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

VICTORIA BARRACKS, MELBOURNE

AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

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The views expressed in this article are the Editor's and do not necessarily represent the policy of the General Staff.—Editor.

THERE is a school of military thought which maintains that so long as an army is thoroughly trained in basic principles it can fight anybody, anywhere. While there can be no doubt about the necessity for thorough training in basic principles, this idea overlooks, or too heavily discounts, several important considerations.

In the first place war is not a theoretical business like pure mathematics, or pure science, or pure anything else. Principles cannot be applied in the raw as it were. They can be applied only through the medium of the means and the techniques available. It is the application of principles through the medium of means and techniques that constitutes the whole art of war. And, in point of historical fact, practically all successful commanders have devoted much thought, time and effort to perfecting the means and the techniques before using them to apply principles.

To maintain that soldiers who have been thoroughly trained in basic tactical principles can fight anyone under any conditions of terrain and climate is tantamount to saying to the unit football team: "The silly galahs in X Battalion have

misread the programme and sent over their water polo boys instead of their football team. But it doesn't matter really. It is too bad you fellows can't swim, but the principles are the same. So strip off and get into the pool and lick 'em."

The football boys, of course, won't have a chance in the water until they have mastered the technique of swimming, no matter how well they know their principles. In passing it should be noted that the water polo lads won't be quite so badly off on the football ground. At least they will not be in imminent danger of death by drowning. We shall return to this point later.

Other things being equal, the successful army will always be the one that has developed superiority in the techniques appropriate to the particular conditions of warfare in which it is engaged. Many a superbly trained army has met with disastrous defeat because its leaders failed to realize that the techniques which have proved successful under one set of conditions will not necessarily succeed under a different set. For example, the German armies which drove victoriously into Russia in World War II were superior to their adversaries in almost every respect — while the fine weather lasted. When winter closed down it was a different story altogether. It was not only a matter of a deficiency of materiél suitable for the Russian winter. The Russian soldier, skilled in the techniques of winter warfare, proved a superior fighting man to the same German soldier who had defeated him under summer conditions. Nearer home the Japanese were at first all over us through their mastery of the techniques of jungle fighting. We licked the ears off them when we made our jungle techniques superior to theirs.

Conversely, the same German Army that met defeat in the East had, only a few months before, been brilliantly successful in the West. It was successful primarily because it had developed tactical techniques admirably adapted to the conditions encountered. The attempt to apply the same techniques in the East to different conditions of terrain, climate and space led to failure and ultimately to irretrievable disaster.

You can go way back beyond Caesar and you will find the same lesson repeated over and over—there is no universal technique applicable to all conditions.

In the past some armies were fortunate in that they had a pretty fair idea well in advance of the conditions of terrain, armament and space under which they would most likely have to fight. Today, because of the introduction of atomic missiles, it is peculiarly difficult for all armies to make this forecast with any real degree of accuracy. Nevertheless, some armies are in a better forecasting position than others because it so happens that the natural peculiarities of the area in which they are likely to be employed demand certain tactical techniques which will be required in atomic warfare anywhere.

It is now pretty generally accepted that atomic warfare will make common practice a degree of dispersion hitherto regarded as exceptional. In his book DEFEAT INTO VICTORY Field-Marshal Sir William Slim forecasts the future pattern of military operations in these words: "Modern war, with its destruction of

bases, disruption of communications and disorganization of control, will, if they are to operate at all, compel armies to disperse. Dispersed fighting, whether the dispersal is caused by the terrain, the lack of supplies, or by the weapons of the enemy, will have two main requirements — skilled and determined junior leaders and self-reliant, physically hard, well disciplined troops. Success in land operations will depend on the immediate availability of such leaders and such soldiers, ready to operate in small, independent formations. They will have to be prepared to do without regular lines of communication, to guide themselves and to subsist largely on what the country offers. Unseen, unheard and unsuspected, they will converge on the enemy and, when they do reveal themselves in strength, they will be so close to him that he will be unable to atomize them without destroying himself . . . The use of new weapons and technical devices can quickly be taught; to develop hardihood, initiative, mutual confidence and stark leadership takes longer."

It is pretty safe to say that when we think of warfare of this sort, units and formations living and moving dispersed and concentrating for battle, most of us have in mind the motor lorry or some other means of conveyance. They *might* be able to do it that way in Europe or in the Middle East, but will we be able to do it in the area in which if present trends continue, we are likely to fight? Looking at this probable area of employment we find that large slices of it are covered with thick jungle. Other large slices are covered with growth not quite thick enough to be called jungle but which, nevertheless, constitute quite serious obstacles to close manoeuvre. Even much of the ground that is free of trees and scrub will, because of the nature of its surface, impose dispersion. The whole area suffers from under - developed communications, and not much of it is suitable for the extensive use of transport for troop movement.

This terrain need not necessarily prove disadvantageous — provided we develop the techniques necessary to extract from it every advantage it does possess. Those advantages are by no means inconsiderable, and it so happens that the techniques necessary to exploit them are the very ones imposed by the conditions of atomic warfare almost anywhere, except perhaps on the naked desert. Those jungy slices for instance! Can a better place be imagined in which to hide units and formations from the gentleman flitting around with an atomic bomb looking for a suitable target? Troops living and moving in those friendly places will be hard to find.

The word "jungle" needs to be clearly defined. Strictly speaking, it is commonly used to describe thick tropical growth, the sort of stuff the Australian Army became accustomed to in the Pacific campaign. We should, however, think of jungle as all growth which seriously impedes visibility and movement, which precludes the use of "normal" tactics, and which breaks up formations and tends to isolate units and sub-units. Clearly, any terrain with these characteristics demands the development of special techniques if we are to operate successfully on it. We learnt that lesson the hard way once; need we do the same thing again? There

is a great deal of that sort of country in our probable area of employment.

At this point it may be as well to glance at the militarily untutored characteristics of the men who will form the great majority of any Australian army. A few, a very few, may be accustomed to the bush. But by far the greater proportion of our soldiers will be city dwellers or men from open farm lands. Nowadays few Australian ever forsake the hazards of the highway. Their knowledge of enclosed country is confined to the occasional glimpse they catch out of the corner of one eye while dodging other road hogs, all too often not very successfully.

To dump such men without adequate training into thick country is to deliver a shattering blow to their nervous systems. They may be as game as Ned Kelly in the open country or the city street, but put them in the thick stuff and they will most likely fold up. They can't see anything but vegetation, they can't move easily, they become confused and get lost. And if they know that the enemy is close at hand the flutter of a butterfly's wing becomes a menacing roar. Fire off a few shots and pretty soon they will be reduced to a state of prostration. They will have lost their nerve as well as their direction—and probably half their equipment to boot.

We ought to know from bitter experience that there is no half-way house in training for work in the thick stuff, even the moderately thick stuff. It is all or nothing. In the military sense, a man is either at home in scrub, heavy timber or

jungle, or he is a lost soul in a weird, twilit prison. He can't fight and he could easily die without any assistance from the enemy. This happens because he is suddenly confronted with something entirely new and quite frightening, with problems which nothing in all his experience helps him to solve.

Conversely, if a man of good physique and average intelligence has been thoroughly trained in the techniques of living and fighting in thick country the effect of coming out in the open is not likely to be so shattering. He might yearn, he probably will yearn, for the friendly shelter of the scrub, but the experience of open spaces will not be entirely new. The environment will at least be familiar. Like the water polo team on the football ground, he will be able to put up some sort of show, particularly if he has been thoroughly grounded in basic principles. To put it another way, if a man is first well grounded in basic principles, and then trained for the worst case he will be able to cope with it. Then if he meets the best case he ought to be able to make a reasonable fist of it. But the reverse is not true, any more than it is true that a team of non-swimming footballers can suddenly get into the water and play polo.

Since so much of our probable area of operations is covered with varying densities of vegetation, it is no more than common foresight to make every possible effort to develop and inculcate the techniques that operations on such terrain demand. There is too much scrub to dodge all

the time, we shall have to get into it as often as not. We ought to make certain that when we do go in we are on top, well and truly on top, of anyone else in there with us. We ought, indeed, to go further and aim to make ourselves so good at the game that the scrub becomes our natural fighting habitat. We should aim to get the enemy into the jungle whenever we can and there, by means of our superior techniques, destroy him.

The area presents terrain and tactical problems besides those pertaining to the jungle, and the study of these should be given its place in training. But the training of the commander, the staff officer and the soldier in the techniques of jungle warfare should, it is suggested, be the basis of our efforts to prepare ourselves for the sort of war which is likely to confront us. For, no matter how good we are in other respects, unless we are the masters in the jungle we are going to have a pretty thin time of it up there.

Training in jungle warfare means a great deal more than teaching the individual and small sub-units how to live, move and fight in thick country. It means digging deep into our minds, tearing out by the roots some ideas which have become second nature, and re-shaping our thoughts to meet the problems of dispersion imposed by the terrain or by atomic weapons, or by both. We are all talking about the necessity of dispersion, but how many of us are doing anything about it? Are we really thinking about the problems of command, control and administration that will inevitably arise in a big way? We talk about dispersion and quick concentration for battle. When we talk like this how many of us have the motor lorry or the aeroplane, or some other means of conveyance in our sub-conscious minds? Sir William Slim has a more realistic view for he visualizes formations and units moving dispersed and concentrating for battle on their own flat fleet.

Atomic bombs or not, there won't be over-much lorried movement where we are likely to go. People will have to get used to the idea of going places on foot, with their ammunition in one pocket and a week's rations in the other. Unit and sub-unit commanders will have to learn how to keep their troops going in isolation for long periods, how to lead them over miles and miles of tiger country to arrive at the right place at the right time. Regimental officers will have to learn that taking care of their men means much more than giving some poor fellow a word of advice about his love life —or lack of it. Formation commanders and staff officers need to forget, temporarily at any rate, about motor lorries and the other conveniences of conventional warfare, and start thinking how they are going to direct, control and maintain their troops in unconventional tropical areas where the atomic bomb is liable to be an additional hazard.

We ought to do more than think about dispersion and jungle warfare, we ought to make them the basis of all individual and collective training. Instead of dumping down formations in one concentrated lump for their annual camps, let us disperse them over miles of adjacent hills and dales. Let us get everyone used to the idea that that is normal, that concentration is abnormal. Only by doing something about dispersion are we likely to master the

techniques it entails. It would, for instance, be interesting to see how many platoons of a battalion dispersed over about 50 square miles of rough country could make a night march, or even a day march, and arrive in good shape at the appointed place and the appointed time. Battalions which cannot do that simple little exercise are not going to be much good when the balloon goes up, not our balloon anyway.

In World War I the Australian infantry adopted a policy aptly summarized in the expression: "No-Man's Land belongs to us; our front line is the enemy's wire." It would not be true to say that they invariably succeeded in enforcing that policy, but they nearly always did. And wherever they went they fought unremittingly to make it fully effective.

In World War II the tradition paid handsome dividends when we substituted a few words and expressed the same principles in the policy: "*The jungle belongs to us.*" In view of our probable area of employment, can anyone suggest a better basis of training? — E.G.K.

To our men, British or Indian, the jungle was a strange, fearsome place; moving and fighting in it was a nightmare. We were too ready to classify jungle as "impenetrable." . . . To us it appeared only as an obstacle to movement and to vision; to the Japanese it was a welcome means of concealed manoeuvre and surprise. . . . The Japanese reaped the deserved reward for their foresight and thorough preparation; we paid the penalty for our lack of both.

—*Field Marshal Sir William Slim.*

WHEN to WAKE a SENIOR OFFICER

Captain K. M. Esau
Royal Australian Infantry

As soon as the firing in the Downs was heard Sir William Coventry had signed an order for (Prince) Rupert's recall and sent it to Arlington for immediate dispatch, but Arlington was in bed and his servants did not dare wake him, so the order did not reach Rupert until after he himself had heard the firing and was already hastening to Albemarle's aid.—From "My Brother, The King," a book on Charles II and his sister, Minette.

This incident from England's wars with the Dutch happened nearly three centuries ago, but it still has an important lesson for us today—that operations will not go well if commanders discourage their juniors from disturbing them outside normal hours. Like a policeman, a commander is on duty 24 hours a day. If he does not realise this he has no business in command.

Arlington's servants have their counterpart in Hitler's staff on D Day, June 6, 1944. Hitler was a night worker, who slept late of a morning and did not like being called before he woke.

Incredible though it may seem, the news of the invasion was not passed on to him on arrival at his HQ, but it remained "on ice" until Hitler woke late that morning. Hitler's rage at not having been roused made the staff wish they had woken him when the message arrived. However, the damage was done. A panzer division near the beach, which could not move without Hitler's permission, missed its chance. In Rommel's opinion this failure to launch an immediate counter-attack was decisive.

A similar fantastic story of the reluctance of junior officers to disturb the rest of senior officers and thereby risk incurring their displeasure comes from Pearl Harbour.

The night before the Japanese attack, a picket boat on duty outside the harbour entrance picked up a submarine on its asdic and engaged

it with depth charges. Standing orders were that US submarines would only enter the area surfaced and escorted by a surface craft. In other words any submerged submarine in the area was presumed hostile. The picket boat quite properly reported the contact to HQ, where a junior officer was on duty. He roused the army equivalent of the field officer of the day. The latter took a dim view of being roused and when it was suggested that he should inform the admiral, he flatly refused. The admiral might give him a worse rocket than he had just given the orderly officer. It would be interesting to know what the field officer would have considered important enough to justify waking the admiral.

Japanese midget submarines DID reconnoitre Pearl Harbour the night before the attack and at least one was lost, presumably the one that the picket boat engaged.

No one knows what the admiral would have done if he had been informed, but he MIGHT have alerted the ships and Air Force for a possible attack at first light or soon after. A few hours' warning could make all the difference to the result of an attack which depends upon surprise.

A final example of the junior officer who couldn't disturb the general after he had gone to bed. During the Syrian campaign General Blamey, after dinner at Nazareth, telephoned General Wilson in Jerusalem, urging him to switch the *main* thrust from the coast to Damascus. The conversation ended with nothing decided. At 10 p.m. Blamey decided to drive to Jerusalem and see Wilson. He arrived at midnight. I quote from "Blamey" by Hetherington:—

Carlyon (the ADC) rang the bell and told the young officer who opened the door that Blamey wished to see Wilson.

"I'm afraid General Blamey can't see General Wilson now, old boy," the officer said. "General Wilson is in bed."

"But General Blamey's outside in the car," Carlyon remonstrated. "He must see General Wilson tonight. This is an urgent matter."

The young officer was courteously immovable. General Wilson was in bed. He was sorry, old boy, but . . .

(Nevertheless Blamey saw Wilson.)

Commonsense is one of the most important factors required in an officer. If an officer hasn't enough of it to know what is important and what is not and when he is justified in waking a senior officer, then he should not be employed where he can do any harm.

However, senior officers must train their juniors so that they realise what is required of them in passing on information, and must organise their headquarters so that they receive important information whenever it arrives, regardless of the time.

FOR VALOUR

THIS is the centenary year of the Victoria Cross, first of the British Commonwealth's orders of chivalry. It is the most highly prized of military awards, and takes precedence over all other orders, decorations and medals.

Up to 1856 only two decorations could be awarded for bravery, the Order of the Bath for senior officers and the Distinguished Conduct in the Field Medal for sergeants. Apart from campaign medals there was no award for junior officers, corporals and privates. This fact greatly impressed Queen Victoria when, one afternoon in May 1855, she was presenting campaign medals to a number of Crimean War veterans. From that day she began to plan the institution of a decoration to be known as the Victoria Cross. As her plans developed she resolved that the new decoration would be the highest of all British awards, yet, materially, would be worth only a trifle. The Queen worked out most of the details herself, including, it is said, the draft of the Royal Warrant prescribing the conditions of the award. She rejected numerous suggestions for the inscription because they failed to express accurately the idea she had in mind. Finally she adopted her own simple words, "For Valour."

The Royal Warrant instituting the Victoria Cross was signed at Buckingham Palace on 29 January 1856. The Queen's idea of a decoration open to all ranks was embodied in Rule Six, which reads: "It is ordained with a view to placing all persons on a perfectly equal footing

in relation to eligibility for the decoration, neither rank, nor long service, nor wounds, nor any other circumstance or condition whatsoever, save the merit of conspicuous bravery, shall be held to establish a sufficient claim to the honour."

From time to time minor changes have been made to the rules, but the basic idea remains unchanged. One little-known clause of the warrant which still stands in its original form provides that in the event of a gallant or daring deed being performed by a detachment, in which all are deemed to be equally brave, the officers, NCOs and privates may select by secret ballot the ones who are to receive the award. There have been eleven instances, involving 33 officers and other ranks, in which Victoria Cross winners have been selected by ballot. Of these 19 were awarded for bravery at Lucknow in the Indian Mutiny. Several awards under this rule were made in World War I, perhaps the most notable being those of Captain A. F. Carpenter and Able Seaman Albert McKenzie, selected by the officers and ratings of HMS Vindictive, Iris and Daffodil for their outstanding bravery in the naval attack on Zeebrugge.

The first man to win the Victoria Cross was Lieutenant C. D. Lucas, mate in HMS Hecla, during the bombardment of Bomarsund. A live shell from a Russian battery fell on Hecla's deck and, although it was on the point of exp'oding, Lucas picked it up and threw it overboard. It is not possible to name the first soldier to win the decoration, for six awards were made for the same action, the storming of the Alma in the Crimean War. The names of the recipients were Lieutenant-Colonel E. W. D. Bell, Major R. J. Lindsay, Lieutenant J. S. Knox, Sergeant L. O'Connor, and Privates W. Reynolds and J. McKechnie. The first airman to win the Victoria Cross was Lieutenant W. B. Rhodes-Moorhouse, Royal Flying Corps. On 26 April 1915 he bombed an important railway junction in France, and although mortally wounded, returned to his base with valuable information.

The youngest recipient of the Cross was Boy J. T. Cornwall, Royal Navy, who won his award at the Battle of Jutland when he was only 16 years old.

Under the original rules the Cross could not be awarded posthumously, but in 1902 King Edward VII inserted an amendment providing for these awards and for the presentation of the Cross to the next-of-kin.

Originally only members of the Navy and Army were eligible for the award. In 1858, however, an amendment provided for the bestowal of the Cross on civilians serving with the forces. Four civilians have won the decoration, three magistrates of the Bengal Civil Service in the Indian Mutiny and a clergyman in the Afghan War in 1879.

An ambiguously worded amendment inserted in 1858 made it possible for the Cross to be awarded in circumstances other than "in the presence of the enemy." At least one award was made under this amendment—to Private O'Hea, who, during the Fenian troubles in Canada suppressed a dangerous fire in an ammunition wagon. O'Hea later came to Australia, where he died of exposure while lost in the bush.

In 1881 the rule requiring the presence of the enemy was clearly laid down.

Three cases are recorded of the Victoria Cross being won by father and son. Lieutenant F. S. Roberts (later Field-Marshal Earl Roberts) won his decoration for taking a standard from the enemy at Khodagunje, India, on 2 January 1858. Forty-one years later his son, Lieutenant H. F. S. Roberts, and Captain W. N. Congreve were each awarded a Victoria Cross for gallantly attempting to save some guns at the Battle of Colenso, in the South African War. Major W. L. Congreve won his decoration while serving with his father's old regiment in France in 1916. The other pair was Major C. J. S. Gough in the Indian Mutiny in 1858 and Major J. E. Gough in Somaliland in 1903.

The decoration has been won by four pairs of brothers, in one of which is the Major C. J. S. Gough, who also paired with his son.

The largest number of VCs won by one unit in the same action is seven, awarded to an officer, a corporal and five privates of the South Wales Borderers for bravery in the disastrous fight at Rorke's Drift in the Zulu War in 1879.

In the hundred years of its existence only three men have won bars to their Victoria Crosses. They are Lieutenant-Colonel A. Martin-Leake, Royal Army Medical Corps, in 1902 and 1914; Captain N. G. Chavasse, Royal Army Medical Corps, in 1916 and 1917; Captain C. N. Upham, New Zealand Military Forces, in 1941 and 1942.

At the time of writing the oldest living holder of the VC is believed to be Major the Earl of Dunmore, who won the decoration on the North-West Indian Frontier in 1897.

The last award of the VC was made to Private B. L. Speakman, of the Glosters, for bravery in action in Korea in September 1951.

Of the 1,347 VCs so far awarded, 87 have been won by persons serving in the Australian forces, 84 by the Army and three by the Royal Australian Air Force. The first of this gallant company was Major (later Sir Neville) Howse, who won his decoration at Vredefort, South Africa in 1900. The last Australian award was won by Private F. J. Partridge at Bougainville on 25 July 1945.

Except for a short period during World War I, Victoria Crosses have always been made from the bronze of Russian guns captured in the Crimea. Unlike most medals, Victoria Crosses are not stamped out with a die. Each one is made separately by Hancock and Company, the London firm which has always made them. After the Cross has been cast in a mould it is finished by hand to bring the letters and figuring into sharp relief. The Cross is then burned an even dark-brown tone with acids and is sent to the War Office for inspection. If it is acceptable it is returned to the makers for the name and unit of the recipient to be engraved on the bar and the date of the winning of the award on the back of the Cross.

The Victoria Cross is by far the most highly treasured decoration in the British Commonwealth. It has been won under every conceivable condition, on land, at sea and in the air, alone and accompanied by comrades, by day and by night, in advance and retreat. The original conception of Queen Victoria, that neither rank, nor creed, nor colour should have any influence on its award, has been faithfully adhered to. The names of all recipients,

together with a description of their gallant deeds, are listed in chronological order in a special register at the War Office, a record of daring and devotion unmatched in the annals of chivalry. — E.G.K.

TRAVEL ORDERS (1779)

FORT BELVOIR, Va.—M/Sgt R. J. Grazier, of the Finance Section, 2571st S.U., has unearthed travel orders issued during the Revolutionary War that show something of G.I. complications in those days. Dated July 6, 1779, and issued by the Office of the Acting Commandant, Federal Defense of Yorktown and New York Harbor in Yonkers, N.Y., the orders are addressed to the CO, 1st Light Infantry, Braddock, Braddock Bks., Millers Junction, RI. They read:—

"1. Issue necessary orders sending one enlisted man, on horseback, via safest and most convenient route, at Government expense, to Fort Von Steuben on the Ohio River below the junction of the two great rivers at Old Fort Pitt, for the purpose of carrying secret dispatches to Major Alonzo DeLafayette, who, at last official roll call, is the Commandant at Fort Von Steuben. If, upon arrival, Major Lafayette is either dead or resigned, the soldier will deliver the dispatches to the immediate Commanding Officer.

"2. The expense section of the Finance Department will supply this courier with the necessary cash to buy himself sufficient food supplies to subsist him the entire journey. If the Finance Department at the destination is not functioning, the enlisted man is authorised to barter with neighbouring Indians for necessary salt and other miscellaneous necessities for the return trip. Uniform buttons and musketry badges may be utilized in connection with bartering. If the situation warrants fraternizing with Indian tribes, due precautions will be taken insofar as the relief tepees are concerned, the soldier making full use of his medical kit immediately after exposure. The expedition directed is considered necessary in the military service. Government mounts and subsistence will be furnished, and if used in bartering, uniform buttons and marksmanship medals will be replaced by the Government, upon application for same by the enlisted man concerned.

"3. Upon return to his home station, soldier will submit a written report showing the full names and ranks of commanding officers of all military forts visited, so that the Department of War can be informed and bring their roster up to date."

This is a copy of the oldest Special Order on file with the Adjutant General's Office in Washington, D.C. The original copy is now in the National Archives in Washington, D.C.

REFLECTIONS on the TRAINING of a SIGNAL UNIT

Colonel J. H. Thyer, CBE, DSO (RL)

INSTRUCTIONS for training are comprehensive and tend to discourage initiative. The training of units in time of peace thus tends to follow a rather stereotyped form. There is a little scope for the exercise of initiative by commanding officers, generally little variation is to be discerned in the routine from unit to unit, and the machine grinds out its products with a regularity bordering on the monotonous.

In war, however, it is different, or at least it was in our unprepared state in Australia in 1939. Units then had to be created from more or less random material. There were available, in totally inadequate numbers, partly trained officers and NCOs. A commanding Officer then was called upon to use his initiative. He had to be prepared to implement a definite plan; a plan, moreover, which should have been the outcome of thought given to the problem during the years of peace. It is to be hoped that such a state of unpreparedness will not arise again. If such hope were realized the following ideas would hold little but academic interest. If, on the other hand, the hope be doomed to disappointment, the ideas may well be of practical assistance. Perhaps some of them might have practical applications at the present time.

It should be understood — and I stress the point — that any success which ensues from the application of ideas, such as I offer, will depend mainly upon the men themselves. There is no particular merit in having ideas.

A trained staff officer spends his time formulating ideas. If he fails to do so his time is entirely wasted. Men respond to ideas and produce the result. This characteristic of behaviour, and the degree of response exhibited by the Australian soldier is not widely appreciated.

One final thought before I reminisce: It may well be that in a future war communications will be so tech-

nical and the time for training so short that the "soldiering" side will of necessity be given a lower priority. Yet, no matter how technical the equipment, the man operating it will be the same and subject to the same impulses. What profiteth it a unit, then, if an operator hath all the skill in the world and loseth his desire to stay put when in action?

In June 1940, I was entrusted with the formation and training of Signals, 8th Australian Division. It was at the time of the collapse of France and the AIF Corps had been increased from two to three divisions. I was then a Major in the Australian Staff Corps and had been actively associated with the training of the Citizen Forces of the Commonwealth since 1918. Naturally I had some crystallized ideas on the lines along which training should proceed.

In the first place, it was, and still remains, my view that a Signal unit should be disciplined to a higher degree than, for instance, an Infantry battalion. That must sound nonsense to the highly qualified telegraphist or the wireless "ham," yet it seems logical to me. The ultimate training is battle. In action an infantryman can, to a certain extent, be carried along by the excitement and feeling of mutual support which belongs to a group. On the other hand, a signalman is necessarily stationary, if we exclude despatch riders, and perhaps isolated. He must function efficiently and coldly without excitement as a stimulant. Thus in similar circumstances a signalman requires more of "what it takes"—measured in terms of morale and discipline—than an infantryman. Consequently, his initial training must be more exacting.

During the action in Malaya in January 1942, at Bakri and during the subsequent withdrawal to Parit Sulong, the Signal truck was bombed and ciphers destroyed. Wireless operators nevertheless functioned continuously during the whole of this hazardous operation. They had to work in a position pin-pointed within an encircled force. They were the point of aim of enemy bombing and mortar fire. Their work called for a high degree of discipline. A DCM and an MM were awarded within the remnants of the detachment.

It was also apparent to me that on any large-scale recruitment every endeavour should be made to allocate persons with technical qualifications into the right units. In a signal unit it would be necessary to seek qualified telegraphists, radio mechanics, motor-cyclists and the like. That aim having been achieved, the initial training should be more military than technical.

A rapid expansion from a peace to a war establishment implied in my view, that the partially trained junior leaders of the Citizen Army would soon be thinned out, and the numbers available after the first and second calls would be very few. It would, therefore, be necessary to concentrate on the training of raw recruits who showed promise of being good NCOs and junior officers.

Finally, in a Signal unit the personnel should not only be familiar with organization and tactical procedures, but should be trained to fight as infantry in the last resort. In fact, during the last few days before the surrender of Singapore, the unit was armed with MMGs and LMGs and functioned with no small degree of merit as "The Snake Gully Rifles."

These, then, were the principles for the initial training:—

(a) It had to be tough.
(b) It had to be more military than technical.
(c) It had to be arranged so that junior leaders could be trained.
(d) All ranks had to be trained as soldiers.

This was all very well in theory, but just how tough could it be? At the time of which I write there was a prevalent idea that as recruits in the AIF had volunteered to serve overseas (whereas service in the Citizen Army implied defence at home) the kid glove should be used at first and a more military and regimental approach made to training after embarkation. I was never a party to this conception, nor ever could be. On the contrary, I argued that at this time—following the fall of France—the more serious-minded men were enlisting, men who had young families, men who were establishing themselves in their various callings. To them it was a big sacrifice. The last thing they sought was slackness and the favouritism and indiscipline which flow from undue latitude. They were mostly in deadly earnest. They would only be satisfied with a serious approach to the problem. Therefore, the initial training must rather be too tough than not sufficiently exacting.

In this matter of degree of exactness, it is a truism that you can ease the pressure if the men cannot quite take it. On the other hand, pressure can only subsequently be applied at the risk of some discontent. To illustrate this point, two instances will serve. Here they are:—

After a few weeks' intense training and no leave, I saw in the distance one night a bonfire with some of the men dancing around it and a figure burning. I asked the second-in-command what it was all about. He made discreet inquiries and then reluctantly told me they were burning me in effigy—only a few of the young hot-heads. I asked him why. He said they wanted some leave. I told him we had better give them some and to make the necessary arrangements. Nothing further was said or done about the incident. Now, at reunions, they gleefully tell me about it and are rather incredulous when I tell them I saw the whole business.

The other incident occurred much later, when the unit split prior to embarkation, and illustrates my idea of mixing justice and understanding. At this stage only a portion of the unit was to depart for Singapore, and that portion alone had embarkation leave. Two sections not proceeding overseas were given no leave, and, not understanding the circumstances, became disgruntled. Unfortunately they were in an isolated area and adjacent to a unit not trained on similar lines. Possibly members of the latter body urged them to go on strike, and so they did. I was informed of the incident in due course, and was at once aware that a drastic lesson was necessary. The two sections were immediately disarmed and placed under guard, and I spent most of the ensuing night interrogating each member personally. I was able to identify five ring-leaders and put them in the camp guard-room at once. The two sections had previously been paraded, with all officers and NCOs on the parade ground, and the relevant sections of the Army Act read to them with due

solemnity. By midnight they began to see that it was not quite such a simple matter as going on strike in the civil sense. Next morning each section, through the proper channels, asked me to receive a spokesman. This I did, and each apologized for the conduct of his section. I thanked them, but said that as they were charged with mutiny I must refer the matter to the Divisional Commander and ask him to allow me to deal with the case. This I did. The Divisional Commander was sympathetic, but of course I did not tell him to what extent I was play-acting. I then dealt with the case and gave each man 14 days' CB, or was it 28?

The next week-end I had one of the Section Officers, Barnett, of cricketing fame, arrange a bivouac for those concerned near the homestead of a well-to-do farmer. I went out to see them on the Saturday afternoon. They had a keg of beer and a most comfortable bivouac. I called on the farmer, who asked me if the men could come to a party. So I left them to a pleasant week-end, if not almost as enjoyable to some as city leave, at any rate an unexpected development to the majority. On the Tuesday both sections were paraded in front of me. I spoke to them further on the gravity of their offence and then remitted the remainder of the sentence. What happened to the five ring-leaders is, of course, another story, but I am told I made no mistake there, and a lesson had been enjoyably driven home.

The point I am trying to make is that you can be tough provided: (1) you are scrupulously fair; (2) you are equally tough on all ranks; (3) you can smell friction and ease the ropes accordingly.

In that conception of discipline the initial training of the unit commenced. About this time I made a trip from Sydney to Melbourne with the GSO 1 (an officer of the Staff Corps) and a recently enlisted driver with no previous experience. We three sat together in the front seat, and the driver, a man of some standing in civil life, was naturally interested in the conversation. I aired my views on training to the G1. He remarked, "Very interesting, but you won't get away with it." The driver, on the contrary, said "I think you have something there." In that latter remark I found complete endorsement.

Picking the officers was a most important problem. On appointment to command, one is immediately besieged by officers looking for an AIF "Guernsey." Care is necessary, as one bad pick might mean a lot of trouble later. There are also numerous contemporaries who would like you to fit in the wife's nephew. However, I was singularly lucky in my first pick. My Second-in-Command had commanded an infantry battalion and surrendered a step in rank to come with me. His ideas on the initial training coincided with mine. The senior major was richly endowed with technical knowledge, a sense of proportion, and loyalty. The senior captain had also dropped rank. He had served with me in the Militia and was a personal friend. I must add that he still is. The adjutant was a business executive with a flair for organization. At times I was over-organized, but that is preferable to disorder. All the junior officers were young and enthusiastic. I was very happy

in my first pick. I like to think that it was ability to gauge character, but I suppose in truth Dame Fortune smiled on me. As time went on I found no cause to regret the choice.

The first step in training, taken before the unit assembled, was a two weeks' course for as many officers and NCOs as could be mustered. The NCOs held their appointments from the Citizen Army and were temporary postings, but most of them held their rank after the NCOs course. I enunciated to this small nucleus my principles as given above, and training from this initial meeting was on these lines. It was rather a shock for officers and NCOs who had enjoyed the easy routine of Militia training, but they all reacted to the spur in a reassuring manner. They were drilled as recruits by the RSM, another happy choice. He had been, strangely enough, a Garrison (concrete) Gunner. He was young, athletic, a good drill instructor, and had the happy way of insisting nicely — the complete foil to my ruthless doctrine. It is very unusual to find all these virtues wrapped up in one who was strictly regimental at all times.

At the end of the fortnight the drafts began to assemble from all over Australia. It was very exciting, this first viewing of the new arrivals. Some first AIF (1914-18) men were amongst them, trying to look boyish. They all had the impression that it was a disadvantage to be an old soldier. I, on the contrary, was fully seized with the value of this leaven of experienced men. I made them wear their ribbons and they mostly became my senior NCOs.

The actual allocation of the men to sections entailed quite a lot of detailed investigation. My business executive adjutant had a specially printed card for each man, and a selection board consisting of myself and the three company commanders made a first selection. They were then gone through in more detail, the company commanders vieing with each other for any choice soldier that showed up. At the same time a first pick was made for the NCOs School and I then personally interviewed each of the latter.

All this took two or three days and then we settled down to the job in earnest. The first period was of eight weeks. The NCOs School was segregated and placed under the Second-in-Command with three special instructional SSMs who had been loaned to us for the period. The men were drafted to their sections and were trained by their section officers. It was rather a strain on the officers and it required a lot of preparation on their part at night. However, the direct and immediate contact with the men gave them confidence, which is a most essential quality in leadership.

During the eight weeks' period no signalling was taught. When I say no signalling, I mean the superficial dot dash part of it. The men were taught primarily to be soldiers. The syllabus included weapon training, and range practices were fired towards the end. A cloth model, however, was used to teach the divisional organization and the tactical employment of Signals — more the why than the how. The how came later.

The syllabus fitted in well with the "Q" situation. At first we had abso'utely no technical equipment. Towards the end of the period, transport and such equipment as 109 (No. 9) sets, cable, field tele-

phones and switchboards began to come forward.

This all sounds very ordinary and it may well be asked "Wherein lay the toughness?" From the very start the daily routine was long and arduous, and exactness in everything was insisted upon. This exactness included cleanliness in the person, in the huts, and above all in the kitchens and eating places. Leave was restricted, but week-end leave accumulated to permit inter-state travel. This was necessary, as the unit was recruited on an Australia-wide basis, and up to forty hours' travelling was involved in some cases.

We were fortunate in that we were isolated at the beginning. By the time we came into close proximity with units working to different principles, the men had become accustomed to the routine and for all practical purposes were unaffected. There were very few minor offences, practically no AWL and when the men went on leave in organized parties the transport authorities complimented them on their behaviour, a very rare thing in those days when leave trains were extensively damaged, and waitresses in railway refreshment rooms were terrified by the rough horse-play of troops on leave.

The officers were kept to a very rigid routine. They all had to be out of bed at reveille and at least one per company dressed and in the lines. Every night there was a lecture of some description.

At the conclusion of the eight weeks of initial training we had a passing-out parade. It was held on a Saturday afternoon so that friends and relatives could attend. We borrowed a band to assist us, and invited a brigade commander to inspect us. The ceremonial included marching past in slow and quick time and advancing in review order. All these movements emerged logically from the training just completed. The bearing and precision of the men proved conclusively that they were proud of their unit. They were certainly worthy of the Signal flag presented to them that day.

The subsequent training became more interesting, but there was no easing of the discipline. For instance, smoking in Signal offices or in any form of transport was strictly forbidden. When an office was set up, if only for an hour or two, a rest area was defined and off-duty men permitted to smoke there. Quite a trivial point to many, no doubt, but to my mind a most important one. I don't for a minute flatter myself that the order was rigidly observed.

At all times during later training the ultimate employment of the unit was stressed. All activities on no matter what level had a tactical idea. Thus interest was maintained. The officers were taken on TEWTs during week-ends. (I had been struck by the lack of tactical training in the Haines Park syllabus of 1918). These tactical exercises were on the brigade level. The tactical situation would be given and the brigade commander's orders. Officers would be asked to give the brigade signal officer's appreciation. The plan had to include, in addition to route and circuit diagrams, a task table showing how work was to be done, the men allotted, and the stores required.

I made it a particular point to interest the Divisional staff in these exercises. This served two purposes: Firstly, the unit was sold to the staff,

which got to know its potentialities, and this selling is just as important as it is for a salesman to advertise his wares. Signals, particularly in these days, is regarded as another form of black magic. This is a popular conception which must be continuously attacked if the unit is to be received into the Divisional inner sanctum where it properly belongs. Secondly, the officers got to know their staffs in a more personal way, and the exercises were necessarily more practical and interesting.

The adjutant sold me the idea of investigating the IQ of the personnel. We had the co-operation of the State Director of Industrial Psychology and a team from Sydney University. A representative cross-section of the unit was tested and records made. The experiment proved very interesting and useful and was, as far as I am aware, the first time any unit was so tested. The tests were, of course, to ascertain ability and had nothing to do with the complexes of sex psychology.

We had a cloth model lecture room. The complete transport of the unit was represented by miniature clay models. The room was fitted out as a Signals technological museum. In addition there was a large white screen about 14 feet by 10 feet. On it was traced the Divisional layout, and pinned in the appropriate place was a photograph of the commander or the staff officer holding that particular appointment. These were some of the aids invoked to make the training more interesting and effective.

Unfortunately, in a sense, just as results were beginning to show, the unit had to shed over one-third of its personnel to form a cadre for Signals, 9th Division, which formation had been created in the Middle East. It was a blow to lose so many officers and other ranks after seven months' training and to be compelled to replace them with raw recruits. On the other hand this had a good effect. All replacement of officers and NCOs came from within the unit. All ranks could then see more clearly the avenue of promotion. This facilitated the further expansion of the unit later in Malaya.

A little later, the major part of the unit embarked for Singapore. The training in Malaya was continued on the same strict lines, but of course it was more interesting. We used our mobility to see as much of the country as possible, and also to ensure that relaxation could be obtained in places enjoyable to the men. The unit was not permitted to become infected by the "Tid Apa" bug then so prevalent in Malaya.

Mobility was the basic idea of all exercises. It is very comforting, no doubt, to set up a divisional system and transmit thousands of messages. An elaborate office with pretty diagrams may create a favourable impression on the staff — during training only — but such things are a snare. The job of Signals is to transmit messages with speed and accuracy; and the real test of a Signal unit's efficiency is to fulfil this function under adverse conditions and rapidly changing situations.

In August 1941, I was given another appointment. My successor was also from the Staff Corps. His ideas and mine were similar and so the general policy was continued. He, however, commanded the unit in action, a fact which must be observed when considering the practical efficiency of the unit.

The unit had some ten months'

training in Malaya before the Japanese attacked, and then it was put to the test. Did it come up to the required standard? The GOC, AIF, Malaya — subsequent to the operation — has always spoken of the unit in the highest terms. General Percival, in his foreword to the unit history, "Through," has this to say: "Of all units which took part in the campaign it was undoubtedly one of the best trained and most efficient . . ." Their CO's task, however, was made easier by the fact that they had at their disposal some of the very best officers and men that Australia could provide. Not only were their technical qualifications of the highest, but they were one and all imbued with the determination that on no account must they let down the formations and units which they served. Perhaps the outstanding example of this spirit is to be seen in the Battle of Muar-Bakri, when, after all other means of communication had broken down and most of the Australian Signal Detachment had been killed or wounded, the gallant survivors, by sheer grit and ingenuity, kept the one remaining wireless set in action long enough to enable the last vital messages to be passed.

I know well from experience how great were the difficulties to be overcome. Communications had to be established and maintained over tremendous distances and in face of a dominant enemy air force. Existing civil systems had to be strengthened and new systems to be built; and, as always in retreats, equipment had to be salvaged to replenish our meagre reserves. Such tasks were far in excess of what a Divisional Signals unit is designed to undertake. They demand great skill, untiring effort, and initiative of the highest order. Fortunately, the unit was richly equipped with these essentials and right well did it live up to its motto, "The difficult can be done now; the impossible may take a little longer." With it nothing was impossible. I would like finally to express to all ranks of this splendid unit my deep appreciation of the loyal manner in which they were always ready to help others. During the campaign, fought over such great distances and at so great a speed, the strains and stresses were great. Frequently there were gaps to be filled and few resources available. Time and again we turned to the Australian Signals for help and time and again they came to the rescue—voluntarily and without fuss. That, if further proof were needed, stamped it as an outstandingly fine unit.

BEST DAMN OUTFIT in these PARTS

Brigadier-General Jeremiah P. Holland
United States Army Provost Marshal, United States Army, Europe

I DO not know if growing old makes us become more cynical, more critical, or more observing. I do not know if age and experience make a person raise his standards beyond the reach of others, and beyond his own maximum efforts of younger years. But I do know that during the past decade there has grown within me an appreciation of an acceptable standard of conduct and how to attain that standard. The criterion may be high, but it is also necessary.

I am thinking, in part, of methodology. How does a soldier attain acceptable standards of conduct, appearance, care of equipment, and respect for command? How does an individual become determined to be the best enlisted man or best officer in the command? The achievement of the standard is symbolised by the development within each individual of an insatiable desire to make his unit the best possible and by active appreciation of the resultant glories and kudos.

In trying to describe this desire and this appreciation, we think of esprit de corps, a good title when earned, but a term that is too easily and hastily bandied about by the unthinking. Perhaps a more fitting and truly descriptive synonym would be *the best damn outfit in these parts.*

In this respect one likes to hear a man say:

Look at our commendations, watch us in a parade, check our conduct, examine the records — and take a look at our old man. He sees both the good and the bad in everything, takes no excuses, and plays no favourite. This is the best damn outfit in these parts.

From the Military Review, USA.

Just what is demonstrated in a testimony like this? Certainly there is evidence of morale, loyalty, and good leadership — fine sounding words, something to strive for—but too many of these qualities are found only in the trite verbiage and stock sayings that clutter reports and burden speeches: "the morale is good," "loyalty works both ways," "leaders are born, not made," and thus it goes, ad infinitum.

The question is, how do we go from words to actuality? What can be done to attain that which we seek in our units—"the best damn outfit in these parts"?

Schools? Yes, but a questionable yes. Today we are beset with schools for both enlisted men and officers. The on-the-job training seems to have passed with the "old Army." In fact, we have become super-conscious about our troop schools and we have even had to dress up a few and call them academies. There was a time when the word "academy" was traditionally married to the Hudson River or some other renowned location whose acres had been hallowed by the march of time. Now we have a plethora of fancy diplomas and a shortage of meaningful training.

Leadership? Emphatically yes! Without it we have but a shell of what should be. We must have leadership in officers and non-commissioned officers, but more basically we must have leadership of the individual, for unless a man leads himself he cannot lead others. This quality must exist from the day he arrives at the reception centre until he stands his last review.

It appears that in speaking of leadership we too often make rank and leadership synonymous. We tend to think that the higher the rank, the greater the leader. In weighing the fundamentals of leadership we must divorce this rationalization from our thinking and take the individual as an individual, stripped of rank, age, and background.

Leadership is not taught; it is instilled. Leadership is pride: pride in one's self, pride in one's fellow men, and pride in perfection. How can you teach pride in a schoolroom? You cannot. It is impossible. But in or out of school, leadership or pride can be instilled. It cannot come from a curriculum; it can only come from a continuous effort.

How can leadership be instilled? First and foremost, you must be instilled with leadership yourself, for there can be no complacent pointing to the trappings of leadership. You, personally, must be determined to make yourself the best soldier in the Army, and make your unit the best damn outfit in these parts.

Know your outfit and know its capabilities, whether you are a private or a commanding officer. Know the weaknesses of yourself and your outfit and do not be afraid to admit them. No unit is perfect, and if you know and appreciate your weaknesses, you know where to strengthen.

Know your men as you want them to know you. Even in this machine age the human element is here to stay. You cannot instill leadership into that vague "private over there in the supply section," unless you know his name, personality, character, desires, and capabilities. Some people call this psychology but I call it leadership.

Read the Book

Know what you are doing. *Read the book.* Call it *RTB* for short and keep that slogan in front of you. Publications have been distributed on everything we do or should do, no matter what the echelon or command. In fact, today we have too many books and publications, but too few readers.

One cannot stop perfecting himself once he receives a diploma, whether it comes from a replacement training centre or from the highest service school in the Army. Read and keep on reading, absorb and keep on absorbing.

Be open-minded. Be aggressive for new ideas from all sources. A closed mind speaks only from that which is already there. We live in a changing world and what are facts today may be history tomorrow. It is only through an open mind that a leader can adapt himself to his circumstances and surroundings.

Be observant. Make corrections. Accept nothing less than perfection. There is only one way to do a job in the Army and that is to do it right. It is the details that make up the whole, and it is the privates who make a good unit.

Once you are secure in these ideas you are well on the road to helping others become leaders. Leaders are not born, they are made—made by others who give willingly of time and effort.

When should we instill leadership? Always! Constancy of effort is a part of the definition of a good leader. He gives unstintingly of his time and attention. He leads a dedicated life, determined to help others as others have helped him.

Observation cannot be confined to the drill ground or to the classroom. A leader's observations and efforts should be boundless. Too many are able to look and too few are able to see. Leadership requires a definitive knowledge of right and wrong. Each glance must register a definite conclusion. In our Army there is no grey area between right and wrong. There must be no halfway acceptance.

Correct or Compliment

Correct that which is wrong and compliment that which is right. To your *RTB* add *C or C—Correct or Compliment.*

Where should leadership be instilled? The answer, of course, is everywhere within your command, but that is not the starting point. The first step is to make certain that you are instilled with leadership, for surely that is within your command responsibility. Without that one cannot help others. Each individual in the Army has a command responsibility beginning with the newest enlisted man, but still, regardless of grade, the command responsibility rests first with one's self. After this, there is the inexorable chain of command. At all times corrections and compliments—*C and C*—must follow the chain of command. Failure to keep this policy is failure to instill leadership.

We cannot tell when the most recent graduates of our schools will be called upon to exercise leadership; and yet, how often do our instructors fail to even mention the basic qualities of self-understanding and of insight into others. Our students memorize the texts, earn their diplomas, and are led to believe that makes them leaders.

Conclusions

Three things need to be added to our classroom instruction: know yourself, know others, and remember that you are a student as long as you are in the Army. Schools are but a link in the chain to the perpetual instillation of leadership and that purpose is achieved only when the basic qualities of good leadership are given life in the actions of men.

Read yourself, read other people, read the book, look and see what is right and what is wrong, then correct or compliment. It is only through the dedicated leadership of individuals that a unit achieves the title, *the best damn outfit in these parts.*

COMPETITION FOR AUTHORS

Award of First Place in the April Issue

The Board of Review has awarded first place and the prize of £5 to Colonel S. A. F. Pond, OBE, ED, for his series of articles on the Palestine Campaign, which concluded in this issue.

Colonel Pond was commissioned in the Melbourne University Regiment in 1926. After service with that unit and with 5 Infantry Battalion, he was posted GSO 3, and later GSO 2, of 4 Division soon after the outbreak of World War II. In 1940 he transferred to the AIF, and became Brigade Major, 27 Infantry Brigade. During the campaign in Malaya he commanded 2/29 Infantry Battalion.

Colonel Pond retired from the Service in December, 1955, from the appointment of GSO 1, Directorate of Military Training, AHQ.

A COMPARISON OF TWO FAILURES

Major J. A. Munro
Royal Australian Army Ordnance Corps

ON the twenty-fifth of June 1812, Napoleon invaded Russia. One hundred and twenty-nine years later, on the twenty-second of June 1941, Hitler invaded Russia. Both invasions were failures.

An analysis of both the campaigns reveals a considerable similarity in the errors made by both Napoleon and Hitler. The latter had the advantage of being able, had he so desired, to study Napoleon's campaign and thus avoid the errors Napoleon made. If he did study Napoleon's campaign, Hitler certainly did not apply what knowledge he gained, for in the event he repeated the mistakes which Napoleon had made before him. In this article an analysis of the two campaigns will be made to compare the errors made by each of these two commanders. The study of each campaign is confined to the major events.

Napoleon's Invasion

Napoleon's invasion of Russia was more imperialistic than any other of his campaigns. It seems that the main purpose of the war was to subject Russia to the economic interests of the French upper middle class. There was also the prospect of gaining India by using the Russian Army as an auxiliary force. Even Napoleon himself never seems to have been really clear as to his aim. Members of the Imperial Staff, including his Marshals, received only brief and general instructions and none of them really had any conception of the basic purpose of the war. The Grand Army from the Marshals down to the privates had no idea why, on the 25th of June 1812, it was led into Russia.

Initially the advance went well and the early withdrawal of the Russians poses the first question in any analysis of the campaign. Was it a planned move to use the vast expanse of Russian territory to bring about a French defeat, or was it forced on the Russians? Many historians, especially Russian, maintain

it was intentional, but examination shows that whilst a few people had thought along the lines of deliberate withdrawal, the retreat of the army was in fact forced upon the Russians. Amongst those who did appreciate the value of the vast expanse of Russian territory was Count Vorontsov, the Russian ambassador in London, who stated at the time:—

"All Europe is tensely awaiting the events whuch must take place between the Dvina, the Dnieper and the Vistula. I fear only the diplomatic and political events. I do not fear the military events at all. Even of the operations should prove unfavourable to us in the beginning, we can win by stubbornly waging a defensive war and continuing to fight as we retreat. If the enemy pursues us, he will perish because the farther he proceeds from his stores of provisions, his arms and munitions depots, the farther he penetrates a land without passable roads or provisions which he could seize, the more pitiful will be his condition. He will be surrounded by an army of Cossacks and in the end will be destroyed by our winter, which has always been our loyal ally."

There is also some evidence that Barclay de Tolly, Commander of the First Russian Army, had for a long time believed that the correct strategy in a struggle with Napoleon would be to use the immense expanses of Russia to lure Napoleon's army as far inland as possible and there await its inevitable destruction.

There is, however, more evidence that, in the event, he retreated only because it was impossible to halt the French. Count von Toll, of the Russian First Army, maintained that no one on the Russian staff had the slightest idea of the part which the expanses would play. The Russian retreat, he maintained, was due to Barclay de Tolly's reluctance to risk the destruction of his army in the first days of the war and that he was not guided by any plan to lure the enemy inland. The "Scythian plan" of luring the enemy inland was not discussed by the Russians until long after the war, and in fact the first to use the term in connection with this campaign was Napoleon himself.

Whatever the reason, the Russian withdrawal continued. Bagration, the Commander of the Second Russian Army, when at Slutsk, received word of French forces advancing on Bobruysk. He made a forced march towards Bobruysk and, due to the ineptitude of Jerome Bonaparte, King of Westphalia, was able to escape with his army and baggage train. Only an hour after Bagration left Vilna, Napoleon arrived with his vanguard. Here Napoleon made one of his mistakes of this campaign. He stopped his advance and remained at Vilna from 28th June until 16th July. The military historian Jomini considered that this was the greatest blunder Napoleon made in his whole life. There seems no doubt that had Napoleon advanced immediately towards Minsk he would have overtaken Bagration and destroyed him.

Why, then, did Napoleon make this fatal error? The answer is administrative failure. He had prepared stores depots and a huge baggage train for the campaign, but all these long files of waggons were unable to catch up with the fast advancing army. Herds of cattle which had been prepared in Prussia were far behind. As a consequence, the soldiers, deprived of regular rations,


KRONSTADT
LENINGRAD
DVINA
VOLGA
VILNO
VITEBSK
MOSCOW
SMOLENSK
MINSK
SLUTSK
PRIPET MARSHES
KIEV
KURSK
LOKHVITSA
UKRAINE
DNEIPER
STALINGRAD
DON
ROSTOV
CRIMEA

began to loot the population. The extent of this pillage was such, that even in those days when harsh action by invading armies was accepted by the civilians, the population turned bitterly against the French. This hostility of the Russian populace was later to take a heavy toll of the French army.

In his dealings with the Russian peasants Napoleon made another error. He made no use of their hostility to the existing regime. He declared that he had never considered liberating them and made no effort to win their sympathy. Because he had no wish to alienate the support of the French landed gentry, he was fearful that his invasion might precipitate a peasant revolution.

After resuming his advance Napoleon was again thwarted, this time at Vitebsk, where Barclay de Tolly, once again refusing to fight, withdrew to Smolensk. Again Napoleon faltered. It seems that here the thought first entered his mind that the Russians were deliberately trying to draw him on. On 28th July he decided to end the campaign at Vitebsk, organize the captured territories, replenish his armies and await Russian peace proposals.

At the beginning of August he again changed his mind, having decided that the only way to end the war in 1812 was to destroy the Russian Army, although all his marshals with the exception of Murat opposed any further move forward. Count Daru, Intendent-General of the Grand Army, was anxious about supplies. Of the 22,000 horses which had been brought to Russia, 8,000 died between Vilna and Vitebsk. The Grand Army had an immense baggage train and herds of cattle, but these were all far in the rear, and although large dumps of Russian stores had been captured the means to move these stores forward were lacking. The baggage trains simply could not keep up with the army.

At Smolensk, Barclay de Tolly and Bagration, who had earlier escaped destruction at Vilna, joined forces. The Russian force now totalled about 110,000, whilst Napoleon had about 180,000. The Russian withdrawal continued, but after Smolensk, Barclay de Tolly was replaced by Kutuzov as Russian Commander. Kutuzov, whose ability was undisputed, even more than his predecessor, sought to avoid a general engagement with Napoleon. Kutuzov, however, did realize that the vast expanses of Russia alone would not suffice to defeat Napoleon—equally necessary was a scorched earth policy.

From Smolensk the Russian rearguard began to take a heavy toll of the French. At Valutino Hill they inflicted 7,000 casualties on Ney's force and in fact did not withdraw until after the French had ceased firing. At Borodino was fought one of the bloodiest battles recorded in history. Clausewitz has stated that "Kutuzov, it is certain, would not have given battle at Borodino, where he obviously did not expect to win. But the voice of the court, the army and of Russia forced his hand." At this battle Napoleon destroyed almost half the Russian Army, but failed to break the Russian resistance. The battle cost Napoleon over 50,000, including 47 of his best generals. Napoleon, shortly before his death, said that "the most terrible of all my battles was the one before Moscow."

After Borodino the Russian army withdrew in good order and during this withdrawal Kutuzov decided not to fight for Moscow. All but a few inhabitants evacuated the city, and when Napoleon entered on 15th September fires were breaking out. The fires lasted until the 18th, destroying three-quarters of the city, and leaving the French only the charred remnants for their winter quarters. Whether these fires were started by the Russians or the French is doubtful. Wellington, in his writings on this campaign, says that he believed that they were not due to the voluntary action of the Russians, but caused by French soldiers in search of plunder. Peace now became essential to Napoleon, but Moscow was politically necessary to him as he needed to show Europe that he had forced the Tsar to sign a peace there. Unfortunately for Napoleon the Tsar made no peace overtures and as Napoleon waited he lost valuable autumn days.

He could not go to St. Petersburg as it was unthinkable to go north in winter, with Kutuzov in his rear. On the night of 19th October, after having destroyed the Kremlin, the French began to withdraw from Moscow towards Smolensk. This withdrawal towards Smolensk has often been regarded as an error. Why did he not move towards the rich intact southern provinces? Clausewitz believed Napoleon did not make a blunder. He has said:—

"Where could Napoleon have found supplies for his armies if not in the stores he prepared in advance? What good was an untapped region to an army which had no time to lose and was constantly forced to bivouac in large masses? What commissary officials would have agreed to travel ahead of that army to requisition supplies, and what Russian organization would have executed his orders? His whole army would have been starving in a week."

The supplies Napoleon's retreating forces expected to find in Smolensk were practically non-existent, the battalions that previously had passed through on their way north to reinforce the Grand Army having eaten them. Those stores that were left lasted only three days.

Kutuzov now had no doubt that the French must leave Russia and that they would do so without any battle. For him the only thing that mattered was the liberation of Russia with the smallest possible losses for the Russian Army. The lack of supplies, the winter and the Russians took a dreadful toll of the French. Napoleon did, however, conduct the withdrawal with skill, and at Berezena in the words of Clausewitz "not only completely saved his honour, but acquired new glory."

Causes of Napoleon's Failure

The causes of Napoleon's failure were:—

(a) He was not clear about his aim. He was never really sure of what he intended to achieve nor how he was to conduct the campaign.

(b) His failure at critical moments, such as at Vilna, to maintain offensive action. By his hesitation and delay he allowed the Russians time to withdraw successfully.

(c) Administrative failure. Wellington's views on this are of interest. He says:—

"It is frequently stated that Napoleon complained that his

orders were not obeyed and that magazines of provisions for his army were not formed upon the retreat at the places at which he had ordered that they should be formed. This may be true, but it must be observed that these orders were not given as other generals at the head of armies have given similar orders, pointing out the places where, and the means by which these provisions were to be collected and stored in magazines—and by supplying the money necessary to pay for their cost. There was but one source for collecting these magazines, that was la maraude. The system of the French army then, was the cause of its irregularities, disorders and misfortunes, and of its loss."

(d) His failure to take advantage of the Russian peasant's dissatisfaction with the existing regime.

(e) The decline in morale of French forces resultant from the administrative failure.

Hitler's Invasion

It is doubtful whether Hitler's decision to attack Russia was an error, but there is no doubt that his preparations to implement the decision and his execution of the plan were one long chain of blunders.

The choice of D day for the assault was unfortunate, but the choice of such a late date as 22nd June 1941 was forced on the Germans. Hitler had originally fixed 5th May as D day, but the Jugoslav incident delayed the attack, first by four weeks and finally until 22nd June. Both Von Rundstedt and Von Kleist have supported the claim that the Balkan offensive delayed the attack on Russia. General Halder has stated that in any case, due to the late arrival of summer in 1941, the weather was not suitable until the invasion was actually launched. This contention, however, has been denied by other authorities. Be that as it may, the delay was eventually to prove most important, as together with an unusually early winter, it was one of the causes of the German failure to capture Moscow. Von Rundstedt also contended that Von Kleists's armoured divisions were worn out in the unfortunate Balkan campaign, and on its conclusion were immediately required to be shifted to Russia without any time for rest or re-organization.

The German plan for the invasion was laid down in their Directive No. 21, the main points of which were:—

(a) The mass of Russian forces in the west to be destroyed by driving forward deep wedges of tanks.

(b) The main thrust to be on either side of the Pripet Marshes. The southern wing of the Centre Group (Von Bock) to annihilate the Russian forces.

(c) The Northern Group (Von Leeb) to capture Leningrad and Kronstadt, then concentrate against Moscow.

(d) The Southern Group (Von Rundstedt) to seize the Ukraine.

In this plan were the seeds of failure. Hitler failed to realize the great importance of Moscow in that he failed to appreciate:—

(a) That the Moscow industrial district was one of the most important centres of Soviet war industry.

(b) Moscow was the hub of the Russian railway system.

(c) In the super centralized Rus-

sian State, Moscow was the focal point of control.

(d) The psychological value of Moscow—the Mecca of Communism.

Hitler was blinded to the value of Moscow because of the importance he attached to securing Leningrad so as to clear his Baltic flank and link with the Finns, and also to securing the agricultural wealth of the Ukraine and the industrial wealth of the Lower Dnieper. Both Brauchitsh and Halder wanted to plan to go in force to Moscow for they realized that the dispersal of effort which would result from this plan would make the Germans too weak to gain decisive supremacy in any one place, or to maintain the momentum of the attack.

The German tactics were characterized by a tendency to force the Russians into battle with a reversed front in which their forces would be surrounded and then crushed by an encircling ring. By strictly adhering to the principle of "not one step backwards" the Russians greatly assisted these German tactics. Blumentritt, who was Chief of Staff of German Fourth Army, has said that the Russians repeatedly held ground so long as to become encircled, but that the Germans repeatedly failed to reap the benefit through becoming immobilized themselves. Moreover, the Russians committed a grave error in concentrating the bulk of their forces so close to their new frontier when to the east of their pre-1939 boundary they had a line of prepared defences.

Right from the beginning of the campaign there was a conflict of view within the German High Command. The majority of the generals favoured the two-sided envelopment whilst Guderian, who commanded one of the two armoured groups under Von Bock, was the leader of a faction favouring deep thrusts by armour to keep the enemy in retreat, leaving infantry to encircle the broken-up enemy forces. Guderian suggested a drive of all fast forces straight to Moscow. This project was rejected and the German forces were slowed down in spite of clear signs of disorganization among the Russians. Von Bock on 13th July changed his earlier opinion and supported Guderian's view but to no avail. On this same day Hitler said to Brauchitsh:

"It is less important to advance rapidly to the east than to destroy the living forces of the enemy."

At this juncture it is appropriate to discuss the German failure to provide winter stores, such as clothing, special lubricants and anti-freeze compounds. Most writers have attributed this failure directly to Hitler. It is said that he thought the campaign would be over in three months and that he would not allow preparations to be made for a winter campaign. Gorlitz, in his book "The German General Staff," states that it was not entirely Hitler's fault. The General Staff calculated that once the proposed line Leningrad-Smolensk-Dnieper was reached, only a fraction of the forces would be needed any longer. On this basis winter stores were considered necessary for only one-fifth of the invading force. Von Kleist, who commanded Armoured Group One under Von Rundstedt, has stated: "There were no preparations for a prolonged struggle. Everything was based on the idea of a decisive result before the autumn."

The Germans next made an error which was probably the turning

point of the war. It was the issue of Hitler's Directive No. 33, which stipulated that the following decisions were to be carried out:—

(a) The right wing of the Centre Army Group, including the Second Armoured Group, to be diverted south to encircle, in co-operation with the Southern Army Group, the Fifth Soviet Army.
(b) The detaching of the Third Armoured Group from the Centre Army Group to go north-east to cut the communications between Moscow and Leningrad.
(c) Centre Army Group to continue to Moscow with infantry alone.

Here again we see Hitler's obsession for destroying Russian armies. In a country of such terrific manpower he should have aimed to capture areas of production and centres of communication and control, thus exhausting the resources of the Russian war machine. Once more we see his lack of appreciation of the importance of Moscow. Directive No. 34 of 21st August reiterated that the principal object was not to be the capture of Moscow, but to seize the Crimea, isolate Leningrad and cut off the supply of Caucasian oil. In accordance with Directive No. 33 the encirclement of the Soviet Fifth Army proceeded at Kiev and on 14th September the German Second Armoured Group which had come down from the north made contact with the German First Armoured Group from the south near Lokhvitsa. The ring was closed, the Germans taking 665,000 prisoners. At first glance this would seem a great victory, but was the gain worth the price? The armoured forces which had been drawn from the centre assault towards Moscow were sadly missed, with the result that the rest of the forces there remained on the defensive. After the battle Hitler said: "Kiev was the greatest battle in the history of the world." His CGS said it was "the greatest strategic blunder in the Eastern campaign."

On 6th September, Hitler issued Directive No. 35. This time the Directive was in accord with the wishes of his General Staff. It ordered the rapid building up of Army Group centre to launch a decisive offensive against Moscow. Hitler, when issuing this Directive, stipulated that the attack was to begin within eight to ten days. Here is a prime example of how his lack of military knowledge led him into error, for how could such an attack be mounted in ten days? The troops required were still involved in the actions resulting from his Directive No. 33 and would have to be regrouped for this new assault.

Despite the great effort made Moscow was not taken. It was too late, for winter had come and movement was practically stopped. The Russian earth could be turned into mud by ten minutes rain, stopping all movement. The roads deteriorated under heavy traffic as the German fast forces consisted largely of vehicles that had not been equipped for cross-country travel and the vehicles themselves deteriorated for lack of winter lubricants and anti-freeze compounds. After an initial snap of cold weather, there was some improvement and further small progress was made so that sub units of one German division penetrated as far as the Moscow suburbs.

Von Kleist was of the opinion that the main cause of the German

failure was that winter came early, but Von Rundstedt said that long before winter came the chances had been diminished owing to the repeated delays in the advance caused by bad roads.

After the failure of the Moscow offensive the morale of the German troops outside the city showed signs of cracking. It was Hitler's decision of "no withdrawal" which averted panic. Tippelshirch, a corps commander, says:—

"It was his (Hitler's) one great achievement. At that critical moment the troops were remembering what they had heard about Napoleon's retreat from Moscow and living under the shadow of it. If they had once begun a retreat it might have turned into a panic flight."

Von Rundstedt, however, disagrees and has said it was Hitler's decision for rigid resistance that caused the danger in the first place, and that it would not have arisen had he permitted a timely withdrawal.

In spite of so many victories and territorial gains the campaign of 1941/42 was not a success. Russia was still undefeated and Germany had to face a second summer campaign. Furthermore, Hitler, by dismissals, was depriving the Wehrmacht of its best commanders.

In the campaign of 1942/43 a similar series of blunders was repeated. Hitler again sought decisive results on the extreme wings of the front while his armies in the centre were overlooking Moscow and the adjacent industrial district. He aimed to capture the Caucasian oil and Ukrainian wheat for the Third Reich. In this he was encouraged by his economic authorities, who said they could not continue the war without the oil from the Caucasus and wheat from the Ukraine. He also planned a local attack on Leningrad to establish direct contact with the Finns. Blumentritt was of the opinion that Leningrad could in fact have been taken, probably with little difficulty, but after his experience at Warsaw in 1939 Hitler was always nervous about tackling big cities. The attempt to bring about the fall of the city by encirclement and blockade failed.

In the Caucasus offensive Hitler made another mistake. On 17th July 1942, he directed the bulk of the Fourth Armoured Army, which at this date was paving the way to Stalingrad for the Sixth Army, to move to the lower Don area. He did this because he felt that the First Armoured Army would not be able, on its own, to force the crossing of the lower Don. Because of the chaotic state of the Russian defences this move was completely unnecessary. General Halder warned Hitler of the following consequences which would result from his action of moving the Fourth Armoured Army south:—

(a) Overcrowding of the Rostov area with fast forces which would have nothing to do there.
(b) Diversion of the Fourth Armoured Army from its task just when the path to Stalingrad lay open.

Just as in the previous year Hitler missed the opportunity to take Moscow, he now missed the opportunity of taking Stalingrad. The Sixth Army, due to the absence of the Fourth Armoured Army, was unable to advance speedily. It was further delayed because of hold-ups in supply, due to some extent to the concentration of troops in Rostov as a

result of Hitler's earlier order. Later, when the error was realized and the Fourth Armoured Army was redirected to Stalingrad, it was too late as the Russians by then had had time to prepare defences.

Hitler was obsessed with the desire to capture Stalingrad. On 12th September he decided to take it by storm. After very bitter fighting the Germans, by the end of October, had captured almost the whole of the city or more correctly the ruins, and could control the Volga traffic. But the price was high — the fighting strength of the German units involved had dropped to one-quarter and the constant weakening of the Caucasian formations to reinforce the Stalingrad units brought the former campaign to a halt. What was Stalingrad worth? The occupation was not essential in order to deny Russia the use of the Volga, on which Caucasian oil and U.S. supplies went north, for it would have been quite sufficient to reach and blockade the river at any point. Hitler, perhaps because of its name, attached to this city a far greater importance than it deserved.

Von Kleist believed that the Caucasian expedition failed primarily because of shortage of fuel due to the Rostov bottleneck. Even so he believed the Germans would still have been successful if his forces had not been constantly weakened because Hitler was taking away unit after unit and directing them to Stalingrad. However, this was not the last important role Stalingrad was to play, for it involved Hitler in an even worse blunder.

The Russians in their counter-offensive were able by 22nd November to encircle the German Sixth Army. This Army could have broken out in the early stages as the encircling ring was not strong. Hitler's decision to stay was fatal.

For the Germans the results of 1942/43 were frightful. After nine months of fighting they were back from where they started and had in the process lost three armies. For Germany it was a blow from which she never recovered and for Hitler it was the grave of the myth of his invincibility. From this time on the initiative was held by the Russians and detailed study of the gradual falling back of the Germans is not necessary. From here on Hitler's blunders can be summarized as refusal to revert to elastic defence and the wasteful squandering of his armoured reserve in the Kursk counter-offensive.

Von Rundstedt has said that even at this late stage Germany could have avoided defeat if the commanders in the field had been allowed a free hand, withdrawing when and where they thought fit instead of being compelled to hang on too long. This fact was to a great extent demonstrated by Von Kleist, who extricated his army from the Caucasus under extraordinary difficulties, with little loss.

Causes of Hitler's Failure

The causes of Hitler's failure were:—

(a) A faulty appreciation in that insufficient attention was paid to the consideration of facts and too much reliance placed on Hitler's intuition. This is exemplified by his fascination for Leningrad and Stalingrad and failure to realize the importance of Moscow.

(b) Failure to maintain his aim.

(c) Inadequate administrative plan-

ning such as lack of preparations for winter and faulty assessment of Russian road and rail system.

(d) Military incompetence. In this regard the German General Staff must be held responsible for some of the blame, for it was they who gradually relinquished the whole of their responsibilities for the day to day prosecution of the war to a man who had been a corporal only twenty years before.

(e) Illtreatment of Russian prisoners and deserters. Just as did Napoleon, Hitler made a great mistake in his attitude to these people. By the treatment he meted out he played into the hands of the Russian propaganda machine and failed to utilize a force which might well have been applied against the existing Russian Government.

Conclusion

In both campaigns similar errors were made. The major error which more than any other led to the failure of both invaders was poor administration, for it was this which forced Napoleon into a winter withdrawal and which prevented Hitler from taking Moscow in 1941. The failure of both has led many people to believe that a successful invasion of Russia is not possible. There is no doubt that the immensity and difficulty of the Russian terrain is a problem, but provided it is efficiently planned and conducted there is no reason at all why such an operation should be foredoomed to failure.

THAT APPRECIATION!

Try Teaching it this Way

Major J. T. Quinn
Australian Intelligence Corps

THEY were reviewing their first few periods of instruction on the subject of Appreciations.

Yes! It had been most interesting. ". . . Some of the headings were hard to remember, but the main thing is to get your AIM right." "Don't confuse factors with courses open, and never put down a factor unless you can follow it with a useful deduction."

"And don't just state a course. Give the advantages and disadvantages. Remember, too, that factors are not confined to relative strengths, ground, and time and space; there could be many others . . ."

The foregoing comments are no doubt typical of those which often follow initial instruction on Appreciations. Students have uppermost in their minds a number of headings and sub-headings, with the idea of putting something under each, plus a number of do's and dont's in connection with such headings.

They may be well on the way, in fact, to a comp'ete misunderstanding of the subject.

It is a mere truism to say that the training of officers in sound military thinking is essential. It follows that the time-honoured subject of Appreciations is of great value because, inter alia, it assists us to think methodically, it teaches us to record, where necessary, our thoughts and plans in a way common to all in the Service so that they may be easily read and understood by others. It gives us, too, a set way of doing things so that in the stress of war we may more readily and effectually review a problem by following a pre-determined, sound sequence of thought.

Few will deny, however, that the subject causes many officers and NCOs unnecessary trouble before they finally obtain a satisfactory grasp of it. "I should be right. I think I have a good idea of Appreciations!" are famous last words before practical examinations involving the subject. All too often it is clearly shown in a student's answers that he has a good idea, perhaps a very good idea, of *a number*

of headings and has shown a determination to put something under each, just as though he were compiling an Operation Order. There is no smooth flow of reasoning; no confident review of the salient points at all. Ah! but he has put something on *relative strengths,* even though it is as irrelevant in the problem set as it would be in a child's essay on a day in the bush. He has added, too, an equally useless "deduction," with the word carefully underlined.

The question is, then: "How shall I teach the subject so that students really understand it?"

For a start, remember you are not teaching them to fill in a form such as an Income Tax Return, where a little thought and a few facts enable you to put something under each section. You are teaching your class to THINK, to handle a problem in a logical, balanced manner by *individual thought.* Try doing it this way.

Do not mention the word "Appreciation." Simply explain that you are about to deal with the handling of military problems. Issue the narrative for a fairly simple but realistic problem and tell your class to write an ESSAY on the problem confronting Lt Bloggs or whoever is the hapless character featured in your narrative.

Explain that the essay should be kept brief and to the point, and that it should be in three parts:—

(a) A very short statement of the actual problem facing Lt Bloggs.
(b) Matters which must be taken into account by Bloggs as having a direct bearing on the possible ways and means of achieving his desired end.
(c) A satisfactory outline plan (or plans) that Bloggs could adopt.

Tell your class not to worry about style or the choice of words, but to record their thoughts in a simple, frank way.

Correct the answers to this essay, and repeat the performance. In correcting the answers watch particularly for a faulty statement of what the problem is; for the inclusion of matters not directly related to the real problem or the omission of matters vital to the issue, and so on. Try to correct students' THINKING at this stage.

After a few essays and the discussion of errors made you should have achieved your main purpose, that is, to have your class thinking and writing logically and with confidence on military problems, unimpeded by the mental blinkers of unfamiliar headings, sub-headings, and other restrictive mechanics.

Once they have gained the *spirit* of reviewing a military problem, and of concentrating on the essentials, it should be a comparatively simple matter to adjust their approach to the approved Appreciation technique as set out in the text books.

Upon switching to the Appreciation technique, do not dramatize the process of appreciating a situation as have some instructors by giving the impression that a commander might be expected, as it were, suddenly to announce that he is about to make an Appreciation, and then shut himself in a tent or shelter until he is able to return and say, waving a few papers, "I have made my Appreciation!"

And please don't tell your class about the man having to make an appreciation when he needed a hair trim, but also had to buy a dozen eggs for his wife, and had only 20 minutes before the last bus left for

home. Such nonsense can give the unfortunate impression that every time an officer wants to perform some operation, no matter how simple, he should go through a laborious thought process.

After all, a great deal of our training is aimed at teaching people to make quick decisions, to act "automatically," with a minimum of direction or mental deliberation.

Do not set too simple a problem either in the introductory essays or in the first Appreciation, as such, that follow. I can recall as a newly commissioned officer being asked by a superior during a field exercise: "What route would you take to get quickly on to that near feature with your platoon?" After brief thought I replied: "Through that copse, along the water course as far as possible . . . " and so on, giving what happened to be, in the particular circumstances, the only reasonable course available. For the following 20 minutes I was lectured on the need to consider all factors, all possible courses, and not to jump to conclusions. The officer admitted that the course stated seemed to be the only sound one. What he objected to (as I saw it) was that I had deduced something in a few minutes when I could have spent half an hour laboriously considering all "factors," and putting up Aunt Sally courses, so that after wasting about half an hour I could triumphant'y announce that I had completed my appreciation and would adopt course so-and-so, which was from the outset quite obviously the only thing to do.

The occasion did much to confuse me on the subject of appreciations for a long time, and I concluded that any technique which teaches you to do in half an hour what could be done equally well in two minutes was indeed an odd one and was not to be taken seriously.

This type of experience is probably all too common. So let us not mention the man making an "appreciation" over a thing like a hair trim, nor insist on deliberate thought on trifling military situations which may safely be left to a person's immediate judgment, or even to his intuition. A warning might be issued, of course, against the making of hasty decisions where deliberate thought is required.

If you wish to relate the subject to everyday life explain, for example, that army commanders have problems to solve just as have executives in civilian life. Point out, though, that they usually have to reach decisions much more quickly and under more adverse "thinking" conditions than do their civilian counterparts, and that for these and other reasons they adopt a particular technique called for want of a better name, an Appreciation of the Situation. The advantages of all officers, no matter how junior, following the same technique could be impressed on the class.

To return to the basic point, why not try teaching Appreciations along the lines suggested? First paint your picture, then frame it. First teach your students to THINK and write with confidence on military problems, then get them to adjust their style to conform to the framework of the Appreciation technique. It just may help!

Road Toll

Captain W. Copp
Royal Australian Provost Corps

IF Australian roads remain in their present state and the vehicle registration rate continues to increase, it is reasonable to assume that the accident rate will also continue to increase. If we accept this as a fact we accept without alarm the unnecessary accidents which take such great toll, not only in man-hours, vehicle loss and strain on the national economy, but in life.

The increasing number of road accidents is a national concern and, since the Army is part of the nation, it is also an Army concern. In this paper it is intended to point out how the Army within its own sphere of activity can assist the nation to reduce the accident rate.

The figures produced by a recent survey in the United States by the Society of Automotive Engineers show that 90 per cent. of road accidents were caused by:—

(a) Speed.
(b) Failure to keep a proper lookout.
(c) Disregard of Road Safety Regulations.
(d) Drink.

How are we to prevent Army vehicles contributing to the main causes of accidents, as disclosed by the U.S.A. survey? Let us consider them one by one.

Speed

Governing the engine so as to limit the vehicle to a safe maximum speed has often been suggested. This method is not the answer, as it reduces the efficiency of the engine, and the expense makes it impracticable. A more practicable method is to establish regular Provost Corps patrols on the routes used by military traffic. This method has proved very successful in other countries. The patrolman, of course, is there to prevent accidents to military vehicles by enforcing road discipline; he is not there to impress his commanding officer with a big tally of reports. The object is not to catch the unsuspecting speedster, it is to persuade Army drivers to keep within the speed limit. It is considered that this object will be achieved if the drivers have plenty of visible evidence that road is constantly being patrolled.

It may be argued that this would necessitate an increase in Provost establishments and that this would be uneconomical. Let us answer that with an example. The four main

highways used by the Army in the Sydney area are:—

Sydney - Liverpool.
Sydney - George's Heights.
Sydney - South Head.
Sydney - Randwick, Maroubra, Cape Banks.

Four men would be required to constantly patrol these routes during normal working hours. Would the cost of these patrols be any greater than the present cost of investigating AAF G13s?

Failure to Keep a Good Lookout

Lighting cigarettes and talking are two common causes of drivers failing to keep a good lookout.

According to Zane Grey a Texan can roll, lick and light a cigarette with one hand, keep his other hand on the butt of his pistol, no hands on the reins, and his two eyes glued to the back of the bad-man, all at a speed of 10 mph. Apparently a good many motor drivers don't think this feat in the least fantastic. It is a common occurrence for a driver to reach over and get a packet of cigarettes and matches from the glove box, extract a cigarette, place it in his mouth and light it. In the process he takes at least one hand off the wheel, and for a second both eyes and all his attention off the road, often at a speed of 30 mph. Every time he does this he fails to keep a good lookout, and is in danger of failing to keep proper control of his vehicle. Only for a second perhaps, but in that second the accident happens. At 30 mph a vehicle travels 42 feet in a second.

Then there is the driver who not only persists in talking, but persists in taking his eyes off the road to look at his audience. Good manners in the drawing room, but not on the road.

Drivers should not smoke while driving and they should at all times keep their eyes on the road. They should confine their conversation to bare essentials lest their attention be diverted from the not-so-easy task of arriving at the destination undamaged. If the passenger is senior to the driver he should insist on the observance of this golden rule; if he is of equal or subordinate rank he should refrain from encouraging the talkative one.

Disregard of Traffic Regulations

By exercising our power of observation on the roads we can often make a pretty fair estimate of the character of the drivers we pass. For instance there is the nervous fellow —a menace on any highway—and the driver with feminine habits who cannot make up his mind. Then there is the forceful character, the driver who forces through and saves three minutes in 30 miles, if he finishes the 30 miles. The rude driver is all too common, the fellow who thinks everyone on the road is a fool except himself and takes great delight in the excessive use of the horn. His favourite trick is to harass the driver in front of him if he is unfortunate enough to stall his engine. Then there is the sneak who sneaks silently up on the left, and the bully with a heavy vehicle and no consideration for the driver of a lighter one. Last but by no means least is the irresponsible one with a fast car and a heavy foot. All these types belong to the AAF G13 Corps.

Fortunately we find some better characters as well. There is the considerate driver who keeps an eye to the innocence of child pedes-

trians, the feebleness of the aged and the helplessness of the incapacitated. Occasionally we see the polite driver, the one who says to himself: "Carry on old boy, you may be on my left, but you seem to be in the dickens of a hurry." And there is the careful driver who keeps his speed down to 30 mph, obeys the rules of the road, and gives good and timely hand signals. Army drivers in this category are a credit to the uniform they wear.

Drink

We all know the consequences of drinking and driving. In the Army a driver should not drink when warned for duty and he should certainly not drink whilst on duty. Furthermore, he should not be ordered to drive, if it is known that he has been drinking.

The Remedy

There is no one hundred per cent. answer to the toll of the road, but the accident rate can be reduced by the exercise of common sense. So far as we in the Army are concerned it will not help very much if we set about improving our driving by draconian methods. If we do, pretty soon no one will want to be a driver. We should first make sure that it is clearly understood that:—

(a) If a driver is carrying out his duties diligently and efficiently and unfortunately becomes involved in an accident, the Army will give him all possible protection.

(b) If a driver is involved in an accident through his disregard of regulations or the rules of the road punishment should be severe.

In addition we should institute an educational drive designed to induce every officer, NCO and private to police in his daily tour of duty:—

Speed;
Failure to keep a good lookout;
Road Safety Regulations;
Drink.

If these measures are supported by the establishment of Provost patrols on highways commonly used by military vehicles the result should be a diminution in the flow of AAF G13s.