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Australian Army History Unit

16 July 2014

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AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL



No. 63 AUGUST, 1954


Notified in AAOs for 31st August, 1954.

MILITARY BOARD.

Army Headquarters
Melbourne,

1/8/54.

Issued by Command of the Military Board.



Secretary to the Board.

Distribution:

One per Officer, Officer of Cadets,
and Cadet Under Officer.

AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

A Periodical Review of Military Literature

Number 63


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VICTORIA BARRACKS, MELBOURNE.

AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

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Contributions, which should be addressed to the Director of Military Training, Army Headquarters, Melbourne, are invited from all ranks of the Army, Cadet Corps, and Reserve of Officers.

GAINING CONTACT

in

JUNGLE

Major-General S. H. W. C. Porter, CBE, DSO, ED,
CMF Member of the Military Board.

To arrive at the main differences in gaining contact in jungle-clad, tropical country as compared with European-type country or the type of theatre experienced in other natural regions, one should turn to the undeveloped lands.

It is true that there may be strategical objectives in jungle warfare which are set in developed lands; but, as the jungle rapidly claims all lands which are not in constant use, there will be a problem of making an approach through dense jungle during some stage of an advance.

As mentioned in a previous article, the actual axis may be a well-made road, a mere track, a coast-line, or a series of jungle features; and by "jungle features" we mean not only ground formations but variations in jungle growth.

Where there are single roads or tracks traversing stretches of virgin jungle, possession of the roads or tracks will be the main concern of the opposing forces; and contact

will, at some stage of an operation, be made on the road or track which the advancing force has chosen. Because of the difficulty which movement off this type of axis presents, there is every likelihood that the advancing force will push as far along the axis as possible, as fast as possible, using the axis itself as a route. Eventually, the defender's screens will be encountered, and will probably manifest themselves by inflicting a series of ambushes on the leading elements of the advancing force. At least, this is what has happened in the past.

It is true that we are not able to employ the thrusting squadrons of armoured cars, tanks and motor battalions to precede the main force, protect its flanks and put a "rake" through the country astride the axis. But our advance guards have the same task as in other circumstances, even though they must move on foot. They must "Push on," "Protect," "Procure information," "Prevent the enemy obtaining informa-

tion" and "Push to the flanks or penetrate sufficiently to gain a springboard," according to circumstances. (Five "P's", you will notice). The advance guards will do their task better if some substitute is found for the "rake."

During World War II we gradually developed the substitutes for Advance Guard Mobile Troops and screens. They were not complete substitutes, in that they were not always able to exert offensive action, lest they destroy what surprise the main force commander sought; but they were able to provide information which was lacking in the early stages of jungle offensives, and in doing so they afforded our forward troops the security which comes of early knowledge of the enemy and his centres of resistance. They took the form of deep reconnaissance parties, dropped by aircraft or landed by submarine, and independent companies. At first, the independent companies undertook offensive tactics of their own; but, on certain occasions, it was found that this action merely alerted the enemy long before the main force could follow up with a blow at a time and place of its own choice. So the independent companies became foot cavalry, and operated only sufficiently far away from the main force to allow a reasonable interval of time between their action and the action of the main force.

The capture of Beaufort, in North Borneo, provides a good example of the value of this type of "cavalry." In addition to a normal Cavalry Commando squadron, operating to provide flank protection, two company-strength patrols moved up two rivers, ahead of the main force. The combined actions of the three

provided the commander of the main force with information which enabled him to choose one river as an axis, and to make his approach with security and surprise. In this example it is of interest to note that the approach was speeded up by the use of landing craft on the Padas River for the transport of a brigade group, including tanks. The alternative to this, a normal approach with adaptations to meet the conditions, was a slow move in face of opposition along the one strategic approach—a railway—with many of the hazards of the advance over the Kokoda Trail.

It is important to note, also, that the action of the three small forces which were acting with a role similar to Advance Guard Mobile Troops was limited to reconnaissance only. One company did, in fact, launch an attack upon an enemy outpost; but only when the commander had made sure that he could completely liquidate the enemy outpost without danger of alerting the enemy who occupied the objective. In any case, the brigade commander wasted no time in following up this action.

It is not always possible to convert the time and space factor of jungle warfare to the same relative dimension as that of open country warfare by the use of landing craft on waterways. In fact, in certain circumstances, moving in single file, on foot, may be the quickest and best way of advancing. Always, however, we should seek to apply the accepted principles. We should seek to obtain information about the enemy by using the jungle warfare version of screens; and having gained information, we may maintain some degree of security by

keeping the enemy under observation while the main force advances.

There is no reason why we should assume that an advance through jungle is akin to groping blindly through a vast smoke screen. This was an early conception during the SWPA operations; and it resulted in the provision of "drill" movements to combat the inevitable surprise which the enemy maintained by waiting until the "groping" ended with contact. Relatively large-scale "jungle drills" which involved moving companies and even battalions, right and left of the point of contact, without appreciation of the situation, were clear evidence of jungle blindness. They may have frightened a weak and irresolute enemy; but they played into the hand of the cheeky outpost commander who set out to delay the advance and gain information.

There is justification for a pre-arranged plan of action on the part of the forward platoon of a vanguard when contact is expected. Having such a plan may save lives when the platoon is ambushed, and when there will be no time for anything but immediate action. In any event, however, the forward platoon commander should seek to maintain the initiative by appreciating likely danger spots during his study of his route on a photo or map.

Let us now turn our attention to a more detailed study of the problem, commencing with the minor tactical picture.

We may assume that we have reconnaissance parties observing the enemy, sometimes up to 50 miles or more ahead of our force; but, even when they are closer in, we may expect parties of about 100 enemy to operate in the country over which

we are to advance. Of some we may have warning. Others may be expected to patrol without revealing themselves prematurely. We have, therefore, to maintain normal protection on the move.

Our Cavalry - Commando sub-units may be expected to be watching our flanks by advancing on parallel routes. Sometimes we may have a special patrol operating ahead of the advance.

We will suppose that our axis is a well-defined foot track, through undeveloped country with normal variations of jungle growth.

Our communications with protective troops will be by wireless; and line will be laid along the axis as the advance progresses.

During a preliminary study of the axis—accomplished by studying air photos with a stereoscope, in conjunction with a map reconnaissance—bounds will be chosen, defiles marked and the jungle texture will be studied with a view to choosing alternative routes, off the track. In short, an appreciation of the task will be undertaken.

Grass patches and "low jungle" patches will be viewed with suspicion. Where the track passes through these features, it may be decided to divert through adjacent "high jungle" in order to avoid being caught in unfavourable circumstances. The size of the patches, among other factors, will determine the course to be taken. Timber edges on the far sides of these patches are likely ambush positions.

The track will probably permit of single file only, so consideration will be given to advancing off the track as well as along it. The nature of the jungle growth on

either side of the track will determine this. Variations in the terrain and jungle texture between successive bounds may result in variations in the frontage of the advance.

Until we pass through our protective net of reconnaissance parties, we will be intent upon making the best speed possible, and we will be anxious to avoid being delayed by enemy patrols. Nevertheless, once an advanced enemy patrol discovers our presence we may expect to encounter successive ambushes which will cause delay to those sub-units advancing along the track. This situation may call for a series of looping movements off the track, whereby bounds are seized by companies moving off the track, as the ambushes are dealt with by other companies whose tasks are to clear the track between bounds.

The history of World War II abounds with examples of "looping" tactics. On the Kokoda Trail the Japanese inflicted these tactics upon our forces, which sought to hold the trail at all costs. We employed the same tactics when we were advancing. Sometimes a new trail was cut by the outflanking force in very rapid time. To a force on the defensive, both the "looping" type of advance and the advance on a wider front, using jungle texture which lends itself to relatively easy movement, are demoralizing—especially if the defence is on a narrow front. Troops of the advancing force appear in rear, on the flanks and on the track in front, almost simultaneously. Where the defenders are mere outposts, they must either disperse or fight a "last ditch" stand. In a properly organized, main defensive position there are, of course, counters to by-passing tactics.


Within the tactical bounds set by senior commanders, there will be minor bounds chosen by junior commanders—as in any other type of advance. The forward company commander, for example, will study his route and plan stages within the bounds set by his battalion commander. He will seek to avoid placing his company in a position, at any stage of the advance, wherein it may be surprised and caught totally in an exposed position. He will employ similar tactics to those he would employ for crossing exposed positions in open country warfare—except that he will probably be forced to space his sub-units longitudinally instead of widely across the front.

When approaching a suspected enemy position, the forward platoon should be prepared for enemy action without warning. Hence, the platoon commander could have a prearranged plan of action for instant operation. Call this a "drill" if you will. Whatever term you use, the experience of the forward platoon should be undertaken with purpose; for its experience will be the main source of information upon which subsequent action by the company commander will be based. Any prearranged plan of action should therefore be designed to produce information, and the information most needed is the strength and position of the enemy. At the same time, prearranged action should provide for the leading elements escaping from the fire plan which has been encountered, while leaving some strength astride the axis further to the rear. It may well be that the size of an enemy ambush may defeat all purposeful moves by sections or individuals of the forward platoon; and, in such

cases, the company commander must take over immediately. If the enemy opposition is of a nature which may be dealt with by the forward platoon, some such action as that depicted in the diagram at right will produce the information required. The two leading sections will vacate the track—one going to the left and the other to the right; while the rear section—the one least likely to be caught in the opening fire—will take up a position astride the track in cover if possible. While moving to the flanks the leading sections will incidentally feel for the flanks of the enemy, while the rear section will mark the limit of safety to which succeeding troops may advance along the track. The rear section may have to withdraw some distance in certain circumstances. Beyond this simple action, little may be expected of the forward platoon unless the opposition is of a very minor nature.

On most occasions time will be saved if the company commander takes over immediately with the aim of maintaining the advance, either by pushing around the opposition or brushing it aside. If the opposition is too great to be treated lightly, as when the forward platoon has failed to locate the extent of the enemy front, the company commander must undertake the task of locating the enemy flanks and procuring information generally.

The main decision confronting the company commander, when his forward platoon has encountered opposition, will be whether the enemy is merely of nuisance value or whether the situation demands a planned action involving the whole of his company. The battalion



Note: Scouts from 3 Section would attempt to rejoin their section if they could not find cover from which to remain in observation of the enemy.

commander will be faced with a similar decision as to the action of the battalion in relation to the action of the forward company, and should be well forward in the order of march so that he may obtain early information.

Should the forward company commander decide to continue the advance, bypassing the opposition with succeeding platoons, the enemy must be liquidated if he does not withdraw as a result of the threat of encirclement. Normally this would be the responsibility of the forward company commander, unless ordered to the contrary. However, the battalion commander may choose to order the forward company to clear the track and relinquish its role of vanguard in favour of another company which will be pushed around the scene of the engagement in a flanking move to regain impetus.

In the early stages of gaining contact it is important to push ahead relentlessly, and to avoid the situation wherein the whole force halts because of a very minor ambush. In practice, the main body would seize every opportunity to close up intervals which may have developed between units during the advance; and, even when there is a pause on the part of the leading elements, the overall progress should not be greatly impeded.

During relatively short advances it may be possible to include a troop of tanks in the advance guard. Its task would be to save time and casualties by coming into action whenever small outposts threatened the progress of the advance. During an advance from Scarlet Beach to Bonga in the Finschaven area, which took place in

the latter stages of the New Guinea campaign, a troop of tanks followed the leading company, and was called forward each time opposition was encountered. The fire from the tanks reduced enemy opposition in much quicker time than was possible by out-flanking moves on the part of infantry. An engineer detachment, including a bulldozer, assisted the tanks forward.

Let us now look at the general picture of a brigade group advancing through country similar to that under discussion. We will not spend much time discussing the order of march, as it will conform with normal principles. Elements will be spaced in the column according to their likely roles.

The first concern of the commander will be the movement forward of his supporting firepower—his artillery, tanks, mortars and machine guns. According to the situation, he may regulate his advance so that he has always some guns in position to support his forward troops. In virgin jungle where there are no tracks immediately available for moving guns forward, engineer resources may determine the rate of the advance. During the latter stages of the SWPA campaigns, long overland advances through virgin country were avoided. In fact, most operations were amphibious, and took the form of a landing close to strategic objectives. The ensuing advances to contact were short. Future operations will probably be planned to avoid lengthy advances through virgin country, according to strategy; so perhaps we may turn away from the unpleasant thought of long inland advances which involve making tracks for guns and vehicles through

vast stretches of undeveloped country.

More likely conditions are those which are incidental to coastwise moves, with good landing beaches determining the bounds, and movement of guns and equipment by sea in landing craft. Or there may be overland moves to secure and improve landing grounds for aircraft, followed by air drops or re-supply by air.

Nevertheless, we must face the situation of movement between bounds in the final stages of an advance being influenced by the speed of the bulldozer, unless it is desirable to move forward without artillery support.

A typical picture of a brigade group in the process of making contact could, looking from front to rear, be as follows:

- Reconnaissance parties, spread in a wide arc, occupying observation posts from which they may report large-scale enemy moves. They would be specially trained and equipped personnel, capable of living by their own resources. Their posting and control would normally be directly controlled by Army HQ.
- Cavalry Commando squadrons advancing ahead and to the flanks of the brigade. Distances may vary from a few miles to about ten miles ahead of the main body. They would be under the command of the brigade commander, and their tactics would be limited to conform with the plans of the main body. The brigade advancing

on one or more routes, with normal protection. Each column would have forward scouts, a vanguard operating as part of its advance guard, and the main body of each column following in the most convenient formation from the point of view of control, conservation of force and mobility.

- Behind the main body, engineers would be busy improving the chosen L of C. Some guns would be in position, ready to fire on call; while others would be making their way forward to gun positions reconnoitred for them by artillery reconnaissance parties with the forward troops.
- Re-supply may take the form of the establishment of dumps—one at the furthest point forward to which jeeps may move, and others to which supplies may be carried by porters pending the further development of jeep tracks.
- Signal communications would be in the process of being developed by raising lines which have been laid on the ground, using trees as posts.

This sketchy picture will revive the memories of experienced officers and allow them scope for filling in details consistent with the advances which have been made in jungle warfare techniques. Further advances will undoubtedly be made in techniques—all with the aim of making jungle conditions fall into true perspective with the host of other conditions with which armies must contend.

SOVIET STRATEGIC CONCEPTS

Translated by Thomas B. Dunne, Intelligence Section, Army Headquarters,
Eire, from an article in "Die Soldatenzeitung."

EVERY power has its limitations, even Soviet military power. This, of course, does not give the free world any grounds for complacency. In the era of total war strategy may also be described as total, and the number of ground divisions and air squadrons comprise only one component of strategy. It is inseparably linked with economic, territorial and political factors which exercise a decisive influence on the efficiency of the purely military machine.

The Kremlin is as keenly aware of this connection as are the Western general staffs. The West has nothing comparable to the imposing number of active Soviet divisions and air squadrons and the combat effectiveness of the Soviet soldier which together form a component of Soviet power. The very existence of this power has in a few years given rise to really fundamental changes of an economic and political character in the world. It has thus proved itself to be an eminently effective instrument of Soviet policy and will continue to be so.

With this instrument the Kremlin can wield a lasting influence, in its own interests, on economic and

—From "Irish Defence Journal."

political developments outside its own orbit of power. Sober planning is the supreme maxim of the Kremlin. The governing principle seems to be not only the utmost exploitation of the superiority gained, but its reinforcement, until a degree of superiority is achieved which will render a "show-down" devoid of all serious risk.

Calls for "Security."

Those who regard this objective as capable of achievement will avoid all risk in the meantime. The lessons of the Second World War have not been forgotten in Moscow. The Soviet Union probably feels a need for security. This, however, is quite different in character from the Western need. The basis of the world revolution and the means of world conquest and international sedition—these are the aims of the Kremlin.

The free world would do well not to assume that such a Soviet need for security indicates the superiority of the free world or peaceful intentions on the part of the Soviet Union.

Offensive Plan.

There is, of course, one strategic component which the Soviet Union

cannot directly influence, and that is space. It is true that technical progress is constantly contracting space, but it does so by surmounting the obstacle rather than by controlling it. The Soviet forces would today have no difficulty in thrusting to the coasts of the European continent, but they would have difficulty in controlling their conquered territory. In this connection a lesson was learned from the mistakes of the German Wehrmacht. Initial successes conceal the germs of defeat if they disperse one's own forces and leave the enemy free to concentrate.

The planning of Soviet strategy is following these lines today. In the calculation of moves, the world champions of the politico-military chess game are constantly ahead of their opponents. In the middle of the "game" the Pentagon now finds itself obliged to undertake a complete regrouping simply because the Kremlin has shifted its forces on the internal line. What Korea failed to achieve—the tying-down of American strength in the vast territory of China—is now to be brought about by the strategic concentration of a quarter of the Soviet active ground and air forces in Northern Siberia facing Alaska.

The besieging of the Red super-fortress by the strategic air-bases continues to represent a source of danger to the Kremlin. Soviet policy is for the time being vainly trying to counter this threat.

The old-fashioned belief that war occurs where there is shooting is long out of date. We are living in the midst of war. It is the first real total war. It is conducted by the enemy with all appropriate means, offensively or defensively according

to expediency. While we give below a survey of the strength, organization and strategic principles of the Soviet forces, it should not be forgotten for a moment that they are only one weapon in an overall plan which is clearly offensive in character.

Illuminating Figures.

The following extracts were taken, with the kind permission of the C. W. Leske Publishing House in Darmstadt, from the book "1954—Peace Has a Chance," by Mahnke and Wolff.

"The following details were available in the headquarters of the Atlantic Pact forces in August, 1953, concerning the effective strength of the Soviet forces (the figures in parentheses are the comparative figures at the beginning of 1952; the ratio of probability in the case of these details is said to be variable to the extent of five per cent.):

Armd Divs	63	(57)
Mech Divs	36	(39)
Inf Divs	52	(55)
AB Divs	6	(5)
Arctic Sp Divs	6	(4)
Cav Divs	5	(4)
Arty Divs	58	(49)
Arctic Sp Armd Divs	1	(0)

Total 227 (213)

The peacetime strengths of the individual service arms revealed no considerable change since 1952. About half of the artillery and a third of the armoured, infantry and mechanized divisions are cadre divisions which could be mobilized in the shortest time. The airborne and Arctic special formations are kept at full war strength. The evidence in the hands of SHAPE on the dis-

position of manpower and material shows that within 30 days the following forces could be mobilized: 27 armoured divisions, 1 cavalry division and 45 artillery divisions.

The Soviet Air Force consists of:

Fighter and Fighter	
Bomber Divs	56 (43)
Tactical Bomber	
Divs	8 (8)
Strategic Bomber	
Divs	3 (3)
Total	<hr/> 67 (54) <hr/>

To these must be added transport, communications and artillery formations. According to available evidence, SHAPE estimates that three additional strategic bomber divisions could be mobilized within a period of 30 days.

Seven Army Groups.

The 23 military districts hitherto centralized in Moscow have been abolished and the gigantic military potential of the Soviet armed forces has been reorganized in seven army groups.

Army Group North, with headquarters in Leningrad and operational sector Northern Europe and the coast of the western Arctic;

Army Group West, with headquarters in Minsk and operational sector Eastern and Central Europe;

Army Group South, with headquarters in Odessa and operational sector in the Balkans;

Army Group Caucasus, with headquarters in Tiflis and operational tasks in Iran and Turkey;

Army Group Turkestan, with headquarters in Tashkent and operational sector Central Asia and India;

Army Group Far East, with two headquarters, one in Vladivostok and one in Anadyr, and operational sectors the Pacific coast and Alaska; finally the

Central Army Group, with headquarters in Briansk, which must be regarded as a general strategic reserve.

The Army Groups North, West and South combined account for 21 per cent. of the active ground forces and 8 per cent. of the active air forces. The corresponding figures in the case of Army Groups Caucasus and Turkestan are 9 and 11 per cent. respectively; Army Groups Far East, South, 23 and 29 per cent., and North, 24 and 25 per cent.; finally, in the case of the Central Army Group in the triangle Ufa-Saratov-Tula, 19 and 15 per cent.

This new regional organisation of the Soviet forces represents a serious interference with the old, traditional methods of Bolshevik leadership, whose strength—and weakness—lay in rigidly-organised centralization. The newly established Army Groups are autonomous bodies which in their supply and transport, distribution of depots and military administration, including the organization providing for mobilization, are, or at least can be, to a great extent independent of one another.

Teaching.

This new concept of defence is supported by certain traditions in the Soviet Union. On the modern scale it was tried experimentally for the first time during the Finnish-Russian War of 1940, when the Leningrad military district was mobilized on an autonomous basis against Finland. The experience of

the German-Russian War, during which the military colossus organized on rigidly centralized lines was swept away while the German Command carried out highly successful operations with its armoured groups and hedgehogs, impelled the Soviet General Staff to pursue this concept further. As early as the late autumn of 1945, Marshal Semyon Konstantinovitch Timoshenko, in a series of lectures at the Frunze Military Academy in Moscow, outlined the principles of a "strategy of attrition over a wide area" in accordance with which the defensive planning of the Soviet Union has been reformed since 1951.

Timoshenko's strategic concept was developed in toto from the traditional Russian "fortress concept," the defensive character of which is, however, combined with very modern offensive ideas and rendered more flexible. The Marshal stated at that time that the Soviet Union as a continental power with far-flung frontiers was like a besieged fortress which could exploit the advantages of internal lines by sudden, concentrated attacks. These could only be designed to disturb the strategic concentration of the opponent, unnerve him and finally wear him down by the destruction of his bases. There could be no question of occupying the enemy glaxis of strategic concentration as this would split up one's own forces and render them unsuitable for massed operations. The Marshal's strategic ideas finally culminated in the demand for the avoidance of any form of rigid front and the necessity of elastic tactics both in the case of successful and unsuccessful offensive actions so that, one way or the other, the enemy's counter-offensive might run

itself out. The reformed Soviet military organization which came into force about 1950 provided the organizational basis for this strategic concept.

Preparedness.

During the Soviet winter manoeuvres of 1952 Timoshenko, as commander of Army Group West in the areas of White Ruthenia and the Southern Ukraine, tried out these new tactics for the first time in manoeuvres proper. The battle groups under his command, supplied with modern equipment, operated as independent units towards the rear and flanks, covered only by mobile formations; they operated at marching pace against an opponent presumed to be coming from a westerly direction. As if they were a large naval formation, Timoshenko let his armoured groups develop frontal attacks and then withdrew them again into a concentrated formation organized on hedgehog lines.

The winter manoeuvres of 1953, which took place in the Kamenez-Podolsk area directed by Marshal Ivan S. Koniev and to which, as in the previous year, neutral military observers were invited, adhered in every respect to the principle governing the tactics first employed in 1952. They revealed a still stronger concentration of heavy weapons which increased the firepower of the operating groups, the employment of massed forces to a greater extent than before (based on the assumption of tactical superiority in the air), a remarkable sacrifice of speed in attack in favour of mass and weight in operation, an unmistakable preference for offensive tasks with, admittedly, a limited effect in depth, and conspicuous employment of tactical atomic weapons.

Central Army Group.

The essential backbone of this strategic idea is the Central Army Group which, as a strategic reserve, is concentrated in the triangle formed by Tula, Ufa and Saratov. It had been so excellently placed that slight changes in the situation are sufficient to bring into offensive action the masses of troops at its disposal in Europe, the Near East, Asia and the Arctic and also to enable them, in defensive action, to intercept enemy offensive thrusts from these directions.

In this central region of Russia there might well be about 45 divisions concentrated in peacetime. They consist predominantly of armoured and mechanized formations supplied with modern equipment. To these must be added the main body of Soviet special combat forces, such as artillery, rocket-projector and airborne divisions. The latter's organization includes a parachutist regiment, an airborne regiment and a formation for special commando tasks, such as "sabotage undertakings."

This brief survey of the strength organization and governing strategic principles of the Soviet forces is sufficient to prove that the Kremlin is by no means affected by that perplexity which, unfortunately, continually frustrates Western military planning. The Soviet strategic concentration is no compromise between conflicting concepts but the

best possible solution of the problem of preparedness for action and choice of battle stations. It represents the best preparation for every imaginable task, defensive and offensive, within the framework of the political objectives of the Soviet Union.

Soldier's Status.

Of course—and this is the disadvantage presented by the flexibility achieved by the armed forces—the Kremlin has had to pay for its preparedness by increasing the power of the military caste and it is not impossible that this may some day prove dangerous in the internal political sphere. Since the end of 1952 the bi-partite organization of the Soviet armed forces has been abolished. All the MVD divisions, which hitherto were controlled by the Ministry for Internal Security, are now incorporated in the army, which thereby not only gained 16 élite divisions but also a degree of independence it had never before enjoyed.

Thus not only the army has become independent but the individual army groups and in the long run they might, up to a certain point, develop an individual character. It would, however, be a mistake to expect this development to produce a tendency to disintegration, at least not until such time as these military units may be affected by a grave, general crisis or the Bolshevik system itself begins to totter.

RECOVERY

Lieutenant-Colonel W. Stafford-Gaffney, A.M.I.Mech.E., A.M.I.E.E.,
Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers.

"It was the high efficiency of the repair and recovery organisation which enabled us to retain our superiority in armour throughout the eleven days the battle of Alamein lasted."

—Viscount Montgomery.

RECOVERY and repair are generally regarded as being matters which can be disposed of in a couple of paragraphs of an administrative order, subjects about which no self-respecting general staff officer, much less a formation commander, need concern himself unduly. In fact, as a staff officer, they are very much your concern, and, should you ever rise to the rank of general, unless you ensure that the organisation within your formation is efficient you will soon be losing your battles and very shortly thereafter you may be "taking felt."

Montgomery was fully alive to this problem. As the foremost exponent, in modern times, of the principle of concentration of force he knew that, though he might commence a battle with a concentration sufficient to give him complete, or local, superiority over the enemy, he could not hope to maintain such conditions without a highly efficient recovery and repair organisation.

During the 11 days of Alamein in 10 Corps alone, of 530 tank casualties recovered by REME, 337 were repaired and put back into action. In other words, to that one corps was given the equivalent of ONE ARMoured DIVISION during a short and vital period. What corps commander would not rejoice to think that he had a spare armoured division hidden up his sleeve in time of emergency!

What then are the essentials of an efficient organisation and how does this fit into the general plan of a campaign or operation? First, to distinguish between the two components. Recovery is largely a tactical operation, and as such should be very much the concern of the "G" staff officer. Repair is more generally an administrative matter and therefore concerns "Q" more intimately. This article is concerned with recovery, repair being touched upon only where necessary to complete the picture.

Consider then a campaign in which a division advances to con-

tact the enemy, mounts a set-piece attack, reorganises and follows up the retreating enemy, is subsequently forced on to the defensive and finally withdraws out of contact.

General Considerations.

At the start of the campaign a general order or directive on recovery is issued by the highest formation in the theatre which is based upon:

- (a) The terrain over which operations will take place.
- (b) The formations allotted to the theatre.
- (c) The total recovery resources available, including railway flats, S and T transporters, river craft, etc.
- (d) The communication networks available to RAEME.
- (e) Information of particular enemy trends in strategy or tactics.
- (f) The type of operations envisaged, e.g., amphibious assaults leading to beach landings, airborne assaults, rapid advance, prolonged defence, etc.

It will enunciate the principles to be observed and the methods by which the available resources will be deployed. It will also indicate how additional assistance may be obtained in time of need.

Each subordinate formation, down to divisions, will amplify this general directive in the form of standing orders to suit its particular role and the resources normally available to it. The basic framework to support any operation is thus available and only requires to be adapted to the needs of the moment. It must be highly FLEXIBLE as the

demands made upon the system ebb and flow with the tide of battle. When a particular operation is to be mounted, a detailed recovery plan is prepared by the CREME of the division based upon his own standing orders. This plan will be in two parts—the initial recovery plan and the current recovery plan.

The Initial Plan.

This initial plan covers all the eventualities which the CREME can foresee after a consideration of the relevant factors and an analysis of the problem based on his own wide experience. War is not static, however, and the occurrence of the unexpected is the rule rather than the exception. The plan must therefore be capable of easy amendment or amplification as the situation on the battlefield is unfolded.

In formulating it the CREME must consider the various factors such as:

- (a) The corps recovery plan to support the operation.
- (b) His own commander's operation order.
- (c) Any additional recovery resources allotted to him.
- (d) Any restrictions on the movement of recovery vehicles in time or space imposed by the operation order.
- (e) Any priorities for the recovery of particular equipments.
- (f) Priority tasks at natural or artificial defiles such as bridges, built-up areas, mine-field gaps or assault river crossings.
- (g) Information of enemy mine-fields and booby trap methods.
- (h) Selection of sites for recovery posts and back-loading areas.

- (i) The need for recovery patrols on main operational or administrative routes.
- (j) Moves of HQs, units, and workshops.
- (k) Wireless or other communications which will be available to RAEME.
- (l) Who is to co-ordinate and control the recovery resources.

He will have obtained the information at (a) and (c) from his DDME at corps. The divisional operation order will guide him on (b), (d), (e) and (g), but some of the problems arising may require discussion with the GSOI. The normal approach is through the AQMG, but any CREME worth his salt must have a good "old boy" link with the G1. The AQMG may have something to say about (e) and will also be concerned with the implications of (h) and (j). The divisional intelligence staff will brief him on (g). He must make his own decisions on (i), (k) and (l), but if additional communications are necessary a further approach to the "G" staff, with overtures to the C R Sigs, will be needed. It is obvious, therefore, that the CREME must be "well in" with the whole divisional staff if he is to provide the support they require.

The careful selection of a competent OIC is essential. The CREME who tries to run everything himself may well be asked, "Why do it, Colonel?" In an armoured division the BEME of the armoured brigade is the obvious choice and in the infantry division the BEME of one of the infantry brigades may be selected. Having picked the man, he must be fully briefed and given

adequate communications. In the armoured division, if the BEME is chosen he is already well set up with his own wireless net and a flick on the regimental net. In the infantry division there are very few sets allotted to RAEME and these will need to be augmented by spares from the signal regiment or any other likely source. This is no time for parsimony, which will inevitably invite disaster.

There is in fact little doubt that a few months of active service conditions will conclusively demonstrate that the wireless sets allotted to RAEME in the infantry division are quite inadequate and will have to be substantially increased in number. It is useless to trifle with the problem by endeavouring to superimpose RAEME requirements on the already overloaded administrative nets of parent units and formations, and to pretend that, in an emergency, access may be had to an operational net is patently ludicrous. Not all traffic will be by wireless, much use can be and is made of DRs, but at the vital moment a wireless net must be available for urgent information.

The Current Plan.

Having appointed his OIC, published his plan, and deployed his units, CREME then sits back, metaphorically, to wait the inexorable march of progress. In his plan he will have called for certain information from his recovery officer regarding the density, geographical distribution and classification of casualties. As this comes in, the recovery picture begins to take shape. He also requires from the staff news of the enemy reaction to the operation, new minefield intelligence, revised priorities for re-

covery and repair of equipment, and any alterations in restrictions on the movement of recovery vehicles and crews. With this information he forms the current recovery plan which is the dynamic counterpart of the initial plan, which it modifies continually to meet the needs of the changing situation. He may allot additional recovery cover to some sectors, or direct certain casualties to a particular area or workshop, more routes may be available for use by recovery vehicles, new priority tasks may arise. All these and other amendments produce the current plan, which must be speedily disseminated to all concerned, a process which entails more frequently than not the use of the wireless net referred to above.

The Advance.

Having seen what organisation is required, let us now return to our mythical division advancing rapidly to contact the enemy. In a general advance no special recovery plan would be issued or required, such a situation being covered adequately by standing orders for recovery, but where the advance of a formation has a particular tactical objective a recovery plan may be required to further the operation. Under such circumstances the aim of the recovery organisation must be to maintain an even flow of vehicles and equipment and to bring forward as much of it as possible in a condition fit for battle. The features which will require particular attention are therefore route clearance and emergency repairs.

Units must be instructed to pull forward all lightly damaged equipment which their own tradesmen or those of the LAD can quickly repair on the eve of battle. All other

casualties must be ditched off the road. If possible, the latter should be recovered to areas which have been previously selected as future workshop sites, as this will avoid double handling and the inevitable minor damage associated with it, but this is subsidiary to the main aim of keeping the roads clear.


Natural or artificial defiles will require most careful consideration. These are likely objects of enemy attack, and any breakdown here will snowball rapidly and soon produce a long line of sitting ducks. The recovery teams allotted must therefore be capable of quickly pulling through any damaged equipment and thus releasing the flow of traffic once more.

If movement is to take place by night a particularly heavy load will be borne by the recovery organisation since accidental damage of greater or lesser proportions is inevitable. Where there is a high standard of convoy discipline, driver training, and unit maintenance within the division this will appreciably reduce the number of such accidents and will pay a handsome dividend in time of emergency.

In an advance of any description a close liaison between the traffic control and recovery elements is essential. They are mutually supporting and must be welded into one efficient organisation. A pooling of communication resources will be particularly advantageous.

Attack.

The division has now made contact with the enemy and, thanks to the efficiency of its recovery system, is in good shape to launch a prepared attack. This more often than not will involve the breaching



Centurion Armoured Recovery Vehicle.

of a minefield or the crossing of a river, operations which from a recovery point of view are very similar. This is because in each case the attacking troops have to be funneled through a restricted outlet before debouching at the far end and deploying for attack.

Adequate recovery teams must therefore be allotted to each gap or crossing point and positioned at the far end of these so as to be able to drag forward all equipment casualties and thus, by removing the obstruction, maintain the flow of troops and the momentum of the attack. These crews must be fed through the gaps at the earliest phase possible, and will for some time be in the forefront of the battle and under continuous enemy fire. The only suitable vehicles for them are therefore armoured recovery vehicles (ARVs). To send any thin-skinned vehicles through at this stage is a pure waste of time and may well prejudice the whole operation. To have a vehicle bogged down in a mine gap is bad enough, add to that a disabled recovery tractor, and, as the Americans would say, "Brother, have YOU got trouble!"

As the attack develops, other recovery problems will arise. At this stage, however, little constructive work can be accomplished. Recovery vehicles are large, cumbersome and expensive equipments which cannot be allowed to swan around in the middle of a battle unless some vital purpose is to be served. Apart from their value they are liable to be in everybody's way and to be regarded by the fighting troops as more of a curse than a blessing. Mobile teams to make casualties runners at the site of damage are therefore of more immediate value.

However, at the earliest opportunity recovery must begin in earnest and the "G" staff must be ready to lift restrictions on use of roads in distance and time as soon as possible. To delay in doing so is to prejudice the return of much needed equipment to sorely pressed divisions. The process should in fact be a gradual one, and as the battle proceeds recovery teams should be allowed to creep further and further forward to reduce the length of recovery hauls and speed the return of equipment to units.

We are now approaching the phase of reorganisation.

Reorganisation and Follow-Up.

During this period recovery crews are sweeping up the battle field, concentrating as far as possible on the more lightly damaged equipment which can be rapidly repaired and returned to units. The CREME may well require additional assistance from corps at such a time and may have an Infantry or Armoured Troops Recovery Unit or a section of the Army Recovery Company allotted to help him.

Having dealt with the lame ducks, the more heavily damaged equipments require attention, and sorting out into those which the division itself can repair and those which must go further down the line and require replacement. This will often be a lengthy process, in which recovery jobs may occupy many hours or even days to complete. To achieve the best results, casualties must be carefully routed so as to spread the repair load as evenly as possible over the divisional workshops, and to ensure that those which must be evacuated to corps go direct to the divisional back-loading point. Large quantities of

POL will be required, as at best recovery vehicles do few miles to the gallon and at worst may need several gallons to the mile.

Recovery areas, where casualties are collected together, must be carefully chosen to reduce the length of hauls and for development at later dates as divisional or corps workshop sites. "Z" casualties, those which are beyond the divisional repair capacity, must be quickly identified and delivered direct to the divisional back-loading point to avoid double handling and waste of effort, as already mentioned.

At this time, and also during the defensive period discussed later, there will, of course, be a steady load imposed by casualties to equipment in the administrative areas which remains fairly constant at all times. This must be allowed for in the deployment of recovery units and teams, but will generally take priority below the requirements of the fighting units.

Following up a retreating enemy presents similar recovery problems to a rapid advance and therefore needs no further elaboration.

Defence.

Our gallant division has now unfortunately over-reached itself and, losing the initiative, has been forced on to the defensive. What effect will this have upon recovery?

Initially, battlefield clearing up can be carried on apace, and when this is complete, normal routine recovery will take over. During such periods, however, out-of-the-ordinary jobs frequently arise which call for special recovery operations. As an example, in KOREA, in June, 1952, two Centurion tanks were damaged in an enemy minefield while taking part in an armoured

raid and had to be abandoned in front of the forward company positions. As these tanks were still somewhat of a mystery to the enemy, it was imperative to rescue them before they fell into his hands.

This task, which lasted several days, became a minor operation on its own. The divisional artillery provided a 25 pr. smoke screen, an infantry battalion gave covering fire, and the engineer regiment cleared a gap through our own minefields for the recovery team, who successfully brought back the two casualties. The complete job required the careful planning and timing associated with any tactical venture.

Withdrawal.

Returning again to our division hard pressed in defence. As a cog in the machine, it has now become involved in a large-scale strategic withdrawal, a distasteful operation but one which is so often desirable to enable tactical flexibility and strategic balance to be regained. What then of recovery?

This is to be a strategic operation and not a rout, an orderly progress to the rear prior to re-grouping, involving our division as one of many other units. The picture then resembles that of the advance to a considerable degree with the exception that in this case equipment must not be ditched if it is humanly possible to recover it. The old familiar problems of route clearance and defile bottlenecks arise once more and the full resources of the division must be applied to bringing back every last piece of equipment. CREME may well need, and will probably have been given, help from corps to augment his by no means lavish resources.

Route clearance is essential to avoid a large-scale hold-up at a time when the enemy may well be upon the division's tail and favourably disposed to harass the retiring columns. The resulting debris must, however, be hauled back as fast as possible. Where this is impossible, vehicles and equipment should be rendered incapable of use by the enemy but preferably left in a state such that they can quickly be put into operation again if recaptured at a later stage of the campaign. This policy of disablement should be published in divisional orders based on the advice given by the CREME.

Recovery teams following up in the rear of the main body of the division invariably pick up an accretion of stragglers and spare drivers from broken-down vehicles. They therefore require ample supplies of rations and POL, as contact with supply and POL points, will be very intermittent. As they must operate in a very independent role, contact may easily be lost and therefore they must be given clear orders of when to pull out, and well defined RVs at which to reorganise.

A carefully thought out recovery

plan is therefore required if the division is to withdraw intact and in good shape for a further offensive.

Conclusion.

It can now be seen that recovery, far from being a minor administrative matter, is more often a tactical problem involving many branches of the staff, supporting arms and services. It is one which requires careful study by formation staffs, since the dividends which an efficient organisation can pay are enormous and are available at a time when they are most urgently required.

The resources at the disposal of a CREME are very limited, and in times of emergency every vehicle and crew may well be required to operate throughout the full 24 hours of the day with little or no rest for days on end. Under such conditions, only careful planning will conserve these resources and enable the peaks of activity to be levelled off by the intelligent forecasting of probable casualty densities and the removal of restrictions on the use of recovery elements at the earliest opportunity.

BATTLE CUNNING

Major D. R. Dalglish, MC, The Royal Leicestershire Regt.

MY aim in writing this article is to try and stimulate some fresh thoughts and ideas on a subject which I have called "Battle Cunning," for want of a better expression, and which I think is of some importance and very rarely studied by the average officer.

What is meant by "Battle Cunning"? The Oxford Dictionary says a ruse is a "stratagem, feint or trick"; a person given to slyness or cunning is known as a "rusé".

A soldier who is "battle cunning" may be defined therefore as a man who is trained to outwit and out-think his enemy either by a subtle tactical manoeuvre or by the surprise use of his weapons, or both.

Many a stratagem or *ruse de guerre* as it was known in the past, has been tried out by fighting men of every race since the dawn of time. In many cases they were successful, or at any rate only those actions that were successful were recorded and handed down to posterity by the chroniclers of old. Many a battle and foray was won by surprise, that oldest principle of war. Many a ruse was not "in the book," so to speak, and some were far from being carried out according to the Marquis of Queensberry's rules, but then war was never a particularly gentle sport and even in the days of

chivalry quarter was seldom asked for and rarely given.

Warfare under modern conditions is no exception, and within reason, no holds are barred. On looking back into history many an interesting story can be found to illustrate what is meant by "battle cunning" and a few are given below.

At the Battle of Hastings, William the Conqueror was making little headway in his attacks on the well entrenched Britons who were holding a strong defensive position behind stockades; William therefore resorted to a trick. He ordered his men to feign a retreat and this they did. The Britons, thinking they had triumphed, swarmed out of their positions and rushed forward. When they were well out in the open, the Normans turned on them and won the day.

During the Crusades, a long drawn out campaign was being fought between the Christians of Europe and the infidels of Sala-a-Din. The Crusaders held a castle in Syria, the Krak de Chevalier, a formidable fortress and almost impregnable to a direct assault. (Incidentally, this fortress is still in a wonderful state of preservation.) The Saracen spies had learned that a party of reinforcements was expected to reach this castle at a given time, so Sala-a-Din

—From *Canadian Army Journal*.

ordered a body of his men to dress as Crusaders and to try and take the defenders by surprise. This they did successfully, the draw-bridge being dropped by the unsuspecting guard and the place rushed. As a matter of fact, this was the only time this famous castle was ever captured and it took this clever ruse to do it.

In 1314 at the Battle of Bannockburn, famous in Scottish history, the Scottish forces under Robert the Bruce had taken up a defensive position with their flanks well protected by natural obstacles. The Scottish commander, realising that it was unlikely that his tough pike men could withstand the direct assault of the heavy and numerous English horsemen, hit upon a plan. He ordered his men to dig a lot of holes in the ground on the only possible approach and to camouflage them with sticks and grass. The cavalry charged and came to grief as their horses stumbled and fell in the hidden pot-holes. Needless to say, the Scots won a great victory. This action can be compared to a modern tank force rushing blindly on to a hidden minefield.

At the Battle of Fontenoy, in the eighteenth century, the British regiments were drawn up in their scarlet array a short distance from the French. With the characteristic chivalry of that age the British Commander stepped forward, swept off his hat and said, in what I am sure was atrocious French, "After you, sir." He meant that the enemy had the honour of the first volley. They duly took the opportunity offered them, thinking it an advantage, but, having fired, the black smoke blew back into their faces blinding them momentarily. The British, seeing their opportunity,

carried out a spirited bayonet attack and won the day. It is thought to have been a calculated trick, the officer having noted carefully the direction of the wind!

To come to more modern times, it is strange and disconcerting to think that the British Army continues to learn from the tactics of its adversaries and is slow to think them out for itself. The German soldier was a clever tactician who did not get too stereotyped and was always trying to vary his methods of achieving surprise, often to our discomfort. He was known as a "dirty" fighter and up to all sorts of tricks. This was probably true in many cases but he could be termed also an original and quick thinking fighting man. The Japanese soldier, too, had a name for low cunning in the jungle but having learned his tricks, which he repeated often with little variety, our own men got to know what to expect and how to counter them. "Once bitten twice shy," to quote an old saying.

The story is told of a patrol of ours which "bumped" a Jap patrol in Burma. The Japs turned and fled down the trail, closely pursued by the exultant Britishers, who were drawn into a skillfully prepared ambush and only got out of a nasty situation with great difficulty. This neat and very old trick was often used by the enemy and, it is pleasing to note, later by our own men, too, with excellent results. The Germans also have used this method to draw our tanks on to hidden minefields and anti-tank guns.

During the siege of Tobruk in 1941, the 9th Australian Division, a veteran formation, had been cooped up for many months. The Germans,

judging by some captured documents, had a healthy respect for them and expressed the opinion that they were some of the best and cleverest fighters on the allied side. An Australian CO once used a good trick on a Boche parachute brigade which was holding a salient on the south-western perimeter. He staged a feint attack on one of the few commanding features in an otherwise very flat desert and got his gunners to put down a substantial smoke screen. The parachutists got jumpy, thinking an attack was coming in, and their DF came down and all hell let loose. Every MG and mortar on the front opened up. The Aussies sat back laughing and proceeded to plot every position and fixed line, as well as the exact location of their mortar and artillery DF. They made good use of this information in a later attack. It is an idea that should be remembered.

An extract from the British Army Journal of January, 1953, written by the Brigade Commander of 28th British Commonwealth Brigade (Brigadier G. Taylor, DSO) is given here ". . . and thence forward in daylight by battalions to their different assembly areas. By D-1, undetected by the enemy, six rifle companies 1 KOSB and 3 RAR lay under the hot afternoon sun on or near PT 238. *The final move had been carried out in the face of the enemy by filtering forward individual men moving seventy-five yards apart through the rough scrub and brush.*"

This manoeuvre was highly successful and the attacks went according to plan. The idea is not to be found in any military text book

that I know of and is purely the idea of an alert and practical mind.

Surprise is one principle of war that can be instilled into the minds of soldiers at all levels. It is so easy to get too stereotyped and to stick too rigidly to the training manuals. Many a ruse is never written down in them!

There are, of course, many other examples that could be quoted but there is only space for a few here. I hope the few I have given will help to emphasize my point.

To conclude, the British soldier is by his upbringing a fairly clean and honest fighter. If he is to become a good *rusé*, the techniques of "battle cunning" must be given more study. The subject should be given some study at all schools of instruction, irrespective of the arm, but particularly at Infantry Schools. All the lessons learned in the last war and in the Korean war must not be allowed to be forgotten.

On TEWTs and on field exercises at the battalion and company level, greater emphasis should be laid on all aspects of surprise and "battle cunning". The idea must not be allowed to creep in that because a certain tactical manoeuvre is unorthodox, it is, therefore, unsound and should not be tried. Provided no basic principles are broken, every encouragement should be given to commanders at all levels to think out new ways of doing old things.

The question that we must always ask ourselves is "How can I best outwit the enemy and surprise him?" If this is in the forefront of our minds at all times, there is little doubt that a more efficient all-round type of fighting man will be produced.

MARXISM - COMMUNISM RELATIONSHIPS - PART 3

RECENT USSR ASPECTS

Lieutenant N. G. Maloy, BEc., AASA,
Royal Australian Army Ordnance Corps.

THE generalization seems justified that more liberal practices grow during periods of substantial external security and internal prosperity, whilst the dictatorial and centralists aspects would become accentuated in periods of actual or fancied threats from outside, and material straits within" (Political Power in the USSR—J. Towster). It is felt that the reason for Russia's dictatorial communism is to be found in the above statement and, that it is not an unavoidable result of Marx's dialectical process and historical materialism, as fancied by the Russian leaders.

The circumstances leading up to the establishment of the dictatorship of the Communist Party in the USSR have been discussed in the previous parts of this series. Its method of operation within that country will now be looked at.

The Soviet Constitution.

The Soviet constitution contains provisions which purport to outline the nature and distribution of political power in Russia. However, the constitution is extremely flexible

and is merely a record of what has been done in the past, and is not designed to be a programme of what is to be done in the future. Also, like most written constitutions, it does not represent the sole source of derivation of power.

Under its provisions the constitution is not required to be presented to the people for a direct popular vote for acceptance or rejection. The power to interpret it is vested in the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and because the Communist Party is the prime mover of change in the constitution, it would appear that the Soviet masses have no means to control the decisions of the state. It should be noted, however, that the draft of the 1936 constitution was submitted to the people and as a result of suggestions received 43 amendments were made to it.

The Communist Party.

It is asserted by the Communists that although there is only one party in Russia the party leaders are able to determine what the rank and file want through the party cells, the

Soviets, the trade unions and the co-operatives, and that the leaders are only interested in putting their wishes into effect. But the Communist Party controls all these agencies through which the wishes of the people are supposedly ascertained, and any attempts to put forward views that are contrary to those of the official leaders can be suppressed. It is also argued that in capitalistic multi-party countries the choice given to the people is merely one of deciding the group of capitalists who will exploit the people next.

All decisions of any consequence are made by the Politbureau of the Party. These decisions become the party line, which all must follow or be subject to severe penalties. The constitutional provision for free speech, press, and assembly becomes meaningless as no one is permitted to exercise them in opposition to the Party. All avenues of publicity—press, radio, schools, etc.—are at the service of the Communist Party, and are closed to opposition groups, and therefore any expression of will contrary to that of the party cannot be effectively carried out.

Suppression of capitalists, as class enemies, is to be expected in the carrying out of the programme as envisaged by Marx and during the dictatorship of the proletariat, but, where is the reason to be found in the liquidation of fellow communists—members of the proletariat?—and this is a part of Russian history! Is it that someone has to be made the scapegoat, irrespective of class, to cover up the failings of the regime. Because control of the courts is also with the party, opposition to the party line to any degree is dangerous.

Governmental Sub-Divisions.

The highest organ of state power is the Supreme Soviet¹, and the Presidium is the executive committee of the Supreme Soviet. The Presidium is in effect a collective president and between sessions of the Supreme Soviet it has full power. It can nullify any decision or orders of cabinet, i.e., the All-Union Council of Ministers, and of the Council of Republics.

The Presidium can also appoint, or dismiss, All-union members, can declare war and award titles, decorations, etc. Its decisions are required to be ratified by the Supreme Soviet at its next session, but as the leading members of the Soviet are elected to the Presidium this ratification is always likely to be given—and, in fact, is certain to be given, as the Communist Party controls both the Supreme Soviet and the Presidium.

The USSR consists of a number of republics, each with its own administrative sub-divisions of provincial, city and village units. The only limits to the sovereignty of the republics is the power granted to the All-union government. The republics have now been granted the right to enter into direct foreign relations and to raise their own armies. This also appears meaningless, as it is unlikely that any republic would adopt a foreign or military policy that differed to any degree from that of the All-union government.

The State.

It was disclosed in "Marx" (Part 1 of this series) that Marx believed that the state existed because an

1. The election held in the USSR on March 15 was for the purpose of electing members to the Supreme Soviet.

tagonistic classes existed and that once the classless society was achieved there would be no further need for the State. If, as Communists aver, the USSR has attained a classless society, why does that country endeavour to increase the power of the State in the form of the Communist Party? The answer is that Marx intended his "Utopia" to be world wide and until world communism is achieved, by conversion and liquidation, the State, in its "dictatorship of the proletariat" form, must remain. If the State should remain for the purpose just given, for what purpose should it remain in its present form, i.e., in complete dictatorship suppressing other institutions? I suggest that one of the functions of State is the critic of other institutions and its influence should go no further than is necessary to ensure that these other institutions are not carrying out their functions in a way that would result in general harm. For example, it is not a function of the State to put forward religious dogma, but it would be a function of the State to ensure that the churches do not prejudice any common interests. The State should be based upon equal citizenship, and maintain interests which are most general, not the rights common to certain sections of the community. Other organizations should not behave so as to affect the rights of other citizens.

Certain types of social activity need to be standard, but by their nature do not submit to compulsory State authority, e.g., religious matters and matters of personal morality. You can't make a man moral by legislation!

I feel the question to be asked is "What is it the State alone can do

—or do best," or "What cannot the State do best?" I cannot see the truth is the answers the USSR has given to these questions, but the questions remain. However, the State as it exists in the USSR tallies with Marx at least to the extent that he believed that "force," not "will," is the means of its operation. "Will" is the basis of other institutions, and history has shown that the only results of attempted suppression will be to put them "underground," e.g., persecution of the church in the USSR and other Communist countries has obtained no greater results than this.

Conclusion.

So-called popular participation in Government in the USSR cannot be compared with popular participation as known in other western countries. For example, there is citizen participation in elections in the USSR, but what is the people's choice—"To vote or not to vote"? "To vote for the Communist party or take a trip to the salt mines"?

The principle of popular election, as democratic countries know it, was rejected by Stalin when he rejected an amendment to the 1936 draft constitution which required the Chairman of the Presidium to be elected by the people rather than by the Supreme Soviet.

We can expect to see a strengthening of the Soviet State, or at least a maintenance of it in its present form, because world communism has not been achieved. Sight must not be lost of the fact that world communism is the aim of the Communist Party and the methods being used in an endeavour to achieve it are varied. Mr. Malenkov was quoted in a recent Sydney

newspaper as saying that the USSR desired peace and friendly relationships with Capitalistic countries. Can this statement be reconciled with the fact that USSR-maintained communists are involved in open warfare, as in Indo-China, and are carrying on a ceaseless infiltration through trade unions, etc., on a world-wide scale? A certain degree of reconciliation is possible in the knowledge that Marx taught that capitalists should be used to strengthen the communist cause until the time is ripe for the overthrow of the Capitalistic system. If Mr. Malenkov does not consider the time ripe for world communism, then his plea for peaceful relationships with Capitalistic countries is

understandable, in the interests of the USSR, until that time arrives.

Countries with low living standards and internal strife are the breeding grounds for communism, and the USSR is not slow to take the initiative. Ample evidence is available in the cases of Korea, China, Indo-China, Malaya and so on.

My conclusion, therefore, is that freedom-loving countries must continually endeavour to build up living standards, be tolerant towards those institutions that do not harm the general good, give all possible aid to those countries less fortunate, and maintain a solidarity amongst themselves as an immunity against the plague of Communism.

There are five matters which leaders must carefully consider: first, reason; second, preparation; third, determination; fourth, vigilance; fifth, simplicity.

—*The Sayings of Wutzu.*

THE WOMEN'S ROYAL AUSTRALIAN ARMY CORPS



THE war-time Women's Services which provided the basis on which to build the Women's Royal Australian Army Corps of the Australian Regular Army were the Australian Women's Army Service and, to a lesser degree, the Australian Army Medical Women's Service.

The Australian Army Women's Service, raised in 1942, grew to a maximum strength of 20,000, and in every phase of its activities proved an invaluable addition to the Australian Military Forces during the 1939-45 war. By June, 1947, when the Service was completely demobi-

lized, its members had served in many branches and sections of the Army doing jobs formerly done by men, and doing these jobs as efficiently as the men whom they had released for field duties.

The first recruit training schools which were set up in each State were held in January and February, 1942. NCO schools were next established and in October, 1942, the AWAS Officers' School—later to become the Army Women's Services Officers' School for training AWAS and AAMWS officer students, was inaugurated. Technical training ranging from semi-skilled to highly specialized trades was undertaken.

The area of service of AWAS was restricted to Australia, where members served all over the Commonwealth as far north as Atherton and Cairns in Queensland, to Western Australia and through Central Australia and the Northern Territory. In May, 1945, a small draft moved to New Guinea to serve on First Army HQ at Lae.

The formation of the Australian Army Medical Women's Service late in 1942, was brought about by the shortage of manpower in the Army Medical Services. Approximately 1,100 members of the Voluntary Aid Detachments, an organization which

had been given official recognition by the Australian Government in 1916, were enrolled for full time duty with the Australian Army Medical Corps during 1941 and the first half of 1942. Because VADs were trained only for nursing orderly duties and the AAMC required women for all suitable trades in medical units, it was decided that VADs and other suitable women should be enlisted and trained in the Army in the same way as the AWAS.

The duties carried out by the members of the AAMWS covered medical trades and administrative general duties, cooking, laundry, etc. They formed an essential part of the staffs in AGHs, camp hospitals, RAPs, convalescent depots, hospital laundries, dental clinics, blood banks, and other units.

This Service was not completely disbanded after the war, but carried on in small numbers through the Interim Army period. In July, 1949, approval was given for the employment in the Regular Army of members of the AAMWS for the performance of essential hospital and medical duties associated with their calling. However, the authority for enlistment of AAMWS was held over pending the preparation of a proposal dealing with the employment of women in all branches of the Regular Army.

In February, 1951, it was decided that AAMWS would be discontinued as a separate service. Women for duty as nursing and ward orderlies and as theatre assistants were absorbed into the newly formed Royal Australian Army Nursing Corps. Those engaged in other trades were later absorbed into the WRAAC.

July, 1948, to July, 1951.

In accordance with Government policy, the Australian Women's Army Service had been completely disbanded in June, 1947.

With the aim of developing in peace-time a nucleus for expansion in war, consideration was given to the re-introduction into the Regular Army of the Australian Women's Army Service for duties other than those which were being carried out by the AANS and AAMWS. It had been proved during war-time that the manpower situation made the enlistment of women essential in war, particularly in base organizations. In addition to those considerations the manpower position during the Interim Army period presented great difficulties to some Corps in particular, such as Signals, and the enlistment of women would overcome some of these serious deficiencies.

A proposal to enlist women into the Army was therefore made to the Minister for the Army, and the approval of Cabinet was given on 13 July, 1950.

Plan for Introduction of Women's Services.

It was decided that the Women's service known throughout the war-time years as the Australian Women's Army Service would become the Women's Australian Army Corps (WAAC).

The primary principle accepted was that women would replace men on a rank for rank basis on the HQs, Staff, Services and Fixed installations in vacancies suitable for women. The types of employment were based on duties carried out by women during war-time.

The conditions of service laid down for officers made provision for

appointment in the rank of Lieutenant, but officers on the Reserve could be appointed in the rank they held during the war if appropriate vacancies existed. Other ranks were to be enlisted in the rank of private, except that women who had previously held rank were eligible for enlistment with that temporary rank provided the vacancies existed.

Organization and Administration of WAAC.

The Corps was to be administered by a Director, WAAC, at Army Headquarters, with Assistant-Directors in each State at the Command Headquarters. The principles observed in the organization and administration of the Corps were that:—

The Director, WAAC, would be responsible to the Adjutant-General for advice on general policy and for the efficient direction of the WAAC. Similarly, Assistant Directors, WAAC, would be appointed to the HQ of Commands, to be the representatives of the Director, WAAC, and be responsible to the GOC Command for advice on all matters affecting the WAAC and for the efficient direction of the Corps.

WAAC personnel posted to other Corps for duty retained their identity as members of the WAAC.

Discipline of members of the WAAC would be the responsibility of WAAC officers.

The WAAC was to include all women in the Army except for those enlisted in or appointed to the Royal Australian Army Nursing Corps.

Appointment and Enlistment of Personnel.

Lieutenant-Colonel Kathleen Best

was appointed as Director, WAAC, and began duty at Army Headquarters on 12 February, 1951. Between April and July, 1951, recruiting began in all States except Western Australia and Tasmania, where recruiting did not begin until January, 1952.

Change of Corps Designation.

In June, 1951, His Majesty King George VI approved the grant of the title "Royal" to the WAAC and the Corps designation was changed to Women's Royal Australian Army Corps (WRAAC).

Appointment of Honorary Colonel.

On 15 June, 1951, approval was granted for the appointment of Colonel Sybil Irving, MBE, Reserve of Officers (AWAS), as Honorary Colonel of the Women's Royal Australian Army Corps.

Uniform.

In May, 1951, approval was given for the provision of the now well-known Highland green uniform. The selected colour with the gilt and silver Corps badges and the gilt buttons followed closely upon the adoption by the WRAC of the British Army of a similar uniform for ceremonial and walking-out occasions.

The black accessories are worn with both the green winter uniform and the fawn linen summer frock.

Corps Badge.

The Corps badge, worn on the lapels of the green jacket, the green beret and fawn summer hat, consists of the stars of the Southern Cross on a silver lozenge surrounded with gilt gum leaves, and surmounted by St. Edward's Crown. The whole is mounted above a gilt scroll con-

taining the letters of the Corps—WRAAC.

The Corps Badge is worn by both ARA and CMF personnel.

Development and Strength of WRAAC.

By October, 1951, the original object of enlisting 251 women had been achieved, but the original restricted range of trades and duties for which women could be enlisted had proved to be a disadvantage in two respects. Firstly, it had prevented the enlistment of many women who were suitable but whose qualifications could not be used; and secondly, the Army at that time was having difficulty in finding recruits suitable for employment in certain trades and duties. Approval was therefore given in October, 1951, for the WRAAC to expand to a maximum strength of 1,000, and for a greater increase in the types of employment for which women could be enlisted. In addition to such duties for the WRAAC as transport driving, cooking and clerical tasks, there appeared less familiar duties such as those of Interpreter, Cipher operator, Psychological Coder, Draughtswoman, Projectionist and Dental Operating Room Assistant.

In June, 1952, the maximum permissible strength of WRAAC was raised to 1,320, but in August, 1952, a restriction was placed on that figure and it was decided that an interim strength of 950 all ranks would not be exceeded at this stage.

Training of Corps Personnel. WRAAC Training Company.

The first course of WRAAC recruit training began on 9 July, 1951. The courses during 1951 were of only

three weeks' duration, which was quite inadequate.

From September, 1951, WRAAC recruit training was centralized at Lonsdale Bight in Victoria and two platoons of a WRAAC Training Company were raised to train a maximum of 84 recruits. This limitation in numbers was governed by shortage of accommodation. The duration of the course was first extended to four weeks, and at a later date to six weeks. The WRAAC Training Company changed its location to Crow's Nest Camp in Queenscliff, Victoria, in July, 1952.

NCO Courses of training were first introduced in 1951 when two courses were conducted at the WRAAC Training Company.

WRAAC School.

On 17 January, 1952, approval was given for the formation of the WRAAC School, to consist of a Headquarters and two training wings, one of which was to be an officer cadet wing, and the other a general wing. This unit is now located at Mildura.

The WRAAC School provides for Officer, WO and NCO training. Officer training began in January, 1952, with a six weeks' course of refresher training for eight officers selected from the Reserve. This was followed in March, 1952, by an Officer Qualifying Course which was attended by eight students, two of whom were officers from the Reserve on refresher training, while the remaining six students were potential officers from the ranks.

Officer Cadets are selected from serving members in the ranks of the WRAAC and from applicants direct from civil life. The courses cover a period of twenty-four weeks.

WRAAC Barracks.

WRAAC Barracks have been provided in each State except Tasmania to provide accommodation for WRAAC members who should for various reasons live in.

Citizen Military Forces (WRAAC).

The introduction of the WRAAC in the CMF, approved in December, 1951, was based on the need to establish in peace a nucleus for expansion in war, since the WRAAC (ARA) alone would not provide a strong enough foundation for quick expansion for a Corps of the size that would be needed.

The scope and scale of employment of the WRAAC (CMF) is based as far as possible on the essential trades required for expansion particularly on outbreak of war, but the main requirement is for potential leaders in all grades. Recruiting began in June, 1953.

The WRAAC (CMF) is being raised in all States except the Northern Territory, as entirely separate companies not integrated with the male CMF. Each company has an ARA cadre.

The first year of training is confined to recruit training, and during this time the trade or duty for which these women will be most suited is determined. The second year of training is carried out in conjunction with the particular Corps for which the member is selected.

Appointment of Colonel-in-Chief.

Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second approved on 1 June, 1953, the appointment of Her Royal Highness the Princess Margaret as Colonel-in-Chief of the Women's Royal Australian Army Corps.

WRAAC Representation in Coronation Contingent.

One officer and two other ranks were selected for the Army Component of the 1953 Coronation Contingent. On 9 March, 1953, they marched out for training prior to embarkation on 31 March, 1953.

WRAAC Overseas Training.

In 1952 a WRAAC officer was nominated to attend No. 4 Course WRAC Staff College, United Kingdom, commencing 15 January, 1953, and concluding June, 1953. This officer successfully completed the course.

A second officer is at present attending No. 6 Course.

Royal Visit.

During the recent visit of Her Majesty and His Royal Highness to Australia, members of the WRAAC, both ARA and CMF, took part in street-lining in all capital cities and some provincial centres and acted as Royal Car Orderlies at many official functions.

Regimental March.

Towards the end of 1953 the Regimental March "Soldiers of the Queen" was approved for the WRAAC.

Sport.

Many types of physical and recreational sports and games are played by members of the WRAAC. In most Commands WRAAC teams compete in civilian associations. This, together with inter-unit and inter-Service competitions, has developed a keenness and enthusiasm for all types of sporting activities.

History and the Military Profession

Brigadier-General Paul M. Robinett,
United States Army (Ret.)

Many of us are prone to think that the study of military history is confined to the study of actual military operations with a view to deducing lessons in the application of the Principles of War. The author of this article shows that military history has a much wider and deeper application, that certain aspects of the subject are as important to the junior leader as are other aspects to the generals and statesmen responsible for the higher direction of war. Although the examples quoted are mostly drawn from American history, the Australian officer, particularly the regimental officer, will be able to find similar examples in the records of his own unit.—Editor.

THE value of history in military education has always been recognized in the United States Army, as in most armies. It has been at the very base of instruction in the Military Academy and the service schools and colleges since their inception. In this emphasis on the value of history in military instruction, the American Army has followed the advice of such great

—From "Military Review," U.S.A.

captains as Frederick the Great and Napoleon, as well as others who have more recently made their mark on the pages of history. Napoleon has written, ". . . the knowledge of the higher arts of war is not acquired except by experience and the study of history of wars and the battles of great captains." General George S. Patton, Jr., one of America's great offensive battle leaders, also emphasized the importance of history. His words, written on the battlefield, were. "To be a successful soldier you must know history, read it objectively—dates and even minute details of tactics are useless. . . . You must [also] read biography and especially autobiography. If you will do it you will find war is simple."

There are dissenters from this point of view, however. Marshal Wavell, for one, holds that the study of psychology and leadership are of greater importance to a military man than the study of operations, contending that Napoleon's military success can be attributed to his knowledge of psychology rather than to his study of rules and strategy. And Le Bon, who was not a military man, has condemned histories on general principle, ob-

-serving that "they are fanciful accounts of ill-observed facts accompanied by explanations the result of reflection" and that the writing "of such books is a most absolute waste of time."

Notwithstanding these opinions, which are not without value as a challenge to historians, it must be concluded that the study of past wars is fundamental to preparation for the next, for current military problems cannot be solved without an understanding of the past from which they stem. Every individual in the military service, from the basic private to the Chief of Staff of the Army, will find a knowledge of military history, and especially of American military history, valuable in the solution of problems, both in peace and in war. Heeding the inscription carved in stone at the entrance to the National Archives—"What is past is prologue"—the soldier must be rooted in the past to understand the present that he may project himself into the future.

Esprit de Corps.

The accomplishments of the United States Army in both peace and war are so outstanding that every soldier can gain inspiration from the record of the past even though still imperfectly told. During the comparatively short span of American history, the Army has fought brave and skillful soldiers of many races and in many lands. These operations have ranged from desperate hand-to-hand engagements with savages, equipped with bows and arrows and tomahawks or spears and bolos, to vast battles with armies landing in the face of modern forces and driving them back to the centre of their empires.

The Army has also played an outstanding role in discovery and exploration; in great engineering undertakings that have joined the oceans, developed ports and harbours, harnessed and controlled rivers, and developed the atom bomb; in medicine and hygiene; and in communications and aviation. It has also been the training ground of scholars, scientists, administrators, educators, diplomats, and statesmen who have made great contributions to every phase of American life.

A knowledge of its accomplishments can play a vital role in the development of *esprit de corps* in the Army. But as Fortescue, the eminent British military historian, has said:

Without knowledge of military history men are really unconscious of the existence of the most wonderful of moral forces . . . ; and it is not a thing of which anyone can afford to be ignorant.

In line with Fortescue's warning, the United States Army has called upon military history in many ways. In the Information and Education Programme, the soldiers are informed of past heroic deeds and accomplishments of individuals and units and are furnished *The Soldier's Guide*, containing historical material. Army posts are generally named for widely-known military men; buildings and streets for others, or for military organizations. Colours and standards are decorated with streamers carrying the names of battles or campaigns in which the unit has honourably participated. For many years *Retreat* has included *The Star Spangled Banner*, which was inspired under the "rocket's red glare." In many units,

mounts and vehicles have borne the names of distinguished soldiers of the past. Such things can be turned to advantage by those who will take the trouble to weld the deeds and records of the past to the task in hand and, if successfully accomplished, the Army-in-being will live and function in the best traditions of the past.

Morale.

In speaking on morale in modern war, General of the Army George C. Marshall once said:

The soldier's heart, the soldier's spirit, the soldier's soul, are everything. Unless the soldier's soul sustains him he cannot be relied on and will fail himself and his commander and his country in the end.

It is not enough to fight. It is the spirit which we bring to the fight that decides the issue. It is morale that wins the victory.

Morale is the state of mind. It is steadfastness and courage and hope. It is confidence and zeal and loyalty. It is elan, esprit de corps and determination.

It is staying power, the spirit which endures to the end—the will to win.

With it all things are possible, without it everything else, planning, preparation, production, count for naught.

General Marshall's thoughts are of the individuals who collectively make up a unit and the entire Army.

General William T. Sherman has given his views on the importance of the spiritual side of the Army in these words from *Personal Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman*:

There is a soul to an army as well as to individual men, and no general

can accomplish the full work of his army unless he commands the soul of his men, as well as their bodies and legs.

General Patton, a profound student of military history and leadership, on several occasions during World War II also noted the unit soul, physically symbolized by the colours and standards.

It can thus be seen that both Sherman and Patton broadened the concept to include the unit as well as the individual in the broader problems of morale. They thought of the individuals of a unit welded together by a leader and given a common soul. The creation of this unit soul is the continuing problem of all commanders from the lowest to the highest, and the problem becomes more difficult when economy and military administration abolish the props which support the commander. But, regardless of handicaps, the quality of a leader is the true criterion of the soul of a unit. He is the one who must inspire the individuals of the outfit and weld them into a whole capable of withstanding all hardships and sacrifices so beautifully illustrated by Captain Nathan Hale as he stood on the enemy's gallows on the morning of September 22, 1776, and said: "I only regret that I have but one life to lose for my country."

At the very base of the problem of morale is patriotism or love of country—the cement that binds a people together and sustains their armies. Without it neither the people nor the Army has a soul. In writing about patriotism, General Ian Hamilton, in his *The Soul and Body of An Army*, said that it is

a plant whose best nutriment is blood and tears: a plant which dies

down in peace and flowers most brightly in war. It does not calculate, does not profiteer, does not stop to reason: in an atmosphere of danger the sap begins to stir; it lives, it takes possession of the soul.

A truly great military historian will capture this spirit which plays such an important role in the outcome of battles, campaigns, and wars. A mere recitation of events will fail to probe the depths of the brew and is of little value to leaders of men.

Intangible Symbols and Morale.

Intangible symbols of the unit's past consist of customs and traditions around which the outfit builds distinctive special observances and practices. Examples of these are almost endless in number and variety. Some of the most widely practised are the celebration of important unit anniversaries, minor distinctions of drill and command, and distinctive greetings and replies. For example, an individual of the 13th Cavalry, on receiving an order or instructions, would salute and reply before departing, "It shall be done." The 7th Cavalry once included saddled but riderless Comanche, the lone survivor of the Battle of the Little Big Horn, in its parades. In 1922, the 3rd Infantry Regiment was granted permission to march on all ceremonial occasions with fixed bayonets in honour of its gallant assault with the bayonet at the battle of Cerro Gordo on April 18, 1847.

It is a mistake to try to invent a tradition or to initiate the observance by a unit of some custom merely read or heard about. To be really meaningful a custom must originate spontaneously out of some battle event or important experience

of the unit. Even such an incident is not likely to grow into a custom unless it is spontaneously passed along and repeated. It is well for the unit to be alert for instances, spontaneous remarks that "catch on" in the unit, and other happenings that might be made the basis for future ceremonial observance. Before many years have passed, the observance may well grow to the stature of tradition or even take on a more tangible form. Many examples showing how incidents of service have been perpetuated can be cited.

Lieutenant-General Winfield Scott was a colourful leader with ability to express himself in words that have become the heritage of units that once served under his command. After the fall of Chapultepec, September 13, 1847, the 3rd Infantry Regiment was put at the head of the column making formal entrance into Mexico City. Mounted with his staff, General Scott waited for the procession in the outskirts. When the 3rd Infantry came abreast, Scott, in a dramatic gesture, swept off his hat and said to his staff, "Gentlemen, take off your hats to the Old Guard." This nickname has persisted and is in use today. On the same occasion, he addressed the Regiment of Mounted Rifles as follows, "Brave Rifles! Veterans! You have been baptized in fire and blood and come out steel." Since that time the regiment has proudly called itself "Brave Rifles" and its unit insignia is emblazoned with that name.

The 13th Infantry earned its name, "First at Vicksburg," as a result of the gallantry displayed by its 1st Battalion on May 19, 1863. On that day, in a frontal assault, the 13th

planted and maintained its colours on the Confederate parapet for as long as the attack persisted. In doing so, it lost more than 43 per cent. of its men. Authorization for the unit to inscribe this motto on its colours came from a board of officers of the XV Corps on August 12, 1863.

The 19th Infantry has for its motto, "Rock of Chickamauga." It earned this name while serving in the corps commanded by Major General George H. Thomas in the Battle of Chickamauga. Stationed on the left of General Thomas's line of September 19, the regiment bore the brunt of the fiercest assaults. The next day, when their ammunition was exhausted, the men held their ground with bayonets. Seventy-five per cent. of the regiment was killed or wounded. At length the command devolved on a second lieutenant. To commemorate this incident, it later became the custom for the junior second lieutenant of the 19th Infantry to command the regiment on each Organization Day, September 20.

Another example originated with the proud remark of an unknown soldier during the Civil War. During that war certain corps had adopted distinctive badges, a custom which has continued in the United States Army. But the XV Corps, commanded by Major General John A. Logan, had not done so. One of the men of the corps, on being asked what his badge was, replied, "Forty rounds in the cartridge-box, and twenty in the pocket!" On hearing the story, General Logan promptly adopted the cartridge-box and forty rounds as the corps-badge.

One of the most effective intangible symbols is a unit march or

song, particularly one that has been associated with the outfit for a long time. Most of the older regiments have these songs or marches. The 7th Cavalry's *Garry Owen* is an example of a song that has contributed materially to the morale of that regiment for many years. With the passing of the regimental bands, however, a special effort will be required to preserve such songs and marches. The different arms and services also have many good songs and marches, and there are others of Army-wide interest. Perhaps the most famous of the branch songs is Lieutenant Edmund L. Gruber's *The Caisson Song*. In a much more important way, *The Star Spangled Banner* and *Battle Hymn of the Republic* have played an outstanding role in developing morale in the Armed Forces since they appeared. New songs and marches originating spontaneously within the Army from time to time can also play an important part in the development of morale in units, in the arms or services, or in the Army as a whole.

Unit History and Morale.

The colour-bearing units are the military families within which the broader soul of the Army is built. It is these families which the division commander, without infringing upon subordinates, welds into a composite team. These units are corporate entities having a legal existence even though their actual personnel may vary from war strength, when on active service, to zero when on an inactive status. Therefore, every unit has its own history, which is distinct from all others. It may have a history extending back before the founding of the Republic, a brief history, or, in the case of new units, no history at all.

In any case, however, each unit shares the history of the United States Army. Any unit, therefore, can utilize pride in the Army's past accomplishments to foster soldierly conduct, pride of outfit, and love of country. Newer outfits, like younger brothers, should strive to excel their seniors.

If the organization is in garrison, histories of the United States, of the United States Army, of appropriate campaigns, and of the unit, if available, and *The Medal of Honour of the United States Army* should be in the company reading and recreation rooms. If practicable, condensed versions of the unit history should be prepared and issued to each individual upon joining the organization. In any case, it is desirable for the commanding officer to inform new men, before they enter upon their duties, of the records of heroes who have gone before, and of the unit's and the Army's accomplishments.

Leadership.

Leadership being the very foundation upon which a successful military career is built, it behoves all officers to study it assiduously. They can best do so by studying the general principles of leadership and then by critically reading the biographies and memoirs of past military leaders with a view to determining the reasons for their successes and failures. But it is not enough merely to make an analysis of the qualities and methods of past leaders. The qualities and methods others have displayed are unique to the individuals concerned; they are not entirely suited to any other. Nevertheless, they can teach an individual of judgment what to avoid

and what to emulate and can help him shape and develop his own qualities for the better. To do so, however, it is essential that the individual add the experiences of others to his own and acquire qualities and methods suited to himself.

Although there is a paucity of good biographies and memoirs, particularly in the lower echelons of command, this material is the best available for an understanding of character, of the characteristics of men, of good and bad leadership, and of the influence of eminent personalities upon events. Military works dealing with the rank and file, such as Bolton's *The Private Soldier Under Washington* and Wiley's *Billy Yank*, should be read with the realization that bad soldiers tend to leave many documents behind them, while good soldiers leave only the briefest sort of records or merely a name. For this reason even so-called "factual studies" of the fighting men are usually heavily loaded on the seamy side of life.

If study is to be profitable, the student must analyze, evaluate, and judge the qualities of both fighting men and leaders, with due regard to the circumstances and conditions under which they worked. But, as Wilkinson has said, "This judgment must never degenerate into mere negative criticism. . . ." It should enable the thoughtful student to determine and to identify in others the desirable traits of soldiers and leaders in both staff and command positions. This should enable a military man to become a practical psychologist, but should not lead him to become pedantic or academic. As Clausewitz has pointed out, a commander

need not be a close observer of men, a sharp dissector of human character, but he must know the character, the feelings, the habits, the peculiar faults and inclinations of those whom he is to command.

To be of maximum value in teaching military leadership, historical works must be factual and frank. Propagandistic history or censored history is dangerous and should not be used as the basis of instruction in military schools or in training. Such history is not history at all. It can provide no sound lessons or basis of intellectual and professional training. It leads to false conclusions. And it fosters one of the worst evils in professional military thinking—self-deception. Histories written during the lives of the actors or too near their era are generally tinged with prejudice, coloured by self-interested flattery, and influenced by the selective treatment of source material. Histories written too long after the time of the participants are frequently fictional or sentimental. History cannot, therefore, serve as an entirely satisfactory basis for instruction in leadership until it portrays the participants' whole—their merits and deficiencies, their temperaments, doubts, ambitions, their *Janus* faces, their tensions and contrasts, and their physical and mental conditions.

Although the study of great captains is important to all military men, the study of "followership," as exemplified by subordinate leaders and staff officers, is equally important and perhaps more so because few can rise to the topmost position and even these must pass through the various grades in both staff and command assignments. General Malin Craig, former Chief of Staff

of the United States Army, emphasized this aspect of a military career in this advice to a graduating class at the United States Military Academy:

No young officer can be unconscious of the impression he is making on others. And yet he would be wrong to govern his conduct solely by the opinions of others. First of all he must to himself be true. Fortunately, by a happy paradox of human nature we best serve ourselves when we think only of serving others. An officer . . . should make it a cardinal principle of life that by no act of commission or omission on his part will he permit his immediate superior to make a mistake. Once an officer establishes such a professional reputation his future is assured. His services will be eagerly sought and his assignment to duties of the highest importance is certain.

A comprehensive knowledge of military history, emphasizing both leadership and followership, will facilitate mutual respect and understanding in the Armed Forces; the broad problems of the higher commanders will be more readily comprehended by subordinates, and the complex human, material, and physical problems of the soldier and of the small-unit commanders better appreciated by superiors.

Instruction and Training.

Military history is the very foundation of our knowledge of tactics and strategy. It is also the foundation on which the theoretical and practical training of troops and the development of training directives are based. It gives life to the bare bones of facts and regulations. An instructor who is not grounded in military history appropriate to the

level of his instruction is dry and pedantic and will accomplish no great results. On the other hand, one who not only knows the principles, but who also can illustrate them with historical examples, giving facts concerning troops, commanders, weapons, supply, communications, terrain, and weather, can give life to his instruction and make it useful.

This is just as true in troop training as in formal instruction in military schools. Above all else, however, military history gives an interesting and deep insight into the minds and hearts of military men, into tactical and strategical methods, procedures, and principles, and into the relations between war, politics, economy, philosophy, geography, and the mentality of nations and races.

If military history is to be of greatest value in instruction and training, it must be more than a logical, factual record or account of events. After the facts have been synthesized into an effective record, there is a final step in the project—the analysis of the facts and the formulation of conclusions based on that analysis. This last step can be taken only by one who is both well grounded in historiography and professionally qualified to deal with the military organization and the operations recorded. In dealing with these subjects at the higher levels, the analyst must have a knowledge of national policy of the higher organization for war, of military geography of strategy and grand tactics, of logistics and techniques of the combined arms, and of weapons. At the lower levels of military organization and operations, the analyst must have a know-

ledge of troop psychology, of weapons, of terrain, of weather and climate, and of tactics, logistics, and techniques of the combined arms.

Changes in Tactics and Techniques.

One of the most important lessons a military student can learn from history is the necessity of quickly recognizing the changes in tactics and techniques which are indicated during the course of a war, and especially during the meeting engagement. It is at these times that secret weapons and differences in tactics and techniques show up most clearly and require immediate adjustment to conditions on the battlefield. History teaches that commanders must react quickly to the new conditions and, at the same time, transmit information to higher commanders concerning the circumstances and occurrences on the battlefield which indicate a need for changes in equipment, tactics, and techniques. The study of the initial phases of military operations deserves special attention. These are periods that mark the introduction of new weapons, new tactics, or inexperienced troops; that involve a sudden shift in type of terrain, in defensive arrangements, in weather, or in seasonal conditions. It is during these periods that faulty organization, inadequate or impractical training, inefficient weapons, failure of leadership and communications, inadequate logistical support, faulty co-ordination of the various arms, unforeseen effect of weather and terrain, rumours, and many other factors, some almost intangible, create a state of confusion which should challenge every military student. Knowledge gained through a study of the initial phases

of past operations will pay untold dividends to those who may be involved later in similar situations.

Learning From Experience.

A military student should not allow personal experience on the battlefield to limit his point of view, but should add to it the experiences of others. Conclusions and principles based on a single personal experience or an inadequate preparation in military history are very dangerous. Ardant du Picq, a profound student of combat, has expressed the matter in another way in his *Battle Studies*. In a questionnaire submitted to contemporaries he said:

Whoever has seen, turns to a method based on his knowledge, his personal experience as a soldier. But experience is long and life is short. The experiences of each cannot therefore be completed except by those of others.

In short, a careful study of objective military history with an open mind and with the determination of learning from the experiences of others will be of great benefit to any military student.

The principles of strategy have been evolved from an analytical study of many wars. They are based on a great many experiences of the past and are immutable. "Consequently," as General Douglas MacArthur has said, "the Army extends its analytical interest to the dust-buried accounts of wars long past as well as to those still reeking with the scent of battle," with the object of the search dictating the field for its pursuit.

In the field of tactics and techniques, doctrine based on personal experience or the experience of

others is apt to lead to error, for, as General MacArthur has also said:

In every age these [tactics] are decisively influenced by the characteristics of weapons currently available and by the means at hand for manoeuvring, supplying, and controlling combat forces.

Leadership, organization, communications, training, morale, terrain, weather and climatic conditions, and the enemy will also differ as well as many other things. Peacetime tactical doctrine, therefore, can be determined only by a process of reasoning, by studying experiences of others in the most recent wars, and by experimentation. When doctrine has been subjected to test in actual battle, it should be quickly readjusted to conform to reality and kept in step with conditions during the entire course of operations.

Learning From the Vanquished.

Upon the conclusion of a war, the victors decide how they should organize and equip for the future. They base their conclusions on their own experiences, which, no matter how great, are limited. It might be said that the victors reorganize on the basis of considerable self-esteem, attributing their success to better organization, equipment, training and leadership, while the vanquished reorganize on the basis of considerable humility, analyzing events and determining and eliminating weaknesses with the intention of defeating the recent enemy. Military progress is, therefore, slow among the victors because conceit and complacency too often have the upper hand. The vanquished, however, looking further ahead, build new organization and new equipment.

This lesson should be carefully heeded by the United States: having won all the wars in which she has engaged, she is in a certain degree of danger because history reveals that military victory has frequently contained the seeds of weakness, deficiencies in co-ordination, training, discipline and leadership, inefficiencies in organization and logistical arrangements, inadequacies of intelligence, and shortcomings of equipment and supply. The most convincing lessons can be learned from defeats. However, it is infinitely better to learn from the defeats of others. It is, therefore, advantageous to study and analyze the records of the vanquished. The student of military history should give careful consideration to the writings of the leaders of defeated nations who have been allowed to express themselves unhampered by censorship. Frequently much more can be learned from them than from the leaders of victorious nations, who are apt to pass over the unfavourable matters and leave the impression that few mistakes were made. The veil of censorship usually continues in victorious nations, where the proprieties are at least insisted upon and military regulations and discipline are at hand to enforce them.

Preparation for Higher Direction.

The American Revolution was but the prelude to the era of peoples' wars, the wild and desperate struggles that have grown in intensity and destructiveness down to the present time. As Marshal Foch said, in his *Principles of War*:

... they [the peoples] were to set themselves the goal, not a dynastic interest, not of the conquest or possession of a province, but the de-

fence or the propagation of philosophical ideas in the first place, next of principles of independence, of unity, of immaterial advantages of various kinds. Lastly they staked upon the issue the interests and fortune of every individual private. Hence the rising of passions, that is, elements of force, hitherto in the main unused.

In the United States, the direction of the Armed Forces is vested in the civilian Chief of State or President, and the policy matters in the Congress. The Executive and the Congress are elected to office and have not often been trained or soundly experienced in military affairs. The President must, of necessity, co-ordinate the vast executive agencies of the government in both peace and war. He must understand the various agencies, and the contributions they can make to the national security, as well as their requirements. He must also be capable of convincing the policy-making body or Congress of the necessity for these requirements. At the same time, he must be capable of decentralizing the execution of tasks to subordinates.

As General Maurice has pointed out, much of the difficulty in the relations between statesman and soldier has arisen in the past because of a misconception of what is meant by the conduct of war. Too many military men have thought of it as the direction of the armed forces in actual operations. Today, however, it implies the direction of the entire power and resources of the nation in pursuit of national objectives and their co-ordination with those of allies. This is certainly the responsibility of the highest ranking military commanders, for they are

intimately concerned in them because of their bearing upon the preparation and organization of the nation for war. On the civilian side, the statesmen are generally even less prepared for their role in a national emergency because the civilian educational system has long slighted the study of war. Those who have aspired to high government positions have had to prepare themselves on their own initiative.

The soundest preparation for an understanding of the delicate relationship of statesman and soldier and of their mutual problems in the conduct of military affairs in peace and war can be made by studying history—particularly American history of the periods preceding, during, and following national emergencies. Unfortunately, future statesmen are rarely sure of their place in sufficient time to make the necessary preparation. Personnel of the Armed Forces are in much better position to foresee their future roles in war than these unknown ones who will some day be their superiors. They should, therefore, conscientiously prepare themselves for the supporting roles of advisors to the paramount civilian authorities and of instructors to the American people. Both roles will require great moral courage if the public interests are to be best served. An improperly prepared individual or a base flatterer may rise to the position of chief advisor on the basis of personality and lead his superiors and the country to ruin. The bloody pages of history are replete with examples of this kind.

Today, every element of national strength—ideological, spiritual, psychological, political, financial, economic, technological, and military—is involved in war and in the pre-

paration for war. Even worse, imperialistic communism has made conflict a continuing and continuous activity among the people in every land in the world. The very name *war* has become too restrictive. *Universal conflict* better describes the relations of man to man, of people to people, and of state to state in the shrunken world of the twentieth century.

Now, less than ever before, can responsible military leaders ignore the broad fields of knowledge involved in this concept of *universal conflict*. Accordingly, military leaders who are responsible for advice on strategy should be versed in the broader aspects of all of these matters and should bring to their task a balanced judgment capable of giving to each the correct value it deserves in solving the great problems that arise in a rapidly changing world.

Above everything else, however, American military leaders should have a knowledge of their own land and its people and of its military history. Without this fundamental knowledge, decisions might sooner or later transcend the practical and realistic. This could result in a national catastrophe.

Education of the American People.

The military student can render an important service to the United States by making clear to the people and their representatives in Congress the basis, causes, and characteristics of war, the principles underlying the conduct of alliances, the co-ordination of domestic, foreign, and military policy, and the conditions governing the conduct of operations and the men who fight them. In doing so, as Burchardt has pointed out, the his-

tory of our country, threatened with the same pitfalls that have engulfed other nations in the past, should be considered in parallel with that of others and in relation to world history and its laws—a part of a greater whole. This will require not only an understanding of the histories of existing nations but of those, once powerful, but now gone forever. The importance of the subject and the profound lack of understanding of war by the people and their representatives, not entirely attributable to indifference, should spur

the patriotic military man to undertake the unpopular and unprofitable role of instructor to the masses and to their political leaders.

The role of instructor to the people is, however, a difficult and thankless one. Many of the thinkers who attempted it have lacked objectivity and in their zeal have adopted propagandistic techniques.

And even the best have been accused of warmongering by their opponents when in fact the latter were themselves planting the seeds of war.
