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

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WHY DO IT, COLONEL?

Why not get someone else to do it?

Major-General S. H. W. C. Porter, CBE, DSO, ED.,
Citizen Force Member of the Military Board.

RECENTLY I read of a well known business man — an American—who was outstandingly successful. He was perfectly healthy, had not even a stomach ulcer, knew all his children other than merely by sight at the breakfast table, had plenty of leisure and made the most of it. As well, he belonged to all the clubs to which a business man should belong, and played an effective part in community service.

When asked how he managed such a successful business while also attending to so many other activities, he said: "Firstly I choose my executives and specialists carefully. Then I do only three things. I ORIGINATE, DELEGATE and SUPERVISE." He admitted, however, that it required more than a college education to gain proficiency in reducing his personal application of his resources to these. At first, it was easier for him to do many of the things himself, which he now left to his experts.

I will not bore you with the details of how he hired experts to take over the interpretation of the mass of legal, commercial and technical "regulations" under which he had to operate; and how he hired more experts to carry out the routine requirements which were consequent upon these; and finally, how he hired experts to examine and test processes and to advise his executives and himself. Simply will I say that he was governed by as many, and more, conditions as is the CO of a regiment. In addition, his customers held the big stick over him.

You, Colonel, do not have to hire experts. You have an establishment of officers, warrant officers, non-commissioned officers, specialists and others; and, once the establishment has been filled, or even partially filled, your task begins. Of the three administrative processes which have been mentioned as part of the business man's task, you are able to skip the first; for a nice collection of regulations and instructions has been assembled and handed to you by "up above." Your establishment enables you to be provided with an administrative

force with which to account for the remaining two—routine administration and testing or checking.

You, of course, must organize your processes. You must appoint people to carry out each process; and you must supervise the execution of their duties—particularly the testing or checking. You, or your predecessors, may have erred in choosing the personalities to fulfil the requirements of the establishment; or, in these difficult days you may not have enjoyed the advantage of choice.

Have you, however, made the most of what choice was yours? Allowing for the fact that the choice of a man with potential more often than not results in the rapid development of an expert, if he is given responsibility, have you seriously sorted out men or youths with potential? Better still, have you an officer in your unit, whose task is minutely to study every draft of newcomers, in search of potential?

Potential for what?

Well, as I have hinted at, unburdening the CO of routine work, so that he may get on with ORIGINATING and SUPERVISING—and as his main burden is said to be administration—*let us look at some* of the burdensome regulations which an efficient staff officer has sorted out for me—and for you, Colonel.

In "Financial Instructions Relating to CMF, 1948," it will be seen that the CO is responsible for obtaining postage stamps (Para. 355), making sure he has sufficient on hand; is to hold the bank passbook and forward it to the bank at frequent intervals; is to verify the deposit with the bank and issue a receipt to the Command Paymaster; is to hold "P" vouchers; is to keep a guard book containing the roll and duplicate pay lists for the unit; and is to issue receipts to Company Commanders after checking the accuracy of pay reconciliations by the latter.

All these little tasks hardly warrant the years of experience which most COs possess, let alone the DSO, ED which they sometimes possess.

However, looking further, we find that Para. 170 gives a lead:

> "The financial *administration* and accounting of a unit is a responsibility of the CO, who will ensure BY SUPERVISION and check, that any accounting work performed on *his behalf is cor*rectly done . . ."

In a sense, a CO is analogous to a trustee; and in any case he would be well advised to act as a trustee. If he is to command his unit, he will obviously be incapable of spending his time running hither and thither with postage stamps and bank passbooks, or even applying green ticks to books of account.

I quote "Snell's Principles of Equity": "But this does not mean that trustees must themselves per*sonally do every act which is* necessary to be done in the execution of the trust. They have always been allowed to administer the trust through the instrumentality of *others whenever there is a moral* or legal necessity for so doing, or where as prudent men of business they would do so on their own behalf."

When there are shortages and discrepancies, more often than not the CO has lacked nothing of energy and sense of duty; but he has often neglected to appoint someone to

help him supervise and check the work of those directly handling money or stores. By trying to do all himself, he has failed in his duty.

There are few duties which a CO cannot delegate. So far as "Financial Instructions" are concerned (excepting the signing of certificates, etc.), there is one only: Para. 300 (2) "As the responsibility for the return of unclaimed pay rests upon the CO, he will make a personal inspection of the paysheets to ensure that all unpaid amounts have been returned by Command Commanders."

AMR & O, 1423-1433 prescribe general responsibilities of a CO, a typical example being:

> "1426. Every CO will be responsible for the condition of the arms under his charge and for their periodical inspection and repair."

How often have we seen COs peering down rifle barrels, in a night light, affecting a profound knowledge of what goes on inside? Fortunately, they do not often take the repair of arms unto themselves. The arms of the unit are far better in the hands of experts; and inspections will be more regularly and effectively carried out if the CO appoints suitable officers for the purpose and ensures that they execute their tasks.

Have you a "Weapons officer" in your unit, Colonel?

"Standing Orders for the Equipment of the AMF and Australian Cadet Corps" place quite a load on the square shoulders of the poor CO who does not or cannot make a plan of delegation. He is responsible for every article of equipment; and, what is more, he must see that every article is serviceable. He must make frequent inspections of "the whole of the clothing and equipment on issue to members under his command." Not even the introduction of women to the army has caused this instruction to be amended. But I hope, by now, you will see the reason why I quoted the "Trustee's Handbook" where it says, ". . . whenever there is a moral or legal necessity . . ." the CO may carry out his trust through the instrumentality of others.

You simply cannot do everything, Colonel—not by yourself, at any rate.

Further to my hint that you should not personally inspect certain clothing, Para. 5 of Standing Orders for Equipment, etc., requires you to ensure that the procedure prescribed is ". . . followed by responsible officers."

If you insist upon reading these instructions literally, you are likely to spend your days in a boiler suit, issuing workshop equipment to detachments, forwarding original copies of something to Local Purchase Officers and preparing schedules of something else, in duplicate, on the first day of every month, while your potential experts play darts.

Unfortunately, there are many COs who ruefully state: "It's all very well. You cannot delegate if you have nobody capable of accepting responsibility."

While discussing one of these overburdened COs, I quoted this, his unhappy statement, to a distinguished, senior commander of the AMF. His retort was: "Ha, ha. His former CO said the same thing."

The fact is, we do not know what talent we have in our units if we do not "hire an expert" to examine our manpower. We probably have accountants, ladies' wear experts metallurgists and the kind of thieves one hires when one wants to catch a thief. Every soldier in our units has an I.Q. (Intelligence quotient) and a set of aptitudes. We should discover potential, and put it to work.

Do not misunderstand me, Colonel. You cannot rid yourself of all your work and responsibility. You will still be busy ORIGINATING, DELEGATING and SUPERVISING. You have a training responsibility, too. Your second-in-command, for instance, needs a little training and practice. So, after you have trained yourself to distinguish the "important from the unimportant" and have developed the investor's sense of picking flaws, you might devote some time to putting him in the picture.

Now that we have mentioned training, we have opened consideration of the remainder of the CO's burdens. In fact, his main purpose in peace time is *training.*

You are probably going to tell me, Colonel, that I should have commenced with a discussion of training; that a certain amount of training is necessary before administration can commence; and that the majority of the people in your unit are there to be trained in warlike pursuits.

I must agree with you. However, I have already made the point that there will be many who come into the Army with qualifications for civilian pursuits which are capable of being turned to account in your unit administration; and, when they are discovered and put to work, they will greatly augment the trained nucleus which usually exists. I now make the point that this also applies to other than administration.

Apart from the training which newcomers to your unit will have received in National Service Training Battalions, you may discover electricians, bricklayers, plumbers and other tradesmen. They will all lighten your burden.

It is safe to assume, too, that your leaders have been chosen because they are capable of learning and training others at the same time, with some degree of efficiency.

There will probably be few officers who are as capable as you at composing training syllabii, field firing exercises and TEWTS; or conducting coaching courses, training guards, delivering lectures, training sports teams and enlivening the unit rifle club. The chances are your officers and NCOs will never be as capable as you, unless you delegate responsibility to them. Some may have an even greater potential for certain types of training than you had at a corresponding stage of development.

You will have your share of instruction to do; but you cannot do all the training for which you are responsible. It then becomes a problem of choice of the things you will do and the things you will delegate to others.

Should you single out certain types of training which you, and you alone, will perform with your superior efficiency — hoping, of course, that the lesser standards of others will improve? I suggest this may have the result of keeping you very busy with your department of

training, to the detriment of the remainder of the unit training.

It has been said in discussion of top executives and leaders generally—all of whom have never enough time—that it is not a question of how much time they devote to a job, but how they use the time available.

Your unit will best profit by your wide experience and knowledge, and your subordinates will learn most from you, if you make your aim the setting of higher standards, the co-ordination of effort and the development of potential. To do this you must be free to take a hand wherever it is most needed, but only for so long as it is needed, or until you are able to hand over to a subordinate with the necessary potential. By so doing, you are able to *originate* standards on a wider field, *delegate* and *supervise*.

Pursuit

Until now they had been following the caravan road skirting the foothills, keeping the open desert on their right. Now Alexander learned that there was a way straight across the desert, but without water. Inspecting the units that had kept up with him, he dismounted five hundred of the most weary cavalry, replacing them with the same number of infantry in the best condition. Leaving the remainder of the foot behind, he struck across the desert by moonlight.

This time he did not stop. Through the day the mounted column began to thin out. In the noon heat the men went on like automatons, because Alexander kept on. They were out of water. Some scouts came in with a small skin or a helmet filled with water that they had scooped up from the rocks. This they offered to Alexander.

"Who are you bringing this to?" he asked.

"To you."

Around the water hundreds of men were gathered, their eyes on it. No one said anything. Alexander emptied the water out into the sand. "It does no good for one to drink alone," he said.

Toward the end of the afternoon they sighted the dust of the fugitives, on the road close to the hills. The desert march had lasted for forty-seven miles.

—*Harold Lamb in "Alexander of Macedon."*

Commanders Must Know Logistics

Lieutenant-General W. B. Palmer, US Army.

IN 1942, certain artillery units landed with their guns in Africa, only to find that their boxes of sights, quadrants and accessories were on another ship which had returned to the United States without unloading. The commanders of those units must take the blame, no matter how many transportation officers interfered; the commanders had allowed their units to become useless. There have also been cases in recent years in which artillery units landed in a combat zone to find no ammunition of their calibre anywhere in the theatre; that could hardly be blamed on the unit commander.

In every war there is a dreadful howl about artillery and mortar ammunition. As an artilleryman, I am all for using plenty of artillery and mortars to save the lives of the infantry. I spent the whole of World War II convincing infantry and tank commanders that it was the smart thing to do. At the same time, I was well aware that the United States could not provide all the ammunition I wanted. We have to share the steel with the Navy, the Marine Corps, the Air Force and the Merchant Marine. We also have to build bridges, railroads, depots and air bases in countries 5,000 miles across the oceans. You cannot build your battle techniques on dreams of unlimited artillery ammunition. The field commander simply must know the ammunition situation for each major operation, or he is practically certain to run short when it hurts the worst.

These artillery problems, however, are very small compared to some really gigantic ones which clearly demonstrate that the training of future commanders should include a more solid foundation in the logistics of conducting war on the far side of the ocean. The things I am going to mention now reflect this need very seriously, especially in the matter of opening beach-heads on foreign shores.

Repeatedly in World War II, supplies were landed in such an excess of tonnage over the capabilities of the local logistic organisation to cope with it, that pretty soon many things could not be found at all. The next thing, the zone of the in-

—*From the "Quartermaster Review," USA.*

terior had to rush out a special shipload of something which was right there in the theatre—and always at a time when ships were worth their weight in gold. Soon the war moved on and supplies were left behind, which are still being gathered up and sorted out to this day.

Two years after the Korean War started, I visited Pusan. They had been working hard, and by that time they had sorted out probably 75 per cent. of the supply tonnage there. Twenty-five per cent. of the tonnage on hand was not yet on stock record and locator cards; they did not know what it was or where it was. I think that is approximately correct.

In Pusan I saw another example of what happens in oversea wars. It was really impossible to check accurately what was unloaded from a ship, because the native Korean tally-men listed many boxes of "This Side Up" and many more of "Handle With Care."

General LeRoy Lutes once told me that in 1942 he visited a South Pacific port where he found 75 ships lying at anchor waiting to be unloaded, while the rate of unloading was four ships a week—this at a time when shipping was desperately scarce. The commander concerned was doing the best logistic job he knew how according to the training he had received, and the challenge is that hereafter his training should be such as to prevent him from making such blunders. We must modify our professional standards and train our future commanders so that they can balance what they insist on having with what they actually need and can handle when it gets there.

The American policy of establishing its defence line overseas has a vastly important corollary. You always have to provide logistic support for dependent allies.

When I commanded X Corps in Korea, I had the Turks, Columbians, Filipinos and Ethiopians, but all of them were logistically assimilated into United States divisions by that time, and no important logistical problems arose at Corps. But the Corps was deeply involved with six different kinds of Korean personnel, and each kind was on a different supply status.

First there were complete Korean divisions; then part of my Corps troops belonged to the Republic of Korea Army; third, I had a Korean Service Corps division, which was composed of civilians under a ROK Army cadre; fourth, National police; fifth, a hush-hush Intelligence outfit; and sixth, a large number of Koreans serving right in our own United States infantry companies and artillery batteries. These six kinds of Koreans involved five different rations and uniforms.

When you give an ally modern weapons and equipment, you are up against maintenance and parts supply. The long period of static warfare in Korea has given us time to accomplish a great deal among the Korean combat units. Repeated command inspections have been valuable in bringing the Korean commanders and their staffs and technical services to improve their maintenance and to overcome that hoarding instinct of hiding weapons and ammunition and then asking for more. ROK division commanders soon began to keep equipment status charts in their war-rooms—making their G4's keep the record in plain sight. The per centage of

deadlined vehicles came down in a steady improvement. Just before I left, my Corps Signal Officer told me that the ROK units had their signal equipment in better shape than did the United States Army units.

As a Corps commander I went again and again to everybody above me to get a decent flow of spare parts for the old Japanese trucks used by the ROK Army, and to get complete kits of vehicular tools and artillery tools for the ROK ordnance companies. They were getting good mechanics but lacked the tools and parts to do their jobs.

There was also a constant problem whether the ROK ration was sufficient to keep the men in health. Their money was so inflated that division commanders could not buy the necessary food to supplement the rice which was issued in kind.

A corps commander finds himself putting plenty of personal energy into logistical problems in this sort of situation. And since it is certainly a fact of life that we may have to fight overseas, all commanders of United States forces will find themselves coping with the support of dependent allies.

Logistic lead-time is another serious fact of life which faces every commander.

Nearly always, the most desirable strategic decisions are constricted by logistical conditions for which there is no early remedy. Acute shortage of ocean shipping must be regarded as a normal logistical handicap in embarking on an oversea war. The first problem is how to get to the war area at all.

The over-all logistic situation at any given time is very largely a result of what looked like a good idea three, four or five years ago. If a commander asks suddenly for some weapon or equipment which is not in production, he will not get it for probably two years; and if he merely decides that he wants more —or less—of something which is in production, it may take four months.

When the field commander decides to add Koreans to his United States units, or to form some new tank units from stocks in his depots, he must move with precision to tidy up the situation back through the pipeline. If you start to feed, clothe and equip 15 per cent. more than your United States troop ceiling, you had better make sure that the zone of the interior[1] is prepared immediately to pick up the added requirements and to ship accordingly.

Or if you decide to convert some tank units from M4 to M48, using stocks in your own depots, you should realize that those stocks represent your battle consumption factor for the units you already have, and make sure that the zone of the interior not only replaces the tanks you took out of stock, but also alters your troop basis and increases the automatic shipments for consumption.

Let me give you another story about lead-time. In London, one day in January or February, 1944, one of our greatest generals told me that our M4 tanks must have half of their ammunition in the form of white phosphorus shells for the invasion of Europe. He said they had burned up lots of German tanks with white phos-

1. Main Support Area.

phorus shells in Sicily, and nobody in the 2nd Armoured Division could tell me about it. I think we were then manufacturing about 5 per cent. white phosphorus shells for the M4 tank, and little could be done about it for many months, but I went at once to the 2nd Armoured Division to get the story. The commanders all assured me that it was quite true—they had really paid off in Sicily, setting German tanks on fire with white phosphorus.

I then asked them for detailed accounts of some actions in which this had occurred, giving the facts with all possible exactitude. Ten days later, I was told that they had been unable to find a single tank soldier who would claim to have set a German tank on fire with white phosphorus shells. What they did find was one case in which an "assault gun" (which was a light tank carriage armed with a 75-mm. mountain howitzer of low muzzle velocity) had been shooting white phosphorus at a German tank which broke into flames. The gunner said very honesty that a lot of things had been firing at the German tank and he did not know whether he or somebody else set it on fire. Evidently some onlooker saw the white phosphorus burst just before the tank started to burn; and from this story the thing had grown, until one of the greatest tank experts in the world wanted me to change the whole production of tank ammunition right now. This incident certainly taught me a profound lesson about getting the facts.

These, then, are what I call the facts of life, and up to now they have been the sort of thing you ought to know so you will not get into trouble. But we come now to something right in your own outfit, and that is the certainty that your troops will become negligent and wasteful in supply and maintenance unless you are very determined about it.

Every experience in my life supports that statement; you can be certain that it will be true. Every commander must jump into supply discipline with speed, vigour and persistent follow-through.

In Korea I had occasion to inspect an American infantry regiment. First I gave them time to put in requisitions and replace their shortages. Only after that did I make my command inspection. To give you only one example, I found that too many of the crew-served weapons did not have their proper accessories and spare parts. Nobody from top to bottom held anyone responsible for such things. One outfit had four recoilless rifles with three sights, two quadrants and one rammer staff. All machine guns were similarly deficient.

It appals me to think how many failures occur in this very last link of the logistic chain. Equipment is manufactured at great expense. It is shipped 5,000 miles by train, ship and truck. It is issued to the troops and eventually, with great labour, carried to the top of a mountain in Korea. How many times, at that last point, had this whole enormous effort been thrown away, as carelessly as a burnt match, by the happy-go-lucky negligence of the people whose lives depend on keeping the stuff in shape?

If a commander has an eye open for waste and neglect of equipment as he goes about, he may at times feel despair about improving the

situation; it appears so universal and shows up in such a myriad of ways.

But the remedy is not too difficult, provided the commander himself is a determined man and really means business. He makes his senior technical service officers get around actively and come home with specific reports of bad conditions. He also makes them give him comparative charts which show the most backward units. In other words, he gets the facts; that always comes first. He then speaks personally to each commander who appears to be falling behind in any respect. He can do this in the most friendly way. It is not the abusive tone but the simple fact of interest in the matter that makes his subordinate jump.

I also believe firmly in command inspections. They are a great help to subordinate commanders, who are younger and less experienced.

That brings me to the commander's relation to his G4 and his supply services.

What is our American concept of the function of the General Staff? It is to assist the commander in doing everything which, if he had supernatural powers, he would do himself as part of his own job of command. This is our doctrine on the subject, and accordingly it is impossible for any commander to dismiss the G4 function as something to be done by a specialist. It is an integral part of the function of command. It is also our General Staff doctrine not to take direct charge of matters which are not a part of the commander's own job, such as signal services, medical services, engineer services, transportation services, and so forth. Those are the jobs of specialists.

Well, then, how do you work with your G4? First of all, pick a forceful man, determined and energetic, a man who has the qualifications of a commander. He has to be an alert, intelligent chap who stays on top of the game with all parts of your command, and it is even more important that he be on the top of the game with the next higher headquarters. He must be a man with the qualifications of leadership and command.

Second, you work out with him regular periodic reports which will enable you to know how you stand logistically, for the whole and in each subordinate command. These reports should be neither numerous nor complex for it is the job of your G4 to save your time by digesting into simple form the information you need.

Third, make it a practice to comment to your subordinate commanders (and of course to your staff) on the information you thus acquire. Your interest in any subject reverberates throughout your command.

Fourth, make command inspections.

Fifth, act aggressively with your superiors to ensure that you get what you need in plenty of time. Here is an especially important point. Whenever the chief of a technical service from a higher level comes down to visit your headquarters, be loaded for bear. Show an aggressive and forceful interest in critical shortages. You will be amazed how delighted he will be by your knowledge, and how eagerly he will help you out. Neither your G4 nor your service chiefs can make the impression that is produced by your rank and prestige; that is just human nature.

I have thought a great deal for many years about the functions of the different General Staff sections. Each is different from the others. It may surprise you to know that G1 is the spot in which I prefer to train my future Chief of Staff. In the case of my G4, I consider him to be in fact—although not in title—the Deputy Commander for logistics. He does in fact command the seven technical services operationally. He is constantly making commitments at higher levels. You want him to act for you in the fullest possible manner, while you dominate the G3 field yourself.

In the Department of the Army, the command relationship of G4 is formally defined in regulations, which state that G4 "directs and controls the technical services." A G4 in the field exercises command informally, by force of personality and leadership, by intelligence and energy. While it is true that his orders are always in the name of the commander, your G4 must be a man whose many day-to-day informal orders are not questioned by the recipients.

I consider it the personal business of the commander himself to spot individuals who are inadequate and must be replaced. He must handle such cases so as to protect his staff from being given the onus. The first thing you want from a staff is harmonious relations, within the staff itself, and with higher and lower commands. You want your G4 to maintain great harmony and trust throughout his extensive dealings. The best corps G4's I have known, in two wars at that level, steered away from recommending reliefs for incompetence. I do, of course, expect my G4 to answer honestly when I raise the question myself.

But I am sure that the detection and relief of inadequate subordinates is most peculiarly the job of the commander personally, and you must not neglect this in the technical services any more than elsewhere. The technical services (like everybody else) are always desperately short of good men. If you will put up with weak sisters, that is the only kind you will get, while other commanders get the good ones. Write that down in your book as the last fact of life.

I can summarize all this in a few words. The ultimate business of a field commander is to destroy the enemy in combat. By personal foresight and care for his logistical arrangements, he can put them in order before the day of battle and thus free himself to turn his personal attention to the fighting.

But, in a broader sense, all of us still have a lot to learn about conducting overseas wars and supporting dependent allies. Scrutinize all recent historical examples with a most critical eye and you will find that our training of future commanders has not prepared them to cope with their logistic problems as skilfully as they cope with tactical problems; in fact, many of them have displayed ignorance and inadequacy which, if continued, can only result in an indefensible proportion of waste, extravagance and paralysis.

The EMPLOYMENT OF AIR POWER in the KOREAN WAR

Major M. B. Simkin,
Royal Australian Infantry.

TO HELP explain some of the idiosyncrasies of what has been termed by many as a "phony war" it is essential that some thought be given to the politico-military background. With this as a basis some of the later paragraphs discussing the application of air power will be seen in their correct perspective.

In 1945, in the concluding phase of the war against Japan, Korea was temporarily divided at the 38th parallel of latitude into American and Russian zones of occupation. Ostensibly it was the purpose of the four Great Powers to create a local democratic government under international trustees, whose responsibilities would cease after five years of guardianship. A joint commission of the American and Soviet commands, in collaboration with Korean representatives, was expected to make the necessary recommendations for the establishment of such a government. However, this benevolent intention was frustrated by conflict between the rival interpretations of democracy and while the United States tried to foster the growth of a liberal community below the dividing parallel, Russia fed the northern half of the country with its Communist doctrines and began to erect the framework of a Russian satellite state.

The Russians, by September, 1948, had installed a "Supreme People's Assembly" so closely aligned with Soviet policy that they, one month later, were able to withdraw their troops—leaving behind, however, a *reasonably well trained and equipped* North Korean Army. This Army comprised just over eight divisions, supported by about 100 excellent tanks of Soviet manufacture, ample artillery and an air force of over 150 Yak fighters of Russian origin.

In May, 1948, elections were held in South Korea (supervised by the United Nations) and Dr. Syngman Rhee was elected President. In January, 1949, the United States, in deference to the wishes of the United Nations, withdrew its occupation forces, leaving behind a small military mission of 500 officers and men. Elections were again held in the summer of 1950, still supervised

by the United Nations, but this time the North Korean "Supreme People's Assembly" denounced this exhibition of democratic practice and demanded the establishment of an all-Korean government. Five days later it invaded the virtually undefended Republic to achieve its purpose by force of arms.

Phases of the Campaign.

For the purposes of this paper the Korean campaign can conveniently be divided into three phases. Firstly, from June to November, 1950. During this period the North Korean Air Force fought alone with piston engined Yak aircraft, whilst the North Korean Army advanced to the Naktong River before being forced back to within a few miles of the Yalu. The second phase covers the period December, 1950, to July, 1951, when the Chinese Communist Air Force started to operate with jet fighters. During this phase the Chinese Communist Army also moved into North Korea and forced the United Nations armies back beyond the 38th parallel. The third phase from July, 1951, to the armistice saw our interdiction campaign pay big dividends as the ground forces of both sides sat in stalemated positions just north of the parallel.

Using these three phases as a framework it is now intended to discuss the different roles that air forces were called upon to perform during the Korean war. During the discussion of each, several conditions peculiar to the war in Korea will be noted. The effect these pervading conditions had on the outcome of the campaign as a whole will be summed up in the concluding paragraphs of the paper.

Air Superiority.

Upon the outbreak of war the Commanding General of the United States Far Eastern Air Force ordered maximum effort flying with the object of obtaining air superiority as soon as possible. F.51, F.80 and F.82's were employed, flying from bases in Japan, and within two weeks North Korean air opposition had been virtually eliminated. The F.E.A.F. was then able to devote itself almost exclusively to operations in support of ground troops. For the remainder of phase one air superiority was complete and our ground forces were able to advance to the Yalu without the worries of air interference.

With the entry of Chinese jets and strong ground forces into the battle, the complexion of the war changed overnight. MiG 15's, operating from beyond the diplomatic barrier of the Yalu, proved more than a match for the American aircraft, and air superiority was lost. Through sheer weight of numbers our ground forces were forced back and it was not until they had reached a point just south of Seoul that they were able to halt. At this point they once again had complete air superiority, for the Communists could not move their fighters to within range of the bombline. Why did the MiG's remain north of the Yalu? The answer is simple— our bombers operating with strong fighter escorts destroyed and kept out of action all airfields in North Korea.

For the remainder of the war the air superiority situation remained the same. In the bombline area the United Nations had complete freedom of action. North of Pyongyang this superiority decreased until just south of the Yalu, where it was

slightly in favour of the Communists.

Strategic Bombing.

During the first phase of the war United States B.29's bombed large marshalling yards, rail and road bridges, and supply dumps as far north as Sinanju. However, these forces were limited in number and were not allowed to attack their normal first priority target—the industrial potential of the enemy. In this campaign that industrial potential lay in the depths of Manchuria, China and the U.S.S.R., all across the diplomatic barrier of the Yalu.

For the remainder of the campaign these tasks did not differ; in fact, it can be said that not once were the B.29's employed in a purely strategic bombing role. This lack of strategic bombing targets restricted the use of air power to such an extent that a decisive United Nations victory in Korea virtually became an impossibility.

Interdiction.

During the first phase of the campaign the majority of our single-engined aircraft were employed on obtaining air superiority and in giving close support to our ground forces. By day the B.29's carried out a limited interdiction programme with some success. However, due to a lack of aircraft, only particularly lucrative targets could be attacked and before long the enemy began to carry out all resupply movement by night. Consequently during this period the interdiction programme was only partially successful.

In the second phase B.26 light bombers were used by night. Good, low level bombing techniques were evolved and in a short space of time excellent results were achieved. It was during this phase that the ground commanders (after their forces had stopped the Chinese advance) agreed to give up the majority of their close support missions in favour of an all-out interdiction campaign. The decision was a good one, for from then until the end of the war the Communists were unable to launch a full scale offensive. In fact, the consensus of opinion of Red prisoners of war was that air power had been the largest single factor in wrecking their system of supply. Air interdiction had so limited Communist supplies that only by strictest conservation, salvage and over-riding precedence to ammunition and fuel movement was the enemy able to keep his armies in the field. These prisoners estimated that over half of the total tonnage destined for the front was destroyed en route.

Close Air Support.

In the first phase of the war it was without question close air support that prevented the forces of the United Nations carrying out a "Dunkirk" operation from the Pusan bridgehead. Fighters, Fighter-Bombers, Light Bombers and Medium Bombers were all used at maximum intensity to save the day. During this period the "Mosquito" aircraft was born. These aircraft, usually Harvard T.6, were used for front line reconnaissance, for marking targets within the bombline and for directing high speed aircraft to such targets. As we had complete air superiority they more than proved their weight in gold and gave to the ground forces a most unusual sense of security.

During the second phase of the campaign close air support became a second priority to interdiction but

nevertheless still played a large part in the land battle. Jet aircraft such as the F.84, and later the Meteor, showed how suitable they were for ground attack missions.

During the third phase when both armies faced each other from deeply entrenched positions and when 90 per cent. of the ground fighting took place at night, close air support lost most of its direct value. However, it did have an indirect value in that the Communists, knowing the air power available to us, had to limit their activities to the hours of darkness.

Transport Air Support.

During the first two phases of the war transport support from C.82's and C.119's proved invaluable. In the fluid operations that took place in both directions, ground commanders could without worry accept penetration and even encirclement with the knowledge that all requirements of equipment, ammunition and supplies would be delivered from the air. One brigade group and one divisional airborne operation were conducted with the precision of a training exercise. However, whilst noting the success of this transport air support, it must be borne in mind that all operations were achieved in a situation of complete air superiority.

In the third phase the requirement for transport support decreased although limited air supply missions were flown to isolated patrol positions. During this period, however, air transport was used on a grand scale for trooping between Japan and Korea—C.119's and C.124's being the main aircraft used.

Throughout the war the majority of casualty evacuation from Korea to Japan was carried out by transport aircraft.

Air Rescue.

Probably the most important morale factor in the Korean air war was the remarkable work of the air rescue organisation. This organization, using helicopters and amphibious aircraft, saved three out of every four aircrew who had been shot down behind enemy lines —some of them more than 100 miles deep into enemy territory. Helicopters were also employed with tremendous success evacuating army casualties in a matter of minutes from virtually the place where they were wounded to base hospitals.

Naval Aviation.

Since the start of the war the Fleet Air Arm of Britain, Australia and the United States took an active part in the air operations. Flying both piston and jet engined aircraft, the carriers were able to sail far north along both coasts of Korea and operate their aircraft against targets that were out of range of the land based ground attack aircraft. Such attacks played a big part in the success of the overall interdiction campaign. In the first two phases of the war carrier aircraft also took a large share of the close air support missions.

However, it must be borne in mind that throughout the war the carriers were able to operate without any real threat from enemy mines, submarines or aircraft.

Unusual Aspects of the Campaign.

From the previous paragraphs it will have become obvious that the campaign was not conducted along the lines of what is regarded today as conventional warfare. It is now intended to emphasise these peculiarities in order that the lessons of the war may be correctly assessed.

Firstly, the entire strategy of the

campaign was based on continued air superiority. Beyond the first two weeks of the war the Communists made no attempts to deprive us of that superiority in areas other than that close to the Yalu. As a result our ground forces received no experience in the art of camouflage, in the difficulties of dispersed warware and became too reliant on close air support. What is more important from the air point of view, the ground attack and transport pilots have been given experience that may be dangerous to them should they have to take part in a war with strong air opposition.

Secondly, because of the diplomatic barrier of the Yalu our bomber aircraft were not able to seek out and attack their primary targets—the sources of the enemies' war materials. The Communists, realising this restriction to our bombers, moved all North Korean industry into Manchuria and then enlisted huge numbers of coolies to manhandle the required ammunition, supplies and equipment to their forces in the front line. This limitation to our air power was without question the most important of the war.

A third peculiarity of the campaign was the remarkable ability of Communist forces in camouflage and concealment. With the tremendous manpower available to them they went to amazing lengths to avoid air attack—a typical example being the allocation of two coolies per tank to walk behind and brush away the track marks! Their individual and collective camouflage was superb and it was the exception to see a vehicle or even a soldier by day. Destruction of rail lines, roads and bridges was never a real problem to them, for with their available manpower the biggest of bridges could be repaired, or a diversion built, in under a week. This peculiarity was a definite limitation to the interdiction campaign and it is one that will have to be faced up to in any future war, be it big or small, against an eastern nation.

Fourthly, the naval forces operating off both coasts did so without having to worry unduly about enemy surface, submarine or air attack. This situation was a great help to the success of the interdiction campaign, but one that is extremely unlikely to occur in the early stages of any future large scale war.

Finally, the overall command structure for the control of the Korean war was unusual and left much to be desired. Overall control of the air forces and direct control of the B.29 bomber force was vested in the Headquarters of the Far Eastern Air Force located in Tokyo, whilst direct control of the rest of the United Nations air forces was in the hands of Fifth Air Force at Seoul. Whilst on the surface this arrangement seems orthodox, it becomes unreal when it is remembered that the tasks performed by the B.29's were little more than tactical and in any case the bombers had to be escorted by fighters of Fifth Air Force. The result was that planning became very difficult, particularly with the B.29's operating from Okinawa. An even worse feature from the control point of view was that between Naval Aviation and the Air Force. Naval aircraft operating off both coasts of Korea received their directions from, and were responsible to, the Commander of Naval Forces in the

Far East residing in Tokyo. The only occasions when naval aircraft were controlled by the Joint Operations Centre at Fifth Air Force were when they were operating on close support missions. Such missions were offered to Fifth Air Force by the Commander of Naval Forces, Far East, or his representative, when they saw fit. The headquarters intimately concerned in the air battle (Fifth Air Force) had no direct control over naval aircraft.

Conclusion.

Considering the political limitations imposed on the use of air power during the campaign, it is difficult to suggest whether the air forces available could have been used to greater effect. An earlier start on the all-out day and night interdiction programme may have produced better results, and a more efficient integration of naval aircraft into the tactical battle would certainly have been an improvement. However, such actions would have had a minor effect compared with the results that could have been achieved if conventional strategic bombing had been allowed. Such bombing, it is true, may have precipitated a large-scale war, but considering the balance of power that existed between the East and the West, a large-scale war in 1951 might have been more successful and less devastating than would a global war in the foreseeable future.

In any case it is also worth considering whether the Korean war was so "unreal" after all. Considering our world-wide diplomatic commitments, is it not probable that we will be faced in other parts of the world with Yalu barriers in one form or another? If so the Korean war will have given us valuable experience in the face of diplomatic restrictions to orthodox military action.

However, no matter what form the next war may take, Korea has given us a few lessons:

The enemy has taught us that an army can live, move and fight in the face of air superiority and an all-out interdiction compaign. In the future our armies must be prepared to live and fight with less equipment, vehicles and amenities.

The enemy has also taught us the value of dispersion, concealment and camouflage. Our reconnaissance squadrons will have to be highly trained, in fact, even specialists, if they are to be of real value.

In the future, interdiction tasks will have to be "round the clock" to be successful.

Helicopters have proved their value and made themselves a requirement for the air forces and armies of the future.

Finally, Korea has shown us that victory against a first class power is impossible without large - scale strategic bombing.

WHAT SITUATION?

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IN ALMOST all armies there is a formal method of appreciating the situation. The format differs but in every case the result sought is a sound decision. In our service we do this by *estimating the situation.* The situation is the terrain and weather; the strength, disposition, composition, morale, and effectiveness of the opposing forces.

This means that *the* situation really consists of two situations, our own situation and the enemy situation. We have all seen these two situations posted on the G3 and G2 maps respectively. Our service schools go to great lengths to teach the *estimate of the situation,* with considerable emphasis on the *estimate,* but without much consideration of the *situation.*

When a commander, in battle, estimates the situation, he should realise that there are at least five situations existing at that time. There are: the true situation, the situation as seen by our own commander, the situation as seen by the enemy commander, the situation we think the enemy sees, and the one he thinks we see.

The true situation is easily disposed of. This may eventually become known provided:

1. That both sides keep accurate records.

2. That these records are made available to a disinterested historian.

Most likely, however, the true situation will never be known, so, for practical military purposes we can discard it in discussing the estimate of the situation. What situation, then, do we estimate?

Our Situation.

The commander depends upon his staff and his subordinates to keep him informed of the friendly situation. It can be assumed that the commander's knowledge of the situation of his own forces approximates the truth. Some disasters and near disasters have occurred, however, because commanders thought that their forces were where they actually were not.

The Enemy Situation.

The other part of a situation is the enemy situation, generally posted on the G2 map, and filled in by intelligence. This cannot reasonably be expected to be as well known to the commander as his own situation. However, if we admit that half of the situation comprises the enemy situation, we at once realize the fundamental importance of intelligence. Good intelligence is priceless, and Napoleon *under-stated* its worth when he said, "One good spy is worth 20,000 men."

—*From "Military Review," USA.*

Napoleon at Waterloo.

Napoleon's Waterloo campaign is a good example of the wrong situation being estimated. His plan was to divide the British under Wellington from the Prussians under Blücher, and defeat the two forces in detail. Blücher was concentrated at Ligny; Wellington was concentrating west of Brussels. On 16 June, 1815, Napoleon attacked Blücher and defeated him. A mix-up in staff procedure resulted in D'Erlon's corps not attacking the Prussians in flank. This corps, in fact, spent the day marching and counter-marching between Ney who was fighting a British force at Quatre Bras and Napoleon at Ligny. Even so, Blücher was defeated—but not routed.

Napoleon ordered Grouchy to pursue the Prussians. Grouchy was dilatory in his pursuit, and submitted erroneous reports to Napoleon concerning the Prussian dispositions. Napoleon was led to believe that Grouchy was pursuing Blücher to the east and was, therefore, between Blücher and Wellington. Actually, Blücher had withdrawn to the north and was approaching Wellington.

In the battle of Waterloo, Blücher came to Wellington's assistance while Grouchy and his 30,000 men never participated. The results are known.

We can now give a partial answer to our question. What situation do we estimate? Namely, a situation composed of the best information on our forces and the enemy; but this is only one situation. There are actually three additional situations.

Next in importance is the situation which our opponent is estimating. He generally knows more about his forces than we do. On the other hand, he knows less about us than we do. Consequently, he sees the situation differently. In fact, a little faulty intelligence on both sides, some negligent staff officers, and one or two hard-headed subordinates can produce a situation which neither commander approximates. Furthermore, the situation as seen by each of the opposing commanders not only differs radically from the truth, but also does not resemble that of the other commander.

Battle of the Philippine Sea.

The Battle of the Philippine Sea is an example of commanders on the opposing sides not knowing the situation. Because of the extensive coverage of this battle it will be necessary only to refresh our memory to bring out the point. It is evident that Admirals Nimitz and Kinkaid thought that Admiral Halsey had left Task Force 31 to guard the San Bernandino Strait. In fact, Task Force 31 had proceeded with Halsey past the Strait leaving it unguarded. Hence, not all the American commanders knew where their own forces were. At the same time, they did not know of the whereabouts of the enemy San Bernardino Strait force until it appeared in Leyte Gulf.

Faulty Knowledge.

What did the Japanese admiral know of the situation? Probably not very much. His decision to retreat just when he had the Leyte Gulf expedition at his mercy must have been based on false information concerning the American forces, and his own forces. Certainly his presence in Leyte Gulf indicates that his mission was to destroy the joint expeditionary force. With

this in mind, the only explanation of his action is an estimate based on faulty knowledge of the situation.

Assumed Situations.

We have now discussed the three most important situations: the true one, that one which our commander estimates, and the one which the enemy commander estimates. There are still two additional situations existing. There is the situation which we think the enemy is estimating and the situation which he thinks we are estimating.

Both of these situations result from counter-intelligence and deceptive efforts. By counter-intelligence activities each commander tries to conceal as much of his situation from the enemy as possible. If a commander's counter-intelligence efforts were wholly effective, his opponent could, at best, only 50 per cent. of the situation to estimate—that is, his own situation.

Counter-intelligence attempts to leave the enemy with an inadequate picture of our situation, hoping that he will make a poor decision based on an ineffective estimate. Deception, on the other hand, is aimed at giving the enemy a false picture of our situation, in the hope that he will make a good estimate of the wrong situation and arrive at the wrong decision.

El Alamein.

There are several examples of deception and counter-intelligence to prevent discovery of the deception. Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery deceived Field Marshal Erwin Rommel prior to the Battle of El Alamein both as to the time and place of the initial attack. By constructing a dummy pipe line toward the south, and by its rate of construction, by the use of dummy vehicles and supply dumps, and their rate of build-up, and by concealing the assault troops in slit trenches for an entire day, the assault was delivered on the night of 23-24 October, 1942, in the north, while Rommel expected an attack some time in November in the south. Plainly, Field Marshal Rommel was estimating a situation which did not exist. Furthermore, Field Marshal Montgomery had a good idea as to what situation Field Marshal Rommel was estimating.

Assumption.

With so many situations, how is it possible to pin down a situation so we can estimate it? This we do by using assumptions. Indeed, by using assumptions we can set up several situations; estimate them, and reach a decision for each one. Then, as the situation is developed by information, we can bring up to date that assumed situation which most closely resembles the actual situation.

Assumptions may also fulfill another function. When we are in a hopeless position, or faced with a very difficult task, we should cast around for some assumption which will modify the situation, then work to make that assumption come true.

Battle of the Bulge.

For example, in World War II, a large-scale German counter-offensive in Western Europe would have been pre-doomed to failure against allied air superiority. However, let it be assumed that the allied air force were grounded. Now all the German High Command had to do was to find out when the weather would ground the allied air force

for a considerable period and plan their counter-offensive for that period. They did this, and the Battle of the Bulge was initiated when the weather precluded effective allied air support of the army forces.

Conclusions.

It has been shown that the situation being estimated depends upon knowledge of one's disposition, intelligence, counter-intelligence, and deception. Let us examine the various levels of military endeavour and see which of these are inadequately stressed or are particularly applicable at each level.

The tactical level (division and below)—at this level it appears that deception is particularly applicable. This is so because here its success is not dependent upon the deception being maintained over a long period of time. At this level we should sell the enemy a gift-grapped situation most suitable to our own plans.

The intermediate level (army and corps)—at this level information concerning our own disposition seems most susceptible to improvement. Not that subordinates are not told to report their situation often enough. Indeed, for this purpose we have devised phase lines, check points, scheduled reports, scheduled objectives, and all kinds of status reports. But where have we stressed that the superior should inform the subordinate of the friendly situation on a periodic basis?

The strategic level—at this level military operations are conducted in two spheres—theatre and national. At the national level, intelligence is supreme. A nation which adopts a course of action based on inadequate intelligence cannot be as effective as the nation which knows the enemy's situation.

At theatre level the situation is almost the same. However, at this level it may be a question of intelligence organization as well as intelligence.

Let us assume that the theatre organization comprises several allies. Further assume that the intelligence in question is controlled by only one ally. Under these circumstances it appears likely that the intelligence so compiled might be in the best interest of that particular member rather than in the interest of the common goal and that the theatre commander will be estimating situations which dictate decisions favorable to this one ally's interests.

In conclusion, the soundness of the decision which the commander makes, depends upon *what* situation he sees (or how accurate is the situation he sees) more than upon his method of evaluating the situation. Therefore, it is vital that the situation portrayed to the commander be the most accurate that may possibly be produced.

CO-OPERATION of the BRITISH COMMONWEALTH FORCES IN WAR

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IN the event of the Cold war becoming Hot the major strategic problem facing the Western Powers is the provision, in time, of minimum essential forces necessary to hold the enemy while overwhelming industrial resources are mobilized. In this situation quite small forces, which are fully trained and equipped, if provided quickly, will be of much greater value than larger forces provided later.

The British Dominions can assist in providing these forces. What steps can be taken now to ensure that their contributions are employed with maximum efficiency?

At the start of the last two World Wars the Dominions were provided, by the rapid deployment of the forces of the Mother Country, with a cushion of time of up to a year after the outbreak of war. During this period they were able to raise, train and move to the critical theatre of operation, their contribution to the common cause. This situation cannot be expected a third time. In the event of war under present conditions it may well be that the survival of the Dominions and the rest of the Western Powers will depend on the timely deployment of Dominion forces.

If the Dominion contribution is to be deployed rapidly detailed plans for its movement and deployment should be completed as far as possible before the emergency arises. In the last few years the necessity for such planning has been appreciated and Service Liaison Staffs have been established in the United Kingdom and the Dominions. There is, however, a further step. Dominion forces must fit with maximum efficiency into the Command structure under which they are to serve in an overseas theatre and must be trained to operate effectively with the forces which may be in the theatre. Little has been done about this and it is profitable to consider what can be done now with particular reference to the Army.

Dominion Armies to a considerable degree have descended from the forces which came to their country from the United Kingdom

in the early days of colonization. This initial association, nourished by allegiance to the one Crown, has developed with the years and been cemented by two World Wars. Today the Armies of the British Commonwealth are, to a greater or lesser extent, organized on the same lines, use the same staff procedure, follow the same tactical doctrine, have the same training methods and are inspired by the same tradition. Although there are minor variations, basic equipment is the same, at least the calibre of weapons is common. Quite apart from the strong sentimental reasons, there are thus great military advantages in these Armies operating together. They can certainly operate more efficiently together than any one of them can operate with foreign allies. Because of the many similarities it would appear that there should be no problems in such operations.

This is, however, an over-simplification. The last two wars and experience in Japan and Korea has shown that there are certain difficulties to be overcome if the partnership of British Commonwealth armies is to achieve maximum efficiency. These difficulties will increase as the independent national status of the Dominions continues to grow. Unless active steps are taken now to consider these difficulties, they may prove a major embarrassment during the initial stages of a future war when the time factor will be of such importance. What are these difficulties?

With the development of the independent national status of the Dominions, however standardized Army organization and procedure may be, Dominion governments will more and more wish to exercise their rights in certain matters which they feel are of paramount national interest. They will, therefore, require direct access to their component commanders on matters relating to national interests and susceptibilities and will require that their commanders have direct access to their governments. National executives will also invariably want some measure of control over the expenditure of funds even on armed forces in war.

As the nations of the Commonwealth develop so do certain national characteristics and interests peculiar to each nation. The army of a nation will always reflect the civil environment from which it is raised. Thus these national characteristics of the Dominions will inevitably be reflected in the domestic and personal administration of their armies. Rates of pay, standards of hospitalization, welfare and to a lesser extent ration scales, will all reflect these national characteristics.

Much experience in this regard was gained in the organization of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan. The independent governments concerned were quite definite in their desire to retain control of matters relating to domestic administration, welfare and finance. The directives to the various National Component Commanders made specific provision for this. The functional control of the force in carrying out its occupational duties and control of overall policy was, however, centralised.

It appeared at first that the insistence by the governments concerned on the retention of direct access to their commanders on the matters

referred to above might result in the unified functional control of the force being impossible. But this was not so. Once all concerned fully accepted and understood the position and applied themselves to the task in hand with goodwill and understanding, unified functional control was both effective and easy to exercise.

Experience with the formation of the British Commonwealth Division in Korea has again shown that difficulties do exist in the joint administration of components from different Commonwealth Armies and that these difficulties can be overcome. It is possible that much that was learned in Japan in 1946 had to be relearned in Korea in 1951. In a major war we may not be able to afford the time for such relearning. The lesson, therefore, is that the experience of Commonwealth co-operation in Japan and Korea must be studied and understood by all concerned now.

Just as national governments are directly concerned with the welfare and domestic administration of their armies operating in an overseas theatre, so too are they interested in their operational employment. Experience in the past has shown that Dominion Governments appreciate that a Theatre Commander-in-Chief cannot receive political direction from a multiplicity of governments. However, national interest in forces operating overseas, encouraged by the detailed knowledge available through modern press and radio of their activities, make it essential that a Dominion Government retains some say in their employment. From an operational point of view any interference of this nature on a political level could prove most disturbing. It is, therefore, most important that senior commanders appreciate this point and take steps to avoid creating situations which may produce such interference.

For example, in the last two wars attempts to deploy small detachments of Dominion forces on isolated tasks have frequently resulted in political interference, and always produced unpleasantness and friction. When a number of Dominion divisions are located in one theatre it is natural that they should wish to fight together as a corps, but in the case of Australia, for example, it took years to achieve this in 1914-18 and in the Middle East in the last war it was never achieved. It is essential if maximum efficiency is to be achieved that commanders appreciate these points and avoid the difficulties that will result if due allowance is not made for them.

Another factor in obtaining maximum efficiency from Dominion forces in a theatre is to ensure that Dominion officers receive a fair proportion of appointments to higher command and on the staff. Most Dominion forces now have officers of seniority and professional ability adequate to fill a proportion of these appointments. The common basis of training greatly facilitates such postings and by them many of the difficulties which may result in political interference can be avoided before they arise. The employment of Dominion officers in these posts in war will be assisted very much if there is an adequate exchange of officers in peace between the British and Dominion Armies.

Lastly there is the question of equipment. Standardization will

play a major part in the efficient operation of the armies of the British Commonwealth in the future. As previously stated, major equipment is at present standard. It is highly important that this situation should remain. Pending standardization within NATO, which may well take some time, every effort must be made to retain existing standardization within British Commonwealth Armies for it is of the greatest mutual advantage.

To sum up above:

(a) In the event of war Dominion forces can make a very real contribution to the forces of the Western Allies.

(b) Planning is progressing for the employment of these Forces and there are many advantages in such employment being a co-ordinated British Commonwealth effort.

(c) For such an effort to achieve maximum efficiency certain difficulties must be overcome. To this end in a British Commonwealth force operating in war:

(i) Commanders of National Components must have direct access to their own governments.

(ii) Finance, personnel and domestic administration, including welfare, must be co-ordinated on national lines.

(iii) Care must be taken not to offend political susceptibilities in the matter of operational employment, particularly regarding detachments.

(iv) Higher command and staff appointments must be allotted on a proportional basis.

(v) At all costs standardization of equipment must be maintained.

What conclusions can be drawn from all this?

First.—How much there is in common between the armies of the Commonwealth and the great advantages that stem from this in war.

Second.—There are differences and difficulties which will greatly affect efficient operation of British Commonwealth Forces unless their existence is realized by all concerned.

Third.—If maximum efficiency is to be achieved in the event of war officers of all the armies of the British Commonwealth must interest themselves now in the differences and difficulties which may arise in war. There is no better way of doing this than by maximum exchange of officers between the forces of the Commonwealth and by detailed study now in our Staff Colleges and other educational establishments.

RED TAPE and RAT TRAPS

Extracted, with slight modifications, from "A History of the Ordnance Services," by Major-General A. Forbes, published by the Medici Society in 1929.

THERE was once a store in which a quantity of military clothing was kept, pending emergencies, and to keep down the rats there was a cat, for which a small subsistence allowance was drawn monthly.

Retrenchment, however, was the order of the day, and the officer in charge was instructed to indent for "Traps, rat, wire, iron, galvanized, Mark I," in the proportion of one trap to every 100 suits of clothing. In the next "Changes in War Material" an elaborate illustration and description of the above trap appeared, and the cat was declared obsolete pending disposal.

The number of traps, according to the above proportion, was found to be 19.3, and accordingly 20 traps were demanded. The indent came back with one trap disallowed, but by way of consolation it was stated that "fractions of a trap exceeding .5 would be considered as a whole trap."

Thereupon the officer in charge of the clothing store pointed out that the odd 33 suits of clothing would be at the mercy of the rats, but without avail.

The 19 traps duly arrived, and a return, AAF X 1063, was ordered to be submitted monthly. The return in question was arranged in bird-cage form, and was a masterpiece of its kind, showing at a glance the amount of clothing in store, the cubic measurement of each room, the number of traps on hand, and the number of rats caught each day. Mice were to be shown under "Remarks." The percentage of rats caught to suits of clothing, and of rats to traps, was to be marginally noted.

As it was feared that the officer in charge of the clothing store might endeavour to take credit for mice as rats, the measurements of the animals caught were to be inserted, and the officer in charge was authorized to demand a "suitable service measuring rod for the purpose."

The officer in charge of the clothing store, anxious to show the keen interest he took in the matter, demanded "gauges, measuring cartridges and live shell," which would enable measurements to be taken to 1/1000 of an inch.

The authorities pointed out in reply that these gauges were fitted with gun-metal screws, and intended for measuring explosive articles

only, "a condition presumably not applying to rats," and that their use with articles of a non-explosive character would therefore be "highly irregular if not dangerous," and that the operation must in any case be carried out under magazine regulations with felt slippers in an isolated building 400 yards from a road. "A plan of the locality was to be submitted."

An application that the term "live shell" might be extended to include live rats was rejected, and it was suggested that an ordinary 2-ft. rule would be sufficiently accurate for practical purposes.

This was accordingly demanded, but elicited the reply that "these stores formed part of chests, tool, carpenters', which were only provided when carpenters' shops were authorized."

A strong case was accordingly made for the erection of a carpenter's shop, which was eventually approved at a cost of some hundreds of pounds.

Meanwhile the officer in charge of the store acknowledged receipt of the traps, and requested instructions as to how they were to be set. The reply came "that the matter had been under consideration and instructions would shortly be published."

The first monthly return showed several suits of clothing destroyed by rats. The authorities thereupon gave evidence of the energy that they have always displayed in an emergency, and a very comprehensive pamphlet was issued within a month, in which the mining of the iron, drawing out into wire, method of galvanizing, manufacture into traps, and the system of inspection, testing and acceptance into service, were exhaustively dilated on and profusely illustrated.

Nevertheless, the second return was like the first.

"Were the instructions regarding setting of traps strictly carried out?"

"Yes; the clothing destroyed doubtless was part of that for which traps were disallowed," was the triumphant rejoinder.

Another trap was allowed, but "it was intended to make a corresponding increase to the clothing store of 67 suits of clothing."

The third return showed "rats caught nil" and more clothing destroyed.

A Mark II trap was introduced, which differed from Mark I in that the wire was not galvanized, and the iron was obtained in Germany.

No rats were caught, and further destruction of clothing occurred.

"None but men of superior intelligence were to be permitted to handle the traps, and a warrant officer was to be struck off duty and detailed to instruct them. A return was to be submitted monthly, showing the number of men instructed."

In selecting the warrant officer, the claims of a man who had been a professional rat catcher were ignored, and the opportunity of infusing fresh blood into this important service was neglected. This grievance was duly aired in a weekly contemporary.

The worthy soldier who was selected elaborated a drill in accordance with "the spirit of instructions," which, after various extensionary motions to develop the

trap-setting muscles, commenced with "take up traps," and ended with "ease springs."

Badges in gold and worsted of crossed rats' tails were authorized for men who attained a certain degree of proficiency in trap setting.

Still no rats were caught, and the destruction of clothing continued.

"The return showing the number of men instructed was to be submitted in duplicate once a week."

Even this failed to produce an improvement.

It was suddenly discovered that the trap, though officially known as "trap, rat, wire, iron, galvanized, Mark II," was in fact made of ungalvanized iron. The responsibility for this blunder could not be brought home to anyone, but after some discussion the nomenclature was amended, and "Changes in War Material" was amended accordingly. This amendment was made retrospective, and past returns were ordered to be re-submitted. They were still found to be blank, and no improvement ensued.

The authorities were reluctantly compelled to admit "that the traps had not answered their expectations, and that there appeared to be no fault either in the traps or the setting," and enquired incidentally what bait was used.

The officer in charge of the store pointed out that no allowance was made for bait in the regulations, and that he could not be expected to provide it out of his own pocket.

In the end, the cat was re-introduced into the service, and was "to be used strictly for the purpose of catching rats." The traps were ordered to be retained "for instructional purposes only."

Great ideas are not lost in the world because they provoke enemies. Great ideas are lost in the world because they lose their friends. You can, by ignoring something, ultimately destroy it.

—Rt. Hon. R. G. Menzies, CH, Prime Minister of Australia.

OPERATIONS IN MANIPUR AND ASSAM : 1944

Colonel Qurban Ali Khan.

THE Chinese General Sun Tzu has said: "He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent, and thereby succeed in winning, may be called a Heaven-born Captain." A Heaven-born Captain means a successful commander. The aim of this paper is to illustrate the truth of this statement with examples from the Burma Campaign.

Japanese Plan.

Early in the spring of 1944 the Japanese invaded India on the Imphal front. Their earlier attack through the Arakan had been made to retain our forces there and divide the defence. They had, in the meantime, built up their strength from four to nearly eleven divisions, the greatest land force they had ever deployed in South-East Asia, which they then threw in, in their attack on the State of Manipur.

The operation had a threefold purpose:

(a) To cross the frontier and seize the main Allied advance base at Imphal.

(b) To cut the Bengal-Assam railway, the supply line to General Stilwell's forces operating up in the Northern Sector.

(c) To overrun the Assam airfields, and thus stop airborne traffic to China.

The Japanese planned to annihilate the Allied forces by cutting their lines of communication, thus employing the same tactics as they had used in the Arakan. But this time they made the mistake of underrating the strength of their opponents.

Allied Plan.

General Slim, Commander of the Fourteenth Army, whose views on possible Japanese strategy were confirmed by reliable intelligence sources at 14 Army HQ, foresaw a major enemy offensive across the Chindwin River, which he had the choice of meeting in three different ways:

(a) By using his troops across the Chindwin.

(b) By fighting the enemy on the line of the Chindwin.

(c) By withdrawing his troops into

—*From "Military Digest," Pakistan.*

the plain of Imphal and fighting the battle there.

Had he adopted either of the first two courses, he would have had a long line of communication, and this would have affected his own supply forward. He therefore chose the third course and accordingly prepared the Imphal Plain for battle. And it was on this 2500 ft. high plain, and in the hills in its immediate vicinity, that the main battle was fought.

Allied Troops.

At the time, the land dispositions of the Allied troops in the Manipur sector were as under:

(a) 17 Indian Division covered the approaches to Tiddim.
(b) 20 Indian Division was watching the Kabaw Valley.
(c) 23 Indian Division was deployed near Ukhrul, with brigades extending south-east of Imphal town.

Japanese Troops.

The Japanese decided to employ three divisions for their main thrust. 33 Division was to attack Imphal from the south and cut the Allied lines of communication between Imphal and Tiddim; 15 Division was to encircle Imphal from a northerly direction; and 31 Division was to seize Kohima, which lies between Imphal and Dimapur, and then cut the Assam Railway.

Japanese Offensive.

Imphal Front.

On 7 March, 1944, the Japanese forward troops first started pressing the Allied troops around Kennedy Peak, beyond Tiddim. Their immediate objective was Imphal, which they wanted to capture before Allied reinforcements were brought up; and they clearly realised that speed, which had been the essence of their previous successes, was essential. To their necessity for speed, however, they were forced to sacrifice the principle of administration so vital to the movement and maintenance of an army; for the tracks they chose for the advance, although affording the shortest routes to their objective, were so poor and lay through such difficult mountain country that they could not serve adequately, or for long, as lines of communication.

The Fourteenth Army's plan was to withdraw all its forces to the Imphal Plain in order to meet the Japanese at the end of their long and tenuous line of communication. There was a certain amount of delay in the withdrawal of 17 Division, because it was cut off for a while and had to fight its way back to Imphal, assisted by 23 Division which, although committed in the Ukhrul area, was sent to help it withdraw. Throughout its withdrawal 17 Division was provided with all its requirements by air: a striking example of the perfect co-operation that existed between the Allied land and air forces. When 20 Division, which was in the Tamu area, also withdrew and converged on Imphal, the concentration was complete.

By this time the direction of the enemy offensive was fully disclosed on the frontier. As anticipated, their thrust was directed towards Imphal, Ukhrul and Kohima.

The three Allied divisions already concentrated in the Imphal Plain were now ready for the Japanese. More troops were flown in as reinforcements; and the Allied garrison at Ukhrul was reinforced and dug in.

When, five days after crossing the Chindwin, the Japanese began clos-

ing in upon Imphal, they were immediately engaged by British and Indian troops and had to fight their way forward.

Kohima Front.

The Japanese were pressing hard also at Kohima. General Slim having reckoned upon their coming had already reinforced the garrison there by withdrawing Allied troops from all the outposts and concentrating them at Kohima. Later, 5 Indian Division was ordered to move by air from the Arakan to Kohima. Its arrival there completely surprised the enemy, who never expected that troops could be



Siege of Imphal.

moved from the Arakan to this front in such a short time. (By rail, this move would have taken four weeks.)

Lines of Communication.

When the Japanese first cut the Allied line of communication between Dimapur and Imphal they declared that Imphal and Kohima had been captured—an expedient, but palpable, distortion of facts, since these two bases, far from being in enemy hands, were strong concentration points, where Allied garrisons certain of being maintained by a steady flow of airborne supplies were in fact waiting for the right moment to strike the Japanese the first of a series of crippling blows.

Japanese Surprise.

Where the Japanese expected a general withdrawal of the forces at Imphal, more Allied troops from the rear were flown in. And, by the time the enemy reached Imphal, the plain was not merely a defended base—it was, as it later proved to be, an offensive spring-board. When the Japanese cut the supply routes for the second time in two months, the Allied Airforce flew in General Slim's requirements and replacements over their heads. The Allied Airforce also repeatedly struck at and cut enemy lines of communication far in the rear, thereby causing the enemy to march a far longer distance than was ordinarily necessary to reach the front line. Undoubtedly, it was the destruction of Japanese communications which had a decisive effect upon this campaign. Since their supplies could never keep pace with their requirements, the Japanese were finally forced to withdraw their shattered divisions. Their failure at Imphal and Kohima might be ranked as one of the greatest disasters in Japanese military history. The success of the Allied forces, on the other hand, paved the way for their subsequent rapid advances.

Conclusion.

From the preceding paragraphs illustrating both the Japanese offensive and the Allied counter-action, the following useful lessons may be drawn. By modifying his own tactics in relation to those of his enemy, Slim achieved success. He did nothing to invite the enemy assault across the frontier, but he made timely and necessary preparations to meet it when it came, basing his plan for the defence of India on fighting the Japanese at the end of their long line of communication, when they would be least able to maintain themselves. This plan proved completely successful.

Throughout the siege of Imphal, General Slim kept a very close watch on Japanese plans and the enemy commander's psychology. And, when he perceived that the Japanese planned to engage the Allied forces in their outposts after destroying their lines of communication, he frustrated the enemy entirely by withdrawing all his outposts and concentrating them in the Imphal Plain. All through the seige he maintained the air line of communication with which the negligible Japanese Airforce was never able to interfere; and as long as the land route was cut, he brought large reinforcements into the Imphal Plain by air. The Japanese lines of communication on the other hand became so extended, and so vulnerable to Allied air attack, that their forward troops, deprived of all supplies, were ultimately forced into a very disorderly and costly withdrawal.

THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN ARMY NURSING CORPS

THE history of the Australian Army Nursing Service is inseparably bound up with the history of nursing generally because so many advances in the care of the sick throughout the ages have sprung from the need for caring for the sick and wounded in war time, and our existing Service owes much to such early pioneers as Paula, the Fliedners and Florence Nightingale.

The first Army Nursing Service in Australia was formed in Sydney in 1898—three years before Federation—and consisted of a Lady Superintendent and 24 nurses. The first actual service of nurses with Australian troops occurred in the South African War, 1899-1902, when New South Wales and Victoria arranged for detachments of Nursing Sisters to accompany their troops proceeding to the seat of war. As a direct result of the splendid work of these Sisters a more satisfactory organization of nurses for military service was given earnest consideration.

With the creation of a homogeneous Australian Military Force soon after Federation the Australian Army Medical Service came into being. A General Order issued on 1 July, 1902, promulgated the change from State to Federal organization of the military forces of Australia. This date can be regarded as the birth date of "The Australian Army Nursing Service" for paragraph 9 of General Order 123/1902 states: "An Army Nursing Service Reserve will be organized from those trained nurses who are qualified and willing to serve as such with stationary field hospitals and base hospitals when required upon a national emergency."

In May, 1904, a "Lady Superintendent" was appointed in New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland and South Australia. In 1906 a Lady Superintendent was appointed in Tasmania, and by 1914 all States had been provided with Superintendents and Matrons, all under the title of Australian Army Nursing Service.

The Service was under the control of the Director-General of Medical Services, and a Matron-in-Chief was appointed to administer the Service and advise the DGMS on service matters. The first Matron-in-Chief at Headquarters in Australia was appointed on 8 May, 1916.

World War I.

On the outbreak of war in 1914 the Australian Government raised the first Australian Imperial Force for overseas service. The nurses to staff the medical units which formed an integral part of the A.I.F. were recruited from the Australian Army Nursing Service Reserve and from the civil nursing profession.

Orders for the AIF laid down conditions of service with the AIF as follows:

> "Members of the Australian Army Nursing Service and Nurses appointed to the AIF will receive all courtesies extended to officers and will have the following rank and precedence—Principal Matron, Matron, Sister and Staff Nurse. Staff Nurses will be known by the title 'Sister,' irrespective of rank."

A Matron-in-Chief was appointed for the Nursing Service with the AIF in 1915.

The uniform of the AANS was modelled on the uniform of the QAIMNS. Compared with modern standards it is difficult to imagine how these pioneer Sisters managed in their grey serge frocks which swept the ground, and their bonnets tied with bows under the chin! The uniform was "modernised" early in the war.

The first draft of Sisters left Australia in September, 1914, and, throughout the war, the AANS served wherever Australian troops were sent. A number was also attached to British medical units in various theatres of war. The record of service of these Sisters is a brilliant one, and one which set a very high standard for all those who follow on.

A total of 2,139 Sisters served abroad between 1914 and 1918, while a further 423 served in Australia. Twenty-one died overseas, and 388 were decorated for their services. Among the decorations awarded were: 5 CBE, 1 OBE, 42 RRC, 138 ARRC and 23 foreign awards.

Between the Wars.

The Service was carried on during the years of peace by the maintenance of a Reserve. Records were kept in all States of trained nurses appointed to the Reserve and willing to serve in time of national emergency.

In 1936 the Matron-in-Chief and Principal Matron from each State were sent to England with the Coronation contingent.

World War II.

On the outbreak of hostilities in 1939 the AANS was placed on an active footing. Volunteers from the Reserve and from the nursing profession generally were appointed to the AANS which formed part of the second Australian Imperial Force raised for service abroad.

On 9 January, 1940, the first contingent of nurses embarked with portion of 6 Division en route for the Middle East. Further contingents followed at frequent intervals to staff the expanding medical services required for the build-up of the Australian forces in that theatre.

During the war members of the AANS served in England, Palestine, Egypt, Libya, Greece, Crete, Syria and Eritrea, in Ceylon, Malaya, New Guinea, New Britain and the Solomons; throughout the length and breadth of Australia, and on the high seas in hospital ships and sea ambulance transports; in Borneo, the Philippines, Morotai and Japan.

Additional Responsibilities.

Throughout the war the main duties of the AANS were to care for the sick and wounded troops and the sick and injured service women of the army. However, new conditions opened up new phases of work. The provision of specialists caused little trouble in the early days, being confined to administrative personnel, theatre sisters, etc. As the war progressed and specialization increased within the Army, the problem became greater. To cope with the demand the AANS trained its own Sisters in specialist departments, theatre technique, blood bank technique, faceomaxillary and plastic work, orthopaedic work, tutorial duties, and work associated with malarial research.

Care of Civilians.

When Central Australia and the Northern Territory became operational areas, the Sisters serving in them had to undertake the care of the civilian and native population as well as of the military personnel, even to the extent of providing an obstetrical service and maternity and infant welfare centres. Similar duties were undertaken in the far North-West and in the Torres Strait area.

Training.

Six Sisters were trained in all aspects of nutrition at the Army Catering School. Working as mobile teams these Sisters visited hospitals in all areas to check on the nutritional aspects of hospital work and to instruct the staffs.

In the early years of the war the number of qualified volunteers far exceeded the requirements of the service. However, the expansion of the armed forces which followed the Japanese invasion of the South-West Pacific threw a great strain upon the nursing profession as a whole, and made it extremely difficult to meet both service and civilian needs. Consequently in 1944 a scheme was launched for training selected medical orderlies of the Australian Army Medical Women's Service as nurses. The scheme provided for seven weeks' instruction in a Preliminary Training School; followed by two years as a trainee nurse in a base hospital. The candidates then went to a civilian hospital to complete the training which enabled them to become fully qualified nurses in any State of the Commonwealth.

Throughout the war, members of the AANS provided a considerable proportion of the instructional staff for the training of male and female nursing orderlies.

Rank.

For the first three and a half years of the war members of the AANS did not hold military rank, but were entitled to the courtesies extended to an officer. However, in March, 1943, members of the AANS became commissioned officers, with the following ranks and appointments:

Matron-in-Chief	Colonel
Principal Matron	Lieutenant-Colonel
Matron	Major
Senior Sister	Captain
Sister	Lieutenant

In April, 1944, a new appointment was approved for Matrons in large base hospitals—that of Senior Matron, with the rank of lieutenant-colonel. In December, 1944, this rank was extended to the Matrons of all hospitals of 600 or more beds.

Officers of the AANS are not addressed by their military rank

which is used only in official correspondence. The time honoured "Matron" and "Sister" have become so deeply woven into the terminology of the Australian Army that they could be eliminated only by a sustained effort. In any case the psychological reaction of the troops to the traditional forms of address is an important practical reason for retaining them.

Casualties.

The Malayan campaign took heavy toll of the AANS. Of the 126 Sisters who served in that theatre, only 61 got back to Australia in 1942. The ship in which the other 65 were evacuated was bombed and sunk. Twelve of them are believed to have drowned, and the remainder became prisoners of war. Twenty-one of these prisoners were shot to death by the Japanese in a cold-blooded massacre on a Sumatran beach. Eight Sisters died in captivity, and only 24 returned to Australia at the conclusion of hostilities.

When the Japanese captured Rabaul, six Sisters attached to a small camp hospital were taken prisoner. These Sisters were liberated by the Americans when they occupied Yokohama in August, 1945.

In 1942 the hospital ship "Manunda" received a direct hit in the first enemy air raid on Darwin. One Sister was killed and one seriously wounded. In the following year the hospital ship "Centaur" was torpedoed and sunk off the Queensland coast, and eleven of the twelve Sisters on board were lost.

During the war the AANS sustained the following fatal casualties:

Malaya	41	
Manunda	1	
Centaur	11	
		53
Deaths due to accident and sickness		18
Total		71

Decorations.

The following decorations were awarded to members of the AANS for service in the 1939-45 war:

MBE	1
RRC	18
ARRC	29
George Medal	2
Florence Nightingale Medal	2
Bronze Star (U.S.A.)	3
Mentioned in Despatches	82

War Strength of AANS.

Between 1939 and 1947 the States contributed the following quotas to the Service:

New South Wales	1,127
Victoria	915
Queensland	552
South Australia	415
Western Australia	340
Tasmania	128
Total	3,477

Honorary Colonel.

During her sojourn in Australia while her distinguished husband was Governor-General of the Commonwealth, Her Royal Highness the Duchess of Gloucester graciously accepted the appointment of Honorary Colonel of the Australian Army Nursing Service. This appointment was notified in a Supplement to General Routine Order No. 114/1945.

Demobilization.

Demobilization of the AANS proceeded concurrently with the general demobilization of the fighting services which followed the cessation of hostilities in 1945. As part

of the general scheme it had been arranged that military hospitals would transfer their patients as rapidly as possible to the Base Hospitals in each State. These Base Hospitals were to be taken over and staffed with civilian personnel by the Repatriation Department. That Department, however, experienced great difficulty in finding the necessary staff, and in some States members of the AANS carried on until May, 1949.

The Far East.

Early in 1946 an Australian General Hospital, the nursing staff of which was provided by the AANS, was established in the former Naval Academy at Eta Jima to care for the Australian component of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan. This unit later moved to Kure, and in February, 1949, became the British Commonwealth General Hospital, with a small detachment of Sisters at a CDS in Tokyo.

Korean War.

The British Commonwealth General Hospital at Kure cared for the sick and wounded of the Commonwealth Division serving in Korea. In September, 1951, the British Commonwealth Z Medical Unit was established in Korea and, together with medical personnel from other parts of the Commonwealth, two Australian Sisters were posted to the unit.

The post-war re-organisation of the Army Medical Service did not provide for any General Hospital, consequently the appointment of female personnel to the Regular Army was not envisaged in the early stages. However, with the build-up of the Regular Army, the war in Korea and the introduction of National Service, it became necessary to maintain a General Hospital overseas and Camp Hospitals in Australia. To provide the nursing staffs for these hospitals, approval was given in July, 1949, to appoint female officers and enlist female other ranks in the Regular Army.

Formation of the Corps.

In November, 1948, the title "Royal" was granted to the AANS in recognition of its service in two world wars. In February, 1951, the Service was designated a corps and became the Royal Australian Army Nursing Corps. At the same time the Australian Army Medical Women's Service, which had provided nursing orderlies and clerical assistance in military hospitals, was disbanded. In the reorganized RAANC commissions are granted to fully qualified nurses while non-professional duties are undertaken by the other ranks.

When this reorganization was complete the RAANC was firmly established as an integral part of the Australian Regular Army. The next logical step was to make provision for the rapid and smooth expansion of the Corps in time of national emergency. Accordingly, an RAANC Company, Citizen Military Forces, was raised in each Command towards the end of 1952. The members of these units undertake the following annual training:

	Days.
Obligatory Home Training	12
Voluntary Home Training	12
Camp of Continuous Training . .	14

Officers of the Companies are given instruction and practical experience in the Army aspects of nursing, and assist with the training of the other ranks of their units.

In August, 1953, 250 Regular and 660 Citizen Force members of the RAANC were serving on the active list. In addition a Reserve of qualified nurses, willing to undertake active military duty in a national emergency, is steadily being built up.

Colonel-in-Chief.

In June, 1953, Her Majesty the Queen graciously accepted the appointment of Colonel-in-Chief of the Royal Australian Army Nursing Corps. The great honour thus conferred by Her Majesty is a source of pride and encouragement to all members of the Corps.

The RAANC and the Troops.

No account of the RAANC would be complete without some reference to the unique position which the Australian Army Nurse holds in the esteem of the troops. The Nursing Service is, perhaps, the one group of human beings which has escaped the critical propensities of the Australian soldier. On the contrary, he holds the Sisters in a place of honour and affection which is, in the final analysis, the noblest monument to their devoted service and magnificent achievements in two world wars.

In their everyday lives nurses try to spread the doctrine of good will towards men—not by preaching it, but by living it. They realize that sickness in any part of the world can endanger the health of the entire human family. They know that sickness and poverty go hand in hand, and that that, conversely, health and prosperity are closely bound up with good will.

—Jane E. Muntz, President of the Royal Victorian College of Nursing.

ALARM UNITS

Translated and condensed by the Military Review from an article by Hans Christian Treutzsch, captain in the former German Army, in "Wehrkunde," Western Germany.

THERE are times during combat—even in cases of relative equality between opposing forces—when crises arise that require, in addition to the employment of the regular reserves, the employment of forces hurriedly gathered together. Their organization is always an evil, even though it may be a necessity. Under the special conditions of the Russian campaign, the organization of such forces became almost a rule. Born of a permanent state of crisis, their continuous existence constituted an impressive symptom of the actual situation.

The following discussion will illustrate some of the problems that will be encountered in organizing forces hurriedly gathered together. For the purpose of clarity, these forces will be referred to as "alarm units" in the following discussion.

The Physical Situation.

Usually the soldier who finds himself included in an "alarm unit" is the man who has become separated from his own unit, a man returning from leave, a man who is convalescing from sickness or wounds, or a supernumerary in a headquarters or service unit. In any case, his connection with his old unit has been broken. This places him in a situation of anonymity. There are lacking, therefore, the regulatory agents which restrain his bad qualities and which cause his good qualities to make their influence felt in the right place. In addition to this, he feels himself to be an outsider, alone and unprotected. He knows none of the other men in the unit, or only very few. Many of the men in the unit are from different branches of the service, and, therefore, as regards combat and the use of weapons, are in an entirely different world of ideas. The speed with which the unit is formed instinctively brings up the fact that the unit will soon be engaged in hard fighting—and that he will be committed to battle without the feeling of security that comes from fighting alongside dependable, well-known comrades. To be sure, the morale of such units can never be very high.

There are also other problems which must be considered. To begin with, there is little or no possibility of receiving mail from home under the circumstances. Moreover, the supply situation in such units is

generally poor, and will be regarded with scepticism until there is practical proof of its adequacy.

Regarded from the viewpoint of the average soldier, inclusion in an "alarm unit" is looked upon as a personal misfortune. The soldier will always strive to get away from this situation as soon as possible; that is, to return to his old unit. Moreover, he will fight against allowing himself, in the natural course of events, to become accustomed to his new environment, against the growth of the inward feeling that he now belongs to the "alarm unit."

The "Alarm Unit" Commander.

In the case of the "alarm unit," combat worth is more dependent on the qualities of the commander than is the case with the regular unit. The commander must, above all, immediately seek to create the necessary atmosphere for confidence, to impart the feeling that there is someone there who will be able to handle all situations. There must be absolute faith in his combat ability. Therefore, it is wrong to make just any supernumerary officer commander of the "alarm unit."

Even in the case of a great shortage of officers, an officer who has acquired experience on the front must be commandeered for this post, if the unit is to be of any value in combat.

The commander must know every soldier, not only as regards his name and grade, but also his personality and his potential worth in battle. If possible, the commander should speak with each man before an operation is undertaken. An understanding, personal word is able to create more unity and inner cohesion in an "alarm unit" than ever so many carefully considered, exact commands.

Whenever possible, the commander should make his men personally acquainted with the situation, and it is well for him to question them to determine how well he has made himself understood. Along the same line, the commander should let the men ask questions, for this eliminates the chances for future mistakes and helps to remedy many problems that would have an influence on the morale of the unit.

The commander should also tell his men how those matters stand which directly affect them; that is, food, ammunition, and medical attention. Unclarified problems are to be presented as settled or in the process of being settled. In all cases, the man must go into battle with the feeling that he is in a unit whose organization will follow the pattern he is accustomed to. This feeling can be developed only through the ability and personality of the commander.

Organization.

The assignment of non-commissioned officers within the "alarm unit" must not be based on rank. Inasmuch as the action will be principally infantry action, non-commissioned officers with prior infantry and combat experience should be given precedence in assignment. Less experienced non-commissioned officers, and those from other branches or services, should be assigned to duties normally performed by privates. By the exercise of a bit of tact on the part of the commander, the natural feeling of having been demoted can be prevented.

The non-commissioned officers should not be permitted to adopt too severe a tone in giving commands to the men; who, naturally, are not very willing to serve. The non-commissioned personnel can still accomplish their jobs without excessive sharpness—and at the same time build up the confidence of the men. It is just as important that the soldier have confidence in his non-commissioned officers as in his commander. Since there will be many evident deficiencies in a hurriedly formed "alarm unit," the creation of a genuine bond from the top down is of major importance. If this is done, there is a good chance that the unit will not become a mere assemblage of unattached soldiers in its first encounter on the battlefield.

In addition to the many details that the soldier should be told, he should know what heavy weapons —artillery, tanks, anti-tank guns, and anti-aircraft artillery—will support the unit. The knowledge of supporting forces will help the soldier to overcome the feeling of having been "written off." The pains taken for such clarification will always be worth while.

Unit Designation.

For the soldier, the "alarm unit" must have a name. Numbers, if possible, should be avoided. A concept is often much more impressive, one which states something about the situation or the future. Words, since they are symbols, help to promote a feeling of unity within the unit. As a rule, the soldiers themselves find a name which they hang on to and which then constitutes the expression of a feeling of unity. Such a name is, therefore, advantageous, particularly if it can exist from the very beginning.

Food and Ammunition.

The "alarm unit" commander must do all within his power to ensure that the unit has an adequate supply of food and ammunition. In addition, the personnel assigned to the kitchen and supply sections must be qualified and efficient. Even in the face of a shortage of combat personnel, one must not cut short the personnel of the kitchen or supply sections. In long, drawn-out, heavy action, the field kitchen not only provides an excellent means of maintaining cohesion within the possibly disintegrating unit, but it also exerts a powerful influence in improving the general morale of the unit.

There should be a thorough check on ammunition consumption. Carelessness or lack of experience can be very costly. This supervision, however, must not arouse the feeling that conservation is necessary because there is no more ammunition available. In addition, a man from the "alarm unit" should be assigned to the next higher ammunition supply point, for experience has taught that the unknown "alarm unit" is often slighted.

Unit Administration.

As soon as the "alarm unit" is organized, an "orderly room" must be established, even though it is manned by only one soldier. This will bolster morale, for the men will know that their mail is being sent out, and that administrative details pertaining to their records and individual welfare are being performed.

Moreover, without a doctor or first aid men in the unit, a sort of assembly point must be established so that wounded personnel can be assembled and directed to medical

aid stations to the rear. If this is overlooked, the wounded will collect at the command post and interfere with the operation of the unit. The location of the nearest aid station must be known to all men in the command post, in order that every wounded man may be directed to it. Negligence in this regard can be followed by serious consequences.

In organizing the fighting groups within the "alarm unit," acquaintances which have already developed are in no case to be broken. A wise commander will even let the men choose the men they want to serve with in their squad or platoon. In this way, men from the same localities, comrades from the same former unit, and men who have been acquainted in hospitals find themselves together and form small cells with inner ties which are of the greatest value for the development of a feeling of unity. The commander should intervene, however, in the allocation of battle-experienced men. These men are given the machine guns and automatic weapons and are urged, as experienced soldiers, to feel a responsibility toward the new men in the unit—an appeal which seldom fails to bear fruit.

The Higher Commander.

"Alarm units" should always be considered from above as possessing equal rights with the other units of the command. In fact, because of their special and unusual circumstances, they should be accorded special support by the higher commander. This commander should take advantage of the first opportunity to visit the unit and tell the personnel that he looks upon the unit as a part of his own formation. Above all, the higher commander must see to it that the "alarm unit" is accorded proper recognition whenever it is merited.

Summary.

Rapidly gathered together formations have a smaller combat value than closely bonded, regular units. The particular point of weakness is the negative psychological situation in which the individual member of the unit finds himself.

This weakness can be eliminated by providing such units with qualified combat commanders who will have the faith and support of the men; by providing such units with adequate supply arrangements; by permitting the continuation of ties of friendship which already exist in the unit; and by having the complete support and understanding of the next higher commander.