin.

The dress of the common people is of coarse homespun cloth generally ragged beyond description, the hair of both sexes is worn long, and even in the coldest weather many of the menfolk leave one arm and shoulder bare.

The upper classes wear clothes of Chinese pattern, the men having long coats of Chinese design exquisitely made of silks and brocade. They normally wear one jade earring. The women wear many jewels and a charm box and braid their hair over a framework which rises to a double peak above the ears.

The people are excellent stonemasons, and can build a substantial stone house on a cliffside. The upper classes have large and pleasant but rather dark houses that are seldom glazed.

Lower class housing is rough and ready with everyone in together. This doesn't matter much, as polyandry is practised, and if the eldest son takes a wife she is shared by the brothers. As elsewhere, polyandry appears to result in decreased birthrate and an increase in the proportion of male births.

Washing the body, or even changing clothes, is not a popular practice in Tibet and, as sanitary arrangements are also very primitive, the smells in some of the smaller houses are, to say the least, memorable. The purity and coldness of

the air apparently prevents the spread of disease.

Tibetans of all classes are extremely courteous and dignified and have a rigidly graded pattern of social behaviour. Curious customs include the giving and receiving of ceremonial sashes on first meeting. Poking out the tongue to a superior is a mark of respect; so also is a sharp suck-in of the breath, so that the air the honourable person is breathing will not be polluted.

The principal exports of the country are coarse wool, gold, silver, salt, rugs, furs and musk. In exchange, generally by barter, Tibet gets from China silk, fine porcelain, jewellery, clothing and tea bricks; from Bhutan rice, sugar balls and tobacco; from India and Nepal cloth, brass, silverware and medicines.

Under Communist Chinese pressure trade with southern countries has greatly declined.

### History

Tibet does not figure largely in world events, and is content that this should be so. There has been Chinese political and military interest in Tibet since the 13th century and suzerainty was established in 1720, when the then Manchu emperor intervened in the country's affairs. This lasted until 1912, when the Tibetans seized an opportunity during the turmoil of the Chinese revolution to drive out the Chinese garrison and restore the Dalai Lama, who had been living in exile in India.

Chinese suzerainty has generally been recognized by the great powers since 1907 but never by the Tibetans themselves. It has never been any-

thing more than nominal unless China was able to maintain a sufficient garrison to enforce her will. Before the spread of Buddhism the Tibetans had been a warlike people, who waged successful wars in China, Burma and Nepal.

British interest dates from the early years of this century. During this period the power policies of three nations, Britain, Russia and China, were beginning to press heavily on Tibet, causing her to become violently anti-foreign and giving all travellers cause to discover the accuracy of the appellation "The Forbidden Land."

Russia particularly was extending southward into Tibet, and was being received with more cordiality than other countries, because a Russian who became a Lama was in high favour with the then Dalai Lama.

In 1901 the Tibetans sent a mission to the Czar. This caused great alarm in Britain, as it appeared to be linked with disturbances on the Indo-Tibetan border.

The outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war and the decline of the Manchu regime in China created the opportunity Britain sought, and in 1904 a small British force under Colonel Younghusband marched out of Darjeeling, and after some initial dilatoriness and a few skirmishes reached Lhasa, but shortly afterwards withdrew altogether from Tibet.

British terms for the withdrawal were exceedingly mild, and Britain remained the good friend of Tibet for half a century. She never attempted to alter the pattern of

Tibetan life, but offered counsel and advice whenever required.

Several young upper class Tibetans were selected and sent to England, where they studied at Rugby and later specialized in such professions as engineering and surveying before returning to Tibet. During World War 2 British influence waned, and after India received independence it ceased altogether.

Throughout the long period of her friendship with Tibet Britain continued to recognize the suzerainty of China.

### Religion

Religion is the central fact of life in Tibet, and Tibetans say that God can be approached only through a Lama.

The original Tibetans practised a primitive form of occultism and black magic called Pon or Bon. It was not until late in the fifth century that Buddhism, established in Northern India eleven centuries before, drifted up to Tibet through the narrow Chumbi valley.

By the time it reached Tibet, Mahayana Buddhism had become debased by tantric doctrines and practices. This proved a successful vehicle to absorb the aboriginal Pon religion, and Lamaism slowly evolved. The doctrine of reincarnation was accepted, and an elaborate ritual arose which bears some superficial resemblance to Mediterranean Christianity. Much of this is simply the similarity of all religious rituals one with another.

The passage of centuries has fossilized the religion to a considerable degree, but it does bring a

great deal of colour into the otherwise hard and dull life of the Tibetan.

Dancing, singing and colourful processions form part of the religious ceremonies, and prayer wheels are turned at every opportunity. These prayer wheels contain hundreds of slips of paper bearing the sacred words OM MANI PADME HUM, which means roughly "the Jewel in the Heart of the Lotus." This has reference to the Buddha, who is often depicted sitting crosslegged on a lotus blossom.

The person who says most prayers may be rewarded in his next reincarnation, and a turn of a prayer wheel does just as well and multiplies itself by the number of sacred slips it contains. Thus one turn of the wheel might perhaps send up a thousand prayers to the future good of the turner. Rich people sometimes employ others to turn prayer wheels on their behalf.

Tibet is a storehouse of many of the best works of Chinese art. Over the centuries these works of art have found their way into the temples and monasteries of Tibet, where they have been appreciated and preserved.

There is possibly much mumbo-jumbo, black magic and evil among the lower ranks who swarm through the dark monasteries of Tibet, but there appears no doubt that some of the better orders of Lamaism reach a high religious and contemplative standard.

#### Lhasa

Lhasa is and will probably remain the holy city of the Buddhists

of the Mahayana (large vehicle) persuasion, and pilgrims will continue to make their way there from as far away as China and Mongolia. Lhasa is a fairly large place; its population is thought to approach 20,000.

It is dominated by the Potala, the palace of the Dalai Lama. The Potala is built on a detached rocky eminence and consists of over a thousand rooms, most of them very dark, dank and smelly.

Externally it is a striking and magnificent building, mainly white in colour, relieved by red and gold. The white walls are kept in good condition by throwing whitewash from the roof and the narrow windows. Part of the roof called the pavilion is unusual, a small portion consisting of beaten sheets of pure gold, the remainder being of gilded metal.

Near Lhasa are three great monasteries called Drepung, Sera and Gandan, "the Three Pillars of State," containing in all some 20,000 monks. Drepung, the largest monastery in the world, is said to house between 7,000 and 10,000 monks alone.

#### Dalai Lama

Until recent events the Government of Tibet was divided into two distinct administrations—one under the Dalai Lama, the temporal ruler of Tibet, and the other under local kings or chiefs. Dalai is a Mongol term meaning ocean and Lama means superior one, so Dalai Lama may be interpreted as "Superior One as Wide as the Ocean." The system of government might be described as a theocracy, since nearly





The Mother of the Dalai Lama, beyond, the Patala

all power rested in ecclesiastical hands.

The system is, however, complicated by the fact that there was another high Lama called the Panchen Lama, who is the spiritual head of the state, just as the Dalai Lama is the temporal head. The power of the Panchen Lama, as spiritual head, might appear greater but the line of the Dalai Lamas is older and has produced more outstanding personalities, and has, in fact, wielded greater power in both temporal and spiritual affairs. The power of a Dalai Lama is absolute and final in a way Westerners find hard to understand.

The succession of both Lamas is by reincarnation decided by an abracadabra of prophecy, signs, portents and, whatever Chinese influence is powerful, a strong dash of politics.

A Regent usually exercises power until the Dalai Lama reaches the age of 17. As might be expected, the number of Dalai Lamas who have died before reaching this age is high.

The present Dalai Lama, whose validity was proclaimed after exhaustive tests at the age of 6, was given full executive powers while only 16 years old. This unusual step was taken apparently to end internal dissension within the Government. The present Dalai Lama, who is 22 years old, is highly regarded by all Westerners who have seen him.

More recently a reincarnated Panchen Lama was also found. Originally sponsored by the Chinese Nationalists, he was soon afterwards

taken over by the Chinese Communists, and much of his education was completed in their hands.

Traditionally there has been a rivalry between these two high Lamas, and the Chinese at various times have done much to foster this ill-feeling when it was to their advantage.

This briefly was Tibet up to the year 1951, a land remote and strange, and a people intensely religious and conservative.

### The Communists Arrive

In 1950 the Chinese Communists, with virtually all of China proper subjugated, turned to the lands along the fringes of their country and the need to "protect special areas within the Chinese boundaries." Tibet was one of these "special areas," and in the following year a show of force was made by Chinese Communist troops and the small Tibetan army was dispersed, it is said, partly by the judicious use of fire crackers.

The Dalai Lama, who had fled to the Indian border, was persuaded to return to Lhasa, and thus the most religious and least materialistic of living human societies came under the jurisdiction of non-religious and materialistic Communism.

A Tibetan delegation was despatched to Peking in April 1951, and the following month an agreement was reached with Peking, granting Tibet "national regional autonomy under the unified leadership of the Central People's Government," promising not to alter "the existing political system of Tibet" and to "respect religious beliefs and

protect the monasteries." The Dalai Lama's status and powers were not to be altered, but the "equal status" of the pro-Chinese Panchen Lama was also affirmed. The agreement also promised that "in matters relating to reform there will be no compulsion on the part of the central authorities."

The agreement appeared satisfactory, and the Chinese took care to exercise the power through the normal Tibetan channels in the initial stages of their occupation.

Chinese troops were stationed at various parts of Tibet, particularly on the southern border passes. Their rationing and accommodation strained Tibetan economy, but in general Chinese pressure was not oppressive and was applied with extreme caution.

Late in 1954 both high Lamas went to Peking for a six months' visit. During the visit, which coincided with the ceremonies for the adoption of the new Chinese constitution, the Dalai Lama said that the Tibetan people repudiated "enemy slanders that the Communist Party and the Peoples' Government would eliminate religion." He declared that the Tibetan people enjoyed full religious freedom.

Before the two high Lamas left Peking in March 1955 it was announced that an agreement had been reached as follows:—

A Tibetan autonomous region should be set up with the Dalai Lama as Chairman, the Panchen Lama as first Vice-Chairman and the Chinese army commander in Tibet as second Vice-Chairman.

Control was to be exercised through these administrations:—

The Tibetan Local Government under the Dalai Lama.

The Panchen Kanpo Lija based on Shigatse under the Panchen Lama.

The People's Liberation Committee of Chamdo in Western Sikang.

The inclusion of western Sikang confirms rumours that this area has been returned to the nominal control of the Tibetans, who have long claimed it. It is thought that the eastern boundary of Tibet will now follow the western bank of the Ch'ang Chiang (Yangtze) River, thus granting to Tibet parts of Chinghai and Sikang provinces.

It is reported that the Dalai Lama had been most impressed with the material progress of China, and there seems little doubt that by the time he left Peking he was at least favourably disposed towards the Communist regime.

### Communications

The Chinese meanwhile had energetically pushed forward road construction, so that one motorable road at least linked Lhasa with China, and it is being pushed southwards to the Indian border at Yatung. Survey work has already begun on a railway from Peking to Lhasa.

A road to Gartok, in western Tibet, following the traditional caravan route, is also well under way. From Gartok it is but a short distance to the undemarcated borders of India and Kashmir.

For some years Russian engineers have been engaged in the construction of a road from Russia through

Sinkiang and western Tibet to Gartok. At the end of 1954 it was reported complete as far as Rudok, north of Gartok.

Although these roads will materially assist trade, there is little doubt that their main purpose is strategic. The first aircraft of a projected Peking-Lhasa airline landed at Lhasa airport on 26 May 56 on a trial flight.

Many of the southern valleys of Tibet are suitable for airfields, and it is presumed that the Chinese will construct these when they have sufficient aircraft to operate in high altitudes. The construction of airfields will probably also follow a strategic rather than an economic pattern.

The programme of road building, construction, irrigation and other works brought very large numbers of Chinese into Tibet and, although the Chinese grew some food themselves, the provisioning of their forces became a major burden on a country which barely produces enough for its own people.

It may be remembered that one of the reasons why Tibet disliked the early Everest expeditions was that the presence of an expedition of even about 100 men disrupted the subsistence level economy of the area through which it passed.

Apart from the supply of food and shelter, the populace was also called on to provide labour and other services for the Chinese forces in the vicinity.

Obviously the Chinese had taken advantage of the absence of the two high Lamas from Tibet to accelerate

long-planned reforms and to increase considerably the pressure on the people.

#### The Dalai Lama Returns

On the return of the Dalai Lama from Peking he soon became aware of a great change in the attitude of the Chinese and the rising discontent of his own people. The reasons for the discontent were:—

- (a) Resentment at the overruling of the Dalai Lama's absolute authority by Chinese officials.
- (b) Rising taxes imposed by the Chinese.
- (c) Imprisonment of local representatives who, it is reported, had presented petitions to the Dalai Lama on his return urging removal of all Chinese forces from Tibet.
- (d) Compulsory indoctrination of youth.
- (e) Acquisition of grain.
- (f) Efforts to disarm the population.

Events slowly and steadily took a more unfavourable turn, and reports reaching India and Nepal indicate that sporadic revolts have broken out from time to time, but have been quickly quelled.

However, a large-scale revolt broke out in Litang in Eastern Tibet in April 1956, up to 8,000 Tibetans were said to have been involved in the upheaval. Large numbers of troops and aircraft were employed by the Chinese before the revolt was contained. The Chinese are reported to have increased their army of occupation from 2,000 to 6,000 during the last few months.

The Tibetans protested to Nehru that some 4,000 men, women and children were killed in the bombing raids carried out to suppress the revolt.

The Tibetans, once a fierce and warlike people, are still extremely independent, and their final subjugation will not be easy.

The Chinese have now fairly effectively stopped the passage of news from Tibet, and we are unlikely to hear what is going on in this unfortunate country.

The Chinese have gone to the length of substituting one of their officials for the Dalai Lama's representative at the recent coronation of the King of Nepal. They also refused an official invitation for the Dalai Lama to visit India in the forthcoming celebration for the 2,500th anniversary of the death of Buddha.

The Dalai Lama is an intelligent man who has had some Western contacts. By this time he must realise that the eventual aim of the Chinese is to squeeze his country into submission and conformation to the Communist pattern, and there is little he can do to prevent it.

The struggle appears likely to go on for some time, but there is no doubt that the Chinese can and will eventually suppress any effective opposition in the southern and more inhabited parts of Tibet. The sparsely populated and forbidding northern plateau will probably remain relatively untouched.

### China's Plans

Why has China taken so much time and effort to conquer such an unproductive and inhospitable area?

If China had in mind military operations southwards, surely there are simpler routes available than those through the extremely difficult country of Tibet.

The natural barriers to free communications, the marginal economy of the country and the lack of materials and indigenous labour all make Tibet a difficult base for military operations.

The country is said to be highly mineralised, gold occurs freely and iron, copper and coal deposits are known to exist, but again religious and logistic problems of a high order would need to be solved before economic development is feasible.

The reasons for Chinese occupation of the country appear to be threefold. Firstly, to prevent Russian expansion southwards. Russia has always desired Sinkiang and Tibet. During the struggle between the Communists and the Nationalists Russia attempted to infiltrate Sinkiang with a view to its annexation.

Russia badly needs a greater buffer of Soviet-dominated territory around her sensitive central Asian industrial empire, which stretches from Tashkent northwards through Alma Ata to Semipalatinsk.

Only the cordial relations existing between the two Communist countries prevented trouble when Communist China reasserted her ancient claims over Sinkiang and Tibet. Russia continues to maintain friendly relationships with both these countries by supplying technicians and medical supplies and by assistance in the construction of roads. Should relations between

Russia and China ever deteriorate, Sinkiang and Tibet might well become trouble spots.

The second reason is ideological. China's original plan probably included the exhibition of Tibet as a showpiece displaying the great change that could occur in a highly religious and backward country once it was converted to the higher ideology of Communism. Tibet could then be used as a base for the peaceful penetration of the vulnerable countries along her borders—Burma, Bhutan, India, Nepal and Kashmir.

The Tibetan experiment has not come up to expectation, and the country, after five years of occupation, is anything but a showplace. It is still, however, a suitable base for ideological expansion and peaceful penetration southwards.

The third reason is "face." Tibet has always been regarded by the Chinese as part of their empire, and whenever China has been strong

she has always asserted her rule over Tibet. The Communists have simply restored to China this ancient right and thus retained "face."

#### The Future

There have been reports recently that Chinese Communist forces have occupied part of northern Burma, which has long been claimed by China. China has also ancient claims to northern Assam, Bhutan, Nepal and Hunza in Kashmir. Through Tibet she also has vague claims of parts of Ladakh and Gharwal.

Chinese occupation of Tibet might thus serve as a warning to these countries. If they do not prove amenable to peaceful penetration, they may one day be faced with something more definite—a Chinese need to class them as "special areas within the Chinese boundaries" and a desire to "protect" them also in a somewhat similar manner as Tibet.

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# The ORGANISATION of P and RT in the ARMY

Captain J. H. Martin,

Royal Australian Infantry

THE standard of P & RT in a unit reflects the morale and efficiency of a unit. The standard of physical efficiency in a nation is an index of its power and morale. When the ancient Greeks were a world power their physical efficiency was at a high level. The decline of the Roman Empire occurred at the same time as their physical efficiency declined.

At the present time the USA and USSR have their physical education programmes at high levels. It is no coincidence that their standing as world powers is higher than ever before.

The physical efficiency of the Australian Army at present is left too much to luck, and the hope that somewhere, somehow, someone will always be found who can fill the breach. This is unsatisfactory and the need for organization is urgent.

What are the basic factors we must consider in the organization of P & RT in the Army at the present time? Perhaps we should examine

the aims of P & RT in the Army to appreciate the organization needed.

Aims can briefly be stated as:—

- (a) To prepare soldiers physically for war, thereby achieving a high standard of fitness and reducing loss of manpower through sickness.
- (b) To maintain a high standard of fitness in trained soldiers.
- (c) To assist in reconditioning the sick and wounded.
- (d) To foster good morale through social relationships, and from healthy competition and vigorous exercises to inculcate team spirit, hardihood and a sense of fair play.
- (e) To provide physical and mental relaxation through games and sports.
- (f) To apply physical training to specific Army needs, e.g., life-saving, lifting and carrying certain items of equipment, cliff climbing, unarmed combat and parachute jumping.

To achieve these aims an organization of trained specialists with adequate facilities would be an essential. To examine the USA and USSR physical education programmes is to learn that they found it necessary to have highly trained specialists handling their programmes. Equipment and facilities conform to the most up-to-date requirements. These countries have realised that physical education needs scientific guidance and management, and their methods are producing good results.

In the Army the organization for P & RT should include:—

- (a) A clear policy, to outline the scope of P & RT to be carried out, and the standard to be attained by soldiers in different categories. The policy should indicate the conditions of service for specialists in P & RT and the training of these specialists.
- (b) Trained personnel, i.e., Officers, WOs and NCOs who have qualified at approved courses.
- (c) Adequate facilities and equipment to ensure that the full programme of work can be carried out and that the personnel can be motivated by the equipment and conditions they are working under. This is a factor which is often ignored at present. Too often a platoon or even a company receives "PT" on a dusty area of ground in a high wind, or alternatively on a muddy area of ground. Sometimes no

facilities or equipment are available, not even medicine balls, and the "lesson" may be given by a completely untrained NCO. Is it any wonder that PT under these conditions becomes actively disliked by soldiers who are introduced to Army physical training in this way. The unfortunate NCO detailed to take a "lesson" under these conditions must, if he makes an intelligent appreciation, realise that his attempts at instruction will be almost fruitless before he starts. If he is not fully trained, and the "lesson" resolves itself into a series of "double marches" and little else, or several arm movements, or abdominal movements consecutively, the personnel receiving the "lesson" become "browned off" in a very short time.

In the matter of trained soldiers it is essential that an experienced and qualified officer should control the policy at the Directorate of Military Training.<sup>1</sup> In the absence of such an officer, P & RT is controlled by laymen who can waste many man-hours, and yet never achieve the aims. At each Command a supervising officer would be responsible for the supervision of all P & RT within the Command, conduct cadre courses to obtain potential students for qualifying courses, determine scales of issue of equipment for units within the Command, and control the conduct of major sporting activities. At each

1. Since this article was written a Staff Officer, P&RT, has been appointed to the Directorate of Military Training.—Editor.



area the provision of an area P & RT officer would enable an economical co-ordination and supervision of P & RT of the units in the area. At each unit a qualified WO should be responsible for the conduct of all unit P & RT, e.g., the conduct and recording of all P & RT tests, organization of unit sporting activities, and the training of unit assistant instructors on the basis of one per company or equivalent sub-unit.

The training of specialists for P & RT has been very much neglected and their appointments have in some cases been made on the basis of their participation in one sporting activity only. Strange but true, a boxer appointed as a P & RT instructor has given a "lesson" to recruits which consisted of arduous running, strenuous abdominal exercises and sparring.

Although Australia has only comparatively recently established physical education as a university subject, it would be a great asset to have every P & RT officer with university or equivalent qualifications. Then we could be sure that sound principles and knowledge guided the conduct of P & RT, so that the aims could be achieved. This is only in keeping with the conduct of physical education in many other institutions. The training of WOs and NCOs requires at least a six months' basic course followed later by refresher and specialist courses.

The establishment of a school for P & RT specialists is urgently needed, i.e., a school which could adequately cover all subjects of P & RT. Such a school should have the facilities to teach and practice athletics, swimming and life-saving,

and all subjects covered in courses. Such a school could cater for sports officers' courses of short duration, and the training of part-time specialists. The staff of the school should have direct access to the medical services for advice and assistance with anatomical and physiological lectures. The co-opting of civilian or other Service instructors would be a tremendous advantage, and if wisely done would ensure the highest possible standard.

The length of time to conduct courses cannot justifiably be shortened. The syllabus of a basic course covers all major sports, gymnastics, anatomy, physiology, first aid, remedial and corrective exercise, combat activities, mutual instruction, the organization and officiating of major sports, etc. Specialist training courses cover the application of P & RT to specific needs of the Service, for instance, swimming, wrestling, fencing, etc.

The conduct of refresher courses for P & RT specialists is long overdue. Overseas countries who have been conducting research into training are continually improving methods of training. Visitors to Australia specialising in physical education contact civilian organizations, who can take advantage of their knowledge. No such opportunities exist for P & RT specialists in the Army. Provision for periodic testing of instructors at refresher courses would ensure that soldiers attempt to keep up to date. Even the most ardent enthusiast can become narrow in his approach if he is not periodically given the opportunity to get refresher training. Again, refresher training keeps the

slacker from "hibernating" in a unit and evading his full responsibility.

Close collaboration with the medical services is necessary in the conduct of well-organised P & RT. Although preventive and remedial exercise is the most urgent aspect of P & RT requiring liaison with the medical services, the conduct of many simple P & RT programmes is greatly assisted by medical advice. There is a considerable variation in the anatomical types of personnel, and as types progress differently in the cultivation of different physical qualities, considerable benefit is gained from the advice of medical services in this regard.

Programmes of P & RT should be flexible and capable of catering for specialised aspects such as recreation, teamwork, endurance, to offset boredom and to prepare a unit for a specific task, etc. The selection of a good programme of P & RT can help to make Army life more attractive to the more athletically inclined. It is obvious that the Army needs the more active and fit members of the male population, and well-organised P & RT would make the Army more attractive to the better type of recruit. A well-organised recreational programme would do much to reduce the numbers who are tempted to spend all leisure in wet canteens and messes.

The present system of P & RT, apart from remedial exercise, is broadly divided into basic and battle physical training. Basic physical training is designed to take the recruit from his enlistment to the completion of his corps training. In it, he is to have balanced lessons designed to cultivate various physical

qualities harmoniously, and by the time basic training is completed he will have mastered the fundamentals of basic skills such as walking, running, climbing, balancing, vaulting, throwing, etc. If the recruit is systematically taught all of his basic training, he can then be introduced to battle physical training. As its name implies, battle PT trains a man for battle. It presupposes he has been thoroughly grounded in basic physical training. The instructor of battle physical training therefore must be well trained in all phases of basic PT as well as battle PT. In battle PT he is required to conduct lessons with improvised apparatus in the field, to apply exercise to specific tasks such as climbing, jumping from moving vehicles, etc. If he is not well trained he may cause serious injury, and his lack of knowledge will soon adversely affect the soldiers under instruction. As battle PT is conducted with a great deal of improvisation, there is a strong tendency to underrate the knowledge and skill required of the P & RT instructor who conducts it. The under-trained instructor in battle PT could do serious harm apart from failing to adequately teach the subject.

Physical education is now recognised the world over as a subject of university status requiring a minimum of two years' training. We should realise and acknowledge the fact that our efforts in the past have been weak and insufficient. Little or no incentive has been given to personnel to attain a high standard of fitness; in fact, some members have seen unfitness as an incentive to avoid arduous duty. A satisfac-

tory organization of P & RT is long overdue. Physical efficiency of an army cannot be left to chance. There is no simple way of raising the physical efficiency of an army in a short time.

Trained specialists in a sound organization with a well-formulated policy are required to raise the standard of P & RT. Such an organization could not be established overnight, but efforts must be made to

achieve our aims for physical fitness and make all soldiers physically battle prepared.

The large number of athletes in all sporting activities in the armed services of USA and USSR who have established world class performances quite recently is an interesting reflection. Undoubtedly our young men could do the same with an Army sufficiently physical efficiency conscious.

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#### COMPETITION FOR AUTHORS

The Board of Review has awarded first place and the prize of £5 for the best original article published in the October issue to "Guerrilla Warfare," by Major C. H. A. East, MBE, Royal Australian Infantry.

Major East served with 2/9 Infantry Battalion from 1939 to 1945 in the United Kingdom, the Middle East, New Guinea and Borneo, finishing the war as a company commander. He then served with the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan with 65 Infantry Battalion, 3 Battalion Royal Australian Regiment, HQ 34 Infantry Brigade and HQ BCOF.

After attending courses and attachments in the United Kingdom he was an instructor at the School of Infantry. Following service with 1 RAR in Japan and Korea in 1952-53, he was appointed Brigade Major of 2 National Service Training Brigade, and then proceeded to the Australian Staff College in 1955.

Major East is now serving with the Directorate of Operations at Army Headquarters.

# JAPAN'S REARMAMENT

Condensed from An Cosantoir, Eire

THE forces of three great powers are in proximity in the Far East, and very much too close for the peace of mind of the rest of the world. They are Communist China, Soviet Russia and the United States. The first two exist in apparent amity one with another, and, although sources of possible discord exist, the chances of Russo-Chinese conflict are still remote, especially while they continue to share a common aversion to the third power, the United States. But very much in the picture also are two lesser States, Formosa and Japan, both proteges of the third power and, therefore, causes of dispute between East and West.

Leaving aside the question of Formosa—even though of the two it represents more immediate possibilities of war in this area—we come to consider the case of Japan, which has the greater potentialities for changing the Eastern scene for better or worse.

Japan, the fifth most populous country in the world with some

ninety million inhabitants, is the only significant potential source of military force not subject to Communist control in that part of the world, and it is to the interest of each side in the present world conflict to try to secure Japan's co-operation for itself. The West is "in possession" as represented by the United States' general supervision of Japanese affairs, but the East is also endeavouring to obtain a footing through the efforts of Soviet representatives and Communist Party activities. The nearer neighbour, China, keeps aloof in this matter.


Japan herself, at the same time, while mitigating or keeping at bay the Western and Eastern influences respectively, is following her own path in re-establishing herself as a great power in the East, Asiatic and yet neutral. The way in which her development in this direction principally shows itself is in the re-establishment and building up of her armed forces and particularly her navy.

She was hampered in the beginning, not only by post-war weakness but also by the restrictions of the American imposed constitution of 1947 and the close supervision of the Americans themselves. She has since been helped in the change in her position from one of subjection to US paternalism to freedom in home and international affairs, by two events in the intervening period. One was the Korean War, which gave the country a new standing in the eyes of the Western powers, and resulted in the Peace Treaty of 1951, which contained no reflection of the constitutional prohibition on rearmament. The other was what has been alluded to as the "thaw" in the Cold War following on Stalin's death, which is producing its effect in the withdrawal of the US Far East Command from Tokyo.

#### Rearmament

Although, in 1950, General MacArthur had already established a "National Police Reserve" of 75,000 men, including 6000 officers and NCOs and 30,000 other ranks of the former imperial army, it was not until June, 1956, that legislation was passed providing the legal basis for armed forces properly so called. These now consist of ground, naval and air formations under the control of a Joint Staff Council.

Already in January, 1954, the Prime Minister, Mr. Yoshida, announced in the Diet a proposed increase of the defence forces, ground and naval elements and the addition of an air arm, and the intention to take over the defence of the country from US forces and contribute to the defensive arrangements of the free nations.



Mr. Yoshida, Prime Minister in 1954

In 1954 the ground forces consisted of 110,000 men, the sea forces of 10,300 men and administrative personnel of 2,800, a total of 123,100 men. The increases provided for in that year were: 20,000 for the ground forces, 5,700 for the sea forces and an air element of 1,300, a total increase of 27,000, bringing the total forces to 150,000. As eventually passed by the Cabinet on March 2, 1954, the Bill to authorize these forces provided for a total of 164,000 men.

The conclusion, on March 9, 1954, of a Mutual Defence Agreement with the United States, was a further step in the direction of Japan's re-emergence as a great power.

Under the terms of the Agreement, Japan was committed to increase her defences in return for the grants of military equipment.

Apart from the increases mentioned, the country will eventually maintain an Army of 260,000 men by 1959; and approximately 5,500 miles of new roads, capable of bearing 20- and 30-ton tanks, will be built. The navy is expected to have 15,000 men. It already had in 1954, 18 frigates supplied by the United States and 55 large landing ships, and expected to get two destroyers and two destroyer-escorts from the United States. The Air Force, the first independent air arm in Japan's history, is expected to number 40,000 men with 1,300 planes, including F-86 *Sabre* jets and B-26 twin-jet light bombers.

The Agreement also set on foot a process of changing from year to year the apportionment of the cost of Japan's defence between that country and the US, whereby the latter's share would gradually diminish.

The Bill to authorize the forces was passed by the Upper House of the Japanese Parliament on June 2, 1954, having already been approved by the Diet. The Upper House made no amendment, but resolved unanimously that units should not be sent overseas.

In October, 1954, the National Defence Agency announced plans to increase the forces still further, by another 20%, to 200,000 in the 1955 fiscal year, even though this would involve a 20% increase over the military budget for the current year, and depend on the receipt of American equipment items which the US had not indicated they were ready to give.

In a visit to the United States in August, 1955, the Japanese Foreign

Minister reviewed the joint arrangement for Japanese defence. He pointed out that the major portion of the burden was borne by the United States, and asked for a more equal distribution. As certain American authorities had been critical of Japan's slow pace in building up its forces, Mr. Shigemitsu asked for a more patient outlook. In the end, on August 31, the United States agreed to consider the gradual withdrawal of ground forces as Japan becomes able to "assume primary responsibility for defence."

By the end of 1955, despite many obstacles, considerable progress had been made towards completing the defences. Plans for 1956 provide for considerable increases in manpower and equipment for the three services.

### Navy

Of the whole rearmament activity in Japan, perhaps the most engaging feature is the reappearance of naval power. As yet no more than a small flotilla in strength, Japanese armed ships provide the nucleus and training ground for the fleet which will have to be launched if Japan is to play her part in maintaining the balance of power in defence of the Western way of life as well as her own shores.

The Western powers are concerned to see Japanese rearmament develop in such a way that, even if the Government there were to come into the hands of the Communists or become autocratic in the way of the former Imperial Cabinet, its power would not amount to a major threat to other nations in the Far East, and that on the contrary it

will make a real contribution to defence against Communist power in that area. The best contribution Japan could make, consonant with these provisions, would be to maintain small ground forces sufficient to deter invasion attempts and an air force sufficient to cover the ground and naval forces, making a naval force, directed principally to anti-submarine warfare, the backbone of Japanese defences.

The dependence of Japan, like Britain, on sea communications for survival, the importance of her fisheries in the national economy for feeding her packed population, demand the presence of a fleet that can safeguard the passage of peaceful shipping, not the development of a heavy striking force for attack.

The chief threat to peaceful shipping, particularly coastwise commerce, in this area is the large Soviet submarine fleet at Vladivostok and other Siberian ports. A second threat is the still small Communist Chinese Navy, reported in May, 1951, to have been supplied with 28 submarines by the Soviet Union. This navy, unlike the Soviet Far East Fleet, has a great number of bases from which to operate in the area.

The development of a limited anti-submarine navy would have this advantage from the point of view of the recent victims of Japanese aggression, that it would not involve the reappearance of Japanese military power along pre-war lines.

The Japanese naval service as at present constituted and as envisaged for the future is adaptable to anti-submarine warfare and commerce

and fishery protection, and is hardly suitable for anything else, seeing that no ship larger than a destroyer is to form part of it. To these could be added reconnaissance and torpedo aircraft and carriers from which they would fly.

Furthermore, Japan is excellently placed strategically to conduct warfare against submarines out of Soviet and northern Chinese bases, and the position would be much improved by the use of American island bases in the Aleutians to the north and Ryukyu and Formosa to the south.

At present (1956) fishery protection duties are carried out by the Maritime Safety Board, an organisation separate from the Coastal Defence Force or naval service proper. Since 1954 the Board vessels consist of 95 gunboats of more than 500 tons and 218 unarmed smaller ships.

As regards the naval service, early in 1953, after the arrival of six 1,500-ton frigates on loan from the US, the naval base of Yokosuka was formally reopened. In 1954, the United States transferred, on loan, two 2,500-ton destroyers, three destroyers of 1,600 tons, and two destroyer-escorts of 1,400 tons, as well as two 1,600-ton submarines, four 320-ton minesweepers and other vessels to form the nucleus of the new navy. The plans for building the new navy, however, did not go far enough for the Naval Chief of Staff, Admiral Nagasawa. In July of the same year, when the plan provided for a 155,000-ton fleet in five years, he demanded a force of 300,000 tons to include all the above types of ships and aircraft-carriers in addition. He was also dissatis-

fied with the execution of the construction programme, saying that it was behind schedule and must be speeded up.

The naval experts, in estimating the needs of Japan's naval defence, came in general to the conclusion that 60 destroyer-escorts of from 1,600 to 2,000 tons, 100 frigates of 1,000 tons and 200 minesweepers would be required, a total tonnage of 380,000. The tasks they envisaged were convoying and anti-submarine defence, reconnaissance and minesweeping.

The early months of 1955, nevertheless, brought the dramatic news that the Japanese fleet was at sea. Her first considerable manoeuvres since the war were carried out with 41 warships and some 6,000 men, a reminder that before long the erstwhile empire will be a factor in the Far Eastern naval scene, though it is in no sense a reappearance of the naval might which once held the East in thrall. At about the same time the new naval force received the first portion of its air arm, with the delivery of 22 machines from the US Far East Naval Forces, under the terms of the Mutual Defence Assistance Programme. The delivery to Tateyama base, 50 miles south of Tokyo, comprised 12 anti-submarine patrol aircraft and 10 trainers.

April 22, 1956, was the first occasion of what might be termed a fleet review, when four destroyers, flying the Rising Sun flag, steamed past Admiral Nagasawa's flagship in Tokyo Bay. By then the naval strength consisted of some 30 ships of about 75,000 tons. The personnel amounted to over 19,000, which is to be raised to 22,000 before the end

of the year. Some 70% of the officers and 90% of the petty officers belonged to the Imperial Navy.

One plan for naval development said to be under consideration provides for 10 aircraft-carriers of 10,000 tons, five 8,000-ton cruisers, 100 anti-submarine destroyers, and 50 anti-submarine frigates, 165 ships of 340,000 tons. An alternative reported plan calls for five cruisers of 8,000 tons, 45 destroyers and 45 frigates, that is 95 ships and 148,000 tons. Be that as it may, the Japanese navy is already the only sizeable sea force of any Eastern country.

#### Air Force

Although an effective naval force of the type mentioned is of prime importance, Japan's most urgent need, according to the Government view, is to build up its air force.

The Japanese Air Force is to be made the strongest in the Far East, on completion of a five-year programme, agreed to in 1954. This programme includes the formation of a Tactical Air Force of 1,300 machines, the supply of 500 F-86 Sabres, 100 twin-jet light bombers and other aircraft. More than half the air bases used by the United States Air Force will be turned over to the Japanese. On the completion of the plan, the Air Force is expected to number 40,000 men.

In February, 1954, it was disclosed that 143 fighter planes would be delivered, on loan, by the United States in the fiscal year 1954-55, under the Mutual Defence Assistance Programme, and the manufacture of aircraft was first provided for in an agreement signed by the Kawasaki Co. and the Lockheed Corporation of California.



Under this agreement the Japanese company have the right to manufacture the F.94C. *Starfire* all-weather fighter and the T-33A trainer, and access to the latest technical and production developments. This not only ended the ban on native manufacturers of aircraft, but permits Japan to start production on a technical level with other manufacturers throughout the world. This agreement also provided for the local manufacture and overhaul of the engines, which are the product of the Allison Division of General Motors. In March the Japan Jet Company announced that the first jet engine to be made in the country would be completed in April or May of that year.

The training of Japanese pilots began in July with the entry of the first group of 35 flight training officers on a three-month refresher course in conventional aircraft, at the United States Far East Air Force base at Matsushima. This course was followed by advanced training at Tsuiki and later in the United States, to become jet pilots. Each of these officers was formerly a pilot in the Imperial Army or Navy. In all, between 200 and 300 Japanese pilots were to be trained in the first year.

On January 20, 1955, the first installment of the aircraft lent, a consignment of 59, was delivered at the Tachikawa base. It was made up of eight T-33 jet trainers, 35 T-6 piston trainers and 16 C-46 transports.

This delivery enabled the training of pilots in jet aircraft to be begun. All instruction is in the English language.

On March 1, 1956, a ceremony was held at Tsuiki Air Base, Kyushu, to mark the establishment of the first unit formed, an air training squadron. At the parade, eight F-86 fighters, four piloted by Japanese, and 12 T-33 trainers flew past. The new flight training wing is under the command of General Genda, a former naval air ace.

The Defence Board's plan, now extended to six years, envisages an increase to 582 aircraft by 1957, and by 1961 an increase to 1,280, including 770 combat aircraft, organised in 21 squadrons. These squadrons are to consist of fighters and fighter-bombers. The necessary bomber force is expected to be supplied by the United States. The expansion is intended to coincide with the development of the Japanese aircraft industry, and it is interesting to note that the first jet aircraft of home manufacture was completed early this year.

#### Ground Force

Japan is to have eventually a motorised army of 130,000 men. A start has been made by the small force already in being, in taking over responsibility for the ground defences since the American occupation troops withdrew from Hokkaido, the most northerly island of Japan, in the autumn of 1954. The present army is organised and trained on American lines and has adopted American ideas of discipline and officer-man relationships. In the opinion of some of its own commanders, it is better trained and equipped, and in every way more efficient, than the pre-war army, and has the advantage of being a volunteer force. There is a shortage, however, of material, which,

except for uniforms and vehicles, is American surplus, including tanks, which are worn-out M-4's and 24's, and rifles which are often defective. A start has been made in the armaments industry, and in February, 1956, the production of Japanese-made tanks was announced. The production of guided missiles is also to be undertaken and the provision of electronic equipment.

In June, 1956, the Defence Board announced plans to raise a 50,000 strong force of Home Guards by March, 1961, additional to the regular ground forces.

#### Foreign Troops in Japan

The agreement, signed in February, 1954, between the Japanese Government and the five Governments which, like the United States, can keep forces on Japanese soil, provides that other United Nations forces "will be treated as US forces are treated under their special arrangements, in line with the practice among countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, regulating the position of forces stationed in each other's territories. The status of these troops in Japan has been changed from one of occupation of former enemy territory to one of stationing permitted under a political alliance.

The Mutual Defence Agreement of March 8, 1954, envisaged the eventual withdrawal of foreign troops, and, in the words of Mr. Allison, the US Ambassador, "brings nearer the time when the Japanese people will not need to rely on American forces for protection and when the United States will be able to withdraw its forces

from Japan." He pointed out that there was no requirement in the agreement that Japan should send troops outside her own territory.

The treaty also provided for the setting up of a military assistance advisory group in Japan to assist in the early development of native forces.

Another agreement provided for military and industrial aid, to the amount of \$50m. Eighty per cent. of this will be for "off-shore" procurement orders in the Japanese defence industry and make arms available, not only for Japan, but for the Philippines, Formosa and South Korea. The remaining 20 per cent. will directly finance the Japanese defence industry.

A communique issued in Washington on August 31, 1955, on the occasion of the visit of the Japanese Foreign Minister, said that the 1954 Agreement would eventually be replaced by another on broader lines, and that the Foreign Ministers of the two countries had agreed to consult in future on the progressive withdrawal of U.S. troops as Japan's defensive capacity increased, taking into account "the related situation in Asia."

On July 3, 1956, it was announced that the U.S. foreign aid programme for the coming fiscal year is to provide for a high-priority delivery of jet aircraft, warships, tanks, "advance weapons," and other military aid. The amount of the aid was not specified, nor were the "advance weapons" defined, but these are taken to mean guided missiles of the latest types.

The Chairman of the House Appropriations Sub-Committee, Mr. Passman, did say, however, that the

amount of aid is about half the total military aid spent on Japan for the years 1950-56, inclusive.

According to Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State, "further advance and development should enable Japan to assume a greater share of her own defence responsibilities, and will permit redeployment of certain American forces at present stationed in Japan."

This was followed on July 18 by the United States Government announcement that its military command in Japan will be withdrawn within a year, but this move will involve no major changes in the deployment of American forces in the Far East.

Although a small American headquarters is to remain in Tokyo in accordance with the Mutual Security Agreement, Far Eastern Command, which has been in Tokyo since the time of General MacArthur's entry there, will, as from July 1, 1957, be based on Hawaii, and come under the Admiral Commander-in-Chief in the Pacific.

At the same time, United Nations Command, also based on Tokyo, will be based on Korea, in view of the unresolved military situation prevailing there since the Armistice of 1953.

#### Foreign Relations

Having come to an arrangement with the United States and other Allied powers, Japan, taking advantage of the "thaw" in the Cold War, following the death of Stalin, next turned her attention to settling matters with the Communist states.

On September 12, 1954, Mr. Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, declared that Soviet foreign policy was based on recognition of

the principle of peaceful co-existence of States with different social systems, and that the Soviet Union was ready to normalise relations with Japan, provided Japan displayed similar readiness. Apropos of which a Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman said that his Government "has always been prepared to establish normal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union on the basis of the San Francisco peace treaty," or on a similar basis.

This exchange was followed in October by a joint statement by the Soviet Union and Communist China, calling for an end to the United States occupation of Japan and a start of normal relations between Japan and the other two powers. Chinese Foreign Minister, Chou-en-lai," addressing a group of Japanese legislatives on a visit to Peking, proposed a non-aggression pact between his country and theirs "when Japan becomes independent." Acting Prime Minister Ogata replied to the joint statement, "We have no intention of changing our policy of co-operation with the United States," but did not dismiss the possibility of trade discussions.

On January 25, 1955, Mr. Dominitsky, head of the former Soviet Mission in Tokyo, handed a communication to the Japanese Premier, Mr. Hatoyama, in which it was stated that "the Soviet side considers it would not be out of place to take all steps towards the normalization of Soviet-Japanese relations," and in which readiness to appoint representatives for talks in Moscow or Tokyo was expressed. The Japanese Foreign Ministry were reluctant to open talks, on the basis of a communication they could not regard as offi-

cial, and preferred discussions, if any, to take place between the Ambassadors of the two countries accredited to London and Washington. Towards the end of May the Japanese Cabinet agreed to the basic policy for negotiating a peace treaty with the Soviet Union to end the technical state of war, as Russia had **not signed** the San Francisco Peace Treaty between Japan and the other Allied powers, ending the Pacific phase of World War II.

A meeting was accordingly arranged for June 1, in London, to be attended by the Japanese delegation, under Mr. Matsumoto, formerly Ambassador in London, and the Soviet delegation, headed by Mr. Malik, the Soviet Ambassador to the United Kingdom. After discussions had gone on for a considerable time, it became evident, on June 18, that the Soviet proposals were substantially the same as those put forward in 1951, in an attempt to revise the San Francisco Treaty, then in draft form, and bore little indication of the conciliatory approach which characterized the preliminaries to establishing relations with Austria, West Germany and Yugoslavia. By the end of July, the talks being still in progress, Mr. Hatoyama, the Prime Minister, could only say that the possibility of a pact of non-aggression had been discussed, that the talks had been based on the principle of recognition of each other's sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and that he himself would remain in office until the negotiations were successful.

On August 16 Mr. Matsumoto presented a draft treaty, the terms of which were not, however, published. This was taken for study

by Mr. Malik, but in view of its failure to satisfy the Russians, Mr. Matsumoto was recalled to Tokyo in mid-September for further consultation. As a result, a policy of negotiation was mapped out which was expected to result in the conclusion of a peace treaty before the end of the year. These expectations were not fulfilled, and in January, 1956, the talks, which were suspended since September, were resumed, with an article-by-article discussion of the Japanese draft. Finally, on March 21, the treaty talks were suspended for an unspecified period, after failure to reach agreement on the territorial issue, the return of certain islands of the southern Kuriles, the sole remaining point of difference. The Soviet Union would not return any islands except Habomai and Shikotan, close to Hokkaido, the northern part of Japan proper.

On May 29 the Japanese Government decided to grant limited recognition to the Soviet Mission in Tokyo, which for the past five years has been officially regarded as non-existent. The mission would be regarded solely as an official Soviet agency in charge of fisheries affairs, and limited diplomatic privileges were extended to it in June. The official recognition of Mr. Tichvinsky, its new head, must await restoration of full diplomatic relations, according to the Japanese view. The Soviets, on the other hand, are pressing for full diplomatic status for their representative, independently of any peace treaty.

The Japanese Cabinet, on June 5, agreed to ask for resumption of the London talks some time before the end of July.

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## BOOK REVIEWS

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### THE SOVIET SECRET SERVICE.

By Otto Heilbrunn. (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., Ruskin House, Museum St., London.)

THOSE who appreciate the article by Major East on Guerilla Warfare (AAJ October 1956), should they wish to pursue its clear implications on what may be the task of the AMF, would do well to study Dr. Heilbrunn's book.

Whilst it is entitled "Soviet Secret Service," its scope goes far beyond the now outmoded concept understood by the term secret service. This term no longer applies solely to the single agent or small spy ring patiently collecting and despatching information of a highly secret nature to a foreign employer, exemplified by the Bernard Newman type of story. The book is, in fact, a painstaking collation of many primary sources (over a hundred are quoted in the bibliographic reference list), and as such has the character of a text-book, and consequently has not the readability of the numerous personal accounts of espionage and partisan activities

which have been published in the post-war years.

But to the serious student its value is great because it clearly shows the pattern and extent of Soviet secret strategy during the Second World War. This is highlighted by a description of the opposing German activities, the failure of which serves to emphasize the success of the Russian efforts. Dr. Heilbrunn traces and compares the various methods of the USSR in gaining information of the enemy and support of her own forces and shows the high degree of flexibility of approach to and adaptation of existing resources in enemy countries.

He outlines the work of the "Red Orchestra," which was a classic spy ring operating from Switzerland from 1941-1947, and which had a network of agents, believed to be up to 400 in number, throughout most countries of Western Europe, including Germany. He then examines the shrewd use of the existing French Communist Party, which he calls a "blueprint for subversion" because it is the leading precedent for Communist subversion in action.

The French Communist Party, acting according to foreign direction, helped in a positive way to bring about the Fall of France. The less successful operations of the Free German Committee from 1943-1945 are described. Had the assassination of Hitler been successful in 1944, the Communists would have had a strong claim to inclusion in a future German Government. Dr. Heilbrunn then goes on to examine the inspired operations of various partisan forces in Eastern Europe, of which the most successful were those of Tito in Yugoslavia.

The author produces a picture of skilful centralised control of secret operations and the adaptation of local partisan resources, to which were added, where necessary, the backbone and steering gear of previously trained leadership. The resulting extensive and well co-ordinated machine not only had tremendous intelligence value, both strategically and tactically, but also had a positive effect in the direct support of front-line operations, sabotage behind the lines, long-range reconnaissance, and propaganda or political warfare.

Dr. Heilbrunn aptly defines these operations as "the war without a battlefield," which, in fact, may be the deciding battle before the hot war ever commences. This is the war fought by civilians, using the weapons of subversion, espionage by infiltration, sabotage and partisan warfare, in which activities imperceptibly merge, and whose theatre lies in the home front and the lines of communication.

—J.D.B.

**CONSPIRACY AMONG GENERALS.** By Wilhelm von Schramm. (George Allen and Unwin, Ruskin House, Museum Street, London.)

THIS is an interesting and very readable account of the extraordinary events which took place in the German High Command while the German forces were being overwhelmed in Normandy in 1944. Whilst the narrative will have more appeal for the military historian than for the general run of military readers, it is worth reading for the very clear and coherent description of the different personalities who were involved in the attempt on Hitler's life, and their efforts to shorten the war and preserve a Germany far different from that which ultimately emerged from the conflict.

The attempt on Hitler's life was the culmination of a long conspiracy among the senior regular officers, many of whom had doubted the ability of Germany to win the war from its beginning. Despite all advice by his military staff, Hitler refused to accept the military situation as it was in 1944, and insisted on directing all operations himself from the remoteness of his Headquarters in East Prussia, to the despair of the commanders in the field.

As is fairly well known, the plot failed mainly because of the lack of unity of the General Officers on the various fronts, and the absence at the critical moment of Rommel, who had been seriously wounded some short time previously. What is not so well known is the success

of the Army revolt in Paris, where the SS men and Hitler's Ambassador were all arrested and their power temporarily nullified before it was known that Hitler had survived. This news faced the conspirators in France with a difficult choice—to go on, or accept Hitler's vengeful reactions. Von Kluge, Commander-in-Chief in France, although initially wavering and inclined to support the revolt, remained loyal to Hitler, and consequently was responsible for the failure of the plot in France. His loyalty was to drive him to a course of conduct over the next few weeks which culminated in his suicide as a result of Hitler's suspicion and obvious attempts to blame him for the debacle in Normandy.

It is interesting to speculate whether, had Von Kluge shown more resolution, or had Rommel not been wounded, the conspirators would have gone on with their plans. And if they had succeeded,

would there have been a surrender in the West that would have shortened the war, changed the fate of many of the peoples of Europe, and perhaps altered the whole course of subsequent events?

The author, who was attached to the staffs of Von Runstedt and Rommel in 1944, writes intimately with warmth and feeling of the various personalities involved in the plot, and paints a fascinating picture of the doubts and fears which beset the conspirators, particularly the unfortunate Von Kluge. He gives us a vivid impression, too, of the mental conflicts which beset so many of the senior German generals who, in the early years of Nazism, had so blithely gone for a ride on the tiger.

The book is illustrated with good photographs of the chief participants in the conspiracy, and these are excellent character studies in themselves.

—W.C.N.

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**AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL**

**INDEX**  
**1956**

No. 80 JANUARY, 1956

No. 91 DECEMBER, 1956



## PART I

## TITLE INDEX

Title	Page	Issue
AMF Gold Medal Essay—Subject for 1956 . . . . .	18	83 Apr
Are You Intelligence Conscious? . . . . .	35	83 Apr
Army and Civil Defence . . . . .	46	83 Apr
Army Officer—Mercenary or Missionary? . . . . .	20	88 Sep
Atomic Training—Now . . . . .	12	80 Jan
Atomic Weapons and Armour . . . . .	5	84 May
Atomic Weapons—10 to 500 K T Airburst . . . . .	12	81 Feb
Australia at Arms—Book Review . . . . .	9	81 Feb
Base for Airborne Penetration . . . . .	13	86 Jul
Best Damn Outfit in These Parts . . . . .	28	85 Jun
British Commonwealth Integration—An Australian Viewpoint . . . . .	5	88 Sep
Canungra—Jungle Warfare Training Centre . . . . .	5	80 Jan
Case for Social Studies . . . . .	33	80 Jan
CMF OCTU—Another View . . . . .	14	90 Nov
Communist Guerrilla Warfare—Book Review . . . . .	42	86 Jul
Comparison of Two Failures . . . . .	32	85 Jun
Conspiracy Among Generals—Book Review . . . . .	37	91 Dec
Current Affairs and Examinations . . . . .	26	87 Aug
Defeat Into Victory—Book Review . . . . .	34	84 May
Defence of Asia . . . . .	9	82 Mar
Economy of Principles . . . . .	37	84 May
Field Ambulance in an Amphibious Operation . . . . .	38	82 Mar
For Valour . . . . .	16	85 June
Gadgets and the Man on the Ground . . . . .	37	88 Sep
Gasoline or Diesel . . . . .	14	80 Jan
Ground Forces—Key to Survival . . . . .	27	90 Nov
Guerrilla Warfare . . . . .	5	89 Oct
Hold the Power and Bear the Responsibility . . . . .	37	90 Nov
Honours and Awards . . . . .	15	86 Jul
Infantry Aspects of Artillery Fire Planning . . . . .	19	84 May
Infiltration by Sea—Perhaps . . . . .	23	89 Oct
Information Required . . . . .	32	84 May
Japan's Rearmament . . . . .	28	91 Dec
Jungle Belongs to Us . . . . .	5	85 Jun

Title	Page	Issue
Know Your Enemy . . . . .	30	80 Jan
Leadership, Sport and Gliding . . . . .	32	82 Mar
Maintenance of the Aim—Training for War . . . . .	17	88 Sep
Maintenance—Yesterday and Tomorrow . . . . .	5	87 Aug
Married Soldier—Bedouin or Troglodyte . . . . .	9	84 May
Military Implications of SEATO . . . . .	5	83 Apr
Military Mind . . . . .	32	89 Oct
Motor Cycling and Military Training . . . . .	33	89 Oct
New Warfare—Book Review . . . . .	9	81 Feb
Old Strategic Lamps for New . . . . .	5	90 Nov
Organization of P and RT in the Army . . . . .	23	91 Dec
Palestine Campaign, 1914-18—		
Part 1 . . . . .	18	80 Jan
Part 2 . . . . .	5	81 Feb
Part 3 . . . . .	24	82 Mar
Part 4 . . . . .	38	83 Apr
Pakistan—Afghan Friction . . . . .	36	86 Jul
Party System in Politics . . . . .	31	90 Nov
Pay and the British Soldier . . . . .	20	83 Apr
Pay and the Soldier . . . . .	16	82 Mar
Peripheral Wars . . . . .	14	84 May
Physical and Recreational Training . . . . .	23	87 Aug
Physical Training for Tropical Warfare . . . . .	28	89 Oct
Planning Atomic Support . . . . .	17	90 Nov
Quick Fire Plans . . . . .	5	91 Dec
Ready for Work and War . . . . .	45	87 Aug
Red Shadow Over Malaya—Book Review . . . . .	34	84 May
Reflections on the Training of a Signals Unit . . . . .	20	85 Jun
Right Word . . . . .	25	84 May
Road Toll . . . . .	46	85 Jun
Role of Command in a Technical Service . . . . .	43	80 Jan
Role of Field Security . . . . .	37	87 Aug
Rumour Hath Charm . . . . .	23	90 Nov
Small Airborne Unit in a Long Range Penetration Role . . . . .	21	80 Jan
Small Things Have Big Applications . . . . .	26	89 Oct
Some Problems of Integration . . . . .	13	83 Apr
Some Thoughts on the Future of Anti-Aircraft Artillery . . . . .	20	86 Jul
So You Can't Get On With the People Under You . . . . .	38	80 Jan

Title	Page	Issue
Study Guide for Atomic Warfare . . . . .	5	82 Mar
Submarine Sappers . . . . .	27	86 Jul
Supervision of Training . . . . .	21	82 Mar
That Appreciation—Try Teaching It This Way . . . . .	43	85 Jun
Trade Secrets of Leadership . . . . .	30	87 Aug
Threat to Strategic Air Command Bases . . . . .	44	86 Jul
Tibet . . . . .	10	91 Dec
To Shoot or Not to Shoot . . . . .	39	89 Oct
Training the National Serviceman as a Driver . . . . .	29	88 Sep
Trends in Air Supply . . . . .	40	83 Apr
Use of Statistics . . . . .	32	86 Jul
When to Wake a Senior Officer . . . . .	14	85 Jun
Why Not a CMF OCTU? . . . . .	41	87 Aug
Writing a Report . . . . .	42	82 Mar

## PART II

## SUBJECT INDEX

## Subject

## Administration

Maintenance—Yesterday and Tomorrow . . . . .	5	87 Aug
Married Soldier—Bedouin or Troglodyte . . . . .	9	84 May
Pay and the British Soldier . . . . .	20	83 Apr
Pay and the Soldier . . . . .	16	82 Mar
Road Toll . . . . .	46	85 Jun
Role of Command in a Technical Service . . . . .	43	80 Jan
Uses of Statistics . . . . .	32	86 Jul

Subject	Page	Issue
<b>Air</b>		
Army and Civil Defence	46	83 Apr
Base for Airborne Penetration	18	86 Jul
Infiltration by Sea—Perhaps	23	89 Oct
Leadership, Sport and Gliding	32	82 Mar
Small Airborne Unit in a Long Range Penetration Role	21	80 Jan
Some Thoughts on the Future of Anti-Aircraft Artillery	20	86 Jul
Threat to Strategic Air Command Bases	44	86 Jul
Trends in Air Supply	40	83 Apr
<b>Armies, Foreign</b>		
Japan's Rearmament	28	91 Dec
Ready for Work and War (USSR)	45	87 Aug
<b>Artillery</b>		
Infantry Aspects of Artillery Fire Planning	19	84 May
Quick Fire Plans	5	91 Dec
Some Thoughts on the Future of Anti-Aircraft Artillery	20	86 Jul
To Shoot or Not to Shoot	39	89 Oct
<b>Atomic Warfare</b>		
Atomic Training—Now	12	80 Jan
Atomic Weapons and Armour	5	84 May
Atomic Weapons—10 to 500 K T Airburst	12	81 Feb
Gadgets and the Man on the Ground	37	88 Sep
Planning Atomic Support	17	90 Nov
Purple Testament	5	86 Jul
Study Guide for Atomic Warfare	5	82 Mar
<b>Australian Army</b>		
AMF Gold Medal Essay—Subject 1956	18	83 Apr
Army Officer—Mercenary or Missionary?	20	88 Sep
Australia at Arms—Book Review	9	81 Feb

Subject	Page	Issue
British Commonwealth Integration—An Australian Viewpoint . . . . .	5	88 Sep
Canungra—Jungle Warfare Training Centre . . . . .	5	80 Jan
Married Soldier—Bedouin or Troglodyte . . . . .	9	84 May
<b>Book Reviews</b>		
Australia at Arms . . . . .	9	81 Feb
Communist Guerrilla Warfare . . . . .	42	86 Jul
Conspiracy Among Generals . . . . .	37	91 Dec
Defeat Into Victory . . . . .	34	84 May
New Warfare . . . . .	9	81 Feb
Red Shadow Over Malaya . . . . .	34	84 May
Soviet Secret Service—Book Review . . . . .	37	91 Dec
<b>British Commonwealth</b>		
British Commonwealth Integration—An Australian Viewpoint . . . . .	5	88 Sep
Some Problems of Integration . . . . .	13	83 Apr
<b>Burma</b>		
Defeat Into Victory—Book Review . . . . .	34	84 May
<b>Campaigns</b>		
Burma 1942-45, Defeat Into Victory, Book Review . . . . .	34	84 May
Palestine Campaign 1914-18—		
Part 1 . . . . .	18	80 Jan
Part 2 . . . . .	5	8 Feb
Part 3 . . . . .	24	82 Mar
Part 4 . . . . .	30	83 Apr
<b>Civil Defence</b>		
Army and Civil Defence . . . . .	46	83 Apr
Purple Testament . . . . .	5	86 Jul
<b>Command</b>		
Hold the Power and Bear the Responsibility . . . . .	37	90 Nov
Role of Command in a Technical Service . . . . .	43	80 Jan

Subject	Page	Issue
<b>Communism</b>		
Defence of Asia . . . . .	9	82 Mar
Communist Guerrilla Warfare — Book Review . . . . .	42	86 Jul
Peripheral Wars . . . . .	14	84 May
Soviet Secret Service — Book Review . . . . .	37	91 Dec
<b>Education</b>		
Military Mind . . . . .	32	89 Oct
Right Word . . . . .	25	84 May
Uses of Statistics . . . . .	32	86 Jul
Writing a Report . . . . .	42	82 Mar
<b>Engineers</b>		
Submarine Sappers . . . . .	27	86 Jul
<b>Guerrilla Warfare</b>		
Communist Guerrilla Warfare — Book Review . . . . .	42	86 Jul
Guerrilla Warfare . . . . .	5	89 Oct
<b>Honours and Awards</b>		
Honours and Awards . . . . .	15	86 Jul
For Valour . . . . .	16	85 Jun
<b>Infantry</b>		
Infantry Aspects of Artillery Fire Planning . . . . .	19	84 May
<b>Intelligence</b>		
Are You Intelligence Conscious? . . . . .	35	83 Apr
Information Required . . . . .	32	84 May
Know Your Enemy . . . . .	33	80 Jan
Role of Field Security . . . . .	37	87 Aug
Rumour Hath Charm . . . . .	23	90 Nov
<b>International Relations</b>		
Military Implications of SEATO . . . . .	5	83 Apr
Peripheral Wars . . . . .	14	84 May

Subject	Page	Issue
<b>Japan</b>		
Japan's Rearmament . . . . .	23	91 Dec
<b>Jungle Warfare</b>		
Canungra—Jungle Warfare Training Centre . . . . .	5	80 Jan
Jungle Belongs to Us . . . . .	5	85 Jun
<b>Leadership</b>		
Hold the Power and Bear the Responsibility . . . . .	37	90 Nov
Leadership, Sport and Gliding . . . . .	32	82 Mar
So You Can't Get On With the People Under You . . . . .	38	80 Jan
Trade Secrets of Leadership . . . . .	30	87 Aug
<b>Malaya</b>		
Red Shadow Over Malaya—Book Review . . . . .	34	84 May
<b>Medical</b>		
Field Ambulance in an Amphibious Operation . . . . .	38	82 Mar
<b>Military History</b>		
Comparison of Two Failures . . . . .	32	85 Jun
Defeat Into Victory (Burma 1942-45), Book Review . . . . .	34	84 May
Palestine Campaign 1914-18—		
Part 1 . . . . .	18	80 Jan
Part 2 . . . . .	5	81 Feb
Part 3 . . . . .	24	82 Mar
Part 4 . . . . .	30	83 Apr
Small Things Have Big Applications . . . . .	26	89 Oct
<b>Morale</b>		
Army Officer—Mercenary or Missionary? . . . . .	20	88 Sep
Best Damn Outfit in These Parts . . . . .	28	85 Jun
Case for Social Studies . . . . .	33	80 Jan

Subject	Page	Issue
---------	------	-------

**Organization**

British Commonwealth Integration — An Australian Viewpoint . . . . .	5	88	Sep
Some Problems of Integration . . . . .	13	83	Apr

**Pakistan**

Pakistan — Afghan Friction . . . . .	36	86	Jul
--------------------------------------	----	----	-----

**Political Institutions**

Party System in Politics . . . . .	31	90	Nov
------------------------------------	----	----	-----

**Russia**

Ready for Work and War . . . . .	45	87	Aug
----------------------------------	----	----	-----

**Security**

Role of Field Security . . . . .	37	87	Aug
Rumour Hath Charm . . . . .	23	90	Nov

**Signals**

Reflections on the Training of a Signal Unit . . . . .	20	85	Jun
--	----	----	-----

**South-East Asia**

Defence of Asia . . . . .	9	82	Mar
Military Implications of SEATO . . . . .	5	83	Apr
Pakistan — Afghan Friction . . . . .	36	86	Jul
Red Shadow Over Malaya — Book Review . . . . .	34	84	May

**Strategy**

Comparison of Two Failures . . . . .	32	85	Jun
Defence of Asia . . . . .	9	82	Mar
Economy of Principles . . . . .	37	84	May
Ground Forces — Key to Survival . . . . .	27	90	Nov
Guerrilla Warfare . . . . .	5	89	Oct
Military Implications of SEATO . . . . .	5	83	Apr
New Warfare — Book Review . . . . .	9	81	Feb
Old Strategic Lamps for New . . . . .	5	90	Nov



Subject	Page	Issue
Peripheral Wars . . . . .	14	84 May
Threat to Strategic Air Command Bases . . . . .	44	86 Jul
<b>Tactics</b>		
Atomic Weapons 10 to 500 K T Airburst . . . . .	12	81 Feb
Atomic Weapons and Armour . . . . .	5	84 May
Base for Airborne Operations . . . . .	13	86 Jul
Canungra — Jungle Warfare Training Centre . . . . .	5	80 Jan
Guerrilla Warfare . . . . .	5	89 Oct
Infantry Aspects of Artillery Fire Planning . . . . .	19	84 May
Infiltration by Sea — Perhaps . . . . .	23	89 Oct
Jungle Belongs to Us . . . . .	5	85 Jun
Quick Fire Plans . . . . .	5	91 Dec
Small Airborne Unit in a Long Range Penetration Role . . . . .	21	80 Jan
Study Guide to Atomic Warfare . . . . .	5	82 Feb
To Shoot or Not to Shoot . . . . .	39	89 Oct
<b>Tibet</b>		
Tibet — Past and Present . . . . .	10	91 Dec
<b>Training</b>		
Atomic Training — Now . . . . .	12	80 Jan
Best Damn Outfit in These Parts . . . . .	28	85 Jun
Canungra — Jungle Warfare Training Centre . . . . .	5	80 Jan
Case for Social Studies . . . . .	33	80 Jan
CMF OCTU — Another View . . . . .	14	90 Nov
Current Affairs and Examinations . . . . .	26	87 Aug
Jungle Belongs to Us . . . . .	5	85 Jun
Maintenance of the Aim — Training for War . . . . .	17	88 Sep
Motor Cycle and Military Training . . . . .	33	89 Oct
Organization of P & RT in the Army . . . . .	23	91 Dec
Physical and Recreational Training . . . . .	23	87 Aug
Physical Training for Tropical Warfare . . . . .	28	89 Oct
Reflections on the Training of a Signal Unit . . . . .	20	85 Jun
Supervision of Training . . . . .	21	82 Mar

Subject	Page	Issue
That Appreciation — Try Teaching It This Way . . . .	43	85 Jun
Training the National Serviceman as a Driver . . . .	29	88 Sep
<b>Transportation</b>		
Gasoline or Diesel . . . . .	14	80 Jan
Maintenance — Yesterday and Tomorrow . . . . .	5	87 Aug
Trends in Air Supply . . . . .	40	83 Apr
<b>Weapons</b>		
Gadgets and the Man on the Ground . . . . .	37	88 Sep

---