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

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AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

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AMF GOLD MEDAL ESSAY

1954

Lieutenant-Colonel F. W. Speed, OBE, ED, psc,
Australian Staff Corps.

In time of peace the function of the Citizen Military Forces is to train for war. Therefore, the only aim of the CMF should be the attainment of a degree of efficiency which will permit it to undertake operations in a major war with the least possible delay. Peace administration, which is unavoidable and which differs in many ways from war administration, should not be allowed to jeopardize the attainment of this aim.

Discuss the means you consider will permit the essential requirements of peace administration to be met and which, at the same time, will enable the CMF to attain the maximum degree of operational efficiency attainable under the existing terms of CMF service.

THE problem of efficiency in peace administration, like a character from mythology, has at least two heads.

One CMF Commander, in a moment of rage induced by a bulky file exclaims "No business would last ten minutes if it were run on the same system as the Army." Another, viewing the Army's capacity to deal administratively with crises such as floods or major bush fires, says proudly "No commercial organization could possibly have coped with the task."

It is beyond the scope of this investigation to determine whether or not the Army organization is soundly based. Any present enquiry must proceed from the assumption that, in fact, it is well organized.

In similar manner it is possible to dispose immediately with another major proposition. It might well be suggested that one of the means which would permit the CMF to attain the maximum degree of operational efficiency would be to provide an ARA cadre of sufficient quantity and quality to carry out

Lieutenant-Colonel Speed was commissioned in 5 Battalion, CMF, on 17 July 1931, and served with this unit until he was appointed Captain in 2/5 Battalion, Australian Imperial Force, in October 1939. After service with this battalion in the Middle East he was Brigade Major of 26 Infantry Brigade from February 1941 to August 1942, when he became GSO II HQ AIF Middle East. On his return from the Middle East in 1943 he was promoted lieutenant-colonel and appointed GSO I (SD and Trg) HQ, First Australian Army. Except for a four months' tour of duty with 1 Australian Corps, he remained in this appointment until the end of the war.

Lieutenant-Colonel Speed joined the Regular Army in December 1948, and was appointed GSO I, Staff Duties, at Army Headquarters. In 1951 he spent four months as an observer in Malaya, and in December 1952 was appointed to his present posting of Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General, 2 Division.

ALL peace administration and leave the CMF personnel free to concentrate on the primary aim of training for war. This, however, is not practicable for at least two reasons:

(a) The necessary increase in ARA establishment would not be provided.

(b) Administration is an inseparable element of command, and experience in it is essential to the attainment of operational efficiency.

Accepting this conclusion as true, we may therefore concentrate on developing a means of administration which will meet the requirement set down.

Approach to the Problem

The problem is approached from two aspects:

1. A general examination of the theory of administration, to determine to what extent it is applied within the Army and in what further directions it might profitably be used.
2. Review of a number of individual examples of inefficiency which seem at present to exist and consideration of some suggestions for improvement.

Early Experience

Peace Administration has made immense strides in recent years. It is instructive to look back on some of the inefficiencies which were current many years ago but which have now gone.

General Sir Ian Hamilton wrote of his experiences at the turn of the century thus:—

"In 1896 I was DQMG at Simla; then one of the hardest worked billets in Asia. After a long office day I used to get back home to

dinner pursued by a pile of files three to four feet high. The QMG, my boss, was a clever, delightful work-glutton. So we sweated and ran together for a while a neck-to-neck race with our piles of files, but I was the younger, and he was the first to be ordered off by the doctors to Europe. Then I, at the age of forty-three, stepped into his shoes and became officiating QMG in India.

"Unluckily the Government at that moment was in a very stingy mood. They refused to provide pay to fill the post I was vacating and the C in C asked me to duplicate myself and do the double work. My heart sank, but there was nothing for it but to have a try. The QMG went home and *with him went the whole of his share* of the work. As for my own share, the hard twelve hours' task melted by some magic into the Socialists' dream of a six-hour day. How was that? Because when a question came up from one of the Departments, I had formerly been forced to compose a long minute upon it, explaining the case, putting my own views, and endeavouring to persuade the QMG to accept them. He was a highly conscientious man and if he differed from me he liked to put on record his reasons — several pages of reasons. Or if he agreed with me, still he liked to agree in his own words, and 'to put them on record'."[1]

More recently, in fact as late as 1939, Clothing Regulations for the British Army were quite extraordinarily intricate. Some graduation in allowance was obviously indicated, but actually all sense of proportion was abandoned.

A WO I received 3s. 5d. a week, but if he wore trousers instead of overalls the rate dropped to 3s. 4d., and if he was serving in Cyprus, Egypt, Gibraltar, Malta or Palestine to 3s. 2½d. The corresponding rates for a private soldier were 2s. 11¾d., and 2s. 10¼d. respectively. There were special columns, inter alia, for the Household Cavalry, for the Foot Guards, for troops stationed in Bermuda and for non-European personnel RA, other than Hong Kong and Singapore RA; and this last column had a footnote that Mohammedan Other Ranks of mountain batteries at Hong Kong would receive an additional ¼d. a week.

Also, these allowances were not continuously in issue. When a man was admitted to hospital he wore pyjamas, if in bed; a hospital blue, if convalescent; and both pyjamas and hospital blues were provided for him free of charge; so there was no wear-and-tear on his uniform, and the issue of clothing allowance during his stay in hospital must be suspended.[2]

These things are ancient history and are unlikely to happen in Australia now. But that conclusion is no cause for complacency. All activity is dynamic and if we do not go forward we must inevitably drop back. It is important, therefore, that all concerned should recognize the need for continuous review and progressive improvement of all administrative methods.

1. HAMILTON, Gen Sir Ian "The Soul and Body of an Army." Edward Arnold & Co., London, 1921 p 92.

2. Clothing Regulations 1939. War Office, LONDON. pp 71-72.

Nature of the Problem

A detailed examination of the present problem suggests that the real difficulty lies in the mass of work at all levels from commanders down to clerical and typing staffs. This large volume of administration is the result of a number of contributing causes. These can be enumerated briefly, and then left until later for production of possible solutions.

Personnel Records

The greater complexity of army trades and duties, the wider range of schools and courses available to CMF personnel, and the greater attention paid generally to man-management, have all increased the volume of personnel administration. The AAF A103A (Record of Service Book) is a most comprehensive record. To this are added the subsidiary AAF G1 (Register of Range Courses), AAF B122 (Regimental Conduct Sheet) and NS24 (Personal Data Sheet).

One man's records represent a considerable clerical and supervisory effort and, when multiplied by the number of personnel in a unit and turned over by the unit, the resultant task is substantial. It is not suggested that we should adopt a system so radically economical as the Russian; but it is apparent that a modification of personnel records is indicated.

National Service Procedures

National Service procedures have increased the volume of work for two reasons:—

(i) Documentation and attendance enforcement are greater individually than in the case of the voluntary enlisted member.

(ii) Unit strengths are now much higher than they have ever been; in some cases the higher establishment has already been exceeded; and no provision has been made for increases in the ARA cadres.

The strength of officers and the quality of ARA staffs has not increased in proportion, and there seems no prospect of such increases occurring. Streamlining of procedures, to any extent possible, is therefore the only practicable solution in this regard.

Equipment Administration

The quantity of equipment held by a unit has increased enormously since before the 1939-45 War and its use in training has correspondingly increased. Accounting and records procedure has become more complex. The result is that more time is spent on the many aspects of equipment administration than on any other single administrative procedure.

The intrinsic value of the average unit's equipment is little, if any, greater than that of many industrial undertakings, yet the accounting and records procedures are substantially more laborious and the whole system needs basic overhaul.

Works

The changes in unit organization and in the composition of formations have meant that many Training Depots are now used by units whose layout is quite different from that for which the depots were designed, and others have hired accommodation which is usually sketchy. Small works, such as the construction of fittings in store rooms, modification of outbuildings and the like are a recurring need.

The works procedure for these small projects is theoretically quite

sound and not uneconomical, but in practice the volume is so great that the system becomes terribly slow and involves a substantial amount of time at all levels back to the Department of Works.

Such works almost invariably stem from an administrative need, and delay in their execution usually means that the work of unit staffs is increased. Moreover, the correspondence and personal visits made by unit and formation officers attempting to get action on the projects is most time consuming.

Check and Recall

A most time-consuming factor in the work of headquarters at all levels above that of the unit, is the need for constant check of matters sent out for unit attention, and the reminders which have as a result to be despatched in a high proportion of cases.

In plain fact this need for check and recall is due to inefficiencies at the unit level. However, the inefficiencies are not necessarily the fault of units. There are at least two causes:—

(a) Lack of experience in unit staffs leading to faulty programming of work, delay in preparing final answers, production of wrong answers, etc.

(b) In most cases, lack of trained typists, which results in slow production of work, and misuse of such personnel as the Adjutant, RSM, etc., on typing.

Investigations

The present investigations system was introduced to cut down the time and effort involved in Courts of Inquiry. This has undoubtedly been achieved.

However, the increase in equipment holdings, the introduction of motor transport (with its attendant increases in accident rate), and the application of the Commonwealth Employees' Compensation Act to the CMF have multiplied the number of investigations far beyond the savings resulting from the adoption of the investigation procedure. A substantial proportion of CMF officers' and ARA staffs' time is devoted to investigations and the clerical work attendant thereon.

Moreover, it seems that some sections of the administrative machine have come to regard a report by a comparatively junior officer, made in the guise of an investigation, as more authoritative than a report by a Commanding Officer.

Here again, it is emphasized that it is the number and frequency of investigations which has become the burden.

Finance Control

Financial control in peace does seem to the outside observer to start from the assumption that every commanding officer is either a fool or a knave and cannot be trusted with more than a very small degree of financial authority.

A lieutenant-colonel's command is the mirror of its commanding officer. In battle, it is in his keeping; if he does not know his business he may throw away needlessly hundreds of lives. What powers are vested in him in peace time to enable him to keep his unit at the highest pitch of efficiency?[3]

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3. DUFF, Maj Gen A. C. "Sword and Pen". Gale & Polden Ltd., ALDERSHOT, 1950 p 73.

Instead of taking the view that a commanding officer must be provided with a closed circuit of regulations so that he cannot err, is not the right attitude that he should be given fairly wide powers and then watched closely to see that the trust is not abused?

If he is given much wider powers then some of the detailed paper work and many of the irritating delays will fall away.

As Major-General Duff points out: "By the time that the data (on which regulations are based) have been prepared, the regulations written and printed, the necessary forms prepared and distributed, the bookkeeping entries made and audited, where is the economy."[4]

The Way to Solution

No single factor or aspect of peace administration can be isolated as the cause, or even the main cause, of the trouble. It is evident that the difficulty lies in the sum total of all aspects of it.

Indeed it can even be said that the great majority of the many aspects of peace administration are individually fully defensible. Taken separately, most administrative regulations and procedures are justifiable in the eyes of those who prescribe them. Moreover most CMF officers will agree with this view; but they feel that the cumulative load of these demands imposes a burden beyond the capacity of part-time personnel, and the ARA staff, to deal with them.

Under the Australian system of government a method of peace administration different from war administration is inescapable, and any proposal which seeks entirely to eliminate the difference can only fail.

The fundamental requirements of a good system of peace administration can, however, be stated as:—

1. Its design should be as near as possible to that of war.
2. It should be reasonably economical of application.
3. It should be fully capable of application by CMF personnel assisted — but only assisted — by ARA Cadres.

The first two factors need little justification. In the first place, we are warned that the next war (if and when it comes) will probably be sudden: and we know that current plans do not allow for leisurely mobilization. Therefore the less change there is involved in the transition from peace to war the better.

In the second place, there is seldom enough money to go round. It is therefore obvious that the system of peace administration must be as economical as possible — even to the extent perhaps that a few well entrenched Treasury rulings might be reviewed.

As to the third factor — that the system of peace administration should be fully capable of application by CMF personnel assisted by ARA Cadres — there is one consideration which is perhaps not fully appreciated.

Rules are sometimes made which are possible for Regular units but which are quite impracticable in the case of CMF. MBI 176/52 on "The Prevention of Fraud" is a case in point.

If a CMF commanding officer were to follow it in its entirety, he would

4. op cit, p 72.

devote practically the whole of his limited time to administration and could even encroach substantially into his civil occupation.

Three examples will serve to illustrate what COs feel bound to do to comply with this Instruction.

Para 25 permits a CO to nominate an officer to sign indents for stores and supplies; but it requires the CO to check the indents before they are signed.

Para 22 requires a CO to keep a record of checks made during inspections, the dates, the items checked and the results.

Para 26(a) requires a CO to keep a check list of all returns which he has to sign, to ensure that all such documents are produced for signature when due.

Taken individually, these three requirements are sound enough, and together they may well be quite reasonably expected of regular COs. But grouped with the many other things which a part-time CO is expected to do, they are not reasonable.

Nor is it possible to say in this instance, as does Major-General Porter in his article "Why Do It, Colonel?",[5] that the work should be delegated, because the whole tenor of the examples quoted is that the CO will do these things himself.

No doubt the originator of the Instruction would say that it is intended as a guide only. However, some of the auditors who apply it do not take it in that way; and COs, in the main, feel that it is mandatory.

The point here is not that MBI 176/52 should necessarily be revised immediately. The need is for realization that CMF Units have not the resources of similar ARA Units and that rules which are not meant to be applied to certain types of units should say so specifically.

Accepting that the fundamental requirements of a good system of peace administration can be stated as above, we can proceed to the methods by which an acceptable system can be achieved.

The first step is a general examination of the theory of administration.

The Theory of Administration

A theory of administration is a comparatively recent development.

Towards the end of the last century and in the first half of the present, the term "administration" was used in the Army to cover that function of command which dealt with the maintenance of the forces in the field.[6] The subject was dealt with in a very general manner in Field Service Regulations Vol 1 from the aspect of warfare but nothing was said of the peace aspect.

On the semi-official side, Brigadier (now Lieutenant-General Sir) W. G. Lindsell first wrote his "Military Organization and Administration" in 1923 to provide a text book on the administrative, as distinct from the tactical, side of warfare.

Since the 1939-45 War, due to the American influence in the latter stages of that war and in the subsequent United Nations' campaigns, there has been a tendency to swing to the term "Logistics." And, whatever it is called, most official publi-

5. PORTER, Maj Gen S. H. W. C. "Why Do It, Colonel?" Australian Army Journal, Feb '54.

6. Field Service Regulations Vol 1 1930, p xvi.

cations deal quite fully with this Administrative aspect of War.

However, no standard work appears to have been produced as a guide to day-to-day peace administration.

In commerce and industry, very little was written about administrative organization prior to 1939. The function of general management had been identified, but the few executives and scholars who wrote on the subject approached it from the standpoint of basic managerial philosophy. They gave little attention to administrative organization as such.

There were some exceptions.

Analysis of Business Administration

Henri Fayol was a noted French industrialist. At an advanced stage in his career he took over a large coal and iron combine which was on the verge of bankruptcy. When he retired 30 years later, the combine was brilliantly successful, with an exceptionally strong balance sheet. Towards the end of his life he sought to reduce to logical form the principles on which his success as an administrator had been built. His "General and Industrial Administration"[7] has probably had more influence on the ideas of business men in Europe than any other work.

In America, F. W. Taylor was regarded by his countrymen as the Father of Scientific Management. He began his industrial life as an apprentice patternmaker and machinist where he realized the lack of real organization which then obtained. Later in the Midvale Steel Company he developed *single handed* a system of shop management the equal of which had never been known before. Taylor was the first to grasp the fact that many of the problems of industry and commerce involved common factors: and thus implied the opportunity and need of an organized science. He was one of the first to codify the principles of administration.

At the present time one of the most useful contributors, certainly from the Service aspect, is L. F. Urwick, Chairman of Urwick Orr and Partners Ltd., Consulting Industrial Engineers. Urwick served in the British Army, where he attained the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel and won the MC and OBE. He combines a sound knowledge of the Army with extensive experience in the UK and USA business worlds. He, in fact, has done much to interest industry and commerce in the army staff system.[8] His writings have a distinct military flavour about them and, although they are addressed to industry and commerce, are of a sufficiently general character to be most useful to the student of army administration.

The Need for Study

The sceptic will doubtless ask why it is necessary to study the theory of administration when it is obvious that so many administrators have been successful without such study.

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7. FAYOL, Henri. "Administration Industrielle et Generale." Quoted in URWICK, L. F., "The Elements of Administration," p 16 (See Ref 9 below.)

8. For example — URWICK, L. F. "Profitably using the General Staff Position in Business." American Management Association, NEW YORK. General Management Series, Pamphlet No. 165, 1953.

Urwick provides the answer in his "Elements of Administration"—

"An individual . . . may be a successful practical administrator with very little learning in the latest theory of the subject, like the good general practitioner who has forgotten all the medical schools ever taught him, but in the interval had read deeply in the book of life and death — sufficiently deeply to know how little he can know, which is a great safeguard for his patients. But he will be a better administrator, as a doctor will be a better doctor, if he manages to keep abreast of the latest thought on the subject."[9]

Where then are these principles of business administration to be found? There are several books which cover the ground and the more comprehensive are:—

Urwick: "The Elements of Administration."

Lepawsky: "Administration."

Davis: "The Fundamentals of Top Management."

Alford and Bangs (Ed): "Production Handbook."[10]

There is also a very interesting book which seeks to translate the teaching of commerce and industry into a text book for service use—Beishline: "Military Management for National Defense".[11]

It is not proposed at this point to examine these principles in detail. As with all true principles they are succintly stated and must be studied against a background of explanation and example. It is sufficient that attention is drawn to them.

The suggestion is made that the principles of efficient business administration should be examined by the Staff College and the School of Tactics and Administration — with a view to their study being brought into the curricula of those schools. Omission to observe the changes which have been, and are now, taking place in commerce and industry is to overlook important developments in a doctrine which has definite application to army peace administration.

It is not suggested that any attempt be made by the Staff College or the School of Tactics and Administration to cover the subject so thoroughly that they produce experts. Time alone would not permit this any more than it would permit them to produce experts in the principles of war. But just as a knowledge, and some understanding, of the principles of war form a useful background to the study and practice of war, so would a knowledge of the principles of business administration be a most helpful aid to efficient peace (or war)

9. URWICK, L. F. "The Elements of Administration." Pitman and Sons Ltd., LONDON, 1943, p 14.

10. URWICK, L. F. "The Elements of Administration." Pitman and Sons Ltd., LONDON, 1943.
LEPAWSKY, A. "Administration. KNOFF, N. YORK. 1952.
DAVIS, R. C. "The Fundamentals of Top Management." Harper & Bros., NEW YORK, 1951.
ALFORD & BANGS (Ed.) "Production Handbook." Ronald Press Co., NEW YORK, 1947.

11. BEISHLINE, Col. J. R., General Staff Corps US Army. "Military Management for National Defense." Prentice Hall Inc., NEW YORK, 1950.

administration. Moreover, good peace administration affects training for war in that time saved in administration in peace-time gives more time for training.

Although a detailed examination of the principles of administration would be inappropriate at this stage, there are certain aspects of theory which are worthy of mention.

The Nature of Administration

Administration is primarily the process and the agency used to establish the object or purpose which an undertaking and its staff are to achieve; secondarily, Administration has to plan and to stabilise the broad lines or principles which will govern action.[12] The fundamental objective of the science of administration is the accomplishment of the work in hand with the least expenditure of manpower and materials.[13]

Relationship of Policy and Authority

In any large-scale enterprise there is always a danger that policy and authority will be confused.

Policy is a basic factor. It is a statement of principle and a rule of action. Its purpose it to facilitate the relation of functions, and their attendant human and physical factors, to objectives.[14]

On the other hand, Authority is the right of decision and command. It is a requisite for the effective, economical discharge of executive responsibility.[15]

There is one irresistible conclusion which must be drawn from these two statements. The higher administrative body which is responsible for Policy must permit its lower agencies to have the maximum possible Authority in the implementation of the policies laid down. Unless the lower agencies have the right of decision and command, the whole machinery of administration will be cumbersome and uneconomical.

Effects of Size

As organizations increase in arithmetical size, their difficulties of administrative cohesion grow in geometrical proportion. For as size increases, the inevitable functional divisions become larger and more separated, both geographically and in points of view about the results desired and about how to get them.[16]

There is a grave danger in any large enterprise that the main aim or purpose may be lost in a mass of detail. The administration of the enterprise can overshadow and stifle its purpose. This is particularly so with a government enterprise — chiefly because public money is involved.

There is an interesting sidelight on this matter which relates to the controls operating during the Second World War.

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12. MILWARD, G. E. "An Approach to Management." Macdonald & Evans, LONDON, 1946, p 34.

13. GULICK, L. "Science, Values and Public Administration" in 'Papers on the Science of Administration.' Institute of Public Administration, NEW YORK, 1937. p 192.

14. DAVIS, R. C., op cit, p 32.

15. op cit, p 143.

16. TEAD, Ordway. "The Art of Administration." McGRAW Hill Book Co. Inc., NEW YORK, 1951, p 179.

In the early stages of the war the system for control of iron and steel compelled every manufacturer to fill in a form saying for which purpose he needed steel.

An analysis made by an efficiency engineer produced the information that 50 per cent. of forms dealt with the use of only 1 per cent. of steel supplies actually used. Arrangements were therefore made automatically to release 1 per cent. of steel produced to this class of manufacturer, leaving it to the producers and manufacturers to decide the distribution, absolving the manufacturers from the need to fill in forms and the Control from having to process them.[17]

Also, it is sometimes forgotten that an effective but unsound application of a sound principle can produce an effective result. Hitler proved this. The principles on which he based his actions were, in many cases, sound enough. It was the manner of their application that was often unsound. However, an unsound application of a sound principle must produce an unsound result. An effective but unsound application of a sound business policy may result immediately in business success, but ultimately in failure.[18]

Flexibility

The need for flexibility has been recognized by management authorities because of the vital nature of such values as:—

(a) The ability to meet changing conditions promptly, and

(b) The ability to adjust the organization promptly to changing loads of works.

An organization must be so built up that, at all times, it is prepared to adjust itself to changing external conditions and to growth and improvement within itself.[19]

The vitality of an enterprise is measured by its power of spontaneous reaction to changes in conditions and of internal modification to meet such changes.[20]

The One Best Way

In the search for perfection which has taken place since business administration became a subject for serious study, there has been a tendency in some quarters to think that there must always be one best way of carrying out a particular task or operation. In truth, this is seldom so.

A very good example of this is in the simple matter of how to hold one's knife and fork. In Australia the child is taught to hold its cutlery in a particular manner which, presumably, is the best method of use. Yet in the USA a child is taught an entirely different method, and is filled with amazement when he first sees an Australian eating.

So, too, in administration, there are those who believe that the

17. MALLALIEU, J. P. W. "Passed to You, Please." Gollancz, LONDON, 1942, pp 47-48.

18. DAVIS, R. C., op cit, pp 200-201.

19. JONES, T. R. "Theories and Types of Organization." American Association, NEW YORK, Series No. 83, 1929, p 35.

20. URWICK, L., in "Cost and Production Handbook." ALFORD, L. P. (Ed.). Ronald Press, NEW YORK, 1934, p 1334.

method they have always used is the only possible way. How false this impression is.

Controlling

An American General has noted the importance of controlling.

"Perhaps the most important lesson of all to be derived from the War Department General Staff's work during World War II was the need for more effective techniques of control. It was not so much a question of having the right kind of organization, as it was the problem of developing procedures to make the organization effective."[21]

In an organization such as the Army, Controlling is one of the vital principles of administration. A wrong conception of its application will lead to unnecessary work, red-tape and frustration. Proper controlling will enable current policy to be maintained, without sacrifice of efficiency.

Delegating

Closely allied with Controlling is Delegating. Unless there is a proper understanding of the correct method of delegation, maximum efficiency will be impossible.

The size and complexity of modern military organizations require most military executives to delegate to subordinates as much of their control functions as is practicable.[22]

Major-General S. H. Porter makes a most useful contribution to the understanding of this subject, at the Commanding Officer's level, in "Why Do It, Colonel?"—an article which should form part of any reading on the principles of administration.[23]

Sound Analysis

There is one last aspect of the theory of administration which merits notice at this stage. This is the importance of a clear understanding of the need for sound methods of analysis in dealing with the many problems in administration which arise.

It is appropriate here to refer to the Baconian System which has stood the test of time. This can be stated as "The correct and complete observation of **facts;** the intelligent and unbiased analysis of such facts; and the formulation of laws, by deduction, from the results so reached."

As to the procedure in analysis, Barnes in his book on work methods gives an admirable list of questions:—

"(1) *What* is done? What is the purpose of the operation?

(2) *Why* is the work done? What would happen if it were not done? Is every part of the work necessary?

(3) *Who* does the work? Who could do it better? Can changes be made to permit a person with less skill and training to do the work?

(4) *Where* is the work done? Could it be done somewhere else more economically?

(5) *When* is the work done? Would it be better to do it at some other time?

(6) *How* is the work done? This suggests a careful analysis and

21. NELSON, Maj Gen Otto L. "National Security and the General Staff." US Infantry Journal Press, 1946, p 585.

22. BEISHLINE, Col. J. R., op cit, p 254.

23. PORTER, Maj Gen S. H. W. C., op cit, p 5.

the application of the principles of motion ecenomy."

Government Instrumentalists

It is interesting, and stimulating to note that Urwick in his "Elements of Administration" takes a gloomy view of the prospect of any substantial improvement in government instrumentalities. He says: "There is a strain of bureaucracy in every man. And time after time those who are responsible for making plans become so intrigued with the ingenuity of their own regulations that they forget entirely that the only justification for any item of procedure is that it helps to get the work done.[25]

"Commerce, under constant pressure from the trading account, has a stimulus not to neglect improvement for too long. The question of how to overcome that internal resistance to cleaning out in our great public services against the tremendous forces of professional conservatism, is democracy's greatest unsolved problem."[26]

Urwick's remarks are directed against the administration of government departments of the UK and the USA. But this is a generality, and there are exceptions. Perhaps in the Australian Army we can overcome the difficulty; and the peace administration of the CMF is undoubtedly a fruitful avenue for action.

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24. BARNES, R. M. "Work Methods Manual." Wiley & Sons Inc., NEW YORK, 1944, p 10.

25. URWICK, L. "Elements of Administration." Pitman & Sons Ltd., LONDON, 1943, p 95.

26. op cit, p 96.

The matter is well covered in a prayer devised by Admiral Hart, USN:—

"Give us strength to accept with serenity the things that cannot be changed.

"Give us courage to change the things that can and should be changed.

"And give us wisdom to distinguish the one from the other."

Some Individual Inefficiencies

Having considered the theory of administration and noted certain aspects of it which are worthy of particular attention, it is now proposed to review a number of individual examples of inefficiency in CMF peace administration which seem at present to exist, and to consider some suggestions for improvement.

Procedural Instructions

If it is possible to say that any one aspect of peace administration is the greatest burden, it is the lack of a simple guide to procedure to which ARA cadres and CMF personnel can turn when in doubt. There is no one set of manuals which can give a clear statement of requirement in the one place on any given subject.

If a member is required to investigate a discrepancy in equipment on charge to his Unit he must consult:—

(a) Standing Orders for Equipment of the AMF. Pamphlet 4.
(b) Military Board Instructions No. 22/1954.
(c) Command Routine Orders.
(d) Command "Q" Administrative Instructions.
(e) Formation instructions amplifying the foregoing.
(f) And to a certain extent, AMR & O.

This situation exists, to a greater or lesser degree, in almost every aspect of administration — personnel records, home training and camp pay, clothing and equipment issues and withdrawals, stores accounting. There is no single source book on any of these subjects.

In some instances a genuine effort has been made to codify existing instructions. MBI 70/1952 on the Administration of National Service men is a good example.

In some respects Standing Orders for Equipment, particularly Pamphlet 4 (Unit Stores Accounting Instructions), go a long way to meet the requirement on the Q side; but those orders have two defects:—

(a) Firstly, they are in bound, printed form and are difficult to keep up to date.

(b) Secondly, they are written in semi-legal language and are not always easy for unit personnel to understand.

A good example of this officialese is in Para 1224, which reads:—

"COLLECTIVE LOSSES

1224. Losses of personal issues — AB83 items (but excepting arms for ARA units and personal equipment for CMF units) — will not be subject to financial adjustment, as prescribed in this part, if the value of the items lost does not exceed £15, unless such losses form part of a collective loss. Collective losses of clothing or personal equipment on issue to members and losses of arms will be investigated and submitted to write off authorities in accordance with the terms of this Part."

"Financial Instructions Relating to the Citizen Military Forces" probably comes nearer to the requirement than any other publication. However, it, too, is written in semi-legal language, and it is very rigid in its directions. Also it does not stand on its own but is supported by a separate body of instructions known as "Command Pay Office Circulars", which must be read in conjunction with it. This is confusing and time consuming.

It has been argued that most of the fault here lies with Commands and Formations because they confuse the subject by issuing the supplementary instructions. There are two answers to this. Firstly, these supplementary instructions are usually necessary to cover local conditions, and to convey explanatory instructions which are issued by AHQ in memoranda form. Secondly, few MBIs are so complete that they can serve as guides to actual procedure; and unit staffs need step by step direction.

The need, in all aspects of "A" and "Q" administration, is for loose-leaf standard procedure instructions, written in simple direct language, covering in the one place all that the unit officer or NCO needs to know to carry out each administrative task required of him.

In more detail, the requirement is as follows:—

(a) Each subject (Preparation of home training pay sheets, Withdrawal of clothing and equipment from National Service personnel, Investigation of vehicle accidents, etc.) should form the subject of a separate, independent Standard Procedure Instruction.

(b) The Standard Procedure Instructions should be produced in

loose-leaf form on foolscap paper. This size is recommended so that an individual Instruction can be either lithographed, printed or duplicated, and new editions can be produced quickly by any agency.

(c) Army Headquarters, and any intermediate Headquarters, should be authorized to prepare an SPI. Those which are of a general character or of a highly standardised nature (for example, Preparation of Claims for Travelling Allowance) could be issued by AHQ; those of particular application (such as Demanding Supplies) could be issued by Command or Formation Headquarters.

(d) Where an SPI issued by AHQ does not fully meet the requirement of an individual command or is not sufficiently detailed, an intermediate headquarters should have the power to add to it or to vary it, so long as principles are not changed. These changes would be part of the SPI and would not be in the form of a separate instruction.

(e) SPIs should be written in simple direct language. The need is for a straightforward style similar to that used in "Successful Instruction, 1951." [27]

Modern business administration tends more and more to become a standardized routine.[28] This holds true of Army peace administration, and if we can reduce much of the day to day unit administration to a routine based on standard instructions the work will be accomplished so much the more easily.

Nevertheless, where conditions are not standardised, routine methods are useless, and only muddle will follow if we attempt to employ them blindly. The best type of procedural instructions are those designed as a guide rather than as orders. A useful comparison in this regard is provided by two Banks. The Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia has a most complete and comprehensive set of Instructions, BUT they are mandatory. Occasionally a Commonwealth Bank officer is heard to remark, "I know it is silly but that is how it is laid down." On the other hand at least one private trading bank has a Handbook which sets out in detail the procedure which should be followed and makes it very clear that, within reasonable limits, the procedure may be varied to meet particular cases.

Such guides enable more junior, less experienced, personnel to do a great deal of the more or less routine tasks, so releasing senior personnel for more important duties, and for supervision.

It is emphasised that the vital element in procedural instructions of this nature is completeness combined with flexibility. Moreover, this flexibility must include some latitude to the individual unit to depart from the instructions so long as principles are not violated.

Typing

Some relief could be given from the burden of typing at the unit

27. GS Training Instruction. "Successful Instruction, 1951." WO Code, No. 8670.

28. McKINSEY, J. O. "Budgetary Control." Ronald Press, NEW YORK, 1922, p 10.

level. The present arrangement is that the orderly room sergeant and one or more of the storemen/clerks are supposed to do the typing of all correspondence, returns, requisitions, etc. However, few of these personnel are experts and, being males, few are willing to learn typing properly. As a result, most of the ARA cadres share the typing between them, from the Adjutants down. The great majority are "two finger hunt and peck" operators, and time which should be devoted to their proper duties is wasted.

The answer is to permit the employment of a civilian typist in each unit against the establishment of one storeman/clerk. Also, during the annual camp, when it may be impracticable to take such civilian personnel with the unit, provision could be made for the employment of WRAAC (CMF) clerks during their corps training period.

Correspondence

The impression is widespread that the present system of handling correspondence is old fashioned and cumbersome.

Consideration might well be given to adoption of the method employed in the German departmental organisation. There is a useful study of this system in a book produced under the auspices of Harvard University.[29]

Pay

At present, pay for CMF personnel is distributed thrice yearly—for home training at the end of each half year, and at the end of camp. Payment is made from Pay Sheets which are prepared by the ARA staff with some assistance from CMF personnel, checked by the Command Paymaster's staff, and used as acquittance rolls. These pay-sheets are a survival of the era before machine accounting.

A very substantial reduction could be made in the time involved in these three pay periods if a new system were designed based on punched-card accounting — from the initial attendance record through to the final pay cheque, using mark-sensing equipment in a central installation in each Command.

Procedure for Works

The Commanding Officer's delegation for urgent and/or minor works is very small, but the procedure is reasonable and much can be done with comparative ease.

However, if a works task is beyond the CO's power but within the GOC's delegation, the procedure is most cumbersome. Even if the task is obviously necessary and can be done by the Command construction squadron, a mass of paper and of approvals is unavoidable. A job involving expenditure of more than £5 must have the approval of the Department of Works before it can be undertaken either by the engineers or by local contract. And the Department of Works is most grudging in giving its concurrence.

There is one sensible answer to this problem:—

(a) Commands should be able to carry out small works, up to a fixed figure, without having to bring in the Department of Works at all.

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29. BRECHT & GLASSER. "The Art and Technique of Administration in German Ministries." Harvard University Press, MASSACHUSETTS, 1940.

(b) Commands should be able to have work done by outside contractors, up to a fixed figure, in a similar manner to COs.

(c) The Works Section or Garrison Engineer concerned should be able to employ the demanding unit as an agent — to obtain quotations from local contractors and to place the approved order.

The system cannot get out of hand as the amount of work which can be undertaken in this way will be strictly limited by the funds available; but a great deal of effort, time and temper will be saved.

Other Delegations

It is further suggested that consideration might be given to other delegations so that more responsibility is passed to units. This would reduce the volume of paper work in requisitions, applications, and other correspondence in seeking approvals and in the documentation resulting from these approvals.

It is proposed that these delegations should stem from the theory that, rather than provide a Commanding Officer with a closed circuit of regulations so that he cannot err, he should be given reasonably wide powers and then watched closely to see that the trust is not abused.

It is realised that the Army deals with public monies and that it is just not possible to give the same degree of freedom as is enjoyed by business executives. But a fairly substantial liberalization of existing delegations could be possible if Commanding Officers are put on their mettle to apply their powers with discretion.

Reduction of Administration in Camps

The Annual Camp is the most important feature of CMF unit training. Time spent on administration reduces the time available for training: and it is the aim of every commanding officer to get his unit out on training at the earliest possible stage and to keep it there to the last possible minute.

To enable this to be done, the business of drawing stores and equipment, setting up camp, preparing training stores and vehicles, and then reversing the procedure at the end of camp — must be reduced to the minimum. The ideal, of course, would be to have each CMF camp fully set up with accommodation stores issued down to individual rooms and tents, and equipment fully serviced and positioned ready for use.

This is an unattainable ideal and the only course is to approach as near thereto as is practicable.

Some of the directions in which this might be done are:—

1. Provision of cadre staffs in camps used by successive CMF formations or groups.

   Under the present system, units in the large Commands follow each other into camp at close intervals. They are preceded by advance parties which take over the allotted blocks, draw stores, and generally endeavour to have the camp ready to operate as soon as the main body arrives. At the conclusion of each camp, rear parties return stores, finalize cleaning up, and hand back the blocks to the area staff.

   The system has weaknesses. A considerable number of man-

hours is involved in the repetition of these preparatory and concluding tasks, and there is a significant period of each camp when units are not fully effective. These losses stem directly from the lack of continuity between one unit and another.

A small "permanent" cadre staff in each major unit camp block would provide this continuity in domestic administration throughout the series.

It is not suggested that the "permanent" cadre staff should relieve units of responsibility for normal administration. Each cadre staff would come under command of the unit it is to serve on the first day of the advance party in each case, and would remain under command until the last day of the rear party.

2. Hand-over in situ from one unit to another of accommodation stores and camp scale of vehicles.

At present, each unit going into camp draws all its accommodation stores and its camp scale of vehicles from the Ordnance Depot at the beginning of camp and returns them to Ordnance at the end of camp. The unit which follows repeats the process. This is time consuming.

One Command has successfully evolved a scheme for the hand-over in situ of bulky accommodation stores, and is now working out a proposal for transfer in situ of vehicles which are serviceable. This scheme could be applied whether or not a "permanent" cadre staff, as above, is provided.

In essence, the scheme is that the outgoing unit positions such of its stores as the incoming unit requires, in the unit lines, ready for check by an Ordnance representative. The latter acquits the outgoing unit's AAF Fla, and immediately hands over, in situ, to the incoming unit.

In evolving these schemes some caution is necessary in the direction which this prior preparation of camps should take. It must be clear at the outset that exercise in administration is an important element of training for war. One of the things which stood out in many units at the outbreak of the 1939-45 war was the absence of administrative knowledge on the part of a great number of militia officers.

The requirement is not so much theoretical knowledge of war administration acquired by reading and other forms of instruction, but a background of experience gained from the day to day practice of administration. Thus it is important, from that aspect alone, that CMF personnel should take their proper share in peace administration.

If this is accepted, then it will follow that any proposal to set up fully established training organizations staffed by ARA personnel, into which CMF units would march in and surrender themselves administratively, would be unacceptable. The CMF Commanding Officer must retain his responsibility for domestic administration, and his second in command—in fact, all his officers—must carry out their administrative duties. The aim must be, not to eliminate those administrative duties, but to rationalize them.

Other Inefficiencies

Instances of instructions such as the UK Clothing Regulations 1939, quoted above, are fortunately now rare. However, there are a number of smaller examples, of which the following are a selection:—

1. Financial Instructions for the CMF provides the system to be followed when unit Commanding Officers claim extra pay for tasks beyond the ambit of their normal duties. The claim gives details of the extra duties. In addition, it is signed by the formation commander (and very often also by another intermediate commander) who certifies that the officer has efficiently performed the duties allotted to him and that he is entitled to pay for the period claimed.

Despite this, a special roll book (AAB 76A) must also be produced with the claim. In fact, of course, this roll book is prepared at the time the claim is made out, to cover the whole period, and from a practical point of view is meaningless.

2. When a claim for travelling allowance is made, the TS4a must be accompanied by a copy of the Movement Order (AAF A19) or the Nominal Roll or Draft (AAF Mob 3).

This is a prudent arrangement where such a document is, in fact, issued before the move takes place. But it is rather ridiculous to demand the attachment of such a document when one is not required for the move itself.

A good example is in the case of a country unit with distant out-centres. Because of transport arrangements the CO, when visiting a detached sub-unit, may have to stay overnight at an hotel. When the claim for travelling allowance is prepared the CO solemnly signs an accompanying movement order, directing himself to proceed to the out-centre on duty for a period which has long since passed.

3. Part-worn clothing which is withdrawn from CMF personnel on discharge or transfer to the Inactive List, must be dry cleaned before it is forwarded to TSG. In some cases, the disposals value of an item of part-worn clothing is less than the contract price for cleaning it, but the unit has no discretion in the matter. The article must be dry cleaned.

4. If a unit wishes to hire a building for use as a training depot — even a shed in the local showgrounds at 5/- a week — the proposal must be passed to AHQ for action by the Department of Interior. This means paper all the way up the channels of command, and a substantial time lag.

It would seem reasonable that formations should have a delegation to hire accommodation up to a specified amount, without prior reference. Permission to open new centres must be obtained in any case, so control will not be lost. The action taken can then be reported to higher authority in order that proper records may be kept and the funds commitment is known.

Corrections Already Made

On the other side of the ledger there are a number of examples of corrections, which are most heartening.

Until recently every CMF soldier had to be provided with a Statement of Earnings for taxation purposes. This was a monumental task, from the Command Pay Office down to the

unit. Now, as a result of action through Finance channels, statements of earnings are required only for sergeants and above. This change is most acceptable.

Also, until recently all discrepancies in stores drawn for annual camps had to be adjusted by a fairly cumbersome procedure, irrespective of the value of the discrepancies.

There is one case on record in which the only discrepancy was an uncalibrated dipstick valued at 6d. A total of 36 pieces of paper were required at five different locations before this adjustment was made. However, the procedure has now been changed and the work involved in minor discrepancies is substantially less.

These examples clearly indicate that progress is continually being made. Nevertheless, those working close to the problems feel that more positive and more drastic action is necessary. This is the core of the matter.

Conclusion

At the risk of digressing from the immediate problem, which is peace administration, it is important to be sure what it meant by operational efficiency which is the chief aim of the CMF. It will be clear that, important as they are, the rank and file are secondary to the officers, warrant officers and senior non-commissioned officers. If these latter have attained a satisfactory degree of efficiency including at least the elements of team organization, then the lower ranks will fit into place comparatively quickly.

The significance of this conclusion is that officers, warrant officers and senior non-commissioned officers must have time to train; and they will not have enough time for operational training if they are overburdened with administration. Some administration is unavoidable, and in fact beneficial; too much prevents the leader from devoting sufficient time to training.

The problem is of such magnitude that only far-reaching action will solve it. Attempts to deal with it piecemeal can only make small progress because most of the individual aspects are in themselves individually defensible. Procedures are so well established and apparently so soundly based that it is difficult for many of those concerned to realize that there is anything greatly wrong.

Increases in ARA establishment, even if practicable, would not provide a solution in the present circumstances. In any case it would be most undesirable to remove more responsibility from the CMF officers because they must learn administration by taking the responsibility. Higher quality, well trained ARA personnel might make some impression on the tasks, but the quality is just not available in sufficient quantity, and never likely to be in the present era of full employment.

The problem is a complex one and therefore not capable of solution by any single simple clear-cut plan.

The only practicable direction in which relief can be effected is by—

education of all concerned in the theory of administration as practised in the really efficient units of commerce and industry

coupled with

an intensive critical examination of all aspects of CMF peace administration — to dispense with

those which are not essential, to simplify those which cannot be entirely eliminated, and to codify the latter in simple, flexible standard procedure instructions which can be easily understood by all who have to apply them.

Finally, it is submitted that a very clear statement by the highest authority of intention to simplify procedures will be necessary so that those with power to approve changes will be convinced in their own minds, at the outset, of the need for action. Otherwise, many individual proposals for simplification are likely to be still-born and good ideas will be smothered.

In reading comments on international affairs one is often reminded of the difference in the image one sees in looking through the two ends of a telescope. Our differences with other nations frequently arise because we do not see a given situation in the same light. Yet, if we are to live in constructive friendship with the other nations of this world, surely the first essential is mutual understanding. Surely in this era of hydrogen bombs it is better to sacrifice something of one's own viewpoint to the honest views of another if that will maintain the peace.

—John M. Cabot, Assistant Secretary of State, USA.

COMMAND and CONTROL of ARTILLERY in a NUTSHELL

Lieutenant-Colonel A. D. Watt, Royal Australian Artillery.

THIS article is an attempt to deal in a short space with a subject which is not well understood, in the hope that busy officers of all arms may be induced to read it.

Command

Artillery units are formed into basic artillery groups such as divisional artilleries, AGRAs and Corps Troops RAA. Each group is commanded by an Artillery officer. At each level the Artillery commander is also an adviser to his respective formation commander.

Since the maximum value of artillery is realized only when its fire is concentrated, a number of these basic artillery groups may be used to support a single operation. For example, a corps operation might be supported by three divisional artilleries, two AGRAs and Corps Troops RAA. To ensure that they are used to the best advantage to further the commander's plan, command of them should be centralized under one artillery commander who should be the highest commander capable of exercising effective command. The actual level at which command is centralized will depend upon the range of the guns in relation to the front to be covered, and the speed at which decisions will have to be made regarding movement and deployment. In the example, command of all the artillery resources might be centralized under the CCRA, who is then authorized by the Corps Commander to initiate and issue the necessary tactical and technical artillery orders.

Not only may artillery formations be grouped under one commander for an operation, but individual units may be added to or subtracted from a particular group for a specific operation or phase of an operation. For example, an armoured division which is to break out as a phase of a Corps operation might have grouped under its divisional artillery a medium regiment, a heavy battery from an AGRA and an element of the Corps Locating Regiment from Corps Troops RAA.

Decentralization of artillery may be necessary in mobile operations or when operating on a wide front, but command should always be recentralized as soon as practicable.

In Support

Artillery support may be made available to a unit or formation

without resorting to grouping. In other words *the fire only* of artillery units is placed at the disposal of the unit or formation. Such units are *in support*. Any artillery in range may be allotted in support for an operation.

Some artillery may be allotted in support with a *restriction, for example*, "in support—at priority call to CCBO" or "in support — at priority call 5 Inf Bde for DF." When units are allotted in support with a *restriction they may be* "superimposed" on a fire plan, which means that their fire may be lifted at any time by the authority to whom they are at priority call (for example, the *CCBO*).

Artillery units allotted in support without any restrictions will fire any tasks allotted to them on the fire plan or be available for impromptu shoots.

In Direct Support

Suppose a brigade is to carry out an operation and several artillery regiments are allotted in support, how does the brigade handle this support? Does it require each regiment to send liaison officers, CO, BCs and OP parties in order to get the fire of the units concerned? It does not, because the range of artillery communications and the methods of control are such that *one* artillery officer can control the fire of any number of units. To meet this need a field regiment is associated with the brigade. The liaison which the regimental commander and his battery commanders provide with the brigade and battalion commanders, the observation which his OPs provide and the communications of the regiment are adequate to control the fire of all artillery units supporting the brigade. Such a regiment is *"in direct support."* Also, to meet the brigade's need for quick intimate support the fire of the regiment may be obtained without reference to higher authority.

It is well to keep in mind that each regiment of the divisional artillery is in direct support of the division and is always available to the CRA. Remembering also that the full value of artillery is realized only when its fire is concentrated, it is easy to see that there may be occasions when the CRA will use the whole divisional artillery to further the commander's plan even though a brigade commander may have a need for the direct support regiment at the same time. Similar occasions may occur at the brigade/battalion level. In all cases when the direct support artillery is temporarily unavailable, the commander may be absolutely certain that it is being used on a higher priority task in accordance with the superior commander's plan.

Control

It will already be apparent that Control means *Control of Fire*. Fire is controlled by the issue of technical orders — either written or verbal — which can be implemented at the guns.

Whenever fire power is allotted to a subordinate the commander making the allotment must say who is to issue subsequent orders to all the artillery concerned. Consider the following cases:—

(a) Deliberate Fire Plans

When artillery is centralized under command of the CCRA, he will allot it to divisions ac-

cording to their tasks. Now he may:—

(i) Instruct CRAs to reproduce their fire plan orders themselves and issue them direct to all supporting artillery formations, or

(ii) Collect fire plan details from CRAs and have his staff prepare and issue the relevant orders.

The first method is a strain on HQRAA Division.

The second method has the following advantages:—

(i) The CCRA will want to add in Corps tasks such as CB, HF, preparatory bombardment and cover plan.

(ii) He will want to check divisional plans.

(iii) He will have to co-ordinate where two or more divisions are concerned.

The problem is similar at lower levels.

(b) Impromptu Fire Plans

These are usually made at brigade level or below, where neither time nor facilities are available for written orders. Therefore they are passed by wireless or line. The artillery commander making the allotment may:—

(i) Authorize the forward artillery commander to frame the plan and pass the orders to artillery units direct.

(ii) Obtain particulars of times and tasks from the forward artillery commander and make the detailed allotment of guns to tasks himself and issue the fire plan orders from his own headquarters.

(c) Opportunity Targets

The urgent requirements are speed and the ability to correct observed fire. Thus the artillery commander or observer who has the information must issue the fire orders. Therefore authority to control additional fire power will often be delegated to subordinates in advance. For example, a CCRA may delegate to a CRA authority to control the fire of all guns of the Corps. Similar arrangements may be made at any level and are normal in the case of defensive fire plans where response to calls must be immediate. Another example is the CCBO who will usually be authorized to issue orders direct to units which are at priority call for CB. Other examples of the delegation of authority to control fire are FOOs and authorized OPs.

Conclusion

The tactical significance of command is the authority to order the move of guns into and out of action. Control implies the authority and the means to order fire.

This article has not covered the subject fully, but has been an attempt to explain as simply and briefly as possible those aspects about which misunderstanding seems to exist. The subject is covered in Artillery Training Volume I, Pamphlet I, and is treated in detail in an article in the Australian Army Journal of September 1953.



IN the early days of the war in the Pacific, when the seemingly irresistible tide of Japanese conquest was sweeping over the islands to the north and east of Australia, the United States 1st Marine Division landed at Guadalcanal in the Solomons. This division constituted the principal component of the United States forces in the Solomons which, together with the Australian forces in south-east New Guinea, first held, and then threw back the mighty Japanese effort to conquer the eastern approaches to Australia.

After a long period of desperate fighting the 1st Marine Division was relieved and brought to Australia for rest and recuperation at Balcombe Camp in Victoria. In this camp the Marines spent some months recovering their strength and absorbing reinforcements before returning to the front to participate in the Allied counter-offensive up the north-east coast of New Guinea.

After the war several Army Schools, including the Army Apprentices' School, were established in Balcombe Camp. As part of their training the apprentices constructed a set of wrought iron memorial gates at the entrance to the camp, to commemorate the close ties forged in war between the United States Marine Corps and the Australian Army.

At the invitation of the Commonwealth Government a representative party from the Marine Corps, led by the Commandant, General Lemuel C. Shepherd, came to Australia to participate in the dedication of the memorial. The ceremony was performed on 24 November 1954, in the presence of His Excellency the

Governor of Victoria, the Minister for the Army and the American Ambassador. The deep significance of the occasion was aptly expressed in the speeches delivered by General Shepherd and the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General Sir Sydney Rowell.

Address by Lieutenant-General Sir Sydney Rowell.

At the end of 1942, the 1st Division, USMC, came to this camp at Balcombe to rest, refit and rehabilitate after its magnificent fight at Guadalcanal. And on the little hill to the west of the camp, where we are now laying down a sports ground, this famous division received the Presidential Citation, the highest award which the United States has to offer to formations or units for distinguished service.

It seemed to me entirely fitting, in the process of improving the appearance of this very important Army training centre, that we should include some visible sign that this camp had housed the 1st Marine Division and which, at the same time, would forge a link between the United States Marine Corps as a whole and the Australian Army.

I also had another thought in mind. In the strange interplay of strategy as between different areas, the operations of 1st Marine Division at Guadalcanal were inextricably interwoven with my own operations in Papua in 1942. And while it is true that US forces, which were intended to reinforce my Command in Papua, had to be diverted to Guadalcanal, it has also been established beyond doubt from Japanese records that a very significant portion of the Japanese force originally allotted to Papua was in fact drawn into destruction at Guadalcanal. So the operations of New Guinea Force and the 1st Marine Division were not separate battles. They were parts of the same whole, in which victory in one meant victory in the other.

This fact alone would have warranted some form of alliance. But there is, I suggest, a wider significance. The Australian Army perhaps does not match the USMC in its ubiquity — we have no comparable Corps March to that of "From the Halls of Montezuma to the Shores of Tripoli." But in the past 50 years we have fought in most parts of the world where unhappily fighting has occurred, and with some degree of right we lay claim to the fact that no Service has a prouder fighting record. Under pressure, we would be glad to share this claim with the Brigade of Guards and the United States Marine Corps.

Quite apart from these rather abstract matters, I believe all will agree that, in the present state of tension, anything that can be done to bring the United States and Australian Services more closely together is all to the good. We had that association in World War II— we have had it since in Korea, where the Royal Australian Regiment has fought alongside the United States Marine Corps and US Navy formations — and we are to continue it under the South-East Asia Treaty.

We are very honoured and happy to have, as the central figure here today, His Excellency the Governor, Sir Dallas Brooks. His Excellency is not only the Queen's personal representative in Victoria, but he is also a distinguished past Commandant General of the Royal

Marines, which Corps has the closest bonds with the United States Marine Corps.

I am grateful to the Prime Minister and my own Minister for their kindness and co-operation in inviting, as guests of the Government, General Shepherd and his representative party. General Shepherd, now the Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, knows Balcombe well. This ceremony could not have been complete without his presence and I need hardly say how much the Australian Army appreciates his being here and how warmly it welcomes him.

These gates have been erected by students of the Army Apprentices' School as part of their normal training. They stand as a symbol of the Australian Army's esteem for the great fighting qualities of the United States Marine Corps. And I would ask you, General Shepherd, to convey to your Corps from my Service our hopes for an even closer association in the future and our best wishes for the continued good fortune of your Corps.

Address by General Lemuel C. Shepherd, US Marine Corps.

I first wish to thank you, General Rowell, for your very kind remarks concerning my corps. Those of us who stand here on this hill top today are privileged to participate in an historic act, symbolising the concord between kindred nations and kindred people. Symbols such as this have been created throughout recorded time, to reflect mutual respect of men of goodwill and their determination to live together in Christian amity. The inspiring British War Memorial at Soissons, the friendship reached between the United States and Canada are all enduring examples of lasting tributes exchanged among many nations of the world. All these symbols have their origin in man's greatest ideals, and they stem invariably from sensations of gratitude, esteem or respect. I notice emotions just such as these have caused the Australian Army to create these impressive memorial gates and the bronze tablets upon them which we dedicate here today. You may be sure that the warm sentiments which inspired this gesture are shared by the American people and particularly by the men of the United States Marine Corps.

A full generation ago, in the First Great War, the indomitable Anzac's charge that spearheaded the amphibious assault at Gallipoli endeared your countrymen to the hearts of fighting men the world over. Most of all it endeared them to the hearts of American Marines whose principal occupation for well over a century has been landing operations. The admiration and respect of our Marines for their Australian comrades acquired a depth that defied description of the Second World War when countless lives were saved and countless sound decisions made as a result of the brilliant, selfless and fearless efforts of your incomparable coast watchers. And the happy days spent here on this continent by men of the 1st Marine Division lent further strength to our respect for your countrymen. In the most recent conflict in Korea our feeling of mutual admiration and comradeship has been cemented still further in the crucible of the battlefield where American Marines,

ground and air, fought beside your forces in the Commonwealth Division and the Royal Australian Air Force units.

In that sense then this set of handsome gates with their inspiring tablets stand as a symbol of great things and happy associations that are past. They portray the depths of our friendship and the roots of our mutual solidarity. But in a far more profound sense they may be viewed by all of us as a gateway to the future. In that future we face the prospect of trials which will test the very depths of our strength and of our faith in the principles which have made our two countries great. In the great task to which we are dedicated, the preservation of the free way of life, there can be no question but that we face a long, hard and tortuous road. These gates point the way to that future. In their superb symbolism they consecrate the hard road that we together must travel in securing for our nations those blessings of peace and dignity and freedom which we so deeply treasure.

Perhaps the greatest of all gifts is the gift of understanding, because it helps to overcome one of the world's most common and most oppressive maladies—intolerance.

—Jane E. Muntz, President of the Royal Victorian College of Nursing.

THE TABLES ARE TURNED

1st Bn. The Cameronians (Scottish Rifles).

A MOST interesting and quite complicated ambush was recently carried out by support company on a stretch of the Singapore-Kuala Lumpur road near Labis, known as "Windy Corner" (see sketch map). This corner has achieved this title because of the very large number of ambushes that have been carried out at it by the terrorists against security forces and civilian transport. Our transport has been shot at several times going through it, and only 18 months ago the terrorists were carrying out as many as six ambushes a month in this area. It is therefore a reflection of the progress that has been made in the emergency to find ourselves in possession of information good enough to enable us to reverse the position and ambush them instead.

We had received information from the police that a private car carrying a large quantity of food was going to make contact with a gang of about 20 terrorists and hand over the food to them at a particular point on the road. In the event, only seven terrorists turned up. We were also informed that the contact would be made at 1530 hours. Undoubtedly this was the best piece of information we had ever had and naturally we were determined that the whole operation would be a success. Plans were carefully made and everyone briefed as to their role. To the north of the main road, where the car was going to stop, lay a small patch of overgrown rubber about 300 yards long by 200 yards wide. Beyond that was open country, largely lallang (tall elephant grass), with jungle bordering it to the north-east. On the west of the rubber was open lallang and swamp, and to the east a stretch of fairly difficult swamp bordered by jungle on the east and north-east edges. To the south of the road, opposite to the rendezvous, was a small hill feature mostly covered with a rather thin jungle—with a 40-yard belt of lallang and bushes between it and the main road. An unobtrusive reconnaissance by vehicle along the main road was made by all platoon and section commanders two days prior to "D" Day.

It was obvious from the start that timings were going to be the most important factor, and in this we were fortunate in being able to synchronise our watches with those of the terrorists, via, of course, the informer. The plan was to move the A Tk Platoon to a point 2-3 miles south of the main road. They would then move by a devious route, so as to arrive undetected on the small feature overlooking the main road with just sufficient time in hand to organize their ambush positions be-

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—From "The Infantry Bulletin," U.K.

fore "H" hour. This party would be the Assault Party and was under the command of Major A. R. Kettles, M.C., who was in charge of the whole operation. A second party, under Lieutenant Baynes, comprising part of the Mortar Platoon and part of the M.G. Platoon, were to move in covered transport to a point just east of Windy Corner. They were then to de-bus, double back through the jungle, and lie up in the swamp to the east of the small rubber estate already described. At "H" hour (or sooner, if firing broke out) they were to debouch from the swamp and move as fast as they could across to the west behind the small rubber estate, dropping off the small two-men ambushes every 30 to 40 yards as they went. Thus they would form an effective stop line across the most probable line of retreat of the terrorists.

A third party from the Mortar Platoon, under Sergeant Tweedie, was to move north of the road by a devious route to lie in some "belukar" (thick, secondary scrub jungle). At "H" hour they were to move forward and ambush an important logging track, about one mile in from the main road, which might possibly provide a quick and useful terrorist escape route as well.

On the main road, about one mile on each side of the contact, scout car stops were set up to stop all traffic at H minus five until H plus 30 minutes. The Commanding Officer was with the stop at Windy Corner, prepared to "take off" in his jeep as soon as the fun began. C.Q.M.S. Docherty was in charge of the stop on the other side.

As soon as firing started, both scout cars were to close in and spray the swamp and lallang on either side of the rubber to deter any terrorists from escaping in that direction.

Just before we started off, we learned that Mr. Stewart Wavell, an outside broadcaster for Radio Malaya, was going to accompany us to try to obtain an on-the-spot broadcast of the ambush.

If the ambush came off it would be the very first recording of an ambush to be made since the Emergency started. Mr. Wavell accompanied the Assault Party.

All the preliminary moves went extremely well and undetected by the enemy, and by "H" hour all troops were in their correct positions. The A. Tk. Platoon coming up from the south encountered some heavy going, both through entangled and hilly secondary jungle and a stretch of swamp about half a mile long and 2 feet deep. On more than one occasion it looked as though the recording machine had had it, but by some miracle it was still functioning when we arrived on the ambush position—somewhat hot and tired—20 minutes before "H" hour.

Needless to say, Mr. Wavell was practically on his knees by this time, but kept going extremely well with a little assistance from the Platoon. The last 80 yards into the ambush position had to be done in the crawling position, and we appeared to be making a most fiendish racket as we wormed our way through some crackly dry bamboo.

At last, however, the whole Platoon was in position overlooking the main road with 10 minutes to spare. It had been arranged that no fire would be opened until Major Kettles fired first.

At exactly 1532 hours, the car duly arrived and honked its horn twice;



it then drove on for a few hundred yards, turned about and came back. It finally stopped dead in front of the ambush and about 25-30 yards away. Another toot on the horn was acknowledged by the waving of a handkerchief by the terrorist leader in the overgrown rubber patch on the north of the road. On this signal the driver and another civilian with him were out of the car in a flash, and had started to unload the food into a ditch at the side of the road.

Meanwhile, the "cut-off" party, under Lieutenant Baynes, was moving quickly across its stop line.

A patrol of "B" Company, 1 Cameronians, in North Johore

As soon as all the food was out, the driver beckoned to the terrorists to come forward, and four appeared in view; one of them hung back, while three came forward. The driver then jumped in his car and drove off. At this point Major Kettles took aim at the middle terrorist and dropped him. At once all hell was let loose and bullets were tearing into the bewildered terrorists trying to get out of the inferno. The two scout cars soon arrived on either flank to add to the cacophony of noise. Riffleman Drysdale, firing an E.Y. rifle, hit a tree behind the terrorists and saw a body fall to the ground—obviously a sentry.

Soon there were no terrorists in sight, and the signal was given to the A. Tk. Platoon to advance. Two dead terrorists were soon located, and the blood trails of the third and fourth. Meanwhile, on the left, C.Q.M.S. Docherty, blazing away from his scout car, had started an almighty lalling fire and one just caught the odd glimpse of him from time to time as the smoke wreathed around him. The Commanding Officer wasn't long in following up with A. Tk. Platoon, and, along with Rifleman Boyle and Major Kettles, he started to follow one of the blood trails.

Suddenly we heard more fire coming from the direction of Lieutenant Baynes' party, and we knew they must have had a contact as well.

Continuing with the blood trail, the party entered some swamp; Rifleman Boyle suddenly shouted, "Here he is," at the same time firing his rifle. After his third shot at the terrorist, who was hiding in the swamp, he must have hit the terrorist's grenade, as there was a loud explosion and bits and pieces flew past the Commanding Officer and Major Kettles. Rifleman Boyle was unfortunately wounded, although not seriously. The terrorist, needless to say, was very dead.

Shortly after this, all firing ceased and a silence descended over the area as the different parties regrouped and moved down to the main road.

By this time, of course, all sorts of people had arrived on the scene, and a certain amount of traffic control was required to keep everyone moving. The final result of the contact showed four terrorists killed, one escaped but badly wounded, one or two who got away unscathed—plus the capture of a civilian who was wounded and was consorting with the terrorists. Documents, weapons, ammunition and a large quantity of food were recovered. Altogether it was a most successful operation in which all the plans, for once, worked smoothly. The recording was a great success and was subsequently relayed over the B.B.C. and Radio Malaya.

Interrogation of a Chinese by a patrol of 1 Cameronians in Malaya

The SOLDIER .....and SOCIETY

Lieutenant-Colonel G. H. Rowden, Royal Australian Infantry.

THE discussion on the social status of the Army officer in Australia cannot be left at the point to which the author of "The Army Officer as a Social Animal" (AAJ 66) has taken it, lest we all start crying into our soup.

Lieutenant-Colonel Loughran evidently wrote his contribution before he read General Legge's penetrating exposition of the subject. All the same he should not have fallen into the error of supposing that the change in the status of the army officer began in the post-war era, or that it is peculiar to Australia. The tide turned a long way further back than that, and it affected a good many other countries besides our own.

Social changes, which are of course based on the general acceptance of new social ideas, do not usually take place rapidly, nor are they, as a rule, the result of any one cause. Once started towards the right or left, the pendulum very often goes too far, and it takes a great deal of time and effort to bring it back to the perpendicular.

A cold, critical look at real history suggests that the prestige of the army officer started to wane at the moment when he began to place more value on social status, and the fun and games which went with it, than on professional competence. The illusion that the ability to hit a polo ball approximately in the right direction had something to do with strategy and tactics brought its nemesis in World War 1, when many thousands of ordinary men paid with their lives for the social accomplishments of their military leaders. Up to that point those leaders had got away with it because relatively few people were concerned. But in 1914-18 too many were involved. You can't fool all the people, not even, as Abraham Lincoln thought, some of the time.

In World War II the army officer recovered a lot of lost ground, but by then the whole social philosophy of the Western world had changed so much that the old order was as dead as Julius Caesar. That old order may have been a better world for those at the top, but it can

hardly be denied that the new order is a better world for the general run of mankind. The changed social standing of the army officer, as well as the social standing of many other people of comparable professional attainments, is the price we pay, and I for one pay gladly, for that new world.

Many of our regular army officers have clung to a tradition which has never had a place in the Australian story. Anyone with a slight knowledge of our social history ought to be aware of the evil legacy bequeathed by the officers of the New South Wales Corps. In the early days of this country the army officer, in the eyes of the people, represented everything that was tyrannous and knavish, and little that was admirable. We'll get over it, of course, but it will take time.

Meanwhile, what sort of social standing do we yearn for? Admittedly it will take a good deal more than our salaries if we want to join the brassy society of the industrial nabobs, the beer merchants and the bookies. But do we want to, really? In every Australian city and nearly every country town there is a society of intellect, culture and wit which costs very little to enter—if you have got what it takes. If you haven't, neither the cut of your coat nor the length of your purse will get you in.

My pocket is no deeper than that of any other regular officer, but all the same I manage to circulate in a bright, pleasant and intelligent society. I very rarely encounter one of those regular officers who got into the army without recourse to a "confidence trick," but I do meet some of those who gave the profession a blood transfusion a few years ago. It occurs to me that those officers, far from lowering a social position which has not hitherto existed in this country, are doing more to establish one than those gentlemen who never move outside military circles. It could well be that these officers, with their broader background and wider experience, will show the Army how to bite its way out of its cocoon. Once through the encrusting shell of ideas which belong to a dead age, an exciting and not impossibly expensive world will be discovered.

Among the first of the interesting discoveries will be the fact that, except at the very highest levels, the salaries of Army officers do not compare unfavourably with many other professional men, particularly those in government and semi-government employ. A glance at the Commonwealth Gazette, which does contain other things besides military promotions and appointments, will show that the salaries of University professors, teachers, engineers, architects, scientists and others who, unlike most Army officers, had to invest large sums in their professional education, are roughly the same as those who wear the Queen's uniform. And some of them — the engineers who build our roads, power plants and irrigation systems, the geologists who search in the wilderness for minerals and oil, and others on whom the development, and therefore the security, of this country largely depends — serve the nation under conditions no more favourable than those of the Army officer. In private industry, of course, the material awards are greater — so are the risks. There is nothing new about that, it has always been the same. The second interesting discovery will be that in all the numerous voluntary organi-

zations working to assist the nation or their less fortunate fellows, members of the sacred band are as scarce as hen's teeth, even in those organizations specifically devoted to the welfare of ex-servicemen and their dependents. All over the country many, many thousands of men and women of modest means are giving much of their spare time to community service. It should not be necessary to draw the attention of the regular officer to the example set by our Citizen Forces. How many of them give a service to the community comparable with that?

As General Legge has pointed out, the Army officer, on official occasions, is given a place in keeping with his appointment. If anyone expects to get any more than that, simply because he is an Army officer, he has failed to grasp the fact that the age of class privilege has passed, if it ever did exist in this country. But if he gets out into the world and participates in the life of the community he will find that the great middle bracket, the core of the nation, will very soon place upon him his true social valuation as an individual. He will find that these solid folk, whose incomes are no greater than his own, don't care two hoots what club he belongs to, or even if he belongs to any clubs at all. They will value him for what he is as a man, no more, no less. Anyone who expects more is in for a chastening experience.

If sufficient Army officers get out into the world and participate in community activities, as individuals, it is possible that they will win much social credit for army officers as a group. Meanwhile it might be a good idea to take Gracie Fields' advice—and count our blessings.

In this discussion, which must now be closed, some interesting and informative points of view have been brought forward. It is now for readers to form their own opinions on the points discussed. — Editor.

It is astonishing how obstinate allies are, how parochially minded, how ridiculously sensitive to prestige and how wrapped up in obsolete political ideas. It is equally astonishing how they fail to see how broad-minded you are, how clear your picture is, how up to date you are and how co-operative and big-hearted you are. It is extraordinary.

—Field Marshal Sir William Slim.

HUMAN ENDURANCE and PHYSICAL FITNESS

Major A. W. John, Director of Army Education.

IT is the attitude of mind that determines whether you go under or survive. The jungle itself is neutral." So wrote Colonel Spencer Chapman, DSO, the hero of three years' guerilla action in Malaya. His was largely a solo effort, ever on the alert for Japanese attacks, wounded, frequently ill of the jungle scourges of malaria, blackwater fever, tropical ulcers or scrub typhus, without food for as long as six days on end and twice actually in the hands of the enemy. In a foreword to Spencer Champan's book, Field-Marshal Earl Wavell made the point ". . . if the spirit can endure, the flesh will usually find the capacity to do so." This is also borne out by the stories of innumerable castaways, though the chances of survival are obviously greater where both spirit and flesh are tempered by experience.

World War Two produced some amazing stories of human endurance. Ensign Carroum of the US Navy, lost during an air mission against a Japanese transport in the Solomon Islands in November 1942, supported only by a standard life jacket, swam and drifted for seventy-three hours without food or water until he finally touched down and was dragged out of the water by Kanakas. Surrounded by islands, his difficulty was to reach one against changing currents and he several times suffered the disheartening experience of drifting away from the island he was trying to reach.

Perhaps the most extraordinary survival story of all time is that of the Chinese steward, Poon Lim, whose ship, the SS Ben Lomond, was torpedoed by the Italians in the South Atlantic. One of the ship's rafts was blown free when the first torpedo struck and, after seeing British seamen picked up by the submarine while he was left to drown, Poon Lim managed to swim to the derelict raft and clamber aboard. He found a limited amount of food and ten gallons of water. When these were exhausted, improvised fishing tackle and the canvas cover of the raft provided him with food and drink. On the hundredth day, patrolling aircraft sighted him but the sea was rough and they could not land. A month later he was picked up by some

Brazilian fishermen after a total of 133 days adrift. Mind and spirit had as much to do with his survival as physical resources.

Chances of survival in colder regions where submersion or exposure in an open boat are in themselves the most hazardous features are usually resolved in a matter of hours. To exist at all under some conditions, proper equipment in good order, and shelter, at least some of the time, are essentials.

Among the feats of endurance which most compel our admiration are those of the polar explorers. The moral, mental and physical resources of men are taxed to the uttermost. In this sphere it would be hard to equal the winter journey — "The Worst Journey in the World" — of Dr. E. A. Wilson, Lieutenant H. R. Bowers, RN, and Mr. Apsley Cherry-Garrard (the author of the book). In the course of Scott's expedition to the South Pole in 1912/13, these men made a side journey of five weeks in the darkness and intense cold of the Antarctic winter to check some scientific data concerning Emperor penguins. They suffered unbelievable hardhips — temperatures down to –77.50 (109½ degrees of frost), iced-up sleeping bags (it took an hour to get bedded down at halts and "if you got out in the night you must tie a string as stiff as a poker and rethaw your way into the bag already as hard as a board"), frostbite, fogs, blizzards and crevasses (". . . my helmet was so frozen up that my head was encased in a solid block of ice and I could not look down — the bridge gave way and down I went — fortunately the sledge harness held"). All this in darkness and incredible cold. To carry on for five weeks on end and triumph over such conditions is surely an unsurpassable feat of endurance.

The limits of man's capacity to endure through heat and cold, hunger and thirst, and strain and exertion, form an interesting subject for investigation. Just what are those limits?

He can stand a range of temperatures of some 200 degrees Fahrenheit from 70 to 80 below zero to 130 to 140 degrees above; not the same man on the same day, but men clad and conditioned to the clime. Admiral Byrd recorded –94 degrees Fahrenheit during one of his expeditions. The highest shade temperature ever recorded was a reading of 136 degrees Fahrenheit in Tripoli during 1922—doubtless all Tripolitans were in the shade along with the thermometer. Sun temperatures of up to 198 degrees Fahrenheit are not uncommon in parts of Australia.

A team of Russian footballers (the Spartaks) has recently astonished London by insisting on the raising of the temperature of the hottest room of the Jermyn street Turkish Baths from its normal 190 degrees Fahrenheit to 212 degrees Fahrenheit and apparently enjoying fifteen minutes in it at boiling point. This sort of thing compels attention to the fact that man can endure artificially created temperatures for short periods, greatly in excess of the highest known natural temperatures. Besides Turkish baths, for instance, you have the stokeholds of ships.

In between the limits mentioned above, unclad man can withstand great cold. The naked aboriginal sheltering beside a wind-break on a frosty night immediately comes to mind. An exercise by which the Yogi gain merit is to remain seated on the ice of some frozen lake and

dry wet towels on their naked bodies. An early English visitor to the court of Ivan the Terrible describes a holy hermit who received the Tzar in the depths of a Russian winter naked except for a skin garment about his loins.

Without wishing in any way to detract from the merits of our local "Icebergs," it is fitting to mention that members of the brotherhood in parts of northern Europe and North America literally break the ice in order to swim in the winter months.

It is easy enough to recall people who have claimed to be "faint with hunger" after missing a meal and others who thought they might die after being deprived of food a whole day; probably the first twenty-four hours are the worst. Fasting is not practiced to any great extent in the West, but is interwoven into the religious beliefs of many Eastern sects. Fasts of up to forty or even fifty days have been made, provided always that water, the great life preserver, is taken. Without water death may come to the hardiest in from eight to ten days. These periods of endurance of hunger and thirst depend upon complete immobility. They will be reduced proportionately where the body is called upon to exert effort.

The limits of prolonged physical exertion are not so easily measured. How are we to determine the merit of swimming the English Channel unsupported as compared with the feat of Ensign Carroum? Or of running the full marathon distance, or cycling 500 miles, or climbing Mount Everest? Each is an outstanding feat of endurance and possibly all are of somewhere near equal merit. We are not here concerned with those who perform prodigies of endurance — of monotony; of piano strummers, tap dancers, etc.; nor with those who perform equally unusual but far more strenuous feats, such as continuous tight-rope walking, with-the-current swimming, or barrow wheeling from one city to another. The name "Marathon," so often indiscriminately applied to such feats, deserves to be used with greater respect.

The modern marathon race over a distance of 26 miles 385 yards commemorates the prowess of Pheidippides in 490 BC. The Athenians received news that the Medes were crossing the Aegian Sea to invade the Greek states. Pheidippides, an Olympic champion runner, was despatched to enlist the aid of the Spartans. He travelled for two days and nights, swimming the rivers and climbing the mountains in his way. Then he returned with the news that the Spartans would march at the full moon. But these were only the initial laps. The runner took his place with the Athenian army and fought against the Medes at Marathon, then ran the 22 miles to Athens with news of the victory.

Incredible distances were covered by runners in the Middle Ages. It is on record that the Persian couriers of Turkish sultans often ran from Constantinople to Adrianople and back in 48 hours, a distance of 220 miles. In modern times, a South African farmer, Arthur Newton, has established records for distances ranging from 30 to 100 miles.

Man and machine combined have covered astonishing distances. In 1937, Hubert Opperman cycled from Fremantle to Sydney in 13 days 10 hours 11 minutes — 2,750 miles in less than two weeks. His best 24

hours' ride during this phenomenal journey was 315½ miles. On another occasion he rode over 500 miles in a 24-hour test.

Bike riding seems to be the exercise to prolong stamina into old age. Some months ago a sixty-two years old Frenchman, Rene Menzies, was reported as having ridden 250 miles a day for the best part of the year. An accident resulting in a broken collarbone kept him in hospital for 23 days. Apart from this, he rode in all weathers including rain and snow storms.

More recently, the veteran cyclist, Ernie Old, topped off an eighty-day jaunt of eighty miles a day, by riding 287 miles in twenty-four hours on his eightieth birthday, bringing his total distance for the eighty days to 6,726 miles. It takes years to build stamina and stamina itself, it seems, may be maintained to an advanced age. Another example is the septuagenarian Italian mountaineer with one of the recent Himalayan expeditions.

Mountain climbing is in a class by itself. Besides the requirement of stamina built up through climbing many miles of mountains over the years and a certain trained judgment to cope with blizzards, crevasses and treacherous terrain, there is the additional hazard of rarefied air requiring the carrying of oxygen equipment weighing up to 40 pounds. As Sir John Hunt puts it " . . . The problem of Everest lies in getting high enough fast enough, meanwhile conserving the energy to make the final effort." (Incidentally, Sir Edmund Hillary was 33 and the Sherpa Tenzing Norky 39 when they conquered Mount Everest.)

To sum up on the age factor in relation to endurance, we may note that breaking four minutes for the mile is a feat only possible in the early glow of maturity. The sprinter gives of his best in his twenties, the distance runner in his thirties. In rare cases a man may equal his best times for distances, or such feats as mountain climbing and bike riding, in his early forties. After this there is a tapering off, though it is possible to maintain a high degree of stamina into old age.

Brilliant athletes are rare and record breakers come and go, but the ungifted majority of men may build up a lot of staying power and maintain it throughout the years. Stamina is largely an attitude of mind reinforced by the right sort of training; stamina is habit. In the first place it is necessary to grasp the general possibilities of human endurance and in particular one's own capabilities. A good maxim in distance racing is to tell yourself, when you feel half dead, that the man just ahead of you feels 'deader.'

How fit does man need to be? To a large extent this is a question every man must decide for himself and usually resolves itself into another question — fit for what?

Many a ski-ing holiday is spoilt because youngsters fail to realize that their normal exercises — golf, tennis and the like — are totally inadequate preparation. On the other hand — distance running, cycling, swimming hiking and mountaineering are. There aren't many snowy mountains in Australia and none near our main cities, so the obvious advice that the best training for any sport is the sport itself, is not helpful.

Every now and again someone will turn up in the squad on physical training whose normal routine makes the jog trotting and set exercises look like physical therapy for

convalescents. Such was JHD, who regularly rode a push bike to Bondi, ran three miles through loose sand, threw the medicine ball for ten minutes or so, swam whatever sort of surf was running summer or winter and then cycled home for breakfast. JHD could never restrain his scorn when he recalled the section sergeant's "this'll make a man of you." It was purely a personal matter on the part of a man who later won a three miles State championship at the age of forty-three. As for the rest of the section, we thought JHD should be in the Commandos.

The physical standards of the Commandos are of the highest order. In "Combined Operations" we read that "One troop in training once marched in fighting order 63 miles in 23 hours and 10 minutes, covering the first 33 miles in eight hours dead." Another troop covered 42 miles in 19 hours. One of the guiding principles of a Commando trainer, Lieutenant-Colonel C. E. Vaughan, OBE, was to fill every man who passed through his hands with the desire and capacity to cover the ground at seven miles an hour. Unmechanised mobility is still highly important.

In pre-war days in New Guinea, it was an unheard-of thing for the average white resident to exert himself unnecessarily. Some went as far as to take a boy on every casual stroll to carry their umbrella or tin of cigarettes. None carried a pack when on patrol. It just wasn't done and, not being done, was accepted as a physical impossibility. The Australian infanteer changed all that, foot slogging with his weapons and equipment over humid muddy mountain trails.

Under certain conditions the infanteer is still expected to be a combination of fighter, navvy, porter, hiker and mountaineer. We are a long way from the days of Pheidippides, though not so far as some people think. Because the whole army is not required to move say thirty miles a day on its own flat feet, doesn't mean that some sections of it will not be. In this atomic age massed mechanised assaults might be a thing of the past. Ability to negotiate mountain and jungle and frozen wastelands in small parties whilst maintaining organized contact and control of the situation could well be the insurance of future survival.

Finally, to face the question of standards of physical fitness — fit enough to (a) run five miles cross-country in 40 minutes; (b) run one mile in 6 mins. 30 secs.; (c) high jump 3 ft. 9 ins.; (d) standing high jump 3 ft.; (e) broad jump 13 ft.; (f) deep knee bend 20 times with 50 lbs. across shoulders; (g) press up 15 times; (h) chin the beam six times; (j) climb a 15 ft. rope—to be fit to do these things in one's prime and to maintain this standard of fitness as long as possible. The foregoing are standard tests of the RMC, and, combined, represent a reasonable standard of physical fitness and staying power.

To be sound in body and be able to achieve them at twenty has average merit, at fory great merit and at fifty or over exceptional merit. This is a worth-while aim for any man.

BOOK REVIEWS

MEN OF DESTINY—CHURCHILL ROOSEVELT, STALIN, HITLER

By H. C. O'Neill (Strategicus)
(Phoenix House Ltd., London)

THE military builders of history cannot engage in their craft without some understanding of the political architects who shape and direct their projects. Knowledge of this background is all the more necessary because, whereas the soldier is schooled within a comparatively narrow field, indeed in a sheltered existence, the statesman is developed in an atmosphere of uninhibited competition, which takes little cognisance of seniority or scientific career planning. This study of the dominant political personalities of World War II is therefore relevant reading for the thoughtful soldier.

H. C. O'Neill, whose widely-circulated summaries and commentaries on the progress of two World Wars are familiar to the English speaking world, under his pen-name Strategicus, is a seasoned veteran of military journalism with a flair for that predigested and concentrated form of writing which constitutes so much of modern literary fare. Consequently, while his book displays a convincing factuality and dynamic development, it lacks the bulk which would do so much to aid digestion.

This is a comparative study of the careers of Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin and Hitler, compressed into 235 pages. The author sets out to give an unbiased, objective account of these leaders which will, at the same time, refute Henry Wallace's concept that this is the Century of the Common Man. He is thus stepping, albeit wearily, in the footprints of Nietzsche and Carlyle. Moreover he suffers the disadvantage of being so near his subjects in time as to gravely prejudice any Olympian pretentions to historical perspective. Nevertheless any minor imperfections of perspective are more than compensated by the vitality and scope which he compresses into his study.

He has taken the patrician, individualist Churchill, matured in political and military sagacity; and the affluent, idealistic Roosevelt, an inspiring if somewhat inconsistent leader. Against these historical "goodies" he has opposed two self-made "baddies," uncommon men who rose from the ranks of the Com-

mon Man. Hitler is shown as an able, if unbalanced, megalomaniac, obsessed with the Frederickian ideal of achieving Germanic destiny, and Stalin, as the brutal cunning realist we know him to have been. Whereas the author conceives his study of Hitler as something of a revolution, the reader may well conclude that his portrait of Stalin is the most effective, in its power and depth.

Politically the book does little to refute the egalitarian prophecies of Henry Wallace, save to emphasize the need for common men to retain the ultimate power in their own hands. Historically it may survive to remind posterity of a selfish and suicidal phase in the development of modern politics and diplomacy. This book is good revision for those who seek to understand the cataclysm of 1939-45 and the succeeding chaos and world-wide dissension. It is an hors d'ouevre which should whet the appetite for more substantial nutriment of the same type, of which there is certainly no dearth.

—Lieutenant-Colonel A. Green.

BEYOND THE IRON CURTAIN. By Sir David Kelly. (Hollis and Carter, London).

Sir David Kelly was British Ambassador to Moscow from 1949 to 1951. With his professional background, recent experience, and obvious gifts for observation and deduction, his views merit respect.

They are well presented in a compact (83 pages) collection of thirteen essays, which range through studies of the impact of the Soviet system on its own people and on the outside world, Soviet doctrine, personalities, friction points, Asia and Berlin.

Particular interest derives from the fact that several of the essays were printed individually as early as 1951 — providing both the author and the reader with the interesting prospect of forecasts made (and time-expired!), alongside projection into the future awaiting verification or contradiction.

Some points, selected almost at random, indicate the scope and calibre of the work:

"The new Soviet State is being built on the rejection of the traditional socialist attitude . . ."

". . . the most striking feature of Soviet foreign policy is its impersonality." This explains, "the complete failure of Western statesmen, from Roosevelt onwards, to obtain by personal meetings any results other than those decided in advance by the Soviet representatives . . ."

"Among the Western nations, two especially fascinate and alarm the Soviet Union: the United States and Germany. Towards the United States the feeling underlying all the abuse is one of envious admiration . . . As regards Germany, there is a genuine deep fear of German military capacity."

Stalin's attitude to revolution: "never play with insurrections . . . concentrate a great superiority of forces at the decisive point at the decisive moment."

"The one nationality which the Russian leaders feel they cannot fit into the 'Union-Republic' is the Jewish race, with their inherent internationalism, their spiritual tradition, their uncanalizable intelligence."

"While no one can predict how the Big Three will work out the

problems among themselves, it is very probable that each of them will at least endeavour to carry on Stalin's general policy and will try to estimate in any given situation what his reactions would have been." — Someone's slip is showing here!

"The proposition that Stalin's basic policy has been reversed is contrary to the trend of his last twelve months and to the public statements of his successors: while the larger proposition that there has been a fundamental change in ideology and method still awaits proof."

What should be the policy of the West towards China? "A policy of defensive containment offers the best hope of liberating eventually all those who wish for liberation, and the reasoning which applies to Russia applies equally in the case of China."

With those extracts it can be seen that Sir David, on his pinnacle, has his share of doubts, too. One can but sympathise with his obvious efforts to prove to his readers (and himself) that his basic proposition — adherence by Malenkov to Stalin's general line — is sound. Such a lot depends on what is "general."

— *Lieutenant-Colonel F. P. Serong.*