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# AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL



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
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*A Periodical Review of Military Literature*

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
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VICTORIA BARRACKS, MELBOURNE.

# AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL

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# ECONOMIC AID in SOUTH-EAST ASIA

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## ITS POLITICAL ASPECTS

---

Captain J. L. Morris  
Royal Australian Army Ordnance Corps

**Economic co-operation and the solution of economic problems are essential conditions for political co-operation.**

*Veljko Vilakovic,  
Deputy Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia.*

**T**HE present state of tension which exists between the Western countries headed by the USA on the one hand and the USSR on the other had its beginnings in the divergent views expressed at Teheran, Yalta, Moscow and Berlin. The ultimate result of these conferences was the dividing of the world into two camps.

Both in their own fashion have courted the hand of S.E. Asia. That neither Communism nor the superimposition of Western cults is the unmixed desire of the East has led to new conflicts which imply fundamental disagreement in the political-social and economic aspects of contemporary international relations.

Both the East and West blocs were cognizant of the powder keg of S.E. Asia, poverty stricken and ill equipped, but seething with a new-found desire for political independence, social and economic improvement.

In the West two schools of thought existed on the best attitude to this problem. Firstly, there were those who supported the economic embargo method, to be used on countries who were anti-Western in sympathy. This was too indiscriminate a method, however, affecting individuals irrespective of politics, sex or age. Besides, it relied for its effectiveness on the full agreement of all nations or a rigidly enforced blockade, both of which

are difficult to obtain on the political level and which are likely to lead to further conflict.

However, the West chose the positive course of economic assistance to these under-developed territories, and it is to our interest to observe the political implications which firstly led to the decision and have arisen since as a result of continued aid.

#### **Political Implications for the West.**

Although the West has realized its responsibility to under-developed territories from a humanitarian point of view, aid has been granted at least as much to prevent the spread of communism. The reasons for this are twofold.

Firstly, regimes which are communist inspired may provide a threat to the security of the West from purely strategic viewpoints. The Western Powers cannot afford to stand by and allow essential bastions of defence to fall into hands which are ultra-nationalistic at the best and fully communistic at the worst. In fact, there is some doubt as to whether communist gains carry the implication of forerunners to world conflict, but the West no doubt considers the friendly status of S.E. Asian countries a good insurance.

Secondly, the products of these areas are a vital part of Europe's complementary economy, a dependence which has not ceased to increase since the Industrial Revolution. Conversely, the West has relied to some extent on the ability of Asian countries to absorb a proportion of her finished goods. Should these countries fall from the Western sphere of influence to communism it is safe to assume on present indications that the benefits of this relationship will cease.

These aspects found expression in the political sphere in the USA in President Truman's famous Point Four programme: "A bold new programme for making the benefits of scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of undeveloped areas"; and in the Colombo Plan as applied by the British Commonwealth.

In the case of the USA this implied a significant modification of policy. In effect it marked the end of isolationism, a trend observable since the entry of USA to World War II. This process was completed by the passing of the Mutual Security Acts of 1951 and 1952.

Economists, however, pointed out that economic aid did not stop at the transfer of goods and capital equipment. A rise in producing potential, they said, was of little benefit unless export markets and stabilized prices were guaranteed. This found political expression in the aims of the Havana Conference, the ITO,<sup>1</sup> and the GATT.<sup>2</sup> Although the somewhat idealistic requirements of these agreements have only been partially realized, and have not always proved desirable, it has been acknowledged that stabilization must begin by an agreement between the major powers to rationalize raw material purchases and stockpiling. The American entry into and exit from strategic raw material markets in 1952 gave ample evidence of the marked effect of demand fluctuations in this extremely elastic economic field.

A decision on the quantity of aid to be granted presented little diffi-

1. International Trade Organization.

2. General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs

culty to the administrations concerned. The decision as to whom to grant it posed many problems. The American administration learnt a sound lesson in its dealings with China, and it was here that the principle of "identification of interests" was first acknowledged. As Professor MacMahon Ball says: "If a government shows itself to be primarily concerned to protect the privileges and powers of the minority it represents and unable to reduce economic inequalities and promote social welfare . . . no amount of economic aid will make it an effective barrier against communism."

However, the West should not be too intent on achieving too close an identity. Ideals which apply in the West do not necessarily apply in the East. A guide to popular support of an Eastern government is best gauged by the strength of the police force needed to maintain order, rather than by its electoral methods.

In considering this problem two courses of action were contemplated. Firstly, it was recognized that national leaders could be replaced by intermediaries who had the ear of the general population and the foreign administration. The French attempt to maintain Bao Dai in Indo China is a good example of this. Western experience generally in Asia indicates, however, that it is a good idea to convince Asian peoples of the good intentions of the West by applying its own hard won democratic principles to colonial subjects.

The alternatives, and on the whole the American approach, is to convince the Asian peoples that their legitimate interests are best served by the West through the

impact of psychological material, and evidence of Western faith and goodwill, and the social and cultural counterparts of aid programmes. This principle was the basis of overcoming the revolutionary Min Yuen in Malaya which was largely brought under control by the inauguration of the Briggs and Templar plans. These plans depended to a great extent on social and cultural modifications introduced to protect minorities.

From the point of view of aid administration it is most simple at the colonial stage, the ultimate aim being the achievement of independence after a period of benevolent colonialism. This is, however, contrary to the best democratic ideals. The alternative is to encourage independence, never satisfactory by half measures, accompanied, unfortunately, by the growth of pressure groups and internal disorder as the British have found in Burma. Aid in these circumstances is extremely difficult to administer.

To summarize, the colonial powers are now finding that the problems of economic aid, including that of to whom to give it, are heightened by the application of the divide and rule policy in the past. Then "administrative economy and uniformity of economic and welfare policies were minor considerations."<sup>3</sup> The Americans, however, are faced with providing grants to many of these countries which are now split by active military operations and rendered impotent by overnight administrations.

In accepting the responsibility for economic aid to under-developed countries the West also became

3. Current Affairs Bulletin, Vol. 8, No. 7.

involved in the complex problems of investment. In short, it was necessary to choose one or more avenues of capital transfer and to ensure that the avenues chosen did not violate accepted democratic principles or, especially in the USA, public opinion. Hence there was a choice between investment on a government to government level, private investment on a government guaranteed basis, private investment on a non-government interference basis, and free grant.

President Truman's Point Four Programme was actually a proposal for investment by US citizens accompanied by technical aid from the US Government. It was soon realized, however, that private investment could not be encouraged on a sufficiently large scale and, under the Mutual Security Programme of 1951-52, the transfer of capital was commenced on a free government to government basis.

From the foregoing it may have been observed that a good deal of emphasis has been placed on the part played by the USA in providing aid and the repercussions of aid on the West as it affects America. The reason for this is the rather unique position which the USA occupies in the world's economy. She has been acquiring through the disequilibrium in the world's balance of payments a vast store of capital. If this trend is permanent, as is feared, the USA has more to gain by restoring equilibrium through outright grants than by preserving disequilibrium through investment. Evidence does indicate that the USA herself takes the view that the disequilibrium is short term, and that only an initial injection of capital is necessary. Whatever the intention behind it, the fact remains that only the USA has the resources to contemplate aid on such a vast scale as S.E. Asia requires.



**Bad Years—Famine and Death.**



This does not mean that private investment has ceased or is discouraged, but it suffers from two important political drawbacks. That is, the only inducement for private capital is a high profit margin which is taken as foreign exploitation by Asian countries. Furthermore, private investors require some guarantee for their entry into risky Asian ventures. However, when the USA agreed to guarantee private investment other interests protested strongly on the grounds that the government was entering fields which were the preserves of private insurance companies.

The Colombo Plan was not accorded the same political significance as American aid, nor did it occasion a great deal of comment on the part of Commonwealth citizens since it primarily concerned Commonwealth countries, India and Pakistan in particular, and since the transfer of capital was made on a government to government basis.

Irrespective of the donor or the means of capital transfer, no country is prepared to see its capital move without some protection. On the international level this implies treaties. The concern of the West, however, is in the degree of faith by which receivers honour such treaties. It is an acknowledged principle that a treaty is valid and binding, in practice, only so long as conditions, which were applicable at the time of drafting the treaty, remain in force. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's recent experience with the Persian Government illustrated this only too clearly. The West can only prevent a similar debacle in S.E. Asia by convincing the Asians that the intention is not to exploit but to give rise to a state of mutual assistance and interdependence.

It will be hoped therefore that the East will live up to its obligations in accepting aid and that the West, especially where private investment



Good Years—Bare Subsistence.

is concerned, maintains the high-minded principles which President Truman's Programme and the Colombo Plan envisage.

It was not expected that communist countries would remain silent over this issue, and through a stream of propaganda and allegations against the West such countries attempted to give Western aid a sinister reputation.

In order, therefore, to determine more closely the political significance of these claims the salient features of the Communist attitude have been considered.

#### **Communist Views on Economic Aid to S.E. Asia.**

Stated in the hardest terms the communist elements identify Western aid as seeking to rob the underdeveloped countries of natural resources, thereby seeking to retain such countries as outlets for exports and suppliers of raw materials. This is intended, they claim, to insistence upon the right to build military installations, and other demands for economic and military privilege contrary to the principles of sovereignty.

It could well be that the supporters of these claims had in mind Section 511B of the Mutual Security Act 1951 which states: "No economic or technical assistance shall be supplied to any other nation unless the President finds that the supplying of such assistance will strengthen the security of the USA and promote world peace . . . and unless such action is taken as may be mutually agreed on to eliminate causes of international tension."

Similarly restrictive conditions were applied by the Mutual Defence Assistance Control Act 1951 (Battle

Act). Under this act no military, economic, or financial assistance is to be supplied to any nation unless it places an embargo on shipments of strategic goods to the Soviet.

Russia, on the other hand, proposes that assistance should be more in accordance with UN principles; should be accompanied by the end of the arms race and resumption of normal trade relations. In contrast to that of the West, Russia's attitude to China is based, M. Gromyko states, on equality, normal trade relations, self help and unselfish mutual assistance. The International Bank, he stated, was merely serving the interest of the Western Powers.

Julius Katz-Suchy, Polish representative at the Second Committee of the General Assembly, 12 Nov., 1952, listed six prerequisites for real economic and social advancement for under-developed territories:

- (a) Determination of own economic plans without foreign interference.
- (b) Land reform essential.
- (c) Hold of foreign monopolies must be removed.
- (d) National income must be better distributed among working population.
- (e) Colonial nature of under-developed economies must end, and such countries must have fair and equal access to raw materials and investment goods under normal international trade conditions.
- (f) All measures taken must help to strengthen the economic and political independence and raise living standards.

This statement appears to be quite reasonable and agreeable in the long term to the West. Application of these principles by the USSR, however, is likely to be more unrestrained, and it is probable that she finds it a good deal easier to level criticism than to supply economic aid in such large quantities. Some evidence of this lies in her dealings with satellite countries.

Firstly, Russia has officially kept in the shadows in S.E. Asia, but the treatment South-East Asian countries could expect would be no better than evidenced by the conditions of the Sino-Soviet Treaty 14 Feb., 1950, the main clauses of which are:

- (a) USSR will provide credit of the equivalent of \$US300 million over a period of 5 years at 1 per cent. interest.
- (b) China and USSR to take jointly all necessary measures to prevent a repetition of aggression on the part of Japan or any state uniting with Japan in acts of aggression.
- (c) Should either party be attacked by Japan or states allied with that country the other party will immediately render all military assistance within its power.

Secondly, the USA has not been slow to point out that the Russian Plan for economic advancement is far from effective since rationing of basic commodities has been reintroduced in Russian satellite states seven years after the war.

Thirdly, although some tentative offers of trade and assistance to South-East Asian territories have been given by the USSR, no more

favourable conditions have been suggested nor aid in such quantity as advocated by the West.

China plays a vital role in this area, and no treatment of political aspects of aid would be complete without considering her unique position. The governing factor from China's point of view economically and politically is rice. It would be to her great advantage to control the rice-bearing areas of Siam and Indo China (and Burma, if possible). It is against her interest, therefore, to see the strengthening of ties between S.E. Asia and the West. The success of the Ho Chi Minh's forces (the Viet Minh) in their efforts against the French, and the infiltration of the Annamese into Siam, must be looked upon favourably. Similarly any unrest in Burma caused by the PVO,<sup>4</sup> RFC,<sup>5</sup> BCP<sup>6</sup> or other factions or in Indonesia by the extreme nationalists plays into Communist hands.

Whilst it is not the concern of this paper to examine the validity or otherwise of the statements given above, they are a good indication of the Communist outlook and cannot help but colour political relations between the East and West, between Communism and the West and the satellite countries of both.

So far then we have observed the political implications of aid from the Western point of view and the objections to this movement of capital under conditions opposed to communist interests which have been made by communist countries. An atmosphere of tension has thus been introduced into Asia, further

4. People's Volunteer Organization.

5. Red Flag Communists.

6. Burma Communist Party.

complicating the already impressive difficulties which confront the S.E. Asian countries themselves in their endeavour to assimilate aid without social and economic disintegration.


The more important aspects of assimilation from the receiving countries' points of view will, therefore, now be considered, bearing in mind that, in the delicate political atmosphere of these countries, social and economic changes have a greatly exaggerated importance which are quickly translated into political action; action which recent events have shown can terminate co-operation between the East and West indefinitely.

#### **Socio-Political Aspects of Assimilation of Western Aid.**

The springs of nationalist fervour in S.E. Asia lie in the determination of nations to control their own affairs. Nationalist sentiment is strong, therefore, but the techniques

of government have not yet been acquired, nor are trained personnel available in sufficient quantities. To add to the burden of these problems Asian rulers are faced with the search for security. Some hope to achieve ultimate security by alignment with the communist and ultra-nationalist elements, but others feel that co-operation with the West is the better solution.

From an economic standpoint the East must rely on two courses of action: save enough at home to buy capital equipment overseas, or borrow from overseas as a means to the same end. The former was the Russian method, used to draw the USSR up by its own shoestrings after 1919. The latter method refers more to the type of relationship which existed between England and Australia whereby Australia, through the injection of British capital, attained economic independence. However, the only nations which



**Stable Prices for Exports—Tin Ingots being checked for shipment from Malaya.**



Absorption of Surplus Labour in New Industries— Counting machine assembly line.

had any hope of financing their own industrial development were those controlled by totalitarian regimes, and the countries we are investigating do not fall into this category. They were forced therefore to look overseas for capital.

The first implication of aid to the East from the Western point of view was its dissimilarity in application to European Aid Programmes (i.e., Marshall Plan). In Europe run down industries merely required an injection of capital for their rehabilitation. In the East, however, aid had to begin at the "grass roots" and provide not only capital equipment but training for personnel and an economic system to carry the new structure. The tremendous amount of aid thus implicated caused grave concern in the East where such a transfer could not be envisaged without some degree of subservience to the Western Powers.

Secondly, the West had to show that through aid programmes the widening gap in the standard of living between East and West could be diminished. In 1947 the average income per head in Asia was less than \$100, whilst in USA it was \$1400 per head,<sup>7</sup> a feature which disconcerted the Eastern intellectuals and which inclined them to believe that if the aim of the West was merely to fill rice bowls it had no attraction or advantage over communism which could give the same guarantee.

Thirdly, it was discerned in the West that it was equally important to ensure a just distribution of wealth as distinct from an increase in net national income. A good starting point for this is land reform, but interference in this sphere may lead to an allegation of violation of national sovereignty. Simi-

7. Current Affairs Bulletin, Vol. 7, No. 3.








larly, justice must also determine the method of distribution of aid. Under the Colombo Plan, for example, India was to get two-thirds of the total available funds and Pakistan one-seventh. This apparent inequality of treatment does not impress Asian countries and gives an impression of political bias.


Fourthly, zeal in achieving an increase in national income should not create new economic patterns at the expense of the destruction of

established social patterns. The impact of the West has tended in the main to destroy old religious, family and village loyalties and to rob life of its spiritual comfort and purpose. The inhabitants of some areas have sought a new basis for life which is not diverted by merely raising income. This is evidenced by the large number of relatively well-to-do intellectual recruits for communism. Therefore, in the Western zeal to promote a rise in the stan-

### Reaction of Economic Aid on Population Growth and Requirements.

#### LEGEND

-  Increase in national income. (Subsistence economy.)
-  New semi-industrial production pattern as a result of aid. (Increase in national income.)
-  Population requirement in terms of national income. (Subsistence economy.)
-  New population requirement. (Through a decrease in mortality rate.)
-  Possible fall in rate of population requirements. (Caused by a change in net production rate.)
-  Surplus. (Higher standard of living.)
-  Deficit. (Lower standard of living.)



dard of living great care should be taken not to disrupt too suddenly a mode of life without providing an alternative.

The importance of assured export price levels and a stable level of the exchange rate has already been emphasized. No government can embark on a long term programme of improvement whilst the rate of national income is subject to great variation. Of course the benefit is reciprocal and the dollar earning capacity of many Western nations is closely tied to the level of prosperity of S.E. Asian countries.

A somewhat sobering note on which to conclude lies in the effect of Western aid should it substantially improve the national income and standard of living. Perhaps insufficient attention has been given to the marked fall in the mortality rate which must accompany improvement in the social services. In lands of extremely high birth rate the effect of this factor can increase the requirement of basic commodities faster than aid programmes can boost production. For example, it is estimated that the Colombo Plan will raise production just enough to meet the increase in population requirements without any substantial rise in the standard of living. The answer to this problem may be a drop in the birth rate as the standard of living rises, as in the West, leaving a surplus of net national income available for investment. This aspect is fundamental to all Asian aid programmes.

To this stage we have discussed the political aspects of economic aid from three angles, that of problems confronting Western Powers, the Communist attitude, and the problems of assimilation of aid in the

receiving country. Compounded, these problems become a study in international relations, and it is only fitting that the supreme international authority—the UN—should be concerned with the subject under discussion.

#### Political Implications of UN Interference in the Field of Economic Aid.

At the outset it would appear that should the United Nations decide to enter into substantial aid programmes, involving a movement of capital goods, it would be embarrassed by attempting to obtain sufficient funds. At the present time the method of, and the amount concerned in, the apportionment of financial levies to enable the UN to carry out its present administrative commitments is a matter of some delicacy. Should by some chance it enter the field the difficulty of obtaining agreement among the Western powers to commence aid to a communist country or vice versa may well be envisaged. However, with the vagaries at present existing in UN voting procedures, members may be forced against their will to see their capital contribution applied in a manner repulsive to them. This would be most damaging to the UN as a whole.

The political implications of aid programmes have not been overlooked by the UN, but it is faced with a difficult and complex problem. CAB Vol. 3 No. 3 puts the situation aptly: "Should competing ideologies, social theories and philosophies simply be gathered under a large umbrella . . . and left to jostle one another or should UNESCO<sup>8</sup> try

8. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

to harmonize them into a higher unity . . . and if it does this . . . will it not in fact be taking sides between them?" Therefore, there seems to be a tendency perhaps for this reason for international organizations to be left out of major issues simply because they are controversial.

Within the UN, unfortunately, aid or promises of it may be used as a political lever to persuade others possessing divergent views to fall into line. It is probable that Latin American countries have not been inconsiderate of the effect on aid from the USA should they vote with the Communist bloc for which they have, at times, had sympathy. This aspect has a similar obvious application in the East.

The United Nations, therefore, has been limited to the collection and distribution of accurate information, and through sources of expert knowledge and advice the UN agencies are encouraging backward countries to make the most of their resources. It has also attempted to focus world attention on social and economic problems and promote joint action among governments. Any move outside these limits has tended to wreck, or render impotent, the organizations responsible before they have had time to prove themselves. UNRRA,<sup>9</sup> ICAO<sup>10</sup> (in early stages) and the International Bank fall into this category.

#### Conclusion.

The easing of tension caused by the widening gap in the standard of living between East and West

relies on a rational redistribution of the world's wealth, a considerable portion of which has accrued to the USA through a continued disequilibrium in world balance of payments and the superior pattern of manpower and resources which it is the USA's good fortune to possess.

The application of such aid in a rational manner, however, required a significant change in US foreign policy, and also involved a number of high level political decisions on the manner in which aid was to be applied. Further complication was introduced by the need for international agreements to assure the growth of a co-ordinated effort and stable economic conditions in those fields which most affected S.E. Asian markets.

Problems concerning distribution of aid were seen to contain a decided political aspect by the way in which the inflow of foreign capital was accepted by communist inspired countries.

Unfortunately for the West, communism has successfully aligned itself with nationalism, and through the support of subversive activities has partially destroyed the intended pattern of aid distribution. Where military action has stopped short communism has used the psychological approach, and has attempted to turn the East against the West by convincing countries in receipt of aid that they are bargaining away their sovereign rights.

From a consideration of the problems inherent in a rise in the standard of living it was concluded that, although there would be an initial rise in the total requirements of basic commodities a reversal would

9. United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

10. International Civil Aviation Organization.




set in through a decrease in the net reproduction rate, should Western demographic trends be applicable to Eastern countries.

The assimilation of aid, it was concluded, had distinct political implications. Asian nationalists, who tempered a desire for immediate independence with the acknowledgment of a necessary liaison with and dependence on the West, had to face possible disintegration of existing society whilst attempting to create

a new economic order. Should the unstable situation which still prevails throughout S.E. Asia get out of hand an immediate switch to communism may well result.

Finally, the part played by the United Nations appears to have fallen short at limited technical aid, the Organization fearing, no doubt, that more harm than good will result, in its already uncertain position, from interference in major issues between East and West.



Reinforced concrete silo 90 feet high and  $\frac{1}{8}$  mile long for fertilizer plant at Sindri.

# SOUTH KOREA'S ARMY

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Reprinted from the Irish Defence Journal.

IN Korea, protracted peace talks have not so far brought peace. Rather they have brought hostility among the Allies. As the talks progress, President Syngman Rhee has become increasingly distrustful of US intentions and openly inimical to Britain. He has now declared that South Korea will ignore a truce and will carry on the war, alone, if necessary, to the Yalu River. Presumably, in such case, his instrument for the unification of Korea under his own autocratic rule, will be the new South Korean Army.

Even by Western standards this army is an excellent fighting force. Half-a-million strong, and organized in 15/16 divisions, it now holds three-quarters of the battle-line stretching across the waist of Korea along the 38th Parallel. General Van Fleet estimates the potential strength of the South Korean armed forces at one million (20 combat divisions).

## Equipment.

South Korean artillery units have increased in the past year from ten under-strength and under-equipped artillery battalions to more than 40

battalions of Field Artillery. Each division has under its command three battalions of 105 mm. guns, and some divisions have, in addition a battalion of 155 mm. (medium) guns.

At the beginning of the year the armoured strength stood at seven tank companies equipped with M. 36's, converted tank destroyers. This number has been considerably increased and the M. 36's are being replaced by modern US medium tanks. The tanks, unlike artillery, are generally held in corps reserve.

The army has its own ancillary services: communications, transport, ordnance and engineers. But the South Korean conscript, while sturdy and hard-working, is lacking in mechanical knowledge. He learns the skills required for the maintenance and repair of vehicles and machines no more easily than his Asian brother in the Chinese or former Japanese army. Few South Koreans can drive.

All men between the ages 17 and 40 are conscripted; those between 20 and 26 go into the army, the remainder into the labour service; only primary school teachers and railway engineers are exempt.

On his call-up the recruit undergoes a 16-week basic training course. This course is the same length as that of the US conscript.

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*This article was published in the July, 1953, number of the Irish Defence Journal, and was probably written in May or June.—Editor.*

On it, the recruit learns drills and the use of weapons and on completion he is assigned to a battalion.

#### Leaders.

If, during combat service, he shows good leadership qualities he may be sent to an Officers' Training School for six months, or to an NCO's school for three months. Once conscripted, officer, NCO and man is in the army for the duration.

Approximately 400 Cadet Officers are undergoing a four-year course to become Regular Officers. About two thousand other officers have undergone courses, including Command and Staff courses in military academies in the United States.

#### Conditions.

The South Korean soldier lives hard and fights hard. His basic ration is 2 lb. of rice per day. This ration is supplemented by an allowance of one shilling a day. The shilling is used for the purchase of fish, vegetables and "Kemchi," a highly-seasoned salad dish peculiar to Korea. Every three days he gets a biscuit. His pay, like his rations, is meagre. A Lieutenant-General receives £4 per month, a Lieutenant 30/- and a private 8/-.

Bad pay and scanty rations have not diminished the South Korean's willingness to fight or noticeably decreased his stamina. His hardihood and endurance are on the whole greater than that of the Western soldiers. The deficiencies in his diet, however, render him liable to tuberculosis and he suffers frequently from night blindness.

Officers and other ranks are remarkably young by Western army standards. Lt. Gen. Paik Sun Yun, the Chief of Staff, is 32; all divisional commanders are in the same

age group; the average soldier is about 20.

The South Korean army is young and vigorous—and perhaps as a consequence—its discipline is harsh. Up until last July officers held power of life and death over men. NCO's punish offenders with blows and stick beatings. But strict, and by Western standards even barbarous, discipline has not diminished the army's soldierly pride. This pride manifests itself sometimes in defence which is stubborn beyond the limit of prudence or value, and at times in repeated attacks excessively wasteful in lives. South Korean officers are extremely sensitive about reverses and temporary defeats.

In December, 1952, they withheld the news that South Korean forces had been driven from the strategic "Pinpoint Hill" by a Chinese attack. In four hours' bayonet fighting on the following day they recaptured the hill.

#### A Comparison.

Man for man they are probably better troops than the Chinese. Of the same sturdy Mongolian stock, they are, to a greater extent than the Chinese, a peasant people. In defence they dig as deeply as the Chinese; they occupy reverse slopes and lay mines and wire just as skilfully, but generally they show a higher degree of improvisation and they are probably better at patrolling.

Both in attack and defence their opponents, the Chinese, fight very much in the manner of the Japanese in World War II. They advance not only up with their own artillery fire, but frequently within it. Their organized attacks are within limits,

stylized. The South Koreans are as tough and equally indifferent to death. But with them American training has reduced this Asian tendency towards extravagance of lives, and in attack generally, the South Koreans are more individual in manoeuvre.

General Van Fleet, the ex-8th Army commander, has stated that South Korean soldiers are superior to Americans in personal camouflage, digging in, mountain climbing, night patrolling, infiltration, ambushes and taking prisoners. These are military skills of supreme importance in the type of warfare now being waged in Korea. There the front is stabilized across mountainous terrain. The FDL's of the opposing forces are only from 30 to 1000 yards apart.

#### **Its Role.**

The South Koreans have held an increasing portion of this 155-mile front with determination and skill. In February of this year, an estimated three US divisions had been pulled back into reserve and replaced by South Korean divisions. Of the seven US divisions on duty in Korea, four, it is now believed, may be held in tactical reserve. It is the intention of the US to withdraw all of the American divisions from the fighting line in Korea within a period of 12 to 18 months; three divisions may be held in Korea in fighting reserve. The length and depth of the battle-line will then be held entirely by South Korean divisions, supported by American heavy artillery and UN Air and Naval Forces.

That this organization of the battle-line is contemplated is a tribute to the basic fighting ability

of the South Korean troops and to the remarkable efficiency of US training. The training has been carried out by the Korean Military Advisory Group (KAYMAG) established in 1945. Little was done between 1945 and 1951. However, shortly after the Communist Spring Offensive of 1951, which almost annihilated the South Korean Army, Maj.-General Cornelius Ryan and 2500 US officers and men set about the task of creating a new Korean Army. From two great training centres at Kwango and Cheju, KAYMAG has produced an effective modern army in little more than two years.

#### **Further Training.**

Training does not cease with the completion of the basic training course in the depots. About 12 US officers and approximately 30 Other Ranks accompany almost every one of the South Korean divisions into the line. The Other Ranks are technicians; the officers specially selected for instructional ability, supported by combat experience. In this way the battle-line becomes, among other things, an advanced training field. The South Korean divisional commander, equally with his signallers, engineers and gunners, is both a fighting soldier and a post-graduate student.

When divisions are brought back into reserve, they are brought back not for rest and recreation, but to undergo further rigorous training in offensive tactics. There is no leave for the South Korean officer or man, except on extreme compassionate grounds. The KAYMAG training programme has now produced nearly sufficient leaders and instructors up to divisional level to train and lead an army of the maximum

size that South Korea can produce. At divisional level the South Korean Army is capable of fighting efficiently (and confidently) on its own. At Corps and Command level there is still probably a lack of team work and a deficiency in staff performance. These defects should be remedied at the Command and Staff Courses to be held in the United States and in Great Britain.

The reorganization and training programme has raised in South Korea a modern, well-equipped and competent fighting army, led by its own officers. It is the second most powerful army in Asia, inferior to the Chinese only in numbers. Its creation is a monument to American ability and hard work.

Other Western nations have raised great armies in Asia, among them the British in pre-1947 India and the French in present-day Indo-China; but these armies differ essentially from the South Korean Army. The pre-World War II Gurkha, who in character, mental capacity and soldiering spirit is remarkably similar to the South Korean, did a two-year Basic Training course. Specialist training required a much longer period. As a soldier of the line, he was commanded in peace and war by European officers. Punjabis, Sikhs and Mahrattas were similarly organized and led. In Indo-China, French Union and Vietnamese troops operate normally in lightly-armed and lightly-equipped battalion formations and are directly controlled by European officers. The South Korean army is not a colonial army in this sense. It is led, trained and administered by its own nationals. In actual fighting the American officers attached to the division no longer command, but act

as "advisers." South Korean Divisional Commanders now normally act upon their own judgment and the "advice" of the American officers is frequently ignored.

#### The Future.

If the Chinese armies were withdrawn the South Korean army alone would have little difficulty in marching to the Yalu River and unifying the country by the force of its arms. North Korea has been devastated and ruined by the war. Its army is broken and its population dispersed. The crack fighting force, which led the invasion of South Korea in 1950, has been reduced to about 50,000 dispirited and demoralized troops. The factories and plants which made North Korea the most highly industrialized area on the Asiatic mainland have been utterly destroyed.

If all the foreign armies withdrew from Korea, it would be possible for President Syngman Rhee to reunite the whole Korean peninsula under his own rule. But to maintain this unification he would require the continued existence of the South Korean Army as a loyal, well-equipped and adequately-fed fighting force. The army is almost non-political. President Syngman Rhee himself enjoys high personal prestige among the officers and other ranks. But there is growing resentment among the young generals at the apparent widespread corruption in political circles. The resentment is intensified by the feeling that army selection and promotion are governed by the aged and allegedly corrupt politicians in Pusan who surround the President. There is the inevitable lack of sympathy between youth and age, between civilian politician and active soldier. The army, moreover, sincerely ad-

mires Western, and particularly American ideals, in a general and non-political way. American training and equipment has made the South Korean Army what it is today. President Syngman Rhee and the politicians look less favourably upon Western policies and politics.

The South Korean soldier who has so far kept out of politics may continue to fight as the servant of his government. But his service depends on the ability of the country to feed and equip him. It is beyond

the capacity of South Korea to maintain alone an army of the size and effectiveness of that which, as her own army, at present holds the line. South Korea is a ruined agricultural country of 21 million people. Her population can produce a great fighting spirit and a million fighting men. Unaided, the country could not arm, pay or feed them. She depends on the West for money, arms and equipment. She must continue to depend on the West for many years to come, if she is to maintain even a perilous and uncertain independence in Asia.

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No physical advantages such as numbers, armament, or position are of much avail if the troops are badly led, and for this good leading they depend on the skill and the knowledge of their officers. No one believes that study will turn an ordinary man into a genius, nor that it will turn a man who is slow and vacillating by nature into an energetic and decided character. But study fortifies the strong character, and enables it to decide and act correctly in critical moments in exact proportion as its possessor has previously studied the art that he is attempting to put into practice.

—From *Military History Applied to Modern Warfare*.

# INTERNAL BALLISTICS



Reprinted from the Royal Australian  
Air Force Training Bulletin.

**I**NTERNAL ballistics can briefly be described as a science devoted to the study of everything that happens in a gun or rocket. It is the purpose of this article to explain simply the many and varied happenings during the passage of a projectile through a gun barrel and to describe various factors under the heading of "Loading Conditions" that have major effects on weapon performance from the standpoint of the internal ballisticians.

## **Ignition.**

When the striker pin strikes the cap and detonates the primer in a quick-firing gun, a large flame spreads rapidly over all surfaces of the propellant. The lighting-up is so rapid that internal ballistic calculations assume that all surfaces of the charge commence burning at the same instant.

## **Shot-Start Pressure.**

This is the initial pressure used to overcome inertia and to move the projectile on the first step of its passage through the gun barrel.

Burning of the propellant releases gases which quickly build up pres-

sure and operate the sealing systems in the chambers. At the front of the chamber, the shell moves forward to a position where its driving band blocks all space between the bore and the shell. From there a short forward movement up the bore deforms the driving band to an extent that it takes up the exact outline of the rifling.

The pressure required here is generally in the vicinity of two tons per square inch, and averages about 10 per cent. of total pressure generated.

## **The Movement of the Shell Along the Bore.**

Due to the quick build-up of pressure, the projectile accelerates rapidly up the bore. The further the projectile moves the greater becomes the space behind it. Eventually this space increases at a greater rate than the production rate of propellant gases, with the result that the pressure starts to fall. The projectile continues to accelerate, however, because the pressure behind it is still much greater than the pressure in front and remains so until the projectile leaves the muzzle.

### The Position of "All Burnt."

Theoretically, maximum pressure is reached at a short interval before the "all burnt" stage is reached, but the gases continue to expand adiabatically. At this point a theoretical pressure space curve will move suddenly downwards. However, since the grains or sticks of the charge are not all completely burned through at exactly the same time, there is a diffusion of the point of "all burnt" into a region. The pressure space curve, therefore, shows no noticeable change at this point.


Variations in manufacture of the ammunition result in changes in the region of "all burnt." Such changes, when near the muzzle, are important for two reasons. In the first place, muzzle velocity will be adversely affected if the complete charge is not burned inside the gun. Secondly, since the pressure is still fairly high in the region of "all burnt," a slight movement to right or left in the time-pressure curve

will make a relatively large change in the area under the curve, and hence in the muzzle velocity.

It is most important, therefore, to keep the region of "all burnt" well back from the muzzle. In practice, it is usual to try to place it at a very early stage in the performance.

### Efficiency.

The efficiency is defined as the proportion of the total energy in the charge which is used in producing the muzzle velocity. The energy is used up in giving velocity and spin to the projectile, in the recoil of the gun, in the motion of the propelling gases, in friction between the driving band and the bore, in the force required to deform the band to the shape of the rifling, in heat imparted to the gun and in heat developed in the propelling gases. The proportion of energy used to give the shell its velocity is usually about one-third in normal guns, but it depends on the loading conditions.



Pressure-Space Diagram in a Gun.



### **Loading Conditions and Their Effect on Ballistics.**

Loading conditions is the name given to the various conditions which hold after the round has been loaded but before it is fired. It covers all details of the charge, the shell and the gun which have an effect on internal ballistics.

### **Inter-relation of Charge Weight and Propellant Weight.**

Variations in the weights of the projectile and the charge obviously result in changes in the muzzle velocity. The extent of the change may be gauged by the fact that to double a given muzzle velocity, it is necessary to use approximately four times the original propellant weight or about one-quarter of the original projectile weight.

### **Effect of "Size" of the Propellant.**

A propellant burns only at the surface, so that the greater the surface area the more rapid will be its consumption. To increase the surface area the propellant is reduced into grains or sticks. The result is that the pressure build-up is more rapid and the state of "all burnt" is accomplished at an earlier stage.

### **Effects of Composition.**

The important characteristics under this heading comprise the energy content per unit weight, the rate of burning, the ease of ignition, and the temperature of explosion (also called the flame temperature).

The energy in one pound weight of propellant can vary widely according to the composition. Probably the highest figure for all solid propellant is about 1250 calories, and only half of this for the lowest. In other words, roughly twice the charge weight of the low energy propellant is required to do the work

of the high energy propellant, assuming that the chamber is large enough to accommodate the charge.

Generally speaking, a high energy propellant also has a high rate of burning (hence a high maximum pressure) and a high flame temperature (hence more rapid wear). Naturally, the ballisticians always asks the chemist for a high energy propellant with a low flame temperature. In time he may get it.

The lower the flame temperature, the more difficult it becomes to ignite the propellant. In this case, more efficiency is demanded from the ignition system.

### **Effect of Chamber Size.**

Given a constant projectile size, propellant size and muzzle velocity, an adjustment in the form of increased chamber space must be accompanied by an increase in the quantity of charge. In this case, however, the pressure will fall because the pressure space curve will be somewhat flattened. The result will be a forward movement of the "all burnt" position with the attendant danger to regularity in muzzle velocity.

### **Wear.**

The average diameter of the bore increases with use. This increase will not be uniform along the bore as one might expect if the wear were purely a matter of mechanical abrasion. The most serious cause of wear is erosion by hot gases from the burning charges.

Erosion commences, and is initially greatest, at shot-start. Thus, the shell must move increasingly further forward before fitting snugly in the bore. This results in an effective increase in chamber capacity accompanied by a loss in engraving pressure. The result is that the

velocity drop is progressive and remains consistent over a large proportion of the gun's life. At a later stage, the proportion of escaping gases has a more pronounced effect, causing rapid velocity drop and excessive inaccuracy.

The reasons why erosion by the gases is greater at the chamber end of the bore are threefold. In the first place, the gases are hotter and at a higher pressure. Secondly, the bore diameter is less at the muzzle, so that there is a slight throttling effect and, thirdly, there is a tendency for the gases to seek a passage, however small, between the driving band and the rifling.

Reduced propellant size gives higher pressure and more wear, but the velocity drop is less in a worn gun and no disadvantage results.

#### Departure from Orthodox Parallel Bores.


The weight of an orthodox gun projectile can be roughly estimated from the following equation:—


$$\text{Weight in lbs.} = \frac{(\text{calibre in in.})^3}{2}$$

Thus the weight of a 6 in. shell works out at 108 lb. In practice most of them would weigh between 100 lb. and 130 lb.

Now a substantial reduction in the weight of a shell will give a much higher muzzle velocity. For example, a 6 in. shell weighing 25 lb. will, with the normal service charge, have a velocity of nearly double the service velocity. Such a shell would have a bad range/ballistic co-efficient (perhaps about one-quarter of normal), so the advantage of increased velocity would be lost. How, then, are we going to extend the range of an orthodox gun when all factors previously mentioned have combined to give the maximum possible result? The theoretical answer, to say the least, is simple.

When the charge is consumed (the region of "all burnt") most of its work is done and the missile is near its maximum velocity. Suppose the missile is made of some collapsible





material and that the bore narrows down in a slow cone to half its original diameter. In this case, the muzzle velocity will suffer to a minor degree, but the converted ballistic shape will be such that a very much greater range will result.

This is the principle of the coned bore and of the Littlejohn attachment, both of which are illustrated.

#### Heavy Cores.

An alternative approach, which also used the principle of the light projectile, was to have in effect two large, light, centring bands around a small, heavy projectile of good ballistic shape. The centring bands are discarded when the projectile leaves the muzzle. Such a system of centring bands is called a "sabot."

#### Skirt Bands.

Very high velocities bring further problems in their train. Copper in its pure state is thought the best material for low-performance guns. It is plastic, so that it easily deforms into the bore, and it has sufficient strength to impart the rotation necessary to keep a shell stable.

The strain to which it is subjected even in low-velocity guns is considerable. For example, in a medium performance gun the shell may be made to revolve at a rate of 200 revolutions per minute in a space

of one-thirteenth of a second. Copper can stand this, but at the much higher strains involved in hyper-velocity guns it fails and sufficient rotation is not imparted to the shell. The resultant instability, inaccuracy and loss of range have led to the introduction of a type of hollowed projectile base which is known as the skirt band.

When exposed to the chamber gases, this base will open out parachute fashion. Being fairly pliable at such pressures, it becomes deformed to the shape of the bore. As the pressure increases, the base walls grip the bore and act as a driving band.

The effectiveness of the skirt band is largely dependent on its design, and there is little room for error.

#### Unrotated Projectiles.

The difficulty in finding a sufficiently strong driving band to withstand the strains of hyper-velocity guns has made the internal ballisticians think of ways of firing unrotated projectiles (i.e., fin stabilised) in smooth bores. At this stage, however, his good work reaches the outer limits in the sphere of his activity, for technical difficulties are great and the external ballisticians appears likely to take over with his long-range rockets.

# GOLD MEDAL ESSAY

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The AMF Gold Medal Essay Competition was instituted in 1930 with the object of encouraging the study of military subjects, stimulating thought, and providing all ranks of the Australian Army with an opportunity to express their ideas in a useful and constructive way.

Each year the subject for the essay is selected by AHQ, and promulgated in Australian Army Orders and the Australian Army Journal. The subject chosen has a bearing on current problems, or on an aspect of modern war which should be engaging the attention of thoughtful soldiers.

As will be seen from the rules of the competition published hereunder the judges do not award the prize if, in their opinion, no essay reaches a sufficiently high standard. However, in the eleven years in which the competition has been held—it was suspended during World War II—seven awards have been made.

In the year 1952-53 an award was not made as the judges considered that no essay reached a sufficiently high standard. In fact, only three entries were received. This is surprising because the subject was one towards which it was expected every thinking soldier would be directing his attention.

This year the selected subject bears on a current problem which concerns every CMF soldier and practically every regular soldier as well. There should, therefore, be no scarcity of ideas. It only remains to set them out in logical order, develop them into essay form and send

them in. Because the subject is one about which a great many people undoubtedly have a great many ideas, it is hoped that a large number of entries will be received.

It is particularly important to note that the length of the essay should not exceed 10,000 words. This does not mean that a competitor has to write 10,000 words or anything like that number. He can make his essay as short as he likes, but he should not make it longer than 10,000 words. There is no lower limit at all, and the upper limit is imposed simply to keep the essays to a reasonable length.

The subject for the 1953-54 competition is:—

In time of peace the function of the Citizen Military Forces is to train for war. Therefore, the only aim of the CMF should be the attainment of a degree of efficiency which will permit it to undertake operations in a major war with the least possible delay. Peace administration, which is unavoidable and which differs in many ways from war administration, should not be allowed to jeopardize the attainment of this aim.

Discuss the means which you consider will permit the essential requirements of peace administration to be met and which, at the same time, will enable the CMF to attain the maximum degree of operational efficiency attainable under the existing terms of CMF service.

The rules for the competition are:—

The right to compete will be limited to officers and other ranks on the Active and Reserve Lists of the Australian Military Forces.

The essays may be of any length but should not exceed 10,000 words; they must be typewritten and submitted in quadruplicate.

The authorship of the essays must be strictly anonymous. Each competitor must adopt a motto, and enclose with his essay a sealed envelope with his motto written on the outside and his name and address inside.

The title and page of any published or unpublished work to which reference is made in the essay, or from which extracts are taken, must be quoted.

The judges may withhold award of the prize if in their opinion no essay reaches a sufficiently high standard.

The essays will be addressed to the Secretary, Military Board, Victoria Barracks, St. Kilda Road, Melbourne, the envelope being marked "AMF Gold Medal Essay," and must reach him not later than 31st July, 1954.

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# THE MORALE of the INDIVIDUAL SOLDIER

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Captain Paul B. Nelson, Jr.,  
Infantry, US Army.

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How often people talk about morale! The generals compare the morale of their divisions, while the privates talk about it over their beer. But do we all really know what it is we are talking about? The term "morale" has become a sort of catch-all title used to label the overall outlook or attitude of this or that organization, or of some particular individual. This situation leaves a great deal to be desired.

Morale, at best, is a pretty slippery concept to pin down, because there is no universal agreement on its components. However, one point is generally agreed upon: the term "morale" is *most applicable* in the discussion of the attitudes or viewpoints of a group.

Our industrial personnel experts long ago concluded that another term was needed when discussing the morale of an individual, and they finally settled on "job satisfac-

tion". This new term, a sort of first cousin to the original "morale," gave them a label to be attached to an individual's outlook or attitudes so that these could be discussed apart from the collective outlook or morale of the group to which he belonged. This new approach to the problem proved to be an extremely useful one. Many problems of low individual morale heretofore inexplicable fell apart when considered in terms of job satisfaction.

Perhaps this same approach would be useful in the Army. We seem to have devoted a lot of attention to group morale, yet we have seldom considered the effect of the individual's job satisfaction on its attainment. This is rather like putting the cart before the horse. If we can improve each individual's level of job satisfaction (each man's morale, if you will), the raising of the morale of the group will not be difficult—in fact, it will probably start improving without our doing anything else. So let us consider the

job satisfaction of the individual soldier.

#### Four Questions.

There are at least four questions we should answer before we will really understand what makes a soldier satisfied:

1. Why do men enlist in the Army?
2. What do men like about military life?
3. What do men dislike about military life?
4. What aspects of a military career are considered important by representative combat soldiers?

Each reader undoubtedly could produce a list of answers to these four questions—and many, of course, would be right—but we should look a little further before we jump to any final conclusions.

#### Answers are Relative.

Take the first question: "Why do men enlist in the Army?" If we had asked a pre-Korea recruiting sergeant, he would probably have told us of some incentives that an Army career offers: high pay, travel, security, retirement benefits, and similar attractive advantages. This would have sounded like a good explanation, but it would not have provided the entire answer. If we asked a seasoned infantryman or a tanker, we would probably be told of the pleasures of an outdoor life, the plain good feeling that comes from being a member of a first-rate combat unit, and the satisfaction involved in living and working with *bona fide* fighting men. These are good reasons as well, but even they do not give us the whole answer. If we asked one of our sharp young sergeants, he might answer that he figures more and bigger scraps are

on the way and that he is learning his trade *well* before that time arrives. This reply, like the others, is a good one; but we still do not have a full and complete answer to the question.

The second question—"What do men like about military life?"—is the easiest one to answer, and everyone should make a passing grade on it. However, since there may be a few things we do not know about, we had better plan to look also into this matter a little deeper.

The third question—"What do men dislike about military life?"—deals with the unpleasant aspects of a soldier's life, and is one we had better stop dodging. Let us not kid ourselves. The life of a combat soldier can be far from pleasant at times, and every soldier is aware of this fact. We would be well advised to stop painting silver linings on every cloud that floats across our military horizon and, instead, to start looking for our trouble spots honestly. We might then be able to locate some of the points that are discouraging many persons from enlisting, and we might be able to modify some and maybe even eliminate others. In any case, we would then know what features of our life bear some explaining to the newcomers.

The final question—"What aspects of a military career are considered important by representative combat soldiers?"—is one that should have been answered a long time ago. The Army might now be making exactly the same mistake as did our civilian industries for many decades, indeed, a mistake they were making as late as the 1930's. The Army's idea of what the soldier wants from a military career might well be off base.

Consider, for example, our pre-Korea recruiting literature. In all those handsome pamphlets we read glowing phrases describing the attractive features of an Army career. We read of travel to Japan, vacation trips to the Alps, athletic programmes, homecraft programmes, information and education programmes, United States Armed Forces Institute (USAFI) programmes, and all those other programmes we have been publicizing in recent years. It took extreme diligence and care to find those few references dealing with the *military* life and the military training that goes with it, and what you did find was usually well slanted. All signs seemed to point to somebody's believing that the rough facts of life—such as the need for training and manoeuvres—should not be discussed. The Army's advertising consultants seemed to think that we would have scared our prospective enlistees away if we told them the whole truth about the Army instead of just the selected features. Perhaps we may have scared some away with such honesty, but I wonder if we might not have attracted some other more soldierly persons in their place. At least, we would not have been placed in the rather embarrassing position of having to explain to many soldiers that they are also expected to do some fighting—that came as a rude shock to many of our troops!

It should be apparent that there is justification for the statement that we need more information on the motives, interests, likes, and dislikes of the man who eventually becomes an experienced combat soldier. We will be much better qualified to examine the *job satisfaction* of each

individual when we know what satisfies most individuals.

Now, what are some of the determinants of this job satisfaction that we are talking about? What variables enter into the picture?

#### Six Factors Involved.

There seem to be at least six general factors involved.

*First*, there is the effect of man's being exposed to unpleasant situations on his outlook toward his job. If, for example, a young soldier who is not yet ready for the responsibilities and the demands of leadership is too soon elevated to such a position, the pressures upon him will be quite considerable and unpleasant. The way in which he responds to these pressures will have much to do with his job satisfaction.

*Second*, the individual's job must satisfy his social strivings or prestige aspirations. A top-notch first cook, for example, will be most unhappy if he is assigned to a unit with a full quota of first cooks in which he will fill, instead, a less important role. This is, of course, a quite unlikely situation today (since we have no great abundance of qualified cooks), but the example serves to illustrate the point.

*Third*, the individual's abilities and personality must fit the requirements of his job. When they do not, he will not be able to handle it in the proper manner and he may be the very first to recognize this fact. It is generally acknowledged, for example, that a man can have too little or too much intelligence for some jobs. The problem is to match the whole man to an appropriate job.



*Fourth*, the soldier's job must provide economic and psychological security. Consider the case of the newly promoted squad leader who was never praised or encouraged in spite of all his best efforts to do a good job. As a result, he became uncertain as to whether he was doing his job in the proper fashion and all signs of individual initiative soon faded away.

*Fifth*, the individual must be able to identify himself with the group of which he is a member. This identification of self with group, which is known to psychologists as the belongingness or in-group feeling, has a tremendous amount to do with an individual's outlook on his own situation or, in other words, his morale or job satisfaction. The greater the extent to which he makes the goals of the group his own, the higher will be his level of job satisfaction. Conversely, the greater the degree to which his goals conflict with those of the group, the more probable are the chances that you have a dissatisfied soldier in your unit.

*Sixth*, the ability of the individual to adjust to his fellow soldiers is important. We have all seen cases where a man just cannot seem to fit himself into the group to which he is assigned. Unhappiness is the inevitable result when this occurs, and the individual concerned is extremely dissatisfied with his lot.

Now there are two implications involved in low levels of individual morale or job satisfaction that are of interest to unit commanders.

First, the dissatisfied soldier, like the dissatisfied worker in industry, often does not realize exactly *why* he is experiencing discontent. In industry, this frequently results in a worker concluding that he should

be paid more money, even though his wages might, in fact, be well above average. Similarly, the dissatisfied soldier might quite honestly, but incorrectly, attribute his discontent to fancied persecutions, poor leadership, inept non-commissioned officers, or chicanery on the part of his "buddies," instead of to the unrealized fact that he simply does not fit his job. A state of dissatisfaction can, in other words, create complaints which are not, in fact, indicative of the true producers of the individual's discontent. The leader must himself then determine the *actual* cause of the difficulty so that he can attempt to do something to alleviate the conditions that are apparently preventing the discontented soldier from enjoying the normal satisfactions of day-to-day living to which each person is entitled.

The second implication to the commander deals with the effect that one discontented individual can have on an entire unit—the "bad-apple-in-the-barrel" situation.

Consider the case of the young lieutenant transferred to the infantry against his will, or who wanted a different assignment and got this somewhat less attractive one instead. If his outlook toward the Army is what it should be, he will snap out of his doldrums before long and realize the situation is not as grim as he would have it. However, if his outlook is not what it should be, he might just pout like a spoiled little boy and putter away at his job and whine to anyone in earshot about his terrible misfortune. Now the chances are that the "Old Man" will straighten this youngster out in short order, but if this is not done soon enough he can damage the

morale of a portion of the command. Misery seeks company, and a malcontent can seriously weaken the morale of a unit not yet sure of itself or the outlook of those young soldiers who have not yet formed sound and healthy opinions of our life in the Army. It behoves all commanders to consider the damage that might be caused in their command if an unsuspected, thoroughly bitter malcontent were turned loose in it.

#### Commander's Task.

Some initial malassignments are bound to occur in a large Army, but these should, of course, be corrected at the earliest opportunity. Even minor changes in assignment can sometimes completely eliminate the source of a man's difficulty. Moreover, the unit commander will often be able to make important adjustments in assignment within the ranks of his own command.

However, if some of his men seem discontented or dissatisfied, the commander should ask himself a few questions before reassigning the unhappy. Are these men encountering too many difficulties in their present assignments? Do they aspire to higher level jobs than those they now hold? Are they capable of holding the jobs now assigned? Do their present jobs provide them with the security to which they might feel themselves entitled? Do they identify themselves with the commander's unit or with some other organization of which they are affiliate members (special duty groups, athletic teams, and the like)? Are they able to get along with their fellows? When the commander has the answers to these questions for each man, he must then decide what is to be done.

If the difficulties of their assignments are beginning to get these men down, they should either be relieved, or assisted in overcoming these difficulties.

If they aspire to higher level jobs than those they now hold, this attitude should be commended and examined from a realistic viewpoint. If a man's present capabilities do not qualify him for the job that he wants, the fact must tactfully be made known to him. This will many times assist such a man immeasurably because it will help him to see what work must be done if he is to reach his ultimate goal.

If their present assignments are not providing adequate economic and psychological security, the assignments themselves must first be examined to see why they fail to measure up so far as these men are concerned. If the jobs are not found to be poor ones and, on the contrary, seem to be of a type considered satisfactory in this regard by most men, then the security aspirations of these men will need some examining.

If the trouble seems to lie in the men not identifying themselves with the unit, the reasons for this lack of identification must be determined. However, the leader should first do a little honest soul-searching to see if he has been doing his job in the proper fashion, because the leader himself is most frequently to blame in this sort of situation. Only after he finds his record without blemish and his performance beyond reasonable reproach can he start suspecting that the men themselves are at fault. It just might be that they have been engaged in extracurricular activities too long for their own good. More than a few men have become near-

professional mattress-counters while on special duty at some post overhead supply office and have found it awfully hard to identify themselves with their regular unit when the time for manoeuvres came around!

If the discontented or dissatisfied are not accepted by the command and cannot get along with their fellow soldiers, the leader must give serious consideration to the possibility that this difficulty might be eliminated if they are transferred to another type unit or to the advisability of separating such men from the service. In such cases, the commander may have to seek professional assistance in order to arrive at the proper decisions.

There are other additional factors involved in the job satisfaction of the individual, but the six we have discussed are the really important ones. When you have soundly grasped these six, you are well on the way to understanding this concept of morale.

However, do not think that this concept is the panacea to cure all morale ills! Consider it, instead, as another useful tool to be included in the kit bag of the commander—and many tools are needed when solving complex and dynamic problems like that of morale. Perhaps this approach will provide the commander with the most effective tool of them all—understanding.

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It is wise to remember that the art of war is by no means contained in any formula. Although Napoleon was consistent in his constant obedience to certain principles of strategy, yet he showed his greatness most in the variety of his plans and manoeuvres, which were as different as the situations with which they were called upon to deal.

—From *Military History Applied to Modern Warfare*.

# COUNTER BOMBARDMENT

## in the

# FIRE PLAN

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Lieutenant-Colonel F. R. Evans  
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COUNTER - BOMBARDMENT (CB) is not a new subject but to the AMF it has achieved more prominence since the war than it enjoyed during it. The reason for this is not hard to find. Artillery was employed in the South West Pacific Area on a very restricted scale, whereas in Europe and Africa it was used to the full. Since the war the AMF has been forced by a potential enemy, who regards artillery as "The God of War", to give it more consideration. Consequently the application of counter-bombardment to the fire plan has become a matter of universal interest.

Like many innovations, its application has been clouded by some ill considered issues. Unqualified statements on the scale of guns required for retaliation have made it suspect. Consequently there may be many who feel that CB is an expensive luxury and that a CB programme will usually involve unacceptable reductions in the fire elsewhere.

A brief examination of the problem may therefore serve to show

how a CB programme may be built up and fitted into the overall fire plan.

As a starting point perhaps a re-statement of the aim of CB may be appropriate. Simply, it is to prevent the hostile guns from interfering with our own activities. Therefore the best way of achieving this aim would be to destroy them.

A dug-in gun, however, is a small and not very vulnerable target. Furthermore it is usually sited some distance back from the Foremost Defended Localities (FDLs) and behind cover. The difficulty of locating it is then the first concern, and this is the function of the RAA locating units. Their methods are chiefly instrumental and the accuracy with which they can fix such a target is seldom better than 100 yards. Usually it is worse. It will be agreed, therefore, that the engagement of a target such as this would seldom be justified.

The Counter-Bombardment Staff Troops, however, gather and relate other information from which they can deduce, among other things, the

type of gun, its habits, and its arcs of fire. Thus a reasonable deduction can be made of the layout of the battery, where it is most likely to be manned, and what areas occupied by our troops it can shoot into. Now the reader is reminded that although guns may be a poor target, there are within the gun position other vital and vulnerable elements, viz., command posts, communications, personnel and vehicles. If the whole battery were engaged with sufficient weight, that battery could be disorganised at least temporarily. The question then, is what weight should be employed.

As a basis for discussion, it is assumed that a four-gun battery would occupy an area of about 300 yards by 300 yards. If the 25-pr. were to be used on the task, 12 guns would be required to cover the 300 yards battery frontage. In addition, it would be desirable to have four similar rows to give the fire adequate depth. In all, 48 guns could cover the target area. But this is only approximately 10 to 1. Such a scale would be sufficient to neutralize lightly dug-in infantry. This target, however, consists of equipment which has to be damaged, as well as personnel who may be dug-in. Furthermore, the fire will seldom be observed and, as stated above, the target position could not be fixed very accurately. Therefore, if it is to be engaged with reasonable prospects of success, the scale should be doubled or trebled. Thus the CB claim for guns on the scale of 30 : 1 is not over-insurance.

At this point it may well be asked how such concentrations are to be achieved. In many instances the requirement for CB fire will arise at the very time that guns are required for other tasks.

By way of explanation, the problem may be related to an operation of war. The attack, being the current subject for study, offers a suitable example. In this, the line of approach would be selected early and an outline fire plan made to cover the advance of the attacking troops. The artillery commander having this information would then examine the route carefully to decide where the assaulting troops would be most vulnerable to artillery fire. In addition he would want to ensure that as little hostile fire as possible fell during the passage of our troops on any other part of the route. He might also have to consider the activities of other elements of the force behind the FDLs.

In the situation under consideration, our own troops would be vulnerable to hostile artillery fire when at the FUP, at defiles such as the minefield gaps, and on the objective before reorganization was effective.

Now, with this information, the artillery commander would study the CB intelligence. This would enable him to decide which hostile batteries could concentrate on the Forming Up Place (FUP). The same procedure would be followed for the approach and exit to the defiles, the defiles themselves, and finally the objective. Then, knowing the plan for the assault, he could deduce when and for how long each group of hostile batteries must be neutralized to prevent their interfering with the progress of the attack during these most critical stages.

Finally the artillery commander must relate this information to the supporting fire plan, as it would be most unlikely that enough guns would be available for CB alone.

The flexibility of artillery must be fully exploited to enable the two to be dovetailed. Those hostile batteries which could fire into the FUP, and on the start of the line of approach, could be treated prior to H-hour and disorganized sufficiently to enable the attack to get away to a good start.

As the attackers were approaching the defile another CB programme would have to be fitted in. It could be done by taking some guns off covering fire tasks and increasing the rate of fire of the remainder. Alternately it might be preferable to arrange a pause in the covering fire. On some occasions it may entail a pause by the infantry, depending on the nature and scale of the enemy opposition. On completion of the CB programme, the covering fire would of course be resumed.

The immediate enemy reaction to the capture of the objective would almost certainly be in the form of artillery concentrations in an effort to prevent the reorganization of our own troops. Therefore, as the attackers approached their objective, more CB concentrations would have to be fitted into the fire plan. Such can usually be arranged as the demand for protective fire at this stage would often be diminishing.

Here it should be pointed out that the results of CB concentrations are difficult to assess. Also, some batteries may not have been located whilst others may have moved to alternative positions. Therefore, some guns should always be available to deal with the hostile batteries that interfere unexpectedly. These guns would be allotted to other tasks but in such a way that they could provide CB fire im-

mediately without leaving gaps in the guaranteed supporting fire. Such guns would be superimposed on their supporting fire tasks. They would answer priority calls for CB as required.

Other factors which may influence the CB fire plan are those relating to the attainment of surprise. Various restrictions on shooting prior to H-hour may be necessary. In such cases a heavy CB programme is usually required subsequently to neutralize the hostile close Defensive Fire (DF).

In the same way, a plan to effect the neutralization of enemy guns during any other operations would be worked out. In the case of the defence, the problem differs in that, although the aim will be the same, the programme will be designed to reduce the weight of the hostile supporting fire by striking immediately prior to the enemy's attack and during his assault. This must of course be co-ordinated with the DF requirements. The ability to do this depends on the CB policy which would have been laid down with the object of maintaining security and obtaining the requisite CB information. CB policy is a subject on its own and is entirely a matter for the higher formation commander so is not discussed here.

Enough has been stated to show that the integration of CB into the fire plan will concern the artillery commander in considerable detail. This will take time and may involve modifications to the overall plan. Therefore, it is essential that he be present at the inception and all other stages of the planning.

In conclusion it is pointed out that, while the effect of the CB fire will seldom be seen during the bat-

tle, the measure of its success will be the ease with which the infantry and armour approach and retain their objective. Used in conjunction with other forms of artillery

support it once moved Field Marshal Montgomery to say: "The contribution of the Artillery to final victory has been immense—The Artillery has been Terrific."

### ATOM BOMB SHELTERS

Sweden is blasting deep into its rock mountains to build a vast system of atomic bomb-proof fortifications that will shelter everything vital to the defence of the country.

Lifting for the first time the secrecy on ten-year-old Operation Granit, defence officials said that it provides for 150 giant rock shelters for 800,000 persons.

Work also is well under way on plans to put the nation's key industries and virtually all the Swedish Air Force and Navy inside mountains.

Most of the nation's jet fighter bases have underground hangars at the present time, and it is planned that in the future virtually the entire Air Force of 1,500 planes will be based underground.

A vital part of the Swedish Navy already can dock in "numerous" secret harbours gouged from mountains along Sweden's Baltic coast. Space also has been blasted for naval yards in the solid rock.

Other underground installations include aircraft, tank, and munitions factories; hospitals; power plants; laboratories; fire stations; and storage depots.

—*Military Review, U.S.A.*

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## BOOK REVIEWS

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**SPEARHEADS OF INVASION** By Lieutenant - Commander W. N. Swan, R.A.N. (Angus and Robertson).

Australian soldiers who participated in any of the Pacific landings, and particularly in landings on Borneo, will find their memories deeply stirred by this story of one of His Majesty's Australian ships.

"Spearheads of Invasion" is primarily the story of HMAS Westralia in the Pacific campaign, but it is also an absorbing account of the succession of amphibious assaults which carried the Allies from Milne Bay to Okinawa.

Before the war Westralia was a passenger vessel engaged in the Australian coastal trade. Lieutenant-Commander Swan was her first lieutenant from the time she was commissioned, together with HMAS Kanimbla and Manoora, as an LSI—landing ship infantry—in June, 1943, until the last months of the war. She took part in the landings at Arawe, Hollandia, Leyte, Lingayen, Tarakan, Brunei Bay and Balikpapan.

Lieutenant - Commander Swan gives a lively and instructive account of the long months of training which preceded Westralia's first action at Arawe on 15 December, 1943. In that action, in strict accor-

dance with a split-second timetable, she despatched to the shore in one hour sixteen landing craft each weighing 16 tons and two of 80 tons each, loaded with 700 troops and 50 tons of equipment.

When, on completion of her first year's service as an LSI, Westralia returned to Sydney in May, 1944, for repairs, she had steamed 35,000 miles, trained 6,000 troops in combined operations and carried 17,000 men to forward areas. Five months later she was disembarking American troops at Leyte. From there she went on to join the armada of 755 ships which put the United States forces ashore at Luzon.

In 1945 Westralia, for the first time, carried Australian troops to an amphibious assault. She took the 2/24th Battalion to Tarakan and the 2/28th to Brunei Bay. A little later she rounded off her career as an LSI by taking troops of the Seventh Division to the landing at Balikpapan.

The background to Lieutenant-Commander Swan's story—the story of one ship—is the broad sweep of the whole war in the Pacific. There are many useful lessons to be drawn from the vivid narrative, and much to be learnt about the part played in the struggle by the Royal Australian Navy. Besides, it is a rattling good story.



# American Military Status

## ...in Japan

Major Richard B. Kreutzer  
Artillery, US Army

IN 28 April, 1952, Japan once again became a sovereign nation with the coming into force of the Japanese Peace Treaty. As a result, the role of United States military forces in Japan changed from one of occupation to that of "guests" invited by the Japanese Government to participate in the defence of that nation.

Although from a theoretical standpoint it could be said that this new relationship was accomplished practically overnight by the signing of the treaty of peace, the transition was actually a gradual process extending over a period of seven years. The purpose of this article is to review briefly the relationships between the United States military forces and the Japanese during the occupation and the events which led up to the current status of United States military forces in Japan. This discussion is necessarily limited to military considerations, although it is recognized that other factors of a political and economic nature are involved.

—From *Military Review*, USA.

The occupation of Japan, beginning in September, 1945, was based on two broad requirements which emanated from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The first was to ensure that Japan would not again become a menace to world peace. The second was to bring about the establishment of a peaceful and responsible government that would conform as closely as possible to the generally accepted principles of democratic self-government.

In keeping with the first requirement, action was initiated without delay to demobilize all Japanese military personnel, disband the Imperial General Headquarters, demilitarize Japanese war industries, and destroy or delimitarize all war material. All of the foregoing was accomplished during the early years of the occupation without incident and with the complete support of the Japanese people.

The new Japanese constitution, adopted in November, 1946—was designed to fulfill the second requirement—the establishment of a peaceful and responsible govern-

ment. With regard to Japan's future military role, the constitution stated:

"The Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes . . . land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized."

#### Pre-Conflict Relationship.

From the foregoing, it is evident that the "New Japan" was to be dedicated exclusively to peaceful pursuits. World conditions at that time apparently made this goal appear realistic. During the major part of the occupation, there was little need for a security force, either internally or externally, except for the usual local civilian police protection required to maintain law and order. To a large degree, this was due to the traditional manner in which the Japanese people submitted to authority, and also, in part, to the presence of the tactical troop elements of the occupation forces.

While the tactical employment of troops was never required, the presence of such forces in Japan was certainly a deterrent to any organized resistance to the occupation on the part of dissident groups or possible military action against the nation from without. Although troublesome at times, the Communist elements in Japan were kept under control by the joint cooperation of the occupation authorities and the Japanese Government without resorting to the use of military forces.

The basis of the early relation-

ships between the occupation forces and the Japanese was contained in a Joint Chiefs of Staff directive of September, 1945, to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) which stated in part:

"Control of Japan shall be exercised through the Japanese Government to the extent that such an arrangement produces satisfactory results. This does not prejudice your right to act directly if required. You may enforce the orders issued by you by the employment of such measures as you deem necessary . . ."

In actual practice, the general and special staffs of General Headquarters, SCAP, accomplished the various occupation tasks by the promulgation of SCAP-approved directives and memoranda to the Japanese Government. The occupation forces in the field had the responsibility of ensuring full compliance on the part of the Japanese Government and its subordinate agencies. Such tasks as the collection and demilitarization of weapons, and the selection and safeguarding of machinery and installations to be ear-marked as possible reparations, were supervised by the occupation forces in the field. Contact with the Japanese Government representatives was usually effected at the regional and local levels.

Administratively, the Japanese supported the occupation by furnishing necessary housing, transportation, supply and maintenance, training, and recreational facilities. In addition, as early as September, 1949, action had been initiated to process large quantities of ordnance, engineer, and signal equipment which had been left on the various Pacific islands following World War II—by utilizing Japanese facilities.

### The Korean Invasion.

The invasion of South Korea on 25 June, 1950, saw the relationships between the United States military forces and the Japanese enter a period of transition. The most immediate evidence of this fact was the early commitment of the United States 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions and the 1st Cavalry Division, all part of the occupation forces, to action in Korea. From the earliest phases of the Korean conflict, it became increasingly evident that additional Japanese participation in the security of their homeland was required.

Accordingly, during July, 1950, the Japanese Government, with the concurrence of SCAP, authorized the establishment of the National Police Reserve. The initial strength of the organization was set at 75,000. The primary mission of this force was

to assist the occupation forces and the local civilian police in the internal security of Japan. In addition, it was obvious that a second, yet equally important, mission would be the defence of Japan from attack from without if it were to materialize. This requirement became a stark reality with the mounting out of the newly activated X Corps and its accompanying forces for the Inchon landing in September, 1950. This left only one partially trained regimental combat team and various provisional defence groups, made up from logistical support agencies, for the defence of Japan. The National Police Reserve, armed with various types of small arms, augmented the meagre forces manning the vital defensive outposts on the islands of Hokkaido and northern Honshu until the arrival of the United




Figure 1.

States 40th and 45th Infantry Divisions, in Japan during April, 1951.

As a result of the sound arrangements which had been established during the five years of the occupation, the United States military forces in Japan were in a position to assume full logistical support of the Korean effort from the very outset. In spite of huge equipment losses, resulting from early tactical reverses, troops were issued their authorized equipment and kept resupplied from stocks available in Japan until such time as the Zone of Interior pipe line could begin to deliver supplies and equipment at the required rate. To meet the ever-increasing demands of the Korean conflict, hospitalization, maintenance, storage, and transportation facilities in Japan were expanded greatly. More dependence was placed on private indigenous industrial facilities in order to augment existing United States-supervised maintenance installations and additional ports and sub-ports were opened to receive greatly increased supply tonnages—particularly Class V. Railways schedules were stepped up in order to expedite delivery of material from the huge supply depot complex in Yokohama to the aerial ports of embarkation in southern Kyushu for air drop or air shipment to the combat zone. The mounting demands placed on hospital facilities in Japan required augmentation of the medical services. This was accomplished, to a large degree, by the recruitment and training of large numbers of Japanese medical technicians. All of these operations required an ever-increasing degree of co-operation between the United States military forces and the Japanese.

### Peace Treaty.

As early of 1947, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers had indicated that the occupation forces had accomplished their mission and that Japan was ready for a treaty of peace. However, for various political reasons, no conclusive action was taken until the fall of 1950. As a result of close co-ordination between the United States, Japan, and other nations which had been at war with Japan, a treaty was prepared which was acceptable to the majority. On 8 September, 1951, the treaty was signed at San Francisco, with 48 out of the 51 nations involved participating. The ratification of the treaty by the required number of nations was effected on 20 March, 1952, and the treaty entered into force on 28 April, 1952.

The three main provisions of the treaty from a military point of view were:

1. Japan is restored to the society of nations as an equal.
2. Japan's sovereignty is limited, in accordance with the surrender terms, to the four main islands of Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu. (See Figure 1.)
3. The treaty provides for the future security of Japan by permitting rearmament and stationing of foreign troops on Japanese territory by separate agreement.

In regard to the last point, the treaty states:—

"All occupation forces of the allied powers shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as possible after the coming into force of the present treaty, and in any case not later than 90 days thereafter. Nothing in this provision shall however pre-

vent the stationing or retention of foreign armed forces in Japanese territory under or in consequence of any bilateral or unilateral agreements which have been or may be made between one or more of the allied powers, on the one hand, and Japan on the other."

As can readily be seen, this clause opened the way for an agreement between Japan and the United States which would provide for the necessary defence of the Japanese islands, and the retention of United States troops and facilities in Japan in furtherance of the Korean mission.

Japan and the United States ratified a security treaty which became effective on the same date as the peace treaty—28 April, 1952. In the security treaty, the United States clearly defines its position by stating that:—

"The United States of America, in the interest of peace and security, is presently willing to maintain certain of its armed forces in and about Japan, *in the expectation, however, that Japan will itself increasingly assume its own defence against direct and indirect aggression*, always avoiding any armament which could be an offensive threat to serve other than to promote peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter."

In the security treaty, Japan agreed not to grant any bases, or the right to garrison troops in Japan, to any third power without first consulting the United States. In turn, the United States agreed to contribute to the security of Japan from attack from without and assist in suppressing any large-scale inter-

nal riots and disturbances in Japan caused by instigation or intervention by an outside power or powers. The disposition of troops in Japan and their administration was to be agreed upon through a series of "administrative agreements." The agreements were to specify in detail all of the relationships between the two governments and the status of members of the United States armed forces and associated civilians who were placed in Japan as a result of the treaty.

#### Administrative Agreement.

As previously indicated, during the occupation, the Japanese Government was obliged to provide certain administrative support to the occupation forces, without cost to the United States. United States forces also were afforded certain personal privileges as a result of their position as members of one of the victorious powers occupying a defeated nation. In keeping with the new relationship brought about by the peace and security treaties, a re-examination of these administrative arrangements was necessary. Accordingly, a joint United States-Japanese delegation concluded a general agreement on 28 February, 1952. The major agreements reached were: —

1. Japan grants the United States the use of such facilities and areas, land and sea, as may be required to carry out the provisions of the security treaty. The United States will have full rights and power over such facilities.

2. All civil and military air traffic control and communications systems are to be developed in close co-ordination and integrated to the extent necessary for fulfilment of collective security interests.

3. The United States armed forces are to have the right to use all public utilities belonging to, or controlled or regulated by the Japanese Government, with the same relative priority as the Japanese Government agencies.

4. In the event of hostilities, or immediate threatened hostilities, in the Japan area, the two governments are to consult with a view to taking necessary joint measures for the defence of the area.

In addition to the foregoing, other agreements were reached on fiscal arrangements whereby the cost of the upkeep of the United States forces would be shared by both nations. The agreement also granted the United States forces such privileges as:

1. Freedom from Japanese taxes.
2. Freedom of entry and exit.
3. United States right of criminal jurisdiction over all United States personnel pending further agreements between the two nations.

#### **Joint Committee.**


It was recognized that a continuing adjustment of the areas and facilities required by the United States forces would be necessary, and that other matters, relating to the administrative agreement, would require joint resolution from time to time. Therefore, provisions were made for the establishment of a Joint Committee, composed of senior representatives of both Japan and the United States, to resolve the problems which would arise during the implementation of the administrative agreement. Since April, 1952, members of the Joint Committee and various working subcommittees, composed of representatives of Japan and the United

States (Army, Navy, Air Force, and State Department), have been hard at work implementing the provisions of the administrative agreement. Matters which cannot be resolved by the subcommittees are referred to the Joint Committee which, in turn, refers unsolvable problems through appropriate channels to the respective governments. Figure 2 indicates the broad range of the current discussions.

#### **The Future.**

In keeping with the joint agreements outlined in the security treaty, substantial United States forces are currently stationed in Japan, so disposed as to defend the country. As inferred in the security treaty, the United States will undoubtedly bear this responsibility until such time as the Japanese are capable of progressively taking over the security of their homeland. Efforts are currently being made to strengthen the Japanese security forces, previously known as the National Police Reserve, and now designated the National Safety Corps (ground forces) and the Coastal Safety Corps (sea forces).

It is impossible at this time to estimate when the Japanese will be able to assume full responsibility. It is estimated, however, that the ground elements will be able to begin assumption of such responsibilities in the very near future. The degree to which such responsibilities can be assumed and the phasing thereof will be dependent not only on domestic developments but upon the current international situation. On the other hand, it appears evident that United States air and naval forces will undoubtedly be required in a support role for some time to come. As long as the



★ The Joint Committee is composed of one senior United States delegate, one senior Japanese delegate, a permanent secretariate, and a variable number of deputies from each nation. In the case of the United States, the senior member is currently an Army Officer and deputies are from the Navy, Air Force and State Department.

★★ The number of United States and Japanese representatives varies in each sub-committee.

Figure 2.

Korean conflict continues and United States forces are employed in the security of Japan, there will be a continuing requirement for extensive administrative and logistical facilities in Japan. It can be expected, however, that these operations will be greatly reduced in the event of cessation of hostilities in Korea and will be further reduced with the assumption of the security role by the Japanese themselves.

#### **Spirit of Co-operation.**

A spirit of co-operation exists between two former antagonists of World War II. Japan and the

United States are bound together with the common purpose of maintaining peace in the Far East. The initial step in the accomplishment of this aim has been effected by ensuring the security of Japan.

As the northern anchor of an island chain defence line, which includes Okinawa, Formosa, and the Philippines, Japan is of great strategical importance to the free nations of the world. Both United States and Japanese leaders are cognizant of this fact and fully realize the importance of close and continuing co-operation between the two nations.

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