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

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BRITISH COMMONWEALTH INTEGRATION

AN AUSTRALIAN VIEWPOINT

Brigadier M. F. Brogan, OBE
Australian Staff Corps

"The whole conduct of war is like the action of a complicated machine with an immense amount of friction; so that combinations which are easily made on paper can only be carried into execution by very great exertion."

—Von Clausewitz, circa 1835.

Introduction

IN the present circumstances of peace and small wars the integration of Australian units and personnel with those of other Commonwealth countries is being effected with agreeable concord and compatibility. This happy condition has not always been in evidence nor does it necessarily follow that such amity will be sustained if our respective countries find themselves involved together in a major or a global war. Precedent unfortunately is against such a postulation, but, providing all concerned are prepared to approach the problem with open minds and frank expression, a repetition of the acrimony and misunderstanding which has preceded previous operational alliances can be avoided. This is an unofficial Australian point of view of Commonwealth integration and it is realised that, in isolation, it has little significance, but is only in real perspective when viewed alongside the cases of the United Kingdom and the other Dominions concerned.

Australia's Military History

The various conditions surrounding the ease or lack of it in which Australian forces have been integrated with other Commonwealth forces is probably best understood by a brief review of the origins and growth of the Australian Army, together with the attitude with which Australia has approached various conflicts.

The mi itary history of Australia is not extensive, being less than 100 years, but during this span there have been five occasions on which Australians have fought alongside troops from other parts of the Commonwealth.

Following the withdrawal in 1870 of British Imperial forces which had since 1788 garrisoned the Australian colonies, the latter were thrown on their own resources to provide for their respective defences. This situation was hailed by colonists as a step towards Federal status and the colonies (later to become States of the Commonwealth of Australia) severally set about their task with martial ardour and, of course, modelled their armies on that which they knew best, namely the British. The assessment of the then threat cannot be traced, but, whatever it was, the authorities were quite sanguine about meeting it—in fact they were spoiling for a fight.

The opportunity came in 1885 following the death on 26 January of General Gordon at Khartoum, which precipitated an upsurge of patriotism in the Australian colonies, particularly in New South Wales. There, the Premier of the day immediately offered to assist the Mother Country by contributing a New South Wales volunteer force of two batteries of artillery and a battalion of infantry. This represented one-third of the military strength of NSW. England replied on the following day, accepting the battalion, but declining with thanks one of the batteries of artillery. The colony of New South Wales was at war with the Mahdi. The other Australian colonies were not at war as their offers to assist had been declined with thanks by the Imperial Government. The contribution of the colony was made in a spirit of patriotism, but with humility. Any problems in integrating this force with Imperial forces did not arise. It was taken for granted by all concerned that the colonial volunteers formed a subordinate contingent within the British force operating in the Sudan. It would have been temerity on the New South Wales commander's part to have queried this position.

It was a short war as far as the New South Wales soldiers were concerned. They were assembled, trained, transported, fought and returned to Australia within the year. The real point is that a gesture had been made which was to form an historical precedent in subsequent conflicts.

The next call came during the Boer War in 1899, when all colonies (states) in Australia rallied around and each offered to send contingents to South Africa. This offer was accepted by the Imperial Government which, however, stipulated that no officer above the rank of captain was to be sent from Australia, except that colonies who sent more than one battalion would be permitted to send a major.

Again there was no question of the Australian colonies having any say in the higher direction of the war, nor in the command of any sizeable field force in the battle zone.

It is interesting at this stage to note that the contingents from the Australian colonies had a certain amount of difficulty in integrating themselves. We see, for instance, the ludicrous situation of Captain Cameron, commanding the Tasmanian contingent, boarding the same troopship, the Medic, in which the Victorian contingent embarked under the command of Major Eddy, when Captain Cameron refused to put himself or his men under command of the major as they were from separate colonies and their respective forces could be considered as mutually foreign. Cameron said

that his orders from Tasmania were to report to the Commander-in-Chief in South Africa and that was what he was going to do, and until he had he was in command of his own men. However, at home the federation of Australian states into the Commonwealth of Australia was imminent, and such was the spirit of mateship on the veldt that after fighting alongside each other in South Africa until November 1899 the Australian colonies decided that their contingents should unite into a federal regiment. This amalgamation in the field was done and was an immediate success from the operational and morale point of view.

However, such a situation was too good to last and shortly after the commander of the Australian regiment had suggested that British officers might be attached to it for instruction in mounted infantry, higher authority disbanded the regiment within five months of its formation, and reorganized it into a mixed brigade comprising British, Canadian, New Zealand and Australian forces. The brigade was divided into corps and the organization was so arranged that an Imperial battalion was in each corps, together with one colonial battalion. In addition the command of the formation and the senior staff appointments went to British officers. The former CO of the Australian regiment (Colonel Hoad) was honoured to become the AAG in the new set-up, and other senior Australian officers were given lesser posts in the redistribution. This caused a lot of ill-feeling at the time, but no serious acrimony was engendered. In any case nothing could be done about it as no international agreement existed on the subject. Neither on their departure from Australia nor after their arrival in South Africa were the Australian commanders given any clear-cut directive as to their powers or their relative positions. As in the Sudan, it was assumed that they were completely subordinate to British commanders.

The next call came in 1914, when an Australian Imperial Force of volunteers was moved to the Middle East and later to France to aid the allied cause. On this occasion the Commander-in-Chief (Maj-Gen Sir William Throsby Bridges) was given a directive which was published in the *Australian* Commonwealth Gazette of 19 September 1914. It confined itself to administrative matters, but left unstated any political directions relating to the operational employment of Australian troops. At the outset and even after the failure of the Gallipoli campaign this subjugation of the AIF to the operational direction of the United Kingdom or Allied Higher Command was unequivocally accepted, but later both the C-in-C of the Canadians (General Currey) and the C-in-C of the Australians (General Monash) were highly critical of the management of the war, and following the application of pressure the Australian Prime Minister was invited to join the Imperial War Cabinet.

Between World Wars I and II much thought was given to the rights of the Dominions to be more vocal in the higher strategical direction of future wars and more influential in their tactical execution. Thus we find, for instance, an Australian officer, Lt-Col H. D. Wynter, in January 1925 advocating in the Army Quarterly that strategical and operational responsibility to various parts of the world should be allo-

cated amongst UK and the Dominions[1]. Major A. R. Selby, another Australian officer writing in the same journal in October 1925, develops the theme and advances a peacetime system of integrating the General Staffs of the Dominions with the Imperial General Staff, particularly in the spheres of Operations and Intelligence.

However, little in the suggested directions was effected, but it is noteworthy that when General Blamey led the Second AIF to the Middle East in 1940 he was armed with a directive which quite categorically expressed the Government's decision that the Force must retain its Australian entity and that the Commander-in-Chief could communicate with the Australian Government on both operational and administrative matters and he could make such decisions as were compatible with the general terms of the directive.

It was the implementation of this Charter which caused the few incidents of strained Commonwealth relationships which occurred during the early phases of the war. In particular, the Australians objected to the whittling away of divisions by reorganizing them into small columns for use in isolated operations. General Blamey terms it the "Middle East penchant for breaking up formations." The C-in-C and his staff officers were continually up against this problem of disintegration and threatened loss of national identity, but in most cases their point was conceded and the AIF fought mainly as complete formations. The New Zealand Expeditionary Force had the same experience but to an even less acceptable degree[2].

The term "integration" as far as Australia was concerned began to become really significant when the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan was being organized immediately after World War II. Australia, denied the chance to take part in a final onslaught on Japan, was eager enough to accept a prominent role in consolidating the allied victory by occupying the homeland of the defeated enemy. Australia was both proud and gratified that an Australian soldier was selected as Commander-in-Chief of the force. It should be recognized, however, that the role to be played by this integrated force was non-operational and that some measure of integration was convenient and economical for all concerned. Nevertheless the Brigade Groups retained their national homogeneity and integration was only fully implemented on Force HQ and, to a lesser extent, in the base organization.

The soundness of the principles and methods on which BCOF was founded were well vindicated on the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. The transition from a peace routine to a war footing was rapid, but in the circumstances, relatively smooth. Now a form of double integration came into being as the integrated British Commonwealth field force in Korea came under the United Nations C-in-C (USA) for operations, but remained subordinate to the C-in-C BCFK in Japan for logistic support—a somewhat complex

1. A more modern version of this concept of Imperial Defence is given by Brig. C. N. Barclay, CBE, DSO, British Army, in Brassey's Annual, 1951, wherein he nominates dominions to areas of strategic responsibility.

2. See speech in the House of Lords by Lord Freyberg on 15 Apr. 53.

situation from the academic viewpoint, but one which, in the main, proved effective.

Our current activity in Commonwealth integration has its setting in the Far East, where Australian units and staff officers are integrated with those of the United Kingdom. The main Australian contribution is one battalion to a Commonwealth brigade group. Naturally enough, the Australians are under the command of local theatre commanders for operations, but are controlled administratively by their own commander. The Australian contingent has been in Malaya less than a year, but present indications are that its presence and its method of control are fraught with no insurmountable difficulties once the inevitable but minor administrative maladies of shaking down are adjusted.

Identity Preservation

The stage of integration we have reached gives cause for current satisfaction, but does this mean that all will be well in the future? It is reiterated that the recent and present situations have not been brought about during or under the threat of a major war. It is quite unreal to argue from the experience of small wars to a major war. In any war in which the Dominions contribute substantial forces the considerations of Korea and Malaya will not apply, but the considerations of World Wars I and II will.

We must face political realities and the certainty that the Australian Government's contribution to forces overseas will undoubtedly be subject to certain provisoes. Not the least of the latter will again be insistence on the retention of Australia's entity as a fighting force in any operation. If formations are detached or split there is likely to be immense pressure from the troops (98 per cent. non regular), the public and from Parliament to bring them together again. In such cases integration is likely to be confined to Army, Theatre and Communications Zone HQ staffs.

It follows that it is idle to talk about integration below the largest formation which can be formed from the force contributed by a Dominion. Below that point it is simply not feasible except as a temporary expedient. It is worth remembering that integration on a grand scale was tried out in World War II in the Empire Air Scheme. Despite a lot of rather fulsome writing on the subject the fact remains that there was constant pressure from Dominion members to be organised in their own units. At the outbreak of war in 1939 and later during that war the Australian Government declined to accept the Admiralty's suggestions for the disposition of units of the Royal Australian Navy. Similar difficulties arose with regard to the deployment of the AIF following the entry of Japan into the war, when the British and Australian Governments did not see eye to eye on the relative importance of the Middle East and New Guinea. All of this is unfortunate, but is reality nevertheless.

In small wars, similar considerations apply. If Australia should contribute a formation it is most likely that the condition will be that it retains its national structure. Integration will be possible only when the contribution is less than a brigade and, even here, integration will lose its significance if attempted within units. The optimum level and degree of integration must be worked out in each case.

This preservation of national identity was well recognized in Burma by our present Commander-in-Chief, Field-Marshal Slim, when commanding the XIV Army, which was composed of a wide range of national formations. Integration was avoided as far as possible. On the contrary he organized the biggest homogeneous formations possible with the object, as he said:—

> ". . . of developing the national characteristics of each component to the maximum extent."

This had the secondary effect of reducing political complications and of simplifying administration.

Selection of Higher Commanders and Staffs

One of the earlier problems to be resolved in the combining of forces of different countries is that of selecting a Supreme Commander or an Allied Commander-in-Chief. This is a most important decision and whilst each participating country, particularly those in or contiguous with the zone of conflict, may hold strong views on the subject, it is hard to overlook the claims of that country making the greatest contribution to the combined effort.[3]. This is a matter of simple arithmetical calculation, after which the selection of the individual becomes a domestic matter. The relationship of the Allied C-in-C to the C-in-Cs of the various countries and of the allied C-in-Cs with their home governments, are more contentious matters and the leaders of national contingents must from the outset be given direction as to where their respective allegiances start and finish. No directive can be completely precise in specifying when a national C-in-C should appeal to or seek guidance from his own Government, nor can it be laid down to what extent an allied Government can intervene in operational matters. The right of political intercession by a sovereign state in respect to the employment of its own forces cannot be disputed since the act of war itself is the result of a political decision, but it is impractical to lay down in exact terms in advance just when, where and how these forces may be employed. Similarly it requires a nice perspicacity on the part of a subordinate C-in-C to discriminate whether projected enterprises are sufficiently foolhardy to justify reporting the facts to his home government, whilst in so doing risking the loss of confidence of his military superiors in his own judgment or integrity, even after a free exchange of views and political directives. The real basis of concerted action, therefore, rests on goodwill, judgment and personalities, and intangible as these factors may be, experience shows that there are no better qualities on which to establish principles of employment of allied forces.

Once the leaders have been selected the process of selecting staffs becomes primarily a matter of personal selection by the leaders themselves. However, assuming that competence is approximately evenly distributed amongst allied personnel, the principle to be borne in mind is that all allies should be represented on the HQ of the formations in which they are serving approximately in proportion to their manpower contribution to that forma-

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3. Lord Freyberg in his speech in the House of Lords on 15 Apr. 53 states that violation of such a condition caused discontent in the Middle East in February 1941, when a British C-in-C was selected to command one British, three Australian, two South African, one New Zealand and two Indian divisions.

tion. Goodwill and co-operation is engendered by the knowledge of the participants that they are adequately represented at the higher echelons and that, if need be, they have a "friend at court" who will attend to their particular interests.

To sum up, the acceptable situation remains as described by Wutzu in 500 BC, viz.:—

> "Where merit is recognized and given rank, wise men appointed, and ability employed."

Particular Australian Considerations
Common Factors

There should be little room for disagreement between Australia and other members of the British Commonwealth on the conduct of operations once the strategic pattern has been formulated. As a race we are of substantially (over 90 per cent.) British origin and "think Western." Although for non-military reasons we live somewhat isolated socially and intellectually from our Asian fellow members, we subscribe to the same tactical philosophies, use fairly standard equipments and at the higher echelons, at least, can communicate in a common language albeit with different accents. Lately the system of intra-Commonwealth interchange of students, staff officers, instructors and regimental officers have been broadened in scope to result in a more universal understanding of individual and common problems.

There is today an increasing awareness in Australia of the influence of Asia on Australian affairs and the implications of new Far Eastern nationalisms in the conduct of our affairs and foreign policy. Our previous tendencies to under-rate these trends and to deliberately segregate ourselves from personal and official contact with Asians is being replaced by actions aimed at living in compatibility with our neighbours. Australian diplomatic and commercial relationships in this region are being extended and consolidated. Mutual defence pacts within South-East Asia are being ratified and implemented. Students from Eastern countries are being invited to study in Australia. Food and industrial machinery are being given by Australia to less developed countries. The study of Oriental culture and languages is being encouraged in our educational establishments.

All of these developments to greater Asian understanding are stimulating but novel to the Australian. Before we can become completely in rapport there is much to be learnt about the customs and the taboos of the peoples who have remained practically ignored on our threshold since the first British settlers arrived here in 1788. Human nature being what it is, it is only to be expected that our increasing contacts with the Eastern world will be occasionally marred by misunderstandings on both sides, and that only tolerance and sympathy by each party can circumvent the ever-present possibility of antagonism in such dealings. Time will no doubt smooth out the initial difficulties.

Our differences with both our Eastern and Western partners would appear to stem more from inherent national characteristics as manifest in the implementation of personnel administration, rather than from any basic dissimilarities in the application of military art. Let us examine some of these Australian oddities without attempting to trace their origins or to defend them.

Discipline

Of course "discipline" springs to mind first. It has become customary in certain circles to regard Australians as always the bad boys of the party. Their exploits as frequently related reflect the Australian's apparent basic lack of military, civic and social responsibility. Perhaps there are some instances providing grounds for such a generality, but actually the average Australian soldier is equally as amenable to discipline as is his New Zealand, Canadian or UK counterpart. The main difference is his aversion to the outward forms of discipline and the implication that he is obliged to subjugate his individualism to the dictates of authority. Thus as a soldier he is prepared to go to great lengths to indulge in a clandestine game of "two-up"—a minor misdemeanour which would not occur to him as a civilian, but as a soldier he regards it as the traditional method of outwitting authority. However, the appearance of a military policeman will have the same salutary effect on him as it would on the soldier of any other country.

The social barrier between officers and men of the Australian Army is probably less defined than in other armies. Whilst not completely egalitarian there is less formality and less outward recognition of status which no doubt appears strange to members of more military-minded nations. This situation is a reflection of our national environment where an easy relationship obtains between employer and employee and where 98 per cent. of the army on mobilization is drawn direct from civilian sources. Thus it is not uncommon to hear officers address soldiers by their Christian names, but it is seldom that a soldier presumes upon such a relationship to the prejudice of military discipline.

The administration of discipline to Australian troops abroad is a complex subject and should not be attempted without the guidance of an expert on military law. There are no less than six separate codes applicable to Australians, depending on whether they are integrated completely, partially or not at all. They may serve under the Army Act, the Defence Act, the Army Act modified by Regulations made under the Defence Act for both war service and for peace, the Visiting Forces Act or the Military Law of another Dominion. Thus it is possible to have Australian soldiers in the same theatre subject to differing codes of law, depending on the degree of integration implemented in their respective units. The strict application of military law at present produces such strange situations as UK provosts being permitted to arrest Australians of integrated units, but not those of Australian units who could be caught red-handed with their less fortunate partners in crime. Similarly Australian prisoners from Australian units in Malaya cannot be confined to UK prisons there, but can be legally subjected to such an indignity by being transported across the causeway to Singapore.

It is natural that accused persons should desire to be tried by their own nationals and receive no worse punishment than could be awarded by their own military courts. As a principle, therefore, at least one member of a court martial held on an Australian should be an Australian officer and the punishment awarded must not be greater than could be imposed by an Australian court. In the case of a death sentence the approval of the Governor-

General of Australia in Council is required before its execution, and the approval of the Australian Adjutant-General is required before sentences of cashiering, dismissal or discharge becomes effective.

Equipment

Traditionally we have based our training doctrines and patterns of war equipment on those formulated in UK. Our Expeditionary Forces have in the past been equipped with major items at their place of concentration abroad. Today, however, there can be no guarantee that time will permit of a similar procedure, even if the Mother Country were in a position to be so accommodating.

Our national economy is at present directed towards reducing imports and relying more on our expanding industrial capacity to produce our own requirements. In certain important categories we have attained a valuable self-sufficiency; dramatic developments are in sight and our potential as a main support area is constantly improving. However, it is unlike'y that we will in the foreseeable future attain complete self-sufficiency for war, and in any case such a policy cannot obviously be pursued if by so doing our national solvency is likely to be impaired. Unless there is a worthwhile civilian market in peace for items of war material we must continue to rely on procurement of these from overseas sources, at any rate at the outset of a war. Our Prime Minister in several public utterances abroad has made this point clear, and it is therefore patent that our major allies will be requested to supply our Expeditionary Force with war equipment beyond our prevailing secondary and tertiary industrial resources. Whether these items be provided on the basis of cash in advance, cash on delivery, off-shore payment, lend lease or gift is beyond the scope of our present considerations.

Pay

Rates of pay for Australian other ranks are relatively high, although not as high as those of Canadians. In an integrated force abroad this favourable condition of service should theoretically produce discontent amongs those Commonwealth soldiers not so well remunerated, but in practice little trouble is created. Apart from the fact that other less legal forms of tender appear, the situation is mainly adjusted by higher costs of living and by domestic responsibilities at home. Depicting the Australian soldier abroad as a Croesus has been overplayed.

Motivation

No Australian soldier (or sailor or airman) is abroad as a conscript. He is there because he has expressed a willingness to serve there (Defence Act .9). Whether he has been inspired by patriotism, adventure or escapism the fact that he is there of his own volition renders him unique — the exact nature of his special position depends on the attitude of mind of the contemplator. Under such a condition of service the soldier's nostalgia will be slower to develop than is the case with those of no choice, but once it has asserted itself it could take a more virulent form aggravated by the knowledge that he cannot opt out of self-elected status. It is therefore important that the other side of the bargain be strictly honoured and that the pre-determined period of his service abroad be observed unless, of course, he volunteers for a further period.

Rations

There is probably nothing more conservative than a man's individual taste in food. His likes and dislikes are formed early in life and he will take considerable persuasion if not compulsion before he will consume food for which he has developed an aversion or a prejudice. This matter of taste is usually accepted together with the truism that there is no accounting for it.

In broad national groups, however, definite patterns of basic commodities can be listed which will satisfy all individuals of such groups even if some of them prefer particular items with this or without that garnishing, condiment, sweetener, fattener or some other personal indulgence to palate. The main point in regard to the Australian ration scales is their comparatively wide variety of commodities and the high nutritive value of the daily ration.

In Australian rations for normal home or overseas consumption at least 25 basic commodities with 150 alternatives are provided. They are bulky and vary in caloric content from 4,000 to 4,300 calories. This is lavish compared with, say the Pakistanian ration of 15 basic commodities with 41 alternatives of a daily caloric value of 3,000 to 3,500 calories. It is not claimed that the Australian ration is better than anybody else's or correctly scaled in quantity, variety or energy potential, but it is what the Australian soldier is used to and what he will accept without much grousing. No doubt other members of the Commonwealth would be revolted by some of the items on the Australian scale and possibly at their presentation, such as steak and eggs for breakfast and no kippers for tea. Similarly the average Australian would not exchange his daily 1½ oz. of butter for an Indian's 2 oz. of ghee and probably vice versa. He expects three meat meals a day[4] and likes plenty of bread and jam, but is not prepared to live on it alone.

Where the West Pakistanian will eat 8 oz. of atta and the East Pakistanian 10 oz. of rice per day the Australian will scorn the atta, settle for ½ oz. of rice and then complain. He doesn't care for foods which are "good for him" such as peanut butter, vegemite, fish and cheese, nor does he share the Canadian's affinity for cookies and doughnuts.

As with Military Law the study of rationing is a special study for a particular set of circumstances. The Australian at home enjoys one of the highest standards of living in the world in whatever terms one cares to measure it, e.g., wages, wireless sets or washing machines, and this fact is reflected in the sophistication of his diet which under normal circumstances his own logistical system attempts to provide. But when the need arises, as was demonstrated in the South-West Pacific area in World War II, he has sufficient in physical reserves to survive and remain operational for quite prolonged periods on a less exciting and less nutritious form of subsistence.

Personal Matters

Although matters affecting the personal well-being of each individual of a component are primarily a responsibility of the component

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4. A complex situation exists in Malaya at present. Because of less meat in the UK ration those Australians integrated with UK units receive 9/2 per diem to compensate for this. When the unit transfers to British Operational Rations this allowance continues, but when all transfer to Ration Packs the allowance ceases.

commander it is submitted that in the over-all interests of the morale of the force it is incumbent on the Commander-in-Chief to ensure the efficacy of the methods employed.

There is one aspect of administration which, although it may not appear to be very important at the time, can have far reaching effects on the individual and his family. This is the matter of personal records — their faithful compilation and their correct disposal. Theoretically there is no reason why medical and other personal records originating in an integrated force should not reach their proper destination, and there is no reason to suppose that they do not reach it when the fighting force is small and its administrative echelons generous. Experience shows, however, that where the forces are substantial and units are widely diffused, records do not always reach their destination. This, of course, can be extremely serious for a soldier trying at some future date to prove his repatriation and pension rights, his right to wear a campaign medal, or even his bona fides to join the Returned Servicemen's League of Australia.

Experience shows, too, that when units are widely diffused in an integrated force, the troops are deprived of the services and the creature comforts which contribute so much to the maintenance of morale, e.g., prompt delivery of mail from home, provision of their own badges, buttons and clothing, canteens stocked with the goods they want, the hospital routine and atmosphere to which they are accustomed, etc. No effort should be spared to offset the psychological upset to a soldier brought about by a sudden change of environment or routine, particularly when the latter are unpleasant or irksome.

Conclusions

Commonwealth integration is no longer a mere gesture of homogeneity—it is a necessity of our global defence structure and as such should be approached with a knowledge of its advantages and its shortcomings from the point of view of each contributing partner.

The comparative ease with which integration can be effected under the present military situation cannot necessarily be projected into conditions likely to obtain during a major war—the complexity of the political aspects will militate against this.

The Australian point of view has much in common with those of other members of the Commonwealth, such as an insistence on the preservation of national identity, a proportionate representation in Command and staff appointments and the right of communication by the component commander with his home government on both domestic and operational matters. The difficulties of decision in this matter by the Commander-in-Chief are appreciated. In this aspect of consultation the attitude of Australia has changed from complete subordination when in 1885 her contribution to Imperial Forces was small, to equity in recent times when her participation has been relatively considerable. This attitude has run parallel with the march to her present national status in world affairs.

A preliminary study is necessary in each context to determine both the optimum level at which integration can be effective and the degree of integration which should be im-

plemented. The main factor is relative contribution, but there are other tempering influences.

Australia is expanding contacts with Asian members of the Commonwealth, but this new attitude may well be accompanied by misunderstandings on both sides in the early stages of its implementation.

In a plan of integration involving Australians the particular domestic problems of the latter in regard to discipline, equipment, rations, records and the like will repay consideration.

With the best will in the world it is inevitable that some difficulties will accompany integration. As Clausewitz said, "Very great exertion" will be required to overcome "an immense amount of friction." Directives by higher authorities, political or military, can never be framed in precise terms without inhibiting operational thought or action. Much must be left to the personalities of the commanders concerned, to their knowledge and to their judgment, but above all to the goodwill engendered by all concerned in their pursuit of the common aim.

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MAINTENANCE OF THE AIM: TRAINING FOR WAR

Captain A. H. Lofts,
Royal Australian Infantry

THE aim of this paper is to draw attention to the great amount of time which is consumed in training of a purely ceremonial nature, and to suggest a way in which this time may be reduced materially without detriment to discipline or efficiency.

Examination of any unit training syllabus will show a very high percentage of training time devoted to "drill." Conversely, examination of weapon training results will show a disturbingly low level of weapons efficiency in the Army as a whole. I am convinced that in most units these factors are closely related. Furthermore, the administratively easy escape which this drill and ceremonial type of training offers to the unimaginative, the overworked, or the lazy becomes a potent factor in many units and formations.

Let us clarify our thinking on one basic essential, i.e., "Why do we have an army?" This question, I feel, may be answered broadly in two parts.

(a) In war an army is required to play its part as one of the essential forces in achieving victory.

(b) In peace, whatever that may be, "an army in being" becomes an instrument of national diplomacy, enabling a nation to speak in international affairs from a position of strength.

Now it is obvious that among democratic nations a peace-time regular army of sufficient size and strength to perform its role in war is not an economic or social possibility. So we arrive at the conclusion that our peace-time army must be the framework on which our wartime army is built. We are, in other words, faced with the vital problem of converting a large number of men of essentially civilian habits and background into officers and men of a wartime army.

And how much time have we to effect this transformation? Perhaps three months, perhaps six months,

certainly not nearly long enough. Can we do it with present training methods? I am sure that we cannot. TIME is the factor, and we do not control time. Saving of time is therefore our problem, because of:

(a) The general shortage of instructors.

(b) Limited time which is available at National Service training battalions and CMF Units.

(c) Training priorities in which we never have enough time to reach a satisfactory standard in weapon training or tactics.

(d) The training methods which we use in peace will obviously be used in time of war, therefore our peacetime methods must be suitable for use in time of war. If we wait until the outbreak of war to arrange our training schedules and methods, it will be too late—tragically late.

Two matters have arisen from the recent war which could be examined here:—

(a) That, in an analysis of World War II battle casualties, the US Army found that approximately one-third of casualties resulted directly or indirectly from LACK OF TRAINING.

(b) That our recent enemies the Germans, who should be perhaps in the best position to know, considered our greatest military weakness lay in "the excessively long time which it took our system of command to react to a change in circumstances at tactical levels." The authority for this statement is in the military writings of Rommel and Mellinthin, whose writings are in my opinion particularly objective.

I think it will be agreed that there is no reason why our casualty figures should be markedly different from the US figures if honestly analyzed, and our predisposition for set-piece operations is borne out by almost any study of military history, or by attendance at any army tactical school or course. These factors can, in my opinion, emanate from a perhaps conscious or perhaps subconscious recognition of the lack of tactical and weapon training among our fighting troops, staffs and commanders, causing the latter to make plans within the capacity of our forces.

Finally, let us consider some aspects of the matter at unit level.

Consider firstly the time spent in any unit on teaching, practising and revising, and amending ceremonial drills, on eliminating unit quiffs in newly posted members, on drilling out personal drill idiosyncrasies which the last man drilled in. Is it worth it? Don't you end up with a bunch of frustrated and bad-tempered officers and men, and what have you achieved towards the aim of fitting the unit for battle? Would it not be better to eliminate all drills which do not contribute to battle efficiency? I suggest we could start with the following:—

Eliminate:

(a) Slope Arms, Order Arms, Present Arms, etc.

(b) Fix and Unfix Bayonets as a drill.

Simplify:

(a) Falling in, on a parade.
Guard mounting procedure.

Institute:

(a) All normal marching with arms to be in the "Rifles slung position."

(b) On ceremonial occasions and when saluting with arms use "Shoulder arms position."

If the time saved in this manner is honestly and actively applied to weapon and tactical training, I think both you, and in due course our opponents, will be more than somewhat surprised.

In conclusion these proposals do not stem from or imply a disregard for drill as such. Smartness and efficiency at drill are essential, but don't you think we could rationalize the business?

I do admit a strong case for "ceremonial drill," otherwise it would not have lasted so long with us. However, in this scientific age I feel that we cannot, in the limited time which we may anticipate, afford to teach and practice "ceremonial drills." Our aim is to "produce battle-worthy men, units and formations," and anything which deviates from the maintenance of this aim must be eliminated.

Mankind takes more pleasure in reading criticism and fault-finding than praise, because it is soothing to individual vanity and conceit to fancy that the reader has become wiser than those about whom he reads.

—*Lord Palmerston.*

ARMY OFFICER

Mercenary or Missionary

Lieutenant-Colonel A. Green
Royal Australian Army Service Corps

Preux chevalier—sans peur et sans reproche.
—Chevalier Bayard.

LIVING in an age of ideologies rather than faiths, when self salesmanship is exalted to the vast detriment of true human worth, the modern army officer finds himself frequently adrift in the economic tides and the technological currents of the times, without star or compass to steer by. It is then that he seeks the satisfying simplicity of the Happy Warrior; the axioms of honest duty and limited, yet adequate, reward, which inspired and sufficed his forebears. Yet there is no flight to a peaceful cloister, in an Army School or a remote garrison, which can guarantee to insulate him from the remorseless onset of contemporary politics, economics and technology. He must seek a valid, tenable faith to sustain him among the plethora of words, ideas, disintegrating philosophies and integrating sciences which assail him.

A Lost Era

The reader who can sustain the sickly ego of the recent Boswell Papers must be amazed at Boswell's fanatical desire to enter the Guards, an aim which he was never to achieve. It is true that snobbery and a parvenu yearning for social acclaim were more responsible for his zeal than any purely military ideal. Nevertheless we can be sure that there must have been hundreds more like Boswell. The life, the livelihood, and the prestige of an officer were much sought after, in contrast with the other ranks whom Boswell's idol Johnson thought inferior to the very criminals in the gaols.

Adverting from the fringe of the profession to its core we find that the lustre of our boyhood heroes, such as Chinese Gordon, Kitchener, Robert E. Lee or Marshal Ney, was derived as much from the general glow of the army as from the quali-

ties of the individual. Contemporary scholars, doctors and lawyers were equally noble, equally valuable, but their professions lacked that distinguishing quality and colour which added to the fame of the soldiers. Arthur Wellesley's brother Mornington was the Governor-General of India at a period of great expansion, yet his reputation is now almost forgotten compared with that of Wellington the soldier. Is it that soldiering as a profession has lost its appeal to the public in recent years, and if so, what does that diminution in status mean to the professional officer?

This has been characterised as the Age of Anxiety. The causes are, allegedly, the disintegration of hitherto unchallenged political and economic systems and the decay of that basic stability which was such a marked feature of the Victorian Era. The erosion of the times is accelerated and amplified by the great mass propaganda media of newspapers and radio, and the violent flux of opinions threatens the essential balance of society. Can it be wondered if the principles of our professional life and conduct are similarly affected? Is there an unvarying standard by which to judge ourselves and the profession we follow?

The Elusive Standard

It is a peculiarity of the military profession that, because we only wage war for limited periods of a soldier's life, we must frame our peace standards by reference to a series of general ideals, and perforce test them in the irrevocable realities of specific wars. Nowhere is this disparity reflected more than in the selection and training of officers, and in the adjustment of the selected officer to his profession. The touchstones of history may afford us a rough guide to the qualities and attitudes which will succeed or fail in given circumstances, but cannot be wholly definitive when the primary factor is that uniquely variable creature—man. It can, however, be fairly stated that the whole health and morality of the profession rests upon a triple contract between soldier, service and people, and that each principal's consideration is vital to the contract.

It is not relevant to discuss the elements which constitute the successful higher commander, or the soldier politician, for these have already been examined at some length by such giants as Field-Marshal Wavell and General de Gaulle. It is rather intended to trace the characteristics which must influence the selection, training, and self-adjustment of the officer in the formative stages, if the officer is to have a happy career and the Army is to develop efficient officers equal to its needs. For, since 1945, the armies we know best have been acclaiming new, idealistic standards to the world, while bemoaning the low standard of the material offering for officer training. And, at the same time, there has been a steady drift of disillusioned and discredited officers, not all misfits, away from the profession. The reason for these anomalies must be important to the professional health of the Army.

Selection and Vocation

A bachelor colonel of my acquaintance summarised the situation from the officer's point of view.

"To stay in this profession, and to take the rough with the smooth, a man simply must have a vocation for soldiering."

There is great truth in his statement, but it will not suffice alone, because it puts the whole onus on the individual, and in application, all that would be needed would be an Infallible Procedure for Selecting Soldiers with Vocations, and the officer problem would be finally solved. Anyway, it is doubtful whether enough embryo military zealots could be found to fill our ranks, even given such machinery. The truth is that the Army, like every great public body, must cut its coat according to the cloth available, in quantity and quality. Thereafter the wear given by the coat depends largely upon the wearer—the Army, and not upon the coat—the officer.

The Commonwealth must therefore select, or accept, the best of the annual crop approximating to the accepted ideal. Rightly regardless of social, economic or academic educational antecedents, the empty ranks of our cadres draw in the neophytes, through RMC, OCS, and the qualification of mature soldiers from the ranks. Such a broad swathe cut from the community needs a common denominator — and that denominator is the professional myth —the mission of the officer.

Education for Command

It was formerly the custom to denounce the educated as, ipso facto, bad soldiers. Certainly some diehard Indian Army recruiters rejected the educated recruit on sight. William Cobbett's illiterate adjutant in the American Colonies, however, depended on the rare literacy of that youthful sergeant-major to read and write his daily routine orders. Since then there has been a complete revolution which insists upon advanced formal education in the aspirant for rank. Yet Napoleon himself a graduate of the conventional artillery academy at Brienne transformed stableboys into satisfactory marshals. Sir William Robertson, by sheer industry and natural adaptability, reached the same rank from similar origins. Formal education is apparently not so essential as a high basic intelligence, which must be combined with drive and a love of the profession.

Apart from purely academic training there is a natural emphasis on the transitional education to fit the entrant for the profession, epitomised in West Point, Kingston, St Cyr, Duntroon and Sandhurst. While this is highly desirable it is obviously not a sine qua non, as the two previous Chiefs of the Imperial General Staff demonstrated, for both graduated from the hard school of war in the ranks. Many soldiers and educationists, our own among them, seek to bring the university to the Army, or the Army to the university, either by drawing more officers from tertiary education or by upgrading the cultural level of the military colleges. All in all, no one type of formal or military education predicates success, although it is obviously a great help, but, without the mental equipment and the inner fire, no man becomes a good officer. Where these qualities exist the Army itself can provide the necessary polish. How otherwise could the Prussian Frederick William have transformed his piccolo-playing son into Frederick the Great; and where did Sir John Monash graduate in generalship?

The Physical Element

Napoleon put the physical factor in war into strict proportion, but the officer has his own material pre-

requisite—the need for a physique equal to the shocks and strains of his profession. Basically fitness for war differs from purely athletic physical condition. It is accepted that many gladiators of sport prove physically unfit for military service. They may be specialist acrobats before the crowd, but be incapable of of prolonged endurance of cold, fatigue, hunger and danger in the field. In the Anglo-Saxon world athletic distinction is of course prized in itself and can confer a peculiar additional prestige upon a qualified leader. Successful generals such as Field-Marshal Montgomery have attached great importance to physical hardihood in all ranks. That eccentric genius Suvorov, who daily stood in his tent, winter and summer, while his batman sluiced him down with buckets full of cold water, was another spartan, who also led by marching alongside his troops, exhorting them "The bayonet is a hero, but the bullet is a fool," and eschewing the comfort of mounted travel for their example and encouragement. It is difficult to prescribe the precise function of physical vigour in the equipment of the officer. Nelson could manage without it, many commanders in the intense battles of the last war collapsed from the lack of it. Contemporary accounts of German failures in Russia emphasize the incidence of psychosomatic illness among commanders at critical phases before Moscow and at Stalingrad. It is recorded that the officiating German commander in the Western Desert died of heart failure at the onset of the Allied advance from Alamein, and Rommel hastened back to retrieve the situation. It is difficult to define the minimum acceptable degree of physical hardihood essential in the officer, since the resultant fortitude is a function of physical and moral qualities. The more there is, the better in general; but without innate mental, as well as physical, toughness an officer cannot be made. Not all of us can aspire to the tough fibre of an old Guards general, Pereira, found dead by the roadside, on a walking tour to Peking in his eightieth year; or Younghusband, who was still climbing the Himalayas at an age when most of us hope to enjoy our pensions.

Technology and the Officer

The modern Army is highly mechanised and demands great technical excellence of its specialists. Unfortunately in peace it never attracts enough of these rare and popular birds. Sometimes they are good technicians and bad soldiers, sometimes they are good neither as technicians nor as soldiers. The dual purpose animal, the true soldier-engineer is the ideal. For him the Army is a happy choice, affording him an education, alternative fields of endeavour, and a freedom which is sometimes denied to his civilian confreres. Earlier technical specialists, such as the oligarchy of artillerymen who practically dominated European armies in the late 19th Century, and elite German railway engineers, enjoyed an especial prestige. Many of our corresponding experts lack such privileges, for instance, in matters of command. It is already pertinent to consider whether an EME is not as qualified for the higher command of modern anti-aircraft formations as any other sort of soldier, and whether some of our arbitrary distinctions between combatant and non-combatant are not invalid. The value of these essential intellects is too grudgingly

acknowledged, since, despite the cataclysmic potentialities of modern weapons, man remains the true measure of military might; that is, the man who understands and controls the new media. Given the ethical purpose of the true soldier, the military technologist is the military man of our times, although he still requires the complementary presence of the pure combat soldier to fulfil his mission.

Personal Faith

God, King and Country have long formed the basis of the military oath. To enquire deeply into the inter-relationship of these profound loyalties and beliefs is a philosophical and psychological exercise beyond the present scope. The assumption that imminent personal victory is inseparable from the Divine Will may often appear to the impartial as an impertinence, if not a blasphemy. Nevertheless, where the religious belief of the commander, high or low, is firm and clear, it is a stabilising comfort. In the higher ranks it may vary in form from the clear extrovert professions of a Montgomery to the inner conviction of divine mission which appeared to characterise Haig, or the humble, frank resignation of General Dobbie, the successful evangelical commander of Malta. These latter-day Christian soldiers contrast greatly with the seeming lack of strong religious belief in Napoleon and Wellington. Even that indomitable soldier John Nicholson, who was himself revered as a minor prophet among his Punjabi sect of Nickelsains, so lacked profound belief as to worry his pious mother. There have been successful soldiers in history who were apparently devoid of religious belief. Probably Genghis Khan was one, and Frederick the Great appears to have been an agnostic in private life. The simple ideal is the old Parliamentarian one of the russet-coated officer, who knows why he fights, and loves what he knows. In this fluctuating war of ideologies the possession of inner faith cannot but be of immense advantage.

The Officer and the People

An army like ours, with a most democratic recruitment to all ranks and trades, should be in a natural state of rapport with the citizenry. This state is qualified by some adverse political, historical and social effects of bias. However strong the mutual ties, they cannot be too strong for the purpose of sound leadership. If the forces are militias, with popular elected officers, or irregulars of any type, the right to lead derives from consent of the led. In regular and para-regular forces there is an absence of direct consent, due to the political and departmental channels of its application. This remoteness is best countered by a sound understanding of the officer's status, and is utterly dispelled in the officer with a vocation. He will recognise his status as public servant and protector of the realm, aware of the national strengths and weaknesses which he must exploit or deny if the army is to succeed. He must be able to handle the voter, the worker, the landowner, politician, parent, and the taxpayer, as well as he can handle their sons. Abroad he must embody the best characteristics of his people and army, for he is an ambassador without the benefits of protocol or precedence, the cynosure of the alien eye. In sum he must cultivate affection and respect for humanity,

which, after all, is his primary raw material.

It is apposite in considering the attitude of the officer to the populace to mark the civilising effects, throughout history, of the good soldier. Our own culture is heavily indebted to the Roman soldier for the civilisation which he brought, even for the propagation of our Christian religion throughout the known world of antiquity. The modern officer has an opportunity to become a great force for social good in his role of trainer of youth under National Service. This is nation-building work, by the inculcation of manly ideals of service, and of high standards of conduct, hygiene and social co-operation, and in particular in present-day Australia, in helping in the assimilation of young New Australian trainees into the body politic. In the technical sphere the ARA officer is a pioneer of professional "knowhow," and often the sole arbiter in all matters military, whether dealing with the civilian layman or the earnest and enthusiastic citizen soldier. In all these tasks lies a worthwhile vocation.

The Officer and the Soldier

The true foundation of military comradeship lies as much in its freedom from mutual profit motives as in the solemn purpose which underlies the military organism. It is not the impending loss of barracks, weapons, manuals, or pay, which makes the retiring old soldier downcast, but the fact that the purest form of mutual respect and affection, based on human worth, not cash, will shortly be removed from his daily life. This respect nourishes the sacrificial instinct of the true, born officer, particularly in free societies. It is the traditional give and take of the mess, the platoon, and the sports field; leading to the consolidation of the team in war. Cheap esteem has no part in it—for as Leslie Henson, the London actor, put it—"Popular, you mean easy-going."

Although the superior form of officer-soldier relationship is to be expected in democratic societies, it is not necessarily absent in more rigid and mercenary organizations. The Turkish Janissaries and the Praetorian Guard were effective military instruments of great force for many years despite their unpromising beginnings. They thrived as closed corporations with a strong stimulus from privilege, and, by a disciplined and spartan regime, achieved considerable results until corrupted by power. The officers were protected persons, like the queen bee in the hive. In return they guaranteed power or loot to their soldiers. Thus could a Wallenstein recruit and lead his marauding condottiere the length and breadth of Europe. We see a choice between Frederick's Prussian grenadier, who fears his officer more than the enemy, and the Anglo-Saxon ranks in whom, particularly, the young subaltern contrives to evoke an amazing and protective affection. Both systems have been made to work. Respect and affection are alike equally valuable in the normal relationship of officer to soldier. Certainly no man can aspire to lead who does not feel genuine affection for his men, although, like the Iron Duke, he may not easily make a display of it. The lack of this quality does in fact eliminate some who already possess the physical and intellectual attributes of leadership; nevertheless it is a quality which

can be fostered in most normal gregarious humans.

Promotion and Integrity

It is sometimes to the detriment of our professional moves that we have evolved effective but mechanistic systems of military human engineering. Men have been replaced by SG gradings, IQ ratings, and collations of Hollerith symbols which are good servants but bad masters. The unique combinations of blood and intellect, of environment and heredity, recede from these methods. The Golden Age when every battalion could cherish one dunderheaded lance-corporal to serve as mail orderly, or even one dunderheaded but gallant major to keep the troops amused, gives place to a remorseless determinism. This inhibits natural competition and militates against the morale of the average officer, since the apparently less gifted are early apprised of their inadequacy. Here we require reassurance of the fundamentally equal value of every good officer to the Army. When the British Army ran as an exclusive club the King's commission was the guarantee of social status, the regiment was an officers' home, and the accidents of promotion were but the intruding incidents of destiny. Thus was a happy officer corps ensured. The race is now to the swift, that is the swift in the examination room and staff college. The slower, but perhaps more stalwart, tend to be depreciated accordingly.

The existing system of academic promotion examinations does not reassure the average officer. Some of the written examinations lack objectivity, many of the viva voce tests are prone to degenerate into inquisitions; and a system which examines officers in tactics in the written papers and concurrently demands attendance at qualifying tactics courses, appears redundant. It is hard to realise that this dry pedantic slogging is the final rehearsal for what Foch called "the bloody and impassioned drama of war."

Over-riding more solid attributes, it is increasingly common in this Atomic Age to find the commercial element of salesmanship obtruding into Army life. There is a depressing incidence of opportunism, inimical to a sound professional atmosphere. A common form it takes is of militarism rather than the true military ideal; obsolete military pomp and panoply, display without training, operational, or real morale value. To distinguish and avoid this evil requires a fine judgment, or perhaps taste. It is the vice which ruined the Empire of Napoleon III. It is often allied with that dangerous type of ambivalence, in which professional competence is coupled with lack of moral courage, as was exemplified in the German General Staff under Hitler. The battle for promotion often inhibits the latter sterling quality. At the mention of promotion the subject's conditioned reflexes stifle the voice of conscience. If we are to have commanders with the martyr courage of a Billy Mitchell, or even the singleness of purpose of a Trotsky, they must be found from men who put the profession first and themselves last, and they will be easier to produce if the process of elimination is convincingly fair and contributes to the general dignity and self-respect.

The Labourer and His Hire

It was cynically observed in the Thirties that "an Indian Army officer fights for his pay." The enemy was

the paymaster. In perpetuation of his privilege, which was to grumble, the officer, or more frequently his wife, still grouses about pay. Yet he is privileged, with ministers of religion and professors, to be underpaid by accepted commercial standards. Nor should pay be the main criterion of worth, although official opinions have varied. It was once maintained that an officer should have private means, since it gave him some freedom of action and conscience. Conversely it has been revealed that members of the British Army Council kept the pay of young officers low because it would be conducive to plain living and high thinking, under the discipline of poverty. The armed services since the last war have granted creeping appreciations in pay to attract more officers. This is based on the fallacy that good officers can literally be bought. Good officers are of course primarily attracted by the incentives of a good and satisfying professional life, although they must be sustained by adequate pay. Over-emphasis on pay must attract and retain mere time servers. The reward of the good officer is the knowledge of work well done, and public appreciation of that fact. Pay baits are frequently used, not to improve the lot of serving officers (who would often prefer better housing, leave, sport, travel or superannuation), but to attract the raw and gullible wavering recruit. He is then little better than the old Asiatic, starveling, "monkey nut recruit." These misconceptions often arise from misguided civilian attempts to "run the Army as I run my business." Unfortunately armies have no regular annual balance, and the first major transaction may prove them bankrupt. Conversely, there are some poor officers who succeed in business because they are motivated by gain and self, and possess the necessary acquisitive aptitude. As the officer reflects his parent society, so this materialism bulks larger in his outlook. It must be contained and restricted to its proper limits. The world owes the good officer a decent living, but the moment he grabs for more he is no longer a good officer.

Politics and the Officer

From Caesar to Peron history is replete with accounts of unsatisfactory soldier-politicians. Cromwell's long shadow embarrassed even the eclectic Marlborough in his political designs. Ulysses Grant lost as President the reputation he had acquired on the battlefield, and Wellington as Prime Minister had to suffer the stoning of his house by the outraged Chartists. We must sincerely hope that General Eisenhower is the exception to prove the rule. The rare soldier-political scientists have not been without effect, as witness Mikhail Bukanin, the former Czarist officer who, in revolt against his profession, launched the anarcho-syndicalists upon the world. Political aspirations form no legitimate part of an officer's equipment, particularly in the Anglo-Saxon world.

Nevertheless times have changed to this extent—that an understanding of politics and of his political responsibilities is necessary to the modern officer. The German command ultimately suffered because it chose to ignore certain obvious political duties in order to preserve its military fabric, and the German nation was dragged into ruin. In the wars of ideologies nobody can be neutral, and the officer must lead in the political indoctrination of the

soldier, provided he keeps to the basic political credo, and abjures party polemics. This delicate operation alone calls for good judgment. Political ignorance in the officer, however, is dangerous. As a responsible leader he must know where we stand internally and internationally. A sound education will enable him to put the army and national policy into perspective. He must be versed in politics, but, at all costs, not a political soldier.

Conclusion

The attributes required of the good officer may vary greatly according to the task and the times, but the need for a sustaining sense of vocation increases. Unfortunately not every officer can be divinely inspired, but given integrity, intelligence, and energy, good officers can be made. The techniques of war become more complex and exacting, but human leadership is still the controlling force. It is therefore an essential for the well-being of the officer cadre that the public should fully recognize its own obligation. The officer is practically powerless to intervene on his own behalf, and the better he is, the less likely to intervene. Unless he is reinforced by the intellectual and moral certainty of his professional convictions he will prove worthless. Unless he is professionally developed, and is free of unnecessary domestic distraction, he cannot give his best. In the evanescent worlds of global and atomic war the civil population looks to the army officer for stability, to prevent any unfavourable violent change. It is therefore axiomatic that his freedom and security to develop should be guaranteed to him in this uneasy peace. Then will be completed the transformation from Mercenary to Missionary, and the officer will flourish in rewarded dedication.

COMPETITION FOR AUTHORS

The Board of Review has awarded first place and the prize of £5 for the best original article published in the July issue to "Some Thoughts on the Future of Anti-Aircraft Artillery," by Major J. R. Salmon, Royal Australian Artillery.

Training the National Serviceman as a Driver

Major D. W. L. Lloyd-Thomas
Royal Australian Army Service Corps

IF one were a master of logic one would deduce by irrefutable argument that the ordinate principle of war is the Selection and Maintenance of the Aim; and equally indisputably one would go on to show that all other principles are subordinate to its greater power. Further deductions would bring final agreement that to select and maintain an aim is a prerequisite not only of war, but also of peace, even indeed of life. So, too, just as a principle applies to the whole does it apply to the part. So therefore does it apply to all considerations in military training, and in deciding how one is to approach the problem of teaching the National Serviceman how to become a military driver one much first select, then maintain clearly in one's vision and so finally achieve, a definite aim.

The Aim

At this time, when the problem is being widely discussed, it is well to consider what the aim really is in National Service driver-training. Stated as a deduction from conversations which I have held with CMF formation, unit and sub-unit commanders I am of the opinion that it is:—

> **To teach as many men as possible during their full-time training period to become safe, un-accident-prone operators of military vehicles under normal highway and track conditions, with a view to the later improvement of their skill during their part-time CMF service.**

With the increasing demands for dispersion, mobility and the rapid movement of small but strongly-armed bodies of troops which will come with a war employing nuclear

weapons, the most important single element of the aim is to produce, as I have underlined, as many such operators as possible; quantity taking for the moment equal priority with quality, so that the driver-trainer (who is there to help to meet the battle needs of his commander) will have to be vigilant that he retains the one without sacrificing the other.

The Field of Selection

Broadly, all military driver trainees are drawn from one of two fields; that is to say, first, those who have driven before they become National Servicemen (whether it was father's car when the policeman wasn't looking or a multi-ton semi-trailer on an interstate highway) and, secondly, those who have never before attempted to operate a mechanically-propelled vehicle. There are, of course, differing shades of experience and ability on the one side and varying degrees of aptitude and absorption on the other; but these are not important to the present stage of our consideration, although each will be later.

Remembering first that the natural development from individual training is collective training and that to engage in the latter form of military instruction one of the underlying needs of a commander is mobility, we find further argument in favour of the production of large numbers of drivers and now also we find that, to achieve the result for which we are searching, such training must be undertaken at the earliest possible stage. Recalling, secondly, that nowhere other than in the National Service Training Battalions—and certainly not in the CMF—is there such a ready concentration of men, instructors and equipment, we are led to the conclusion that the main attack against the problem must be launched while the men are still in those battalions. We begin, therefore, to see how part at least of our aim is to be achieved.

One shortage in CMF formations which is unlikely within a plannable future to find a wholly satisfying supply to counteract it, is of instructors. In the world of mechanical transport the two basic requirements in an instructor are, first, the skill itself of being able to handle vehicles and, then, experience in applying that skill in all conditions. Both of these qualities exist in measurable quantity among trainees in National Service Training Battalions long before any driver-training is attempted. What a waste of instructional power it would be, therefore, to leave untapped this well of knowledge which is urgently needed in the battalions themselves and later in the CMF.

We are able thus to confirm two elemental decisions. First, that the majority of our drivers must be trained while they are undergoing their ninety-eight days' full-time training. Secondly, that to make full use of his abilities to the best military advantage, we must give priority in driver-training to the experienced vehicle operator and convert him into a military driver and, in an important proportion of cases, into a driving instructor, before we begin to try to teach the novice how to handle the controls of a mechanically-propelled vehicle.

The Present Policy

The policy hitherto has been that novices shall be trained as drivers before trainees who hold civil driving licences undergo conversion-

training to allow them to qualify for the issue of permanent or temporary military driving permits. An examination of this dictum in relation to the aim which I have stated will show that it is the most important single factor which prevents the needs of the CMF from being satisfied, if not to the full, then at least in part. A reversal is dictated by the aim of National Service driver-training itself. In my opinion no training policy should attempt to dictate how or in what order drivers are to be trained, since this, after all, is a matter for the driver-trainer who, we have shown, is there to meet the ultimate battle-needs of his commander. Rather should a policy state that the Regular and CMF training organizations shall between them produce as many competent vehicle operators as they both need and, further, that they should do as quickly and as economically as possible.

Given, then, agreement that the need which underlies the whole programme is to produce as many drivers as possible at an early stage in the individual training of National Servicemen, we are able now to examine the sequence and the manner in which the training is to be undertaken. Again by another route we are led to the decision that we must first draw upon the experience which exists ready-made within our ranks in order to provide in the first instance as large a number of drivers as possible and, in the second instance and much more importantly than in the first, to provide a field from which we can draw National Service driving instructors to augment the small Regular staffs who act in this capacity. Our power in this way to meet as driver-trainers the needs of our commanders becomes immediately a stronger and more effective instrument.

The Selection Plan

The basis of all productive activity, whether it is a simple military lesson or a campaign to bring higher education to backward peoples, is a plan. So, therefore, must the project to train National Service drivers follow a plan; and the basis in this case is found long before the trainee leaves the warmth of his own hearth for the somewhat more chilly if heartening atmosphere of a National Service Training Battalion. At this early stage the Staff Duties branch of the General Staff at Command Headquarters must first have decided, in consultation with the CMF commanders and the training branch, how many drivers are required yearly by each CMF unit; and it must then have planned to obtain them proportionately in each intake (through the Adjutant-General's Branch, if this is the Command link with the Department of Labour and National Service) from among civilian drivers who are domiciled in correct geographical relationship to the Training Depots of the CMF units with whom they will later serve. It is unlikely that the whole military driver requirement will be met by this form of selection; but my experience of measures of the kind undertaken for Infantry drivers in Eastern Command in late 1955 showed that they could produce without difficulty at least fifty per cent. of the numbers which were then needed. The balance of the military driver population must be made up of novices, who will have to be trained in National Service Training Battalions and, where this is not possib'e, by CMF units during home training or week-end

Weeks of Intake	Instructors Available		Total	Deduct Instructors for employment as senior instructor and on vehicle servicing instruction	Nett availability for employment on practical driving instruction
	From Battalion Resources	Attached			
4 and 5	5	NIL	5	2	3
6	5	RAE 1 Inf 2 RAA 2 RAASC 5	15	3	12
7	5	RAE 1 Inf 2 RAA 2 RAASC 7	17	3	14
8, 9 and 10	5	RAE 1 RAA 2 Inf 1 R Aust Sigs 3 RAASC 5	17	3	14
11	5	RAE 1 RAA 2 Inf 2 R Aust Sigs 3 RAASC 7	20	3	17
12	5	RAASC 7	12	2	10
13	5	NIL	5	2	3

Table A

bivouacs. (But not, I suggest, during annual camps which properly should be devoted to collective training.)

The Initial Training Plan

At the beginning of each training year the National Service Training Battalions must be given two planning facts.

First they need the Staff Duties target figures for driver-training in each intake.

Secondly they must be told how much help can be given to them in driver-training by the attachment of instructors from CMF units and Trades Training Centres and, in terms of the numbers of instructors and dates, when they may plan to expect such assistance.

The battalions can then produce an outline training plan in the form shown in Table A.

Certain restrictions must be incorporated in the outline plan which is a development from this diagram. Those which I advocate are based on my own experience as a Supervisor of Training in a battalion in Eastern Command, and they may well require modification elsewhere and in other conditions; but it is advisable to examine them as they stand before we proceed further with the development of the plan.

First, it is to be remembered at this and all subsequent stages in the consideration of the plan that not more than one instructor from each National Service Company can be provided as the permanent staff of the Driving School, unless basic and

other corps training is seriously to be prejudiced.

Secondly, the Driving School must be under central supervision, preferably under that of the Supervisor of Training since Company Commanders are already more than fully occupied with other forms of training. Additionally, effective savings in manpower, equipment and vehicles can be made by running one large school rather than a group of small schools. In 2nd National Service Training Brigade, one school to serve the needs of all arms was run in one battalion with the assistance of instructors attached from the others, as well as instructors from the CMF units for whom drivers were being trained.

Thirdly, the school opens at the beginning of Week Four of the Intake and closes at the end of Week Thirteen. Week Four is in effect the third week of full-time training since only two days of Week One, in which trainees report to their battalions, are available for instruction. No good purpose is served by opening the school before this time and its activities would in any case tend only to mar the benefits which the recruit gets from an energetic early fortnight's training in drill and discipline, both of which make an indispensable foil for military driver training. The school closes ten working days before the end of the Intake to allow the battalion to service and to prepare its vehicles for the next session of the school.

The Scope of Training

The development of the Initial Training Plan, combined with a detailed syllabus, should be such as to allow for the following forms of instruction in the school—

Driving instruction of a standard which will allow trainees to qualify for the issue of temporary driving permits,or, where by virtue of their previous experience they are able to pass the standard Trade Test, permanent permits;

Two days' practical Vehicle Servicing Instruction; and Instruction in the use AABs 406, 416 and 417.

Instruction in other documentation procedures, principally in the "G" series of forms applicable to mechanical transport, should be included in Company training programmes and must be given before trainees are admitted to the Driving School.

In certain cases in which trainees qualify for the issue of permanent driving permits and when they have sufficient experience and ability, the Supervisor of Training should be authorised to use such trainees as additional instructors; provided always that he does not allow this activity to interfere with their normal basic training or, where it is applicable, with their training as potential National Service NCOs or CMF officers. They will, in any event, be available for employment as CMF driving instructors, and their documents should so be endorsed.

Further Planning

The two main factors which will affect the rate of driver production, namely, the scope of training and the number of instructors to be available, having been decided, we can now examine the pattern of the flow of trainees into and out of the school. A preliminary appreciation, taking into full account the principles ordered in the latest Military Board Instruction concerning the

Weeks of Intake	Instructors		Output (Driving instructors by weeks by 2)
	Servicing	Driving	
4 and 5	1	3	12
6	2	12	24
7	2	14	28
8, 9 and 10	2	14	84
11	2	17	34
12	1	10	20
13	1	3	6
TOTAL BASIC POTENTIAL			208

Table B

safety of pupils and of other road-users, allows for a production rate of two trainees per driving instructor per week, so that a weekly summary based on the instructor figures on which we made our Initial Plan would look like Table B.

Varying, however, with the amount of experience which licensed drivers have at the beginning of their conversion-training, the rate of qualification will correspondingly be greater than two men per instructor per week. My own experience has shown that, while licensed drivers are passing through the school, the rate will be approximately four qualified men per instructor per week, so that the figure of 208 which we have decided is the basic potential of driver production becomes 416. A weekly average of 10.4 instructors working in this way for ten weeks, or a total of 104 Instructors/Weeks, is accordingly capable of producing an average of 40 drivers per week for each of ten weeks, which is a worth-while investment from the point of view of the CMF commander who provides them.

The original planning figure, in this case 208, is usually in the region of one-third of the target figure published by Command Headquarters and, in the absence of instructions giving special priority to any unit, one-third of the driver content of each CMF unit requiring drivers should be trained in the first instance. It can confidently be anticipated, however, if the Department of Labour and National Service selection procedure has been thorough, that this proportion will double itself in the way in which I have shown that the basic potential of 208 becomes a reality of 416; and it should further be remembered at this stage that we have yet ignored the bonus of production which is to be gained by using selected National Servicemen as temporary extra instructors.

The Relationship Between Driver and Other Training

The formation of a school for teaching a specific subject in a National Service Battalion presupposes, first, that the numbers of trainees attending the school at one time will be only a small proportion of the whole and, then, that the subject matter is extra-curricular.

Courses to train potential National Service NCOs and CMF officers are provided in this way, and to ensure its success it is my opinion that driver-training, as opposed to being a part of the Block Syllabus for any particular form of Corps or other training, should be provided in the same manner.

Since the Driving School is to be open for some ten weeks out of fourteen and as more than four hundred trainees are likely to pass through it at different stages in their basic training, the Supervisor of Training in any battalion in which this method of producing drivers is adopted will have to make certain that each of the many stages of basic training is divided into its proper sub-stages of Instruction, Testing and Recapitulation. Only by doing so can trainees safely be taken away from basic subjects and then be restored to them a week later without missing essential training.

The Organisation of the School

The Supervisor of Training should regard himself as the Chief Instructor and in this capacity may need to refurbish his own knowledge of mechanical transport, its servicing and operation, and the road-laws which apply in the State in which he is training. His whole responsibility is much broader than the supervision of driver-training, and he must accordingly appoint, from among his own staff or from the instructors detached to the Driving School from Companies, a Senior Instructor with full administrative and executive powers within the terms of his charter.

The Senior Instructor should divide his school into two wings, namely, the Driving School and the Vehicle Servicing Wing, and should appoint a Warrant Officer or NCO, depending on the staff which is available to him from time to time, to be in charge of each.

All trainee drivers who are due to undergo training each week are called forward to report to the Senior Instructor at the first parade on Monday mornings and they remain attached to the school — and so unavailable for duties or other forms of training, excepting night training — until the end of the day's work on the following Friday. One trainee should be allocated to each driving instructor, and instructor and trainee together should proceed to practical driving instruction for two and a half days (that is to say, twenty hours) tuition or whatever shorter period is necessary in the opinion of the instructor to allow the trainee to pass his driving test. When he is thought to be fit for testing or, in any event, at the end of two and a half days, the trainee will be tested in practical driving by the Senior Instructor or another tester to be nominated by the Supervisor of Training. Successful candidates will be recommended, subject to further elementary tests in vehicle servicing and documentation, for the issue of permanent or temporary driving permits as the case may be. Trainees who fail the test, if they are presented for it before the end of two and a half days, should be allowed further training up to that length of time and again be tested. In no case, however, is it wise either with an experienced driver or with a novice to extend practical driving instruction beyond this limit. since to do so will cause constantly lengthening delays among better trainees who are waiting for admission to the school.

In Week Four, following these principles and using as an example the availability of three Driving Instructors (as opposed to Vehicle Servicing Instructors), six students would report to the Driving School on the Monday morning. Of these, three would move to practical driving instruction on the ratio of one student to one instructor, while the other three would proceed to vehicle servicing instruction under the Vehicle Servicing Instructor. The roles of each group would change at the end of two and a half days, or earlier if one or more of the "driver" group were successfully to be tested for a driving permit. In this event the smooth flow through the school is maintained by calling forward further trainees to replace those who graduate early; and since this is a regular occurrence while licensed drivers are being converted into military permit holders, a reserve must be at call ready to take up vacancies as they occur. In my experience the size of the reserve has to be of the order of one reserve for each trainee, so that no instructor has at any time to wait for a student.

Vehicle Organization

The Supervisor of Training must provide one training vehicle for each instructor and, if they are old vehicles, a reserve of fifty per cent. against mechanical breakdown; but he has neither staff nor facilities for looking after them. Their care must, therefore, become a matter for the battalion quartermaster, who is normally helped in this respect by an assistant quartermaster and a NCO in charge of Transport.

Instructors should take over vehicles as their permanent drivers for the duration of their employment, thereby becoming responsible for the custody of all vehicle tools and equipment, for ensuring that the complete equipment schedule is checked weekly, for all servicing which is a driver's responsibility, and for daily washing and fuel replenishment at the last parade of the day.

The assistant quartermaster, or in some battalions, the NCO in charge of Transport, should be instructed to issue vehicles on this basis to instructors. He should further ensure that tool kit inventories are properly signed when a vehicle moves to or from the charge of an instructor. He should lastly ensure that AAB 406 inspections are made at the proper interval, that drivers' checks are entered in the vehicle documents and that RAEME period checks are made at service stations.

Conclusion

The plan which I have described in this article is but one way of producing a large number of safe vehicle operators in as short a period as possible. It has, from my point of view, only one merit above other plans—that it selects, maintains and achieves its aim and, finally, as it has done within my own experience, gains the objective which it first set out to reach. There is no reason why it should not be altered in the whole or in part; but no alteration, however small, can be made to the aim or to the priority given to holders of civil driving licences if we are to obtain anything like the full measure of peacetime benefit and wartime security from the Citizen Military Force.

GADGETS and the MAN on the GROUND

Major Reginald Hargreaves
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Let nothing be allowed to obscure the fact that good Infantry is the sinews of an Army.
—*Maxims of Napoleon.*

In all military thinking the first essential is to hold firmly to fundamentals. However, where speculation regarding the military "shape of things to come" is concerned, soaring imagination, inflated by the thought of new inventions and techniques, so easily takes wing that it becomes a matter of some difficulty to keep both feet planted firmly on the ground. This applies particularly to the "specialists," anxious to exploit some newfangled military gadget in which they have a psychological vested interest.

In the type of warfare with which the world would be likely to find itself confronted in the near future, the paramount desire among the non-Communist belligerents would be for a speedy victory, at the minimum cost in lives, treasure, and material resources. It follows that in trying to weigh the requirements for future conflict, a fatal tendency arises to seek for some push-button device, some apparently easy way out, that will save life by absolving the fighting man from all but a modicum of fighting.

It is this comprehensible, but shallow-minded, desire to win war on bargain basement terms that ensures for the gadgetmonger an uncritical attention and eager credence out of all proportion to the value of the particular contrivance he happens to be championing. In the outcome, wishful thinking and sanguine assurance combine to create an atmosphere in which it is extremely difficult to hold to the blunt, hard fact that, with opponents of anything like

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equal strength, there are no short cuts to victory. However ingenious and promising the latest device for abbreviating conflict, in the long run the chances are that it will turn out to be just another means of prolonging it.

War had its origin in the first attempt by a prehistoric tribe to "claim jump" a neighbour's better-stocked hunting grounds. The venture was strictly an infantry enterprise; and with warfare's expansion every device evolved by human ingenuity has been designed to aid, or impede, the work of the infantryman. More often than not, the intention has been to try to obstruct him; a fact which attests to the transcendent importance attached to the foot soldier's activities.

Time was when the Infantry went to work without any preliminary bombardment, for the simple reason that no gadgets in the way of cannon had yet been invented to lay down a protective barrage. Time was when the Infantry went to grips without having to wait until the tanks had (theoretically) broken a way through for it; and this for the excellent reason that the tank, even in the elementary form of the Hussite war cart, had yet to make its appearance. Time was when the Infantry closed with its adversaries without waiting for the dive bombers to soften them up in order that tanks could break through so that the "footsloggers" could wade in.

Delaying the inevitable—it boils down to very little more. Without the Infantry, the supporting arms—helpful as their time-consuming activities have become — would be entirely without purpose; and quite incapable, incidentally, of achieving victory in their own right. It is the cutting edge of the sword that strikes home. The "pommel," the "grip," the "guard," the "*quillons*" and the "fuller"—all go to furnish forth the weapon. However, it is the "forte" and the "foible," the cutting edge, that gives the blade its usefulness, its power of impact. It is as the cutting edge of the sword that the Infantry functions, and always will.

The history of war is the story of the deterrents that have been devised to impede the infantryman in the execution of his task. It is no less the chronicle of the footslogger's consistent success in surmounting all the obstacles with which ingenuity has sought to default him of his predominance on the battlefield.

Alexander's Infantry

In 492 B.C., for example, the two great military powers of Greece and Persia embarked on a life and death struggle in which victory or enslavement were the alternatives with which the former found itself confronted. For over half a century, the Greeks fought valiantly to maintain their freedom. However, their success in the Battle of Marathon and the great sea encounter of Salamis still left the issue undetermined; although again and again they had demonstrated their superiority in close combat.

When Alexander succeeded to power on the assassination of his

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father — Philip of Macedon — he found himself in command of a powerful army, in which the Infantry was by far the most formidable element. With this splendid force of 30,000 seasoned foot troops and 5,000 horse troops at his heels, the youthful monarch crossed into enemy territory, to find himself confronted by Darius, the Persian King, at the head of a host half a million strong.

The first encounter was at Issus—on the plains of Syria—where Alexander, retrieving an initial tactical blunder, outmanoeuvred his opponent and, with the heavy infantry of the phalanx, beat in the flank of picked Persian troops of the centre. Darius fled in panic; and it was not until he had put the Euphrates River between him and the victorious Greeks that he started to reorganize for a counter-offensive.

Mustering another horde of half a million men, Darius awaited the advance of his adversary at Gaugamela (Arbeia). He had prepared a surprise for the terrible hoplites of the phalanx, in the shape of bronze-armoured chariots with stout scythe-blades protruding from either side. In the Persian's boastful words, these war cars would slice the enemy phalanx into gobbets; and the remnants of the demoralized and scattered formation would fall easy prey to his fleetly moving horse troops.

However Alexander perceived his danger at once; and since his foot troops were divided into the heavy Infantry of the phalanx and lighter troops—or hypaspists—armed with bows, slings, and throwing spears, he sent forward the latter to take the chariot charge in flank as it gathered speed.

Amid a hail of arrows, darts, and javelins, the charioteers sought desperately to keep formation and maintain their impetus. However, so many of their horses had been brought low that the entire forward movement piled up in a bloody tangle of interlocked wheels and frantic steeds, lashing out amid the scythe-blades that lacerated them more cruelly the more furiously they struggled.

The device upon which Darius had counted to countervail against the enemy Infantry had failed. Since he had no other resource to fall back upon, the phalanx moved steadily forward to turn an armed host into a swarm of gibbering refugees, to be dealt with by Alexander's Cavalry at its leisure. A tactical "surprise" based on a novel mechanical device had failed to turn aside the sweep of the infantryman's sword and, as always, its keen edge had prevailed.

Caesar's Infantry

In 56 B.C., Gaius Julius Caesar made his first bid at the conquest of Great Britain; repeating the venture in greater force the following year. With the men of the 7th and 10th Legions at the head of his invading troops, the Roman Commander anticipated little serious trouble from the swarm of wild tribesmen, who would fight under all the disadvantages that attend on lack of expert military training and the absence of a proper tactical doctrine.

However, the tribesmen had perfected one tactical "surprise" which for a brief moment threatened to prove the invaders' undoing. Hitherto the Legionaries had made no acquaintance with the Britons' war chariots; more rudely fashioned than those of Darius, but furnished with

similar menacing scythe-blades. Moreover, the Britons' tactical employment of them was on entirely different lines to anything the Romans had been told about by their military chroniclers. With the invasion force advancing inland in column of route, the chariots, containing six warriors in addition to the driver, would be raced furiously along the ranks, seeking everywhere for a gap, for a chance to "break the line" and wreak as much damage as possible before sheering off to repeat the manoeuvre further down the marching throng.

For a time these chariot combat teams, darting out of concealment, wrought considerable mischief. However, a hastily improvised drill—which confronted the advancing war cart with a "hedgehog" of bristling javelins—soon put a very different complexion on affairs. For although the 7-foot, 12-pound javelin was primarily intended to be thrown—as a missile weapon—and ranked with others in an impenetrable *chevaux-de-frise*, it served to "prop off" the careering charioteers as effectively as the hedge of British bayonets held off Napoleon's cavalry on the field of Waterloo. At the same time, certain men in the ranks, especially detailed for the task, would stoop under the shelter of their shields and hamstring the horses with their short double-edged swords.

Yet, once again, the validity of a fundamental axiom had been given striking emphasis—that once a surprise gadget or device has lost its novelty, infantry tactics can always be adjusted to deal with it effectively.

Long before they conquered Ancient Briton, the Romans had met and learned to deal with a surprise device of quite unusual characteristics. In 281 B.C., the Legions had found themselves confronted with the army commanded by Pyrrhus—King of Epirus—and in the forefront of his battle array had been ranged a new form of "storm troops" that took the shape of elephants. At first, the effect of these huge beasts charging into the cohorts' ranks was devastating. The Legionaries were quite at a loss how best to deal with them, and, therefore, prone to flinch and scatter—although the invaders' own losses in the Battle of Heraclea were so heavy that to this day the term "Pyrrhic victory" is employed to denote a success in which the debits are out of all proportion to the gains. However, it was not long before the Legionaries devised a method of tactical defence to deal with this strange new element of the battlefield. At the encounter of Beneventum, the elephant charge was entirely disrupted when specially selected men darted in to hamstring the lumbering beasts, while others waved flaming brands before them until they turned and stampeded back toward their own lines—to trample the ranks of the very men who were pressing forward to exploit a repetition of their earlier success.

In the great struggle between Rome and Carthage, Hannibal, the leader of the Carthaginian host, also employed elephants against the cohorts of the Legion. However, his paralyzing victories were less attributable to the presence of these monstrous descendants of the mastodon than to the deterioration in the quality of the Roman Infantry and the feeble, vacillating system of command. It was not until the brilliant, resolute Scipio Africanus had revitalized the Legionaries' fighting spirit that the tables were turned, at

the Battle of Zama, and a defeated Carthage was humbled in the dust.

It was lack of the proper tactical doctrine, to deal with another new element in warfare, which led to the overthrow and death of the Roman Emperor, Valens, at the Battle of Hadrianopolis in 378 A.D. The Roman leaders had always relied—and rightly—upon their indomitable foot troops, but they had done so to the dangerous neglect of the Cavalry and other supporting arms. This lack of balance in the Roman forces was spared the usual penalties visited upon military imperception so long as they were confronted by opponents who placed equally preponderant emphasis on their own Infantry.

It was a very different story, however, when, on a broiling day in August 378, Valens rushed forth from the city of Hadrianopolis to seek out the Gothic hosts of Fritigern. In no respects was it a day which saw the Romans at their best. Their approach march was so ill-timed that the right wing arrived in sight of the enemy while the centre and left were still some distance to the rear. The result was that the laggards arrived on the scene of action blown and flustered; and a good deal of confusion accompanied the forming of the battleline.

The Gothic foot troops were concentrated in a laager of wagons, and the Legionaries resolutely advanced on this improvised stronghold, determined to block all avenues of escape and put every one of the defenders to the sword. The fight was raging hotly all along the barricade of tumbrels when suddenly a vast and hitherto concealed cloud of horsemen charged into the Roman left. It was the main body of the flying squadrons of Alatheus and Safrax, and it fell on the Legionaries' exposed flank "like a thunderbolt which strikes a mountaintop, and dashes away all that stands in its path."

For this kind of torrential assault by Cavalry, the Legionaries were entirely untrained and, therefore, unprepared; through neglect to work out a thoroughgoing tactical doctrine for their own horse troops, they found themselves helpless in the face of an admirably conceived and oft-practised attack by a well-mounted foe. With Valens and most of his principal subordinates struck down, the Legionaries, scattered and demoralized, were "like ripe corn for the sickle"; and the day ended with 40,000 of them stretched in death on the open plain.

Neglect of another fundamental, to train men for the *next* war rather than the last, had brought a proud Infantry to humiliation and disaster.

Rise and Fall of Cavalry

Hadrianopolis marked the beginning of a period, lasting over 900 years, throughout which the Cavalry remained the arbiter of the battlefield. In the military forces that emerged from the blight which descended on the world with the fall of Rome, the armoured knight lorded it over a "rabble of foot troops" who found it virtually beyond its power to do him injury. Chain mail and armour plate were the gadgets whose powers of resistance the infantryman found it almost impossible to overcome. To thrust a bill or halberd at a man encased from head to foot in steel was about as useful as trying to pierce a lobster with a toothpick.

Then in 1282 A.D., the English King Edward I returned from a punitive expedition to the Welsh

Marches with a very healthy respect for the prowess of the hostile bowmen with whom he had recently been in contact. As he was quick to perceive, here was a missile weapon whose steel-tipped shaft, if properly sped, would provide an answer to the lordly and hitherto imperforable knight in armour.

The Battles of Crécy (1346 A.D.) and Poitiers (1356 A.D) speedily demonstrated that no Cavalry, however snugly sheathed in metal, could stand up to the missile weapon which, in one fell swoop, had restored the Infantry to the proud position of the Queen of the Battle.

However, it was not long before another device of war emerged, whose steadily progressive employment was to exert the most far-reaching influence on all the infantryman's future activities. About 1254, Roger Bacon had hit upon the compound that came to be known as gunpowder; and within 50 years of its discovery, its application to military purposes was well under way.

However, so far as the infantryman was concerned, the introduction of the handgun, or harquebus, into warfare proved at the outset rather a handicap than an advantage. To begin with, the weapon itself was so heavy and unwieldy that it required a steel-shod rest, rammed into the ground, to support the barrel. Then the process of firing the piece—in which, as Stow informs us, "the musketier takes down his musket, uncockes the matche, blowes, proynes, shuttes, castes off the pan, castes about the musket, opens his charges, chargeth, drawes out his skowring sticke, rammes in the powder, drawes out again, puts up the skowring sticke, lays the musket on the rest, blowes of the matche, cockes and tryes it, gardes the pan, and so makes ready"—took such an unconscionable time that three or more pikemen had to be detailed to guard the harquebusier in the lengthy intervals between shots. As a consequence, a dichotomy arose which separated the Infantry into two elements—offensive and defensive.

In the outcome, deadly as were the injuries wrought by the contemporary 1¼-oz. bullet, the inordinately slow rate of fire and the many accidental explosions occasioned by the smouldering match, militated heavily against the usefulness of the musket as an aid to infantry fighting. It was not until the matchlock and its derivative, the wheel lock, had been replaced by the more reliable flintlock, that an efficient gunpowder-charged weapon restored the infantryman to that dominating position on the battlefield he had held so often in the past, and will continue to hold in any foreseeable future.

With gunpowder, the first of the chemical propellents, the world had passed into the technological epoch of war; and valour had become useless unless supported by the products of the mechanician's art, of which the most versatile, as well as one of the most powerful, had been placed in the hands of the foot troops. For when the firearm became fitted with a bayonet, the infantryman was presented with a weapon which combined missile action and a means of closing with the enemy that was virtually without parallel. Artillery was useful in sieges, of course, and could support the footslogger in battle; Cavalry was always effective against broken Infantry and occasionally could drive home a useful charge from the flank. However, as the firearm became progressively

more accurate of aim and speedy of discharge, the tendency was to train the *arme blanche* as a unit of fire-power capable, into the bargain, and should the rare occasion offer, of shock action on traditional lines.

Trench Warfare

As was only to be expected, the defence continued with increasing zeal to try out devices designed to minimize the effect of the infantry's fire and impede its assault with the cold steel; first that of the musketeer's *alter ego*, the pikeman, and then that of the linesman whose firearm had been furnished with a bayonet. In 1522, for example, at the Battle of La Bicocca, the Marquis of Pescara concentrated his musketeers in a sunken road, the banks of which afforded his marksmen considerable protection: and the era of the trench, the rifle pit, and the foxhole was inaugurated. It was an action, moreover, which hastened the arrival of the bayonet, since it was made plain that something less cumbersome and unwieldy than a 7- or 8-foot pike was required to remove men ensconced in deep entrenchments.

Then there were such surface obstructions as abatis of interlocking tree trunks and branches — such as those which so seriously held up the advance of the Black Watch (42nd Highlanders) at Ticonderoga in July 1758. To this device can be traced the genesis of the knife rest and barbed wire entanglement, by way of the sangar of the North-West Frontier of India and the thorn-scrub zareba which played so prominent a part in Kitchener's Omdurman Campaign of 1898. The countermeasures to overcome these obstructions extend from the introduction of the bearded pioneer with his leather apron and gleaming axe, who clove a way through all obstacles by sheer brawn, on to the rolling barrage of later warfare. In the general sense there gradually emerged a tactical doctrine for the infantryman which was summed up by General George Patton, in his well-known recommendation to "*Hold your enemy by the nose with fire, and kick him in the pants with movement.*"

World War I saw the progressive strengthening of obstructive defences on such a scale that it can only be termed stupendous. After the Battle of the Marne, two armies swayed to a standstill in absolute deadlock, as the retreating Germans rounded to confront the pursuit that panted on their heels. With tremendous energy, both sides sought to deepen and expand the sketchy system of shallow trenches and unconnected rifle pits into which they had flung themselves overnight, when war of movement had modulated into war of position. Steadily and surely a system of field fortifications came into being, on both sides of no man's land, which possessed much of the solidarity of permanent works, while covering a considerably greater area in depth, and boasting virtually uninterrupted continuity. Defended by machine-gun posts, strong points, mortars, barbed wire, and the musketry of their garrisons, they were given additional strength by artillery in close support. In the outcome they became so inviolable, so terribly difficult and costly to assault, that their impenetrability threatened to bring about a condition of permanent stalemate.

Something had to be done to permit the Infantry to approach its opponents in sufficient strength to

impose its will upon them by its superiority in close fighting. The Germans were the first to think of a device that promised to further this purpose; and on 22 April 1915, they launched an attack at Ypres which was heralded by a cloud of poison gas. Chemistry was the gadget, *the obstacle to the action of the defence,* which was to make a way for the infantry asault it was unable to secure without aid. In this case, it only added to the confusion—and the casualties—of the general action which ensued. For the best elements among the Allied troops, recovering with exemplary swiftness from the momentary demoralization which the surprise of this new addition to the armory had created, charged *through* the gas cloud to engage the enemy in the untainted region beyond it.

Thereafter, gas warfare could pretend to little more than nuisance value. Its discharge from containers from the shelter of a trench at an opposing line was of very limited effect, once both sides had been furnished with adequate gas masks. Moreover, a sudden shift in the wind might well cause it to recoil on the very positions from which it had been projected. Sprayed over back areas and gunsites in the form of gas shells, it might catch and immobilize a few of the casual and unwary, but it did little to impede those well grounded in "gas drill" and accustomed to going about their work subjected to the relatively slight inconvenience attendant on wearing a gas mask. In effect, once its surprise value had been discounted and adequate measures taken to counter its effect, its usefulness as an obstacle to the advance of resolute Infantry was virtually nil.

The same may be said of the *flammenwerfer,* or flame thrower, so long as it continued to be manhandled. With its first appearance, its unusual qualities as a weapon gained a certain surprise success for it. It was soon found; however, that if the troops against whom it was directed took cover in the bottom of their trenches, so that the stream of flame—which tended naturally to rise—passed over their heads, a marksman away on the flank could easily pick off the man carrying the container and projector, and with his collapse the device went out of action.

The Tank

Barbed wire, on knife rests and posts, in elaborate "aprons," or in loose rolls, having proved an obstacle on which artillery fire, mortars, and the bangalore torpedo could wreak no more than superficial damage, the Infantry sought to tackle it with hand-manipulated secateurs. However, this was a deadly slow process, and carried out in the open under concentrated machine-gun and rifle fire as it was, it proved all too costly in casualties. Something that was impervious to small arms fire was what was needed to crush a way through the wire obstacle and make a way for the infantrymen's advance. The answer took the form of that lumbering armoured mastodon which was given the code name of "tank," by which it is still called.

The first appearance of this remarkable gadget undoubtedly had a profoundly demoralizing effect on the Germans, to whom it came as a complete surprise. The author recalls that on 15 September 1916, the day of the tank's first appearance in action, entire groups of the enemy spilled out of their deep-dug de-

fences and came forward with their hands up in token of submission—and the German does not surrender easily. Indeed, something of the measure of their consternation can be gauged by the jawbreaking name they first bestowed on the dreaded tank — *Schutzengrabenvernichtigungsautomobil.*

In 1917, the massed tank attack at Cambrai proved a highly successful stroke which, had it been properly exploited, might well have led to a resounding victory. For, at that time, no real answer to the problem presented by the tank had yet been evolved. However, before the end of the campaign, the Germans had evolved a heavy anti-tank rifle, which clearly presaged the anti-tank guns of later days; gadgets which in due course were to relegate the tank to the role of just another adjunct to infantry fighting.

It is not without significance, incidentally, that Ludendorff's last and temporarily successful throw, in March 1918, was executed by Infantry *solus;* and was eventually halted by Infantry without noticeable benefit of tanks.

In 1940, Hitler's factory-fashioned blitzkrieg succeeded because the measures necessary to counter it were imperfectly understood and even more imperfectly put in train. Even to the last, the French were thinking in terms of linear defence; it was the Weygand *line* when the entire situation cried aloud for defence in depth.

Not so very long after, at the Battle of El Alamein, the wheel came full circle, and the world was indulged in the spectacle of the Infantry actually nursing the tanks into action. Thereafter, it was found that the pestilential obstacle of minefields was far better dealt with by Engineer units and properly trained teams from the Infantry, than by tanks trying to negotiate them with the help of such adventitious attachments as flails and similar devices, designed to explode the mine well ahead of the advancing armoured fighting vehicles.

With the Normandy Campaign, it was the footslogger who had personally to clear the bocage country step by step, while the tanks were engaged in a process of mutual extermination elsewhere. With regard to the later stages of the struggle, while admiration must not be withheld from General Patton's spectacular drive across country with his armoured "cavalry," it has equally to be borne in mind that it was an infantry unit that made the first momentous crossing of the Rhine at Remagen.

A very senior officer once pronounced to the author, "All wars end in the same way; two men in a ditch, and one of 'em comes out alive." Allowing for a certain over-simplification, the truth of this terse dictum can scarcely be gainsaid. When the ground has been cleared of all the tricksy devices by which both sides have sought to spring a surprise or gain advantage over each other, what is left? It is the infantryman, and those comrades of the immediate supporting arms upon whom he relies for his close-up backing—field gunners, mortar men, sappers, and the like, who may fairly be said to form an essential and integral part of the infantry combat team.

They constitute the cutting edge with which the job must be finished; and it is only by their carefully co-ordinated efforts that it ever can be finished. One of the fundamentals of war that is far too often over-

looked is, that while an enemy position can be demolished by air strike or long-range missile action, it can only be taken and held by Infantry. If it is not so taken and held, there is nothing to prevent its reoccupation by the foe. Then all is to be done again.

The Future

So far as future conflict is concerned, it is a moral certainty that the brunt of the real work will continue to fall on the infantryman.

Presupposing the use of tactical atomic weapons on both sides, it becomes necessary to envisage a battle area approximately 200 miles deep. Dispersion and concealment will be the dual necessities of the day. Yet, once the welter of factory-made gadgets has succeeded in mutually eliminating each other and a momentary superiority has been gained by the use of tactically employed atomic warheads, no time dare be lost in turning the superiority to full advantage. With everything pulled back out of reach of atomic field weapons, it is obvious that any heavy tank formation would be far too remote from the temporarily disrupted enemy combat zone for them to arrive on the scene in time to make the most of the fleeting opportunity presented. Only Infantry, lifted from the periphery of the battle area—where it will have been safe from hostile interference — and flown in by "planes and gliders," could be brought to the point of decisive action with such speed as fully to profit by the brief phase of demoralization the enemy would be bound to experience during the immediate aftermath following a concentrated "shoot" with atomic missiles. Indeed, in the interest of speedy exploitation it might well prove necessary to drop parachute combat teams right on the heels of the "big bang," with glider-borne elements acting as their immediate supports. Naturally, both parachute and glider-borne troops would be formed as complete combat teams, with a full complement of supporting arms, up to and including light tanks and field guns—and in due course the convertiplane should come to be their means of transport.

With local victory ensured by the speediest possible action, the rest of the build-up would proceed on normal lines.

It will be perceived that in this glimpse of the possible "shape of things to come," the Infantry, with its immediate supports, will be, as always, right in the forefront of the fray—"the first in and the last out," as is their proud tradition.

That the infantryman must ever regard this onerous responsibility as his own peculiar obligation, may be accepted as another of the prime fundamentals of warfare. Moreover, he must learn to fight his battles without too much thought of the heavier supporting arms that are there, when opportunity offers, to back him. When the foot soldier starts to look over his shoulder, his quality has seriously deteriorated. Napoleon once observed that a too numerous Artillery was a sure sign of a weak and irresolute Infantry. By the same token, too great a reliance placed on gadgets, on specious but gimcrack alleged short-cuts to victory, can only have the effect of weakening the spiritual fibre and whittling away that toughness of morale upon which victory ultimately depends. As Armand du Picq so emphatically affirmed, "Man is the first weapon of battle" and in emphasizing this it is obvious that

the writer had the infantryman primarily in mind. Provided the footslogger is properly indoctrinated about the latest gadgets—atomic or hydrogenic; realizes what they *can* do and what they *cannot;* and appreciates that like all gadgets, at all times, they can only play the *overture* to the *opera* that he alone can perform; then he will see things in their right perspective, and will come out right on top, as heretofore.

It is less the gadgets and contrivances with which he is supported than the enemy rifleman in his front that constitutes the footslogger's main concern. It is upon his sober realization of this unyielding fact that the entire fate of the Western World may someday come to depend.