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

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Old Strategic Lamps for New?

Lieutenant-Colonel A. Green,

Royal Australian Army Service Corps

IT is a remarkable paradox of our times, and a rare tribute to our Intelligence Service that we appear to know more about our enemy's strategy than our own. There is never a Study Period nor a Corps Conference held, but the assembly is given an exhaustive and erudite explanation of our potential enemy's theories of war, with great, and justifiable, emphasis upon Revo'utionary Warfare. The comparatively thin coverage given to our own counter-plans has led one wit to remark that "I have heard so much about Revolutionary Warfare, and so little about our own strategy, that I am beginning to suspect that ours is simply one of pure Reactionary Warfare." Heaven forbid it!

So long as the expanding Communist empire retains the strategic initiative it may be inevitable that our reactions are closely determined by the actions of those powers possessing the initiative. Since the Communists themselves, just as do we, insist upon the Clauswitzian dogma that war is the continuation of politics by other means, any military strategy must directly reflect its parent political doctrine and aims. It is for these reasons that a genera' examination of Australian strategy, based upon causal political factors, is required if we are to assess the value of our defence machinery and preparations.

Revolutionary Warfare

There can surely be no serving member of the AMF who needs further explanation of the nature of the Communist dialectic, its political effects in world events, and the devastating consistency of purpose which lies behind any superficial changes in its approach. It will suffice to recall that probably the first impact of who'esale revolutionary warfare upon the civilised world since the Spartacist rebellions (Rome, 73 BC) was that of the French revolutionary armies, which harnessed the mass enthusiasm of the newly enfranchised populace in a popular and fanatical army which, by its elan and

weight and, later, Napoleon's leadership, held Europe in awe for two decades. The initial impetus of this military reform was political in origin, since it departed from the accepted basis of stereotyped dynastic and feudal armies, and involved the entire nation in the *levee en masse,* and was fundamentally inspired by devotion to an ideology.

The recurrence of revolutionary warfare after the Russian October Revolution in 1917 was greatly intensified in form, since it was based upon a more aggressive and comprehensive politico-economic creed, which assumed the inevitability of internal war in class warfare, and external, international war in the coming triumph of Marxism. The coincidence of this movement, with the technical realisation of total war, and now with nuclear war, has greatly changed the methods of waging war. These now familiar techniques are primarily political warfare, leading to political subversion, Fifth Column and guerrilla warfare, and popular patriotic wars, waged in concert with aggressive open warfare. The most dangerous characteristic of these different processes is that they spring from a consistent central doctrine, and, when one type of warfare is apparently checked, the campaign continues in one of the alternative forms.

Now this major movement is a global pressure, expanding from the Iron to the Bamboo curtain. In the strategic areas of interest to the AMF the onward march of our enemies has been sustained since the 1948 Calcutta Conference; by subversion in Burma, guerrilla war in Malaya, so-called patriotic war in Indo-China, hot war in Korea, and active political warfare in the Island Chain. In particular, the Communists have been remarkably successful in canalising the latent nationalism of Colonial Asia to their own advantage, and in creating successful armies and staffs from very unpromising material, by successive processes of political indoctrination and guerrilla warfare leading to open formed warfare. It is incorrect to assume that such wars, culminating in forcible and violent ideological conversion and, in extreme cases, in wars of annihilation which admit of no compromise or equilibrium, are unique in world history. They are foreign to the world since the Age of Reason, but they have had their ancient counterparts, notably in the Mongol expansion, in the purely military sense, and in the great Islamic wave of conquests, in the ideological sphere. Ultimately both those growths were contained and stabilised, but only after they had established sway over areas comparable to the present Communist *bloc.* It is now our problem to contain this massive hydra-headed menace in defence of our own ideals, way of life and territory.

Basis of Australian Strategy

A national strategy essentially grows from political, geographical and economic factors, which are then expressed in military terms. Underlying any Australian strategy, therefore, is our democratic philosophy of "freedom slowly broadening down from precedent to precedent," implying a definite individual economic and political freedom of development combined with an imposed social obligation towards the community as a whole,

e.g., in providing education, health, security. This ideal we share to greater or lesser extent with the other allied democracies and near-democracies, including even some of our former enemies. From this ideal springs the global front of formally allied nations under the USA's leadership in NATO, SEATO; and some less rigidly aligned powers, including many of the neutralist powers, in supra-national obligations. In a narrower sphere of local interests are the geographical agreements of ANZAM and ANZUS. Of particular relevance to Australia there is also the permanent alliance of political, economic, military and, not least, sentimental interests in the British Commonwealth, which constitutes a literally incalculable factor of great potential effect. There is thus a complex of formal and implied alliances on several different planes, which is at first sight confusing, but possessing a strong element of common purpose in expressing Australian foreign policy. It is fair to state this as a policy of interlocking alliances designed to offset our military weakness and isolation, and to conserve our national existence during its immaturity.

A hundred years ago the public admission that an independent nation of our natural resources and advantages was unable to undertake in entirety its own defence would have been an open invitation to conquest or, at best, protective tutelage. However, in these times Australia is little worse off than the Great Powers themselves. Even the United States proclaims that it cannot "go it alone." The only ultimate form of security is now a collective one. At one time it sufficed that military might and economic autarchy of the order now possessed by the USA could completely guarantee national defence. Now such a power, in turn, depends on allies for bases, and for benevolent neutrality to deny their territory to the enemy. Thus the USA depends on Britain, Turkey, Spain, Iceland, Pakistan for strategic air bases, upon Canada for landward defence, and upon the new worlds of Latin America, Australasia and South Africa for at least friendship in neutral areas. Australia is particularly valuable in this context, affording a dependable maritime base adjacent to South-East Asia, as was found in World War II. The conclusion that we are indispensable to our major allies is, however, not warranted, but our value is both positive and negative as we contribute bases, raw materials, and military forces, whereas our (unthinkable) defection could double the advantage to the enemy.

This relationship dominates our strategic thinking. Defence is primarily based on major alliances, our own forces being continuously available as present earnests of our co-operation, to ensure the eventual support of our major allies. This aspect was emphasised in Korea, and now in Malaya, and has been a consistent trend in Australian defence thinking since confederation, excepting the few woolly isolationists who have become less vocal as the facts of atomic life have emerged. Thus Australia must produce effective forces, co-operating in cold or hot wars as they eventuate, against any threat to her own shores. This is the basis of Australian strategy and military

planning and is inevitable. It is therefore the primary *raison d'etre* of the Australian armed forces.

Strategic Assets

There are certain obvious strategic assets which Australia enjoys. The first is temporary isolation from the main immediate thrust lines of the ideological war. Whereas Germany, Malaya and Burma are astride those lines, Australia lies beyond them. Even the Japanese advance swerved North-West from the Island Chain. Then, in addition, Australia possesses a vast but diminishing cushion of space, by sea and land. However, the use of space, whether as a neutralized area of insulation from threatened attack or as a commodity convertible to time by military action, depends upon the possession of adequate forces and their positioning at the periphery of the spatial barrier. This is the underlying cause of our participation in the Far Eastern Strategic Reserve, particularly in Malaya. Without the necessary "teeth" our isolating space is valueless.

A growing strategic asset is the capacity of Australia to serve as a dependable, defendable base. The presence of essential raw materials such as iron, agricultural resources and fissionable ores, and of industrial plant, operated by a stable and skilled population, confers great advantage upon any British Commonwealth, American, or other allied forces seeking viable Pacific bases. These advantages are accentuated by the tension and chaos manifest on the adjacent mainland of Asia. Such a base is, however, untenable unless it possesses permanent elements for its own immediate defence by land, sea and air. This is therefore the second task of our armed forces—to defend the base.

There is, however, still much to be done before the base itself is in an ideal state to support major war, or a major power. The development of internal communications, in particular, is lagging badly behind other developments. Without adequate rail and road systems the prosecution of war will be hindered, and the growth of the nation itself impaired. Co-ordinated economic growth, of balanced primary and secondary industry, and deliberate promotion of nation-building, and potentially defensive major projects, are necessary, even at the expense of private comfort and well-being.

Since our foreign and our subsequent defence policy is essentially one of mutually protective alliances, it is necessary to consider the various types of emergency against which these alliances protect us. Our manuals clearly define the main concepts of global, limited and cold war. The type of warfare for which we prepare must govern our role within our alliances, and, in turn, the nature of the forces raised to discharge our obligations.

Which Type of War Should We Plan For?

Global war connotes the engagement of America and Russia, with their respective allies or satellites in unrestricted, full-scale then broken-backed war, including nuclear and perhaps chemical and biological warfare. In turn, it presupposes the employment of the strategic air forces, the growing range of intercontinental missiles, and deployment of major armoured and airborne forces in the main

theatres of war, which will probably be, in the opening phases, on the mainland of Europe and Asia. This commitment poses difficult questions for the lesser partners, equally for powers such as Britain as much as for Australia. The instinctive desire of these partners, for reasons of prestige and their own considered inherent security, is to contribute national components to all the forces required in such warfare. Thus Britain maintains a Bomber Command, not necessarily wholly integrated within Strategic Air Command. This, she thinks, gives her a stronger voice in matters affecting global warfare, even though it be at the expense of urgent and apparently prior requirements, such as the metropolitan defence of the homeland. Similarly in Australia, particularly in naval and air force circles, there are pronounced trends to "go large" in forces of broad strategic effect, such as long-range bomber aircraft and aircraft carriers, although these national forces themselves may be inadequate or uneconomical to operate independently.

Since the licensed soothsayers who provide the public with its opinions have decided that global war is now realised to be wholly unprofitable by both the main protagonists, the prospects of the global and broken-backed war appear to have receded. The prospect of limited war remains with us. This implies open, formed warfare within restricted regions, with or without the use of nuclear weapons. It places less emphasis on the major strategic weapons, but accentuates that on tactical forces. Korea is an excellent example. By tacit agreement the theatre of operations was limited by both sides. The demand for tactical forces, particularly infantry, close support aviation, and air transport, proved almost insatiable and most costly to major and minor powers alike. The role of the Australian forces in this campaign is a classical example of the strategic *quid pro quo*. In discharge of open political obligations to the United Nations, the Australian naval, land and air forces participated in the war. The underlying purpose of that effort was ostensibly to uphold the rule of law among nations, but fundamentally to obtain the complementary support of the UN in general, and of America and Britain in particular, in the event of war threatening Australian shores; a so, *en passant*, to stay the advance of Communism towards Australia. Our role in future limited wars would, therefore, appear to be to assist in repelling outright Communist aggression in such regions as Malaya, under ANZAM, and in Thailand, Pakistan and Viet Nam under SEATO obligations, by the application of conventional forces, with or without nuclear weapons.

In the cold war the main dues which Australia pays to the common defence effort take the form of political, economic and military support in the no-man's-land between East and West. Thus Colombo Plan aid, and the force now in Korea and Malaya, all tend to the same aim. Behind these open efforts to influence the battle for men's minds must be recognizable military preparations to serve as a reassurance to friends as well as a deterrent to political enemies. Small, regular forces in overseas garrisons are required, backed by

a reserve force at home possessing independent resources of mobilization and deployment.

Balance of Forces

The nature of these forms of war, and the various forces which they each dictate, is the dominant factor in deciding our balance of forces. This balance is a nice matter, and is critical to our defence. It is rendered more difficult because the limitations on manpower and finance allow no latitude to the perfectionists in any of the armed forces. The frequent appeals to the forums of Parliament and Press ventilate this struggle, notably in the extravagant claims made for air power, that alone it can hold aggression at arm's length from Australia, or alternatively liquidate it on our own shores. The pre-eminent role of air power in our defence may not be underestimated with impunity. Nevertheless, as General Sir Horace Robertson recently explained to the United Service Institution of Victoria, a valid, objective assessment of the forces required is our greatest defence need, whereas much appears to be decided in a vein of political or economic expediency. Another strategist of international repute, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Slessor, recently made public utterance upon an aspect of this problem. It was ironical that Sir John visited Australia as the guest of the RAAF. Nevertheless he went on the record, after scouting the idea of imminent global war, to state that the most valuable contribution Australia could make to our mutual defence would be well-trained AMF infantry formations, airportable and ready for action at short notice in South-East Asia. He may have been somewhat biassed by the local British problem in Malaya, nevertheless, judged by the requirements of Korea and Malaya, his dictum has an obvious validity. Therefore a clear-sighted decision upon the size, nature and role of each service is a primary need if our strategy is to meet Australia's defence problems.

This affects such fundamental questions as whether an army can ever achieve the degree of readiness for deployment which the speed of modern war requires or whether Australia can ever support a Regular Army of the required strength to defend herself. It further poses vital questions concerning the type of air power we need to support our contractual efforts. The Air Force preparation and training for the tactical air support of land forces appears currently to be neglected, for the sake of more independent air operations. This is unfortunate because tropical conditions impose additional difficulty in the discharge of reconnaissance and close offensive support tasks, and at the same time pay a heavier dividend for these functions probably than open conditions. Similarly, the provision of transport air forces, to transport our land forces both within the periphery of the Commonwealth and its Territories or overseas, and for their subsequent logistical support, appears to be treated as a matter of negligible priority. If land forces are raised and trained without commensurate backing in tactical and transport aviation, our overall preparations would appear to be out of phase. Meanwhile we are also apparently preparing to become junior partners

in less probable global wars before we are ready for highly probable limited war.

Some Army Aspects of Present Strategy

Within the AMF are purely army questions which depend upon a clear interpretation of our own strategy. One of the most interesting is the nature of armoured forces required. If there is ultimate danger of the continent itself being invaded, armour in strength is indispensable. Another urgent question is the type of training and equipment needed by the AMF for its role in South Asia. If the theatre is extensive jungle, the army must get on its flat feet; on the other hand, tropical warfare in some areas will permit of relatively fluid mobile operations. It is considered that such alternatives call for a doctrine of preparing for the worst case. Thus an army prepared for warfare in thick jungle could be quickly adapted and supplemented for more intensive operations, whereas the converse is not so practicable. This affects the whole training system of the AMF, and, if adopted, would render the jungle role the primary task of all training establishments, except specific conversion institutions teaching open warfare. The consequent gain in realism and readiness would be considerable.

Necessity makes many queer bedfellows, particularly in Cold War. We cannot afford to be hypercritical in evaluating our allies, but we must be realistic in appraising their, and our, complementary contribution to the alliance. We exist in a fluctuating area of senile and adolescent nations, stretching from South-East Asia to the Middle East, swayed by resurgent nationalism often to the point of xenophobia. They lack the common cultural affinities which we share with our main Western allies, yet their military situation resembles ours more closely and is more immediately relevant to our future security. We must accordingly learn to like them and co-operate with them. In adjusting our preparations to this background such basic problems arise as whether we should supply modern highly trained fighting troops to bolster the morale of our less dependable allies, or efficient rear services to ensure their ability to continue in the field. Our resources in such an event may not be adequate to meet both needs. On the other hand, it is normally desirable from a national point of view to place balanced forces in the field, self-contained for operations in any theatre, but again our resources may not be equal to this theoretical ideal.

Underlying our declared foreign policy are the peculiar military problems which historically pertain to wars of intervention. Western forces in South-East Asia must be ready to operate against co-ordinated guerrilla and conventional forces. Such operations, as the Germans found in Russia, can be most expensive in manpower. Additionally, jungle warfare makes excessive demands upon manpower, particularly in porterage in unroaded jungle. We can scarcely compete in man pack operations against the massed coolie power of Asia as seen in action in Korea. On the contrary, we need air transport, preferably helicopters, to give us logistical parity.

Another grave problem is that of relative quality in training. At one time any advanced Western nation, by superior technical education, morale, equipment and discipline, could scatter almost any Asian opponents. Ever since the Russo-Japanese War that advantage has been diminishing, and we must now train hard and fight desperately to gain the necessary superiority. Moreover, in view of the probable numerical superiority of the enemy, this superiority of quality on our side will be more necessary than ever. Of course there are devices to improve our chances. One of the most obvious, if political auguries permit, is the use of an atomic killing ground to halt and disperse the masses of the enemy. The risks inherent in this course require careful calculation.

The chief lesson derived from these examples of our military problems is that our military preparations lag behind our political commitments, and will do so until our doctrine and techniques are matched against realistic premises of the nature of the future war. In NATO the Western powers have declared that nuclear weapons will be used, and that fact permits realistic training to proceed in that treaty area.

Conclusion

The dynamic of Communistic revolutionary warfare demands great exertion and sacrifice from us all, before the exigency of war arises. Unfortunately the democratic way of life is a lethargic, peace-loving, wishful-thinking one. Yet little reflection is needed to show that for the next twenty or thirty years Australia must remain on guard for its future, while the population pressure and political ferment of near Asia runs unabated. Mere votes of funds and call-ups of trainees cannot in themselves guarantee that future. Military thought and action, arising from a positive diplomacy and a clear-cut strategy, must dominate those processes. It is convenient to summarise the essential elements of that strategy. The following are those principal requirements:—

(a) The preservation of our major alliances, particularly those which guarantee our integrity.

(b) The pursuit of a positive Australian diplomacy in South-East Asia designed to influence the waverers and encourage our friends.

(c) The development of the home base by full population, industrialization and major strategic works.

(d) The defence of the home base by military and civil measures, particularly against the event of global war.

(e) The assumption of suitable tasks in the defence of democracy in South-East Asia as a *quid pro quo* for complementary aid in our own defence.

(f) The balancing of our forces with our role and our resources, to enable them to operate either in conjunction with allies or, in the worse case, independently in limited war.

(g) The shaping of our forces to facilitate operations in tropical Asia, or, if necessary, on the mainland, which will entail changes in equipment, training doctrine, and in the forms of organization and mobilization.

(h) Defence in space and depth, employing the maximum technical resource, including nuclear weapons, to offset our numerical disadvantage.

It is realised that in such a brief survey there can only be a scanty consideration of many important factors. Moreover, one is appalled even after this short survey at the negative quality which pervades this our obvious strategy. The truth is that a democratic, defensive posture is an inoffensive thing. Unless it is animated by a concerned political awareness of danger, such as eventually halted the Communists in Korea, it must fight at a corresponding disadvantage. The Government, by bold and characteristic Anglo-Saxon forethought, has acted to forestall our enemies and buttress our friends. Such courageous planning demands a thoroughness of strategic execution such as will enable it to succeed. And that calls for a concerted, realistic and sacrificial effort for many years to come, and of an order which few of us can yet appreciate.

We must perceive the necessity of every war being looked upon as a whole from the very outset, and that at the very first step forward the commander should have the end in view to which every line must converge.

—*Clausewitz.*

A CMF OCTU – Another View

Major J. C. Gorman,
Royal Australian Armoured Corps

CAPTAIN W. C. A. Jones, RAE, is to be commended for this article "Why Not a CMF OCTU?" in the August issue of the Australian Army Journal. In my opinion, the idea is basically sound, but requires certain modifications to make it a practical proposition.

Any sergeant has the right to present himself for examination for first appointment to commissioned rank, without first obtaining the approval of his commanding officer. Although he may succeed in gaining passing marks, his commanding officer is not bound to recommend him for a commission. But in my experience of several years —and several regiments—in the CMF, very rarely is a commission refused an NCO who has qualified at the examinations. Thus, in effect, the individual may select himself for a commission.

The *bona fide* candidate, however, as Captain Jones says, is greatly hampered by the fact that he is virtually his own instructor, aided perhaps by a few formation or regimental "cram" week-ends. The further he is from a metropolis the more he is forced to rely on the written word—and the texts are few. For example, the number of candidates who must study from, and be examined on, an unamended Manual of Military Law must be legion. The armoured troop leader candidate can lay his hand on no concise volume devoted to troop tactics. Various *precis* and articles are all that he can expect. It is all most frustrating.

The value of cram courses lies mainly, if not solely, in the aid they give the candidate to obtain the necessary marks, for the knowledge gathered from them usually passes as quickly as does the examination. However, so far as passing examinations is concerned, spectacular results can be achieved. The Hunter River Lancers once presented 18 candidates, and required 18 lines of AAOs to list their successes.

It seems to me that the candidate hoes a difficult row. However, it is not too much to ask a soldier to make some sacrifice to win his commission. I do not, therefore, rule out Captain Jones' plan on the ground that it requires too much

sacrifice on the part of the candidate. The principal impediment to its adoption lies in the impossible strain it would impose on the Regular Army, already stretched beyond reasonable limits by the CMF commitment. It fails to make provision for candidates from units in country areas. It deprives the unit of its best NCOs for a year. Finally, it takes from the commanding officer the right to select his potential officers.

Suppose Commands ran a nine-day CMF OCTU bi-annually. It could be staffed, planned and run entirely by the CMF, leaving the ARA responsible for providing accommodation and "Q" services. The instructors could be drawn from the CMF Staff Group, aided by CMF active list officers of the rank of major and above. If the course includes two week-ends it will require an absence from civil employment of only five days.

The OCTU would concern itself only with subjects A, B and C, modified to be common to all arms and services. Technical subjects are at present best taught at service schools, and could not be included in the syllabus. However, a student who passed A, B and C should be assured of a provisional commission, and he will be spurred to qualify for a probationary commission by the knowledge that his seniority is seeping away whilst he delays.

Captain Jones makes an important point in suggesting that candidates attending an OCTU should remove their rank badges. The fact is that the candidate is an officer cadet, not a sergeant who hopes to gain a commission after passing the prescribed examinations. The replacement of the NCO rank badge with the white epaulette of the officer cadet is much more important than the simplicity of the act suggests.

Let us examine the proposed procedure in action.

Sergeant Smith decides to attempt commissioned rank. He parades to his commanding officer, who, *if satisfied,* submits his name as a candidate for OCTU. The submission must be accompanied by the CO's written recommendation of the candidate for commissioned rank. This requirement discourages the CO from taking the easy course of simply sending on the candidate's application. On arrival at the OCTU, Officer Cadet Smith is allotted to a syndicate and the course proceeds on lines similar to those of DA 21 (a) courses. Some examinations are written, "C" for example, and the remainder are conducted by discussion.

By the final Sunday morning it is known who has passed and the order of seniority. Preceded by the departure of unsuccessful candidates, there is a passing out parade at which stars are pinned on. Candidates who have had the foresight to qualify in subject E or other technical subjects before attending the OCTU are graduated as Lieutenants (Probationary), and are senior to the remainder, who are graduated as Lieutenants (Provisional). Incidentally, it is high time that officers wearing but a single star bore the title 2nd Lieutenant.

The advantages accruing from the procedure outlined above are:—

(a) All candidates have the same chance, whether they are from city or country areas.

(b) The additional strain on the ARA is slight.

(c) A common doctrine is taught.

(d) Results are known at once, thus obviating the weary wait of many months before the star arrives on the epaulette.

(e) ARA officers are relieved of the necessity of setting and correcting examination papers.

(f) No candidate is accepted for training without the recommendation of his commanding officer.

(g) Units lose the services of their best junior leaders for only a very brief period.

(h) There is a mingling of junior leaders of the CMF, which in itself brings valuable results.

(i) The whole procedure is streamlined and more efficient than the existing one.

The disadvantages appear to be:

(a) Some candidates may not be able to spare the time from their civil employment. However, this disadvantage would be slight if two courses are run each year.

(b) Sufficient CMF instructors of the right calibre may be hard to find. In this case the ARA would have to fill the gaps, though this is to be avoided wherever possible.

(c) Nine days may seem a very brief period, but CMF officers are passed as qualified to command units in ten instructional days at DA 21 (a) courses.

Weighing up the advantages and disadvantages, I submit that this is a more practical proposition than the one put forward by Captain Jones. And it can be implemented without additions to existing establishments and without imposing fresh burdens on the Regular Army.

PLANNING ATOMIC SUPPORT



Major E. U. Gooch, RAA,

Scientific Adviser's Office, AHQ

This article is to be regarded as RESTRICTED, and is not to be republished in whole or in part without the permission of Army Headquarters.—Editor.

Introduction

THIS paper attempts to forecast in some detail the procedures which may be necessary in planning the tactical use of atomic weapons. While it embodies some doctrine or provisional doctrine, much of it can be regarded as opinion only.

Prerequisites to an understanding of the subject are a knowledge of:—

(a) The effects of atomic weapons in various circumstances.

(b) Their possible means of delivery.

(c) Their likely availability.

(d) The types of target suitable for their use.

(e) The measures of control necessary when using them.

The effects of atomic weapons and the capabilities of their possible means of delivery are already widely known. It may be as well,

however, to deal quickly with availability, targets and control prior to a discussion on planning and its various aspects.

Availability of Atomic Weapons

For security reasons, very little information has been released on the likely availability of atomic weapons for the support of the land battle. If atomic weapons are available, however, it is reasonable to assume an allotment for a corps battle varying between several and many, depending on how critical the battle is to the overall plan.

A reasonable assumption may also be made with regard to the weapon powers available for each of the possible means of delivery, i.e.,

Guns—2 and 10 KT.

Free flight rockets—10, 20 and 50 KT.

Guided weapons—10, 20, 50 and 100 KT.

Aircraft—10, 20, 50, 100 and 500 KT and some MT weapons.

Types of Target

In general, tasks selected for atomic weapons will be those which cannot be performed as effectively by conventional weapons. Selection of targets will depend on:—

(a) Their importance in relation to the overall plan and the prevailing tactical situation.

(b) Their strength and composition.

Target selection and planning will be facilitated by early and complete information. As planning takes a considerable time, it must be carried out as far as possible before the operation. Depending on the amount of planning possible, therefore, it is convenient to classify targets into:—

(a) Pre-planned targets.

(b) Contingent targets.

(c) Opportunity targets.

Pre-planned targets are those which can be firmly selected before the operation and for which complete detailed planning can be carried out. They may include airfields, administrative installations, defiles, known positions and headquarters.

Contingent targets are those for which much of the detailed planning can be done in advance. Such targets could be engaged relatively quickly, should the need arise. They may include likely or possible concentrations, assembly areas, gun areas, river crossings and bridgeheads.

Opportunity targets are those which cannot be forecast and which may be fleeting in nature. Successful engagement will depend on early recognition, good communications and efficiency not only in processing and evaluating information but also in preparing the weapons to be used and delivering them to the target. As so many time-consuming steps are involved, success against fleeting opportunity targets cannot be expected to be great.

Control of Atomic Weapons

Owing to the magnitude of their effects and the relative shortage of their supply, the use of atomic weapons must be controlled on a high level and on a joint land/air basis, i.e., at army/tactical group level at the lowest. However, if full advantage is to be gained from their use, it may well be necessary to delegate employment below this level.

It will probably be normal for the army and tactical group commanders to allot a number of atomic weapons to corps as a result of their land/air plan. They would, at the same time, lay down any necessary restrictions on their use, e.g., the land/air operations in one area could necessitate one corps having to obtain approval from the joint operations centre (JOC) before using its weapons, while another corps could be given complete freedom of use, providing, of course, that the safety of friendly aircraft is ensured through a prior warning to the JOC.

In the event, it is thought that, while the corps commander will plan the use of his atomic weapons with his divisional commanders and may even allot some of them, the corps itself must authorize the actual firing to ensure the safety of friendly troops and aircraft.

Responsibility for Planning

After the allotment of atomic support, its use must be planned in detail, along with the use of all the other forms of fire support available for the operation. With regard to atomic support, in particular, this planning will involve decisions on:—

(a) The number of weapons to be committed initially to the operation and the number to be held in reserve.

(b) The application of the committed weapons to targets.

(c) The conditions of use for the reserve weapons.

The decision on the number of weapons to be committed initially will be a fundamental one which will arise during the commander's appreciation, and which will be expressed in his outline plan. He may decide to use the weapons allotted either:—

(a) As the basic means of destroying the enemy, in which case his armour and infantry are virtually in support to further and complete the task;

or

(b) As a means of support for the operations of his armour and infantry.

Surprise is easily achieved with atomic weapons and their effects are widespread and rapid. Therefore, the more weapons the commander can commit initially to pre-planned targets as a basis for his plan, the more advantage he is likely to gain. However, contrary to the principle of concentration of effort, it will usually be necessary for him to retain some weapons in reserve for support of the operation, i.e., to cope with contingent or opportunity targets.

In the case of those atomic weapons which have been committed, their application to targets involves decisions on:—

(a) The targets to be engaged.

(b) The effect required on each target.

(c) The weapon powers, ground zeros and heights of burst required to achieve these effects.

(d) The means of delivery to be used.

(e) The safety of friendly troops, aircraft and installations.

(f) Timings.

It will be seen that some of these decisions arise from tactical considerations and others from technical considerations, while some may embrace both aspects. Thus, the completed plan is achieved through the combined efforts of the commander concerned and his artillery adviser. Operational staffs will have to be well schooled in the tactical use of atomic weapons and artillery staffs up to the army/tactical group level will have to be reorganized so that they can carry out any of the technical work involved.

Determination of the conditions of use for those atomic weapons to be held in reserve will be mainly a command responsibility. It may be possible to foresee a number of contingencies at the outset, and planning for contingent targets should proceed as far as possible, as insufficient time may be available when and if the need for applying atomic weapons to them does arise.

Planning in Detail

The commander, in framing his outline plan, will have committed some of his atomic weapons to targets which can be pre-planned and will have stated the number to be held in reserve for contingent and opportunity targets. He may also have allotted some weapons to lower formations.

As with the planning of conventional fire support, the level to which the detailed planning can be delegated in the case of atomic weapons will depend on a number of factors. The main questions to be answered in deciding this level are:—

(a) Where can detailed information be obtained?
(b) How much time is available?
(c) Who can give the necessary technical advice?
(d) How intimate is the support required to be?
(e) Which units or formations will be affected when the support is provided?

In the event, it is thought unlikely that detailed planning for atomic support will be delegated below divisional level. Whichever the level concerned, however, the commander will discuss with his artillery adviser the use of the atomic weapons as part of the overall fire plan, stating which targets are to be planned for and, if possible, when they are to be engaged and to what effect. He will also state any restrictions or conditions of use.

Within the framework stated by the commander, it is the duty of the artillery adviser and his staff to prepare the detailed fire plan, making use of all the information available and consulting further with the commander or his operational staff as necessary. This consultation ensures that any relevant changes in the tactical plan are taken into account and that clarification is obtained in the case of any requirement of the commander being not feasible for technical reasons.

The plan for the atomic weapons to be used on the pre-planned targets will necessarily form the basis of the fire plan, the conventional forms of fire and air support being used to deal with targets not suitable for atomic effort or to supplement the atomic effort as necessary.

Supplementation of the atomic effort may be required:—

(a) When the allotment of atomic weapons is not sufficient for the targets offering;

or

(b) When it can be foreseen that certain portions of the atomic targets will not be adequately dealt with, due to their relative invulnerability;

or

(c) When faulty information on the target nature and extent results in the atomic effort being less effective than planned.

Technical Aspects

The process of planning the use of atomic weapons in detail is largely technical, and will be carried out along the lines indicated in the articles in Australian Army Journals 78 and 81 or in accordance with any technical doctrine which may be issued for the purpose.

As mentioned earlier, it seems likely that this work will be done by a specially trained officer on the artillery staff concerned. Dealing with each proposed strike in turn, this officer would probably go about his task in the following general manner:

(a) He would obtain detailed up-to-date information on the target nature and extent.

(b) He would determine the best theoretical location for ground zero, probably through an analysis of the target into components of similar vulnerability.

(c) He would select a height of burst for the weapon, normally as low as possible within reason, so that all target components may be dealt with to the desired degree.

(d) If given a choice of weapon power and means of delivery, he would normally select the most economical weapon and the most accurate and reliable means of delivery.

(e) He would check the safety of friendly troops, using information on proposed locations and states of protection at the intended time of burst.

(f) He would inform his superior of the probable effects of the burst on the target, so that fire planning using other means could be carried out for those parts of the target which may not be adequately dealt with or which may recover too soon.

Implementing the Plan

Once the detailed fire plan has been made, its implementation will not follow automatically. It may be necessary to co-ordinate it at higher headquarters with the plans of other formations taking part in the operation and, in any case, relevant details of the proposed use of atomic weapons will have to be passed to the JOC, either for approval or for warning.

These matters having been clarified, the artillery staff or that of the higher headquarters will issue fire plan orders, including orders for the firing of any atomic weapons by artillery units. The operational staff will initiate any necessary demands for air support, including demands for any atomic weapons allotted from Air Force sources. They will also write into the formation

operation order any specific instructions concerning the atomic weapons to be used, e.g., safety measures not already covered in standing orders. Copies of the operation order will, of course, be sent to any neighbouring formation concerned as well as to lower formations and units.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it is as well to stress that the planning of atomic support is an integral part of the overall fire planning for the operation. It is a joint command/artillery function, and the detailed planning cannot proceed until the commander has decided whether to use his atomic weapons as the basis of his plan or to use them in support of his armour and infantry. If any atomic weapons form the basis of the plan, a consideration of their use must be made before the general fire planning can proceed. The detailed planning for the atomic weapons will be carried out by a technical officer on the artillery staff concerned. Fire planning culminates in the issue of fire plan orders or in the making of a demand if Air Force weapons are involved. In any case, JOC must be made aware of any proposed atomic strikes.

Though their effects are rapid and widespread, it is important to realise that atomic weapons in the tactical battle are merely another form of support. Any plans for their use should treat them as such.

COMPETITION FOR AUTHORS — ANNUAL PRIZE

The Board of Review has awarded the annual prize of £40 for the best original article published in the Australian Army Journal in the financial year 1955-56 to Lieutenant-Colonel W. F. Caplehorn for his paper "The Effects of Atomic Weapons on Military Operations." This paper was published in the April and November 1955 issues of the Journal.

Lieutenant-Colonel Caplehorn graduated from the Royal Military College, Duntroon, in 1939, and was commissioned in the Australian Staff Corps (Artillery). During the war of 1939-45 he served with New Guinea Force and as an instructor at the Staff School, Australia. After the war he studied at Melbourne University to obtain his Master of Science degree, and was then seconded to the Department of Supply. In 1953 he was appointed Technical Staff Officer, Grade 1, in the Office of the Scientific Adviser to the Military Board. He is at present on exchange duty in the United Kingdom.

Rumour Hath Charm

Lieutenant-Colonel J. J. S. Hobbs,
Australian Intelligence Corps

IT seems that a real estate agent arrived at the gates of Heaven, confident that he already had an option on a piece of property there.

Disillusionment was sudden, when he was greeted by the gatekeeper with, "There's no room for you. All allotments set aside for real estate agents have been taken out on a perpetual lease."

The applicant though disillusioned was not abashed, retaining, as he did, some of his earthly instincts. So he asked permission to look around, only to find that all was as the gatekeeper had said.

Mounting a bench on the main thoroughfare, the estate agent shouted, "Oil has been discovered in hell!" and instantly there was a mass exodus of real estate men to the nether regions.

The gatekeeper watched the newcomer's face light up with satisfaction, then slowly cloud over with worry. Suddenly he grabbed his suitcase and raced after the other estate agents and, as he gathered speed, he shouted back, "You know, there may be something to that rumour!"

Unfortunately, rumours often work out that way, being contagious and affecting not only those among whom they are spread but also the rumour-monger himself.

The natural egotistical desire of most human beings to be first with the news is, of course, one reason behind the spreading of rumours, but it is not the only reason. In war, there may be a more sinister reason—the use of rumours to spread enemy propaganda, or, if you like, the use by the enemy of careless talk to further his psychological warfare.

Propaganda was defined by Lord Northcliffe as "the exploitation of news or ideas to influence the public mind in a given direction."

Experience has taught broadly how people react to specific appeals or approaches, and the propagandist will be selective in regard to the group among whom a rumour is to be circulated and in his assessment of the type of rumour that will appeal to the selected audience.

The term "wishful thinking" came to be widely used during World War II, and experience showed that the most successful rumours were

those which the audience strongly desired to believe.

Subsequent disillusionment on the part of the audience does not overcome the natural desire to "spread the news," but frequently contributes to a fostering of mistrust and disunity amongst the people concerned, with the possible consequence of lowering confidence in leaders and of undermining faith in the cause. In extreme cases trouble may be fomented among the dissatisfied elements and defeatism may become prominent, thus gradually impairing national or Allied unity.

During World War II the Germans created a special organization to introduce whispering campaigns into enemy countries, and professional rumour-mongers were trained for this purpose and also for later use during the Allied occupation of Germany.

The enemy seeks by all means at his disposal to sow seeds of dissatisfaction, disaffection and despair. One of his principal methods is the propaganda technique of spreading false stories, initially by means of agents. In military circles, the technique is aimed at the undermining of morale. Morale is injured when hopes are dashed by the discovery that a rumour is false.

It was rumoured during World War II that the Japanese radio had welcomed a certain Allied formation to a theatre in the South-West Pacific Area. The rumour was that, immediately after the troops boarded the convoy, a ship's radio had picked up a Japanese programme in which the announcer disclosed that the particular formation was at that moment embarking and named its destination. This rumour was given such credence by the troops in question that morale was affected to such an extent that a change in plans was considered by the operational staff. Complete investigation later proved that the rumour was entirely false.

Most of us who served in the Pacific Islands will remember the rumour to the effect that the taking of atebrine would cause sterility. Of course this rumour was also false, but it is interesting to note that investigations are reported to have indicated that the origination of the rumour was partly attributable to Japanese agents. The implications in relation to our forces of a decline in the taking of atebrine are obvious.

Rumours which emanate from careless talk and which may have a basis of truth, may cause the loss of the element of surprise in operations, with a consequent probable increase in the rate of casualties. Thus, in war, rumours about troop movements are immediately the most dangerous.

The Allied invasion of Cape Gloucester was a case in point. Weeks before the actual operations rumours were being circulated from Sydney to Finschhafen, and names of landing beaches and the number of troops to be involved were being mentioned. Although all were rumours, some were based on factual information and, subsequently, documentary evidence became available to show that the Japanese were aware of the rumours and had actually ordered a strengthening of the beach defences.

Rumours are a serious business in war-time. Does this apply equally during peace?

In occupied countries—Germany, Japan, Korea—the use of rumours by subversive elements as a means of creating disfavour towards, and dissatisfaction with, the Allied forces was a constant source of worry to the military governments.

In the civil emergencies in Malaya, Kenya and Cyprus, terrorists, suitably briefed by higher authority, have not hesitated to spread rumours amongst the civil population in attempts to gain sympathetic support, to lower public morale and to foster a spirit of local non-co-operation with the British forces.

A basic Communist concept in the implementation of the Cold War is the use of Communist parties abroad to undermine national authority by the use of insidious propaganda in the form of rumours discrediting Government actions and policy, and aimed at disparaging the nations' leaders in the Government and in industry. Recent examples of this occurred in Australia after the Government's decisions to send Australian troops to Korea, and later to Malaya, were made known.

In regard to the AMF the Communist aim of undermining morale and creating disaffection is well known. One method that may be employed is the use of rumours concerning pay increase, leave, postings, form of training, rations, promise of amenities, married quarters, etc., which, if not based on fact, will greatly affect the morale of the troops concerned. Many of these rumours are not, of course, subversively inspired, but are the result of "wishful thinking," though they are equally harmful to morale.

From the point of view of higher authority, rumours, be they baseless or partly factual and concerning conditions of service in the AMF or future appointments and postings, can often prove administratively embarrassing to the staff or department concerned.

It should be remembered that to deny a rumour will often mean revealing fact, which action at the time might be considered premature or undesirable.

Current security regulations prohibit unauthorized discussion on all official matters, but, unfortunately, this restriction is generally interpreted very broadly.

Instruction in the control of rumours is an important aspect of security training, and as in peace we train for war so such instruction should be continuous amongst all ranks. The aim of this aspect of training should be to make all members of the AMF so conscious of the dangerous nature of rumours that they automatically question every rumour heard and do not allow themselves to be affected by what is heard from a doubtful source. Every effort should be made to trace a rumour to its source and, if considered desirable, disciplinary or other action should be taken against the originator.

During the war unit security officers sometimes instituted a "rumour clinic," which took the form of informal meetings with troops, during which the soldiers were encouraged to present new rumours. Unit security officers would then either deny the rumour on the spot or would seek official denial from else-

where if at all practicable. If the rumour proved to be true, discussion at the "clinic" was aimed at pointing out the danger of passing it on. It doesn't matter what form of training in this respect is used, as long as the interest of the troops is aroused in this particular aspect of security alertness.

Of course, before suggesting reform to others, a little self-criticism of the attitude of each and everyone of us towards this problem may pay dividends, for few of us will be able to say honestly that we have not originated, or been interested in, conversations which have opened with, "They tell me that . . ."

During World War II an American service-woman was conversing with an officer who had just finished an address on the evil of rumours.

"How do you like Australia?" he inquired.

"Why I think it's just fine," replied she. "Back in the States everything is so dreadfully monotonous. But over here, why, there's an exciting new rumour every day!"

WELLINGTON ON COMPLAINING

THE temper of some of the officers of the British Army gives me more concern than the folly of the Portuguese Government. I have always been accustomed to have the confidence and support of the officers of the armies which I have commanded; but, for the first time, whether owing to the opposition in England, or whether the magnitude of the concern is too much for their minds and their nerves, or whether I am mistaken and they are right, I cannot tell; but there is a system of croaking in the Army which is highly injurious to the public service, and which I must devise some means of putting an end to, or it will put an end to us. Officers have a right to form their own opinions upon events and transactions; but officers of high rank or situation ought to keep their opinions to themselves; if they do not approve of the system of operations of their commander, they ought to withdraw from the Army. And this is a point to which I must bring some, if I should not find that their own good sense prevents them from going on as they have done lately.

—*Captain F. L. Jones, late The Irish Regiment of Canada, in the Canadian Army Journal, 1956.*

GROUND FORCES — Key to Survival

Lieutenant-Colonel Carl A. Peterson,
Infantry, US Army

Call it by any name you wish — international communism, the Communist conspiracy, Soviet imperialism—we are faced with a strong, aggressive force that has both a desire and a plan to swallow the rest of the world. Outward evidence of Soviet intentions will sometimes be crystal clear and sometimes heavily veiled. The veils do not alter the intentions—we are in the middle of a life and death struggle. Sometimes the enemy action is creeping slowly as in the form of inciting and arming the Arab world; sometimes it is bold and swift as in Czechoslovakia and Korea. Always it pushes forward except when and where it meets resistance.

Should political and economic measures fail, what type of military resistance is necessary? Is firepower sufficient? We have tremendous firepower and the means to deliver it. What do we want to do with it? Do we want to trade nuclear blows with the enemy until a decision is reached? That is the impression gained from what we hear and read; it is the concept of a push-button war. Is this the quick and easy way? Is this the way of certain victory? No one can say, for it has not been tested. Sober reflection indicates that such a concept would eventually commit us to an inter-continental nuclear artillery duel ending only when one side is erased for all practical purposes and the "winner" scarcely better off. One can visualize the survivors on both sides fighting like wild animals for scraps of decaying food.

We cannot give up and let the Communists take over, as we would be just as badly off. It would be better for mankind to go back to the Dark Ages and start afresh in his climb for something better.

—*From Military Review, USA.*

Power in Being

There is a solution. It is found in having power in being that will deter war or, if war is started by reckless and miscalculating men, will defeat and control the enemy without destroying the world. This power must have the characteristics of application to the right spot in just the right doses to achieve the exact results desired.

If the Communists move into West Germany or Turkey, for example, we can inflict terrific damage on the Communist homeland with our nuclear weapons, but we cannot maintain the neutralization achieved unless we control the enemy Government. We must control it physically. Control by the sea or by the air is transitory, but only on the ground is it lasting and certain. We need a ground force to follow immediately the shock action of the nuclear firepower. We need a field army which is not tied down to specific area missions, but which is available and can be quickly transported to any area of the world, including the enemy heartland, and can be sustained in combat for an indefinite period.

Such a strategic Army striking force, in co-ordination with the sister services, could make victory of some value if global war is forced on us. In addition, it would act as a deterrent to both global and small wars and make the victorious and expeditious halting of a small war as much of a certainty as can be found in these times.

What is needed to obtain the required strategic striking force? We are short of men, money, matériel, mobility, and maybe motivation. We need divisions and we need the ability to move those divisions at an atomic era speed. They must have the capability of being moved expeditiously over long distances to the battlefield and also the capability of rapid movement on the battlefield.

For Mobility and Survival

Perhaps a few thoughts would be in order on the requirements to make the Army more mobile and allow it to live on the nuclear battlefield.

First, we need more reconnaissance units with greater range, greater cross-country mobility, and sufficient fighting power to obtain information, screen less mobile units, seize key points, and patrol large areas. To obtain reconnaissance units with sufficient mobility differential over the remaining land forces to carry out the traditional cavalry roles, we must have a family of lightly armoured cross-country vehicles and aircraft.

Second, we need to get more out of the individual soldier on foot in the way of speed, endurance, and sustained effort. This can be done by lightening the load on the individual, by fewer types of weapons and other equipment, by additional light radio equipment to be used by the squad leader and even by the individual soldier, by using lightly armoured vehicles to deliver the soldier and his supplies to the fighting area, and by using helicopters and other aircraft to save his feet and his back. These are some of the ways to conserve the energy of the soldier so that the maximum may be used in fighting the enemy; also it may result in more soldiers available to fight and fewer handling supplies.

Third, we can gain mobility by increasing the range of firepower and decreasing the weight of the ammunition. Some range increases can be made in conventional artillery, but the real progress is through guided missiles. Atomic artillery is the answer to the problem of decreasing the weight of ammunition by several hundred tons per division per day of active combat. It is generally agreed that the 280mm. gun is not the final answer; continued improvement is necessary.

Fourth, our operations outside the continental United States must not be dependent on major ports, as it is likely that such ports will cease to exist if we try to use them. Such operations would require logistic support both by air and by the use of many small ports and beaches. Although we have the devices to operate without using major ports, we need these devices in greater quantity.

Fifth, we need more trained manpower and a longer period of service. Inept or untrained men will immobilize the best equipment. Our units must be professionally competent.

Finally, air transport is the key to both the tactical and the strategic mobility of the Army. It is difficult for the Army to obtain aircraft or the use of aircraft; as long as the Army is dependent on the priority whims of other services for the means to make it effective it will be without the needed effectiveness. Lack of adequate funds and unrealistic inter-service priorities are hamstringing the Army.

Public Understanding

To get more money, matériel and men for the Army requires a complete understanding by the public for the need. The economy could sustain the extra effort but it would be unpalatable. It might mean more work per week and more taxes for everyone.

A field army of 15 divisions would require approximately 600,000 additional men, which would cost approximately 33 billion dollars a year. Perhaps a more realistic initial effort would be the addition of a corps of 5 divisions, which would require approximately 150,000 men and cost approximately 800 million dollars per year.

This brings us to motivation. Once the need is understood, the effort would be forthcoming, for, as history reveals, neither the American people nor the Congress have failed to supply the wherewithal once the need became apparent. Habitually in the past the United States has been unprepared when faced with war; there has been a lack of understanding and feeling of the need for the Army until the need became startlingly apparent. Clearer and more complete explanation is required than has been attained in the past.

Each officer should understand this problem and be sure that the people under him are aware of it. The Information and Education Programme can be more meaningful, especially to the officers and men who are brought into the Army by the processes of the Selective Service System. They have a right to know, and through them the Congress and the public can be in-

formed. In the final analysis we obtain our Army from the people through the Congress.

Perhaps the people would like to pay a little more and expend an additional effort to be saved from an interminable inter-continental nuclear artillery duel.

I believe the Army is an indispensable component of our national security. Nothing has occurred on the world scene that diminishes the fundamental role of land forces. By that I do not mean that the weapons and tactics of warfare have not changed, but they have always been in process of change and will continue to do so. But the ability to take and hold ground, and control people who live on the ground, remains a major factor in a nation's power. When it comes to military forces, nothing has appeared that can act as a substitute, or guarantee to do the job of soldiers. A look at the realities of life today will demonstrate that land forces are a prime element in any nation's security structure.

—Wilber M. Brucker, Secretary of the Army, USA.

THE PARTY SYSTEM OF POLITICS

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN SYSTEMS

Lieutenant R. Kerr, BA,
5 Infantry Battalion, CMF

THE extremely loose and decentralized character of the American party system finds its roots in the intentions of the Founding Fathers as expressed in the Constitution. Madison, writing in Federalist No. 10 said:—

"Among the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction."[1]

Madison felt that there was a strong tendency for mankind, by virtue of its conflicting opinions and ideas, to fall into groups of opposing interests. This, he felt, would tend to create minorities or majorities, the members of whom would be bound and enthused by common ideals, and who would thus be motivated to make others subservient to their will.

It was the protection of the rights of both that he aimed to achieve. "But," he said, "the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. . . . Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society."[2]

But he realized that conflicting interests lay in practically every sphere where pecuniary and economic interests were at stake. He left no doubt, therefore, that the regulation of these conflicting interests formed the principal function of Government. Whilst he knew that enlightened statesmen would tend to modify the resolution of factions, he also knew that statesmen would not always be the leaders of government, so it was the control of the effects of factional interests with which he was mainly concerned. The minority, of course, could always be defeated by the opposite overwhelming majority, but the majority itself "must be rendered, by their number and

1. Federalist No. 10 p 53.
2. Federalist No. 10 p 56.

local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression."[3]

This state of mind on the part of Madison and others led naturally to the introduction into the Constitution of the "checks and balance system," in which sovereignty is divided between the Executive, the Legislature and the Supreme Court. As will be shown, this separation led to a loose disjointed system of government, poor discipline and loosely organized parties voting on bi-partisan lines with strong pressure from sectional groups.

The British Constitution, on the other hand, largely an unwritten one, has evolved over centuries through the medium of custom and convention, and has grown in strength as it has limited the prerogatives of the Monarchy. Along with this evolution evolved the rudiments of the party system, where the Whigs and Tories have since been largely submerged, or have joined forces with the Conservative and the powerful Trade-Union backed Labour Party. So the British Constitution, flexible and broad in its scope, embraced, without any apparent effort, the principle of the two-party system of Government, which is now fundamental to the British political procedure.

Let us, then, examine the Party system of the United States.

Although the Constitution makes no mention of parties, a party system has developed in America. But these parties are not, like that of the British Parties, organizations with a distinct ideology. The twin party structures, that of the Democratic and the Republican parties, are a method by means of which a series of sectional alliances act a little more cohesively than formally for the purposes of capturing the Presidency. Absence of an aristocracy, denominational parties, and a cabinet system, with the subsequent prevention of the formation of principles, has resulted in the absence of party philosophies and ideologies. But the party is there, because to the party with the majority vote goes the all-important Presidency.

At the lowest level of the party machine is the precinct composed of three to four hundred party members, with a precinct captain at its head. Above the precinct is the ward composed of a number of precincts for the city and the county. Both ward and county send delegates to the State Committee, which in turn sends delegates to the National Committee. The party machine is primarily concerned with the control of Government jobs which comes to it through the system of patronage. Under these circumstances, it is natural that "Politics becomes an end in itself and not, as in the case of other interest groups, a means."[4]

The British Parties, as has already been indicated, are parties of principle. Briefly, the Labour Party's ideology is that of Socialism, whilst the Conservatives believe in the industrial freedom of private enterprise. The minority Liberal Party pursues a somewhat erratic middle course.

3. Federalist No. 10 p 58.

4. Odegard and Helmes—American Politics, p 415.

The Labour Party was formed to be the political instrument of the trade unions. At its base it has the ward with a secretary and chairman. It has the right to send delegates to the General Committee of the Constituency party, which in turn elects an executive. The General Committee can discuss policy and send delegates to the national conference. The Annual Conference is the final authority and its decisions determine party policy. The Conservative Party is organized on similar lines with electorate committees, regional committees.

However, some very important points of dissimilarity between the British and United States systems occur. As the British parties are parties of principle, so they have a policy which is presented to the elector. "They explain and elucidate on the respective merits and dangers of alternative policies."[5] Thus the elector has the choice of a policy, as well as alternative rulers. American parties do not present issues to the people because they have no ideology, and because the lack of unity and discipline in the party, plus the separation of powers, may make it impossible for the promises to be carried out. The British parties draw their strength from the internal unity of common ideals, but also from party discipline. Members who do not toe the party line are often expelled. This includes members of Parliament, who sometimes find that endorsement is not available.

Of the American party system it has been said that . . . "The party gets its strength from the interests it represents; the convention and the executive committee from the party; and the chairman from the convention and committee."[6] However, the desire for prestige and power, loyalty to leaders, and the pleasures of patronage also play a very important part.

It appears to be an anomaly of the American Party System that more discipline exists in the party machine than in the Congressional parties, who often vote across party lines.

Another distinction between the British and American parties is the handling of finance. The British Labour Party, for example, with its tightly knit organization, derives its funds from the small annual subscriptions of its thousands of members. These contributions go to a central fund for the purposes of combating elections and other activities. Ivor Jennings says, "The central activities of a party in a normal year cost something like £50,000. . . . Taking the country as a whole, a general election costs the Labour Party between £300,000 and £350,000."[7] Most Conservatives and Liberal candidates provide their own finance or subscribe to local funds. It is difficult to get Conservative figures, since these are not made public, but it is estimated to be about £450,000. However, it will be seen that British expenditure is comparatively modest.

On the other hand, expenditure by the American parties often reaches tremendous costs. "Senator Guy M. Gillete, chairman of the Senate Committee investigating the

5. Greaves—British Constitution.

6. Odegard and Helmes—American Politics p 416.
7. The British Constitution—Jennings W.I, p 55.

1940 elections, stated that close to $35,000,000 was spent."[8]

The Republicans spent $13,195,377 and the Democrats $7,441,860, both exclusive of county and local expenditure. In addition to election, there are state and city campaigns for and against constitutional amendments.[8]

"The highest campaign cost recorded on any single measure in that State was a total of $1,207,000 spent for and against the referendum on a chain store tax passed by the 1935 legislature."[9]

These moneys are spent on general overhead such as salaried staff, rentals, etc., field activities such as payment to speakers, transportation and publicity, which includes radio costs, mail campaigns, literature, newspaper advertising and the like. Other expenses are grants by the National Committee to aid State committees, and general election day expenses.

Generally, the source of these contributions are bankers, brokers, manufacturers and pressure groups who hope to gain a legislative dividend from their investment. "The geographical distribution of contributors reflects both the distribution of wealth in the nation and the distribution of the financial support of both parties."[10] In 1932 both National Committees relied heavily on contributions from residents of the Northern States. The Republicans drew heavily from the central States and the Democrats from the South.

8. American Government—Zink, p 157.
9. Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups, Key p 451.
10. Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups, Key p 463

As has already been indicated, contributors have a definite motive for their actions. For example, steel combines, supporting a high protective tariff, raised on one occasion $8,000,000 for the Republican Party. Although there are laws for the regulation of party finance, these are inadequate. In some States they limit expenditure by the candidate, but make no mention of committees. However, a major point which emerges here is that as parties draw their financial support from a small percentage of the population, so the voice of this support is out of all proportion to their numbers.

When Madison suggested that the only way to guard against the tyranny of the majority was to enlarge the sphere and divide the community into numberless groups and interests, so that it would be impossible for a majority will to exist, he little knew what seeds he was sowing for the future. As has been seen, a two-party structure does exist, but these are merely the mechanism used by interest group, and unlike the British parties cannot be said to be representative of the will of the people.

"Each major party represents a cross-section of the political, economic and social interests in the community — farmers, bankers, manufacturers."[11]

Accordingly the members which they elect to Congress do not naturally group themselves as Republicans or Democrats, but as representing labour, bankers, farmers, and thus vote across party lines.

11. Odegard and Helmes — American: Politics p 752.

The *blocs* or groups which they represent, and other factions which wish to be heard, are known as pressure groups, and are always in contact with the legislators, putting forward their case.

Although pressure groups such as the Anti - Vivisection League, Women's Suffragettes, Temperance Unions, etc., exist or have existed in England, they have been able to exert little or no direct pressure, since legislation is largely introduced by the Cabinet and not the private member to whom they generally turn.

Having emphasised the loose-knit nature of the American political parties in contrast with the closely integrated structure of the British parties, let us now examine the conduct of the respective parties in their legislatures.

Here the American parties operate under the restrictions of the "check and balance" system of government. Although Congress has the power to legislate such a power is useless unless the majority party has captured the Presidency, because of the Executive power of veto. But even so, the majority party is still liable to have its legislation defeated as members of both parties vote across party lines.

"Of 36 issues in the United States Senate during six different Congresses, only 12 resulted in inter-party disagreement when a majority of one party stood opposed to a majority of the other."[12]

Analysis of Congressional votes revealed a traders' bloc, a manufacturers' block, a farmers' bloc, etc., indisputable evidence of unstable party lines and lack of discipline and centralized leadership. In the House of Commons, a Cabinet whose legislation was defeated would be forced to resign. However, the majority, either Labour or Conservative, would be most unlikely to do this, since it could lead to a dissolution of the House. Secondly, party discipline, rigid in the Labour Party and somewhat less so in the Conservative Party, would tend to prevent a party defeating its own Government. Thirdly, there is no breaking down of parties into blocs on American lines. Members interested in certain legislation may sit on committees formed to examine certain topics, e.g., Nationalization of the Steel Industry Committee, Scotch Committee, etc. Consequently, although it is possible to speak of party responsibility for legislation in the UK, it is impossible in the United States, where Senators vote together regardless of party affiliations.

Even the party caucuses in both countries are organized on different lines. For example, Labour caucus in the UK is the policy-making body, which directs the Parliamentary party on what line its legislation is to take. Any Labour Cabinet or Prime Minister who deviates from this course is severely taken to task. In the Conservative Party the annual conference is the policy-making body, but it cannot impress its will on the Cabinet or Prime Minister. For example, Mr. Churchill did not attend the 1951 Conference, which was an indication that he did not intend to be bound by their decisions.

12. Odegard and Helmes — American Politics p 152

However, in America both Houses, Senate and the House of Representatives, have a caucus which contains the members of both parties. It is not a policy-making body, but it is from caucus that members of the committees are chosen. These committees in many respects take the place of the British Cabinet system. The British Cabinet is the executive body responsible for all legislation, and its members are the members of the majority party. However, the American committee contains members of both parties, according to strength. The chairmanship based on seniority goes to the stronger party, but members are not decisively influenced by party loyalties. Discussion is much more free than in the chambers, and members vote according to their sectional interests. The strength of the pressure group convention is emphasised here, as they may appear before these committees to present their case. Many Congressmen, acting under the pressure of interest groups, introduce legislation, knowing full well that it will be quashed by a committee.

It is clear, then, that American political parties were not meant to be, as they are in Britain, an integral part of the constitutional structure. They cannot remove the Government as can the Opposition in UK by mustering a majority vote, nor can they go to the people on specific issues, because they have no power to shape policy.

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HOLD the POWER and BEAR the RESPONSIBILITY

Captain Theodore J. Lepski,
Infantry, US Army

A YOUTHFUL group of eager but unsuspecting cadets solemnly inspected the weather-stained statue of General George S. Patton as it stands so stolidly and silently on a granite pedestal in front of the library at the United States Military Academy.

At precisely the same time General Patton stood before the bulletin board in the Officers' Club at Fiddler's Green. He noted an order thereon directing him to appear before the board of governors immediately. The directive was signed ALEXANDER THE GREAT!

The vast membership of the Officers' Open Mess at Fiddler's Green is most inspiring and is well known to all students of military art and science. The evolving history of the world has been written to a large measure around the fabulous exploits of its members.

—From "Military Review," USA.

It is said that there are NO dues —drinks are FREE—the single initiation requirement is to have been a soldier of honourable reputation. Few club rules are necessary, and the general atmosphere is one of mutual respect, even though many of the members waged bloody campaigns against each other some days or eons ago.

The board of governors is composed of some of the world's great captains and illustrious military leaders, whose principal responsibility is to decide upon the membership of the Military Hall of Fame. Although their task is most difficult and time-consuming, the prestige and sound judgment of the board members have proved infallible. Even here at a soldier's resting place, "responsibility walks hand in hand with capacity and power."

Quite understandably, they have reached objective areas of agreement in the principles of leadership, primarily due to their long

association in the best of military company. The board is dynamic in its approach to this subject, seeking at every opportunity to test the validity of its conclusions.

They are at present engaged in a project to determine the importance and pertinence of the following principles of leadership:—

1. Seek responsibility and develop a sense of responsibility among subordinates.
2. Take responsibility for your actions regardless of their outcome.

Frederick the Great has been appointed project chief, and the other members of the group detailed are:

Julius Caesar

Napoleon Bonaparte

Hamilcar Barca

George Washington (recorder).

Alexander, chairman of the board of governors, has liberally consented to allow the leadership group to sit jointly on a proceeding, about to begin, concerning the nomination of an American by the name of George Smith Patton to the Military Hall of Fame. The principals are in place. General Foch, master-at-arms, calls the room to order and the examination begins.

All members are duly sworn in the usual military manner. There is some discussion as to order of rank, which is quickly ironed out by Alexander. Washington reads the order convening the board and prepares to make his opening statement.

"May it please the board," interrupts Patton's counsel, "the nominee respectfully requests to challenge Hector for cause."

Alexander momentarily frowns at this legal gibberish so recently introduced at Fiddler's Green, and, after quickly checking his Special Regulations on procedure, directs counsel to present evidence.

Hector is called to the stand, is sworn, and Patton's counsel begins interrogation.

"Did you indicate your disapproval of General Patton to a group of club members just before this board convened?"

Hector frowned but replied in the affirmative.

"Explain to the board the reason for your remarks."

"In Patton's youth he often played games with his friends. Invariably, he assumed the role of Achilles and proclaimed that as such he was a superior swordsman to Hector. Naturally this is untrue because. . . ."

Alexander intervened impatiently. "Your opinion is undoubtedly biassed and obviously irrelevant. Do you have anything else to offer?"

"No, sir."

"Then you should have challenged yourself," admonished Alexander. "You're dismissed."

Hector saluted the board and stormed out of the room.

"Proceed," directed Alexander.

Washington called General Patton to the stand.

Patton glanced at the members of the board. For the first time in his memory he felt overawed in the presence of this famous group. He rose and smartly saluted the board. The oath was administered.

Alexander angrily pounded his fist on the table and roared. "There is absolutely no need for the oath here. These people were all closely screened prior to their arrival. Let's get on with the matter."

"Your name, sir?"

"General George S. Patton."

"What were your last three assignments, General?"

Patton looked up at Washington in astonishment before he remembered the international timelessness of this place.

"Commanding General, United States Fifteenth Army; Commanding General, United States Third Army; Commanding General, United States Seventh Army."

Washington explained the objectives of the project and directed him to watch a film clip for the purpose of comment upon the actions and orders he observed.

Patton and the board leaned slightly forward in expectancy. The projector flashed on and Patton immediately identified the picture to be a documentary film of the Sicilian Campaign during World War II. The screen portrayed Patton receiving a telegram from his commander, General Harold Alexander, directing him to take up a defensive position in the vicinity of Caltanissetta for the purpose of covering the left rear of the British Eighth Army attacking northward.

General Patton was visibly angered at the contents of the telegram, and after a moment he called Generals Keyes, Wedemeyer and Gay into his command post. Together they are shown drafting a plan for an enveloping attack to seize the town of Palermo. The film reeled on, showing Patton flying to General Alexander's headquarters in North Africa, where he presents the plan for approval. After some lengthy discussion with General Alexander, Patton smiles and finally departs on his return trip to Sicily. Succeeding scenes reveal Patton's entire force in a general advance which, after some severe fighting, carried them into Palermo.

The lights suddenly came on in the room and the projector was shut off. There was a moment of silence as if all present were off in faraway places day-dreaming of battle participation.

Washington cleared his throat and said, "Do you recognize the action, General?"

"That's my Seventh Army knockin' hell out of the Germans and Italians in Sicily," said Patton. Almost instantly he remembered the directive Washington had put out decrying the use of profanity. He glanced at Washington and nervously coughed. Faint smiles flickered over the faces of the other members on the board.

"Explain your actions, General," said Washington in a sterner tone of voice.

Patton shifted in his seat and directed his remarks to the members of the board. "I have always felt that the cardinal principle of leadership is the complete acceptance of responsibility for the direction of my command toward purposeful, legitimate goals. Once I have accepted authority, I must accept accompanying responsibility. It is not sufficient to accept responsibility for a given mission only, but every effort must be made to seek responsibilities of the kind which enhance

the value of my organization to the next higher command. In a crisis the true leader must be decisive in meeting the demands of a situation and prepared to assume unhesitatingly whatever additional authority is necessary to meet that situation. Guided by what I believe to be the intent of my superior, I am always prepared to assume full responsibility for my actions.

"I sincerely believed in this case that General Harold Alexander did not mean exactly what his directive implied to me. There was also the strong possibility that he was not fully aware of my tactical position. I therefore took the liberty to frame the course of action I believed General Alexander would have taken were he in a similar position. If an emergency existed, I would have acted without first taking the time to gain approval. Of course, I would also recognize my position in the matter of assuming the responsibility for the action."

The members of the board nodded in agreement. Alexander the Great inquired if there were any questions and Julius Caesar rose from his chair. He walked toward the witness, inspecting General Patton closely for several minutes. Finally, he asked, "What were you and General Alexander talking about in his command post for so long in the film, General?"

Patton replied, "I was explaining the situation to General Alexander and pointing out the various elements of my proposed operations plan."

"Was that all?" said Caesar.

"There was one other matter discussed. General Alexander stipulated that my attack be a reconnaissance in force."

"Reconnaissance in force, General!" exclaimed Caesar. "If I remember the film correctly, I saw at lease the equivalent of two divisions. Will you explain that?"

Patton grinned a little as he remembered the situation and said, "I committed all the troops I had available at the time, sir. If the attack had failed, I would have been relieved."

Caesar pondered the answer for a moment, then walked back to his seat asking, "How did the campaign turn out, General?"

A German general sitting in the spectator section stomped out of the room and slammed the door.

"Disregard that last question," said Caesar. "No further questions."

Washington then directed Colonel Jomini, court clerk, to read a passage from a document entitled "Sicilian Campaign, 1943":

During the advance on Messina, along the north road in Sicily, we had made one successful amphibious turning operation and were in the act of executing a second one when, shortly after supper, General Keyes, who was with the 3d Division, telephoned me that General Bradley, commanding the II Corps, of which the 3d Division was a unit, and General Truscott, commanding the 3d Division, were both convinced that this second amphibious operation was too dangerous, and therefore requested authority to postpone it. I told General Keyes

to tell them it would not be postponed and that I would be there at once.

I took General Gay with me, dropping him off at the beach, where the amphibious troops were then taking off, with orders to see that they took off. I then went to the Headquarters of the 3d Division, which was under limited shell fire, and found General Truscott, a most dashing officer, suffering from such physical fatigue that he was convinced that the operation could not succeed. I directed him to carry it out, stating that if he succeeded he would get the full credit, and that if he failed I would take the blame. I then called General Bradley on the telephone and told him the same thing. I stated to both of them that, having complete confidence in them, I was returning to my Headquarters, because if I stayed around I would fail to show confidence.[1]

The next morning I received word that the attack had been a complete success.

General Washington broke in on the narrative at this point and thanked Colonel Jomini. "General Patton, do you recognize that résumé?"

"Yes, sir, I do. That is a quote from my diary."

"Exactly," said Washington. "Will you comment further upon the reasons for your action here?"

General Patton began by saying, "It is a very difficult thing to order two officers in whom you have great confidence to carry out an operation which neither of them thinks possible.[2] I was almost compelled to direct the second amphibious turning operation personally, but I decided against that course of action. I have always felt that the delegation of responsibility as well as its acceptance requires a secure relationship with one's subordinates and senior. That secure relationship is based primarily on the mutual trust and confidence each has for the other. I realized that both Generals were very tired, and that accounted for their pessimism. It was my responsibility to stimulate their desire to continue to contribute to the overall operation. If I took the task myself, I certainly could not have properly fulfilled my responsibilities of the army commander, nor would I be properly developing my subordinates."

Hamilcar Barca listened in earnest as his mind went back to the First Punic War. He remembered vividly his occupation of Messina and the ensuing battles with the Roman Legions sent to oust him from Sicily. His mental reconstruction was so realistic that he began talking to himself, and was heard to murmur, "If only I had used *young* Patton's trick of amphibious envelopment, I'd have defeated the Romans, I'm sure. . . . My boy (Hannibal) wouldn't have had to cross the Alps to destroy Rome. . . . By Zeus—it would have been Carthage, *and not Ro.* . . ."

"Hold!" spoke up Caesar, who overheard the monologue. "You fail to reckon with the Roman Legionnaire. He . . ."

[1] "War as I Knew It," George S. Patton, Jr. Houghton Mifflin Co., p. 380.

[2] Ibid.

"At ease!" bellowed Alexander. "This is no time or place to fight your mythical campaigns. Get on with the show, George."

Washington bade Patton continue his explanation.

"I was certain," continued Patton, "that the Germans were on the run. If I could prevent them from getting set, as they could easily have done (given several hours of freedom), I would be able to finish them with little cost in soldiers' lives. I have studied all of your campaigns, and I felt certain that the calculated risks you took in similar situations proved to be the decisive factor in achieving victory at the cheapest price in lives."

Patton looked into the ageless face of Napoleon, and asked, "Did you once say, 'At the beginning of a campaign, to advance or not to advance is a matter of grave consideration; but when once the offensive is undertaken, it must be maintained to the last extremity. Because retreats always cost more men and material than the most bloody engagements—with this difference—that in a battle the enemy's loss is nearly equal to your own, whereas in a retreat the loss is on your side alone'?"

Napoleon nodded, and a smile of recognition lighted his features at the repetition of one of his old maxims. Before he could comment, however, there was a slight commotion in the rear of the room. Marshal Vandamme rose exclaiming, "Then why in hell didn't you pursue Schwarzenberg after defeating him at Dresden in 1813? If you hadn't been so damn interested in Josephine you could have destroyed him in pursuit. But no . . . you let him retreat at leisure, allowing him to surround my force at Kulm, where he nonchalantly transferred only 20,000 of my soldiers to Fiddler's Green!"

Napoleon's smile turned to a scowl. A shadow of regret momentarily crossed his face. He rose and directed Marshal Foch to escort Vandamme from the room. As the two departed, Vandamme turned, and pointing his finger at Napoleon he shouted, "It was your responsibility, *mon* General!"

A tense atmosphere gripped the room. In a moment Alexander turned and in a loud voice said, "How successful were you in the pursuit of Mademoiselle Josephine, *mon* General?"

The soldiers howled in glee as Napoleon squirmed. Washington quickly bade Patton to continue. "I was prepared to assume full responsibility for that second amphibious force if they were defeated. It has always occurred to me that my authority to direct held me responsible for results, if not by my commander, then certainly before God. The full impact of this fact is the worst burden of all."

Patton fell silent as he reflected upon the events that transpired during his judgment before he was sent to Fiddler's Green. Although he had honestly felt that he had made every effort to prepare for his leadership role in life—plunged every last effort and energy into each mission, he was shocked at the balance-sheet shown him revealing the lives expended in carrying out his directives. Perhaps I was too lax—maybe I should have been more relentless.

Washington broke his introspection with his question to the board. "Do you desire further interrogation?"

"Apparently not," replied Alexander, as he looked up and down at the members of the board.

Jomini had prepared complete records of Patton's campaigns and had sent them to the senior tactical review board, where they were studied and criticized as only a senior tactical review board can. Results of the examination were then submitted in evidence.

Alexander asked Frederick if he had any more witnesses in connection with his project. If so, he would be permitted to examine them now and be able to take advantage of the merits of any additional help the board of governors might provide.

Frederick directed Washington to proceed.

"Gentlemen, there is a witness who is well qualified to testify, but who is not present. I have caused an exhaustive search to be made of all Forms 66 on officers recently assigned and joined to determine the availability of personnel who have had close relationship with the absent witness. One officer now present is prepared to testify for the absent officer, subject, of course, to your approval."

"This is most irregular, General Washington. Ordinarily I would not allow this sharp break in precedence, but if it will tend to clarify issues now before this group you may proceed."

General Washington recalled Patton to the stand. After he was seated, Washington began to question him. "General, your records indicate that you have been closely associated with General Dwight David Eisenhower for many years of your active career. Is this true?"

"That is quite true," replied Patton.

"What is your opinion of him, General?"

"I know General Eisenhower to be a most outstanding military leader of unquestionable character and ability."

"Will you draw upon your recollections and furnish the board with some examples of his leadership and techniques? You realize, General, that you do not have to bring up any information which would prove unfavourable to you."

Patton instantly shot back, "Sir, I have absolutely nothing to conceal from this or any other board or court. Furthermore, I resent any implication that I might be withholding information from this board."

Alexander cautioned Washington and directed him to phrase his questions in such a manner as to indicate the court's complete faith in the veracity of the witness. Washington apologized, and Patton, still somewhat disgruntled, went on with his statement. "As a Colonel, I commanded a tank brigade in France during World War I. General Eisenhower, at that time a captain, was placed in command of a tank training centre in the United States. It was unusual for an officer of that grade to be given an assignment of that importance and responsibility. About 30,000 recruits were sent to his installation

for tank training. Ike, as we affectionately referred to him unofficially, built that camp from barren ground into an efficient training centre—a model for any other centre to follow. The support given him was practically non-existent at first and circumstances were extremely trying. Beside that, he was issued one tank with which he had to train that large body of troops. Nevertheless, he undertook the job with commendable success. The replacements he sent overseas to me were so well trained that it took a minimum of time to orient them in the operation of the vehicles in my command before they were committed in combat.

"When the war was over we were assigned to the same station, and my impression of his capabilities was confirmed. He expended prodigious energy in study and analysis of the campaigns just concluded, striving to find solutions to the problems. He constantly drove himself to be prepared adequately for command should he be given the opportunity in the future.

"I believe that the mark of a leader is directly proportional to his effort and energy applied in prior preparation for possible assignment to high positions of great responsibility. Pleas of ignorance have never taken responsibility away.

"His preparation was not in vain. He was assigned the tremendous responsibility of organizing and leading the Allied forces in World War II. By that time he had surpassed me in rank through his great talent and organizational capability.

"To him fell the task of uniting all Allied effort."

During Patton's opening remarks the Duke of Marlborough slipped into a vacant seat in the rear of the room. The old campaigner listened with increasing interest to the remarks about uniting Allied efforts. Before he knew it, he was lost in the swirling reminiscences of the countless obstacles that faced him during his command of the Grand Alliance during the Queen Anne's War. Old wounds ached as he recalled the petty bickering and political machinations that ultimately lost him his command. One thing quickly reminded him of another — Lille, Ghent, Blenheim — where he finally defeated Ta'lard. . . . Gibraltar belonged to England! He speculated on the political importance of that acquisition already proud in the realization of its military and naval importance. His reeling mind slowly spiralled back to hear Patton's high voice describing a man who met and solved similar problems and trod the same battlefields.

"During the early days of our campaign in North Africa Ike was beset with political entanglements as well as military problems. If the campaign were to go rapidly and successfully, every effort had to be made to gain early French assistance."

An old French war horse of Verdun fame visibly stiffened as Patton described the chaos of politics that persisted in those trying days. How well he, Pétain, remembered the political embroilments that led to the *humilities* he suffered in the twilight of his professional career;

the Axis *heel* poised to *rape* all of his beloved France, his promises to defend the territories or suffer complete occupation. . . . A desire to grasp hands with the allies and shake off the yoke—Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, RESPONSIBILITY. . . .

Patton's voice grew angry as he continued. "The political situation was being handled by the State Department within its own channels without timely notification of its actions or decisions being given to Eisenhower. When the situation, as Ike saw it, demanded that the solution was to work through Darlan, he became the scapegoat in a political scramble vastly exaggerated by opportunists the world over. When pseudo-officialdom, in the guise of American and foreign politicians, aided by newsmen, jeopardized his position, he demonstrated his great capacity for assuming responsibility. What prestige he may have inadvertently lost through his initial, real politico-ineptitudes was more than transcended by his military brilliance and extraordinary facility in achieving unity of the various nationalities within his command. The very fact that he made no effort to shift this responsibility or plead ignorance of the details over which he had little control is signal proof of his loyalty and capability of accepting the responsibility for his own sincere decision."

News had quickly spread to the Tap Room of the club that a newcomer was being examined. A bewhiskered old soldier downed his drink at the bar and walked over to the boardroom. General Grant was shown to a seat beside General Pershing, who filled him in on what had already transpired. Pershing's regard for General Patton had grown steadily since they both had served on the Mexican Border together. When the tumult of World War II boiled over, old Black Jack was forgotten by everyone except Patton. The memory of that farewell salute by young George at his bedside still brought a tear to his eye.

Patton's voice went to still higher pitch as he continued. "Ike learned his lesson quickly. He wasn't to be hamstrung in the same political snare again. His adroit handling of the political implications involved in the liberation of Paris, as well as the problems inherent in the smooth handling of the chain of command during the European campaigns contributed immeasurably to the solidification of the Allied effort. If I were a politician, I'd seriously consider him Presidential timber."

Grant and Washington winced at the thought. As one they considered the vast chasm between the handling of military affairs and guiding the intricate complications of democratic processes of government.

Alexander the Great, Caesar, Frederick, Napoleon—many of the others instantly contemplated upon the wisdom of a professional soldier undertaking such tremendous additional responsibilities; but even they were unaccustomed to democracy and its ponderous ways.

Patton's voice went on. "When I became enraged at a young soldier for what I believed to be malingering during the Sicilian Campaign, I struck him in the face. The repercussions were again way

out of proportion to the incident and placed Ike in a terribly compromising spot. I earnestly believed that my responsibilities to the individuals who lay in the hospitals and to the others who daily flirted with death on the battlefield demanded drastic positive action to prevent malingering in any and all of its dirty manifestations.

"Ike must have realized my true motives. Aside from a strong letter directing my public apology and pointing out the bungling error in my procedure, he kept me on the team. The pressure of Army morale and public opinion was enormous, but he still stood up for me. His ruthless dismissal of incompetents and disloyal elements was more than balanced by his sometimes reckless loyalty to the subordinates he sensed were conscientious, capable but human.

"He was able to stimulate his subordinates to great efforts. They felt disheartened if they realized that their results were letting him down. Here is the essence of the principle of delegation.

"In delegating enormous responsibilities to his senior commanders, Ike never shifted blame upon them when he was under fire for results. At the same time he granted maximum freedom of action to those subordinates, even when the action was critical. The endless ramifications of protocol — which nationality should command and who and where they should fight—consistently focused hypercritical world opinion on his decisions.

"He discreetly maintained control and made the important overall decisions. His reactions were wise and immediate; he exuded supreme confidence, even though he inwardly quaked at the enormity of consequence incident to some of those decisions."

The old campaigners were lost in the vivid memories of the awesome trials and tribulations visited upon them as a result of their appointments to positions of responsibility. Many remembered the secret desires and momentary wishes for the peace and complacency of anonymity—the flashes of temptation to turn their backs and let the situation carry itself . . . and be damned.

But as they remembered the successes because of redoubled efforts during those trying times when order was brought to chaos, their shoulders straightened, and the pride of a soldier's accomplishment surged up within. The leaders thrive on responsibility—followers avoid its terrifying effects.

No one realized for a moment that Patton had concluded. All in the jampacked room were silent in happy reverie of the excitement of the old days. Suddenly, Alexander straightened and asked, "Have you anything else, General Washington?"

"Not at this time, sir."

Alexander called a recess and the board retired to consider the records and testimony presented by General Patton. The members of the leadership project conferred to determine the impact of Patton's remarks.

Several hours later the proceedings were reopened. The room was immediately filled with distinguished spectators. Generals Lee and Grant were deep in conversa-

tion when Foch called them all to attention.

The board filed in and took their seats. Alexander asked Frederick if he had a statement to make at this time. Frederick rose and read from a prepared document. "Disguised in the trappings of power, glory and authority, command responsibility is a lonely, wearisome and demanding curse. It is to be handled only by those who fear it not, but eagerly accept its burden.

"Look for leaders among those who seek responsibility and diligently prepare to undertake it.

"Develop the sense of responsibility in subordinates to prepare them for greater capacity.

"Delegate authority—if you don't, responsibility will soon grow so heavy that you will fail to properly discharge it or break under its onerous effects.

"There remains no doubt that willingness to accept responsibility is truly the foundation of all leadership.

"The principles: Seek responsibility and develop responsibility in subordinates; and take responsibility for your actions, regardless of their outcome, are valid and pertinent principles of leadership."

Alexander agreed with the committee's findings and then directed General Patton to stand before the board.

Patton's heart beat faster; there was an imperceptible quiver in his hands as he stiffly assumed his position in front of the board.

The cadets inspecting the statue of General Patton at West Point stared in disbelieving amazement at the bronze features . . . could it be . . . was the statue smiling, or was it just the optical illusion sometimes caused by the sun casting shadows over the metal and stone?

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