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16 July 2014

0.120002064



# AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL



*C copy*

No. 60

MAY,

1954


*Notified in AAOs for 31st May, 1954*

MILITARY BOARD.

Army Headquarters,  
Melbourne

1/5/54.

Issued by Command of the Military Board.



Acting Secretary to the Board.

*Distribution:*

One per Officer, Officer of Cadets,  
and Cadet Under Officer.

# AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

*A Periodical Review of Military Literature*

Number 60


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VICTORIA BARRACKS, MELBOURNE.

## AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL.

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Contributions, which should be addressed to the Director of Military Training, Army Headquarters, Melbourne, are invited from all ranks of the Army, Cadet Corps, and Reserve of Officers.



# AUSTRALIAN RAILWAYS

in

## WORLD WAR II

Condensed from a report prepared by

Brigadier L. G. Binns.

**F**OR the purpose of organizing the railway systems of the Commonwealth for defence, action was taken on the recommendation of Lord Kitchener to constitute the War Railway Council in 1911. It was composed of the Chief Railway Commissioners from each system and representatives from the Navy and Army, and met under the chairmanship of the Quartermaster-General. Its functions generally were to advise on railway transportation as related to the problem of national defence and also on proposals directed towards the unification of the gauges.

Up to 1936 very little, if anything, was achieved towards preparing the railways for war—the need was hardly apparent.

### **Coming Conflict with Germany.**

About the middle thirties events in Europe were moving swiftly towards the coming conflict with Nazi Germany, but until a year or two later there was no practical manifestation in Australia that the time had arrived for any drastic overhaul of our existing defensive apparatus.

The possibility of conflict in the Pacific was still remote from our minds. The security of this country was linked with the old concept of British naval supremacy and the immunity of Australia from attack so long as that condition continued. If war came World War I was to set, so far as we in Australia were concerned, the pattern for the disposition of such forces and resources as we would be able to contribute to the British Commonwealth pool.

It is understandable that in this background little attention was given to our railway systems. In any case, they were relatively in much better circumstances than they are today for, except for sea borne traffic, they enjoyed a near monopoly of passenger and freight traffic. Neither road nor air services had at that time shown signs of becoming serious competitors, either on an intrastate or interstate basis.

### **Unification and Unemployment Relief.**

About 1935 some exploratory attention was given by the Com-

monwealth and State Governments to the question of the unification of railway gauges as a means of absorbing unemployed labour and turning to better account the vast sums which were being spent on relief work, and which accomplished little, if anything at all, in the way of creating real or permanent assets. However, the economic value of unification was discounted, and the only "peg" on which to hang it was its value from a defence point of view. Accordingly, the question was put to the Defence authorities.

If there was any chance at all that unification could be achieved as a national unemployment relief measure, all hope was abandoned in the face of the Defence authorities' response "that, from a defence point of view, the breaks of gauges present no difficulties, nor would the necessity to transfer at break of gauge points result in any cumulative delay in the swift and ready passage of considerable bodies of troops." This was an inexpert and restricted view based on the narrowest interpretation of the relationship of war to the national economy.

#### Planning for War.

Early in 1937 the defence services, under Government direction and approval, began to plan for war. Defence schemes were revised, mobilization machinery was overhauled, and in every important direction plans and instructions applicable to a transition from a peace to a war footing were placed under preparation. In the Quartermaster-General's Branch in particular special attention was given to the movement and transportation problems by sea, by air, by rail and by road. Plans were prepared to cover

specific phases of mobilization, up to a general mobilization, and the movement of a second AIF overseas.

Under the impetus of war planning at Army Headquarters the War Railway Council was revived. Planning teams of specially selected Railway officers were created in each railway system, and formed a sub-committee of the War Railway Council under the leadership of the QMG's planning staff. The sub-committee met regularly and, when occasion required, agenda was prepared for the consideration of the War Railway Council. By these means the Council fulfilled three functions:

- (a) Planning
- (b) Co-ordination
- (c) Advisory.

#### Control of Railways in War.

Under conditions applicable to a general mobilization, the status and condition of the separate State railway systems were in the view of Army Headquarters, issues of considerable importance. This question had earlier received the attention of a committee composed of the Commonwealth Railways Commissioner and representatives of the Army and the Commonwealth Treasury. The committee came to the conclusion that, in the event of general mobilization, military control of the railways should be applied under Section 52 of the Constitution, and that such powers of control should be vested in the Quartermaster-General. The machinery to give effect to this proposal was included in the existing Commonwealth War Book, later revised.

This proposal was exhaustively examined by the QMG's planning staff in conjunction with the sub-

committee of the War Railway Council, and the unanimous decision was taken that the proposal was impracticable and mischievous.

By direction of the QMG, new proposals and plans for control were formulated, and subsequently endorsed by the War Railway Council. The Commonwealth Government and the State Premiers recorded their agreement, and the proposals were written into the revised Commonwealth War Book.

### Principles of Control.

The revised proposals for the control of the railways in war were broadly based on the following principles:

- (a) In the event of a general mobilization the Commonwealth Government would take control of State and privately owned railways with the view to securing their operation as a National system under Commonwealth controlling authority.<sup>1</sup>
- (b) Control was to be applied primarily by vesting the Railways Commissioners in each State with the necessary powers to control all the railways within the State for and on behalf of the Commonwealth, provided that—

(i) Railways which in peace time are the property of the Commonwealth would be controlled by the Commonwealth Railways Commissioner.

(ii) The privately owned railway between Cockburn and Broken Hill in New South Wales would be controlled by the South Australian Railways Commissioner.

- (c) Co-ordination was to be effected through the creation of a War Railways Executive Committee consisting of the Commonwealth Commissioner and certain of the State Commissioners.

The functions of the War Railways Executive Committee were exclusively *executive*. The Railways Commissioners to whom control was to be delegated were to continue to be responsible for the administration and operation of their respective systems as in time of peace, subject to such instructions and directions issued by the Executive Committee upon the policy of the Minister for Defence.

The financial implications of control by the Commonwealth were necessarily given careful attention, and it was proposed that on the assumption of control the States would be reimbursed by the Commonwealth on a basis of their gross annual earnings averaged over the pre-war years. Earnings of the railways during the war years, over and above the amounts rebated to the States were to go into a Sinking Fund. From this Sinking Fund was to be met the cost of rehabilitating the railways systems when "decontrol" was applied by the Commonwealth.

### Control Applied.

When Japan came into the war the question of control received earnest consideration. In the final event the control applied by the Commonwealth followed the broad principles outlined above, except that the War Railways Committee was created as an advisory body only, executive authority rested with the chairman. Later, in 1943, the Land Transport Board was formed and superimposed over the War Railways Committee.

1. Powers of control rested on Section 52 of the Constitution and were, on the interpretation of the High Court, of the widest possible nature.

The executive powers of control under this later arrangement gave way to co-ordinating functions only, and this led to difficulties.

One important omission in prescribing control powers after Japan entered the war was the absence of appropriate financial arrangements as between the Commonwealth as the controlling authority and the States whose railways for all practical purposes became for the duration of the war Commonwealth instrumentalities. The unsatisfactory condition of the State railway systems today arises to a considerable degree from the stress and strain of the war period, and the insufficiency of funds to undertake rehabilitation and modernization in the post-war years. A brief examination of war time railway finance will show that had the original proposals for the establishment of Sinking Funds been fully carried out this unhappy position might not have arisen.

#### War Time Earnings.

In the 10 years preceding the outbreak of war the accumulated deficits

of the whole of the railway systems amounted to approximately £62,000,000.

Table "A" shows how railway revenues during the war years must have increased as a result of war time traffic. The nett ton mileage and the passenger mileage show the extra traffic handled, but the gross ton mileage gives a better picture of the magnitude of the work which had to be done by the railways. Not only does it include both forms of traffic, but it includes the influence of unbalanced traffic which was frequently an important factor.

Nor was the very substantial increase in traffic as a result of the war the complete story so far as increased revenues were concerned, for strong representations were made to the States that special and substantial reductions in freight rates for Defence traffic generally should be made. This was accepted and reduced rates became operative from February, 1941, and were again revised in 1943. Table "B" shows the substantial concessions that were granted by the States on the 1941

System	Net Ton Mileage Freight	Percentage increase in	
		Passenger Mileage	Gross Ton Mileage
	%	%	%
New South Wales . . . . .	25	75	43
Victoria . . . . .	23	73	21
Queensland . . . . .	108	80	71
South Australia . . . . .	23	156	33
West Australia . . . . .	22*	99	9*
Commonwealth . . . . .	640	740	387

\* Denotes decrease.

Table A.

Increase in Traffic during War Period—  
Maximum per Cent. Increase over 1937-38.

basis. For brevity comparative rates for 100 miles and 600 miles only are included. Unfortunately figures are not available to assess what the benefit of the Special Defence Rates must have meant in "savings" to the Commonwealth.

Undoubtedly the stresses and strains on the railway systems were very great during the war years, but in relation to their circumstances today and from the point of view of financial stability it was, relatively, a happy condition. Revenues were buoyant and generally reached a high level of factual surpluses after long years of increasing and apparently unavoidable deficits.

The real tragedy was that in the absence of any ability to undertake improvements, overhaul and maintenance projects except as the sheer necessity of war time requirements demanded, all surplus earnings went into State consolidated revenues. Little attempt, if any, was made to earmark reserves for essential or even vital rehabilitation projects in the post war period. Some States maintain that the Commonwealth, by the introduction of uniform taxation as a war time measure, left them little or no opportunity to earmark funds for this essential work.

This is not a problem that post mortems will solve. Looking at it retrospectively, the problems of the war period and the immediate post war period were closely inter-related. Unfortunately concentration on the first left little time for post war planning. The railway systems finished the war with a heavy burden of deferred overhaul, maintenance and rehabilitation which was to become increasingly beyond the ability of their finances to cope with. It could be argued that, in view of the extremely wide powers of control applied by the Commonwealth during the war, some measure of responsibility rested upon the Commonwealth that funds were made available to the States for essential rehabilitation work when the war ended.

**Pre War Survey of Railway Systems.**

Coincidentally with the preparation of plans for a general mobilization the QMG's planning staff, in conjunction with the sub-committee of the War Railway Council, made a survey of the additional railway facilities required to develop the interstate railway routes to maximum capacity subject to the limitations of breaks of gauge and single track operation. Maximum capacity

Freight Charge	Mileage		Railway System											
			N.S.W.		Vic.		S.A.		Qld.		W.A.		Trans Aust.	
	s.	d.	s.	d.	s.	d.	s.	d.	s.	d.	s.	d.	s.	d.
Ordinary rate . . . .	100	84 4	65 0	67 4	107 6	58 9	78 0							
Defence rate . . . .	100	12 6	25 0	16 8	16 8	16 8	16 8							
Ordinary rate . . . .	600	233 9	282 3	290 1	401 0	222 1	301 8							
Defence rate . . . .	600	75 0	91 8	100 0	100 0	100 0	100 0							

**Table B.**  
Concessions Granted for Defence Traffic.



State	Place	Work Required
NSW		Provision of new crossing loops, telephonic communication, modification of rolling stock.
	Albury	Transfer facilities, additional platforms, signaling facilities.
	Tocumwal	Transfer facilities, additional platforms, signaling facilities.
	Wallangarra	Transfer facilities, additional platforms, signaling facilities.
Victoria		Provision of new crossing loops, modification of rolling stock.
	Dysart	Provision of platforms and yard facilities.
S. Aust.		Additional sidings and crossing loops, modification of rolling stock.
Queensland		Extension of existing crossing loops and new loops and sidings.

Table C.

Works Planned before the Outbreak of War.

was related to strategic or large scale military movement only, the question of considerable movements of freight on an interstate basis was to receive later consideration.

The survey showed that the works listed in Table "C" would have to be completed before the main interstate routes could develop maximum capacity subject to the limitations mentioned above.

Since these facilities, although essential from a Defence point of view, had practically no peace time value, the States were unable to accept financial responsibility along with the Defence Department and the proposals were held in abeyance. However, the respective railway systems prepared all the necessary plans, drawings and specifications, and copies of these were held in the QMG's Branch at Army Headquarters. Soon after war broke out in 1939 the works were put in hand and completed within a few months. After Japan's intervention much

more had to be done, but in the early stages of the war these works were of inestimable value to the concentration of the AIF for despatch overseas, and to the mobilization of the CMF for home defence.

#### Effect of Probable Interruption of Sea Borne Traffic.

In July, 1940, the War Railway Council was called together to consider an agenda prepared by the QMG's staff in conjunction with the Council's sub-committee. At this important meeting the Council examined the impact on the railway systems of possible severe dislocations to sea borne traffic.

At that time the relationship of interstate traffic carried by rail to that carried by sea was 1 to 20. Iron ore from Whyalla and coal from New South Wales constituted 52 per cent. of the interstate sea borne tonnage. Both these commodities were basically essential to our economy, and any serious dislocation of their movement, which was exclusively

sea borne, could have had a severe, if not devastating, effect on our war effort.

Without the introduction of additional facilities the railways were unable to handle the problem which would be created by even a partial dislocation of sea borne traffic. The limiting factor was, of course, the break of gauge points. On all interstate routes the capacity of transfer facilities was but a fraction of track capacity. The latter in turn required many additional sidings and crossing loops before any substantial increase of goods traffic was possible.

Based on appreciations of the General Staff and the Naval Board, the Council recommended that the impact of diverted sea borne traffic on the railways should be assessed at 75 per cent. of the existing sea borne traffic.

Subsequent events proved this to be a wise assessment and the Coun-

cil, after expert examination of the problem, recommended that additional works should be put in hand in the following categories:

- (a) Works required for purely troop movements.
- (b) Works required for conveyance and transfer of petrol and oil in bulk.
- (c) Works required to handle freight diverted from interstate shipping.

The works required under (a) on each of the railway systems covered principally entraining and detraining facilities, alterations and additions to platforms, tracks, etc., and the provision of end loading ramps for vehicles.

The works required under (c) included improved track facilities, additional crossing loops, supplementary terminals, enlarged transfer yards, modification of rolling stock and mechanical equipment for handling goods.

	Total per annum	Maximum per day
<b>At Tocumwal</b>		
Iron Ore . . . . .	900,000 tons	3,000 tons
Coal . . . . .	450,000 tons	1,500 tons
Coke . . . . .	270,000 tons	900 tons
General Goods . . . . .	750,000 tons	2,500 tons
<b>At Wodonga</b>		
Coal . . . . .	1,350,000 tons	4,500 tons
<b>At Albury</b>		
General Goods . . . . .	1,350,000 tons	4,500 tons
<b>At Broken Hill</b>		
Iron Ore . . . . .	1,100,000 tons	3,700 tons
Coal . . . . .	450,000 tons	1,500 tons
Coke . . . . .	270,000 tons	900 tons
<b>At Wallangarra</b>		
General Goods . . . . .	750,000 tons	2,500 tons

Table D.

Capacities of Break of Gauge Transfer Points after Completion of Works Authorized in November, 1940.

In November, 1940, the project, estimated to cost £1,184,460, was approved as a Commonwealth charge, and immediate action was taken by all the railway systems to proceed with the necessary construction. With the completion of the works the transfer of the tonnages shown in Table "D" to and through the break of gauge points was possible.

An appreciation of the works from a Defence point of view may be obtained by comparing the figures given in Table "D" with the tonnages normally handled before the works were put in, on a three shift daily basis, at the following break of gauge points:

Albury—300 tons (near congestion).

Tocumwal—200 tons.

Broken Hill—50 tons.

Since, however, full benefit would not be derived from the above mentioned works unless there was sufficient suitable rolling stock, the War Railway Council recommended that all plant of this nature then idle for want of overhaul or maintenance repair should be brought into efficient operating condition as early as workshop capacity would allow. In addition, the undermentioned new plant would be required for the New South Wales, Victorian and South Australian systems:

Locomotives . . . . .	19
24-ton Wagons . . . . .	350
Bogie Wagons . . . . .	550
Brake Vans . . . . .	50
Water Tanks . . . . .	20

Five hundred thousand pounds was allocated from loan funds and, within the limits of this amount, construction of the new plant began immediately.

Since the rolling stock on the isolated Darwin-Birdum line was insufficient for military requirements, the necessary additional plant was transferred by sea from the Western Australian Railways, and brought into operation by the end of February, 1942.

However the plant thus provided was the bare minimum requirement, and effected improvements to railway communications only in New South Wales, Victoria and on the 5 ft. 3 in. system in South Australia. To make the position reasonably safe against Japanese intervention the War Railway Council considered that the undermentioned additional plant was required for the Queensland, Central Australian and South Australian 3 ft. 6 in. systems, and for the Trans-Australian 4 ft. 8½ in. system.

Locomotives . . . . .	34
Bogie Wagons and Vans . .	450
Wheeled Wagons . . . . .	120
Water Wagons . . . . .	41
Brake Vans . . . . .	11

In addition a number of existing locomotives would have to be reconditioned, and station, siding and signalling facilities provided.

This further new construction meant a heavy workshop commitment, and War Cabinet was of the opinion that the provision of the plant should not interfere with the actual or potential production of munitions. The Government decided, therefore that munitions should take priority up to June 30, 1942, when the position would be reviewed.

Other major projects which were in hand under State arrangements before Japan entered the war, and

on which the War Railway Council of July, 1940, recommended work to be accelerated were:

Construction of new Hawkesbury River Bridge, NSW.

Duplication of Junee-Cootamundra section of Main Southern Line, NSW.

Construction of Sandy Hollow-Maryvale Line, NSW.

Duplication of Goulburn Junction-Seymour section of Main North Eastern Railway, Victoria.

#### **Entry of Japan into the War.**

The entry of Japan into the war revived consideration of the inadequacies the War Railway Council's proposals were designed to obviate, and necessity demanded a heavy programme of engine and rolling stock construction. When this was eventually undertaken the Garratt engine was designed to meet locomotive deficiencies, and standard bogie flat wagons were introduced to meet rolling stock deficiencies on all 3 ft. 6 in. gauge systems. Further additions and improvements to the railways were found necessary as the burden of war traffic increased.

Works authorized and undertaken when Japan's entry into the war threw a tremendous strain on the whole national economy and necessarily required a great deal of time to produce their effects. It was the work planned and undertaken before Japan entered the conflict which alone enabled the AIF to be rapidly deployed on its return from the Middle East, and permitted the concentration and deployment of the CMF to proceed with a reasonable degree of celerity.

#### **Factors Contributing to Increased Traffic.**

The traffic increases on the Australian railways caused by Japan's entry into the war were due to many factors which are briefly summarized hereunder.

#### **Defence Traffic.**

The increase in traffic due to the primary task of moving men and material cannot be determined with exactitude but comprised all movement arising from mobilization, training, concentration in strategic areas, concentration for embarkation, service leave, etc.

In all over three-quarters of a million men were enlisted in the three services. Stores and materials to the value of several hundred millions of pounds were involved in freight moves. In addition, strategic dispositions involved special "peak" movements such as concentration in Western Australia, the Northern Territory and North Queensland, the return of the AIF from overseas, and the influx of United States forces.

There also developed special types of traffic requiring the waiving of normal peace time safe working regulations and vastly increased numbers of special rolling stock for the carriage of ammunition, explosives and munitions production components. Ambulance trains were also required.

#### **Civilian Traffic.**

The tremendous increase in defence production occasioned large transfers of population from rural to urban industrial areas as well as movements from non-essential to essential industries. These movements threw greatly increased loads on the railways, both as regards passenger and freight traffic.

The tremendous construction programme undertaken by the Allied Works Council on behalf of the Australian and United States forces, and in connection with the establishment of war industries, also brought its problem of transportation into the general pool of urgent requirements. The personnel of the Construction Corps were freely transferred in large numbers from place to place over the whole continent. Construction materials for Allied Forces projects and war industries required transportation from sources of supply to job locations, and often involved extremely long railway hauls which necessitated the allocation of engine power and rolling stock already strained to capacity.

Petrol rationing also made its contribution to the additional burden on rail traffic.

#### **Traffic Diverted from Sea.**

Increased tonnages of freight normally carried by sea were thrown on to the railways, due not only to the requisitioning of shipping for defence purposes, but also to considerable rearrangements of the population which demanded increased volumes of interstate traffic above the peace time years.

Vast quantities of stores and supplies arrived for the United States forces, and also lend-lease supplies for the Australian services. Owing to the demands for the interstate and intrastate movement of these supplies the pre-war predictions of the volume of traffic diverted from sea to rail proved gross underestimates of the position that actually arose.

#### **Drought Traffic.**

Nature also entered the competition for railway space. For several years prior to 1945 there was a

succession of poor seasons in the south eastern States. Stock for agistment had to be moved, and arrangements often had to be made at short notice to move large numbers of beasts to processing plants. Fodder sent from western States to eastern ports had to be distributed by rail.

#### **Percentage Traffic Increase.**

The increase of traffic on the Australian railways brought about by the conditions outlined above reached a maximum of 41 per cent. in 1942-43, and averaged 25 per cent. over the six war years.

#### **Traffic Restrictions.**

Such a great increase inevitably demanded restriction of non-essential traffic in general and interstate traffic in particular. Severe restrictions were placed on civilian travel. For example, a civilian was not allowed to travel interstate without a permit, and this could not be obtained without good reason. A wide range of goods classified "non-essential" was debarred from carriage on the railways. Primary produce was generally carried only to the nearest market, irrespective of whether better prices were obtainable in other localities. Sleeping berths were withdrawn and, owing to the shortage of coal, the States themselves severely restricted the intrastate movement of passengers and goods.

#### **Priority Classification of Freight.**

In order to ensure prompt and adequate transport for service equipment, munitions, raw materials and essential goods, the following priority classifications were adopted:

- (a) Special despatch.
- (b) Special despatch—explosives.
- (c) Priority despatch.



Wagons carded (a) and (b) indicated that direct transport from point to point by specified connecting trains in accordance with a movement order was required and that, except for operational safety reasons, the programme was not to be varied.

Wagons carded (c) indicated that urgent transport was required and that preference in despatch was to be given over all traffic except categories (a) and (b)

The system was only partially successful because complete traffic congestion occurred at certain times.

#### **Delays at Breaks of Gauge.**

Contrary to the Defence pre-war opinion that the breaks of gauge would offer no serious disability, the gauge difficulty during the war did become an acute and vital problem. No completely satisfactory solution was found, and schedules had to provide for delays at break of gauge points.

At one stage in 1943, when the first offensive was being mounted in New Guinea, all sidings up to 100 miles south of Clapham (the break of gauge transfer point near Brisbane), Albury and Tocumwal were cluttered up with staged traffic, and the effect on the interstate routes was felt as far away as Adelaide.

There is no gainsaying that these delays were serious. The following advice telegraphed from the Quartermaster-General to the Minister for the Army shows the congestion and delay which occurred at this time:

"Independent of any action by the Transport Board, New South Wales and Victorian Railways obliged to refuse all loadings to relieve what is now complete blockage due to endeavour to force through terminals and

transhipping stations more than they can absorb in any circumstances."

It is fortunate that we were trying to support an offensive, and not fighting desperately to throw back a Japanese onslaught on our own shores.

#### **Rolling Stock Disabilities.**

The general disadvantages of the breaks of gauge—no common pool of locomotives and rolling stock and transshipment with its many disabilities—under which Australia laboured during the war provide us with some valuable lessons.

It was necessary to provide special rolling stock such as flats, tank wagons, ambulance trains and ward cars for seven systems on an aggregate scale far greater than if there had been a common pool. Another serious difficulty which was felt, particularly in Queensland whose railway system progressively reached a tremendous peak of traffic as the strategic position changed favourably, was the inability to pool workshop resources, or to divert vehicles and locomotives for repair to other systems on which the strain was less severe.

Additional installations at transfer points, extensive sidings, platforms, mechanical handling equipment and transfer cranes had to be provided at Albury, Tocumwal, Terowie, Broken Hill, Wallangarra, Clapham and other points. Although complete statistics are not available, some idea of the magnitude of the transhipping problems may be obtained from the fact that the tonnage transferred overall approximated 1,800,000 tons per annum over the war years, and reached a peak of 2,300,000 tons in the most critical year.

In the first place the transfers caused a delay to through traffic which, even under the most favourable conditions, slowed down the overall time of through transportation. Peaks occurring in through routing increased the time taken to tranship, while facilities not adapted for such heavy traffic were themselves prime causes of congestion.

Secondly, the transfers entailed an economic waste of manpower. This had to be provided by troops and civilians. Upwards of 1,600 service personnel were required at transfer points in addition to a large pool of civilians. Even then at frequent intervals sufficient labour could not be mustered to meet peaks of loading.

Thirdly, the load capacity of similar vehicles varied on the different systems and necessitated splitting of the onward consignment of less than truck loads. The splitting of consignments frequently resulted in vital parts of munition assemblies and stores arriving at operational bases at different times, thus causing difficulties and wasted time in re-assembling those consignments.

Arising out of the foregoing disabilities and other factors contributing to the great burden that was thrown on the railways, it was necessary to spend approximately £21,000,000 on the railways during the war. The break-up of this amount fell into three broad categories:

Locomotives and rolling stock . . . . .	£11,000,000
New lines, sidings and track work . . . . .	7,000,000
Miscellaneous works . . . . .	3,000,000
Total . . . . .	£21,000,000

Much of this expenditure had no post-war value to the railways because a large proportion of the facilities were to service defence installations, warehouse areas, etc., and made no contribution to the general problem of increasing capacity.

In particular, the amount spent on locomotives and rolling stock did not catch up with deferred maintenance, overhaul and repair. In order to devote the greatest possible proportion of railway workshop capacity to munitions production the routine job of maintaining plant was reduced to a minimum. In fact, war-time railway maintenance was just sufficient to ensure that maximum motive power, trucks, cars and other vehicles were at the disposal of the Commonwealth and could be run over the main strategic routes at reasonable speeds. This extensive deferment of repair, maintenance and replacement, reduced the railways to a parlous condition from which they are finding it extremely difficult to recover.

#### Lessons.

From the railway point of view the war falls into two phases—prior to Japan's entry and after Japan's entry.

The pre-war planners foresaw pretty well everything that would be required in the first phase, that is to say, they foresaw what would be required in a war in which Australia would not be directly threatened, and in which the main military movement problem would be concerned with the concentration and embarkation of an expeditionary force for overseas service and the leisurely mobilization and training of the Citizen Military Forces. For

economic reasons it was not possible to undertake the works required in time of peace, although they were on a modest scale. However all the necessary plans and specifications were prepared to the last detail, and held in readiness for rapid implementation. When war broke out it did not at first throw any great strain on the general economy, there was no shortage of materials and a large pool of labour was available. Consequently the works were put in smoothly and in good time to meet the situation that arose in the first place.

When Japan's attitude became more threatening the Railway War Council in July, 1940, planned for a direct threat to Australia. Although the Council did not foresee all that would be required, the works they planned and put in hand were completed or well advanced before the threat developed. Had these works not been undertaken before the threat developed it is highly probable that they would not have been completed in time to be of much use, in which case the strategic deployment and maintenance of the forces would, at the very least, have been dangerously impeded.

That this is not an unreasonable conclusion is shown by the fact that those projects which were undertaken against the background of other competitive and conflicting demands for labour and materials were subject to such delays that much of what was done was too late to make any real contribution towards easing the heavy burdens on the railway system. For instance, the additional work on Clapham Junction would have been of inestimable value during the peak year of 1942-43. However, by the

time it was completed the peak had passed, and it did not fulfil the purposes for which it was initially designed.

Perhaps the outstanding lesson is that the opinion expressed by the Defence authorities in 1935—"that from a Defence point of view, the breaks of gauge present no difficulty, nor would the necessity to transfer at break of gauge points result in any cumulative delay to the swift and ready passage of considerable bodies of troops"—proved in the event to be about as wrong as any opinion could be. Even if no delays to the passage of troops occurred, and this is by no means true, the troops were not much use without the vast quantities of munitions and supplies they required to fight with. And, as has been shown, very serious delays occurred in the movement of freight of all descriptions.

We got by, but only just. The margin was dangerously small.

### Conclusions.

Of the conclusions which may be reached as a result of a study of railway operation in Australia in time of war the following are the most important.

### Plans.

Plans, not only for any new works that may be required, but also for the efficient control and operation of the railways in war, must be made in advance. The planners must take into account much more than strictly military movements. The switch of the whole national economy from a peace to a war basis will inevitably throw a tremendous burden on the railways. If this is not taken into account and planned for the effect on military operations could be catastrophic.

State	1938/39	1940/41	1941/42	1942/43
New South Wales . . . .	£19,146,000	£23,216,000	£27,686,000	£33,335,000
Victoria . . . . .	9,283,000	11,239,000	14,520,000	16,153,000
Queensland . . . . .	7,657,000	8,196,000	11,264,000	17,148,000
South Australia . . . . .	3,133,000	3,530,000	4,964,000	5,876,000
West Australia . . . . .	3,599,000	3,572,000	3,996,000	4,446,000
Tasmania . . . . .	487,000	600,000	686,000	810,000

Table E.

Comparison of Peace and War Time Total Earnings,  
1938/39 to Peak Year 1942/43.

Details of the control and direction of the railways must be agreed to and laid down in advance. If this is not done and arrangements have to be improvised under extreme pressure, the resultant misunderstandings and imperfections are likely to lead to grave dispersion of effort.

#### Finance.

From the long-term national point of view the switch back from war to peace is almost as important as the switch from peace to war. If it is to be effected with any degree of smoothness the financing of the inevitable back-log of railway rehabilitation must form an integral part of pre-war transportation planning. If the original plan for the provision of sinking funds had been adhered to the Australian railways would have ended the war with sufficient money to undertake rehabilitation, and would not be in their present unhappy condition. Financial arrangements for rehabilitation must not only be made, they must be adhered to.

Reference to Table E shows that had an adequate proportion of inflated war time earnings been placed

in sinking funds instead of going into consolidated revenue, funds for rehabilitation at the end of the war would have been available.

#### Unification of Gauges.

Even if we are at present planning for a possible outbreak of war in which our main concern will be the despatch of forces and munitions to an overseas theatre the long range defence problem must not be lost sight of. With the speed at which international affairs are moving today the situation may be quite different in ten, or even five, years' time. Then we might again be faced with the problem of providing for the close defence of our northern frontiers. And then it will be too late to take the only steps that will really enable our railways to cope with the situation—unification of the gauges throughout the continent. Anything short of unification is nothing more than an improvisation which, as experience has shown, is dangerously liable to disastrous breakdown under the impact of war. And unification, if it is not to upset the national economy, will take a good many years, probably from ten to fourteen, to complete.

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## BOOK REVIEWS

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**INDEPENDENT COMPANY.** By Colonel Bernard J. Callinan, DSO, MC. (William Heinemann Ltd.)

**T**HIS is the most fascinating book yet written about the guerrilla warfare waged against the Japanese in Portuguese Timor. It tells how a small force, often heavily outnumbered, was able to contain a much stronger enemy and inflict on him considerable casualties at a time when events in the Pacific were at a critical stage.

The author relates in a factual manner the every-day problems of a small isolated force—the fight against malaria and dysentery, the never-ending search for food and co-operation with loyal natives. Irregular warfare does not normally receive much attention in military training. However, this narrative tells how the problems of supply, control and co-operation were solved in these particular operations.

The story traces the movements of the 2/2 Australian Independent Company from its formation and training at Wilson's Promontory, Victoria, through a brief period in the Northern Territory, to its arrival and subsequent operations in Timor. Later it was joined by the 2/4 Independent Company, and the

two units bore the main weight of the campaign. In his analysis, Colonel Callinan gives the following requirements for success in operations of this nature:


- (a) A friendly native population.
- (b) A surplus of food in the country over and above the needs of the population.

When these two requirements could no longer be met and the Japanese were closing in, the decision to withdraw the force was made, *not because of defeat* but because of administrative difficulties. The companies withdrew at the end of a job well done.

The book is well illustrated by photographs taken by Damien Parer for the Australian War Memorial. These show the nature of the country and give some idea of the type of natives who co-operated with the companies. However, the sketch maps, always important in describing operations, would have been much improved by a clearer delineation of military dispositions.

The book is not military history in the sense that the plans and actions of each side are methodically studied. But it is a stirring narrative of guerrilla warfare as waged by a gallant band of Australian soldiers. The story of this war of






*Australian War Memorial Photograph*

**A War of "Pigi Pigi."**

**L/Sgt. W. Tomassetti taking in supplies.**



*Australian War Memorial Photograph*

**Testing a Wireless Set.**

**Sig. K. Richards, Cpl. J. Donovan, Sgt. J. Sargeant.**

constant movement, patrol, ambush and escape demonstrates the basic principles of this type of warfare. The book will commend itself to everyone interested in the deeds of Australian soldiers, as well as to those interested in the art of leadership under extremely difficult conditions.

**AUSTRALIA IN THE MODERN WORLD.** A series of eight lectures prepared by the Australian Army Educational Corps.

**H**ISTORY is marked at intervals by periods of revolutionary change. It seems as though mankind, after coasting along steadily and quietly for a time, suddenly develops intense intellectual and physical activity. New inventions and discoveries are made, great advances are accomplished in the physical world. And in the intellectual sphere new ideas, speculations and theories develop, and impinging upon each other produce still more ideas and theories.

These periods of great activity are exciting times in which to live, but they can also be confusing. "Where do we go from here, which direction shall we take?" The question is often difficult for the individual and the nation.

In Australia in the Modern World the AAES has not set out to answer all the confusing questions which beset us today. What they aimed to do, and succeeded in doing, was to present a factual, concise view of Australia and her place in the world. Not only does this enable us to see ourselves in true perspective, but it also gives us the firm base from which to make our due contribution to human progress.

The eight lectures contained in the book, each of which was written by an expert on the subject, together give an integrated view of our country and her problems—her form of government, her resources and industries, her place in the British Commonwealth and her relations with other nations, her dependent territories, her armed forces and the necessity for her rearmament.

The book was written primarily for use as lecture material in national service training battalions. But it has a wider application. Every soldier would be a better citizen, and a better soldier, too, for reading and absorbing the information it contains.

The AAES is to be congratulated, not only on the production of a book of great value to the Army, but also on the attractive manner in which the material is presented.

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# AUSTRALIA

in the

# PACIFIC

Major M. B. Simkin,  
Royal Australian Infantry.

SINCE the end of World War II conditions in the Far East and the Pacific have altered considerably. Japan is being rehabilitated; China has become a Communist power; Burma and Indonesia have become independent republics; there is active fighting in Indo-China and Malaya and there is an uneasy truce in Korea. These changes have had a direct bearing on Australian strategy and in this article it is intended to examine Australia's changed position in the Pacific.

Firstly then, let us assess the present day threat to peace and security in this area. Despite Stalin's death and signs of domestic trouble and a "softer" Kremlin policy, the Russian objective is still a Communist world. What has taken place in the past few months is a change in Soviet tactics. Stalin's methods have not succeeded. Soviet pressure did not paralyse the free world but, rather, forged its unity and re-armed Britain and America. So the Communists have pulled out of the Korean war, at least temporarily, as they previously called off the Berlin

blockade and the Greek civil war when we decided to get tough. In fact, the patience, unity and strength of the non-Communist world has forced the Russians to try a new policy.

What now? Until there is positive evidence of a change of heart, I think we can expect more subtle, more challenging, more divisive tactics—always with the same goal of world domination. We can expect Communists to encourage and exploit every sign of weakness, distrust, misunderstanding or jealousy in the Western world; they will probe the soft spots in the free nations and tempt the backward areas—the Colonial States and the new nations in Asia—with both economic and emotional lures. They will also try to invade with trade. So I feel that this is no time to relax. And because people everywhere are weary of continual tension, the period ahead is as perilous as any since the end of World War II. Peace is more secure and the chances of another major war within the next ten years are diminishing every day. But with the

Soviet threat less obvious, can we maintain the teamwork that was cemented in time of war?

The Communist appeal is to the elemental wants and feelings—land, rice, peace, nationalism and anti-colonialism. Consequently the Russians are likely to make their biggest effort in the Far East. For here is the greatest reservoir of human and physical resources, together with the greatest poverty and ignorance. At the moment the minds of the people are generally open. Democracy and Communism are freely compared, mostly, unfortunately, from a basis of little understanding or experience of either. Actually there are about 700 million people in this area living outside the perimeters of the Soviet and of the Western powers. The choice these people make, whether it be to remain neutral, or whether it be to ally themselves with one side or the other, may tip the balance of world power.

Now let us look at the current situation in the major countries of the Far East.

#### **China.**

In China today—although she is over-populated, poor and without the vast, undeveloped resources of Soviet Russia, the Communists, though solidly installed, face tremendous problems. Industrialization and increased food production will require goods and machinery from the West. That is why some authorities conclude that China wants peace and trade above all, even though, like Russia, she will continue to press for sympathetic Communist states around her borders. Some of the Western countries, too, are hungry for trade with China, and they feel that normal

commercial relations will reduce China's dependence on Russia and ease the pressure towards the rice, rubber and tin of South-East Asia. Militarily China, backed by Russia, is the predominant power in the Far East and so she is likely to remain in the foreseeable future. However, unless forced to by Russia, she is not likely to use her military weight in offensive operations outside Asia, excluding perhaps Formosa, should American protection be withdrawn from that island.

#### **Burma.**

It is generally considered that war brought more physical damage to Burma than to any other country in South-East Asia. Hence, on liberation from the Japanese, her economy had nearly collapsed and many political uncertainties and disorders have since made the task of stabilization extremely difficult. Since receiving independence, however, the Union of Burma, under a socialist government, has made good progress, Communism is on the wane and is no longer regarded as a serious menace.

The United States is giving Burma economic help through the Economic Co-operation Administration and in March, 1951, Britain, India, Pakistan and Ceylon provided a joint loan of £6,000,000 sterling. Burma has also received limited aid from Australia under the Colombo plan. Notwithstanding this assistance, the Burmese Government feels that it has been given rather grudgingly and that it has been completely inadequate. Consequently, if this non-Communist state is to continue as such, and if her rather lukewarm friendship is to be warmed to something valuable, she should receive generous aid from all the Western



countries, including Australia. Such assistance would not go unnoticed by the other minor countries in South-East Asia, and may have a political and strategic value out of all proportion to the monetary outlay.

### Japan.

Largely through the help of America and to a smaller degree the British Commonwealth, Japan is quickly regaining her feet and is destined once more to be a great industrial power. To prohibit this successfully would be to condemn the most virile people in East Asia to poverty, misery and revolution, the perfect breeding ground for Communism, which at the moment is virtually non-existent in the country.

Japan will again become a great industrial power more rapidly than she can become a military power, for in her case the one depends so much upon the other. But during the intervening period an undefended Japan would be a constant temptation and an easy prey for the territorial imperialism of the Communists. We must not forget that one of the checks upon aggression today is the fact that, with Western Germany and Japan outside the Soviet orbit, the balance of heavy industrial production weighs down heavily in favour of the Western world. Japan must therefore be defended. By whom? No democracy would be prepared to maintain a large army indefinitely in Japan, if only from an economic point of view, so the answer is, Japan must be defended by the Japanese themselves. This decision is one that is unpalatable to many Australians, but nevertheless it is one that must be faced up to.

### Indonesia.

The Communist revolt in Indonesia was ruthlessly crushed at Madiun in 1948, and since that date the Communists have concentrated largely on control of the trade union movement and on the infiltration of key organisations. The mass arrests in 1951 further disorganised the Communists, and little apparent headway has been made in regaining their former influence.

No elections have yet been held in Indonesia and it is, therefore, impossible to gauge the true strength of the Indonesian Communist movement. However, should the chaotic conditions in West Java and the Celebes continue unchecked, it is possible that there may be a popular demand for authoritarian government by another party.

Australia is relatively popular with the Indonesian government and considering the proximity of the two countries, the relative populations and their densities, it is obvious that every endeavour must be made to keep a friendly government in power. The Colombo plan is a step in the right direction. However, the present difference of opinion as to the ownership of Dutch New Guinea is a problem that will require the most delicate handling.

### Malaya.

The Emergency in Malaya has again served to highlight the strategic importance of Malaya to the British Commonwealth. As we no longer have the unqualified use of India, the need for a major base for the British Forces in the Far East has to be met by Singapore, the fate of which cannot be divorced from Malaya. Without this country we would lose control of the Straits of Malacca, which virtually seal off

the short shipping route from the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea. Even with a friendly Indonesia the bulk of naval and merchant shipping would then be forced around a circuitous route to destinations in Asia. Under these circumstances the naval base at Trincomalee would lose much of its value and the pro-British states of Borneo would be left in virtual isolation.

Most important of all from the strategic point of view is that without Malaya the free world would lose the air fields which are so vitally necessary to complete the ring of air bases from which our strategic air forces could attack important industrial targets in southern Siberia and Communist China. Furthermore the British Commonwealth would lose its last firm foothold on the Asiatic mainland. This would mean the end of direct British influence in the area, and without this influence the situation of the smaller countries of South-East Asia would speedily deteriorate. Without the example, the advice and direct assistance from Britain and the Commonwealth, it is questionable whether Burma, Siam and Indonesia would be willing and able to withstand the pressure of Communism.

It is therefore very heartening to see that during the past few years the Malayan Communist Party suffered severe reverses and as the months go by the situation is being brought more and more under control. Unless a major upheaval occurs in the Far East, it is safe to say that a continuation of the present policy should mean that in a further twelve months the Communists will no longer be a serious threat in Malaya.

### Indo-China.

It is almost trite to say that Indo-China is the key to South East Asia. Because the only practical routes from China into South East Asia pass through Hanoi, the fate of the Red River Delta in Tonking is of concern to all people interested in the future of South East Asia. In January, 1950, China and the Soviet Union recognized the government of Viet Minh; the United States, Britain, Australia and other Western powers quickly reacted by recognizing the government of Viet Nam. A group of Asian nations, led by India, abstained from recognizing either.

The Viet Minh, although backed by China, are regarded by most Asians as nationalists first and Communists afterwards. This, of course, is totally wrong and it is for the West to convince Asia that the democracies are fighting in Indo-China to preserve their independence from Communist tyranny. The British Commonwealth must also consider the war in Indo-China in relation to the defence of Malaya and the security of India. The French forces in Indo-China draw a great deal of moral and material support from British held Malaya and Singapore, and also as an outcome of British influence in the neighbouring states of Siam and Burma. It will be seen that in some respects Malaya is a backstop for Indo-China. Therefore, if Britain relinquished her foothold in Malaya, the French would face intensified demands for the evacuation of Indo-China, not only from the rest of Asia, but from metropolitan France as well.

### Present Security Arrangements in the Pacific.

A number of arrangements exist at the moment for the furtherance

of security among the nations in the Pacific. The United States is a partner in a mutual security pact with the Philippines and has initialled such a pact with Korea. It has a security treaty with Japan and has defence understandings with the Nationalist Government of China in Formosa. Australia and New Zealand have also combined with the United States to sign the A.N.Z.U.S. treaty and as members of the British Commonwealth have the closest ties with Great Britain and the other Commonwealth nations through the A.N.Z.A.M. agreement. All these arrangements and relationships constitute together a solemn warning to any potential aggressor. However, they have dangers. All are strictly limited in scope and include only the Pacific island nations and the United States. They contain no Asiatic mainland countries and overlook Canada as a Pacific power. In addition, the exclusion from all but the A.N.Z.A.M. agreement, of Great Britain, with her direct responsibilities in the Pacific and her large forces in Malaya and Hong Kong, is a definite weakness.

The Five Power Staff Agency is a step in the right direction but suffers from two major drawbacks—one, it is purely military and, two, it is only advisory in that it does not report to any combined committee at a higher level, reports being merely referred to the respective governments for such action as they may desire.

A true Pacific Pact, to ensure the broadest possible membership, should be open to all free Asian nations desirous of joining. Furthermore such a Pact should not be a purely military alliance, but should

provide for economic, social and cultural co-operation along the lines of the Colombo Plan.

#### **Australia's Future Strategy.**

The security of Australia depends upon the success of the British Commonwealth and our allies in the decisive conflicts which may take place in Europe, the Middle East and the Far East. Our most effective defence, therefore, lies in rendering all possible assistance to our Allies in combating Communist cold war activities, whilst at the same time building up our strength against the possibility of a global war. In the case of such a war, whilst South East Asia is held, defence in depth is provided to Australia and there will be no direct threat except to sea communications in the form of submarine attacks and mine laying.

From a defence point of view our Navy, Army and Air Force must be organised, equipped and trained to take their place within a larger British organization and must be prepared to operate away from the shores of Australia. We have seen the importance the retention of Malaya plays in the strategy of the free world, consequently defence forces sent abroad should operate in that area. Such participation would, from a Commonwealth point of view, be both militarily and economically a much better proposition than employment in the Middle East theatre and should commence as soon as our present Korean commitment ceases to exist. Acceptance of such a task would be a great relief to the hard pressed British Defence Forces that are spread all too thinly over the trouble spots of the Empire.

In the meantime we should use what political and military influence

we have to further develop the friendship of Burma and Indonesia, to hasten the defeat of the Communists in Malaya and Indo-China and to ensure that Japan prepares herself for possible Red aggression whilst remaining Communist-free.

Furthermore, in our own and the general interest, we must give, in close co-operation with the British Commonwealth and the United States, maximum possible economic assistance to all Communist threatened countries.

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### MACEDONIAN WARFARE.

The Macedonians revolutionized warfare. The great change they made was not this or that technical development, or even better generalship; it was the infusion of a new spirit.

When Alexander after Gaugamela took steps to prevent his enemy ever fighting again as an organised force, he was doing exactly what Nelson afterwards meant when he said that a victory was not complete if one ship of the line got away. This new spirit is not quite expressed as a change from the amateur to the professional—we almost feel as if we had passed from the ancient to the modern world.

It was rather the intense earnestness and thoroughness they brought to bear on the matter. They had no precedent, but they understood principles; if you had to fight, you fought for all you were worth, and with every sort of weapon except one. They did not, as a rule, practise the things we call atrocities; on balance, Macedonian warfare was distinctly more humane than either Greek or Roman . . . But if unorthodox methods helped you, if it aided your military operations to start a revolution, to employ propaganda, to create a combination reaching from Epirus to India, you did just these things as part of the day's work. When somebody put to Antigonus Gonatus the question beloved of later text-book writers: "How should one attack the enemy?" his answer was, "Any way that seems useful."

—W. W. Tarn in *"Hellenistic Military and Naval Developments."*

# SIGNIFICANCE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN A DEMOCRACY

Lieutenant N. G. Maloy, B.Ec., A.A.S.A.,  
Royal Australian Army Ordnance Corps.

IN a political democracy the widest body of demand is taken into consideration whilst formulating legislation, as the public have a part in the making of the laws. Their part in the formulation of the laws is exercised through the party system in Parliament, wherein there is a duly-elected majority party to govern and a defeated party—or opposition—to criticise the government's actions. Each side of the house is representative of some section of the community, and by process of government and criticism various points of view are brought forward. This process results in action which operates for the general benefit of all. Free discussion of this nature is the essence of democracy.

The party system is often criticized on the grounds that it slows down legislation because the parties enter Parliament with regimented views which cannot be broken down by discussion. Because of this apparent futility of discussion, it is held by the critics of the party system to be more expedient to have one body to govern without any opposition. However, in the British system, and in those countries which have modelled their political institutions on the British system, it has

been realized that the single party theory is inconsistent with democracy. In the British system recognition of the importance of the opposition is expressed in its formal title—"Her Majesty's Opposition."

The political democratic system may be two-party or multi-party. Generally, it may be said that the two-party system operates when the likelihood of any party, other than one of the two major parties, getting into power is negligible. At present the United Kingdom and Australia are working on the two-party system while France, for example, is working on the multi-party system. As the splitting of public opinion, to the extent required of the multi-party system, may very seriously impede government action, the two-party system is generally held to be the more satisfactory. Also, in the multi-party system public support tends to grow around individuals rather than around principles, while the pitfalls of shaky coalitions are always present.

In the United Kingdom the two-party system did not really come into being until the end of the nineteenth century. Since that time the consolidation and regimentation of the system has proceeded steadily, and has been accompanied by the development of many methods of

ensuring the constant co-operation of the party members, e.g., the party whips.

The object of a political party is to obtain a Government of its leaders, and to keep them governing as long as possible. Candidates are not elected because of personal attributes, though in some electorates these may be important, but because of the party label which they carry. They are expected to vote with the party on all major issues. If sufficient members fail to vote with the party the Government may resign, or dissolve Parliament. Since rebellious members enjoy no certainty of re-election, the threat of a dissolution may be all that is necessary to bring them into line.

Power to govern is sought by a party through the medium of the suffrage in which voting may be either compulsory or voluntary. In the leading democracies of today the right to vote is held by all adults of both sexes who have not been certified as insane. It is the electors who give the party label its value. The people are presented with the party's programme, and, by means of the ballot, they exercise their right to accept it or reject it. Even when a party has been elected to govern, its proposals may be rejected by public opinion expressed through the other channels available in a democratic state, e.g., freedom of speech and assembly, newspapers, etc. Further, the party in power must act within the limits of the Constitution, though there are occasions when it may act first and seek approval afterwards, in time of war, for example.

Since differential advantages are not consistent with democracy, a Government must consider the needs

of all the people if it wishes to increase, or even to retain, its majority. In the two-party system especially there is usually a large "floating vote" which can swing an election result. The parties endeavour to win these votes, and this can be done only by showing results which operate for the benefit of the people generally, and not merely in the interests of the adherents of the particular party in power. This "floating vote" is exercised by those members of the community who are not stalwart followers of any party and who are swayed at the election by results in the past, or promises for the future, achieved or made by the competing parties.

Although the significance of political parties is the same, generally, in all genuine democracies, it is conditioned by different codes which may vary from country to country. The limiting factor in each case is the Constitution which may be either rigid or flexible. From the community's and the party's point of view rigid Constitutions, like those of Australia and the United States, have the disadvantage that they are extremely hard to alter to meet changes in the legislative requirements of the nation. The Constitution of the United Kingdom is much more flexible.

The party system has been responsible for the evolution of the Cabinet, which is essentially a committee of the party, or coalition of parties, in power. In principle it consists of the most capable members, who are placed in charge of departments, and it links the executive branch of government to the legislative.

Generally, then, the significance of the political party in a democracy lies in the fact that it is the practical

means for obtaining popular rule by the people through the medium of the parties. Support for the party's platform is obtained by soliciting public approval and avoiding hostile criticism, especially from the "floating vote." Parties must keep in close contact with the electors in order to know their wishes, and the Constitution or the mandates obtained by referendum place the

necessary limits on their activities. In "Parliamentary Government in England," Professor Laski says: "There is no alternative to party government, save dictatorship, in any modern state of appreciable size. Government requires leaders; leaders require not an incoherent mob behind them, but an organized following able to canalize the issues for an electorate with a free choice."


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Not only will science and truth wither away where freedom is suppressed or curtailed, but the state itself will wake up one day to the realization that, both by reason of a pervasive dullness of mind which it has succeeded in generating among its citizenry, and by reason of the unavailability of material instruments which the inventiveness of freedom alone can supply, it is decisively handicapped in the pursuit of its own ends. He tampers with the source of life itself who tampers with freedom.

—Dr. Charles Malik, Republic of Lebanon.



## IN THE SHADOW



Prepared by Lieutenant-Colonel C. L. Thompson, MBE, 58/32 Infantry Battalion, from information already in existence, to which the writer pays tribute, but accepts responsibility for any omissions in putting this article together.

THE writing of this article was inspired by reading "The Camouflage Story,"<sup>1</sup> especially the chapters describing the measures taken at El Alamein to deceive the enemy. In the main, the methods adopted all possessed a remarkable similarity; they were simple and natural.

Lieutenant-Colonel Barkas, the author of "The Camouflage Story," writes convincingly on the need to deceive the enemy, and we cannot do better than quote his own words:

"The unmasking of one scheme of visual deception does not necessarily put camouflage out of business. Provided the enemy has an efficient intelligence service, pro-

vided he is capable of reacting to what he sees, or *thinks he sees*, he can apparently be taken in again and again.

"It is a game of bluff. Suppose you set out to trick your enemy, let us say with a dummy defensive position. Suppose you have done it well so convincingly that it has helped to shepherd his attack in a direction where, carefully concealed, your real strength has been lying in wait.

"Suppose that he has, nevertheless broken through and overrun the dummy position. He finds that your minefields were a sham and that many of your trenches were canvas and paint. He finds that your vehicles and stacks of ammunition were mockeries. He takes them to pieces, sees how they work, photo-

1. "The Camouflage Story," by Lieutenant-Colonel Geoffrey Barkas, OBE, MC, published by Cassell & Co. Ltd., 1952.

graphs them. He compares the results with his earlier air photographs. He knows all about them now. Will you ever be able to deceive him in the same way again?

"Never fear. Put yourself in the position of the enemy commander. Suppose that within a few weeks or months you try the same dummy on him again. Can he ignore it? It would be a bold commander who did so, for there are many things he still does not know. Is it an honest and straightforward swindle this time? Or do we merely want him to think so? Is it a warning or an invitation? Is it a dummy, anyway?

"Might not the real be hiding beneath the sham?"

The need for visual deception is always present be it so whether wars are fought with rifles, radar or guided missiles.

Whilst no apology is made for listing hereunder some of the more important rules on the subject of camouflage and concealment, it should be realised that complete adoption is one of degree. It is a matter of experience to know how much importance should be given to the question of camouflage in relation to other tactical requirements. For instance, in Korea, much skill is used to hide our posts from the enemy's ground observation, but little work is done to hide posts from air observation, because up to now, his air observation has been negligible.

#### Concealment.

The art of personal concealment lies in making the best use of ground and existing cover. The principal points are:

(a) A gradual movement is less likely to catch the eye than a rapid one.

- (b) When halted, keep absolutely still—know how to "freeze."
- (c) Avoid movement on a skyline.
- (d) Tone in with your background—keep in the shadow.
- (e) Avoid being silhouetted.
- (f) The face shows up more clearly than the rest of the body; therefore, break up its outline.

#### Camouflage.

Camouflage is the use of artificial aids to obtain concealment. It consists chiefly in breaking up the outline of the object concerned. The principal rules are:

- (a) Change the identity of the object by breaking its outline.
- (b) Study the surrounding landscape and copy it in colour and form.
- (c) Do not overdo your camouflage.
- (d) If local vegetation is used, it will fade and attract attention unless constantly renewed.

To aid the effectiveness of camouflage, a post should be sited:

- (a) In a shadow.
- (b) As close as possible to rocky outcrops, belts of timber, terraces, ledges or other existing patterns.
- (c) At the junction of two different types of ground such as the edge of a ploughed paddock.

Other rules which are important could well be repeated:

- (a) Lay down and enforce track discipline from the beginning. Use duckboards which can be taken away later. Improve vehicle tracks liable to become *waterlogged* before it rains.
- (b) Remove spoil from site, place under trees or make special dumps where it may be covered with turf, brushwood, etc.

- (c) Carefully conserve and stack turf and relay it over topsoil.
- (d) Use raised platforms (or at worst hessian) if spoil has to be stacked before removal so the original surface of the ground will not be disturbed.
- (e) Take special care that concrete is mixed on raised platforms.

Artificial aids, such as use of wire screens, hessian, garnishing paints and nets, produce many schemes.

Tracks are probably the biggest single "give away" in an area. It is therefore essential for track discipline to be rigidly enforced. Otherwise, failure to observe track discipline may neutralize other steps to camouflage an object.

The rules for track discipline are:

- (a) Make full use of existing tracks whenever possible.
- (b) Never cut corners.
- (c) Limit number of new tracks to an absolute minimum.
- (d) Fit all new tracks into the pattern of the background—along fences, gullies, creek beds, under trees, along the edge of scrub.

- (e) See that those which cannot be fitted into the ground pattern are carried beyond the position to which they lead, to some logical destination.
- (f) Institute one-way traffic systems for vehicles. Turning circles will often betray HQ, gun positions and dumps.
- (g) When a turning point is inevitable, site it under natural or artificial cover or on ground that may be frequently rolled or ploughed.
- (h) Prevent cable-laying and maintenance parties from making a "star mark" of straight tracks radiating from a HQ.


#### Deception.

The aim is to create a false picture, on which the enemy will act. It can be successful even on the individual scale, and should be part of all camouflage and fieldcraft training. There are three simple rules:

- (a) Think out what picture the enemy might see and paint the false one you wish him to see.




Disguising stores as lorries and bivouac tents.




Guns, gun limbers and a 25 pr. tractor disguised as ordinary lorries.

- (b) Use the factors that spoil concealment — movement, shine, shape and shadow—to create the false picture; and use them to the degree necessary — for example, the enemy under fire and smoke will be tricked by the crudest of dummies.
- (c) Keep one step ahead of the enemy; as he gets to know one ruse, go one better. Keep him guessing.

Training in deception should aim to teach every soldier that as well as concealing the real whereabouts of men, weapons and defences, he must



Tanks disguised as lorries.



A dummy lorry completed and a dummy tank in course of erection.



Sketch of a dummy water point at one end of a dummy pipe line, showing the "reservoir," the "pump-house" and a "soldier" filling cans.

confuse the enemy's observation and waste their fire by misdirecting it elsewhere.

### Examples.

The following sketches copied from "The Camouflage Story" illustrate the measures taken at El Alamein. They are made as part of the operation plan and initiated at the highest level. Lieutenant-Colonel Barkas describes his briefing for the task of organising the deception at El Alamein in the following words:

"In principle the task was simple. The planners told us what size and kind of 'forces' would be most likely to impress the enemy and influence his appreciation. They told us where and at what rate they should appear. They undertook to find the necessary labour, stores, and transport. The rest was up to us, but now we had the magic words 'Operational Priority' to back us up. In practice, the task entailed a mass of detailed staff work which I unloaded with confidence . . . reserving for myself the less arduous and more entertaining duty of touring and watching the circus grow."

### The Approach Tracks.

As there was no hope of concealing the direction of tracks from air observation, it was decided to:

- a) Site them in the least conspicuous areas.
- b) Commence the destruction of tracks at widely spread parts of the course, so that only on D-Day would they reveal themselves as one coherent system.

**Dumps.** — Walls of existing trenches were given a facing of extra masonry in the form of petrol cans stacked against the sides.

**Food.**—Dumps disguised as camouflaged lorries and bivouac tents.

**Guns.**—By backing limber up to gun and then rigging a dummy vehicle over the butt, a lifelike representation of a truck was presented.

**Armour.**—An existing tank was disguised by means of a canopy over it and made to look like a thin-vehicle.

Dummy tanks were used to swell concentrations to deceive the enemy as to our strength.



### Normandy.

The principles of "dig and camouflage" are repeatedly emphasized by troops in the face of superior artillery and fire power. For example, at St. Lo, in the Normandy hedgerow country, the Germans went to great pains to hide all traces of activity. They used the dense foliage to hide MG and rifle posts. Sods were planted on top of shelters; ammunition stacked along the hedgerows, covered with brush. Brush screens across entrances to fields permitted movement through them without detection by opposing ground forces. Previously prepared slots, connecting one field with another, made covered withdrawal from forward positions simple.

The following are two illustrations of German defences. (Taken from page 67 of USA "Tactical and Technical Trends," No. 54, Jan., 45.)

### Italy.


The illustrations of a German Anti-Tank Gun show heavy camouflage consisting of netting and reeds stretched on a pole frame over the gun emplacement. From the landing beach, the muzzle would be hard to pick out, although, of course, it



Typical firing positions in hedgerow, with observation post in tree above. These positions were not protected from air bursts.

Each of these hedgerow personnel shelter accommodated one or two men and afforded complete protection from all but direct hits.





**Camouflaged MG post. Steps in foreground lead to tunnel.**



**Concrete MG post hidden under thick camouflage of reeds.**



50 mm. A Tk gun on Mamifiano hill could fire on almost all the landing beach. Heavy camouflage consisted of netting and reeds

would be given away by its flash. It is doubtful whether it would be located by air photography, although the shadow of the muzzle of the Anti-Tank Gun might give a clue to its location to a trained aerial photo interpreter.


As a matter of interest, the photo of the German 90 mm. gun emplacement illustrates clearly the effective shadow when the sun shines on nets properly garnished. The shadow of the net can be seen in the centre of the gun emplacement. Also illustrated is a concrete German machine gun post hidden under a thick camouflage of reeds.

#### Conclusion.

It is hoped that the thoughts expressed in this article will stimulate junior officers and all those con-

cerned with the training of young soldiers in Fieldcraft and Tactics to keep before them the need for camouflage, concealment and deception. Too often in peacetime the tendency is to give time only to the training of soldiers in tactics and application of fire power, rather than to the problems of concealment and camouflage.

It is realised that a knowledge of tactics and the use of infantry weapons are prerequisites for ability to use correctly methods of deception. However, the challenge is ever present for all of us concerned with the training of young soldiers to give attention to camouflage and concealment training and bring this subject out of the shadow into the sunshine.



Checkerboard nets conceal a 90 mm. gun emplacement.

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# SPAIN—

## BASE OR REDOUBT

Professor von der Heydte, Lieutenant-Colonel  
(Rtd) in the German Army.

ON 26th September, 1953, three agreements between the United States and Spain were signed in Madrid. The first was a defence pact of ten years' duration which could be automatically prolonged for two further periods of five years each if one of the two signatories did not terminate the agreement. This defence pact was supplemented by an agreement, valid up to the 30th June, 1956, concerning economic aid which America undertook to grant Spain and by a convention providing for "joint defence aid," some articles of which may be abrogated at any time. In spite of their varying periods of validity the three agreements together form one indissoluble entity. Their aim is stated to be the "ensuring of peace and international security." The two governments are mutually bound "to co-operate to promote understanding and goodwill between peoples and maintain world peace," to "employ all means, mutually agreed to, to remove the causes of international tension" and to "fulfil all military obligations which they have undertaken in other bilateral

or collective agreements to which they are partners."

The Spanish Government binds itself "to contribute to the development and maintenance of its own defensive strength and that of the free world to the extent permitted by its human reserves, resources, institutions and the general economic position without allowing economic stability to be impaired" and "to employ all reasonable means necessary to the development of Spain's defensive capacity."

For the purpose of fulfilling this obligation the American armed forces are granted the use of military bases in Spain; the bases concerned are to be named for the first time in a later supplementary agreement. Only rumour designates them as the Mediterranean harbours of Cartagena, Almeria, Valencia and Barcelona and one Atlantic port—Cadix or La Coruna—together with the air bases of Madrid (Barajas) and Seville. These bases are to remain "under Spanish jurisdiction" and "under the Spanish flag and command"; they will be used jointly by the forces of both Powers. The United States is entitled to develop the bases and to import the goods required for the maintenance of

—Translated from "Wehrkunde," Germany, by Thos. B. Dunne, Army HQ, Eire, and reprinted in the "Irish Defence Journal," November, 1953.

American personnel attached to those bases duty-free into Spain; Spanish supplies and services availed of by the United States "for joint defence purposes" will enjoy a large measure of freedom from taxation.

On termination of the agreement the United States may dismantle installations built at its expense or sell them to Spain. The security of the bases is primarily the responsibility of Spain; the United States may, however, "without restriction" provide protection for its own personnel and installations. U.S. military and economic commissions remaining in Spain, under the aegis of the American Embassy and enjoying diplomatic immunity, are entitled to supervise, in "full freedom," the execution and functioning of the agreements. In return Spain is, first of all, permitted to dispose of the "frozen" 226,000,000 dollars which were already promised, in principle, under the American Mutual Security Act during the 1951-53 period for allocation by the 30th June, 1954, but which could not be paid over until the negotiations preceding the pacts under discussion were concluded. 141,000,000 dollars of this amount are reserved for purely military purposes. Furthermore, the United States undertakes "to supply war material during a period of several years in order to contribute, insofar as is possible, in co-operation with Spanish industry to the building up of an effective air defence of Spain and to improve the material of the Spanish ground and naval forces."

The extent and nature of these forthcoming measures of assistance—which must also include the

thorough modernization of the road and rail network and signal communications without which any form of armaments assistance could not produce the desired effect—must always be determined in technical discussions dictated by circumstances and be dependent on priorities and limitations which the United States has conceded to third countries in agreements as well as on approval of the required amounts by the American Congress.

The conclusion of the American-Spanish military alliance forced the Iberian Peninsula on the attention even of those people to whom Spain had hitherto been both an unknown and uninteresting country. The agreements provide the American forces on the Iberian Peninsula with a unique rear base for military operations in Europe. The Spanish harbours as bases and supply-centres permit the American fleet to conduct naval warfare in the Mediterranean, no longer dependent on home or British bases. Through its position between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, Spain is a link between the American naval units in the Mediterranean and the homeland. The Spanish airfields on the plains of Seville and Murcia, as well as on the high plateau of Madrid (which if properly developed would, due to the terrain, be suitable for all types of modern aircraft, and due to the favourable southern climate, be usable the whole year round) would enable the American forces to conduct air operations extending at least to the Congo, the Suez Canal, over the Dardanelles and up to the German North Sea coast. Spain is for America a large aircraft-carrier on the doorstep of

the Old World of which the Mediterranean is still the centre.

In a very different, but no less important sense, the Mediterranean is as significant to the American military command as it is to the British General Staff. To the English, the Mediterranean is the great line of communications between West and East—a line of communications controlled by the two extremities which are in greatest danger, the Straits of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal, and the fortress of Malta in the centre. To the Americans, the Mediterranean is a link between North and South, between Europe and Africa, and simultaneously the great anti-tank ditch dividing Europe and Africa; this North-South link—and this anti-tank ditch—is effectively flanked by the Spanish position.

Spain is a base for the conduct of war in Europe and Africa, but it is not a redoubt: Spain's geographical strength, its "geographical omnipotence" of which Donoso Cortes spoke a hundred years ago, lies in its relationship to Europe and Africa and not in the barrier of the Pyrenees which divides Spain from the European continent.

In the age of parachutist and airborne operations there are not only no islands, but no peninsulas. An enemy who has penetrated across the Rhine into the strategic heart of Europe or encircled Europe from the south in a gigantic pincers movement, thrusting as far as Tripoli and Tunis, is simply invited to undertake large-scale parachutist and airborne operations in the Iberian Peninsula. Spain (as in the north of Europe, Denmark, and, with certain qualifications, Ireland) is one

of those countries particularly endangered by parachutist and airborne landings. The parachutist finds in Spain everything he could desire for a successful operation: a thinly populated country in which at least tactical surprise is possible and the strength and intentions of the airborne force can remain concealed during the critical hours following the landing; terrain providing favourable cover and natural positions facilitating the preparation of ground operations after the landing; a few lines of communications which could easily be cut and—over great distances—a loose, rather defective network of traffic arteries, mostly narrow roads and one-track railways which are simply an invitation to the enemy to block them and render rapid, effective defensive operations against airborne troops extremely difficult; and last but not least, a land of wide spaces which allows the attacking parachutist the necessary freedom of movement and facilitates the systematic operational extension in all directions of the terrain won after the first landing while giving the defending ground forces no opportunity to mount preventive defence action by the adequate local protection of particularly endangered areas and the assembly of sufficient reserve divisions; such preventive defensive action against airborne forces requires and would permanently tie down such strong forces that the remaining defence units—on the coast and the front—would be gravely endangered.

This sensitivity to airborne operations to a great extent offsets the advantage which Spain derives from the short distance covered by its northern frontier. The entire length

f this frontier is 677 kilometres, that is, one-third of Italy's Alpine frontier; of this 677 kilometres there is only one sector, barely 200 kilometres wide, favouring aggressive action. This is the area between Roncesvalles and Irun, the historic gateway to Spain which has been the scene of invasions and counter-invasions—a central chain of mountains with no strong natural sectors running east to west—while the high mountain-chain of the Eastern Pyrenees does not offer very practicable terrain to modern armies and scarcely permits the execution of large-scale operations.

Spain's sensitivity to airborne operations also renders deceptive and unfounded the hopes of many "isolationist" Spaniards for an Iberian redoubt behind the Pyrenees in the event of war in Europe. It also proves conclusively how doubtful—not to mention impossible—a peripheral defence of Europe would be. Spain is a base, not a redoubt. Even the Pyrenees, because of their lack of depth, do not offer as suitable a site for a redoubt as, for instance, the Alps.

Spain cannot be defended on the Pyrenees; it must be defended on the Elbe. Undoubtedly the Spanish General Staff has recognized this fact as clearly as the American military command; at any rate many of the provisions in the agreements just concluded, if their military significance and their aims in the event of war are carefully examined, indicate that it was not the intention of the contracting parties to create an Iberian redoubt but an Iberian base to support a defence lying as far eastwards as possible in Europe.

The value of agreements such as those now concluded by Spain and

the United States depends not so much on the written text as on the implementation of the individual provisions. A study of the text suffices to show the care taken by both partners to the agreements; the Spanish-American agreements of the 26th September, 1953, may serve as a model for the elaboration of mutual agreements. Nevertheless, the implementation of these agreements will produce many minor cases of friction. Such a close alliance as that entered into by the United States and Spain could not rigidly exclude friction in its operation in view of the extreme differences in the entire sociological and political structure of the two countries. Such friction will, of course, for the most part, occur in the political and not in the military field; the next few years may bring many cases of temporary differences of opinion and discord arising out of the Spanish Government's obligation "to stabilise the national currency, create and maintain internal financial stability and, in general, restore and maintain confidence in Spanish currency," or Spain's undertaking to suppress trade practices and trade agreements encouraging the formation of monopolies and cartels in any shape or form—an undertaking designed to liberalize an economic system which is strongly influenced by tendencies towards a planned economy—or finally arising out of the Spanish Government's duty to grant the United States within Spain, that is for consumption by the Spanish people, "complete freedom of information" regarding the purpose and progress of the American aid programme.

These trivial cases of friction and differences of political opinion



will, it is true, scarcely affect the military sector. In the military sphere the primary requirement will be that the American soldier should become aware, as soon as possible, not only of the individuality, but also of the value of the Spanish soldier, that he should learn to understand and appreciate the spirit animating the Spanish soldier which impelled him to such peerless actions during the Civil War and in the "Blue Division" in the Second World War.

Following on the alliance with America, Spain will be able to contribute much to European defence. Its most valuable contribution will be the spirit of the Spanish soldier which is embodied in leading military personalities such as Franco, Moscardó, Gerardo Caballero, Muñoz Grande and Vigon, just as it is reflected in thousands and thousands

of unknown Spanish soldiers who voluntarily gave their lives in the Civil War and in Russia in order to halt the Red tide threatening Europe.

If the American soldier succeeds in meeting his new Spanish ally with the necessary tact, appreciating his qualities and his merits, this military alliance of two vastly different peoples and states can give birth to a unique synthesis of cool calculation and concentrated passion, highly developed technique and chivalrous spirit, the most valuable achievements of modern times and the no less valuable traditions of a glorious past—a synthesis which by its strength will considerably influence all future strategic planning and help to free us from the nightmare necessity for a peripheral defence as the "ultima ratio" in a Europe which is militarily too weak

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